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18 June 1952

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

To: SR/WDC

From: SR/Plans and SR/W 2

Subject: Contact with CASSOWARY 2 at Commodore Hotel, New York  
City, 11 June 1952

Present at this conference were CASSOWARIES 2 and 15, and [ ]  
[ ] (known as [ ] and [ ] [ ])

The conference began at approximately 10:30 A. M. and ended at 1 A. M.  
on 12 June. The following is the stand taken by CASSOWARY 2:

**I. Inconsistency of U. S. Policy**

A. The message which was sent into the Ukraine in the summer of 1951 stated "We will clandestinely give full technical assistance to the UHVR through ZPUHVR and political support consistent with U. S. policy of self-determination". This is a stand which is completely acceptable to CASSOWARY 2, as well as to any Ukrainian. Since last year, however, "self-determination" has been given any number of interpretations and CASSOWARY 2 wanted assurance that the U. S. still stood firmly on this principle.

B. If the U. S. still stands for the principle of self-determination, there were a great number of overt manifestations which do not reflect this policy.

1. VOA: Since, to the present time, the programs of the VOA have been largely patterned on the Russian programs, and have been, in character, largely Russian, therefore, Ukrainians assume that the U. S. is pro-Russian and by the same token, not for self-determination of the nations within the USSR.

2. The American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia and SONR were built on incorrect assumptions. The people backing this venture were "given mandates by the U. S. government and are backed by U. S. government money". This is perfectly alright

**SECRET**  
Security Information

**SECRET**  
Security Information

as far as CASSOWARY 2 is concerned but the point is that the people who are running SONR misinformed the U. S. government by spreading rumors that Eastern Ukrainians would be perfectly willing to enter into federative agreements with the Russians. The fact that neither the Eastern nor Western Ukrainians had joined SONR is in itself eloquent proof that the Ukrainians from both geographic areas favor an independent Ukraine. Moreover, CASSOWARY 2 believes that the people who are running SONR interpret "self-determination" as having "the Russians determine for the Ukrainians that the Ukrainians want to be part of Russia". This, he concludes, is not self-determination.

3. Since SONR did not get any Ukrainian groups to join voluntarily, SONR created a "Ukrainian Liberation Movement" made up of some 12 or 15 individuals who, in turn, created six notional parties. To head this "Ukrainian Liberation Movement" the individuals immediately concerned appointed General Demid GULAI, a political opportunist unknown in the Ukrainian emigration. When three Ukrainian boys attacked GULAI in order to "teach him a lesson", these boys were sentenced to seven years in jail (although the Prosecuting Attorney asked for a five year maximum sentence); when, however, a Nazi who had, to CASSOWARY's own knowledge, liquidated at least 20 Ukrainians (this can be documented), was tried for his crimes, he received only a five year sentence. To CASSOWARY 2 this situation is a clear sign that the Ukrainian movement is in disrepute with American official circles.

4. It appeared to CASSOWARY 2 that the Ukrainian question is repressed by the U. S. government because projects jointly taken up by ZPUHVR and the U. S. always end in failure and because of the general VOA-SONR development. On the other hand, the U. S. seems to be favoring individuals who are "traitors to the cause" and political opportunists such as GULAI or Peter Yablon YAROFI. The latter is not trusted by anyone, including the Russians, but he had been invited to Admiral KIRK's party which gave him political importance (at that particular time) greater than is CASSOWARY 2's. This is merely another of the manifestations of U. S. policy which does not truly reflect self-determination.

**SECRET**  
Security Information

II. The Effects of this Inconsistent Policy

A. Emigration

1. The Ukrainian emigration studying the overt manifestations of U. S. policy is uncertain as to where it stands. Therefore, it cannot take a "position". This can mean that the Ukrainian emigration, although anxious to cooperate with the U. S., cannot do so since everything that the U. S. seems to propagate is against Ukrainian aspirations and the overt manifestation of policy does not reflect self-determination.

2. Because of this uncertainty the emigration cannot assure the homeland headquarters that the U. S. is really willing to back a liberation struggle. This, in effect negates any good that the emigration could do for the liberation struggle in the homeland.

