

A Brief Interpretation, Analysis and Commentary on the U.S. Army's Leaked Information in February 2023



Suyi control

Guerrillas, the motherland and the people are calling!

SOURCE: https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/620436462?utm_id=0

At the beginning of April 2023, rumors gradually began to flow out on the Internet, saying that in early March of the same year, a series of photos of secret materials of the US military leaked from a certain Discord channel, the content mainly related to the Russian-Ukrainian war situation. By April 7, the series of images had become known. Unfortunately, some of the photos have been deleted by the Discord server, but the United States failed to eliminate the impact of this leak. The author tried to obtain all the relevant photos I could find, selected the parts related to Ukraine, and briefly interpreted, analyzed and commented on them .

First of all, let's talk about the credibility of this article. According to the New York Times, I obtained 48 of the more than 100 photos in the leaked documents. From the perspective of information volume, the content of this article has a particularly large amount of information, and a large amount of information is far beyond the scope of open source intelligence to obtain and organize. From the perspective of information volume, it is difficult to be a third party (that is, any subject other than the US military intelligence department) forged. As for the possibility that the U.S. military and intelligence agencies deliberately falsified this document and then released it, I think it is because it is difficult to imagine that the U.S. military has a motive for doing so (you can see from the following that these

leaked documents do not discuss particularly sensitive content, such as the Ukrainian campaign counterattack plan, etc.), so I think the probability is extremely low.

Comprehensive judgment, the nature and probability of this article:

1. True Leaked Documents: 99%
2. US military information warfare fake material: 1%

The series of leaked documents appears to consist of at least two parts:

Part of it is a daily newspaper written by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and graded by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff J2 (Inter-Services Intelligence Department). Different pages have different grades, and some are classified as secret//Only allowed to be obtained by personnel from the United States and the Five Eyes Alliance ;parts are classified as top secret//restricted to U.S. citizens//governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

A portion of the CIA's Daily Intelligence summary, rated Top Secret // SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE-GAMMA // Originator Restricted Document Dissemination // Accessible Only to U.S. Citizens // Governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) .

The following postings cannot be done in exact order, and everyone can judge for themselves based on the confidentiality level and name of the file header. *My personal comments are given in italics.*



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE | CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DAILY INTELLIGENCE UPDATE (U)**BREAKING INTEL ... IN THE LAST 24HRS** (U)

Initial reporting not fully analyzed or coordinated (U)

1 POLAND/UKRAINE (U)

- 24 Feb: The Polish CHOD stated that Warsaw intends to "immediately" transfer four MiG-29 Fulcrums to Ukraine (S//NF)
- This would be the first known transfer of fighter aircraft from a NATO member to Ukraine; Poland has 28 Fulcrums in various states of operability, of which 16 are currently flyable (S//NF)

4 IRAN (U)

- 25 Feb: Iran conducted a partially successful flight test of a Zolfaghar SRBM equipped with a cluster warhead from Shadad Desert Camp in southeastern Iran; two of at least seven submunitions impacted a target area at a range of ~570km (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- This may be Iran's first successful test of a Zolfaghar SRBM equipped with a cluster warhead following two prior launches that ended in failure (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

2 RUSSIA (U)

- 27 Feb: Russian UAS developer AO Kronshtadt completed the first full flight test of the SIRIUS UCAV at its testing center near Ryazan, southeast of Moscow; Russian officials considered the flight successful (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- The SIRIUS, also known as the INOKHODETS, will be capable of strike, ISR, and EW missions; Russia intended for the first flight to occur in 2021 (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

5 TERRORISM (U)

- 26 Feb: An airstrike killed AQAP external operations leader, Shura council member, and media emir Hammad al-Tamimi and his associate in Marib, Yemen; Tamimi is the second external operations leader killed since Nov 2022 (TS//SI//NF)
- Since at least 2016, Tamimi oversaw maritime attack operations—including the partially disrupted cell that attempted four attacks on Western ships off the coast of Yemen—and viewed attacking U.S. interests as AQAP's top priority (S//NF)

3 PRC (U)

- 25 Feb: The DF-27 (CSS analysis ind ~2,100km)
- The DF-27 targets at a high probability of anti-ship warfare in 2022 (TS//SI)

6 ISRAEL

- 28 Feb: Palestinian dual citizen who were opened fire
- Palestine further violence rioting in

GLOBAL HIGHLIGHTS (U)

- 1 **TERRORISM** | ISIS Senior Leader Killed in Syria (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- 2 **PRC** | LHA-31 Completes First Operational Activity (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- 3 **UAE** | Negotiating Weapons (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

BRIEF ITEMS (U)

- 1 **UK/PRC** | Competing UK Visions for Counter-PRC Policy in Indo-Pacific (S//NF) (U)
- 2 **RUSSIA/UKRAINE** | Status of the Conflict as of 28 Feb (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- 3 **ISRAEL** | Pathways to

FOCUS AREA (U)


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THIS PAGE IS CLOSED TOP SECRET // SENSITIVE INFORMATION // Accessible only to U.S. citizens // Governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

This document is a daily intelligence update from the Joint Intelligence Division (J2) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J2) as of 0515 hours EST on February 28, 2023.

The situation involving Russia and Ukraine includes: the Polish government announced that it will "immediately" provide Ukraine with four MiG-29s, which will make Poland the first NATO country to provide active fighter jets to Ukraine. Poland has a total of 28 MiG-29s, 16 of which are flyable.

Situation of the Russo-Ukraine War on February 28, 2023. D+369.



The content mainly involves the memorabilia on February 27, the ratio of troops between the two sides, the ratio of casualties, and the judgment of the size of the Russian army.

According to the assessment, the Russian army invested 527 (97%) of the 544 battalions, of which 474 (90%) were on the front line. It should be noted that the mobile battalion here includes the reserve battalion and the artillery battalion. The Russian army includes 218 motorized battalions (motorized infantry, tanks, airborne...),

41 reserve battalions and 268 artillery battalions (don't forget that a motorized infantry brigade in the Russian army has 4 artillery battalions). 364 battalions have relatively effective combat effectiveness, and another 110 battalions have basically lost combat effectiveness. From what I know of the Russian Territorial Army (TrV), only 41 reserve battalions seem significantly underrepresented.

The assessment of the Ukrainian Army is 34 mobile brigades, 11 firepower brigades and 27 territorial defense brigades. I calculated it myself, which is about 170 mobile battalions, 135 reserve battalions and 130 artillery battalions. The strength is about 70% of the Russian army. One detail is that there are only 3 tank brigades in Ukraine. We all know that in addition to the 1st and 17th tank brigades before the war, Ukraine also mobilized the 3rd, 4th, and 5th tank brigades in the reserve army during the war. It was previously reported that the 5th Tank Brigade had been disbanded (but it is worth noting that MilitaryLands reported that [the brigade was rebuilt in March 2023](#)) to supplement the tank losses of other formations. Now it seems that at least one of the 3rd and 4th tank brigades has been disbanded. As for the 14th Tank Brigade that was previously in the reserve army, it is estimated that it will never exist again. To be honest, I think the organization of the tank brigade has failed in the first place - tanks are now a scarce resource, and the tank brigade seems to have too many tanks and too few infantry. I can't imagine any kind of mission that only the tank brigade can do but the mechanized brigade can't do, but there are quite a few missions that only the mechanized brigade can do and the tank brigade can't.



A detail was mentioned in the briefing: the Ukrainian SBU believed that the explosion of the A-50U in Belarus on February 26 was the act of its own agents violating orders.

By the way, the evidence in the P picture is actually very simple, pay attention to the "6 00" of the Russian military equipment loss in the picture on the right. It is impossible to have such a gap in normal typesetting, but it is clear from the left picture: when it is a Russian friend P picture, change 6,004 to 600, so you have to remove the thousand separator, but in this process, you forgot to modify the thousand place Gaps caused by delimiters. The "8 rotary-wing" lost by the Russian army's rotor in the right picture can also be seen. The number of spaces is obviously wrong (there are 1.5-2 spaces here). properly caused. People who do text work are very sensitive to spaces, which can be seen at a glance.




Yaroslav Trofimov

@yarotrof

...

When secret U.S. slides leaked out yesterday, Russian propaganda channels quickly reposted them — but after a little photoshop. Suddenly, 43.5k 🇷🇺 fatalities turned to 17.5k, while 17.5k 🇺🇦 KIA became 71.5k. Russian vehicle losses shrank from 6,004 to 600. Spot the differences.


翻译推文



下午2:33 · 2023年4月7日 · 483 查看

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It is said that a well-known Russian friend retweeted a picture that had obviously been posted, and after being stunned, he was still stubborn, saying whoever posted first and who posted later, and took a look at Ding Zhen. Sorry, there is still a picture waiting below, this time it is a high-definition version, and there are data strips, there is no room for tampering.



It can be seen from this picture that the U.S. military evaluates the current combat effectiveness of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries as "Moderate" (ie, it is difficult to maintain operations in one or several dimensions). For the Russian Army it is the field of ground combat (63%), for the Ukrainian Army it is the field of air force and air defense systems (68-70%).


