

1 **Tuesday, 15 October 2024**

2 **(10.00 am)**

3 **LORD HUGHES:** Yes, Mr O'Connor.

4 **MR O'CONNOR:** Sir, our first witness this morning

5 is Caroline Sturgess who is going to read a short pen

6 portrait about her daughter, Dawn.

7 The statement she is going to read is supported by

8 a photograph of Dawn which we will bring up now.

9 **LORD HUGHES:** Please.

10 **MR O'CONNOR:** So perhaps first of all Mrs Sturgess

11 could stand to take the affirmation.

12 **MRS CAROLINE STURGESS (affirmed)**

13 **LORD HUGHES:** Mrs Sturgess, you are welcome to sit

14 down unless you particularly want to stand. All right,

15 thank you very much.

16 Now, do we have the photograph? Yes. All right,

17 Mrs Sturgess, over to you.

18 **A.** I am Caroline Sturgess, Dawn's mother. This

19 is on behalf of the whole family and I am writing it for

20 the purpose of the Inquiry.

21 Dawn was the eldest of our four girls, a mother of

22 three children herself. Now she would have been

23 a grandmother, but she will never have the absolute joy

24 of meeting her first grandchild and doesn't get to watch

25 her grow.

1

1 repeated. She was a very loved mother, daughter,

2 grand-daughter, sister, auntie, niece, cousin and

3 friend.

4 I last spoke to my daughter on the evening before

5 the incident. We spoke at length about the excitement

6 she felt at the prospect of finally leaving the hostel

7 and living independently once more.

8 The final part of our conversation that night was

9 discussing taking Dawn's daughter to her the following

10 day so they could spend some time together. She was to

11 ring me that morning with a confirmed time for me to

12 drop her off. It was pure chance that Dawn had sprayed

13 herself with the Novichok before her daughter arrived.

14 Dawn's death was a tragedy to us all, but the fact

15 that her daughter was not killed as well is solace that

16 we often revisit.

17 We understand that the perfume bottle contained

18 enough Novichok to kill thousands of people. Again,

19 although we were devastated by her death, our family

20 finds comfort that Dawn was the only life lost that day

21 when the potential harm was much, much more and we know

22 she would agree.

23 The next section is just a quote from Dawn's

24 daughter:

25 "Me and my mum had a bond that I will never forget.

3

1 She was an intelligent, funny, extremely selfless

2 and very kind person. She always cared deeply for her

3 family and many friends that surrounded her. She did

4 not judge a single person and strived to make others

5 happy, even when she didn't feel like smiling herself.

6 Dawn was raised in a normal, loving, caring family

7 in a village where we knew each other and where the

8 majority of our family still live today. Her

9 circumstances escalated to her living in John Baker

10 House for the last two years of her life.

11 Dawn grasped this opportunity to address her

12 issues. She was excited that it would be a new starting

13 block for a fresh chapter. She remained in constant

14 contact and was totally supported by us all.

15 Dawn's main priority continued to be the welfare of

16 her children. Her youngest, still in primary school,

17 was always very excited to see her mum. I tried to take

18 her in to see her as much as possible. They loved

19 spending quality time together. Dawn always greeted her

20 in the same manner, on her knees with her arms out so

21 she could run into her arms.

22 The narrative that has been set for Dawn on social

23 media and in the press was extremely distressing to

24 everyone who personally knew her. She was not a known

25 drug user, as had initially been reported and then

2

1 The day I heard she had fallen really ill was

2 heartbreaking to hear. In my mind I thought she would

3 push through it because there was nothing my mum

4 couldn't handle. The day I heard everyone was going to

5 say their goodbyes when she was in intensive care was so

6 upsetting. Shortly after she passed away. One thing

7 I will never forget is due to my age I never saw her or

8 got to say goodbye."

9 **LORD HUGHES:** Mrs Sturgess, thank you very much.

10 Not easy. I will rise for five minutes just to allow

11 people to rearrange themselves in court.

12 **(10.04 am)**

13 **(Short Break)**

14 **(10.09 am)**

15 **LORD HUGHES:** Ms Whitelaw.

16 **MS WHITELAW:** Good morning, sir. Good morning

17 Deputy Chief Constable. My name is Francesca Whitelaw

18 and I ask questions on behalf of the Inquiry.

19 Could you give us your full name, please?

20 **A.** It is Paul Mills.

21 **Q.** You have made three --

22 **LORD HUGHES:** Has the gentleman been sworn,

23 Ms Whitelaw?

24 **MS WHITELAW:** No, thank you.

25

4

1 **DEPUTY CHIEF CONSTABLE PAUL MILLS (sworn)**  
 2 **LORD HUGHES:** Thank you, Mr Mills. Stand or sit  
 3 according to comfort.  
 4 **Questioned by MS WHITELAW**  
 5 **MS WHITELAW:** Thank you. You have made three  
 6 witness statements for the Inquiry. You should have  
 7 a copy of those witness statements in front of you.  
 8 **A.** I have, thank you.  
 9 **Q.** Thank you very much for making those witness  
 10 statements and for attending today to give evidence.  
 11 Could we just look at those witness statements in  
 12 turn. Firstly, your core witness statement, extending  
 13 to some 235 pages, is dated 13 October 2024. Sir, it is  
 14 tab 5 in your witness bundle.  
 15 **LORD HUGHES:** I have it. Thank you.  
 16 **MS WHITELAW:** For the transcript, the reference is  
 17 INQ006090.  
 18 On page 235, the last page, is there a signature?  
 19 **A.** I will just turn to that. Yes, there is.  
 20 **Q.** And is that your signature?  
 21 **A.** Yes, it is.  
 22 **Q.** Are the contents of that statement true to the  
 23 best of your knowledge and belief?  
 24 **A.** Yes, they are.  
 25 **Q.** The next statement, a supplementary statement

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1 **Q.** Can you confirm that the contents are true to  
 2 the best of your knowledge and belief?  
 3 **A.** I can confirm that.  
 4 **Q.** Thank you very much. Deputy Chief Constable,  
 5 this morning you are giving introductory evidence about  
 6 your role in Wiltshire Police and their involvement in  
 7 the events of 2018 which is going to be drawn primarily  
 8 from your summary statement, but you are due to return  
 9 to give evidence later in the week to give more detailed  
 10 factual evidence about Wiltshire Police's response to  
 11 the poisoning of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley.  
 12 Sir, given this, with your permission, the Inquiry  
 13 intends to publish the supplementary statement of DCC  
 14 Mills after his evidence on Thursday.  
 15 **LORD HUGHES:** Yes, I'm sure that's helpful.  
 16 **MS WHITELAW:** Thank you.  
 17 To begin, could you tell us your current role,  
 18 please?  
 19 **A.** Yes, I'm currently one of two Deputy Chief  
 20 Constables with Wiltshire Police.  
 21 **Q.** Are you based at Police Headquarters in  
 22 Devizes?  
 23 **A.** Yes, I am.  
 24 **Q.** You have been a police officer for 29 years;  
 25 is that correct?

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1 of 16 pages, is dated 11 October 2024. The reference  
 2 for the Inquiry is INQ006091 and, sir, it is tab 6 in  
 3 your witness bundle.  
 4 **LORD HUGHES:** Tab 6 or tab 7?  
 5 **MS WHITELAW:** That one should be tab 6 and there's  
 6 a third witness statement in tab 7.  
 7 **LORD HUGHES:** Yes, that's fine, although 7 seems to  
 8 bear the date 11 October. Perhaps they both do?  
 9 **MS WHITELAW:** It does indeed. They both are dated  
 10 11 October.  
 11 Could you just confirm that that statement is true  
 12 to the best of your knowledge and belief?  
 13 **A.** I can just say the copy I have in front of me  
 14 isn't signed, but I can confirm that I have signed that  
 15 statement.  
 16 **Q.** And that the contents are true?  
 17 **A.** Yes, and the contents are true.  
 18 **Q.** Finally, given the length of your core  
 19 statement, you have prepared an overview summary  
 20 statement of some 44 pages which is at tab 7, sir, again  
 21 dated 11 October and the Inquiry reference is INQ006117.  
 22 Is there a signature on that one on page 44?  
 23 **A.** Yes, there is.  
 24 **Q.** Is that your signature?  
 25 **A.** Yes, it is.

6

1 **A.** Yes, that's correct.  
 2 **Q.** When did you transfer to Wiltshire Police?  
 3 **A.** I transferred to Wiltshire Police in 2007 from  
 4 Northamptonshire Police.  
 5 **Q.** Moving to your role at the time of the  
 6 Salisbury and Amesbury poisonings, at the time of the  
 7 poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal on 4 March 2018,  
 8 were you an Assistant Chief Constable?  
 9 **A.** That's correct.  
 10 **Q.** And had you been in that role since  
 11 September 2014?  
 12 **A.** That's correct.  
 13 **Q.** I think, as it happens, the day after the  
 14 Skripal poisonings on 5 March you were promoted to  
 15 temporary Deputy Chief Constable?  
 16 **A.** Yes. That was a planned promotion  
 17 notwithstanding these events.  
 18 **Q.** So was that also the rank you held at the time  
 19 of Dawn Sturgess' poisoning?  
 20 **A.** Yes, it was.  
 21 **Q.** And that promotion was made substantive  
 22 in September 2018?  
 23 **A.** Yes, it was.  
 24 **Q.** Now, for both the Salisbury and Amesbury  
 25 poisonings -- and it is relevant to deal with both as

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1 your roles overlapped -- could you confirm for me that  
2 you held the following roles? So first of all, on  
3 4 March 2018, the date of the Skripal poisonings, were  
4 you the on-call Chief Officer?

5 **A.** Yes, I was.

6 **Q.** Does that mean what it says, the most senior  
7 officer who is on call at the time?

8 **A.** That is correct.

9 **LORD HUGHES:** Chief Officers being presumably the  
10 Chief Constable, you, the deputy and the assistants?

11 **A.** Yes, sir. At that point in time, sir, we had  
12 a Chief Constable, we didn't actually have a deputy, so  
13 it was two Assistant Chief Constables and we worked on  
14 a rota.

15 **LORD HUGHES:** Yes, thank you very much.

16 **MS WHITELAW:** So what is the Chief Officer's role  
17 in those circumstances?

18 **A.** So it is an on-call role. Below it, you have  
19 a superintendent who in essence is the Silver Commander  
20 for the force 24/7 during any given period, and the role  
21 of the Chief Officer really is around what I would call  
22 critical incidents, incidents which may have  
23 a significant impact upon the force and indeed upon  
24 those who we provide a service to. So it's an  
25 escalation role. You are contacted by the

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1 **A.** It's a little bit further than that, sir. So  
2 the Act creates an obligation to make sure there's  
3 appropriate planning in place around potential emergency  
4 incidences, and then there's a response element of it as  
5 well. So in relation to the SCG, if I may call it that,  
6 that is the response element of it and SCG and also  
7 what's called TCGs, which are is the Tactical  
8 Coordinating Group, they are put in place if an incident  
9 does occur to make sure there's an appropriate response.

10 **LORD HUGHES:** Yes, and all this is a system which  
11 has been thought out in advance and is applied when  
12 something happens; is that it?

13 **A.** That's right, sir, and it comes from the  
14 learning of other events.

15 **LORD HUGHES:** Right.

16 **MS WHITELAW:** So the SCG is a multi-agency body --

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** -- for coordinating the local joint response  
19 to an emergency at local strategic level; is that  
20 correct?

21 **A.** Yes, and I think the key word there is the  
22 emergency element of it. So it's normally at a point  
23 where a major incident has been declared and then  
24 there's different levels of partners in it, there's  
25 category 1 partners and category 2 partners, which would

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1 Superintendent in the event of such an incident  
2 happening, at which point in time you would take on the  
3 role of what's called a Gold Commander to oversee  
4 the policing response to such an incident.

5 **Q.** So secondly, in terms of your roles over this  
6 period, between 5 March and 23 March, so the period of  
7 the immediate response to the Skripal poisonings, did  
8 you chair the Wiltshire and Swindon Local Resilience  
9 Forum Strategic Coordination Group?

10 **A.** Yes, I did.

11 **Q.** We will abbreviate that, if we may, to SCG?

12 **LORD HUGHES:** That's a bit of a mouth full,  
13 Ms Whitelaw. Give it to me again.

14 **MS WHITELAW:** That is the Wiltshire and Swindon  
15 Local Resilience Forum Strategic Coordination Group and  
16 if I may, sir, I'm going to break that down a little  
17 bit. To start with, the Local Resilience Forum, is that  
18 a process for bringing together responders within  
19 a police force area under the Civil Contingencies Act  
20 2004 so they cooperate and fulfil various roles and  
21 responsibilities in response to an incident?

22 **A.** Yes, it is. That is the framework for civil  
23 protection in a given police force area working with  
24 partners.

25 **LORD HUGHES:** So it's an incident specific --

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1 come together as a multi-agency forum to oversee the  
2 strategic response.

3 **Q.** So those partners, if I can just zoom out  
4 a little bit to the broader membership, would that  
5 include Wiltshire Police but also Counter Terrorism  
6 Police in these incidents, Wiltshire Council, Public  
7 Health England -- you are nodding, but if you could just  
8 say "yes" so that we have it on the transcript?

9 **A.** Yes, sorry. Yes, yes.

10 **Q.** Department for Environment, Food and Rural  
11 Affairs and potentially military representatives as  
12 well. Those sorts of partner bodies?

