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7 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/3

FROM: SR/3 W2

SUBJECT: Report of meeting held with CASSOWARY 2 on 3 December 1953.

1. An operational meeting was held on 3 December 1953 which was attended by the undersigned, CASSOWARY 2 and 15. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following:

- a. Latest messages received from the field
- b. W/T transfer to headquarters and subsequent messages to be sent
- c. The recruitment program and current developments in this respect
- d. Bandera's message to Miron as transmitted via Javelin link
- e. The study group and imminent activity regarding the AERANTER Project
- f. Reorganization of operations in the Ukraine based on points set down in attached Annex "A"

2. In the discussion on latest messages received from both CARTHAGE 5 and 12, CASSOWARY 2, after being briefed on the contents of these messages wherein Hruzin told of his lost contact with Koval and of postponing sending couriers and CARTHAGE 12 told of the dangerous situation he found himself in, had little to say. He stated he was pleased that the courier mission was called off for this year since he doubted the couriers could have safely exfiltrated this late in the fall using our "untested" aid facilities. As to CARTHAGE 12's danger signal and subsequent warning, CASSOWARY 2 expressed his concern but hoped, as we do, that CARTHAGE 12 succeeded in saving himself and his W/T equipment.

3. CASSOWARY 2 was told that as of 10 December W/T traffic will be handled by headquarters and that all messages will require his or CASSOWARY 15's coordination. He stated that he did not yet have CASSOWARY 3's method for deriving authenticators as sometimes used in messages to Hruzin, but that he expected to get them soon. The case officers informed CASSOWARY 2 that these authenticators were not always used, especially with messages not containing important political matters, and therefore there would be no problem in handling the messages from here for the time being. CASSOWARY 2 advised that he would instruct CASSOWARY 15 on the topic for the messages to be sent on 15 December.

4. In view of CARTHAGE 12's cutoff, the case officers informed CASSOWARY 2 that no messages should be sent CARTHAGE 12 until approximately

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15 December, allowing him to that time to contact us again. If not heard from by then, we would begin sending according to his plan.

5. The current recruitment program whereby CASSOWARY 4 was to have attempted to contact and perhaps recruit candidates in the United States has shown no progress according to CASSOWARY 2. He mentioned that the limitations placed on recruitment, i.e., a) candidate must not have any relatives or dependents in the United States, b) must not have resided in the United States more than three years and c) must not be a citizen of the United States, practically makes it impossible to recruit anyone in America. However, he will continue sending CASSOWARY 4 to investigate all leads as they are made known.

6. CASSOWARY 2 did express hope that Matla would succeed in his mission to Germany as far as activating the triumvirate is concerned which, CASSOWARY 2 felt, would open the doors to recruitment in Europe from the ranks of ZCh members or sympathizers. Asked whether Matla was specifically instructed to concern himself with recruitment or spotting, CASSOWARY 2 answered that he was.

7. CASSOWARY 2 was advised regarding our notification that the lengthy letter written by Bandera was transmitted to Miron via the Javelin link. It was pointed out that the British would not send us a copy of the original Ukrainian text as sent to Miron but would provide us with a translation of the text sent. CASSOWARY 2 stated that he had no objections to receiving a translated version for regardless of what he received, he would only consent to transmit a similar message, word for word. CASSOWARY 2 further stated that he intended to inform the homeland that his transmission of the Bandera text is in no way to be construed to mean that he concurs in the contents of the text, but that according to agreement, he is only providing his link in the homeland with a "copy" of Bandera's instructions to Miron. CASSOWARY 2 stated that he suspects some finageling on the part of both the British and Bandera regarding the contents of the text and Bandera's purpose for writing it, for if Bandera was sincere in his desire to instruct Miron to subordinate himself to Koval, he would not have needed to write such lengthy qualified instructions but instead would have ordered Miron, in the most direct manner, to subordinate himself to Koval. CASSOWARY 2 also pointed out that he was not consulted as to whether he agreed or disagreed with the contents of the text but was merely given a copy to transmit to Hruzin. In light of the contents of the message and the manner in which it was handled, CASSOWARY 2 feels that it is possible the British themselves instructed Bandera to write such a text.