3. This lack of a firm clarification of its stand by the U. S. has a negative effect on the younger generation. Young people, if they are going to fight and risk their lives, must be ideologically motivated. If the younger elements are uncertain as to U. S. stand, they will not be willing to risk their lives by acting as couriers into the homeland. If this lack of stand by the U. S. continues any longer, there will be no young people whom the U. S. will be able to use as agent recruits.

B. The Homeland

1. In last year's message the homeland was assured of U. S. policy of self-determination. For a year now, however, they have been listening to the VOA and have heard nothing which they could construe as a reflection of the policy which was announced to them. This creates in their minds an uncertainty as to where the U. S. stands vis-a-vis the liberation struggle.

2. Because of this uncertainty, the homeland leadership is unable to formulate the proper form of approaching the masses. This, in effect, stalemates their propaganda efforts and liberation struggle. It is, therefore, insufficient to send them assurances of our good will without having some of these assurances reflected in our overt policy.

**SECRET**  
Security Information

C. Soviet Reaction to Lack of U. S. Policy

1. The Soviets take advantage of every American weakness and play it up in their propaganda. The U. S., on the other hand, does not seem to recognize golden opportunities. Last year, Moscow initiated another purge of Ukrainian Nationalism (attack on SOSIURA and other intellectuals). The U. S., however, took no advantage of this purge and there was hardly a mention of it in the American press. The Soviet purges usually begin in the Ukraine and then extend to Georgia, Turkestan, Byelorussia, and the rest of the Soviet non-Russian territories.
2. Since the U. S. took no stand towards last year's purge in the Ukraine, this purge has gained momentum and now has been extended to other areas of the Soviet Union. The masses of people seeing that the U. S. is not particularly interested in what is happening within the Soviet Union are led to believe that the world is not interested in their plight. Therefore, it naturally follows that there is a loss of motive for fighting the Bolshevik regime.

III  
Assessment of Present Status

A. USSR

1. In the initial stages of the war and throughout the war, STALIN promised and granted all sorts of concessions to the people. These were not only in the realm of greater nationalistic development of the non-Russian nationalities but were also in the social and economic fields affecting all areas of the USSR.
2. When the war ended, the people realized that all those promises and concessions were merely lip service and because of this there was a general ferment and dissatisfaction throughout the Soviet Union. That would have been a perfect time for the U. S. to have done something to intensify this dissatisfaction.
3. Since the war the regime has been doing everything in its power to liquidate the intellectuals who are the natural leaders of any anti-Soviet reaction. There have been purges upon purges with no U. S. reaction or evidence of sympathy.

*Masses know nothing  
Your comment gives  
underground little  
credit! R.  
Also VOA efforts. H  
In new by first  
remarks and extended  
to exclude the next two  
remarks. H  
Statement is not  
"illogical" in view  
current developments  
in the target areas  
HPR*

**SECRET**  
Security Information

4. During the war the Soviet regime had developed patriotic slogans in order to motivate the people to fight for their respective republics. Since the war all nationalistic slogans were eliminated and the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction so that nationalism in any form is dubbed bourgeois decadence. Again the U. S. is not taking advantage of this situation in its propaganda efforts.

B. CASSOWARY 2 is of the opinion that the U. S. can follow one of two possible courses in this stage of the war with the Soviet Union:

1. Whatever resistance there is in the Soviet Union could be fanned and increased. This, however, does not appear particularly logical since the time of maximum overt resistance is long past. If the present time were seven years ago, then such a course would be a logical one. Now, however, it would be against the reality within the Soviet Union.

2. The more practical approach would be for the U. S. to build up its covert assets and facilities, both inside and outside the USSR borders, in preparation for the coming war. These activities should include agent infiltration, intensified propaganda offensive, building of support structures and nets, etc. CASSOWARY 2 would like a policy decision on this point in order that he be in a position to make operational plans for his organization.

C. Since the present war is a struggle for men's minds and souls, and since the U. S. has no positive propaganda approach to the masses of the Soviet Union, the U. S. is losing the cold war. Because the U. S. lacks the positive approach and because the Soviets are stressing American weakness, as exemplified by Korea, the Soviet masses are becoming gradually convinced of Soviet invincibility. This must be counter-acted. The time to act is now since tomorrow may prove to be too late.