The U.S. military's estimate of Russian losses appears to be Oryx/0.8. Not surprisingly, more than one Western intelligence agency is citing Oryx. But I think the assessment of the remaining equipment of the Russian army is very inaccurate. How could the Russian army have only 419 tanks left in the theater? Where did the Ukrainian Army get its 500 tank reserves? On the one hand, I suspect that the US military data copied the IISS and did not calculate the number of unblocked at all, but on the other hand, I think the US may have referred to the results of satellite images. Otherwise, how can it clearly distinguish the number of tanks "in the theater" and "in the station"? Quite confusing.

The U.S. military's assessment of the Ukrainian air defense system is somewhat different from the Oryx data (Oryx reported that the Ukrainian army lost 50 S-300 series TELs, equivalent to about 6-7 battalions, and the U.S. military reported the loss of 11 battalions; or the U.S. military is based on a Battalion 4 TELs?), but considering that the U.S. military has obtained the deployment map of the Ukrainian air defense

system (see the following page), the U.S. military materials should be more accurate. On the other hand, the loss of the Ukrainian tactical air defense system seems to be Oryx data. How much does the US military rely on Oryx data? I don't understand the loss of Russian surface-to-air missiles. The 3,307 sets of tactical surface-to-air missiles in the station frightened me. What statistical standards and information sources are these?

As for the loss of personnel, I will not say the number, it is written in black and white; I do not have any independent sources to assess the accuracy of the casualty data. The Americans also emphasized that Ukrainians will have a bias when sharing data, which may not be allowed. But the source, this intelligence report, is a combination of reports from Russian, Wagner and Ukrainian officials. First of all, how did you get the data of Russia and Wagner, and second, how did you synthesize it? I'm in the dark for now.

The last paragraph states that the DIA is about to introduce a new methodology on the sustainability of equipment on both sides in the Intelligence Weekly. Don't know what it will be.



Israel is unwilling to provide deadly weapons to Ukraine, how can Israel be involved? Several options are given in the paper:

1. Either follow the Turkish model, sell lethal weapons to third parties under the pressure of the United States, and transfer them to the Ukrainians; the Turks can dance on two eggs, and so can the Israelis.
2. Israel feels threatened by Russia boosting aid to Iran. For example, Russia provides Su-35 to Iran. ***Not long after, on March 11, this actually happened. So on March 16, Israel approved the sale of weapons to Ukraine. Americans have a good grasp of the pulse of Israel, Iran and Russia.***
3. In order to resist the Russian-backed Iranian activities in Syria, let Israel fall further towards the United States.
4. Russia directly attacked Israeli aircraft with surface-to-air missiles.



Iran to buy Su-35 fighter jets from Russia - Iranian broadcaster

voanews.com

Iran to Buy Su-35 Fighter Jets From Russia: Iranian Broadcaster

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Journal of Management Education 32(1) 10-11


timesofisrael.com

In first, Israel said to authorize sale of defensive military ...

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The document also lists the Israeli weapons that the United States considers most helpful to Ukraine: mainly surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank missiles, because Ukrainian surface-to-air missiles are facing an obvious crisis, which will be discussed below.



This one is the daily report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operations Department, Logistics Department, and Strategic Planning Department (J3/4/5) on the same day (2.28). This is a picture with the largest amount of information, and it has to be discussed in sections.

Russia/Ukraine Joint S

Orders and Decisions

- Last 24: None
- Currently Pending: None

SIGACT / CCIR

- RUS/UKR NECs: 3x NECs, 4x non-threat missile launches; 5,265x total NECs
- Manned ISR over the Black Sea: 1x RC-135V/W (GBR) with 2x Typhoon escorts is scheduled for ISR operations from 0600-1000 EST

US Composition & Disposition-USEUCOM AOR

US Mil In USEUCOM: 91,896 / Afloat: 8,446 / Jaslonka: 1,251

US Maritime Vessels

13x Surface Ships:

- 0x Carrier, 5x CRUDES, 2x C2 ship, 6x Auxiliaries

5x Subs:

- 4x SSN, 1x SSGN

US Air Components

9x FSs:

- 2x 5th Gen, 7x 4th Gen

BTF 23-2 (4x B-52s)

2x Army CABs:

- 12th CAB, 1 AD CAB

US Land Units

1x Corps: V Corps

2x DIVs:

- 4 ID & 101st ABN DIV

5x Army BCTs:

- 2 SCR, 173rd IBCT, 2/1 ID, 2/1 CD, 2/101 IBCT

Composition Changes Next 72 Hours

Deployments

-

Redeployments

-

Projected Change (Air Mvmt)

-100 thru 03 Mar

Disposition Changes:

Sea: NSTR

Air: NSTR

Land: NSTR

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First of all, the upper left corner is NATO's intelligence activities and troop deployment in the theater. An RC-135V/W of the British Air Force was operating over the Black Sea under the escort of the typhoon (there will be pictures to describe its trajectory). I don't understand the signal intelligence part, and I'm studying it.

U.S. troops are deployed in Europe. The strength of the troops is accurate to the person. It also specifically mentions that there are 1,251 people in Jasionka (Rzeszow Airport, the main airport for US strategic airlift to Ukraine).

In terms of military strength, the U.S. military's maritime forces under the command of the U.S. European Headquarters (USEUCOM) include 0 aircraft carriers, 5 destroyers, 2 command ships, 6 auxiliary ships, 4 attack nuclear submarines, and 1 cruise missile nuclear submarine. In the air, it includes 2 fifth-generation aircraft squadrons, 7 fourth-generation aircraft squadrons, and 4 B-52s. Also counts the Army's two combat aviation brigades. It is worth noting that in addition to the existing 12th Combat Aviation Brigade of the Army in Europe, the 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade is also reported to be located in Europe. This surge has not been reported before. In terms of ground forces, the headquarters of the Fifth Army was organized the year before last. The 4th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division are reported to be located in Europe, with 5 BCTs under their jurisdiction, except for the 2nd Stryker Cavalry originally stationed in Europe. In addition to the regiment and the 173rd Airborne Brigade, there are also the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. Compared with the state before the Russo-Ukrainian War, one airborne IBCT and one ABCT were added (there was originally a rotating ABCT).

Activities Last 24 Hours

SEA:

- 1 GEORGE H.W. BUSH CSG:** U/W Adriatic Sea; FLOPS
 - OPS Sorties-73; Fixed Wing-54, Rotary Wing-17, COD-2
 - Exercise NEPTUNE STRIKE (20-28 Feb)

AIR:

- 2 Airborne Sensitive Reconnaissance Ops (SRO)/ NATO ISR**
 - **BLK:** [0 Manned, 2 Unmanned] 2x MQ-9
 - **ROU:** [2 Manned, 1 Unmanned] 1x U-2, 1x RC-135V/W, 1x MQ-9
 - **POL:** [3 Manned, 1 Unmanned] 1x U-2, 1x JSTARS, 1x CL-650, 1x MQ-9
- 3 Operation ATLAS GUARDIAN:** DoD-NATO supporting enhanced Vigilance Activities (eVA) and enhanced Air Policing (eAP):
9x US eAP CAP sorties complete (9x ASSURE; 0x SHIELD)

USAF continues eAP mission from Lask, POL

Alert 60 AEW: USAFE maintains Alert 60 AEW ISO Jasionka force protection from Powidz AB, POL

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In terms of the previous 24-hour activities, I noticed that in addition to MQ-9, RC-135 and JSTARS, the U.S. military is using U-2 in Romania and Poland to carry out reconnaissance. U-2 has not turned on the ADS-B beacon. Known by Open Source Intelligence. The USS George Bush participates in the Neptune Strike exercise in the Adriatic Sea. Air early warning and patrols were maintained on the eastern flank under Operation Atlas Guardian, specifically targeting Jasionka airfield.