13 **A.** It would. I think it's important to give that  
14 context that some of those bodies are national bodies  
15 that wouldn't normally be involved in a local response,  
16 but due to the nature of what we were dealing with, they  
17 came alongside what I would call the normal category 1  
18 responders.

19 **Q.** So representatives attending the meetings?

20 **A.** Yes, that's right.

21 **Q.** You mentioned sitting beneath that SCG was  
22 a Tactical Coordinating Group to deliver tactical  
23 responses. So is that also multi-agency?

24 **A.** Yes, it is, and just to briefly expand on  
25 that. So the SCG sets the strategy for the overall

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1 response and then the TCG is responsible for putting in  
2 place a tactical plan to actually deliver the strategy.

3 **Q.** Could we just go to INQ005141 on the screen,  
4 please.

5 This is a witness statement made in December 2019  
6 by a witness we're going to hear from later, but if  
7 I could just go to page 3, please, if you could look at  
8 that top paragraph there, which deals with the SCG, and  
9 in particular I just want to draw your attention five  
10 lines down:

11 "The SCG was responsible for steps taken to protect  
12 the public outside the national security investigation."

13 Is that something with which you agree?

14 **A.** Yes, I do agree with that. I think it was  
15 very much a partnership. We are intelligence led by the  
16 investigation and what's going on in the investigation,  
17 but absolutely the responsibility, both at a local level  
18 and at national level with national partners, was to  
19 oversee that public health response element.

20 **Q.** So in terms of the interaction between your  
21 role as the chair of the SCG and other policing roles,  
22 is it right that Wiltshire Police initially and then  
23 Counter Terrorism Police, when they took over, were  
24 responsible for the evidential investigation, whereas  
25 the SCG was responsible for consequence management?

13

1 was to understand the timeline of where they had been,  
2 had they transferred any of the Novichok and, if so,  
3 what was the public health risk.

4 **Q.** Thank you. So we have spoken about your first  
5 two roles.

6 Thirdly, did you undertake the same role, that's  
7 the SCG chair, between 3 July 2018 and 5 September 2018,  
8 that is the period of response to the poisonings of Dawn  
9 Sturges and Charlie Rowley?

10 **A.** Yes, I did.

11 **Q.** In both the Salisbury and Amesbury  
12 investigations, were the dates at which you ceased your  
13 role as Chair of the SCG when leadership of the SCG was  
14 handed over from Wiltshire Police to Wiltshire Council  
15 for the recovery phase of the operation?

16 **A.** Yes, that is correct. I would just say in  
17 relation to that wording, Madam, that at the point the  
18 SCG stands down from a response perspective, it does  
19 actually stand down. There's a process whereby you go  
20 over to recovery. At that point in time, the SCG is no  
21 longer in existence, there are different structures for  
22 the recovery.

23 **Q.** We may mention one of those in a minute. In  
24 fact, I will come to it now. Fourth, in the time  
25 between the Salisbury and Amesbury poisonings, so that's

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1 **A.** Yes, that is correct, in both incidences  
2 Wiltshire Police initially responded, initially  
3 undertook the investigation and then there was  
4 a handover to Counter Terrorism Policing who then took  
5 on the investigation thereafter.

6 **Q.** We will come back to that, but you define  
7 "consequence management" in your summary witness  
8 statement and I'm looking at page 3, paragraph 10(b),  
9 as:

10 "... the steps taken to prevent the impact of any  
11 incident escalating."

12 Can you just give us some examples of what that  
13 would be in practice?

14 **A.** Yes. Probably the best example I could give  
15 with this that became very apparent to me early on with  
16 this, you had two investigations ongoing: you had the  
17 investigation into who had actually committed this act,  
18 but from an SCG perspective, you had an investigation  
19 into public health and what I said at the time was we  
20 had to establish who touched what, when, where and what  
21 was the public health risk as a result of that. So  
22 putting again that into context, as we heard yesterday,  
23 with the Skripals, we know that they were poisoned at  
24 their home address and came into Salisbury and went to  
25 different locations. A real big part of the SCG's work

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1 10 April and 10 May, I think you were also Chair of  
2 a Remediation Strategic Coordinating Group. Is that the  
3 structure -- one of the structures that you were talking  
4 about that would come after the SCG?

5 **A.** Yes, and if I may, just to give some context,  
6 what would normally happen in an emergency response is  
7 there is a definable position where the emergency  
8 response has come to an end. With this, due to the  
9 complexity of it, we had to put in place a tailored  
10 handover certificate. So there's normally a handover  
11 from the Chair of the Strategic Coordination Group to  
12 the local company, a gentleman called Alistair  
13 Cunningham, who would then take that on and their  
14 responsibility is for remediation, in this case  
15 contextually very much around the scenes that we had,  
16 but also for regeneration as well in terms of the  
17 impact. This has clearly had an impact on Salisbury and  
18 then latterly Amesbury. That was their role.

19 The slight difference here in terms of me coming  
20 back into play a role was a particular strand of the  
21 recovery strategy was around remediation of those sites.  
22 It was a highly technical exercise which was being led  
23 by Wiltshire Council and DEFRA, but they needed the help  
24 and the assistance of the emergency services and other  
25 partners, so I agreed to undertake that role as you have

16

1 described.  
 2 **Q.** So far we have talked about local structures,  
 3 but a fifth role I think you undertook is did you  
 4 co-chair the National Health Emergency Response Cell ?  
 5 **A.** Yes, I did.  
 6 **Q.** Can you briefly just explain what that body is  
 7 and how and when it was established by reference, if you  
 8 need to, to your witness statement?  
 9 **A.** Yes, thank you. So in normal circumstances  
 10 again what you would have at a local level -- sorry for  
 11 all the abbreviations -- is something called a STAC  
 12 which is a Scientific Technical Advice Cell which I set  
 13 up. However, due to the complexity of the science  
 14 relative to the attack, it was agreed by government that  
 15 we needed to put in place the Health Emergency Response  
 16 Cell. So it was led by the Government, chaired by  
 17 the Home Office with me locally as the co-chair and its  
 18 role really was to be the bridge between the local  
 19 scientific advice into something which sat above it,  
 20 which is called SAGE. So that's the Scientific Advisory  
 21 Group for Emergencies, so in essence they are giving the  
 22 advice to myself at a local level.  
 23 **LORD HUGHES:** So it operates underneath SAGE which  
 24 many people may have heard about?  
 25 **A.** Yes, and it was a new entity, sir. Just to

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1 given to the SCG response to the poisoning of the  
 2 Skripals?  
 3 **A.** That was Operation Fairline.  
 4 **Q.** What was the name given to the response to the  
 5 poisonings of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley?  
 6 **A.** That was Operation Fortis.  
 7 **Q.** Now, these names are distinct, aren't they,  
 8 from the Counter Terrorism Police operation names that  
 9 we have heard and will hear more about: Wedana, Caterva  
 10 and Read?  
 11 **A.** That's correct.  
 12 **Q.** I would like to just next cover the status of  
 13 Operation Fairline. So, to recap, that's the response  
 14 to the Skripals at the time Operation Fortis came into  
 15 being, and for your reference, to orient yourself, I'm  
 16 looking at paragraph 33 of your summary statement.  
 17 **A.** Thank you. As has been detailed, on 23 March  
 18 the Strategic Coordination Group had been stood down.  
 19 Again as discussed, remediation activity and recovery  
 20 activity was ongoing led by Wiltshire Council. The  
 21 investigation in relation to the attack on the Skripals  
 22 and Sergeant Bailey was still ongoing at that point in  
 23 time. Also as an organisation, both as Wiltshire Police  
 24 but also as part of the Strategic Coordination Group and  
 25 Local Resilience Forum, we had undertaken a learning

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1 try and, I guess, bridge the local to the national.  
 2 **LORD HUGHES:** Right, thank you.  
 3 **MS WHITELAW:** So in addition to those five specific  
 4 roles that I have mentioned, did you also represent  
 5 Wiltshire Police at various local, regional and national  
 6 meetings?  
 7 **A.** I did, yes.  
 8 **Q.** You have just mentioned one of the national  
 9 bodies that will be a familiar name to many of us, SAGE.  
 10 Was your experience that at least part of the role of  
 11 SAGE in the Salisbury and Amesbury poisonings, together  
 12 with Public Health England, was to provide scientific  
 13 and public health advice?  
 14 **A.** Yes, it was.  
 15 **Q.** One of the other national bodies we may hear  
 16 about and with which the public will be familiar is  
 17 COBRA. Does COBRA facilitate fast-time briefing of  
 18 senior ministers and officials?  
 19 **A.** Yes, it does.  
 20 **Q.** You mentioned, I think, attending some of  
 21 those meetings?  
 22 **A.** I did, yes.  
 23 **Q.** Next, if I could ask you, please, about  
 24 Wiltshire Police's names for the operations for the  
 25 Salisbury and Amesbury poisonings. What was the name

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1 exercise which had been conducted by the College of  
 2 Policing which had run from 25 June -- 25 June to  
 3 29 June.  
 4 **Q.** Can we just ask you on that point, the College  
 5 of Policing is the national professional body for  
 6 the Police Service in England and Wales; is that right?  
 7 **A.** Yes, that's correct.  
 8 **Q.** You said that there was a debrief learning  
 9 process. I think that was due to report on the Skripal  
 10 poisoning response, Operation Fairline, but then  
 11 Operation Fortis came into being. So is it right that,  
 12 in fact, that the two were amalgamated so that they  
 13 actually -- in fact, they didn't report until  
 14 later October?  
 15 **A.** Yes, that is correct. So we had undertaken  
 16 the sessions during that week that I have described to  
 17 elicit the learning, led by the College of Policing, who  
 18 had undertaken a number of reviews into big incidences  
 19 and had been selected by the Local Resilience Forum.  
 20 But due to then the immediacy of the Fortis Operation we  
 21 didn't have that learning written down in terms of the  
 22 recommendations. So ultimately post Operation Fortis we  
 23 ran another learning exercise with the College of  
 24 Policing which was undertaken in the September and the  
 25 report from that was received on 24 October 2018.

20

1 **LORD HUGHES:** So the first College of Policing's  
2 examination of what had happened and debrief -- what you  
3 described as a debrief -- was due to report just about  
4 at the time that the second incident took place; is that  
5 right?

6 **A.** So just to give that context, sir, so it had  
7 actually taken place the week directly before. It had  
8 finished on the Friday and then on the 30th -- so it  
9 finished on the 29th, so on the 30th you then had  
10 incident number two.

11 **LORD HUGHES:** So you did it -- you paused -- have  
12 I got this right? You paused and undertook to add in  
13 the new information and the new events?

14 **A.** Yes, and it became a combined report in the  
15 end, sir.

16 **LORD HUGHES:** Okay, got it.

17 **A.** Thank you.

18 **MS WHITELAW:** So if I can summarise it in this way:  
19 at the time that Operation Fortis came into being,  
20 a number of actions were still ongoing within Operation  
21 Fairline and also you have mentioned the investigation,  
22 the Counter Terrorism Police investigation into the  
23 Skripal poisoning was still ongoing.

24 **A.** Yes, it was, yes.

25 **Q.** Importantly, the item or items used to deliver

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1 and the Ambulance Service, and is there to provide  
2 advice and guidance. So that's the national element.  
3 From a local level, yes, I absolutely reflect that  
4 we didn't put anything further out. Clearly  
5 police officers are trained in relation to generic  
6 responses, but I do believe in hindsight it would have  
7 been sensible just to have put some advice and guidance  
8 out, just confirming that which was already there.

9 **Q.** Thank you. We're going to come back to this  
10 in more detail when we look at the Wiltshire Police  
11 response to Dawn Sturgess' poisoning later in the week.

12 We're also going to hear much more evidence about  
13 public health later in the Inquiry, but one point for  
14 now, please. In your summary witness statement, for  
15 your reference at paragraph 185, you refer to  
16 a statement made by Jenny Harries, the then Deputy  
17 Medical Director of PHE, on 23 March 2018, the day  
18 Operation Fairline was stood down, which said:

19 "The risk to the general public from this incident  
20 remains low and this has not changed. The public safety  
21 is our number one priority and we have adopted  
22 a precautionary approach to those who were in the pub or  
23 restaurant within the specified timeframe." (*as read*)

24 Was that the last public health related message  
25 issued during the life cycle of the Operation Fairline

23

1 the poison in the Skripal poisoning had not been located  
2 at the time of --

3 **A.** No, they hadn't.

4 **Q.** -- Dawn Sturgess' poisoning. Indeed, you  
5 didn't know in June/July 2018 whether there was a vessel  
6 or container that had been discarded still in or around  
7 Salisbury or in Wiltshire or in the country?

8 **A.** We did not know.

9 **Q.** Given that, do you agree that in those  
10 circumstances Wiltshire police officers ought to have  
11 been advised to be particularly alert to any signs of  
12 nerve agent poisoning from March 2018 onwards?

13 **A.** I can give that some context, if I can, Madam.  
14 So what had been formulated by the national CBRN centre  
15 was advice which had gone out to what are called CT  
16 commanders and CT tactical advisors. That had been put  
17 in place in March, post the Skripal attack, and gave an  
18 overview. Said that it was an isolated incident, was  
19 the intelligence, and there wasn't believed to be  
20 a further risk. However, did give some information in  
21 relation to signs and symptoms of Novichok and  
22 reaffirmed what our standing protocol was around what  
23 a CBRN response would look like and also gave  
24 information around contacting the national CBRN centre  
25 which sits across the fire service, the Police Service

22

1 SCG as far as you know?

2 **A.** Yes, it was, yes.