8. Cassowary 2 was briefed on the new cover apparatus which, if proved feasible to implement, would be introduced in regard to the study group in the near future. Briefly, the mechanics of this cover are as follows. A trust fund, ostensibly created by several anonymous donors, is to be established for the purpose of aiding certain Ukrainian scholars to accumulate materials on Ukrainian history, literature, etc. which materials eventually will be retained in a yet to be established Ukrainian National Archive in the United States. This trust fund will be administered by

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a cleared lawyer residing either in Pittsburgh or Philadelphia. The specific duties of this lawyer will be to dispense the funds to a person heading this study group and to provide a suitable cover story as to the source of the funds and to back up the legality of the study group if this ever becomes necessary. Under this plan, the lawyer will make out monthly checks payable to CASSOWARY 2 who, as the responsible person designated to head the study group according to the stipulation in the trust, will in turn serve as paymaster for the other members of the group and will also be officially known as the head of the group. All members of the group, which will continue to be known as the Prologue Associates, will be processed for covert clearance in order to become witting members of the group. The members will be told, under this new plan, that they are in fact working for some branch of the US Government and will state so in the income tax returns. As to the story they will use in relation to friends, etc. they will merely state that they are working for CASSOWARY 2 within the confines of the trust.

9. CASSOWARY 2 greeted this new plan with enthusiasm, realizing the advantages inherent in it.

10. Since approval for the AERANTER Project is expected momentarily, CASSOWARY 2 was requested to prepare for us in writing a list of objectives or aims of his proposed broadcasts, i.e., name of broadcast programs, to whom broadcasts to be directed and for what purpose, etc. Cassowary 2 brought up the question of limitations which he assumed would undoubtedly be imposed in script contents in line with U.S. policy regarding the Soviet Union. He expressed some fear that these limitations might restrict him to such an extent that this black broadcast facility would be nothing more than a duplicate of VOA. To assure CASSOWARY 2 that the broadcast was intended to be black in the true sense of the word, the case officers informed CASSOWARY 2 that there would be very little restriction as to what he could include in the scripts, that the only limitations would be in regard to statements against the Russian people as such, attempts to incite untimely revolt, and mention of future fate of the Ukraine in terms of pre-determination. Other limitations, if any, would be decided on the basis of the prepared scripts submitted to us prior to their being taped for transmission.

11. CASSOWARY 2 brought up the problem of where best to make tape recordings, mentioning that he thought space now occupied by the study group was not adequate since if a special sound proof booth was to be constructed he could hardly build it there and still maintain the desired security in the work to be done. He also brought up the problem of personnel, and specifically, the need of a good announcer. He suggested that the best way to handle the problem of the booth would be to rent a house somewhere in the N.Y. vicinity in which could be constructed a suitable fixture. In this location, too, only those directly connected with making the tapes would ever know what is being done as compared with the office set-up whereby all members of the group would know of the operation.

12. As to the problem of the sound proof booth, the case officers suggested that CASSOWARY 2 rent a house for himself, live in it and there construct a booth too. The rent, of course, in this arrangement would have

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to be paid by CASSOWARY 2. CASSOWARY 2 stated that at present he is paying \$110.00 a month and that a detached house would cost at least \$150.00. Could we pay the difference in rent? The case officers promised to look into the matter.

13. As to the additional personnel requested by CASSOWARY 2, the case officers advised him that they considered the present study group staff adequate to initiate the program and that in the event additional personnel became needed, the request would be given consideration.

14. Following point by point the contents of Annex "A", a new operational approach was outlined to CASSOWARY 2. After hearing the case officers elaborate on each specific point of the plan, CASSOWARY 2 hardly knew what to say. His first reaction was to state that he could very easily provide us with a similar plan showing the inadequacies of American aid or support or planning in the operation to date, and could furnish us with his plan as to what the Americans should do to strengthen the operation. CASSOWARY 2 then began his critique of past operations in an attempt to show that from the American side there never was a basic plan to aid the entire Ukrainian underground on a long range basis but instead, all past operations were singular efforts in themselves, not fitted into the overall scheme of things, and designed to accomplish only limited tasks. Past failures in support, operations, etc. was the fault of American inexperience or lack of desire to really want to strengthen the entire Ukrainian underground.

15. After hearing CASSOWARY 2's views, the case officers reminded him that it was not their intention to hold court in the matter for the purpose of establishing guilt for failures, but rather, they were attempting to initiate a plan of operation which took into consideration past failures and present and future conditions and expectations for the purpose of strengthening the entire Ukrainian underground for the benefit of both the Americans and the Ukrainians.