It is reported that 97 NATO special forces personnel (from the United States, Britain, France, La, and Netherlands) are currently deployed in Ukraine. The total number of U.S. personnel in Ukraine is 100, including 71 State Department personnel and 29 Department of Defense personnel, the latter including the Department of Defense Attaché (DAO), Defense Cooperation Office (ODC), Special Forces (USSOF), Marine Corps embassy guards team (MSAU) personnel.

| Activities Last 24 Hours Cont. | | Activities Next 24-48 Hours | |
|---|--|---|--|
| <p>SAG-U</p> <p>4 Conducting bilateral training with partner nations supporting key UKR efforts</p> <p>V CORPS</p> <p>5 South East Flank Battle Groups (BG): (POL, SVK, HUN, ROU, BGR): BGs conducted training with partner nations to deter RUS aggression</p> <p>6 Train & Advise UAF (UKR Armed Forces): (USA): Patriot Training (16 Jan-27 Mar) (DEU): FA BN Collective Training #1 (06 Feb-07 Mar) (DEU): UKR Mech BTG #2 Collective Training (06 Feb-12 Mar) (FRA): Phoenix Strike (RANGER) (17 Feb-31 Mar) (DEU): UKR (STRYKER) BTG #4 Collective TNG (20 Feb-19 Mar) (DEU): UKR BDE #1 HQ Staff Training (20 Feb-01 Mar) (DEU): Phoenix Strike (RANGER Tranche 1) (22 Feb-31 Mar) (DEU): UKR (STRYKER) BTG #5 Collect. Training (24 Feb-25 Mar) (NLD): Phoenix Strike (Riverine) (26 Feb-18 Mar) (DEU): UKR Mech BTG #3 Collective Training (27 Feb-29 Mar) (DEU): FA BN Collective Training #2 (27 Feb-28 Mar) (DEU): UKR BDE #2 HQ Staff Training (27 Feb-28 Mar)</p> | | <p>SEA:</p> <p>1. GEORGE H.W. BUSH CSG: U/W Adriatic Sea; FLOPS • OPS Sorties-79, Fixed Wing-61, Rotary Wing-18 • Exercise NEPTUNE STRIKE (20-28 Feb)</p> <p>AIR:</p> <p>2. Airborne Sensitive Reconnaissance Ops (SRO)/ NATO ISR • BLK: [1 Manned, 3 Unmanned] 1x RC-135V/W (GBR), 1x RQ-4, 2x MQ-9 • ROU: [1 Manned, 1 Unmanned] 1x RC-135V/W (GBR), 1x RQ-4 • POL: [1 Manned, 3 Unmanned] 1x CL-650, 3x MQ-9</p> <p>3. Operation ATLAS GUARDIAN: 16x U.S. and 94x NATO missions scheduled for Eastern Flank Border CAPs</p> <p>4. USAF continues eAP mission from Lask, POL</p> | |

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The main task of the U.S. Fifth Army at this moment is to supervise and train the Ukrainian army. On February 27th, a large number of training missions were going on at the same time: Patriot missile operation training in the United States, field artillery battalion 1st echelon training in Germany, mechanized battalion 2nd echelon training, Phoenix strike (Ranger) training, Stryker Battalion 4th Echelon in Germany, Brigade Headquarters 1st Echelon, Phoenix Strike (Rangers Part 1) training, Strike Battalion 5th Echelon, Phoenix Strike (River) in the Netherlands Intensive training, the 3rd echelon of the mechanized battalion in Germany, the 2nd echelon of the field artillery battalion, and the 2nd echelon of the brigade headquarters.

Phoenix Strike is mentioned three times in it. It is not known what the meaning of this word is, is it related to the Phoenix Ghost (Phoenix Ghost) wandering ammunition? What are Ranger and Riverine? I don't know if the person who named this is an old fan of "Assassin's Creed".

The U.S. Fifth Army is responsible for commanding multiple battle groups on the south side of the eastern flank, including those in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

J5 Policy

Key Upcoming Engagements

- (T) Feb: CJCS s/c with UKR CHOD & Air Def CDR
- (T) 2 Mar: CJCS BILAT with ITA CHOD, MINDEF, and NSA-Equivalent in Rome
- (T) 6 Mar: CJCS BILAT with Spanish Military Leadership
- (T) 5 Apr: CJCS o/c with BEL CHOD

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The J5 mission of the Strategic Planning Division seems to be mainly responsible for various liaisons, and it seems that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Milley needs to go to Ukraine, Italy, Spain, Belgium and hold bilateral talks (BILAT) with the corresponding military leaders.

- (T) 5 Apr: CJCS o/c with BEL CHOD

J4 Logistics

GMLRS

| Last 24hr Expended | Total Expended | OH | PDA Due in (Qty) | 7-Day Burn Rate | DOS | ZERO (7 Day) |
|--------------------|----------------|-----|------------------|-----------------|-----|--------------|
| 17 | 9,584 | 278 | 0 | 13 | 22 | 21-Mar |

155mm Rounds

| Last 24hr Expended | Total Expended | OH | PDA + USAI Due in (Qty) by 12 Mar | 7-Day Burn Rate | DOS (7 Day) | ZERO (7 Day) |
|--------------------|----------------|--------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|
| 779 | 951,752 | 10,892 | 30,000 | 3,474 | 4 | 3-Mar |

PDA Deliveries

- 155mm Rounds/Charges/Fuzes/Primers**
- Enroute: 1,840x 155mm HE (PDA32)
 - Next 24 hrs: 1,840x 155mm HE (PDA32)

GMLRS

- Enroute: None
- Next 24 hrs: None

Other

- Enroute: 18x MAXXPRO (PD22); 12 HMMWVs (PD23/28)
- Next 24 hrs: 1x flight carrying Phoenix Ghost (PD25) to Ramstein

JDAM-ER

- Enroute: None
- Next 24 hrs: None

PATRIOT

- Enroute: None
- Next 24 hrs: None

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The data provided by the J4 of the Logistics Department are very important - the consumption and replenishment of GMLRS and 155 howitzer shells. PDA is the aid authorized by the President, which is to directly transfer materials from the active US arsenal to assist Ukraine; USAI is the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which is the US to purchase materials from arms dealers to assist Ukraine.

Everyone knows that the material consumption of the Ukrainian war is staggering, but the specific data still looks shocking: Ukraine has fired 9,584 GMLRS rockets in half a year, which means that its average daily shooting volume has reached about 50; Now, the average shooting volume on the 7th is only 13 pieces, and the reserve is 278 pieces. It is guessed that the US military's GMLRS reserves are a bit too much (a total of 50,000 pieces were produced before the war, and I don't know how much the US stored before the war). However, in the long run, [Lockheed Martin said this year that the current GMLRS production capacity is 10,000 a year, and it can be increased to 12,000-14,000](#) , which seems barely enough for Ukraine (as long as it is saved).


As for artillery shells, Ukraine has used 950,000 American 155 shells, which is about half of the US pre-war reserves, and is still being consumed at a rate of 3,400 shells per day. Ukraine's shell reserves are only 10,900, which is only enough to fight for 4 days! This means that once the United States and Europe cut off the supply of ammunition to Ukraine, it will quickly have a fatal impact.

It should be noted that here the Americans do not discuss the shells provided to Ukraine by Europe and other countries and regions. Europe claims to provide Ukraine with 1 million rounds of shells this year, equivalent to 2,739 shells a day. The combination of these two items may mean that Ukraine can fire around 4500-5000 rounds of shells per day. This has not yet counted the ammunition produced by Ukraine itself and the 105mm shells provided by the United States (should also be at the 500,000 level), or ammunition from other sources (such as South Korea mentioned below).

Because of this, the U.S. closely secures and carefully manages Ukrainian ammunition. 1,840 PDA shells are transported to Ukraine every day. Why is the 1840 speculation related to the US military model transported.

Compared with the big items such as ammunition, the MAXXPRO, Humvee, and Storm Shadow in the appendix are simply not worth mentioning.

There is no difference in the activities in the next 24 hours, so I will not analyze it.




Number, type and routes of NATO ISR aircraft and escorts (French Mirages) in the Black Sea region. It can be seen that the U.S. military has stipulated a distance of 40 nautical miles from the Russian-occupied Crimea. There are more drones and fewer manned ones. However, in the case of an escort, an incident occurred in mid-March when a Russian fighter plane crashed into a US military MQ-9. It is not clear what the NATO escort plane was doing in this incident.



ROK 155 Delivery Timeline (330K)

SECRET

CAD: 27 Feb, 1330 SST



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The New York Times reported on January 17 this year that the United States was acquiring shells from Israel and South Korea. On the one hand, it is the strategic reserve materials left by the United States in these two countries, and on the other hand, it is the ammunition produced by these two countries. These two countries do not want the shells produced in their own countries to be hit on the heads of the Russians, but agree that the United States will add these ammunitions to its own ammunition depots to free up more ammunition for military assistance to Ukraine. This report proves that South Korea has gone one step further—it plans to transport 330,000 shells by air and sea to their destination within 72 days—the destination of the sea shipment is shown as Nordenham, Germany (a port city near Bremen). The "end user" of the ammunition is Poland, but South Korea is considering allowing Poland to supply them to Ukraine. (see below for this)



nytimes.com


<https://www.nytimes.com> > U.S. > Politics · 翻译此页

Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine


2023年1月17日 — WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is tapping into a vast but little-known stockpile of American ammunition in Israel to help meet Ukraine's dire ... 知乎 @suyi控

This may mean that the South Korean government has made up its mind to provide ammunition to Ukraine, and this heavy aid of 330,000 rounds of shells (according to the current consumption of the Ukrainian army is enough to fight for three months; 180,000 rounds of ammunition will be used in D+63 and D+73 arrived intensively within two days) may be used by Ukraine for spring and summer counteroffensives.

However, it should also be noted that there is no specific date for this timetable. It may be until February 28 that the Korean side has not yet finalized the final date of shipment.




This picture is not well drawn, and the lower left corner is not so much a briefer's comment as a complaint: "The Russian army advances an average of 2,700 meters a month (90 meters a day), and if it continues like this, it will take 11 months to touch 30 Kramatorsk is 1,000 kilometers away!" Of course, in fact, the calculation of the future changes of the front cannot be divided by this method, but the US military is willing, who are you and me?



