

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

ATTACH NO. PCMA-577

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CLASSIFICATION

 *30 July 63*

DATE: 23 September 1952

TO : Chief, SR  
Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC  
SPECIFIC— August 1952 Dispatch of CARTHAGES  
12 and 13 to the Western Ukraine

Deadline:	Check one
Hq Action Req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para _____ by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para _____ by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
For info and files	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Transmitted herewith are the following attachments:

- Attachment A:  report of the August 1952 dispatch of CARTHAGES 12 and 13 to the Western Ukraine.
- Attachment B: A copy of URC-4 instructions in English and Ukrainian.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

OCT 31

Approved:

Removed from Project *Aerodynamics*  
CS Classification: *74-124-29/B*  
JOB # *63-705/83*  
Box: *257* Folder: *1*

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~~Distribution:~~ *Duplicate*  
1-SR w/att A (in ~~trip~~) and att B    
3-COM w/att A (in ~~trip~~) *1 copy*    
2-MOB w/att A (in ~~dupl~~) *1 copy*    
*1-EE w/att.*

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ATT TO ECMA 577

September 1952

SUBJECT: REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC/August 1952 Dispatch of CARTHAGES 12 and 13 to the Western Ukraine

A. INTRODUCTION

1. On 12 August 1952 CARTHAGES 12 and 13 were successfully dispatched to the Western Ukraine, and dropped in an alternate DZ which the members of the crew claimed to be located in the grid 2325, sheet W-18, map GSGS4416, or slightly southwest of Gorgan Lenski, grid 2228, sheet W-18, map GSGS4416.

2. Original operational plans called for the following: CARTHAGES 12 and 13 were to be dropped in the primary DZ located in grid 9267, sheet V-18, map GSGS4416, where a reception committee headed by CARTHAGE 5 would be waiting for them. If this DZ was reached and the reception committee sighted, CARTHAGES 12 and 13 would jump here with an A-6 bag attached to each, and three supply bundles would also be dropped as requested by CARTHAGE 5. In the event this primary DZ was not found, or not used for other reasons, one of several alternate DZ's would be sought and used for the drop. In this case the supply bundles would not be dropped, and the jump would be made only with the A-6 bags, with a small bag of food attached to the A-6 bag of CARTHAGE 12. These alternate DZ's were, Synaczewska Magura, grid 0444, sheet V-18, map GSGS4416; Kruhla, grid 1035, sheet V-18, map GSGS4416; Gorgan Lenski, grid 2228, sheet W-18, map GSGS4416; or any other likely spot in the general area of the alternate DZ's selected as might be chosen at the discretion of the pilot.

3. Below is a report of this dispatch which embodies in it: a) a chronology of event which preceded the dispatch, including preparation for the dispatch, briefing, departure from the training base to take-off point, and finally waiting for departure; b) the case officer's account of the dispatch; c) case officer's debriefing of CASSOWARY 6 who served as jumpmaster and escort to CARTHAGES 12 and 13 on the mission; d) description of equipment, packing and physical preparation of CARTHAGES 12 and 13; and, e) case officer's comments and recommendations.

4. Specialized reports of the dispatch and the complete operation will be submitted under separate cover by those responsible for their respective sections, and should be attached to this report for a complete picture of the operation. These reports will be: a)  report of packing, preparing CARTHAGES 12 and 13 for the jump, preparing the plane to handle jumpers and cargo, instructing the jumpmasters and finally his debriefing of the jumpmasters upon their return from the mission; b)  detailed report of the Commo briefing given CARTHAGES 12 and 13; c)  report on the Air Section's preparation for the mission and a detailed debriefing of the crew; d)  report on briefing of CASSOWARIES 2 and 3 apropos our requirements and objectives in mounting the operation, instructions etc. given CARTHAGES 12 and 13 by CASSOWARY 2 and 3.

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B. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS WHICH PRECEDED THE DISPATCH

## 1. July 21-28.

a. During this period, all equipment, either to be carried by CARTHAGES 12 and 13 or to be dropped separately as a fulfillment of CARTHAGE 5's request for supplies, was obtained, redied and packed. The job was not a difficult one since most of the equipment required, with the exception of some specifically requested items for the supply packs, was already on hand, having been accumulated for the anticipated March 1952 operation which never materialized. Those items requested by CARTHAGE 5 not on hand at CSOB/K were procured by  and CASSOWARY 4, and were delivered to meet the scheduled packing date set by . The packing was completed on 28 July. Everything that was to be either carried, dropped or worn by the CARTHAGES was then transported to Wiesbaden by  where it was to be stored until dispatch time.

## 2. July 27.

a. This day was spent briefing CARTHAGES 12 and 13 on the use of the URC/4, map reading, first aid and as a general question and answer period prior to closing the packs of equipment.

b. The URC/4 briefing was conducted by  acting as interpreter. Following the briefing, Gallo, with the aid of CARTHAGES 12 and 13 translated into Ukrainian the URC/4 instructions, a copy of which each took with him. (A translated copy has been furnished Commo for future use, and one copy is attached herewith.)

c. Serial numbers, frequencies, etc. of the URC/4's packed will be included under topic heading "Description of Equipment...".

d. Map reading briefing consisted of "checking out" CARTHAGES 12 and 13 on how to orient a map, how to report positions by use of coordinates and how to report positions using the grid system found on the maps furnished them for the mission (the GSGS 416 series).

e. The first aid briefing consisted of repeating the elements of first aid, how to administer morphine, sulfa, codeine, benzedrine, avipal, APC, bicarbonate of soda and vitamin pills. (All medicine packed was labeled in Ukrainian and included instructions in Ukrainian.)

f. All monies to be carried by the two-man team were counted, divided equally and signed for by CARTHAGES 12 and 13 during this briefing period. CARTHAGES 12 and 13 were also given their Czech and Austrian documents.

## 3. July 29.

a. A final commo briefing was given CARTHAGES 12 and 13 on this day by  participating as interpreters. (A detailed report of this briefing will be submitted by )

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b. In general terms, the following was accomplished during the commo briefing. Primary and secondary signal plans were issued to CARTHAGES 12 and 13, accompanied by instructions and later an examination was given in conjunction with the latest procedure changes which had been taught the CARTHAGES approximately one week prior to this final briefing session. CARTHAGES 12 and 13 were also issued cipher pads (primary system) as well as a "back up" cipher system. Instruction and examination in their use followed. Finally, the CARTHAGES were examined in the use of all danger and control signals assigned to them.

4. July 30.

a. This day's plans called for a final briefing session between CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARIES 2 and 3, to be followed by a farewell dinner party. The CASSOWARY briefing went off as scheduled, with CARTHAGES 12 and 13 being told the location of the primary DZ as well as the several alternate DZ's selected for the mission. All pouch material intended to be transmitted to CAWNPORE from the ZPUHVR was given to CARTHAGE 12 by CASSOWARY 2 and 3, as well as mission plans and instructions from the CASSOWARY side. [ ] did not sit in on this briefing and therefore cannot shed any light on what transpired. [ ] will probably include the CASSOWARIES briefing of CARTHAGES 12 and 13 in his report.)

b. In the evening, following this briefing session, a dinner party, planned by [ ] and CARTHAGE 10 was held. Attending the party were, CASSOWARIES 2, 3, 6, CARTHAGES 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, [ ]

c. According to plan, CARTHAGES 12 and 13 were to depart for Wiesbaden the following morning (July 31). However, shortly before dinner, [ ] arrived with a note from [ ] announcing the postponement of the first possible takeoff date from 2 August to 4 August. Since the CARTHAGES did not know exactly when they were to depart from Bad Woerishofen nor when the takeoff date began, there was no possibility for a morale problem to arise due to the postponement. The postponement was made known to CASSOWARY 2 and 3, both of whom seemed to welcome the delay since they stated that there were still a few items to be cleared up, and that the delay would give them an opportunity to type additional pouch material. Thus, the dinner progressed until the wee hours of the morning, with everyone having a good time.