16. Tentative direct comments to the plan in Annex "A" as given by CASSOWARY 2 were as follows:

a. He agreed that a more effective centralization of the homeland is needed whereby the internal net could coordinate its affairs more rapidly and with more success.

? b. He questioned our assumption that there is no effective legal structure which supports the underground for how, he claimed, could the underground have gotten its support to survive winter after winter. He admitted that this legal structure should be strengthened, but that it was absurd to think it does not already exist.

c. He questioned the need for and importance of some type intelligence, stating that since the situation changes continually, information becomes obsolete in a matter of days. Therefore, the emphasis should not be so much on intelligence gathering as it should be on supporting the underground

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to fulfill its role in the present and future struggle against the Soviet regime.

d. He disagreed with the premiss that the current underground structure is confined in its movements to the Carpathian Mt. districts stating that he felt certain that Koval's headquarters are somewhere in the plains area either to the north or northeast.

e. He agreed that operational control could be better handled, or at least coordinated, from abroad via w/t communications with homeland headquarters directing its instructions to a center abroad for re-transmission via w/t to the homeland headquarters periphery etc.

f. He had little comment on the bunker force and support of this aspect of the operation with the exception of remarking that he doubted whether sufficient technical equipment would be provided to permit an individual bunker to exist as envisioned in the plan.

g. He agreed that the legal structure should be strengthened and exploited extensively for the purpose of cutting down the number of air drops, providing more information of the type desired by us, for spreading to the East and to help the underground exist under changing conditions. He expressed some skepticism in the use of postal channels to support the underground but agreed to try this method of support if the homeland provided the necessary addresses.

h. He had no comment to make regarding dispatching a ZP representative to the Ukraine to present this new approach to the underground.

i. He agreed that arrangements should be set up to help the underground members exfiltrate but wanted our assurance that the method of aid organized be fool proof. It was pointed out to him that we would do all we could in this respect but that it would be impossible for us to predict success in every attempt made; that no matter how good our facilities might be, a lot would depend on luck and current conditions.

j. He agreed that exfiltration of certain people from the underground should be started in the order listed in the Annex.

17. CASSOWARY 2 requested more time to consider thoroughly every aspect of the plan before stating officially what he would or would not do in implementing it. On the basis of a copy of the plan, which he requested, he will present to us in writing his thoughts on the subject, arguments for or against specific points listed and his suggestions as to what ought to be done.

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ANNEX "A"

1. Present situation in the Ukraine regarding the Aerodynamic Operation.
 - a. No effective centralization or communication.
 - b. No effective legal structure.
 - c. No information on the Ukraine.
 - d. Movements restricted to Carpathian Mt. districts.
2. Desirable end.
 - a. Transfer of operational control to center abroad, i.e., ZP (see para 3c below).
 - b. Reduction of bunker force to three or four illegal installations with:
 - i. maximum geographic coverage.
 - ii. maximum technical equipment.
 - iii. maximum personnel and support.
 - iv. no lateral contract without HQ permission.
 - c. Establishment of legal structure in order to:
 - i. Service black bases with equipment and food and to cut down number of air drops.
 - ii. Provide information.
 - iii. Spread to the East.
 - iv. Give underground more staying power.
3. Means of accomplishing this end.
 - a. Dispatch ZP emissary to homeland.
 - i. Train either Cassowary 4 or 6 and at least one W/T man for dispatch.
 - ii. Brief either Cassowary 4 or 6 fully on all new approaches.
 - iii. Drop either Cassowary 4 or 6 to a selected DZ.
 - b. Arrange preparations now for a relatively large scale exfiltration via CSR-DDR.
 - i. Set up caches with maps, instructions, money, documents, etc.
 - ii. Have couriers and guides prepare from Berlin side.
 - c. Exfiltrate from the Ukraine in this order:
 - i. Leaders to participate in directing from abroad, including Hruzin and either Cassowary 4 or 6, the above new operation.
 - ii. Legals who could be trained and sent back to a legal structure.
 - iii. Partisans to man new black bases.
 - iv. Non-legalizable exfiltrees.

- d. Legalize all four in para 3c above by:
 - i. Providing documents.
 - ii. Providing suitable cover stories.