3 **Q.** Appreciating what we have previously  
4 acknowledged, that you didn't know at this time about  
5 any item or items used to deliver the poison and whether  
6 any was discarded, as far as you were aware was there  
7 any precautionary advice to the public at this time not  
8 to pick up any unusual items or items that didn't belong  
9 to them? That is before June 2018.

10 **A.** No, and if I may just give some context, so in  
11 relation to the development of the advice which is  
12 contained within my statement, early on it was agreed that  
13 Public Health England nationally would develop that  
14 advice and clearly that would be informed by  
15 intelligence, but in relation to my role locally, there  
16 was no advice which was given to us to actually then put  
17 out. We did have a media cell in place, but we didn't  
18 get any advice to put out as you have described. What  
19 ultimately became the mantra "If you didn't drop it,  
20 don't pick it up".

21 **Q.** You said you didn't locally, but also just to  
22 clarify, I think you said "no" at the beginning of your  
23 answer, but were you aware of any national advice not to  
24 pick up objects before 30 June?

25 **A.** No, I was not.

24

1 **Q.** If I can move now to address the respective  
2 roles of each of the policing bodies in these  
3 investigations. Starting first of all with Wiltshire  
4 Police, your force, the local police force which  
5 initially responded to and investigated both incidents  
6 because they occurred in your force area ; is that a good  
7 summary?

8 **A.** Yes, it is, yes.

9 **Q.** There came a time, didn't there -- and I think  
10 in the case of Dawn Sturgess it was on 4 July -- where  
11 responsibility for the criminal investigation was passed to  
12 Counter Terrorism Policing?

13 **A.** Yes, that is correct.

14 **Q.** As far as you were aware, was the reason --  
15 the timing for that when DSTL had indicated that tests  
16 on Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley were indicating that  
17 they had been poisoned with Novichok?

18 **A.** Yes, that's right and that's the point where  
19 I --

20 **LORD HUGHES:** The date again, please.

21 **MS WHITELAW:** 4 July.

22 **A.** Yes, 4 July. That's the date where the second  
23 major incident was declared, sir.

24 **LORD HUGHES:** Thank you. That was because by then  
25 the source of her illness had been confirmed?

25

1 happened, there had been a journey from local  
2 Special Branches that were actually hosted under Chief  
3 Constables locally in their own forces to a mixture of  
4 what's called counter terrorism units that had the  
5 ability to investigate and also consider intelligence.  
6 Then you had what's called CTIUs, which is Counter  
7 Terrorism Intelligence Units and that's what we had in  
8 the south west of England, where their role is purely in  
9 relation to intelligence and they don't have an  
10 investigative capability, hence why we were reliant upon  
11 the South-East.

12 **Q.** I'm going to take that a bit more slowly, if  
13 I may, because it will be new to some people.

14 **A.** Sorry.

15 **Q.** So we talked about the south east, but of  
16 course you are in the south west, so there was also  
17 a South-West Counter Terrorism Unit at the time?

18 **A.** So there was a South-West Counter Terrorism  
19 Intelligence Unit.

20 **Q.** Thank you.

21 **A.** And the important differentiation is it  
22 doesn't have an investigative arm of it at that point in  
23 time.

24 **Q.** But South-East did?

25 **A.** Yes.

27

1 **A.** Yes, yes.

2 **MS WHITELAW:** Once Counter Terrorism Policing took  
3 over, did Wiltshire Police become responsible for  
4 consequence management which we have discussed,  
5 operating through the SCG?

6 **A.** Yes, that is correct in both incidences.

7 **Q.** The second policing body we're going to hear  
8 more detail about from the next witness, but that's  
9 Counter Terrorism Policing. Is your understanding that

10 Counter Terrorism Policing is a collaboration of UK  
11 police forces working with the intelligence community to  
12 protect the public and national security?

13 **A.** That is correct.

14 **Q.** I think the Chief Constable of Thames Valley  
15 Police is responsible for Counter Terrorism Policing  
16 South-East?

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** In 2018 was that known as the South-East  
19 Counter Terrorism Unit?

20 **A.** Yes, it was.

21 **Q.** That was the regional branch of Counter  
22 Terrorism Policing at the time, was it?

23 **A.** It was and, if it's helpful, I can give some  
24 context. As you say, it's a regional structure and at  
25 that point in time across England and Wales -- what had

26

1 **Q.** Which is why we may see involvement of  
2 South-East Counter Terrorism Policing coming in?

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** The Metropolitan Police Service , SO15, is the  
5 National Counter Terrorism Command base in London?

6 **A.** Yes.

7 **Q.** We're going to come back to more detail, as  
8 I say, about Counter Terrorism Policing from the next  
9 witness, but you -- the third policing body you  
10 mentioned, which I just want to ask you briefly about,  
11 was Wiltshire Police Special Branch, so going back in  
12 time, did that exist in 2010 onwards?

13 **A.** So I would say it existed before that, but  
14 certainly in terms of the material times for the Public  
15 Inquiry, in 2010 that was a stand-alone unit, which was  
16 called Special Branch in Wiltshire Police that came  
17 under the direction and control of the Chief Constable  
18 of Wiltshire Police.

19 **Q.** So a stand-alone --

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** -- under Wiltshire Police, dealing with  
22 counter terrorism matters?

23 **A.** Yes, that's right.

24 **Q.** Then when did that change from being  
25 a stand-alone Wiltshire Police Special Branch?

28

1           **A.** You will forgive me, this is quite complex.  
2 We're talking about a decade where we're going from  
3 localisation, to regionalisation, to ultimately  
4 nationalisation. From a Wiltshire perspective, in 2011  
5 we entered into a collaborative agreement with Avon and  
6 Somerset Police whereby Special Branch was actually  
7 delivered then across the two forces and that was the  
8 early inception of the South-West Counter Terrorism  
9 Intelligence Unit.

10           **LORD HUGHES:** So it grew, did it, into the  
11 South West Counter Terrorism Unit?

12           **A.** Yes, it did, sir. If I may just briefly  
13 continue to help you. Then in 2013 what happened is  
14 that in addition to the two forces I have described,  
15 Devon and Cornwall and Dorset Police also formed part of  
16 that, so we now, by that point, have a South-West CTIU,  
17 if I can use that terminology, that consists of four of  
18 the five forces in the south west policing area.

19           **MS WHITELAW:** So that was 2013 that it began to  
20 expand?

21           **A.** Yes.

22           **Q.** So when we see references to Wiltshire Police  
23 Special Branch in 2018, was that -- was there still the  
24 counter -- the stand-alone at all or is that the  
25 vernacular used for the now more -- the collaboration

29

1 do some further research on if required.

2           My understanding is, certainly in 2010, we had  
3 a stand-alone system which was called the National  
4 Special Branch Intelligence System. You will forgive  
5 me, due to the passage of time it has been difficult to  
6 work out exactly what systems were in place once we then  
7 go into a regional collaboration in 2011. We are trying  
8 to do some work in the background to further assist the  
9 Inquiry with that.

10           **Q.** Thank you. Perhaps we can come back to that  
11 then.

12           So returning to the various policing bodies that  
13 were involved in the Salisbury and Amesbury  
14 investigations, is it right that, as is usual for  
15 significant resource intensive incidents, other police  
16 forces around the country provided mutual aid officers  
17 to assist?

18           **A.** That is correct.

19           **Q.** Particularly because I think that Wiltshire is  
20 one of the smallest forces in the country; is that  
21 right?

22           **A.** Yes, we're the third smallest force in the  
23 country and very early on in both incidences we put in  
24 place what is called, as you referred to, mutual aid  
25 which means, through a national coordination approach,

31

1 with other forces?

2           **A.** I have to be careful here, Madam, in relation  
3 to my knowledge of this because, as I say, you had  
4 an element of regional and national also going on. My  
5 understanding -- and I underline "understanding" here --  
6 is that we still in a collaborative arrangement had  
7 a local Special Branch. Often we describe it as hub and  
8 spoke. So you have the hub in the centre, but then the  
9 spoke in this example is Wiltshire Police actually  
10 having a Special Branch within this collaborative  
11 arrangement. Then again my understanding is the  
12 South-West CTIU had additional capabilities, such as the  
13 wider assessment of information intelligence and also  
14 then the link into the security services which was  
15 facilitated through them.

16           Probably the final bit, if I may, was in terms of  
17 the on-call facility which is material to the Public  
18 Inquiry, that was provided by the South-West CTIU.

19           **Q.** So we will come to the factual specifics  
20 later, but in general terms, if Wiltshire Police want  
21 some information from the South-West CTIU, do they have  
22 access to that information directly to their records, or  
23 would they have to contact the CTIU to ask them for that  
24 information?

25           **A.** Again, it's just something we can go away and

30

1 we're able to bring other officers in to work alongside  
2 Wiltshire officers.

3           **LORD HUGHES:** So you are calling in officers --  
4 additional officers from other forces?

5           **A.** That's correct, sir. In addition to what we  
6 have described around the counter terrorism  
7 investigation, which was very much around supporting us  
8 with the multiple scenes that we had that we needed to  
9 guard.

10           **LORD HUGHES:** Yes.

11           **MS WHITELAW:** Just to mention one further policing  
12 name that we have already heard something of and will  
13 hear more of, that's Operation Verbasco and the name  
14 being given to the joint police operation between CT PSE  
15 and the Metropolitan Police SO15 that was set up  
16 specifically for the inquest Inquiry. Is it right that  
17 Wiltshire Police is not part of Operation Verbasco, but  
18 it has worked with it to assist the Inquiry?

19           **A.** It is, that's right.

20           **Q.** Thank you. I want to move now just to  
21 explaining very briefly the stage at which you and  
22 Wiltshire Police became aware and involved in the  
23 poisoning of Dawn Sturgess. So Dawn was taken ill on  
24 the morning of 30 June 2018, as we know, but is it  
25 correct that Wiltshire Police wasn't informed or aware

32



1 of this until the evening?  
 2 **A.** That is correct.  
 3 **Q.** By reference to paragraph 37 of your summary  
 4 statement, could you just tell us when and how Wiltshire  
 5 Police became aware of the incident?  
 6 **A.** Yes. High level, Madam, at 18:58 hours we  
 7 received a call into our control room, which is called  
 8 the communications centre, from the Fire Service.  
 9 Again, to give context, the Fire Service in Wiltshire is  
 10 the Dorset and Wiltshire Fire and Rescue Service that  
 11 provides a service across two forces.  
 12 We were told at that point in time by their control  
 13 room that there was a potential HAZMAT incident. HAZMAT  
 14 basically refers to hazardous material. That the  
 15 Ambulance Service was attending at 9 Muggleton Road in  
 16 Amesbury and it was confirmed within this call that at  
 17 that point this was for information purposes only.  
 18 **Q.** Thank you. If we could pause there for  
 19 a moment. That was the address of Charlie Rowley, 9  
 20 Muggleton Road. Could we have up on screen, please,  
 21 INQ005033. This should be a transcript of the call you  
 22 have just mentioned. You will see "HAZMAT" in big  
 23 letters there.  
 24 **A.** Yes.  
 25 **Q.** Judge?

33

1 Then what the ambulance said and can we go over the  
 2 page, thank you. Three casualties basically suffering  
 3 respiratory problems:  
 4 "Ambulance have no clue what's caused the symptoms,  
 5 so we're going on worst case scenario really.  
 6 "Do you need police attendance?  
 7 "It's just an inform for us at the moment, just so  
 8 that you're aware, but obviously if we find out any  
 9 more ..."  
 10 So that was the call --  
 11 **A.** Yes.  
 12 **Q.** -- that you described to the police call  
 13 handler. Thank you, if you go could on to the next  
 14 point of information that you received, which I think is  
 15 19:02.  
 16 **A.** Yes, it was. So at that point in time, again  
 17 we receive a call into the communications centre, which  
 18 is from the Ambulance Service, so that's South-West  
 19 Ambulance Service, and at this point they are querying  
 20 whether or not Wiltshire Police are aware of what they  
 21 describe as a special job.  
 22 **Q.** If you could pause there for a moment. Could  
 23 we have on screen, please INQ005034 and this should be  
 24 that, similarly a transcript. If you want to look at  
 25 that and just explain what that call said.

35

1 **LORD HUGHES:** It has come via the Fire Service and  
 2 it's nearly 7 pm in the evening?  
 3 **A.** Yes.  
 4 **Q.** Is this notification to you that something was  
 5 happening to Dawn Sturgess in the morning or to Charlie  
 6 Rowley in the afternoon, or both?  
 7 **A.** At this point in time, sir, it's purely  
 8 telling us about a HAZMAT potential incident.  
 9 **LORD HUGHES:** Simply at that address?  
 10 **A.** Yes. There's further calls that happen  
 11 quickly after in the sequence where we had become  
 12 aware --  
 13 **MS WHITELAW:** You will see on the screen it says:  
 14 "A female in respiratory arrest, we've got a second  
 15 patient unable to breathe and unresponsive and a third  
 16 patient also displaying symptoms."  
 17 Is what's said in the call. Further down, you will  
 18 see 9 Muggleton Road.  
 19 **LORD HUGHES:** Yes.  
 20 **MS WHITELAW:** We have gone on "It might be  
 21 a possible HAZMAT" and then if we can go down to the  
 22 bottom:  
 23 "So ambulance are on scene?"  
 24 "Well, they've passed it to us, but I don't know if  
 25 they are actually on scene, let me have a look ..."