5. July 31.

a. Because of the postponement of departure time, the CASSOWARIES requested exclusive time with CARTHAGES 12 and 13 for additional briefing. This was granted. [ ] who had remained in Bad Woerishofen overnight following the dinner party left for Munich with CASSOWARY 6. [ ] took CARTHAGES 10, 15 and 16 out for the day.

6. August 1.

a. This second day of the postponement period was set aside for [ ] to rehash all phases of commo briefing with CARTHAGES 12 and 13.

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b. In the evening a second farewell dinner party was held, attended by those same people who had attended the last one on July 30.

7. August 2.

a. At 0900 all those who had attended the dinner the night before gathered for a farewell breakfast. In addition, [ ] arrived shortly after 0900 to bid CARTHAGES 12 and 13 goodbye.

b. Following breakfast [ ] CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 2 had a brief conference during which time the alternate drop zones were again pointed out, with CASSOWARY 2 stressing to [ ] to make sure the Air Section was properly informed of the selections.

c. Shortly before 1000 [ ] took several photographs of CARTHAGES 12 and 13 AND CASSOWARIES 2 and 3.

d. At 1000 farewells were said. A round of drinks was served, toasts were made to CARTHAGES 12 and 13, hands were shaken, tears were shed and shortly after 1000 [ ], CASSOWARY 6, and CARTHAGES 12 and 13 departed for Bad Schwalbach, the town in which the waiting period was to be spent.

e. According to plan, the above group was to proceed to Augsburg where at 1100 it would be met by a Munich representative to make a car switch as a security measure. After arriving at Augsburg at 1102 and waiting until 1125, during which time the Munich representative did not appear, it was decided to continue the trip in the original car.

f. Upon arrival in Bad Schwalbach at 1930 rooms were obtained at the Hotel Herzog von Nassau.

8. August 3.

a. At 1015 [ ] and CASSOWARY 6 met [ ] in Wiesbaden to arrange future waiting plans. [ ] gave [ ] a telephone number to call at 1300 on the following day to find out whether or not the mission was on for the day, and also an emergency telephone number by which [ ] could be reached if necessary.

b. At this meeting, [ ] gave [ ] two money belts belonging to CARTHAGES 12 and 13 to be secured at the Wiesbaden Air Base and which contained cipher pads, Czech and Austrian documents, signal plans and "L" pills.

c. Here CASSOWARY 6 and [ ] requested of [ ] permission to speak with those in charge of our Air Section in order to discuss the alternate drop points and to obtain a general briefing of the tentative flight. [ ] said such a meeting was not necessary at the time; that there would be ample time for this discussion on the alert day and then prior to takeoff. [ ] and CASSOWARY 6 were satisfied that this arrangement would prove adequate.

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d. [ ] and CASSOWARY 6 returned to Bad Schwalbach and to CARTHAGES 12 and 13. The rest of the day was spent sightseeing, eating and sleeping.

9. August 4.

a. [ ] called [ ] at 1300 as scheduled. [ ] answered the telephone and informed [ ] that the alert was not on for this day.

b. [ ] went to the Frankfurt office to draw a cash advance in anticipation of a long waiting period. While at the office, [ ] called [ ] to inform him that all was fine, and to receive any new instructions, etc.

c. Returned to Bad Schwalbach and routine of waiting.

10. August 5.

a. [ ] made telephone call at 1300. Alert not on for this day. When CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 were informed all were a bit disappointed, but at this early stage of waiting period, not upset or nervous. All rationalized that no one can do anything about the weather.

b. The rest of the day was spent either reading, sightseeing, eating or sleeping.


11. August 6.

a. [ ] telephoned [ ] at 1000 and received a negative answer regarding the mission. During the telephone conversation, [ ] requested a meeting for the purpose of changing telephone numbers and for a general discussion of the situation. This meeting was held in Wiesbaden at 1100.

b. At the meeting, [ ] stated that the weather was still not suitable for the mission, and that that was the only possible factor in the delay. He also gave [ ] a new telephone number in Frankfurt. [ ] informed [ ] that the CARTHAGE dispatch group would move from Bad Schwalbach that afternoon and probably go to Bad Homburg. This move, aside from security reasons, was desirable as a morale factor since CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and especially CASSOWARY 6 were becoming noticeably restless and anxious, and a move, it was thought, would take their minds off the mission and constant cancellations.

c. At approximately 1230 CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 were told that the weather was still bad and the trip was not on for the day. CARTHAGES 12 and 13 took the news philosophically but CASSOWARY 6 displayed his emotions briefly by a short outburst of cursing and pacing the floor. He recovered in due time and adopted the attitude of the others. [ ] then told them that they were moving to Bad Homburg and this information had the anticipated effects.

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d. At 1300 [ ] [ ] paid the hotel bill (he had registered for all the rooms in his own name), and all then departed for Bad Homburg, arriving there about 1500.

e. At Bad Homburg rooms were obtained at the Deutscher Hof Hotel. Since each was required to register separately, CASSOWARY 6 filled out the hotel forms for CARTHAGES 12 and 13, using their Allid Identity Cards to obtain the necessary information. After settling down, all spent the rest of the day either reading, walking, eating or sleeping.

12. August 7.

a. [ ] [ ] telephoned Holland at 1300 and received a negative reply for the day. This information was passed on the CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 and was received by them as though they had expected a negative answer since the weather in Bad Homburg was threatening and they assumed must be bad all over Europe. None grumbled or made any discouraging comments.

b. To boost morale [ ] [ ] drove the group to Frankfurt for the day. In Frankfurt, [ ] [ ] again went to the office to draw an advance. Following this, [ ] [ ] went to the PX where they bought CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 each a shirt, underclothes and socks.

c. The group returned to Bad Homburg about 1800. After dinner [ ] [ ] took CARTHAGES 12 and 13 out for an evening of recreation. CASSOWARY 6 preferred the solitude of his hotel room.