IV. CASSOWARY 2 would like to have a clarification of U. S. stand toward the Ukrainian emigration.

A. Recently, ~~VITVITSKI~~, a U. S. representative of the UNRada, approached CASSOWARY 2 in order to see whether the RADA and CASSOWARY 1 could possibly unite in their anti-Bolshevik struggle. The conversations were going on in good order when suddenly, CASSOWARY 2 received a letter from one of the individuals in the UNRada Executive Council stating that "a representative of the U. S. Government" said that the U. S. Government wants no rapprochement between CASSOWARY 1 and the RADA and that the U. S. wants the RADA to exclude from its complex, ~~BAHRIANNIY~~'s URDP and OUN/MELNYK. CASSOWARY 2 pointed out that he did not know whether this was a bona fide representative of the U. S. Government, but he did know that this individual was considered as a bona fide representative by the RADA. In the past the

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Security Information

U. S. appeared to favor a unification of the Ukrainians. Why suddenly has the policy changed?

B. In its current operations efforts, does the U. S. wish centralization or decentralization? CASSOWARY 2 has been under the impression that his organization was the only political organization with which the U. S. was dealing on the basis of current operations. Suddenly he discovered, however, that the MELNYK group is recruiting for the U. S., agent types for operations into the Ukraine. Basically, CASSOWARY 2 has no objection to the U. S. cooperating operationally with anyone it wants to cooperate ~~with~~ but when it becomes a question of operations into Western Ukraine, CASSOWARY 2 would at least like to know with what political groups we are cooperating in order that he might make suitable plans.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The principal objectives of this meeting were:

1. To obtain CASSOWARY 2's views and concurrences on the proposed changes to be made in the message to the UHVR Headquarters.
2. To persuade CASSOWARY 2 to give up his job in the steel factory in order to devote more attention to the problems affecting his organization.
3. To improve the political relationship with CASSOWARY 2 and to secure as close a cooperation as possible.

B. All three of the above objectives were accomplished.

1. CASSOWARY 2 agreed to change the first paragraph of the proposed text to the home-front in accordance with our desires.
2. After considerable persuasion, he also agreed to give up his job in the steel factory. Details concerning his future status and arrangements for payment of his salary still remain to be worked out. CASSOWARY 2 insists that he does not want to be an American agent and, therefore, any payments to be made to him will have to be made to him through ZPUHVR rather than a personal basis. He would also like to discuss this matter with CASSOWARY 3 at the earliest opportunity. These are, however, details which can be easily worked out, and, as a result, a more constructive program would evolve for utilizing CASSOWARY 2's talents.

**SECRET**  
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Security Information

3. This meeting has proved to be extremely useful and fruitful and has clearly illustrated that CASSOWARY 2 is a reasonable man who, if properly approached, could be of considerable use to us. The meeting served to improve our relationship with him and to establish a better basis for future cooperation.

C. On the basis of the foregoing, the following recommendations are made:

1. That a more frequent political contact be maintained with CASSOWARY 2. This is necessary in order to keep up his morale, as well as to put his experience and knowledge to a more constructive use.

2. That CASSOWARY 2 be put to work writing for us his ideas and plans as to what can be done to counter-act the Soviet cold war activities. At the same time, CASSOWARY 2 should be encouraged to go over the pertinent data obtained from the Ukraine as a result of the successful courier exfiltrations, with the idea in mind of having this material analyzed for us, for presentation to other interested government agencies, or for publication in the press. Some of the material obtained as a result of successful courier exfiltrations has no longer any intelligence significance, but could be profitably exploited overtly. There is no reason why some of this material should not be released to the emigre and American press. If such action is undertaken, it would serve to considerably enhance the ZPUHVR prestige, and it would also improve our position with CASSOWARY 2 and his organization.

D. In order to permit CASSOWARY 2 to work out the specific details concerning future financial arrangements resulting from his giving up his job in the steel factory, every effort should be made to expedite his visit to Germany. An additional reason for this visit would be to permit CASSOWARIES 2 and 3 to discuss the more important organizational problems and assist them in developing future plans and strategy concerning possible mergers with UNRada or the BANDERA group.

E. If we are to continue working towards a closer relationship with the ZPUHVR, an effort must be made to have the Department of State show a little more interest towards CASSOWARY 2. CASSOWARY 2 has previously complained that he has not been able to see responsible officials in the Department of State to whom he could present his case. This is again an example of where overt and covert activities are not harmonized, and it would be in our interest to see some improvement in this field.

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