34

1 **A.** Yes, so high level in relation to this,  
 2 further to use of the term "Special job", during the  
 3 call the Ambulance Service informed us that they had  
 4 attended an incident at the same property earlier that  
 5 day, described symptoms of that individual as  
 6 respiratory arrest and severe breathing problems.  
 7 **Q.** That's two-thirds of the way down the page  
 8 just to orientate with the page.  
 9 **A.** They then updated us that the individual had  
 10 been taken to Salisbury District Hospital and they had  
 11 now returned back to the property and were dealing with  
 12 what was stated to be two further patients at that point  
 13 in time and they give an overview of symptoms to be  
 14 excessive drooling, sweating and stating that certainly  
 15 one of the males was unresponsive and making really  
 16 weird noises.  
 17 **Q.** Can we just go over the page on that. Thank  
 18 you.  
 19 **A.** Then ultimately the Ambulance Service states  
 20 that there is a significant response for the  
 21 Ambulance Service and the Fire Service.  
 22 **Q.** At the top of that page, we've got breathing  
 23 problems, "Completely incoherent", that was the symptoms  
 24 being described. At that point, we had the first  
 25 patient that went into respiratory arrest and they

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1 thought she had just had a fit. Then talking about the  
 2 first patient, Dawn Sturgess, being in hospital, and  
 3 then further down:  
 4 "She got taken in to Salisbury district. But it's  
 5 just so you're aware of it, obviously I don't know the  
 6 full details at the moment. I just thought you might  
 7 want to know there's going to be significant response  
 8 from ourselves and Fire Service as well."  
 9 So this is at 19:02.  
 10 **A.** Yes.  
 11 **LORD HUGHES:** Forgive me if I'm slow to catch up .  
 12 That's only four minutes after you had a rather similar  
 13 notification call from the Fire Service.  
 14 **A.** That's correct, sir.  
 15 **LORD HUGHES:** Both of them are about Muggleton  
 16 Road, both of them refer -- both -- to a patient earlier  
 17 in the day, apparently a female patient earlier in the  
 18 day, and to further patient or patients in the evening.  
 19 **A.** That's correct, sir.  
 20 **LORD HUGHES:** Right.  
 21 **MS WHITELAW:** Thank you. Can we take that down  
 22 then, please.  
 23 I think there was a third call at 19:09 from the  
 24 Fire Service; is that right --  
 25 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

37

1 you became involved?  
 2 **A.** If I can just take a moment.  
 3 **Q.** Of course.  
 4 **A.** In relation to the Muggleton Road incident, so  
 5 contextually the incident occurred on the Saturday, we  
 6 now go forward to Monday, 2 July, at 16:38 hours.  
 7 I wasn't the on-call Chief Officer at that point in  
 8 time, but I was in my role as the Deputy Chief  
 9 Constable. I was contacted by the on-call  
 10 Superintendent, who was called Superintendent Burt, and  
 11 he gave me -- would you like me to give a high level  
 12 overview of what he told me?  
 13 **Q.** Yes, indeed.  
 14 **A.** He gave me an overview that an incident had  
 15 occurred over the weekend, two people had been taken to  
 16 Salisbury District Hospital and both remained seriously  
 17 unwell. He indicated that initially the hypothesis was  
 18 one that it had been a drugs overdose. However, that  
 19 had developed to be a drugs overdose where there was  
 20 potential pesticide poisoning within that, which is  
 21 commonly referred to as a bad batch incident.  
 22 He then went on to indicate to me that there was  
 23 wider public health messaging which had been put out by  
 24 DS Martin, who the Inquiry will hear from later, and  
 25 that was warning the public.

39

1 **Q.** -- according to your statement asking  
 2 Wiltshire Police for their estimated time of arrival.  
 3 In between these calls was a decision made by the Force  
 4 Incident Manager, Inspector Noble (?), that Police should  
 5 attend and officers were dispatched?  
 6 **A.** Yes, that is correct.  
 7 **Q.** If we could go to INQ004989.  
 8 That, you will see, is the police log; if you could  
 9 confirm?  
 10 **A.** That is correct.  
 11 **Q.** On the second page, we see at 19:12 "Resource  
 12 dispatched" and arrived at scene at 19:19 on the 30th.  
 13 Does that indicate the time at which police officers  
 14 were attending --  
 15 **A.** Yes, that is correct.  
 16 **Q.** -- 9 Muggleton Road. I'm going to leave what  
 17 happened next there to be picked up both by you in your  
 18 further evidence this week and by the evidence of the  
 19 first responder, sir, that we're going to hear from  
 20 later.  
 21 **LORD HUGHES:** All right.  
 22 **MS WHITELAW:** But what I do want to just confirm  
 23 with you is the point at which you yourself became  
 24 involved. By reference to paragraph 81 of your  
 25 statement, if you need to, please could you tell us how

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1 He also stated to me that as a precaution, because  
 2 of the pesticide element, samples, which I believe were  
 3 urine, had been sent to DSTL Porton Down for analysis  
 4 and we awaited the results of those and then he gave me  
 5 a high level overview that he had also been in contact  
 6 with Superintendent Minty, who had been the Chair of the  
 7 TCG for Operation Fairline, the Skripal incident, who  
 8 was a CBRN Commander and CBRN advice had been sought and  
 9 he had also spoken to Mr Bob Young, who was basically  
 10 the Major Incident Manager for Wiltshire Police at that  
 11 time.  
 12 At that point, I was aware this was precautionary  
 13 and we were awaiting the results, and at the conclusion  
 14 of the conversation I asked to be updated if there was  
 15 any discernible change in the circumstances described.  
 16 **Q.** You were being kept informed pending test  
 17 results --  
 18 **A.** Yes.  
 19 **Q.** -- and you wanted to be kept updated?  
 20 Moving to paragraph 94, for your reference, of your  
 21 statement, were you subsequently updated, or did you  
 22 receive an update at around 7 o'clock on Tuesday,  
 23 3 July?  
 24 **A.** Yes, I did.  
 25 **Q.** 7 o'clock in the evening, I should say, and

40

1 could you just tell us about that call?  
 2 **A.** Yes, I can. So I was at home at that point in  
 3 time and I had worked extensively during operation  
 4 Fairline with DSTL and I was contacted by a gentleman  
 5 called Tim from DSTL who had sat on the Strategic  
 6 Coordination Group and had been my key advisor and he  
 7 stated to me that the two patients, the drug -- the  
 8 testing had come back and it indicated Novichok. He put  
 9 that in a statistical context for me and stated that he  
 10 was 75 per cent sure that they had been poisoned with  
 11 Novichok and this was moving, further to a question from  
 12 myself, to 1000 per cent clarity that that was indeed  
 13 the case.  
 14 **LORD HUGHES:** Sorry, who had -- this was  
 15 information -- 75 to 100 per cent certain Novichok  
 16 involved, in which incident?  
 17 **A.** This is in the incident number 2, this is the  
 18 Dawn Sturgess incident.  
 19 **LORD HUGHES:** Muggleton Road. Thank you.  
 20 **MS WHITELAW:** Sir, so this is the call on 3 July.  
 21 Was that the basis upon which you decided to stand  
 22 up the SCG again?  
 23 **A.** Yes, it was immediate from that point in time  
 24 what the public health risk was, so I made a number of  
 25 calls to set up the Strategic Coordination Group meeting

41

1 **Q.** Did Counter Terrorism Policing attend on the  
 2 basis that they were still at the time investigating the  
 3 Skripal poisoning?  
 4 **A.** I guess, yes, but clearly there was new  
 5 information here that, notwithstanding incident number  
 6 1, the likelihood was that it had been confirmed as  
 7 Novichok, that they would have had primacy right from  
 8 the very start.  
 9 **Q.** You said you declared a major incident, so was  
 10 that after that first meeting at 22:27?  
 11 **A.** Yes, it was. We obtained a situational  
 12 awareness of what had gone on over the last number of  
 13 days. Obviously the confirmation that it was Novichok  
 14 and at that point in time it was clear to me that  
 15 a major incident needed to be declared.  
 16 **Q.** Can you just explain for us what is meant by  
 17 the declaration of a major incident?  
 18 **A.** Yes. A major incident -- I can't give  
 19 verbatim the definition, but contextually what it  
 20 means --  
 21 **Q.** Sorry, can I help you just by -- in your  
 22 statement at paragraph 15 I think you summarise it, in  
 23 case it helps you.  
 24 **A.** Thank you. Yes, contextually what it means is  
 25 there is a response required by one or more of the

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1 which later sat that evening and that was the point in  
 2 time where I declared a second major incident.  
 3 **Q.** That was the same multi-agency structure that  
 4 had already been in place for the Skripal poisoning and  
 5 been stood down. You created it again, did you?  
 6 **A.** I did. If I may just add a slight caveat to  
 7 that. For incident number 1, it was clear, due to the  
 8 public health related nature of this, that I needed some  
 9 what I would call key partners around the table. For  
 10 incident number 1, which was very much around shutting  
 11 down scenes and assuring public safety, yes, Counter  
 12 Terrorism Policing were round the table, public health  
 13 partners, council, and then we expanded it when we got  
 14 to day two to a wider meeting which was more mirroring  
 15 what had been in place for --  
 16 **Q.** Going back to the first meeting in the  
 17 evening, your paragraph 97, which bodies were  
 18 represented at that meeting?  
 19 **A.** At that meeting you had Wiltshire Police,  
 20 Counter Terrorism Policing were involved right from the  
 21 very start, you had Wiltshire Council and you had public  
 22 health partners, the hospital was there, and NHS England  
 23 were there at that point in time, from memory.  
 24 **Q.** Which is PHE at the time?  
 25 **A.** Yes, public health, yes, which is --

42

1 emergency services under the major incident plans. Each  
 2 of the emergency services has major incident plans.  
 3 Again, for one or more of the emergency services,  
 4 there's a requirement to put in place special  
 5 arrangements to actually deal with the incident which is  
 6 facing them.  
 7 **Q.** Who can declare a major incident?  
 8 **A.** Any one of the partners under the Local  
 9 Resilience Forum structure which I described earlier can  
 10 declare a major incident.  
 11 **Q.** Could the ambulance or the Fire Service have  
 12 declared a --  
 13 **A.** Absolutely, and indeed the hospital.  
 14 **Q.** That was the Tuesday evening, 3 July. In the  
 15 early hours of Wednesday, 4 July, were all the scenes of  
 16 relevance to the movements of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie  
 17 Rowley, as known at the time, which we will come on to  
 18 hear about, secured and preserved by Wiltshire Police?  
 19 **A.** Yes, for me that -- in addition to the  
 20 treatment of Dawn and Charlie -- that was absolutely the  
 21 number one priority. As I explained earlier, the  
 22 potential movement of the Novichok in that period  
 23 created a significant potential public health risk and  
 24 we had to ensure all of those scenes were identified and  
 25 locked down.

44

1 Q. Just to deal with the morning of 4 July 2018,  
2 I think you took part in a national call -- this is  
3 paragraph 102 of your statement for your reference.

4 A. Thank you. Yes. Yes, I did. Very similar to  
5 the relationships that we had developed in Operation  
6 Fairline, the Chief Constable and I had a conversation  
7 with the executive of Counter Terrorism Policing, which  
8 was Assistant Commissioner Basu, and at that point in  
9 time it was confirmed that they would be leading the  
10 investigation into the poisoning of Charlie Rowley and  
11 Dawn Sturgess.

12 Q. At 10.40 on 4 July 2018, you and the Chief  
13 Constable of Wiltshire Police had a conversation with  
14 Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu of the Counter  
15 Terrorism Police and that was when it was decided that  
16 Counter Terrorism Police would take over?

17 A. Yes. Clearly they had attended the evening  
18 before, so there was a degree of collaborative working  
19 going on and a degree of handover at that point, but  
20 certainly at an executive level that was when that was  
21 confirmed and again we would undertake locally, through  
22 the SCG and the LRF, the consequence management role.

23 Q. On that day, did you also attend a COBR  
24 officials call?

25 A. Yes, I did.

45

1 like to address with you shortly now.

2 You say, at paragraph 31 of your statement, that:  
3 "Wiltshire Police had received intelligence reports  
4 relating to Dawn Sturgess' address and her association  
5 with Charlie Rowley and his drug taking behaviour.  
6 However, there was no intelligence that Dawn Sturgess  
7 herself was a drug user." *(as read)*

8 You go on to say that you are aware that in certain  
9 Wiltshire Police documents Charlie Rowley and Dawn  
10 Sturgess are described as two known drug users. Is  
11 there something you would like to say about that?

12 A. Yes, absolutely there is. Important in terms  
13 of these documents, these are documents that were  
14 created post-incident. They weren't existing records  
15 prior to these incidences, but on two occasions there  
16 are documents which refer to them both collectively as  
17 known drug users. As has been detailed and I will go on  
18 to explain in my future evidence, that is correct in  
19 relation to Charlie Rowley, but is not correct in  
20 relation to Dawn Sturgess. There was indeed reasons to  
21 suspect that she may have become unwell due to her  
22 association with drugs, but notwithstanding that, there  
23 was no police intelligence that she was a drug user and  
24 in relation to that I would like to, on behalf of the  
25 Chief Constable and Wiltshire Police, apologise for that

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1 Q. Could you just tell us what was confirmed by  
2 reference to paragraph 103 at that time?

3 A. I attended that call. During the course of  
4 the call, it was confirmed that Novichok, as was  
5 described the evening before, had caused Dawn and  
6 Charlie to become unwell. It was outlined that the mode  
7 and location of the delivery of the Novichok at that  
8 point was unknown. However, the lead hypothesis was  
9 that they somehow had picked it up and come into contact  
10 with discarded Novichok from the Skripal poisoning.