13. August 8.

a. [ ] [ ] called [ ] [ ] at 1300 and again received a negative answer on the mission. [ ] [ ] told [ ] [ ] that [ ] [ ] had arrived from Munich and that he and [ ] [ ] wanted to hold a conference on the situation. This meeting was arranged to take place at the Zypher Diner located on the Autobahn outside of Frankfurt. This was convenient since the CARTHAGE dispatch group had already made plans to move from Bad Homburg that day and to look for rooms somewhere in the vicinity of Offenbach.

b. The group arrived at the Zypher Diner at about 1420, ordered lunch and shortly thereafter [ ] [ ] arrived.

c. [ ] [ ] gave [ ] [ ] a new telephone number to be used in calling about the mission.

d. [ ] [ ] it seems, had arrived to investigate the state of things in general and specifically the morale of the teams (CARTHAGES and others awaiting dispatch) since information had reached Munich that the delay

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might possibly cause complete cancellation of some missions because some team members could not hold up under the strain much longer. [ ] informed [ ] that the CARTHAGES were holding up very well under existing circumstances, and that the biggest problem was CASSOWARY 6, who, nevertheless, with the proper coddling would also weather the storm. (CARTHAGE 12 and 13, who had every reason to become unnerved and anxious because of the long delay, mentioned to [ ] sarcastically that CASSOWARY 6's morale was not what it should be considering that he was one of their superiours.) [ ] assured [ ] that the CARTHAGES could hold out indefinitely, considering the state of their morale on that day.

e. Before departing, [ ] gave [ ] a letter from [ ] in which CASSOWARY 2 apologized to CASSOWARY 6 for not saying goodbye to him before he had left Bad Woerishofen. [ ] passed this information on to CASSOWARY 6 and it seemed to lift CASSOWARY 6's morale somewhat. [ ] also walked over to where CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 sat, chatted with them for several minutes and assured them that all was ready but that the weather was the only obstacle. [ ] appearance had a good effect.

f. After lunch the drive to Offenbach was continued and rooms were obtained at the Kaiser Hof Hotel. Here, as in Bad Homburg, each had to register separately, and again CASSOWARY 6 filled in the forms for both CARTHAGE 12 and 13. The hotel was pleasant, the food good and everyone's morale seemed to have gone up considerably.

14. August 9.

a. [ ] called the new telephone number and got a negative answer from [ ] who answered the telephone.

b. This bad news was passed on to CARTHAGES 12 and 13 who received it passively. When CASSOWARY 6 heard it he reverted to the old routine of swearing and pacing the floor but snapped out of it in a few minutes.

c. The rest of the day was spent relaxing and in the evening (Saturday) all went out to a cafe, ate well, drank wine until the wee hours of the morning and watched CARTHAGE 12 dance and have a good time generally. Any bad effects as a result of earlier news of postponement seemed to have vanished.

15. August 10.

a. [ ] telephoned at 1015. [ ] answered "No" again.

b. All adopted the attitude that it was inevitable that the whole moon phase would be spent waiting. The peak of anxiety seemed to have passed and everyone appeared relaxed and calm, including CASSOWARY 6. [ ] suggested that all go for a drive but CARTHAGES 12 and 13 said they would rather go to a movie and just wander around town. They were provided with sufficient spending money for the day and left the hotel. [ ] and CASSOWARY 6 went to a baseball game in Frankfurt and after that a drive in the country. In the evening all had dinner together and then several bottles of wine before retiring.

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16. August 11.

a. According to prearranged plans, [ ] was to meet [ ] and [ ] in the Casino in Frankfurt at 1300 instead of telephoning. Therefore it was decided that the group would move from Offenbach, meet [ ] and, if the dispatch was not on for the day, find a new hotel.

b. While CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 sat in the car in a parking lot, [ ] kept the appointment with [ ] and [ ] in the Casino dining room. The first order of business was a "no" from [ ] regarding the mission. This was followed by a general discussion of the team's morale, weather, etc. [ ] then furnished [ ] with a new telephone number and with that the meeting ended.

c. Following the meeting, [ ] again went to the office to draw a cash advance.

d. After lunch with the team and CASSOWARY 6, a drive south from Frankfurt was begun in search of a suitable hotel. Arriving at about 1600 at a place called the Chicken Bar Hotel, located about ten miles south of Frankfurt and just off the Augobahn, rooms were obtained for the night only. Here the same registration procedure was found as in Offenbach and Bad Homburg and was handled in the same manner.

e. In the late afternoon CARTHAGES 12 and 13 went for a long walk while [ ] and CASSOWARY 6 drove to the Rhein-Main air base and later to a movie. In the evening all drank wine and talked. Morale excellent.

17. August 12.

a. [ ] made his telephone call at 1000. [ ] answered the telephone--the green light at last! CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 were informed immediately and their reactions were as expected--a sigh of relief that they were finally going.

C. THE DISPATCH

1. Upon being notified that the CARTHAGE team would depart on the evening of 12 August, preparations were made to go to Wiesbaden Air Base, the place from which the operation was to be mounted. Implementing the prearranged plan, [ ] CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 checked out of the Chicken Bar Hotel, had lunch, purchased sufficient food and beverages for the trip to the Ukraine, changed to GI fatigue clothes in a wooded area outside of Wiesbaden, met [ ] near the railroad station in Wiesbaden at 1600 and then proceeded to the outskirts of Wiesbaden to await the arrival of the Air Section representatives who were to escort the team, [ ] onto the airbase.

2. After a short wait, [ ] arrived. Without delay, they escorted the CARTHAGE team onto the base, arriving at the Air Section hangar at approximately 1630. Entrance to the base was made without

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incident since earlier arrangements had been made whereby the CARTHAGE group was not required to show passes, but instead, was to ride in a car driven by [ ] following immediately behind [ ] whom the guard at the gate recognized.

3. Waiting at the hangar housing the C-54 to be used on the mission was what seemed to be a flight of Air Force officers, among whom were Ritzenberg, Henry J. Brission, Gerald V. Bidgen and other colonels, majors and captains unknown to [ ] Also present was the mission crew of five, [ ] and several Air Force personnel who were responsible for the maintenance of the airplane.

4. The airplane, a sterilized C-54, was parked in a closed hangar. It had long been readied for the flight, its cabin windows blacked out and the supply packs in a position near the door ready to be hooked up for the drop. All equipment to be wither carried or worn by CARTHAGES 12 and 13 as well as CASSOWARY 6's survival vest was also in the plane, all conveniently arranged by Helland for the smoothest possible handling.

5. Upon arriving at the hangar, CARTHAGES 12 and 13 immediately boarded the airplane, as did [ ] CASSOWARY 6, [ ] showed each CARTHAGE where his equipment was and gave [ ] the "L" pills and the money belt containing cipher pads, etc. which [ ] had given to Helland on August 3 to keep secure until needed. [ ] then gave that part of the contents of these money belts (3 encode pads and 2 decode pads, primary signal plan, primary crystals) to both CARTHAGES 12 and 13 to be put into another money belt which would be carried on them personally. All other contents of the second money belt (secondary signal plans with crystals, additional encode and decode pads, and emergency book cipher system) were placed in each man's A-6 bag. The A-6 bags were then closed by [ ] Shortly before take-off, [ ] gave two "D" pills to both CARTHAGE 12 and 13 and one to CASSOWARY 6.

6. With [ ] assisting them, CARTHAGES 12 and 13 changed from GI fatigues to their partisan uniforms. At the same time CASSOWARY 6 put on civilian clothing of his own choosing. All items of clothing discarded by CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6, as well as all personal belongings not being taken with them such as local documents, money, etc. were gathered together by [ ] and taken off the plane.

7. When CASSOWARY 6 had changed clothes, he requested of [ ] that he be briefed by the Air Section and be introduced to the crew, especially the two jumpmasters. [ ] had already made this request through [ ] and shortly after CASSOWARY 6 had spoken to [ ] about it, [ ] summoned both [ ] and CASSOWARY 6 for the briefing and introduction.