Comment: Russia's attrition tactics in the Donbass are likely to lead to a stalemate, making it impossible for Moscow to seize the entire Donbass region by 2023. We draw this conclusion with some confidence, based on National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite imagery and commercial satellite imagery, LAPIS-based time series video, Overhead Persistent Infrared Imaging (OPIR) data, signals intelligence, open source intelligence, liaison reports, We found that in the past seven months, the Russian artillery firepower has been at a relatively high density, and the combat losses have been high, but the land captured is very limited. We would have reached the above conclusions with greater confidence if we could assess the strength of Ukraine's persistent combat capabilities on the Kharkov-Lugansk and Donetsk fronts. We also cannot fully determine the damage done to the morale of the Russian squadron by Ukraine in August-September 2022, or how much time it will take to replenish ammunition and equipment or rebuild troops. Since April 2022, the Russian ground

forces, Donbass separatist armed forces, and the Russian private military security company "Wagner" have launched a campaign of attrition in the Donbass region. The ground assault slowly squeezed out Ukrainian defenses. This tactic has caused so much damage to the Russian military's ammunition stockpile that - unless the Russian military unexpectedly regains its strength - the Russian military will be depleted and Moscow's war objectives will not be achieved, and the war will continue beyond 2023 .

I have no brief comments to make on the above comments. In general I support this view. In fact, a month ago, the Russian army began to talk about the ammunition shortage problem. It seems that Russia has finally beaten the Soviet Union's ammunition family.



A heat map of the battle near Bakhmut obtained by the National Geographic Information Agency (NGIA) infrared reconnaissance satellite. This thing is similar to the nature of open source intelligence engineers using NASA fire monitoring satellites to observe, of course, the accuracy is higher. According to this assessment, the Ukrainian defense line on the left (ie north side) of Bakhmut is retreating, the Ukrainian army


maintains control of the city center, and continues to build new defensive positions in the rear so that the city can be defended after the fall .



I don't think this picture makes much sense.

CAO 28 1800EST FEB 23

Delivered, in country
Delivery on track
No Delivery timeline
No commitment




















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The problem with Ukraine's integrated air defense system. This is also a very important picture. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine did not have the production capacity of air defense missiles (the relevant manufacturers are all located in Russia), and after 2014, Ukraine will naturally not receive any air defense missile supplements. So after a year of war, the ammunition of the Ukrainian surface-to-air missile system, which had played a major role, was about to run out. It can be seen that by 2023.2.28, there are only 476 ammunition left for the Ukrainian S-300 series (SA-10, SA-12), but the average monthly consumption is about 200. The Beech (SA-11) system has 116 ammunition remaining, but the average monthly consumption is 69 ammunition. Ukraine dug up 700 S-125 (SA-3) wrapped in German oil paper, but the performance of these missiles was suspicious. If the situation continues, Ukraine's surface air defense system will be basically inoperable by May 2023, which will give the Russian Air Force (VKS), which has been pretending to be dead for a year, a great chance. Therefore, the United States is rushing to provide Ukraine with Patriot, Hawk,


NASAMS or all air defense systems it can get at this time, and refit the Sea Sparrow for Ukraine's beach launcher. It is worth noting that the United Kingdom is still carrying forward traditional arts, and has to buy 100 beach missiles from some unknown country. Don't ask me where I bought it from, I don't know either. It is also worth noting that this document mentions the expected consumption of Patriot, NASAMS, and IRIS-T: 100, 40/month, and 24/month. In other words, after being completely replaced by the Western system, the projectile volume of the Ukrainian air defense system will drop to 60% of the previous level. This has not taken into account that the coverage of the Ukrainian air defense system will decrease due to the reduction in the number of launch battalions/companies.

Current operators [edit]

-  Algeria^[122] 48 systems Buk-M2.
-  Armenia^[123]
-  Azerbaijan^[124] 4 dvizion BUK-MB
-  Belarus^[125] – 12 complexes as of 2016.
-  Cyprus^[126]
-  Egypt – Buk-M1 and Buk-M2 versions^[127]
-  Georgia^[128]
-  India^[citation needed]
-  Kazakhstan – 1 Buk-M2E ordered in 2018 and delivered in 2021^[129]
-  Iran
-  North Korea^[130]
-  Pakistan^{[131][132][133]}
-  People's Republic of China^[134] – Improved variant as the HQ-16, a navalized VLS system. Joint People's Republic of China/Russian project to upgrade the naval 9K37M1-2 system 'Shtil' (SA-N-12).
-  Russia – more than 440 9K37 and 9K317 as of 2016 (350 in land forces and 80 in air force).^{[135][136][137][138]} Replacement of complex 9K37 with the newer 9K317 Buk M2 is planned to be completed by 70% or more by 2020.^{[139][140]} 1 battalion of Buk-M3 was delivered in 2016.^[citation needed] 66 Buk-M-1-2s, 36 M2s and 36 M3s were delivered in 2012–2017.^[141] As of December 2017 3 missile brigades are fully equipped with Buk-M3.^[citation needed] 7 Buk-M3 brigade sets on order as of early 2020.^[142] (see [List of equipment of the Russian Ground Forces](#))
-  Syria^[143] 8 complexes 9K317E Buk-M2E delivered from [Russian Federation](#) in 2011 ([Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – Arms Transfers Database](#)) for Land Forces + 10/8^[144] Buk-M2E for Air Defence.^[145] + 20 Buk-M1-2s.^[146]
-  Ukraine^[147] – 72 9K37M1 as of 2016.^[148] Modernisation of stored systems to Buk M1-2 standard planned.^[149]
-  Venezuela 12 Buk-M2E in service.^[150]



Former operators [edit]

-  Finland – In 1996 Finland started operating the missile systems that they received from Russia as debt payment.^[151] Due to concerns about susceptibility to electronic warfare, Finland has replaced the missile system with [NASAMS 2](#).^{[152][153][154]} Finland still does use this, mainly in [Jorunge](#). Still ready for wartime use and are all in "operational condition".^[155]

Consolidated UAF Air Defense

BLUF: Current UAF Air Defense (AD) plan balances limited resources to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI), population centers, front line of troops (FLOT), and other key assets across Ukraine. UAF's ability to provide medium range air defense to protect the FLOT will be completely reduced by MAY 23. UAF assessed to withstand 2-3 more wave strikes. As 1st Layer Defense munitions run out, 2nd and 3rd Layer expenditure rates will increase, reducing the ability to defend against Russian aerial attacks from all altitudes.

- Assessment**
- SA-10 and SA-11 comprise 69% of Ukraine's Air Defense medium-high-range, medium-high-range protection (>20,000 ft). Based on **current** interceptor consumption:
 - BLUK (SA-11) will be completely depleted by 31 MAR 2023
 - S300 (SA-10) will be completely depleted by 02 MAY 2023
 - AD systems with remaining interceptor inventory (SA-3, SA-12, NASAMS, S300-T, etc.) have a limited quantity of systems, which means that only select assets can be covered. They are unable to match the Russian volume and cannot be layered.
 - US/AMP SHORAD contributions (Stinger, Avenger, Gepard, etc.) continue to mitigate the expenditure of Strategic and Tactical SAMs. However, short-range, low-altitude systems do not have the same deterrent effect on the threat of Russian multi-role aircraft to the FLOT and CNI.
 - Limited or no Ukrainian Air-to-Air Defense (AZAD)
 - Multiple mitigating options must be simultaneously pursued to increase decision for more sustainable solutions
- RUSSIA**
- Increased Russian capabilities:
 - Air Superiority, AZAD, and Bomber freedom of aerial maneuver (i.e. unguided munitions, etc.)
 - Ground attack capabilities against the Ukrainian FLOT and counteroffensive (i.e. localized air superiority, CAS, ISR, etc.)
 - Improved accuracy, range, and survivability of long-range munitions as they are no longer required to fly terrain contouring flight paths
 - Quantity and duration of strikes, and no longer dependent on ALCMs and Shakhed UAS
 - Gained ability to strike, support, and resupply via fixed and rotary wing (i.e. Airborne Operations, Air Assault, UAS, ISR, CASEVAC, Aerial Resupply, etc.)
 - Decreased Ukrainian capabilities:
 - Inability to prevent Russian air superiority
 - Losses the ability to strike, support, and resupply via fixed and rotary wing (i.e. JDM, ISR, UAS, ISR, CASEVAC, Aerial Resupply, etc.)
 - Losses the ability to mass ground forces on the FLOT and counteroffensive
 - Ukraine will have to choose what CNI to protect
 - Increased consumption rates:
 - SA-10 consumption rate will increase to cover SA-11 as it goes down
- Course of Action**
- (SUNF) Near Term (0-3 Months)
 - Resupply FSU SA-10 and SA-11 munitions from allies and partners
 - Firing Policy Change: SA-10 and SA-11 only engage TACAIR
 - Assist with repair of NMC FSU interceptors
 - (SUNF) Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) (Joint force to include one-way attack UAS, surface fires, SOP, etc.)
 - (SUNF) Military Deception
 - Firing doctrine adjustment (weapon-to-target pairing)
 - (SUNF) Mid Term (3-6 Months)
 - Solicit contributions of Western AD systems (S300-T, NASAMS, Patriot, etc.)
 - (SUNF) Expedite Program "FranklinSAM"
 - Mobile Missile depots to repair non-operational missiles
 - Long Term (6-12 Months)
 - Deliver NATO Air Defense systems at required capacity
 - Establish digital integration solution for Air Defense