11 Q. We know that Dawn Sturgess very sadly died on  
12 8 July 2018. Did Operation Fortis continue and the  
13 response work of the SCG continue until 5 September  
14 2018 --

15 A. Yes, it did.

16 Q. -- when there was the handover to the recovery  
17 phase to Wiltshire Council; is that correct?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. On a final topic, Deputy Chief Constable --  
20 and I'm referring to paragraphs 31 and 32 of your  
21 summary statement -- later this week we will hear  
22 evidence, as I have said, from factual witnesses about  
23 Wiltshire Police's response to the poisonings of Dawn  
24 Sturgess and Charlie Rowley, but there is just one  
25 further point you deal with in your summary that I would

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1 internal error to the family. I can only try and  
2 understand the impact of that further to their loss.

3 Q. Thank you, Deputy Chief Constable. Those are  
4 the questions I propose to ask you at this stage by way  
5 of introduction to your role and that of Wiltshire  
6 Police and, as we said, you are due to give evidence  
7 later in the week. Thank you.

8 A. Thank you.

9 LORD HUGHES: Thank you very much.

10 Now, Mr Mills, I gather you are going to be coming  
11 back from time to time and your evidence has been, as it  
12 were, compartmentalised.

13 You are free to go, of course, and if between now  
14 and your return you need to confer with counsel about  
15 the remains of your evidence, then of course you are  
16 free to do so. What I don't want you doing is going  
17 over the ground that you have just covered.

18 A. Thank you, sir.

19 LORD HUGHES: Thank you very much.

20 MS WHITELAW: Sir, would it be a suitable time for  
21 a morning break?

22 LORD HUGHES: Yes. All right, Ms Whitelaw, 11.20,  
23 please.

24 (11.03 am)

25 (Short Break)

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1 (11.20 am)  
 2 **MS WHITELAW:** Good morning, Commander Murphy. As  
 3 you know, my name is Francesca Whitelaw and I ask  
 4 questions on behalf of the Inquiry.  
 5 **COMMANDER DOMINIC MURPHY (sworn)**  
 6 **LORD HUGHES:** Commander Murphy, either sit down or  
 7 stand according to taste.  
 8 **A.** Thank you, sir.  
 9 **Questioned by MS WHITELAW**  
 10 **MS WHITELAW:** Could you give us your full name,  
 11 please?  
 12 **A.** Yes, thank you. My name is Dominic Murphy and  
 13 I'm the commander of SO15, the counter-terrorism command  
 14 in the Met Police.  
 15 **Q.** Thank you very much for attending today to  
 16 give evidence.  
 17 **LORD HUGHES:** And that is?  
 18 **A.** SO15 is the counter-terrorism command of  
 19 London, sir. So CT policing in London, plus I have  
 20 a number of national responsibilities which I'm sure we  
 21 will cover in due course.  
 22 **LORD HUGHES:** Thank you.  
 23 **MS WHITELAW:** Could you look at your witness  
 24 statement which should be in front of you. This is your  
 25 open witness statement to the Inquiry extending to

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1 So thank you for the chance to do that.  
 2 **LORD HUGHES:** Thank you.  
 3 **MS WHITELAW:** Commander Murphy, much with the  
 4 previous witness, this is an introductory evidence from  
 5 your point of view and you are due to return to the  
 6 Inquiry a number of times to give evidence on different  
 7 tranches.  
 8 **A.** Yes.  
 9 **Q.** You have introduced to the Chair and the  
 10 Inquiry your role. How long have you held that role?  
 11 **A.** So I have been the Commander now for just  
 12 approaching two years.  
 13 **Q.** You have set out your professional background  
 14 in detail in your witness statement. I will be  
 15 referring to paragraphs 6 to 10 onwards for your  
 16 reference. Did you join Hertfordshire Constabulary in  
 17 1994?  
 18 **A.** I did, yes.  
 19 **Q.** You became a Detective Constable in 1999?  
 20 **A.** Yes.  
 21 **Q.** Did that involve working in CID on a murder  
 22 team and in a covert role?  
 23 **A.** Yes, it did.  
 24 **Q.** Was that until you joined what was  
 25 Special Branch in 2003?

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1 48 pages dated 2 October 2024.  
 2 Sir, it should be tab 11 in your bundle. There are  
 3 a number of documents bearing Commander Murphy's name.  
 4 Tab 11 should be the witness statement. For the  
 5 transcript, the reference is INQ006056.  
 6 On page 48, there should be a signature.  
 7 **A.** That's correct.  
 8 **Q.** Is that your signature?  
 9 **A.** It is.  
 10 **Q.** Are the contents of that witness statement  
 11 true to the best of your knowledge and belief?  
 12 **A.** They are, yes.  
 13 **Q.** Thank you.  
 14 **A.** I would, if I might, sir, please express on  
 15 behalf of Counter Terrorism Policing my deepest  
 16 condolences to the Sturgess family and of course to  
 17 Charlie Rowley. In addition to that, pay due respects  
 18 to Sergei and Yulia Skripal and Ollie Bell and Nick  
 19 Bailey, two police officers that were responding to that  
 20 first incident and also suffered from poisoning.  
 21 Sir, if I might, also the people of Salisbury.  
 22 I was here for many, many months during this incident  
 23 and I was, as were my team, incredibly impressed by the  
 24 resilience and compassion shown by the people of  
 25 Salisbury who were greatly affected by this incident.

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1 **A.** Yes, that's correct, in Hertfordshire.  
 2 **Q.** In 2005, were you seconded to SO13 which was  
 3 then the Metropolitan Police Antiterrorist Branch as  
 4 part of the response to the 7/7 bombings?  
 5 **A.** Yes, I attended on the first day of 7/7 and  
 6 then spent a considerable amount of time working with  
 7 SO13 in response to that incident.  
 8 **Q.** Did you transfer permanently to SO15 in 2006?  
 9 **A.** Yes, I did.  
 10 **Q.** Have you worked in counter terrorism roles  
 11 since then?  
 12 **A.** Yes.  
 13 **Q.** I think your experience included responding to  
 14 and assisting in the management of evidence in the  
 15 Litvinenko poisoning; is that correct?  
 16 **A.** That's correct, yes.  
 17 **Q.** Is it right that, as a result of your  
 18 experiences with the Salisbury and Amesbury poisonings,  
 19 you subsequently qualified as a Chemical, Biological,  
 20 Radiological and Nuclear -- we will hear the term  
 21 CBRN -- Strategic Commander?  
 22 **A.** Yes, that's correct.  
 23 **Q.** But I think you weren't qualified in that role  
 24 at the time of the poisonings?  
 25 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

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1 Q. But is it the case that Counter Terrorism  
2 Police took advice from CBRN specialists throughout  
3 those investigations?  
4 A. We did, yes.  
5 Q. Have you held leadership positions in the  
6 responses to nearly all of the terrorist attacks in  
7 London over recent years?  
8 A. Yes, that's correct. As a result of being on  
9 SO15, I have been involved in terrorist attacks both in  
10 the UK and overseas.  
11 Q. You were awarded the Queen's Police Medal in  
12 2020 for services to policing and counter terrorism?  
13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
14 Q. Before I move on to ask you about your role  
15 and that of counter terrorism policings in the events of  
16 2018, if I could deal with just a preliminary point,  
17 please, and I would be grateful if you could confirm  
18 these matters for me. As may be obvious to many, your  
19 role leading SO15 Counter Terrorism Command is  
20 a sensitive one?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. In the course of the investigations that you  
23 are going to address in your evidence and the course of  
24 this Inquiry, you have had access to security sensitive  
25 material?

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1 revealing material that the Chair has determined is  
2 sensitive and subject to a restriction order?  
3 A. Thank you, yes, that's correct.  
4 Q. I deal with this now, sir, so that everybody  
5 understands the necessary approach in this case.  
6 **LORD HUGHES:** Yes.  
7 **MS WHITELAW:** With that introduction regarding  
8 documents, Commander Murphy, I'm going to ask you about  
9 the Verbasco police report, but could I start just by  
10 asking you to confirm in your evidence what we have  
11 heard in relation to Operation Verbasco, that it is  
12 a joint SO15, Metropolitan Police and Counter Terrorism  
13 Policing South-East operation that was set up for the  
14 inquest which was converted to a Public Inquiry.  
15 A. Yes, it was, that's correct.  
16 Q. Is there anything you would like to add to  
17 what DCC Mills has said in relation to Operation  
18 Verbasco?  
19 A. No, the -- it's a fully joint team between  
20 South-East and London and it has worked, sir, to support  
21 the Public Inquiry and disclosed material to you from  
22 a broad range of our operations and the information  
23 available to us.  
24 Q. Is one of the ways in which Operation  
25 Verbasco, so the Metropolitan Police and Thames Valley

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1 A. That's correct, I have.  
2 Q. We know that Dawn Sturgess' inquest was  
3 converted to a Public Inquiry precisely so that  
4 sensitive material, which might otherwise be excluded  
5 for reasons of public interest immunity, could be  
6 considered by the Chair and importantly open gist  
7 capturing the important and relevant detail that some  
8 sensitive documents may contain could be provided?  
9 A. Yes, that's correct.  
10 Q. Is the relevance of this to your evidence  
11 that, as you set out in paragraph 14 of your witness  
12 statement, some of the information included in your  
13 statement represents an open gist of the contents of  
14 closed documents?  
15 A. Yes, that's correct.  
16 Q. Is the practical effect of that that there may  
17 be instances where you are not able to identify an  
18 underlying document for your evidence?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. Or it may be that you are not able to answer  
21 a question for reasons of national security?  
22 A. Yes, that's correct as well.  
23 Q. Or, equally, it may be that you will need to  
24 ask for time to check a particular matter to ensure that  
25 you are providing as full an answer as possible, without

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1 Police as Core Participants, have put as much material  
2 into the public domain as possible for the purposes of  
3 the Public Inquiry through the Verbasco police report?  
4 A. Yes, it is, that's correct.  
5 Q. If we could just go to INQ005820 on the  
6 screen, please. This is, I think, the front page of  
7 that report; is that right?  
8 A. That's correct, yes.  
9 Q. If we could just go to page 2, we will see the  
10 index there and page 3, please. Thank you.  
11 Could you just give us the summary of what that  
12 document is?  
13 A. Yes, thank you. So this is a report that  
14 seeks to explain the role of Counter Terrorism Policing,  
15 plus also the frontline response to all of the incidents  
16 that we are here to consider, sir, as part of this  
17 Public Inquiry. It deals with material that supports  
18 the response to those incidents and provides an update  
19 on all of the circumstances regarding both the Counter  
20 Terrorism investigation and what we learned from the  
21 original -- the initial response to each of those  
22 things.  
23 Q. It has extensive footnotes; is that right?  
24 A. It does, that's correct.  
25 Q. That's the document supporting the matters you

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1 indicated?  
 2 **A.** Yes.  
 3 **Q.** I would like to confirm with you the process  
 4 that was undertaken to achieve it. First of all, was  
 5 the Inquiry team given full access to all documents held  
 6 by Operation Verbasco?  
 7 **A.** Yes, it was.  
 8 **Q.** Secondly, did the Inquiry Legal Team then  
 9 identify topics relevant to the Inquiry Terms of  
 10 Reference and ask Verbasco to address those through the  
 11 report?  
 12 **A.** Yes, that's correct.  
 13 **Q.** Thirdly, did both Verbasco and separately the  
 14 Inquiry Legal Team identify certain documents which  
 15 should go into the report or be footnoted?  
 16 **A.** They did.  
 17 **Q.** Fourthly, did that include sensitive material  
 18 which could nonetheless be gisted into the report?  
 19 **A.** Yes, they did, that's correct.  
 20 **Q.** Fifthly, did the report develop over the  
 21 preparatory stages of the Inquiry going through several  
 22 iterations?  
 23 **A.** It definitely did that, yes.  
 24 **Q.** Until the Inquiry was provided with a final  
 25 iteration, the version we have now, which is

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1 the outset?  
 2 **A.** Yes, that's correct. I became involved on the  
 3 5th, so the Monday after the initial poisoning.  
 4 **Q.** Did you assist the Senior Investigating  
 5 Officer, DSUVN012?  
 6 **A.** Yes, so I had several roles, but one of my  
 7 first roles was to act as a critical friend for the SIO  
 8 from the CT Policing South-East. That's the Senior  
 9 Investigating Officer in the south east.  
 10 **Q.** You were the Senior Investigating Officer  
 11 yourself for the investigation into the suspects?  
 12 **A.** Yes, that's correct.  
 13 **Q.** Is it right you continue to lead all aspects  
 14 of the national security police investigation?  
 15 **A.** I do.  
 16 **Q.** Is that because the criminal investigation  
 17 into the suspects remains ongoing?  
 18 **A.** It does remain ongoing, yes.  
 19 **Q.** We are going to, in due course in this Inquiry  
 20 and later in the Inquiry, hear more detail about that,  
 21 including from you, but for now could you just confirm  
 22 the names of the suspects you set out at paragraph 208  
 23 of your witness statement?  
 24 **A.** Yes, so the names are Petrov, Boshirov and  
 25 Fedotov. They have all been charged in those names.