8. Those known to [ ] at the briefing were: [ ] and the entire five-man crew. The first order of business was that of introducing CASSOWARY 6 to the crew. CASSOWARY 6 and the chief jumpmaster exchanged a few words in Polish, establishing the fact that both could understand each other perfectly in that language. [ ] then stated he would brief CASSOWARY 6 and the chief jumpmaster together in the airplane regarding the

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jump procedure, unloading of the supply packs, signals for unloading, etc. [ ] therefore asked CASSOWARY 6 what questions he wanted answered by the Air Section representatives. At this point, [ ] unfolded a map marked for the proposed flight and the DZ.

9. While CASSOWARY 6 paused for a moment, [ ] pointed out to Brissen the new alternate DZs as given to [ ] by CASSOWARY 2. These, in the order of preference were: Synaczewska Magura (1335) GSGS 4416, V-18, Grid 0444, and Kruhla (1345), V-18, Grid 1035. [ ] then told [ ] that although these two points were preferred, the crew, if and when seeking either one of these two points found any other suitable site in this area, could use its own discretion in making a selection of the alternate DZ. It was also pointed out by [ ] that if necessary, the crew could fly as far south as Gorgan Lemski (1589), GSGS 4416, W-18, Grid 2228 in seeking an alternate DZ. This plan was accepted by [ ] who informed the crew officially.

10. CASSOWARY 6 then proceeded to ask questions and received the following answers from the Air Section representatives:

- a) The weather from the take-off point to the DZ was good.
- b) Departure time was approximately 1830 and arrival time over the DZ approximately 2330 (Central European Time).
- c) The route to the DZ would be via Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine.
- d) CASSOWARY 6 would be informed when the plane was over TURKA, a check point to the primary DZ.
- e) In the event of an emergency, CASSOWARY 6 would be immediately informed of its existence and nature. In case of serious trouble necessitating abandoning ship, CASSOWARY 6, CARTHAGES 12 and 13 would be told where they were jumping, that is specifically at what point in either Austria, Czechoslovakia or the Ukraine. This emergency jump would be without A-6 bags.
- f) No member of the crew would speak to CARTHAGES 12 and 13 during the flight. Prior to jump time and when they jump, the jumpmasters would converse with them only as sufficient to prepare them for the jump. Only the chief jumpmaster will communicate with CASSOWARY 6 regarding official matters, the former having obtained his information via intercom from the pilot and then passing it on to CASSOWARY 6. CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 will remain in the cabin of the plane during the entire flight.

11. CASSOWARY 6 was disappointed that the plane was not equipped to receive directional signals from the reception committee headed by CARTHAGE 5 although the latter had been supplied with settings and directions for the use of his Rebecca-Eureka. This had been pointed out previously by both the Commo and Air Sections because of increased security if the plane was not

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required to transmit powerful Rebecca-Eureka pulses. In addition, it was not certain that CARTHAGE 5's set functioned or that he still knew how to operate it and to give the proper recognition signal. [ ] attempted to explain the situation to CASSOWARY 6's satisfaction.

12. The above briefing lasted approximately fifteen minutes. Before leaving the briefing site, [ ] asked CASSOWARY 6 whether he had any other questions to ask. His answer was negative. Then [ ] CASSOWARY 6, [ ] and the chief jumpmaster boarded the airplane to run through the jump and the jump signal plans. [ ] joined this session a few minutes later.

13. On the airplane [ ] first explained the drop procedure for the supply packs. (It might be said here that the briefing by [ ] at this time was primarily for CASSOWARY 6's benefit since [ ] had long before worked out all the details and plans with the chief jumpmaster. Actually CASSOWARY 6 could have been dispensed with entirely on this particular flight but went primarily as a morale booster for CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and probably as the CASSOWARY representative, to make sure that everything went off as planned.) The jump position of the jumpers was next explained, followed by an explanation of the mechanics of the whole routine, such as hooking up, opening the door, etc. [ ] explained the signal system (lights in the airplane and the warning bell) while at the same time checking the working order of all mechanical parts involved.

14. The order in which the points mentioned in para 15 above would be carried out are as follows:

a. Some time enroute the supply packs were to be placed on special mounts [ ] innovation for rapid ejection and which he will probably explain in detail in his report of the dispatch) and hooked up, ready to be shoved out of the airplane. The parachutes were already fastened to each supply bundle.

b. Approximately one-half hour from the primary DZ, the chief jumpmaster and his assistant would remove the door of the airplane, and the red light would go on in the plane.

c. Approximately ten minutes before reaching the DZ, CASSOWARY 6 and the chief jumpmaster would attach the A-6 bags to CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and hook their static lines to an attachment on the floor of the plane.

d. Over the DZ a green light would come on, accompanied by a loud buzzer, indicating the time for the bundles and the jumpers to go out of the airplane. The bundles would be pushed out first, followed by CARTHAGE 13 and then CARTHAGE 12. The bundles would be handles by the chief jumpmaster and his assistant, while CASSOWARY 6 would assist CARTHAGES 12 and 13.

15. Following the general briefing on jump procedures, [ ] checked out CASSOWARY 6 in attaching the A-6 bags to CARTHAGES 12 and 13. While doing so, the various straps on the A-6 bags were adjusted for final use. Since CARTHAGES 12 and 13 also adjusted their parachutes during this dry run,

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CASSOWARY 6 suggested that they wear them the entire time enroute to the DZ, loosening, of course, all the straps but keeping them in a position for quick fastening. Some question arose as to CARTHAGE 12 and 13's comfort riding with parachutes on, but CASSOWARY 6 insisted that the parachutes stay on them. CARTHAGES 12 and 13 were indifferent to the whole matter. They left the parachutes on, loosened the straps, spread out on the floor and relaxed.

16. The time came to say good-bye. [ ] had left the airplane when the jump briefing had ended. [ ] bid farewell to CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 and then he too departed. [ ] then gave several packages of cigarettes to CARTHAGE 12, opened several cans of grapefruit juice which he and CARTHAGES 12 and 13 drank, checked to see whether all of the food and beverages needed for the trip were brought aboard, found time to snap several pictures of CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6. [ ] then left the airplane. [ ] remained a few minutes longer and until the crew boarded.

17. The crew, dressed in civilian clothing, boarded with [ ] who, it is assumed, stayed on the airplane while it taxied to a take-off position. The doors of the airplane were closed at 1820. The airplane was wheeled out of the hangar at 1830, its engines started at 1835 and it took off at 1855.

18. After the airplane had left, [ ] the ETA of the airplane. During this conversation [ ] brought to light a near security mishap involving an American newspaper (published by some branch of the US Air Force, possibly a Materiel Section which modified the plane used on the dispatch) partially covered with green paint, dated May 1952 which one of the officers present had found folded and wedged in a crack of the floorboards on the airplane. Ritzenberg said he would look into the matter.

19. It should be stated here that while preparations were being made for the takeoff, i.e., jumpmaster briefing, readying CARTHAGES 12 and 13, etc., [ ] was present as an observer. During this time he made valuable suggestions to [ ] regarding various aspects of the pre-dispatch preparations.

20. Approximately one-half hour after the airplane had departed, [ ] left the air base for Frankfurt where they waited until shortly before the airplane was to return. Some of the Air Section representatives also left the hangar, however, a majority waited at the hangar until the plane returned.

21. [ ] returned to the air base at approximately 0210, August 13. The airplane had not returned. [ ] again asked [ ] the airplane's ETA and was told that it should have returned at 0220. Since the airplane had not yet returned, those present speculated that it must have gone on to an alternate drop point since the 0220 ETA was based on the airplane's return from the primary DZ.