| Threats | AD Systems | Current Inventory | Current Rate | Current Status | Current Alt. Rate (Monthly) | Current Status |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------------------|--|
| 1. Additional Strategic SAMs Required | | | | | | |
| SA-10 | 25 | 25 | 421 | 188 | 02 MAY 23 | Primary population center and infrastructure defense |
| SA-11 | 3 | 3 | 55 | 20 | NOV 24 | Firing rates will increase when SA-10 and SA-11 depleted |
| SA-12 | 57 | 50 | 213 | 44 | 03 JUN 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-13 | 2 | 2 | 101 | 42 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-14 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-15 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-16 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-17 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-18 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-19 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-20 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-21 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-22 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-23 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-24 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-25 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-26 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-27 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-28 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-29 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-30 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-31 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-32 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-33 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-34 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-35 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-36 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-37 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-38 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-39 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-40 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-41 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-42 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-43 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-44 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-45 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-46 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-47 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-48 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-49 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |
| SA-50 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 24 | MAY 23 | Strategic FLOT defense |

| Threats | ADA Systems | Systems On-Hand | Systems Req. | Missiles On-Hand | Missile Exp. Rate (Monthly) | Expected Missile Exhaustion | Notes |
|--|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| *EUCOM 25 Assessment | | | | | | | |
| 100K | Patriot | 0 | 12* | 0 | TBD; Est 100 | | 2x RTTYs for delivery in APR 23 (USA & DEU); 2x Launchers Only (NLD) |
| | SAMP/T | 0 | | 0 | TBD | | 1x RTTY (ITA) May 23 (Partial TBM capability) |
| 9x Additional Strategic SAM Batteries Required | | | | | | | |
| 40K | SA-10 | 25 | 25 | 421 | 180 | 02 MAY 23 | Primary population centers and infrastructure defense |
| | SA-12 | 3 | 3 | 55 | 20 | NOV 24 | Firing rates will increase once SA-10 and SA-11 depleted |
| | SA-11 | 57 | 50 | 111 | 60 | 13 APR 23 | Primary FLOT defense |
| | NASAMS | 2 | | 105 | 40 | MAY 23 | Remaining: 6x (US); 1x (CAN); 2x (NOR) |
| | IRIS-T | 1 | 16* | 10 | 24 | MAR 23 | 4x Remain in Commitment (DEU) |
| | HAWK | 0 | | 0 | TBD | | Bahrain, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, UAE |
| | SA-8 | 67 | 67 | 90 | 20 | JUNE 23 | Firing rates will increase once SA-11s are depleted |
| | SA-5 | 3 | 3 | LINK | LINK | | Non-mobile, fixed sites. Legacy SAM system |
| | SA-3 | 5 | 2 | 698 | 33 | DEC 26 | Non-mobile, fixed sites. Least capable SAM system |
| 13x Additional Tactical SAM Batteries Required (Minimum); Goal should be "1:1 for SA-11s" | | | | | | | |
| 12K | MANPADS | N/A | 2928* | 192 | 340 | MAR 23 | Stinger, Igla, Strela-10 |
| | SPADA-2000/Aspide | 1 | | 11 | LINK | | 1x Transferred (Spain); 2x Committed (Italy) |
| | Crotale | 2 | | 22 | LINK | | FRA 2x Delivered |
| | Avenger | 0 | 114* | ~190 | TBD; Est 25 | DEC 23 | 12x Committed (US) |
| | ZSU-23 | 1/UNK | | LINK Study | LINK | | |
| | Gepard | 20 | | 13,800 Rnds | 280 | MAR 27 | 2x FEB; 5x APR (DEU) |
| **100x Additional SHORAD Firing Units Required | | | | | | | |

8a SECRET//NOFORN

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On the other hand, it should be noted that before the war, the Ukrainian army had more than 70 battalions of medium- and long-range missiles (one battalion = one launching position); even if NATO products arrived, it was hard to imagine that they could provide up to 70 companies (NATO launching company ≈ Ukrainian army launch battalion), even though the performance of anti-aircraft missiles may be slightly improved, the overall air defense capability may still decline. Poor prospects for Ukraine in an anti-aircraft missile war of attrition.

(U//FOUO) CIA Operations Center Intelligence Update

TOP SECRET//SI//SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

This version of CIA Operations Center Intelligence Update is from 04:42, 2 March 2023

How to print this Update

Russia: Defense Officials Contemplate Responses to Prigozhin's Claim of Not Receiving Munitions (TS//SI-G//OC/REL FVEY)

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL FVEY) Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials as of late February considered possible actions to counter Wagner owner Prigozhin's public accusations that the MOD was not supplying munitions to his troops in Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Defense officials noted Prigozhin's allegations could be legitimate and proposed doubling munitions supplied to Wagner forces followed by a public statement.

[12](G/OO/121475-23)

Russia, Haiti: Wagner Seeks Possible Security Contracts With Port-au-Prince (S//NF/DSEN)

(S//NF/DSEN) Wagner associates as of late February planned to discreetly travel to Haiti to assess the potential for contracts with the Haitian Government to fight against local gangs, according to a law enforcement report.^[1](DEA-NN-IIR-3998-23)

Hungary, US: Budapest Identifies Washington as Adversary (C//NF)

(C//NF) Hungarian Prime Minister Orban on 22 February identified the US as one of his party's top three adversaries during a political strategy session, according to the US Embassy in Budapest. **Comment: Orban's inclusion of the US in his list of top three adversaries constitutes an escalation of the level of anti-American rhetoric in his discourse.** [2](23 BUDAPEST 51)

Iran: Tehran Prepares for Early March SLV Launch (TS//SI//REL FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL FVEY) The IRGC Aerospace Force as of 28 February is was likely preparing to launch a Gha'em-100 space launch vehicle (SLV) equipped with a Nahid-1 satellite probably in early March, according to a signals intelligence report and imagery analysis.^[3](3/OO/121457-23)^[4](CA0045)

Iran: IAEA Rescinds Tehran's Voting Rights, Director To Visit Tehran for Enrichment Discussions (TS//SI//REL FVEY/FISA)

(TS//SI//REL FVEY/FISA) The IAEA as of late February informed Tehran it lost voting rights at the IAEA for 2023 due to errors in contributions in 2021 and 2022 and required Tehran to pay a sum more than \$1.4 million to restore its voting rights, according to a signals intelligence report. Separately, IAEA Director

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Next up is the CIA set of reports. Although the security level is higher, it feels that the quality has declined. I'm too lazy to comment and see for myself.

(U//FOUO) The below information is current as of 1200 ET/1700Z.

(U) RUSSIA/UKRAINE

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

UAF in Bakhmut Almost Encircled; HUR Plans to Send in Elite Unit to Stabilize Catastrophic Situation

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Ukrainian forces as of 25 February were almost operationally encircled by Russian forces in Bakhmut, Ukraine and Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) Chairman Kyrylo Budanov on 28 February ordered that an elite HUR combat unit be deployed there for 2 weeks to stabilize what he considered a "catastrophic" situation. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Roman Mashovets on 25 February provided Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak with an update, which assessed that the situation in Bakhmut was rather difficult. According to Mashovets, there was only one UAF supply road to Bakhmut, which was subject to shelling, as well as a couple of foot crossings to the left bank of an unspecified river in Bakhmut. He asserted that the contested area had a "204.8 elevation" and that, if the Russian forces gained full control of it, then they would have almost the entire section west of Bakhmut and a direct line of sight to the UAF supply road. Also, if Russian forces were to take control of an unspecified filtration station, then the supply road would again be under a direct line of fire. Mashovets reported that, for those reasons, the morale in Bakhmut was low, with the Ukrainian forces under the impression that they were almost operationally encircled. Budanov on 28 February explained to UAF Ground Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyy, HUR First Deputy Chief Maj. Gen. Oleh Ivashchenko, and a HUR officer identified only as Vova that HUR would bring in units to Bakhmut for a brief time to stabilize the situation. Budanov later relayed to Vova that the situation in Bakhmut was "catastrophic" and Syrskyy declared a need for HUR's Kraken unit to prevent the UAF from losing Bakhmut. Also that day, Syrskyy asserted to Budanov that Ukrainian forces desperately needed to reach Yahidne, Ukraine because an unspecified road was the UAF's "last breathing tube." (COMMENT: This is possibly the supply road that Mashovets referenced.) Budanov ordered Vova to send one of "Shaman's" units to Bakhmut for no more than 2 weeks, instructing him to bring in only the unit's combat element and not its command post. (COMMENT: "Shaman" likely refers to the call sign for HUR officer Ihor Polonskyy. It is unclear if "Shaman's" unit and the Kraken unit are the same.) Vova criticized UAF leadership for insisting on sending a "combat element" to the front lines in Bakhmut without proper command and control, noting that the UAF needed clear control on the ground and that the Kraken unit has demonstrated that it has enough power and resources to establish it.