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1 dated October 2024?  
 2 **A.** That's correct.  
 3 **Q.** Sir, we will be referring to that document  
 4 throughout the course of the Inquiry.  
 5 **LORD HUGHES:** So this, in summary -- tell me if I'm  
 6 wrong -- I may well be wrong, but from what you say, it  
 7 sounds, Mr Murphy, as if this is the distillation of the  
 8 outcome of the work done by Operation Verbasco. In  
 9 other words, by the combination of Counter Terrorism  
 10 Police South-East and the Metropolitan Police?  
 11 **A.** Yes, sir, that's correct, and in close liaison  
 12 with the Inquest Legal Team, sir, to ensure that it  
 13 answered the questions posed in the Terms of Reference  
 14 for the Inquiry.  
 15 **LORD HUGHES:** Right. Thank you.  
 16 **MS WHITELAW:** Could I ask you now, then, what your  
 17 role was in March 2018?  
 18 **A.** Yes, in March 2018, I was a Detective Chief  
 19 Inspector just about to be promoted to Detective  
 20 Superintendent and to take over the command of an  
 21 investigation team within Counter Terrorism Policing.  
 22 **Q.** We will come to the detail of the Counter  
 23 Terrorism Policing investigations, but is it right to  
 24 say that you were involved in the Counter Terrorism  
 25 Police investigation into the Skripals' poisoning from

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1 **Q.** We have heard that they are aliases; is that  
 2 right?  
 3 **A.** That is correct.  
 4 **Q.** Could you give us the aliases for each of  
 5 those.  
 6 **A.** Mishkin, Chepiga and Sergeev.  
 7 **Q.** In terms of the charges against them, is it  
 8 correct that on 19 July the CPS authorised charges  
 9 against Boshirov and Petrov for conspiracy to murder,  
 10 three counts of attempted murder, two counts of grievous  
 11 bodily harm with intent and one count of use or  
 12 possession of a chemical weapon arising out of the  
 13 Skripals' poisoning in it Salisbury in March 2018?  
 14 **A.** Yes, that's correct.  
 15 **Q.** Sorry, and the individuals affected?  
 16 **A.** That's correct. So I attended the Westminster  
 17 Magistrates' Court in London and presented the case to  
 18 the Magistrate of the court and then secured those  
 19 charges and warrants that then followed.  
 20 **Q.** I am just going to ask for those warrants to  
 21 be put up on the screen for you to confirm, please. If  
 22 we could go to INQ004908 first of all. Can you confirm  
 23 what that document is?  
 24 **A.** Yes, that's an arrest warrant. I think it is  
 25 called a first instance warrant actually technically,

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1 but where the Magistrates' Court have agreed that those  
2 individuals are charged in their absence.  
3 **LORD HUGHES:** Those are the charges, aren't they?  
4 **A.** Yes, they are, sir.  
5 **MS WHITELAW:** We see, don't we, at the bottom the  
6 date of that -- this is -- sorry, at the top Alexander  
7 Petrov is the name and on the bottom is Friday,  
8 20 July 2018.  
9 **A.** Yes.  
10 **Q.** If we could then go on the screen to  
11 INQ004909. Is that the same document for Boshirov?  
12 **A.** It is, yes.  
13 **Q.** Again, we see the name at the top and the date  
14 at the bottom.  
15 **A.** Yes.  
16 **Q.** Were those charges announced publicly on  
17 5 September 2018?  
18 **A.** They were, yes.  
19 **Q.** I think, on 20 April 2021, the CPS authorised  
20 charges against a third individual, Sergey Fedotov, for  
21 the same offences?  
22 **A.** Yes, the investigation had continued after the  
23 charging date and the announcements in September to  
24 secure enough evidence to be able to charge Fedotov for  
25 the same offences.

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1 **A.** Yes. So counter terrorism investigations more  
2 generally operate differently to normal investigations.  
3 One of the main differences is the partners with which  
4 we work most closely. As you will know, we work very  
5 closely with MI5, but as a result of that -- so we  
6 structure our investigations slightly differently  
7 because of the highly sensitive information that we have  
8 access to.  
9 There's an additional layer within counter state  
10 threat investigations and I am the lead for counter  
11 state threat investigations from policing for the UK.  
12 Those investigations have an additional layer of  
13 need-to-know principles where a smaller group of people  
14 are entitled or able to see the intelligence on a very  
15 strict need-to-know basis.  
16 **Q.** So taking that in stages more slowly, who  
17 leads responsibility for counter terrorism and national  
18 security in the UK?  
19 **A.** So that is led by MI5 who is the agency  
20 responsible for those under UK law.  
21 **Q.** And MI5 works closely with MI6 and GCHQ; is  
22 that your --  
23 **A.** Yes, that's correct, yes.  
24 **Q.** Could you explain the structure of CT policing  
25 in the UK and SO15's role within it?

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1 **Q.** So if we can just bring that up screen as  
2 well, that's INQ004580.  
3 **LORD HUGHES:** That's July. July?  
4 **A.** 2021, sir.  
5 **LORD HUGHES:** 21?  
6 **A.** Yes.  
7 **MS WHITELAW:** Again, we see the date at the bottom,  
8 the name at the top there.  
9 **A.** Correct.  
10 **Q.** At paragraph 201 of your witness statement,  
11 could you confirm what the status is of the criminal  
12 investigation, please?  
13 **A.** Yes, thank you. The criminal investigation  
14 continues to date. We are seeking further evidence and  
15 we have at this point, sir, managed to secure sufficient  
16 evidence to identify them in their real names and of  
17 course their membership of a Russian intelligence  
18 agency.  
19 **Q.** As I say, we will deal with some more detail  
20 in relation to the suspects in later weeks, but if  
21 I could move now to some questions about the way in  
22 which counter terrorism and in particular counter state  
23 threat police investigations work in this country.  
24 Do they operate differently from criminal  
25 investigations?

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1 **A.** The most senior police officer in the country  
2 for counter terrorism is the Assistant Commissioner of  
3 Specialist Operations. At the time of this incident  
4 that was transitioning between two different leaders .  
5 Under that we have a Senior National Coordinator for  
6 Counter Terrorism, that is an individual who is a Deputy  
7 Assistant Commissioner from the Metropolitan Police, and  
8 they have oversight of all investigations that happen  
9 around the country.  
10 I work for the Senior National Coordinator as the  
11 Commander of the Counter Terrorism Command. We have  
12 three missions in Counter Terrorism Policing, but  
13 largely our main mission is counter terrorism, as you  
14 would expect. We also do counter state threat  
15 investigations and we have a duty on behalf of the UK  
16 to manage war crimes investigations. Those last two, state  
17 threats and war crimes, come under me as national  
18 commitments as part of SO15's responsibility.  
19 **Q.** So CT policing, as you have heard me put to  
20 DCC Mills, is a collaboration of UK police forces --  
21 **A.** That's correct.  
22 **Q.** -- working with the UK intelligence community?  
23 **A.** Yes.  
24 **Q.** To help protect the public and national  
25 security by preventing, deterring and investigating

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1 terrorist activity and you have drawn attention in  
 2 particular to counter state threat for the obvious  
 3 reasons in these investigations.  
 4 You mentioned the Assistant Commissioner Specialist  
 5 Operations was transitioning between individuals in  
 6 2018, so can you just tell us who those individuals  
 7 were?  
 8 **A.** Yes, so over the weekend there was  
 9 a transition period between Sir Mark Rowley, now the  
 10 Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who was the  
 11 Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations, we  
 12 call that ACSO as an abbreviation. ACSO was in place  
 13 over the weekend and it was transitioning to Assistant  
 14 Commissioner Neal Basu.  
 15 **Q.** In March this weekend --  
 16 **A.** In March 2018, sorry --  
 17 **LORD HUGHES:** That particular weekend?  
 18 **A.** That particular weekend, yes. You will see  
 19 there was a common pattern forming, sir, in relation to  
 20 that weekend. It was quite significant in a number of  
 21 leadership changes across the country, but then they had  
 22 a handover period, so Sir Mark was still present during  
 23 some of the first week of this operation and while they  
 24 transitioned to Assistant Commissioner Neal Basu.  
 25 **MS WHITELAW:** Then you mentioned the Senior

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1 and risk from that intelligence or information.  
 2 **Q.** So do MI5 chair that meeting?  
 3 **A.** They do, yes.  
 4 **Q.** But it's attended by Counter Terrorism Police?  
 5 **A.** Correct.  
 6 **Q.** That's the joint operational team meeting.  
 7 **A.** Yes.  
 8 **LORD HUGHES:** You described it as if it is two  
 9 people, but I imagine it may sometimes be more than  
 10 that.  
 11 **A.** It is substantially more than that, sir. So  
 12 we tend to have experts from both our teams that then  
 13 can help inform the assessment of the threat we see in  
 14 that meeting.  
 15 **LORD HUGHES:** Right.  
 16 **MS WHITELAW:** You refer in your statement to the  
 17 Executive Liaison Group meetings. Is that another form  
 18 of meeting that is for the purpose of liaison between  
 19 the intelligence services, MI5, and CTP?  
 20 **A.** Yes, it is. When there's a particularly  
 21 challenging investigation or a high risk investigation,  
 22 or one that is likely to have a significant national or  
 23 international impact, we can have something called an  
 24 Executive Liaison Group, a ELG, and that is a strategic  
 25 level meeting chaired by the Senior National Coordinator

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1 National Coordinator. Who was that in 2018?  
 2 **A.** So again that had transitioned, so -- and was  
 3 moving into -- on the Monday of the incident we first  
 4 became involved, to Deputy Assistant Commissioner Dean  
 5 Hayden.  
 6 **Q.** Thank you, because we shall see --  
 7 **LORD HUGHES:** He is incoming or outgoing?  
 8 **A.** He is incoming. He was the Commander of SO15  
 9 and then transitioned into this next role above the  
 10 Senior National Coordinator.  
 11 **MS WHITELAW:** Thank you. That's helpful because we  
 12 will see the names reappearing in the documentation that  
 13 we're looking at.  
 14 How do CTP and MI5 share intelligence and  
 15 operational updates?  
 16 **A.** There are a number of different ways we do  
 17 that, sir, but in 2018, if there's an information or  
 18 intelligence which might be relevant to a counter  
 19 terrorism or state threat investigation, we normally  
 20 hold something called a JOT. That is an operational,  
 21 working level meeting, called a Joint Operational Team  
 22 meeting. In those JOTs we will have a team leader from  
 23 the security service and a Senior Investigating Officer  
 24 from the police and we work together to share  
 25 intelligence and information and assess the threat, harm

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1 for Counter Terrorism and through that meeting they can  
 2 provide oversight of the public safety risk, the threat  
 3 harm and risk and monitor the investigation both from  
 4 MI5 and the policings perspective. Very much  
 5 a partnership meeting again with different attendees,  
 6 sometimes from government, but mostly from the  
 7 intelligence community and policing, to respond to those  
 8 incidents.  
 9 **Q.** So two types of meetings but that one is  
 10 chaired by the Senior National Coordinator for Counter  
 11 Terrorism Policing?  
 12 **A.** Yes.  
 13 **Q.** Whereas the JOT is chaired by MI5?  
 14 **A.** Correct.  
 15 **Q.** Does the JOT develop the ELG strategy?  
 16 **A.** It does, yes.  
 17 **Q.** You have mentioned the difference between  
 18 Counter Terrorism Police investigations and other  
 19 investigations and you have referred to counter state  
 20 threat investigations. Are those generally more complex  
 21 than counter terrorism investigations, the counter state  
 22 threat?  
 23 **A.** They're more complex in how you handle  
 24 information and you make decisions, but otherwise the  
 25 structures are very similar for how we operate. It's

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1 really who is entitled to see that information and what  
2 that information means to us in decision-making terms.

3 **Q.** So one of the things is the need to know  
4 principle being applied --

5 **A.** Absolutely.

6 **Q.** -- in terms of handling information. Is that  
7 because of the enhanced capability and resources of  
8 states?

9 **A.** It is, absolutely. In this case, when you are  
10 investigating terrorism, it's pretty unlikely that those  
11 terrorists will have capability to do some things that  
12 we know some states have to do to us as a country. As  
13 a result, we have a very much more restricted sharing of  
14 intelligence in those investigations.

15 **Q.** You make the point in your witness statement  
16 that whereas there might not generally be the sort of  
17 general mass casualty you might see in a counter  
18 terrorism situation, the compromise of information or  
19 sources might cause damage to national security that  
20 could lead to a loss of life?

21 **A.** Yes, that's correct. We have seen incidents  
22 that do, of course, directly lead to loss of life from  
23 state threat investigations in a similar way to counter  
24 terrorism, but equally the compromise of such sensitive  
25 intelligence can have a very significant impact and it

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1 working processes between the CTP and the security  
2 services?

3 **A.** Yes, there has. Very significant  
4 developments.

5 **Q.** Now, in a counter terrorism or counter state  
6 threat investigation, we have heard there will be  
7 a Senior Investigating Officer; what is their specific  
8 role?

9 **A.** They are to lead the day-to-day activity  
10 within any kind of investigation. We will frequently  
11 see on television a sort of -- for example, a murder  
12 team investigation with a Senior Investigating Officer  
13 that sits above it and directs the day-to-day conduct  
14 and strategy of that investigation.

15 There is exactly the same role in Counter Terrorism  
16 Policing. An SIO will lead the day-to-day activity that  
17 takes place from a large investigation team. It just so  
18 happens that in our world, obviously, we work closely  
19 with different partners than you might in other parts of  
20 policing.

21 **Q.** So they are setting the strategic and tactical  
22 objectives of the investigation?

23 **A.** Yes.