22. At 0255 the airplane was seen circling the field. It landed at 0305 and shortly thereafter it taxied up to the hangar, was wheeled inside and the hangar doors closed. When the doors of the airplane were opened, the supply bundles could be seen, indicating immediately that the primary DZ was not used

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and that CARTHAGES 12 and 13 had jumped at one of the alternate DZ's. While the crew was getting off the airplane and being greeted by those present, [ ] entered the briefing room located at one end of the hangar to ready things for the debriefing of the crew. [ ] had been told earlier by [ ] that the new arrangements called for [ ] to sit in on the debriefing and then pass on pertinent information to the case officer. [ ] left the room and went to greet CASSOWARY 6. By this time the crew entered the briefing room, followed by [ ] and others. While the debriefing was in progress, CASSOWARY 6 and [ ] sat discussing the operation. [ ] debriefing of CASSOWARY 6 follows later.)

23. [ ] soon returned with [ ] and with a marked map (one used by the crew) related the salient features of the drop to [ ] They were as follows:

a. Take-off time from Wiesbaden was 1855.

b. Flight enroute and to Turka without incident. The weather was clear all of the way.

c. Jumpmasters alerted over Turka. This was approximately 2230. Plane reached primary DZ about 2245, and circled in area several times looking for reception lights. There was much activity in the area which the searchlight pilot assumed to be road traffic or perhaps army maneuvers. At least one searchlight was seen but it did not hit the airplane. When the airplane was parallel with the town of Korostow, Grid 9262, V-18, GSGS 4416, located in vicinity of DZ, all lights went out in the town.

d. Pilot decided to fly to alternate DZ. Chief jumpmaster informed of this and he in turn informed CASSOWARY 6. Enroute to alternate DZ rocket flares were either shot from the ground or dropped from another airplane flying in the same course as ours. These started approximately at a point several miles east of the first alternate DZ (Synaczewska Magura, GSGS 4416, V-18, Grid 0444) and lasted until the airplane passed to the southeast of the town of Iadwinkowka (GSGS 4416, V-18, Grid 1515). On the return flight made slightly west but parallel with the above two points, more rockets appeared. In all, the pilot counted sixteen rocket flares.

e. On the approach to Gorgan Lemski (W-18, Grid 2228) the pilot noticed no activity whatever. All was blacked out and quiet. The pilot circled Gorgan Lemski once and observed that the terrain below was very rugged approximately in the center of this mountain clearing. He did, however, locate a spot suitable for jumping in a meadow just southwest of Gorgan Lemski proper. On the second pass over the meadow the jump was made, the exact location being Grid 2325, Sheet W-18, Map GSGS 4414.

f. Drop time was 2305; altitude at drop time was 900 feet and the airplane was travelling 130 MPH.

g. Both jumpmasters from the crew saw the parachutes open and the jumpers descend.


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h. Other than the rocket flares mentioned above the return flight was made without incident.

24. Having obtained the above information from [ ] and CASSOWARY 6 departed for Munich. The time was 0400. A stop was made at the Zypher Diner for breakfast, and later near Darmstadt from which point [ ] telephoned [ ] to let him know that the mission had been completed.

D. DEBRIEFING OF CASSOWARY 6

1. [ ] debriefed CASSOWARY 6 regarding the mission shortly after the latter returned to the Wiesbaden Air Base, enroute to Munich following the mission and later at the CARTHAGE safehouse in Bad Werisshofen. The debriefing was conducted in the usual question and answer form, however, to maintain continuity information obtained from CASSOWARY 6 is presented below in narrative form and as though CASSOWARY 6 were relating what he saw, heard or experienced. The reader can be assured that all possible questions were asked of CASSOWARY 6 and answered to the best of his ability. Following is CASSOWARY 6's account of the mission:

"The take-off was naturally without incident. Shortly after we became airborne, we, that is CARTHAGE 12 and 13 and myself, stretched out on the floor and just relaxed. Of course, none of us stood up while the airplane was taking off. As you know, CARTHAGE 12 and 13 already had on their parachutes even before we departed. I also put mine on because I just felt better flying with it on. Psychological, I suppose.



"The airplane was blacked out which meant we could not look out of the window to see where we were flying. There was not much to do enroute other than to relax, chat, or munch on the food we had with us. I conversed with the two jumpmasters now and then, always interested to learn what George (the chief jumpmaster) heard from the pilot through the intercom. Several times the two Polish jumpmasters entered the pilot's compartment of the airplane where they remained for a considerable period of time.

"As far as I could tell, the flight was progressing without incident. I had no idea where we were at any given time enroute, with the exception of knowing when we had reached Turka. At the briefing session I was told that I would be informed when we crossed each border enroute but the crew ignored this completely. As I said, I first knew where we were when George told me we were over Turka.

"Enroute the pilot entered the cabin of the airplane once. This was about 2130. I chatted with him briefly about the weather, and asked him how things were progressing. He said the weather was good and that up to that point all was going along fine. He said nothing to CARTHAGES 12 and 13.

"At about 2200, George and the other jumpmaster opened the door of the plane. I gathered from this that we were nearing the primary DZ. I asked

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George what the situation was and he told me that we were approximately one-half hour from the primary DZ. Shortly thereafter, arrival at Turka was announced. After the doors were opened, George, the other jumpmaster and I began readying CARTHAGES 12 and 13 for the jump. We checked to see that the parachutes were properly fastened and at the same time hooked on the A-6 bags and fastened the static lines. At about 2215 the red light went on in the airplane and remained on until after CARTHAGES 12 and 13 finally jumped. Some time enroute, I don't remember what time, George and the other jumpmaster put the three supply bundles into the release rack, ready to be pushed out of the airplane.

"Once the door of the airplane had been opened and CARTHAGES 12 and 13 made ready for the jump, I stood near the door, looking out and at the ground below. At one point I saw what appeared to be a big fire with men on horseback circling it and riding in that vicinity. Naturally, I could not recognize the area. Following this I saw, at various intervals, auto lights, house lights, and one search light which, fortunately was at a distance and did not hit our airplane. At one particular point lights were in such great quantity that I assumed we were either over a large town or that army maneuvers were being held in the area. As I said before, I could not identify the exact location, even though the airplane was flying at a very low altitude, so low, that I thought we would cut off the treetops.

"After flying for more than thirty minutes with the door of the airplane open and obviously searching for the primary DZ, George informed me that we were heading south in search of an alternate DZ. The time was about 2235. The entire time the airplane had been flying low and ever since the door had been opened, I, too, had been looking for what might have been the signal lights for the reception committee. I ~~was~~ saw nothing that would indicate CARTHAGE 5 waiting below.

"As soon as I found out that we were heading for an alternate DZ, I told CARTHAGES 12 and 13. George and I then fastened the small food pack onto CARTHAGE 12's A-6 bag. CARTHAGES 12 and 13 were both ready to jump, as they had been for the past half hour or more. CARTHAGE 13 then told me his plan to rendezvous with CARTHAGE 5 which I was to pass on to  who in turn was to send in a message to CARTHAGE 5. This plan was that CARTHAGES 12 and 13 would meet CARTHAGE 5 at the dead drop where Poltava wintered with Lystek in 1948.

"As we flew south to an alternate DZ (I was not told exactly which alternate DZ had been chosen) I continued looking out and below me. I noticed that there were fewer and fewer lights below and finally they disappeared altogether. At one point enroute to the alternate site, I asked George whether I could open a window on the other side of the airplane since I had been permitted to do this on other flights. George said no.

