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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 17 June 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/Operational/AERODYNAMIC

SPECIFIC— CASSOWARY-CAWNPORE Message Indicators

References: MUNI-8623; WASHF-39180

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. Per paragraph 3 of first reference, we transmit herewith the report on discussions with CASSOWARIES 3 and 4 regarding the CAWNPORE-CASSOWARY message indicator system. The reasons behind our decision not to press CASSOWARY 3 to reveal the method for deriving the indicators are contained herein.

2. In compliance with paragraph 1 B of second reference, CASSOWARY 3 was requested on 10 May to reveal the system employed by himself and the homeland for deriving the indicators inserted at the end of incoming and outgoing messages. The entire question of CASSOWARY-CAWNPORE indicators had been thrown into sharp focus several days earlier with the receipt on May 6 of homeland message # 17, in which the CAWNPORE indicator was found to be incorrect. Therefore, when the official request to explain the indicator system was made to CASSOWARY 3 on 10 May, he was already aware of the confusion and consternation that had arisen both here and in Washington. CASSOWARY 3 was well apprised of the complications that the use of his system had caused, especially at a time when a cautious approach was necessary in dealing with a w/t link that had suddenly re-appeared on the air after a silence of seven and on half months.

3. Since he was not accompanied by CASSOWARY 4 when requested to reveal his system, CASSOWARY 3 asked that he be allowed time to discuss the matter with his deputy. When the subject was brought up again on 20 May, CASSOWARY 3 declared that, if we deemed it absolutely essential, he would reveal the system employed for deriving the CAWNPORE indicators but not the CASSOWARY system. When the case officer expressed surprise at CASSOWARY 3's refusal to explain his own system in view of his willingness to reveal the CAWNPORE one, CASSOWARY 3 replied that he felt obliged for the good of the operation to respect our request, especially since receipt of the 6 May incoming message containing an incorrect indicator. However, he believes he would not be morally justified in divulging his own CASSOWARY system. When it was pointed out to him that his indicators were not a real or effective control over messages we send to the homeland, CASSOWARY 3 replied that he realized once we obtained his indicator for a specific message, we could then make any changes or even substitute another message without his knowledge and without the homeland realizing that the message did not have CASSOWARY 3's

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CASSOWARY 3's endorsement. When pressed for the value or point of the system, CASSOWARIES 3 and 4 became upset and presented their views in a very emotional manner.

4. Concerning any changes we might make in outgoing messages which have already been endorsed, the CASSOWARIES rely upon our good faith not to take unilateral or uncoordinated action. Moreover, the indicator systems were not designed to guarantee that CASSOWARY 3 sees all incoming and outgoing messages, but rather to impress the leaders in the homeland with the fact that CASSOWARY 1, in its relations with the Americans, has been able to maintain its freedom of action and status of true representative of the homeland underground and has not sold itself into "agent" status. According to CASSOWARY 3, the appearance of the CASSOWARY indicator on messages we send to the homeland will signify that the message is a coordinated effort and that the Americans consider the CASSOWARIES as partners rather than "paid agents". It is vital that this impression be conveyed to homeland leaders since past incidents have created a burning issue, both in the emigration and the homeland, of the possibility that the CASSOWARIES have sold themselves as "agents" to the Americans.