24 **Q.** Managing the day-to-day activities of officers  
25 and staff undertaking different roles in the

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1 can lead to sometimes the loss of life if we're not  
2 cautious with how we handle that intelligence.

3 **Q.** Bearing that in mind and referring to  
4 paragraph 23 of your witness statement, how is the  
5 threat to national security best counteracted?

6 **A.** I mean, it's really important, as we have  
7 learned in counter terrorism over the years -- and the  
8 model for policing has changed in this area, sir, a lot  
9 as a result of learning -- that we come together and  
10 work so closely with members of the intelligence  
11 community, sometimes of course our international and  
12 other partners, to ensure that we're sharing the  
13 required levels of information that allow us to make an  
14 assessment of that threat and in turn the response to  
15 that threat.

16 **Q.** Information sharing --

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** -- being vitally important and joint  
19 decision-making processes?

20 **A.** Extremely close collaboration that is a part  
21 of that joint decision-making process that takes place  
22 in the JOT and to some extent in ELG.

23 **Q.** I'm not going to ask you for detail, but is it  
24 right to say that since 2018, some six years ago now,  
25 there have been significant developments in the joint

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1 investigation and ensuring that the team works  
2 collaboratively with different agencies; is that right?

3 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

4 **Q.** What was the structure of oversight for the  
5 Senior Investigating Officer?

6 **A.** There are several different types of  
7 oversight. I have talked about the ELG, the Executive  
8 Liaison Group in CT, but one of the others is what we  
9 call a PIP4, so professionalising --

10 **LORD HUGHES:** A what?

11 **A.** PIP4, which basically means the  
12 Professionalising Investigations Programme, which is  
13 a College of Policing programme. It is about how we  
14 train and accredit our senior investigating officers and  
15 a PIP4 -- so an SIO is referred to, sir, as a PIP3 so  
16 they have been through the college training to be SIO.  
17 A PIP4 is that next level, a strategic Senior  
18 Investigating Officer who can act as a guide to a Senior  
19 Investigating Officer in a complex investigation and  
20 also can remove some external influence over the SIO to  
21 allow them to run an investigation. For example, if  
22 there was a significant media presence in an  
23 investigation, that strategic SIO, the PIP4, can take  
24 the media away and be responsible for delivery of that  
25 media, allowing the SIO to focus on the important work

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1 to investigate the crime that's happened.  
 2 **LORD HUGHES:** Yes, and from what you're saying, the  
 3 SIO is, as it were, the operational manager of the  
 4 investigation; is that right?  
 5 **A.** Yes, that's correct, although they do take  
 6 strategic leadership of it, sir, and it's only in really  
 7 complex cases will we have a PIP4 where we feel that  
 8 extra level of oversight and support is absolutely  
 9 necessary.  
 10 **MS WHITELAW:** So if I have just got the layers of  
 11 supervision correct, we start with the PIP3, the Senior  
 12 Investigating Officer.  
 13 **A.** Yes.  
 14 **Q.** Then the PIP4, who has senior oversight, but  
 15 also links to other consequence management type issues  
 16 like media and the issues that we have heard with DCC  
 17 Mills?  
 18 **A.** That's correct.  
 19 **Q.** Then we have the Senior National Coordinator  
 20 and then the ACSO at the top; is that correct?  
 21 **A.** That's correct.  
 22 **Q.** In the Salisbury and Amesbury poisonings, we  
 23 have heard -- if I perhaps start from the top and go  
 24 down again -- ACSO, Sir Mark Rowley transferring to Neal  
 25 Basu, and the Senior National Coordinator transferring

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1 liaison?  
 2 **A.** Initially what would normally happen is the  
 3 PIP4 acts as a conduit between the Strategic  
 4 Coordination Group you heard about today and a counter  
 5 terrorism investigation. This was such a large, complex  
 6 investigation that the decision was taken at a very  
 7 early stage to deploy a Detective Superintendent into  
 8 the SCG who could attend all of the SCG meetings and  
 9 ensure that there was a two-way communication that  
 10 existed between the SCG and the investigation. I took  
 11 a decision early in the investigation to also send in  
 12 a forensic expert from SO15 to work in what you heard  
 13 called the STAC earlier, the Scientific and Technical  
 14 Advisory Cell, that was part of Mr Mills' response.  
 15 **Q.** Was that Keith Asman?  
 16 **A.** No, it was an officer that would report to  
 17 Keith Asman.  
 18 **Q.** Right. But Keith Asman was the forensic  
 19 coordinator; is that right?  
 20 **A.** He was the forensic coordinator working on  
 21 behalf of the Senior Investigating Officer from the  
 22 South-East Counter Terrorism Unit. I apologise, I know  
 23 I appreciate it's so complex, so if you have any  
 24 questions --  
 25 **Q.** This is why we thought we would have an

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1 to DAC Hayden?  
 2 **A.** Correct.  
 3 **Q.** The PIP4, who was that in Salisbury and  
 4 Amesbury?  
 5 **A.** This was a Detective Chief Superintendent from  
 6 the South-East Counter Terrorism Unit at the time.  
 7 **Q.** Can you tell us -- you have talked about the  
 8 importance of information sharing and collaboration,  
 9 joint working. With which partners did Counter  
 10 Terrorism Police liaise in the Salisbury and Amesbury  
 11 investigations?  
 12 **A.** There were a broad spread of partners  
 13 obviously engaged in all of our responses to this, sir,  
 14 but clearly we worked with our intelligence community  
 15 partners in the way that we normally would, but in  
 16 addition to which, as you have heard from Mr Mills  
 17 earlier today, we worked very closely within our counter  
 18 terrorism investigation with the SCG and the response  
 19 under him as Gold for Wiltshire and of course  
 20 consequence management to ensure that the scenes in  
 21 Salisbury could be returned to normal at some point in  
 22 the future.  
 23 **Q.** So how did you ensure information sharing  
 24 between that parallel response? Was it just through the  
 25 PIP4, or was there anybody placed within the SCG or to

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1 introductory session to explain the systems.  
 2 How frequent was liaison and collaboration with,  
 3 for example, the SCG, other departments?  
 4 **A.** Well, we would have attended either through  
 5 the PIP4 or through our nominated Superintendent every  
 6 one of the SCG meetings. We did exchange information.  
 7 You can understand, perhaps, the -- having talked about  
 8 what I have talked about -- challenges of need to know.  
 9 Sometimes the information exchanged from the  
 10 investigation into SCG might have been slightly  
 11 different in this case, but having those embedded  
 12 officers allowed us to make sure that we were across  
 13 what everybody was doing, so those would take place on  
 14 an almost daily basis.  
 15 **Q.** Did you liaise with government departments  
 16 involved in health and science, such as DSTL and PHE ?  
 17 **A.** So throughout this process we had a very close  
 18 liaison with DSTL. We were given nominated scientists  
 19 to work with at DSTL to ensure that when we were taking  
 20 investigative decisions we had the science advice from  
 21 an expert who understood what we were dealing with in  
 22 Novichok as a --  
 23 **Q.** So just to be clear, as part of the evidential  
 24 investigations, you had direct liaison with DSTL quite  
 25 separately from the SCG and their scientific public

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1 health advice that they would be receiving from DSTL and  
2 PHE?

3 **A.** Yes, although there was clearly liaison  
4 between the different -- the two different teams within  
5 DSTL, so you would have the DSTL representing SCG, DSTL  
6 rep supporting the investigation, both from the same  
7 agency, both understanding where we were headed.

8 But it's important to say as well we had  
9 relationships with Public Health England, who you heard  
10 Mr Mills mention earlier, in terms of those broader  
11 advisory notes and as ACSO, Mr Basu would attend COBR  
12 meetings or on occasion Mr Hayden would attend COBR  
13 meetings where, of course, SAGE were present and could  
14 be involved in those discussions.

15 **Q.** What about the emergency services and local  
16 authorities? How did that liaison, if any, work?

17 **A.** If we had liaison with them directly, it was  
18 to do with specific things in relation to scenes, for  
19 example, or support that was needed in terms of  
20 consequence management, but the majority of that liaison  
21 took place within the Gold and SCG in which we then  
22 worked closely with Mr Mills and his team to ensure that  
23 that engagement took place.

24 **Q.** As a general point, we have heard from DCC  
25 Mills that the poisoning of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie

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1 about Amesbury?

2 **A.** I'm not aware of them offering in Amesbury,  
3 but again the same applied really. The same resources  
4 that we had in Salisbury were sufficient to deal with  
5 the investigation in Amesbury.

6 **Q.** We have heard from DCC Mills about the  
7 Wiltshire Police responses, response operations to  
8 Salisbury and Amesbury, about Fairline and Fortis.  
9 Could you give us an overview of the CT police  
10 Operations Wedana, Caterva and Read, please?

11 **A.** I can.

12 **Q.** 29 to 34 in your witness statement, if you  
13 need to refer to it.

14 **A.** Thank you. The first operation you mentioned  
15 is Operation Wedana. This was the operation name given  
16 to Counter Terrorism Policing South-East investigation  
17 into Sergei and Yulia Skripal's poisoning here in  
18 Salisbury. That was a reactive investigation, so an  
19 investigation that focuses on responding to crime scenes  
20 and victims, speaking to witnesses, checking CCTV,  
21 trying to gather as much evidence to identify what  
22 happened and where it might have happened.

23 There was a second operation and my role in that  
24 one, as I mentioned earlier, was to support the SIO, the  
25 Detective Superintendent from the South-East Counter

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1 Rowley happened while investigations were still ongoing  
2 in relation to the Skripals and there had already been  
3 a number of structures set up, and did that assist?

4 **A.** Yes, it did. So we were able -- so, for  
5 example, lots of our team had deployed within Counter  
6 Terrorism Policing terms at least and in terms of  
7 Mr Mills' team, to both of those incidents and so we  
8 were able to establish that reporting structure and also  
9 the specialist officers and staff that we would need to  
10 respond to these incidents much quicker in the second  
11 incident as a result of what we had learned from the  
12 first incident.

13 **Q.** Finally on the point of liaison with different  
14 agencies, you say in your witness statement -- and this  
15 is paragraph 76 -- that support for the Salisbury  
16 investigation was offered by the National Crime Agency,  
17 the NCA, and from the FBI, the Federal Bureau for  
18 Investigation in the States, but that wasn't needed  
19 because CTP had sufficient resources and skills; is that  
20 correct?

21 **A.** Yes, that's absolutely correct. We clearly  
22 remained very close in liaison terms with both those  
23 agencies, but yes, we did not require resources from  
24 them to help us.

25 **Q.** And that was in relation to Salisbury. What

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1 Terrorism Unit as a critical friend and ensure that the  
2 support was provided to that Senior Investigating  
3 Officer.

4 The second operation is Operation Caterva. These  
5 two operations ran in parallel. Caterva was the  
6 operation for which I was the Senior Investigating  
7 Officer. This is a covert investigation that seeks to  
8 identify those responsible for this incident, in this  
9 case on the basis of the charges Petrov, Boshirov and  
10 Fedotov, and work with partners to understand in  
11 a covert sense how we use intelligence and information  
12 to inform our investigation and then conduct an  
13 evidence-based inquiry.

14 That's -- Wedana is the response to the incident,  
15 Caterva is the covert operation into the suspects and  
16 then as soon as CT Policing became aware of the cause of  
17 Dawn and Charlie's poisoning, clearly we started  
18 Operation Read which was under a different Senior  
19 Investigating Officer, again from the south east, DCI  
20 Murphy, and it was really important that that  
21 investigation was led by a separate individual to ensure  
22 the conduct of the investigation wasn't dissuaded by  
23 some other activity that we had already undertaken, so  
24 we like to see that independent SIO take response --

25 **Q.** We're going to hear more about that from you

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1 tomorrow.  
 2 **A.** Great.  
 3 **Q.** Although it was a separate SIO, given that  
 4 element of independence, did you liaise quite closely  
 5 between your role as the SIO for Caterva and Operation  
 6 Read?  
 7 **A.** Yes. In effect, you have the Detective  
 8 Superintendent of Wedana, me as the SIO for Caterva and  
 9 the DCI who was the SIO for Operation Read constantly  
 10 speaking to each other, attending the same meetings, the  
 11 same JOTs and sharing information.  
 12 **Q.** I'm going to just recap that because it is the  
 13 first time we're sort of going into the detail of those  
 14 three investigations --  
 15 **A.** Of course.  
 16 **Q.** -- which are obviously of critical importance  
 17 to this Inquiry. So Wedana we have the reactive  
 18 investigation to the Skripals?  
 19 **A.** Yes.  
 20 **Q.** For which your role is a critical friend to  
 21 the SIO?  
 22 **A.** Yes.  
 23 **Q.** That's incident led, so focusing on gathering  
 24 all of the evidence, door-to-door inquiries, scene  
 25 searches, that sort of thing?