"Since leaving what I assumed to be the primary DZ area, approximately twenty minutes had passed and we still had not reached an alternate DZ. Both CARTHAGE 12 and 13 commented on the long time it was taking to reach this alternate DZ. I too showed concern, ~~and kept~~ looking out of the airplane and

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noticed that there were no lights whatsoever below and that we were flying over very mountainous area, dotted with clearings here and there. We were still flying very low. Finally, the green light came on and the jump buzzer sounded. I bid the boys a final farewell and with the aid of George, assisted first CARTHAGE 13 and then CARTHAGE 12 out of the airplane. The time was approximately 2303. Both parachutes opened and appeared to have descended within several meters of each other. I regret that I was not told the exact location of this DZ and therefore did not tell CARTHAGES 12 and 13.

v "After the drop, we started home. George closed the door of the airplane. I sat down and tried to relax. Sometime enroute back, I don't remember the time, the pilot entered the cabin and came over to talk to me. In effect, he said that he hoped that they (the jumpers) had landed all right, that he hit what was a good alternate DZ and was concerned about the jumpers lest his own conscience bother him. He also ~~asked~~ asked me whether we would hear from CARTHAGES 12 and 13, by any means whatsoever, I naturally told him that we would. When he heard this, he just stood there in front of me for several seconds, silent and then departed for the pilot's compartment.

"Quite some time after we had started home, George informed me that we were approaching Linz, Austria. At this point both George and the other jumpmaster showed their jubilation over a successful mission, for at this stage of the flight they considered the hurdle more than crossed. I, too, was relieved. As far as I was concerned the mission was over."

Note: Times, as given in CASSOWARY 6's version of the mission, were practically all approximations and should not be considered discrepancies in his account when compared with   report of the debriefing of the crew. CASSOWARY 6 stressed the point that he did check his watch whenever possible, but that the general tempo and excitement or preoccupation with other things did not permit him to note specific times whenever something of importance occurred. Also, his limited view from one side of the airplane, and then only for a short period of time, did not permit him to get the full picture. Thus, the crew's version of what they saw may differ greatly from what CASSOWARY 6 saw.

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## F. CASE OFFICER'S COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. If in the future CASSOWARY 6, or another CASSOWARY jumpmaster, is to be used when CARTHAGE personnel are dispatched, he should be treated with more respect and consideration by the Air Section representatives, even though this attention be a sham to satisfy the jumpmaster's anticipations. The general treatment which CASSOWARY 6 received left him with the notion that he was merely being tolerated while the crew received attention. One must appreciate the fact that any jumper, or even jumpmaster, going on a mission of the type just completed, is aware of his own importance and the dangers he must face and the possible consequences. This feeling of importance by the jumpers and jumpmaster becomes acute at the point of dispatch and, if not recognized and treated accordingly by those charged with the responsibility of handling the jumpers, leaves an imprint of resentment and mistrust. This might not be the case when dealing with a single agent unaffiliated with any political group. However, the impressions, good or bad, passed on by the CARTHAGES and CASSOWARY 6 are bound to have an effect on future operations and ~~their~~ ~~other~~ dealings with us.

2. Why at least one case officer was not permitted to sit in on the debriefing of the crew upon its return from the mission is not understandable to   It is recommended that in the future at least one case officer be permitted to participate in the debriefing of a crew upon its return from a dispatch mission. The Air Section can continue to conduct the debriefing, but the case officer should have the authority to inject any question considered by him to have a bearing on the operation but which might have been omitted by the Air Section representative conducting the debriefing. This should create a better spirit of cooperation between all concerned and produce the maximum results desired by this organization. Since there are two separate interests involved in an operation and debriefing as being described above, both interests should be properly represented during the entire phase of the operation.

3.   regrets that at least one URC-4 was not carried by either CARTHAGE 12 or 13 considering the importance of this piece of equipment, for use in future operations and considering the extensive preparations made by CARTHAGES 12 and 13 for its ultimate use. The entire fault lies in the fact that too much confidence was placed in the idea that the bundles containing the URC-4's would be dropped.

4. In conclusion,   would like to extend, in behalf of CARTHAGES 12 and 13, their thanks and appreciation to   the Commo staff and other members of the organization for the training, support and general care given them during their preparation for the mission.

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E. DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT, PACKING AND PHYSICAL PREPARATION OF  
CARTHAGES 12 and 13

1. CARTHAGE 13 either wore or carried the following items of equipment.

a. He wore:

- 1) one pair of undershorts
- 2) one undershirt
- 3) one yard of muslin cloth (wrapped around his feet in place of socks)
- 4) one shirt
- 5) one pair of wool OD pants (riding breeches style)
- 6) one wool OD blouse
- 7) one handkerchief
- 8) one pair of partisan type leather boots
- 9) one wool OD cap (in pocket)
- 10) one football helmet (for jumping only)
- 11) one wool sweater
- 12) two wristwatches
- 13) one pair airforce coveralls (used for jumping only)

b. Attached or strapped to him were:

- 1) one Sam Browne belt with harness attachment
- 2) two grenade straps
- 3) two grenades
- 4) one Belgian Browning (heavy) 9 mm pistol holster
- 5) one " " " " " pistol
- 6) two " " " " " clips with 26 rounds of ammunition
- 7) two leather carbine clip holders with four clips containing 120 rounds of MI carbine ammunition


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c. In his pockets he carried:

- 
- 1) one compass
  - 2) one pocket knife
  - 3) one fountain pen and mechanical pencil
  - 4) one leather wallet
  - 5) two "L" pills
  - 6) one Belgian Browning (light) 9 mm pistol with one clip filled with ammunition (in outside pocket of coveralls for quick access)
  - 7) candy

d. Strapped to him was also one waterproof money belt containing:

- 1) 25,000 rubles
- 2) 125 American dollars
- 3) 200 Deutsch Marks
- 4) 500 Polish zloty
- 5) 1,500 Austrian Schillings
- 6) 25,000 Czech Koron
- 7) one set of Czech documents (see attached photographs)
- 8) one set of Austrian documents (see attached photographs)
- 9) one primary signal plan with crystals
- 10) three encode pads
- 11) two decode pads

e. He jumped with and XT-10 parachute/

f. He carried an A-6 bag on the outside of which was attached:

- 1) one pack board
- 2) one parachute bag (empty, to be used in burying parachute)
- 3) one Carbine holster

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- 4) one MI Carbine with automatic switchover
  - 5) one airforce survival type rucksack (empty, to be used later for carrying purposes)
- g. In the A-6 bag he carried:
- 1) leather pouch containing: GSGS4416 maps W-19, V-18, W-18, W-17, U-18, V-17, U-17; maps Mapy Krajov, C.18-19, Kraj Presovsky and Jraj Kosicky; one flashlight; one small can gun oil; one first aid pack consisting of one morphine syrette, iodine, ammonia capsule, aspirin, bandages; one can of DDT powder; assorted pins; one Minox camera with leather case; one Minox light meter with leather case; sixteen rolls of Minox film; one collapsible gun cleaning rod; one empty plastic water bag; fifty rounds of 9 mm (heavy) ammunition; one Zippo lighter; one straight razor; one ballpoint pen; one spoon; three packs of razor blades; one safety razor; two packs of lifeboat rations; one pair undershorts; one undershirt; one ounce sealing wax; one pair of tweezers; one small towel; one cake of soap; one tooth brush; one stiptic pencil; one tube of shaving cream; one shaving brush; three handkerchiefs; two pair of stockings.
  - 2) one US Army pancho (used to pad the pack)
  - 3) one foam rubber lined canvas bag containing: one RR-2 receiver, one RT-3 transmitter, one spare parts kit, and 25,000 rubles
  - 4) one rubber lined canvas bag containing: one GN-58 generator (modified), one web strap with which to fasten generator to tree, one RA-2 adaptor and one GN-58 cord
  - 5) Two URC-4 batteries
  - 6) one money belt containing: two secondary signal plans with one set of crystals, two encode pads, two decode pads, one instruction book on RR-2 receiver and RT-3 transmitter (in Ukrainian), one copy of URC-4 instructions, one conversion table, one emergency book cipher system and one blank scratch pad

Note: Total weight of the A-6 bag when fully packed was approximately 56 kilos. All items carried in A-6 bag were wrapped separately in waterproof material.