(U) 3/00/122312-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

Ukraine Learns of Alleged Russian Plot to "Throw" So-Called Special Military Operation By 5 March

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak on 17 February learned of an alleged Russian plot to "throw" the so-called "special military operation," presumably in an attempt to sabotage Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) member Yelyzaveta Bohutska, who received the information from an unidentified Russian source with access to Kremlin officials, Russia planned to divert resources from Taganrog, Russia to Mariupol, Ukraine and focus its attention on the southern front. According to Bohutska's source, the plan for "the offensive" (no further information) was suspected to be a strategy devised by Russian National Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev and Russian Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov to sabotage the Russian effort to defeat Ukraine. According to Bohutska's source, Gerasimov opposed the offensive; he informed Putin that the Ukrainian Armed

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This article is classified as "unclassified//for official use only" (U//FOUO), and it is one of the few unclassified texts among all leaked documents.

The main content of this article consists of 2 parts, and only the first half of the second part can be seen:

1. The situation in Bakhmut (end of February). The U.S. assessment believes that Bakhmut fell into a state of encirclement in the battle at this time, and the morale of the defenders was low. For this reason, Budanov, the director of the Ukrainian General Intelligence Bureau, ordered his Kraken troops to enter Bakhmut for no more than two weeks on February 28 to avoid "disasters." Yermak, Ukrainian president's chief of staff, also believes that the situation in Bakhmut's direction is particularly difficult. The main

point of contention is considered to be the 204.8 highland overlooking the main logistics channel of the Ukrainian army in Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army believes that if the Russian army occupies this highland, it can overlook the only supply route of the Ukrainian army. Under such circumstances, on the 28th, Budanov approached Ukrainian army commander Sirsky and a Ukrainian army commander with the call sign "Viva", explaining that the Ukrainian General Intelligence Bureau could relieve the plight near Bakhmut. Silsky asked Budanov to take back Yahidne (see the picture below for the location), because there is only one lifeline left for the defenders in the city. Budanov then asked Vova to send a unit of the "shaman" (US intelligence believes that the shaman refers to Ihor Polonsky, but it is not clear whether this unit refers to the siren) to perform a task of no more than two weeks, and It is required that only combat troops be sent, not command posts. Weiwa objected that what is needed now is a clear command, how can only combat troops be sent, and the Kraken troops are capable of establishing command.



The mixed command of the Ukrainian army in Bakhmut has been pointed out by many parties. One month later, if the Ukraine Control Map is used as an indicator, the Ukrainian army obviously failed to complete the task of recapturing Yehidne, and its position was further compressed. This means that the logistics of the Ukrainian army is more difficult than at the end of February. The relationship between Budanov and Silsky is noteworthy because it reflects the delicate relationship between the General Directorate of Military Intelligence (GUR) and the armed forces of Ukraine. The fact

that the GUR has combat units out of proportion to its mission remains to be seen what that means in the future.

2. Ukraine believes that Russia may officially abandon "special military operations" on March 5.

The source of all this is Yelyzaveta Bohutska, a member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (belonging to the Servant of the People). The woman claimed to have heard from "Kremlin officials" that Russia was planning to divert resources to the south for some kind of offensive, and that Patrushev and Gerasimov would join forces to oppose Putin's plan. Gerasimov promised to give up the title of "special military operation" when Putin underwent chemotherapy on March 5 and was unable to take power.

Now it's April 8th and nothing happened. I don't know if the Kremlin bed listener that Bohutska found has changed his mind.

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

Forces' capabilities were superior to Russia's and cautioned that Russia would suffer heavy casualties were it to proceed with the offensive. Bohutska on 22 February indicated that Gerasimov reportedly planned to continue his efforts to sabotage the offensive, noting that he promised to "throw" the so-called special military operation by 5 March, when Putin was allegedly scheduled to start a round of chemotherapy and would thus be unable to influence the war effort.

(U) 3/00/122254-23

Russian MoD Provides Plan to Strike UAF Locations in Odesa, Mykolaiv for 3 March

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided plans for the Combined Grouping of Troops to conduct missile strikes against Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) locations in Odesa and Mykolaiv for 3 March. All of the strikes were to take place when the unit was ready and would utilize a weapon system to be decided by the commander. The location in Mykolaiv was a workshop on the grounds of an armored vehicle factory used to repair UAF armored vehicles. The following additional locations were targeted in Odesa: an aviation factory used for storing and updating Ukrainian Tu-141 "Strizh" UAVs; an alleged location of a Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system in between healthcare facilities; and a temporary deployment point for UAF "Pravyy Sektor" subunits reportedly containing up to 100 personnel.

(U) 5/00/122643-23

Russian GOU Provides Potential Targeting Information for Ukrainian Energy Infrastructure, Bridges

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian 3rd Directorate, Main Operations Directorate (GOU) provided targeting information as of 28 February on 12 energy infrastructure facilities and 12 bridges in Ukraine, which would potentially be struck on an unspecified date. The type of munitions to be used was unspecified. (COMMENT: The potential strikes were likely in the planning or approval process.) The potential targets provided were as follows: seven thermoelectric power plants near Shostka, Chernihiv, Sumy, Eskhar, Kamianske, Mykolaiv, and Odesa; five electric substations near Liubotyn, Krasnohrad, Lozova, Piatykhavky, and Kryvyi Rih; ten railroad bridges near Novomoskovsk, Balivka, Pidhorodne, Pavlohrad, Dnipro, Vasylyivka, and Zaporizhzhia; and two vehicle bridges near Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro.

(U) 6/00/122297-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Ukrainian President Suggests Striking Unspecified Russian Deployment Locations in Rostov, Russia

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in late February suggested striking Russian deployment locations in Russia's Rostov Oblast using UAVs. Zelenskyy on 28 February expressed concern to Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) Commander-in-Chief Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyi and an unidentified Ukrainian official that Ukraine does not have long-range missiles capable of reaching Russian troop deployments in Russia nor anything with which to attack them. He suggested that Ukraine attack unspecified deployment locations in Rostov with unspecified UAVs. Zaluzhnyi assessed that Ukraine could reach Tuapse, Russia—which Zelenskyy believed was unnecessary—and noted that, after Russian troops arrived in Rostov, they would be on the move. Zelenskyy added that the Russian forces were traveling to Avdiivka, Ukraine. The unidentified official calculated that the troops would arrive in Avdiivka as soon as 5 or 10 March. (According to BBC Monitoring on 28 February, local media reported that an oil facility in the southern Russian Black Sea port of Tuapse was slightly damaged by a fire following an apparent attack by UAVs. Local residents heard two explosions seconds apart, after which a fire broke out.)

(U) 6/00/122318-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russia Devises Plans to Combat NATO Tanks Going to Ukraine Beginning April 2023

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian General Staff and Ground Forces in February developed measures to combat NATO tanks that were expected to be delivered to Ukraine beginning in April. The strategy called for establishing three fire zones based on range—long, medium, and short—with each zone covered by specific weaponry and unit types. At the same time, personnel training efforts would be administered to educate on the vulnerabilities of NATO tanks, and to develop morale and psychological fortitude within the personnel units confronting them. Financial incentives would be

3. Russia plans to attack Odessa and Migulayev on March 3. The main target in Migulayev was a workshop of an armored vehicle repair plant, in Odessa a plant for storing and upgrading Tu-141 UAVs, between medical facilities allegedly deployed Cheetah self-propelled anti-aircraft guns positions, as well as a temporary camp for about a hundred "Right Sector" militants.

I have not found out whether this attack happened.

4. The President of Ukraine intends to attack an unspecified Russian deployment site in Rostov, Russia. On February 28, Zelensky, Zaluzhny and another unidentified Ukrainian official said Ukraine had no long-range strike means capable of reaching Russian military camps in Russia. Zelensky suggested that the Ukrainian military use drones to strike Russian troops in Rostov. Zaluzhne believes that Ukraine can hit Tuapse at most (Ukraine just attacked Tuapse's oil refinery with drones on 2.28), and Zelensky thinks it is meaningless to hit Tuapse. Zaluzhny also believes that the Russian army in Rostov will not stay long and will act soon (in other words, it is too late to fight now). Zelenskiy added that Russian troops are advancing towards Yadrivka and may arrive between March 5-10.

The content of this material makes little sense, but the problem is the way the United States obtained this material. The content of this material does not look like a briefing from the Ukrainian side (because the chat content is too boring, and a person whose name is not even known is recorded on the scene). SI-GAMMA is mentioned in the security code, and the level is top secret. I guess the US military has monitored the communications of the President of Ukraine (of course, this is not surprising after the prism). It is also mentioned here that the US military confirmed that the source of the attack on the refinery was the BBC citing local surveillance camera footage, and did not cite an independent verification source (perhaps the independent verification source simply does not exist).