5. Prior to the dispatch of CARTHAGES 1 and 2 to the homeland in 1949, the two couriers paid a visit to CAVATINA 1 and, as a result, confronted the CASSOWARIES with the charge that they were American agents. When CARTHAGE 3 reported to homeland leaders in June-July of 1950, the CAWNPORE chiefs asked him if he thought it was true that the CASSOWARIES had become American agents. All these charges and suspicions can be directly attributed to the published and oral statements of CAVATINA 6, which has been waging a relentless campaign against CASSOWARY 1 since the split occurred between the two organizations in the Fall of 1948. When CARTHAGE 3 and his cohorts arrived in the West for the first time in 1949, the CASSOWARIES requested our cooperation in isolating them as completely as possible in order to avoid any possibility that of their being tainted by emigre political bickerings. As a result, when questioned by CAWNPORE leaders in the Summer of 1950 concerning the Ukrainian emigration, CARTHAGE 3 expressed ignorance because he and his fellow couriers had been denied access to the emigre newspapers other than occasional issues censored by the CASSOWARIES. On CARTHAGE 3's return to Germany in October 1950, he conveyed CAWNPORE 6's oral request to CASSOWARY 3 that the couriers be given every chance within security limitations to familiarize themselves with the activities of the emigration. The CARTHAGES, presently in training, obviously cannot be denied the privilege of reading Ukrainian newspapers printed in the emigration. Therefore, the CASSOWARIES are obliged periodically to deny to the trainees the constant attacks and charges lodged against them in CAVATINA newspapers. Since the CAVATINAS send copies of their newspapers in each pouch to the homeland and undoubtedly reiterate the attacks in official correspondence, it is not strange that homeland leaders have doubts and attempt to determine the facts by such means as questioning CARTHAGE 3. An indication of the effectiveness of the CAVATINA press attacks can be best illustrated by the results they have on the CARTHAGES presently in training. As a result of their reading, the CARTHAGES are prone to misinterpret many facets of their present training as attempts on our part to prepare them to be American agents and to subvert them from their primary loyalty to the homeland underground. As

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74-124-29/3

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-2-

already stated, the CASSOWARIES are obliged periodically to refute the suspicions that they have sold out to American intelligence and are recruiting Ukrainian emigres to become American spies.

6. CASSOWARY 3 stated that, prior to the dispatch of May 1951, he held a long conference with CASSOWARY 5 in an attempt to determine the best method of illustrating to homeland leaders that CASSOWARY 1 had maintained exclusive loyalty to the homeland. They decided upon the indicator system as the best means of convincing the homeland that CASSOWARY 1 was a partner in the operations which the Americans launch into the homeland.

7. In view of our long range approach to this project, we feel nothing will be gained at this time by insisting that CASSOWARY 3 divulge the CAWNPORE indicators. By not requesting him to reveal his indicator system, we hope to ameliorate the low CASSOWARY morale which has resulted from the disintegration of the original LANDSBERG Project and our failure to implement the Labor Service Company which we had promised to CASSOWARY 3. Moreover, with the next dispatch of personnel to the homeland, CASSOWARY 3 will be morally obliged to inform the underground that he had revealed the system to the Americans. Until we have established a firm working relationship with the underground, we feel the advantages to be gained from CASSOWARY 3 informing homeland leaders that he had not been obliged to divulge his systems despite the confusion they had caused us will be far greater than the advantages gained by our possessing the details of the CAWNPORE indicator system. In addition, if we refrain from pressing CASSOWARY 3 for the system, we prove our good faith that the w/t link will be used for the mutual benefit of all concerned and avoid forcing the CASSOWARIES into a position where the CAVATINA charges of "American agents" would be confirmed.

8. CASSOWARY 3 stated that he had discussed indicators with CASSOWARY 5 exclusively and intended that they be used only for important messages encoded by CASSOWARY 5. However, an analysis of last year's traffic indicates that CASSOWARY 5 passed the indicator system on to CAWNPORE 6 who, in turn, instructed CARTHAGE 5 in its use. CARTHAGE 5's consistent use of them for every message is very likely prompted by instructions from CAWNPORE 6.

9. According to CASSOWARY 3, the incorrect 6 May 1952 CAWNPORE indicator was probably caused by the fact that the system for deriving the indicators is fairly complicated and CARTHAGE 5, a relatively simple, uneducated type, might easily encounter difficulties in working out the system. Judging from various CASSOWARY 3 remarks, the CAWNPORE system, at least, is based on an Ukrainian almanac date system. There is some connection between the indicator and the day the message is scheduled for transmission. When more than one message is sent per contact, only one indicator is required (at the end of the final message), although the same indicator may be used at the end of the other messages as well. The CASSOWARY indicator is derived in some particular sequence from the last CAWNPORE indicator and vice-versa.

Approved:

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