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2. CARTHAGE 12 either wore or carried the following items of equipment:

a. He wore:


- 1) one pair of undershorts
- 2) one undershirt
- 3) one khaki shirt
- 4) one yard muslin cloth as foot wrap
- 5) one pair of partisan type leather boots
- 6) one wool sweater
- 7) one pair wool OD pants
- 8) one wool OD blouse
- 9) one football helmet (for jumping purposes only)
- 10) one pair airforce coveralls
- 11) two wristwatches

b. Attached or strapped to him were:

- 1) one Sam Browne belt with harness attachment
- 2) two grenade straps
- 3) two grenades
- 4) one Belgian Browning (heavy) 9 mm pistol holster
- 5) one " " " " " pistol
- 6) two " " " " " clips with 26 rounds of ammunition
- 7) two leather carbine clip holders with four clips containing 120 rounds of M1 Carbine ammunition
- 8) one Bowie type knife with sheath



c. In his pockets he carried:

- 1) three fountain pens
- 2) three mechanical pencils
- 3) one Zippo lighter



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- 4) one small pocket calendar
  - 5) one compass
  - 6) two handkerchiefs
  - 7) six packages of Pall Mall cigarettes
  - 8) one leather pocketbook
  - 9) one small notebook
  - 10) assorted materials from CASSOWARY 2 and 3 which made up their official pouch to the homeland
  - 11) one gold chain and medallion
  - 12) two "L" pills
  - 13) assorted chocolate candy
  - 14) one Belgian Browning (light) pistol with clip and ammunition (in pocket of coveralls for quick access)
  - 15) one leather motorcycle hat
  - 16) one steel flask ( $\frac{1}{2}$  pint) pure alcohol
- d. Strapped to him was one money belt containing:
- 1) 25,000 rubles
  - 2) 125 American dollars
  - 3) 300 Deutsch Marks
  - 4) 500 Polish Zloty
  - 5) 1,500 Austrian shillings
  - 6) 25,000 Czech koron
  - 7) one set of Czech documents (see attached photographs)
  - 8) one set of Austrian documents (see attached photographs)
  - 9) one primary signal plan with crystals
  - 10) three encode pads
  - 11) two decode pads
- e. He jumped with an XT-10 parachute.
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- f. He carried an A-6 bag on the outside of which was attached:
- 1) one Carbine holster
  - 2) one MI Carbine with automatic switchover
  - 3) one airforce survival rucksack (empty)
  - 4) one empty parachute bag
  - 5) one entrenching tool
  - 6) one pack board
- g. In the A-6 bag he carried:
- 1) one leather pouch containing: maps GSGS4416 W-19, V-18, V-17; fifty rounds of 9 mm (heavy) ammunition; five ounces loose tobacco stripped from American cigarettes; one tooth brush; one pair barber clippers; one thermometer; one empty plastic water bag; two ball point pens; one Minox camera with leather case; one Minox lightmeter with leather case; twenty-four rolls of Minox film; one deck playing cards; one miniature chess set; one small first aid pack containing six morphine syrettes, ammonia capsules, iodine, aspirin, and triangle bandage; one pack of assorted needles and thread; eight packs of cigarette paper; ten packs of lighter flints; one steel mirror; one tube of fungicidal ointment; two ounces salt; two tins of lifeboat rations; one spoon; one straight razor; one pair of tweezers; one pair of scissors; two pairs of socks; one small towel
  - 2) one US Army pancake (used as packing material)
  - 3) one foam rubber lined canvas bag containing: one RR-2 receiver, one RT-3 transmitter, one spare parts kit, and 25,000 rubles
  - 4) one rubber lined canvas bag containing: one GN-58 generator (modified), one web strap with which to fasten generator to tree, one RA-2 adaptor and one GN-58 cord
  - 5) two URC-4 batteries
  - 6) one money belt containing: two encode pads, two decode pads, two secondary signal plans with one set of crystals, one emergency book cipher system, one scratch pad, one package containing UPA emblems given to CARTHAGE 12 by CASSOWARY 3 for delivery and distribution in homeland, two wristwatches, one copy of URC-4 instructions, one conversion table, one book of instructions (in Ukrainian) for RT-3 transmitter and RR-2 receiver

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Note: Total weight of the A-6 bag fully packed--approximately 55 kilos. All items carried in the A-6 bag were wrapped separately in waterproof material.

h. Fastened to the bottom of his A-6 bag was a specially designed foam rubber lined canvas bag, dimensions 12"x12"x18", which contained 30 pounds of concentrated and other types of food as well as 200 rounds of MI carbine ammunition. This bag was only to be used, and was, in the event CARTHAGES 12 and 13 jumped in an alternate DZ, unaccompanied by the three supply packs.

### 3. Supply packs.

a. Three supply packs were prepared and taken on the dispatch in fulfillment of CARTHAGE 5's request for supplies. Unfortunately, these supply bundles were not dropped because the primary DZ with the waiting reception committee was not found.

b. Before taking off on the mission, CARTHAGES 12 and 13 and CASSOWARY 6 and [ ] discussed the possibility that the primary DZ might not be found, and in this case, what was to be done with the supply bundles. The conclusion was reached that due to the great weight of these three supply bundles, the added burden of the two A-6 bags CARTHAGES 12 and 13 were to carry, and the unknown quantity in jumping to an alternate DZ, that these bundles would not be dropped if the primary DZ was not found.

c. All items of equipment were grouped according to their importance, divided into three parts and packed. The number one pack, or the one containing very urgently needed items, consisted of the following:

- |   |        |
|---|--------|
| 1) 1050 rounds of 9 mm (heavy) ammunition   | 30 lbs |
| 2) 500 rounds of 9 mm (light) ammunition  | 12 lbs |
| 3) 1600 rounds of MI Carbine ammunition   | 50 lbs |
| 4) 10 hand grenades   | 17 lbs |
| 5) medical pack containing an ample assortment of:<br>DDT powder, compress bandages, anti-fungicidal<br>salve, adhesive tape, cotton, mosquito repellent,<br>boric acid ointment and eye dressing, tourniquets,<br>benzedrine tablets, mercurichrome, iodine, codine,<br>avipal tablets, morphine syrettes, vaseline treated<br>sterilized wound dressing, penicillin salve | 5 lbs  |
| 6) pack containing assorted vitamin tablets   | 4 lbs  |
| 7) 20 carbine clips (thirty round capacity each)  | 3 lbs  |
| 8) 2 entrenching tools  | 7 lbs  |