5. The Russian army is taking measures to deal with the Ukrainian Western-made main battle tanks that will appear on the battlefield in April. The strategy formulated by the Russian General Staff and the Army includes setting up a three-layer firepower network from far, middle and near, and studying the weaknesses of Western tanks.

This is another SI-GAMMA document, and it is guessed that it is also the information obtained by the United States monitoring the communications of the Russian powerful department. This information itself is not very valuable.

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

offered for the capture or destruction of foreign tanks, and videos of tanks being destroyed would be widely distributed to reduce the confidence of Ukraine and the West and reassure Russian troops of their ability to overcome this new weaponry. The General Staff expected the proposed measures to undermine any desires by Ukrainian leadership to launch counterattacks, damage the image of NATO members that lend support due to the destruction or capture of their so-called modern tanks, and discourage the West from rendering additional assistance to Ukraine.

(U) G/00/122542-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian Armed Forces Tasked With Mine-Clearing Operations in Luhanska for Gazprom Pipeline

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian state energy conglomerate Gazprom officials in early February requested mine-clearing support from Russian Armed Forces for an area in Luhanska Oblast, Ukraine where they would be building a pipeline between different gas distribution networks. The Gazprom officials specified that the pipeline would be constructed between Raihorodka and Trokhizbenka. (COMMENT: Despite this projected location, additional coordinates and engineering reconnaissance reports detailed below indicate the area being cleared of mines is between Krymske and Trokhizbenka.) In response to the request from Gazprom officials, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Chief of Engineering Forces was expected to have a proposal outlining the actions required to fulfill the request by 10 February. A Russian MoD official on 6 February reported results of engineering reconnaissance around the area of the projected pipeline, which was defined as an area between Trokhizbenka and Krymske. The overall inspection area consisted of 18 hectares, of which 7 hectares had already been cleared of mines as of 6 February, and was noted to contain hard-to-traverse areas because of plots containing dense vegetation. Preliminary reconnaissance revealed that there were mixed mine fields within the inspection area, specifically PMN and TM-62 mines. It was also specified that to properly conduct mine-clearing operations, a BMP-3M vehicle would need to be allocated. Additionally, an element from the 2nd Army Corps 36th Separate Engineering and Construction Battalion would be tasked with mine-clearing a reinforced concrete vehicle bridge over the Severskiy Donets River near Trokhizbenka.

(U) G/IT/122383-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russia Reports Insufficient Personnel, Equipment Levels of Eastern GTF Subunits

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian National Defense Command Center in February disseminated a report on the decreased combat capability of military units operating under the Eastern Grouping of Troops (Forces) (GTF) due to an insufficient quantity of specialized personnel, functioning military equipment, weapons and ammunition as of 15 February. The Russian Federal Security Service Department for Military Counterintelligence reported security and munition storage protocol violations at field army warehouses within the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 29th Combined Arms Army that could possibly lead to incidents. Specifically, over-watch posts at the brigade's combat positions were not fully deployed, security for the field army warehouse was not assigned, fake warehouse positions were not equipped, and munitions storage locations were not camouflaged. Additionally, vehicles were not being inspected for explosives, man-made barriers with ground sensors for the most dangerous areas of the artillery warehouse were not installed, and artillery ammunition was being stored outside of its packaging in an open field.

(U) G/00/122329-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

UNSG Considering Early March Travel to Ukraine to Meet With Ukrainian President

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres and UN Office of the Secretary-General Director Miguel Graca on 28 February discussed the possibility of Guterres traveling to Ukraine in early March to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Guterres disclosed that Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak notified him that Zelenskyy wanted to speak with Guterres in person, which seemed to annoy Guterres. Nonetheless, Guterres wanted Graca to explore possible scenarios for a trip to Kyiv. While Guterres clearly was not happy about going to Kyiv, he asserted that if this was what it took to "disentangle the situation," then it was necessary to make the trip. Guterres instructed Graca to keep the possible trip confidential, and did not want the Ukrainians to know that the UN was exploring the possibilities of a trip there at that time. Shortly thereafter, Graca alerted Assistant Secretary-General for Department of Safety and Security Unaisi Lutu Vuniwaqa about Guterres's possible trip to Ukraine. He

The Russian Defense Command issued a report in February on the decline in the combat effectiveness of the military units of the Eastern Army Group due to problems with professionals, available military equipment, weapons and ammunition until February 15. The Military Counterintelligence Department of the Russian Federal Security Service reported that the ammunition reserves in the field depots of the 36th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 29th Army Group violated the norms and could lead to accidents. In particular, the observation posts at the brigade combat positions were not fully deployed, the field warehouses were not guarded, the fake warehouse locations were not installed, and the ammunition storage locations were not camouflaged. In addition, vehicles were not inspected for explosives, artificial barriers equipped with ground sensors were not installed in the most dangerous areas, and artillery ammunition was unpacked and placed in the open.

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

presented two travel scenarios for the trip: leave New York on 6 March after the opening of the annual Commission on the Status of Women and return by 9 March in time for the afternoon session of the UN General Assembly; or leave New York in the afternoon of 10 March and return on 14 March. Graca added that the travel into Kyiv would be by either car or train, and emphasized that they were just looking at the possibilities of travel at this point and doing internal groundwork without reaching out to any external entities or countries, including Ukraine.

(U) G/00/122293-23

Almost Certainly IAEA DG Upset About Probable UN Refusal of ZNPP Visit Amid Fighting

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials in mid-February shared that "he," almost certainly referring to IAEA Director-General (DG) Rafael Grossi, was upset over the reluctance of unidentified individuals, probably UN officials, to allow an IAEA mission to travel to or from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid battles in the area and reportedly wanted to push back probably on the hesitancy. Grossi's Senior Adviser Diego Candano Laris on 17 February disclosed to IAEA Chief of Cabinet Jacek Bylica that Candano received a map detailing battles in "the area," probably referring to the area surrounding or along the route that the IAEA used to rotate inspectors to the ZNPP. Candano explained that the map was shared as a way to justify why "no one" wanted to cross this area. According to Candano, almost certainly Grossi explained that he did not understand the logic and believed that if Ukraine and Russia both guaranteed the route and voiced that they would not attack presumably the IAEA mission, then it should not matter if there was fighting happening. Candano revealed that almost certainly Grossi believed that the IAEA should be pushing back and that almost certainly Grossi was already "very upset." Bylica agreed with Candano and shared that there were a lot of people that were upset. However, Bylica alleged that the UN had not yet received a "positive message" in writing from either of the countries, that the Russians' message was only made orally, and that the Russians had not responded to the UN.

(U) 3/00/122310-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF)

South Korea Mired in End User Concerns Related to U.S. Push to Obtain Ammunition for Ukraine

(S//SI-G//OC/NF) Yi Mun-hui, Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs at South Korea's National Security Office (NSO), on 1 March informed NSO Director Kim Sung-han that the South Korean National Security Council (NSC) was mired in concerns that the U.S. would not be the end user if South Korea were to comply with a U.S. request for ammunition. The NSC reportedly was also worried that the U.S. President would call South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol directly. Yi stressed that South Korea was not prepared to have a call between the heads of state without having a clear position on the issue, adding that South Korea could not violate its policy against supplying lethal aid, so officially changing the policy would be the only option. Yi urged Kim to solicit the thoughts of Im Ki-hun, Secretary to the President for National Defense at the NSO, since Im pledged to determine a final stance by 2 March. Yi advised that Kim should then discuss the matter further with the NSC if it were still necessary. Kim expressed his concern over how the issue would be perceived domestically: if the announcement of Yoon's state visit to the U.S. were to coincide with an announcement that South Korea changed its stance on providing lethal aid to Ukraine, the public would think the two had been done as a trade. Kim then suggested the possibility of selling the 330,000 rounds of 155-mm ammunition to Poland since getting the ammunition to Ukraine quickly was the ultimate goal of the United States. Yi agreed that it may be possible for Poland to agree to being called the end user and send the ammunition on to Ukraine. Yi noted that the draft legislation on allowing advanced countries to be named as end users for arms exports was in the process of becoming law, but South Korea would need to verify what Poland would do.

(U) Z-G/00/122198-23

(U) RUSSIA

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, CAN, GBR)

Russian MoD Concerned Over Potential NATO Naval Forces Navigating Internal Channels of NSR


(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, CAN, GBR) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in early February provided an assessment discussing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the threat of U.S. and NATO military assets in the region. According to the

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TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

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Clarification on issue of ammunition provided by South Korea - National Security Office (NSO) Assistant Chairman for Foreign Affairs Yi Mun-hui said [may] allow sale of 330,000 rounds of ammunition to Poland and allow Poland to put But it has to be provided to Ukraine, but it involves legal issues. Considering that the Americans have already prepared all the transportation plans excitedly, this matter should be almost inseparable.