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- |  |   |        |
|--|---|--------|
| 9) one Belgian Browning 9 mm pistol (heavy)  | ) |        |
| 10) two Belgian Browning 9 mm pistol clips   | ) |        |
| 11) one leather holster for 9 mm pistol (heavy)  | ) |        |
| 12) two Belgian Browning 9 mm pistols (light)  | ) | 6 lbs  |
| 13) four Belgian Browning 9 mm clips (light)   | ) |        |
| 14) two " " " " holsters (light)   | ) |        |
| 15) one miniature chess set  | ) |        |
| 16) two files  | ) |        |
| 17) two cans lighter fluid   | ) |        |
| 18) one utility saw  | ) | 1 lb   |
| 19) one automatic flashlight   | ) |        |
| 20) five rubber tobacco pouches  | ) |        |
| 21) three small cans of gun oil  | ) |        |
| 22) one Tokarev pistol   | ) |        |
| 23) one " " holster  | ) |        |
| 24) two " " clips  | ) | 2 lbs  |
| 25) fifty rounds of 6.72 ammunition  | ) |        |
| 26) five Zippo lighters with extra flints  | ) |        |
| 27) two URC-4's (Serial No. 1762, frequency 128 on VHF and 256 on UHF; and Serial No. 1481 with frequency 127 on VHF and 254 on UHF) | ) |        |
| 28) four URC-4 batteries   | ) | 20 lbs |
| 29) two URC-4 antennas   | ) |        |
| 30) two URC-4 tripods  | ) |        |
| 31) one pair of partisan boots   | ) | 4 lbs  |

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- 32) one foam rubber lined canvas bag containing:  
one RR-2 receiver; one RT-3 transmitter; one  
spare parts kit
- 33) one foam rubber lined canvas bag with: one  
GN-58 generator; one RA-2 adaptor; one GN-58  
cord; one web strap
- 34) two spools of antenna wire
- 35) four BA-48 dry batteries

70 lbs

d. The total weight of the above listed equipment, less packing material, was approximately 256 pounds. With packing material, the equipment made up a bundle weighing approximately 336 pounds.

e. All items of equipment were wrapped individually in water-proofed containers or were already sealed in tin when first obtained. All radio equipment was packed first in specially constructed foam rubber lined canvas bags so designed that two bags, dimensions 12"x12"x18", held a complete radio set including receiver, transmitter, generator, batteries, spare parts kit, and could easily be carried by one person or, because of their waterproof construction, could be buried intact for a considerable length of time.

f. These items of equipment, after being wrapped separately, with small, loose items put into rucksacks, were packed in an A-4 bag, ready for dropping. When put into the A-4 bag, the radio equipment was placed so that it would sit on top when the bundle landed on the ground.

g. Supply pack number two contained the following assortment of food:

- 1) oatmeal cakes 33 lbs
- 2) bouillon cubes (canned) 11 lbs
- 3) bacon (canned) 7 lbs
- 4) salami (canned) 10 lbs
- 5) corned beef (canned) 3 lbs
- 6) tea 1/2 lbs
- 7) sugar 1 lb
- 8) candy and chocolate (canned) 6 lbs
- 9) lifeboat rations (canned) 15 lbs

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- 10) medical alcohol (3/4 quart) 2 lbs
- 11) pork meat (canned) 60 lbs
- 12) lard (canned) 42 lbs

h. All of the above items of food either were canned when obtained or were so prepared before being packed. This food was placed into three rucksacks first and then put into an A-4 bag, making a bundle weighing approximately 250 pounds. Less packing material, the food weight was approximately 224 pounds.

i. The number three supply pack contained the following:

- 1) four pairs of leather boots 17 lbs
- 2) assorted suit material 57 lbs
- 3) eight khaki shirts 4 lbs
- 4) nineteen pairs of underdrawers 9 lbs
- 5) muslin cloth 7 lbs
- 6) assorted thread and buttons  $\frac{1}{4}$  lb
- 7) four pairs of socks  $\frac{1}{4}$  lb
- 8) three panchos 8 lbs
- 9) three sweaters 1 lb
- 10) loose tobacco 15 lbs
- 11) cigarette paper (48 packs)
- 12) assorted Ukrainian newspapers, periodicals and clippings 5 lbs


j. The above items were first wrapped individually in water-proof material, divided and placed into three A-6 bags which in turn were packed into one A-4 bag. The total weight of these items, less packing, was approximately 121 lbs. When packed, the bundle weighed approximately 145 pounds.

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*to EGMA-577*

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SECURITY INFORMATION



INSTRUCTIONS FOR BEACON ASSEMBLY AND OPERATIONS

1. To set up:

Select a high location that is free from trees and is at the approach side of the drop zone. Assemble the beacon transmitter to the tripod mounting. Extend the tripod to its maximum height. Assemble the 4 element antenna to the top of the transmitter box. Assemble the one element antenna extension and extend to its full length of about 60 cm. Fold each of the 4 elements downward to a horizontal position and extend to full length of about 63 cm. Attach the battery and battery cable to the set.

2. To operate:

Set "BAND SWITCH" to the upward position, (the A or VHF frequency). Unlock the control buttons. Depress the "TRANS" and "TONE" buttons (the upper 2 buttons) and lock into the operate (depressed) position. Keep the unit operating in this manner except when transmitting the verification signal.

3. To send verification signal:

When plane is first heard:

Unlock the control buttons. Depress the "TRANS" (center) button and lock into position. Send the verification signal twice. Unlock the control buttons. Depress the "TRANS" and "TONE" buttons and lock into position. Repeat transmission of the verification signal every 5 minutes.

----- CAUTION -----

UNTIL

DO NOT SEND THE VERIFICATION SIGNAL AFTER THE AIRCRAFT IS WITHIN HEARING RANGE.

Removed from Project *Aerodynamics*  
CS Classification: *74-124-29/3*  
JOB # *63-705/83*  
Box: *25* Fold # *1*

SECRET

*actors to 52*  
*conform; Report*

**DESENSITIZED**

per GSN 43-43

*23 Sept. 52*



RESTRICTED TO *SR/CA/E*

*74-124-29/3*

**ІНСТРУКЦІЇ ДЛЯ РАДАГУ**

**В**



- 1. Виборіть найбільше пункт в терені, прикривіть вікном і вийдіть із неї на білу дошки. Опісля прикривіть терену умовною лінійкою і переверніть її до відказу. Також вийдіть на білу дошку ту лінійкою, на якій в апараті. Получіть каблем батарею з апарату.
- 2. Поставте функціонію "А" /догори/. Під годком лінійкою умовною лінійкою, як лінійка має прикладити нахилити на два верхні гудки і замкніть. Середній гудок внондає, а верхній видає тон.
- 3. Так приймайте замкнений апарат, щоб видавав тон, коли замкнете лінійку. Як хочете лінійку відомкніть верхніми два гудками та прикладіть середній і замкніть. Тепер можете говорити до лінійки.
- 4. Умовлений сигнал повторяється двічі і по ній хвилині. Як ви хочете умовлений сигнал, то знову надасте тон і так повторяете, по ній хвилині.

**УВАГА!**

Не вимикайте умовного сигналу до того часу поки замкнете лінійку.