Bachmut topographic map. It includes the number of Ukrainian troops (about 12 brigades, a total of 15,000-30,500 people), the strength of the Russian army (10 mobilization battalions with combat effectiveness, 15 mobilization battalions with combat effectiveness (?), 10 mobilization battalions without combat effectiveness, 12 Wagner detachments), about 29,000 people.

BDA From Recent Strike? 21Feb23 KP0255 POSS. Severe Damage

RFI# 750 |



Target: KP0255 / Assembly Area
GRID: 48 802225 38 036200
Pre-Strike Image ID: 20FEB23221207048000E000.tif
Post-Strike Image ID: 21FEB2325202120041812000021E_SAAAAA8NABND
Date of Assessment: 21FEB23
Organization: 176 IS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Overall Assessment is: **POSSIBLE SEVERE DAMAGE**
US-Produced / US-Measured Target

Pre-Strike 20FEB23 1116Z



(SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY) On 21FEB23 1420Z, UAF engaged 1x Assembly Area with 2x PSW munitions, located IVO Bakhtul.
PHYSICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: POSSIBLE SEVERE DAMAGE The strike caused severe damage to the structure. Comparing the post strike image to pre strike imagery, the structure identification features are no longer visible. The weaponized air point is approximately 0.5km from the FLOT.

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BDA From Recent Strike? 15Feb23 KP0041 - Severe RFI# 750 | Damage GBU BBCARD



Target: KP0041 / C2 NODE
GRID: 47 834649 07 858150
Pre-Strike Image ID: 10FEB23221109064000E000
Post-Strike Image ID: OSINT
Date of Assessment: 15FEB23
Organization: SAG-U

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY


Overall Assessment is: **Confirmed Severe Damage**
US-Produced / US-Measured Target

Pre-Strike 10FEB23 1323Z



(SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY) On 15FEB23 0430Z, UAF engaged 1x C2 NODE with 3x GBU munitions, located IVO Marinka, likely associated with 8th CAA. **PHYSICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: CONFIRMED SEVERE DAMAGE** The strike destroyed the northeastern center segment of the building causing 45% damage to the target resulting in windows to be blown out, debris scattered, walls to fall, panels to be blown off the walls, as well as the roof, and a collapse of the northern center segment of the building. There is a vehicle north of the target that appears to be loaded up with scavenged equipment left over. The Targeted building in the south was not damaged. There is observable historic damage in the area. Only 1x of the 3x GBU rounds has observable damage. The weaponized air point is approximately 6 km from the FLOT. **INITIAL FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT: CONFIRMED SEVERE FUNCTIONAL DAMAGE** The northern structure suffered total functional damage due to the mass amount physical damage, debris, and collapse of portions of the building. The southern target suffered no physical damage and sustained no functional damage.

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The U.S. military uses satellite images to conduct damage assessment (BDA) for Ukrainian military strikes using precision-guided weapons. When laser-guided bombs were used to attack a command facility near 8 episodes in Malinka, only one target building was completely destroyed, and the other one was missed. Data on the location of the target is also worth looking at. The target point is 0.5-6 km from the front line (FLOT).



SECRET//NOFORN

RFI# 750 | Why are JDAM-ERs Failing? BDA From Recent Strike?



BLUF: JDAM-ER isn't "failing" however there are two factors that have contributed to duds and/or misses.

- Bomb Fuzes Not Arming At Release** - This was the case on 15 Feb (1x high order explosion / 2x dud at 1000 ft). See pic displaying fix (Above).
 - The UKR AF have implemented a material fix to ensure JDAM-ER fuzes are arming correctly. Using base arming lanyard off to the aft MAU-12 sway brace.
- GPS signal acquisition** - The SAG-U and TF Greywolf suspected that RUS GPS jamming hindered JDAM-ER operations, causing some misses (also the case sometimes with GMLRS). However, the Director of the Joint Navigation Warfare Center (JNWC) stated based on their analysis, GPS jamming should have not affected the JDAM-ER strikes based on target location compared to active Russian jammers, but other factors may have prevented the JDAM-ER from acquiring GPS signal. EC JFM50 is working with USAF and SAG-U to ensure UKR is following appropriate TTPs to ensure the JDAM-ERs have a good GPS location from the pylon prior to weapon employment and is not trying to get GPS acquisition in flight after launch.
 - The UKR AF have dropped 9x JDAM-ER against 3x targets (one re-attack due to a miss). Each target required 2-3 JDAM-ER to achieve desired effects per 603 AOC / A32T weaponizing.
 - The GWT and SAG-U assess good effects on all 3x targets w/ 21 Feb strike BHA / BDA on going. (storyboards attached)
 - The GWT assesses medium to high confidence that 4/9 weapons have missed due to RUS GPS jamming effects.
 - RUS GPS jammers are a high priority for SAG-U, and we will continue to advocate / recommend that those jammers are disrupted / destroyed by land S/S fires to the maximum extent possible before JDAM-ER employments.

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JDAM-ER has been put into use by Ukraine at the end of February, and the hit rate is not good. The U.S. military therefore analyzed the reasons. Sometimes the bomb fuse is not installed properly. The U.S. Security Assistance Group in Ukraine (SAG-U) and "Task Force Gray Wolf" (the [U.S. Air Force's technical verification team in Germany](#)) believe that the GPS jammers set up by the Russians may partially interfere with the accuracy of JDAM-ER (some Sometimes it can interfere with GMLRS); however, the director of the Joint Guidance Operations Center (JNWC) believes that in principle, GPS jammers cannot interfere with the above-mentioned weapons, but other reasons cause JDAM-ER to fail to receive GPS signals well. The United States is currently working on solving this problem, or studying countermeasures against Russian GPS jammers. Ukraine conducted 4 attacks on 3 targets (one of the targets was repeatedly attacked due to the first bombing), and a total of 9 bombs were used, 4 of which missed.




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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

ICDD: 28 0030 EST February 2023


Ukraine | Freeze Favorable To Vehicle Maneuver (~16 INCHES) Projections



** CURRENT INTEL: NOT FULLY IC COORDINATED OR SOURCED **

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

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This picture has been going viral recently. The numbers of the brigades, the corresponding equipment numbers, and the time of formation of the army are all in the picture, and I will not describe them separately. In short, it points to a statement that the above-mentioned brigade will basically complete the training between the beginning of April and the end of April. The specific equipment quantity and source can be seen by yourself. This is basically correct with the previous disclosure of open source information.

US, A&P UAF Combat Equip

BLUF: Based on known contributions, training pathways, and projections, (12) combat credible BDEs can be generated for the Spring Counteroffensive, (3) internally by Ukraine, and (9) are US, Allied & Partner (US/A&P) trained and equipped. Of the (9) BDEs, (6) BDEs will be ready by 31MAR, and the final (3) BDEs by 30APR. Equipment delivery times will impact training and readiness in order to meet this timeline.

| Committed: | Committed: | % Delivered |
|------------|------------|-------------|
| | | |

Committed, No Timeline:
C&E 40 x Sentinel
EST: 8 x FH-70


50a. Tanks Unpaired, Choc Time:

SECRET/REL TO FRM, UKR, FVEY, NATO

ay something about troop generation. At present, the formation of the newly formed Ukrainian mechanized brigade is very similar: basically a tank battalion consisting of 2 tank companies, 3 mechanized battalions/motorized infantry battalions, and 2 artillery battalions reduced to about 2/3. Considering that what Ukraine currently lacks is shells rather than guns, it makes no difference to reduce some artillery strength. Tanks are estimated to be the number that NATO and Ukraine can make up in the short term. NATO has not talked about replenishing the losses of Ukraine's existing tank formations. Considering that the United States has a relatively high assessment of the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian ground forces, it is possible that the loss ratio of the existing tank formations has not been large enough to significantly affect the combat capability.

In addition, the above material does not discuss the three brigades organized in Ukraine (guessing refers to the 41st Mechanized Brigade, the 142nd Reserve Infantry Brigade and the Integrated Infantry Brigade [reported by MilitaryLand in early April](#)). It looks like the three brigades will use exclusively Ukrainian supplied equipment, and I'm not sure what that will be. Maybe Ukraine has really dug out some deep tank reserves? Or Ukraine managed to integrate no less than 90 captured Russian tanks? It remains to be seen further. Adding to the doubt is that it seems that the newly organized brigades of the Ukrainian Marine Corps (the 37th, 38th, and possibly even a 34th) were never brought into the discussion.

It also mentioned the designation of the new campaign army: the 9th Strategic Reserve Army and the 10th Campaign Army; the 9th Army was used to rotate the rebuilt troops, and the 10th Army was used to carry out offensive operations. The number of brigades the two armies will receive is undecided. Previously, the pro-Ukraine camp had been discussing that Ukraine intends to add some military headquarters as a more fixed intermediate command level between the brigade and the direction command (previously only a temporary command organization such as a campaign group/strategic battle group was set up). This information officially disclosed the existence of these two military departments.



The remaining few pictures are the first batch of pictures to be fired. They are very classic, and I don't have much to say, just look at the data.

Edited at 2023-04-12 10:26 · IP belongs to Beijing