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1 **A.** Of course. So this was the first identified  
 2 use of a chemical weapon in the UK in this case, in this  
 3 sense, used as a tool, we say, to conduct an  
 4 assassination in this style.  
 5 Having worked on the Litvinenko investigation,  
 6 I understood quite quickly how significant this would be  
 7 and how completely challenging it would be. From even  
 8 our senior investigations through to how we would work  
 9 with partners to understand who might be responsible for  
 10 it, the scale of the incident, the impact on the public  
 11 of Salisbury, this really was an unprecedented  
 12 investigation, not one that we had seen before, but one  
 13 that we were able to apply our existing operational  
 14 processes to in order to respond.  
 15 **Q.** Because the impacts were multiple, weren't  
 16 they?  
 17 **A.** So not just on Salisbury, but there was very  
 18 significant impact on international relations, sir, as  
 19 well. You will have seen -- and I'm sure we will  
 20 discuss further -- the impact on decisions taken by  
 21 other governments and the impact that using a chemical  
 22 weapon has on the streets of anywhere in any country  
 23 amongst our allies as well.  
 24 But, of course, more broadly, you saw the impact in  
 25 Salisbury. The world's media were here all of the time,

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1 **A.** Yes.  
 2 **Q.** Caterva, the parallel investigation into the  
 3 suspects for which you are the SIO is a proactive  
 4 investigation led by intelligence; is that right?  
 5 **A.** Yes, that's correct.  
 6 **Q.** That's the one in which you work with --  
 7 particularly work with intelligence partners?  
 8 **A.** Yes.  
 9 **Q.** Then we have Operation Read, which is another  
 10 reactive investigation to Dawn Sturgess and Charlie  
 11 Rowley's poisoning?  
 12 **A.** Yes, correct.  
 13 **Q.** For which we have heard that the SIO was DCI  
 14 Murphy, but with whom you liaised, as did the SIO for  
 15 Wedana?  
 16 **A.** Yes, it's important to say the same PIP4 sat  
 17 above all three of those operations as well. In order  
 18 to ensure that coordination, the Chief Superintendent  
 19 from the South-East Counter Terrorism Unit acted as PIP4  
 20 across all three investigations.  
 21 **Q.** Thank you. That brings us on now to asking  
 22 you about the scale and complexity of these  
 23 investigations and perhaps you could indicate -- and you  
 24 deal with it at paragraphs 33 and 34 -- the factors that  
 25 made this particularly challenging.

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1 reporting every day activity that was taking place here.  
 2 On top of that, clearly there was a very large  
 3 coordinated response on behalf of Her Majesty's  
 4 Government at the time and in addition to that clearly  
 5 we had the Russian State commenting in the media, but  
 6 also making enquiries also on a regular basis.  
 7 **Q.** So particular challenges conducting an  
 8 investigation where there's involvement suspected of  
 9 a hostile state. You have mentioned the media. It's  
 10 important, isn't it, for the police to be operationally  
 11 independent?  
 12 **A.** It's extremely important, yes. We must be  
 13 able to work without that external influence, unless of  
 14 course that influence is helpful to our investigation,  
 15 so yes, what we -- we sort of guard our operational  
 16 independence very closely in incidents like this where  
 17 of course we will listen to what's happening in the  
 18 world, we will listen absolutely to the challenges that  
 19 are happening, but we need to focus on the evidence  
 20 that's in front of us, the information available to us  
 21 that helps inform our prioritisation of actions in an  
 22 investigation.  
 23 **Q.** You have mentioned the broader impacts of  
 24 course on the people of Salisbury and Amesbury and the  
 25 country more broadly, but also there were individual

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1 impacts, weren't there, of course, on those contaminated  
 2 and very tragically in Dawn Sturgess' case, the fatal  
 3 impact?  
 4 **A.** Absolutely.  
 5 **Q.** Was there also a twin focus on protecting the  
 6 public from harm as well as trying to find those  
 7 responsible and trying to achieve justice?  
 8 **A.** This was an overriding principle of all of our  
 9 investigations actually, is how do we identify the  
 10 ongoing risk to the public, even in those early stages  
 11 in the first incident here in Salisbury, and take steps  
 12 to make sure that while we gather evidence that's  
 13 important to our criminal investigation and we're doing  
 14 that with primary focus on what does it mean to public  
 15 health, what does it mean to the health of officers and  
 16 staff who are deploying into these really challenging  
 17 contaminated scenes on a daily basis, so the safety and  
 18 wellbeing of the public and our officers and staff were  
 19 paramount throughout our investigation.  
 20 **Q.** I think we will hear more about, particularly  
 21 when you are dealing with a nerve agent, the practical  
 22 implications that that had for officers who were  
 23 searching and investigating --  
 24 **A.** Yes.  
 25 **Q.** -- and seeking evidence.

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1 "... including working in counter intelligence and  
 2 counter terrorism investigations and operations."  
 3 In the same paragraph MD39 says they were not  
 4 involved in the events but the witness is "well placed  
 5 to provide this statement on behalf of MI5", given their  
 6 current and previous roles, "and my experience of the  
 7 functions and operation of MI5 generally."  
 8 At paragraph 4, MD39 confirms that:  
 9 "The purpose of this statement is to address the  
 10 nature and extent of MI5's investigation into the  
 11 poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, and latterly  
 12 Ms Sturgess, and its liaison with the parallel police  
 13 investigations."  
 14 As I addressed with you in relation to your own  
 15 evidence, Commander Murphy, MD39 says at paragraph 5  
 16 that they have:  
 17 "... sought to be as transparent as possible, but  
 18 I must emphasise at the outset that there remains  
 19 a level of detail that I cannot address without risking  
 20 serious harm to national security."  
 21 MD39 in that paragraph goes on to explain the  
 22 reasons for that. Commander Murphy, is that a balance  
 23 that you well understand?  
 24 **A.** Yes, absolutely.  
 25 **Q.** At paragraph 7 MD39 confirms, however, that

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1 One of the questions the family of Dawn Sturgess,  
 2 those poisoned by the Novichok, the people of Salisbury  
 3 and the wider public will of course ask is was MI5  
 4 involved in the investigations and you have already in  
 5 your evidence indicated that Counter Terrorism Policing  
 6 works closely with MI5, particularly through ELGs and  
 7 JOTs, and that they in turn work with MI6 and GCHQ, so  
 8 I would now like to adduce, if I may, please, through  
 9 Commander Murphy a witness statement which has been  
 10 provided by MI5 to the Inquiry. If we could have that  
 11 up on screen please. It is INQ006055.  
 12 This is a four page witness statement of MD39 who  
 13 is a senior officer within the Security Service, dated  
 14 2 October.  
 15 The witness starts at paragraph 2 by offering  
 16 condolences:  
 17 "... both on my own behalf and on behalf of MI5,  
 18 to Ms Sturgess' family ... and to all those who have  
 19 been otherwise affected by the awful events in 2018."  
 20 Introducing themselves at paragraph 3, the witness  
 21 explains they have worked for MI5 since 1999. They say:  
 22 "I am currently a senior leader within MI5's  
 23 Counter State Threats Branch."  
 24 And that they have undertaken a wide variety of  
 25 roles:

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1 MI5 has made available to the Chair and his legal team  
 2 everything that they have sought to review and that.  
 3 "... the Inquiry will therefore be able to  
 4 investigate all the matters it covers in closed where it  
 5 cannot do so in open."  
 6 At paragraphs 8 to 11 MI5 sets out its legal powers  
 7 and remit, which includes the:  
 8 "... protection of national security and, in  
 9 particular, its protection against threats from  
 10 espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities  
 11 of agents of foreign powers ..."  
 12 At paragraph 10 MD39 explains that MI5's history of  
 13 effort against the Russian Federation and former Soviet  
 14 Union means it:  
 15 "... has built and maintains significant experience  
 16 and expertise in the investigation of the activities of  
 17 the Russian State today."  
 18 Commander Murphy, I would like you to confirm for  
 19 us your understanding and experience of what's set out  
 20 at paragraph 11 in terms of the division of powers and  
 21 roles as between MI5 and the police.  
 22 **A.** Yes, thank you. So in paragraph 11 the  
 23 witness refers to MI5 not having powers of arrest, for  
 24 example. How it tends to work in reality is that in the  
 25 intelligence phase of an operation, sir, it will be MI5

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1 led and then, as we transition into disrupting some  
2 activity, it will become police led and supported by  
3 MI5. That transition is largely what's being referred  
4 to here by the witness, where they work closely with  
5 other law enforcement partners to ensure that once  
6 there's a need for action based upon that intelligence,  
7 they know who to come to to see that action.

8 **Q.** So for members of the public, in particular,  
9 who may not be familiar with the respective powers,  
10 the police have powers of arrest --

11 **A.** Yes.

12 **Q.** -- and conduct criminal investigations with  
13 a view to prosecution?

14 **A.** Yes.

15 **Q.** MI5 provides police and law enforcement with  
16 information and intelligence assessments on threats, but  
17 each collaborates with the other on investigations that  
18 may result in criminal proceedings, does that  
19 summarise --

20 **A.** Absolutely correct, yes.

21 **Q.** Moving on to section C of the statement,  
22 "MI5's investigation", at paragraph 13 MI5 confirms:

23 "MI5 carried out a full investigation into the  
24 incident in Salisbury and those within the Russian  
25 intelligence services responsible for it. Although

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1 **A.** Yes.

2 **Q.** So does that sum up the partnership model and  
3 the respective roles and responsibilities that you  
4 experienced during the investigations into these events ?

5 **A.** Thank you, yes, it does.

6 **Q.** At the end of paragraph 14, MD39 indicated  
7 that:

8 "While a large proportion of the investigation  
9 involved covert activities and collection of  
10 intelligence, some simultaneous overt activities were  
11 conducted by police, including large-scale CCTV  
12 retrieval and public appeals for assistance."

13 Again, is that right?

14 **A.** Yes, that's right. In essence that is us  
15 sharing information from our investigative activity back  
16 with MI5 to ensure that we've got that two-way sharing  
17 to make joint assessments of what we do next.

18 **Q.** Thank you. That brings me to my final point  
19 about police techniques and evidential sources. Your  
20 witness statement contains reference to a very large  
21 number of techniques and evidential sources which appear  
22 to have been exploited by the police in the  
23 investigations. I'm going to list them and then ask you  
24 to confirm whether that list properly represents the  
25 range of police techniques that were considered or

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1 the police and MI5 have distinct roles and  
2 responsibilities, MI5 works together with the police to  
3 achieve the objectives of a post-incident investigation.  
4 This partnership model was adopted for the post-incident  
5 investigation into the events in Salisbury, and then  
6 after Ms Sturges tragically fell ill and died the same  
7 model was adopted."

8 Commander Murphy, can you confirm that there was  
9 indeed a covert investigation from your knowledge?

10 **A.** I can, yes.

11 **Q.** At paragraph 14 MD39 gives slightly more  
12 information about what the police did and what MI5 did  
13 in this particular case:

14 "... the police led on ensuring public safety, the  
15 prevention of further attacks, evidence gathering to  
16 support executive action and ensuring public confidence  
17 and reassurance, including delivering public  
18 communications in relation to the incident."

19 Do you agree with that?

20 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

21 **Q.** MI5 led on the:

22 "... gathering and exploitation, assessment and  
23 dissemination of intelligence to support the  
24 post-incident investigation."

25 Is that correct?

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1 deployed and the evidential sources that were used in  
2 the investigations. So you refer to house-to-house  
3 enquiries --

4 **LORD HUGHES:** Where are you please, Ms Whitelaw?

5 **MS WHITELAW:** In fact because I am all over the  
6 statement now --

7 **LORD HUGHES:** All right, that's fine.

8 **MS WHITELAW:** -- I'm going to list the types of  
9 enquiries and evidential sources and no doubt Commander  
10 Murphy will let me know if I have missed any, or if any  
11 are incorrect.

12 So house-to-house enquiries -- but, sir, I do have  
13 some paragraph references for you, for your reference,  
14 I will just indicate as we go, it is 103.

15 Scene searches and forensic investigations.

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** Building victim profiles, sir, paragraph 36;  
18 reviewing digital devices, paragraph 38; police  
19 interviews with victims, paragraph 103.

20 **A.** Correct.

21 **LORD HUGHES:** Sorry, what was the last one?

22 **MS WHITELAW:** Police interviews with victims.

23 **LORD HUGHES:** Oh, yes, right.

24 **MS WHITELAW:** 103. Developing working hypotheses?

25 **A.** Yes.

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1           **Q.** The development of sequence of events and  
2 timelines through scene investigations?  
3           **A.** Absolutely.  
4           **Q.** Sir, paragraphs 63 to 66. Witness interviews,  
5 communications data --  
6           **A.** Yes.  
7           **Q.** -- police intelligence. The last three, sir,  
8 are paragraphs 63 to 66.  
9           CCTV, paragraph 84?  
10          **A.** Yes.  
11          **Q.** Outside enquiries, for example financial  
12 investigations and witness trawls?  
13          **A.** Correct.  
14          **Q.** That's paragraph 84. Automatic number plate  
15 recognition enquiries, paragraph 90; reviewing  
16 information from other police forces, officers,  
17 Wiltshire Police in this case; sampling, paragraph 90?  
18          **A.** Yes.  
19          **Q.** CBRN policing techniques?  
20          **A.** Correct.  
21          **Q.** Paragraph 101. Wifi checks and cell site  
22 data, paragraph 103; conventional biometric swabbing  
23 fingerprints and, in the context you describe it at  
24 paragraph 122, you say that was considered?  
25          **A.** Yes.

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1 online just the same as anybody else can?  
2           **A.** Right.  
3           **MS WHITELAW:** Presumably when there's open source  
4 media research, police would also seek to establish, in  
5 parallel, other evidential support for anything they  
6 might find in open.  
7           **A.** Absolutely, yes. I think things posted online  
8 are sometimes not the strength of evidence that we would  
9 like to see, so of course we parallel everything in an  
10 investigative sense.  
11          **Q.** On that note, was this information something  
12 that had to be taken into consideration particularly in  
13 this case?  
14          **A.** Yes.  
15          **Q.** Can you just explain that?  
16          **A.** So there was an awful lot of information  
17 posted online, but also there were a number of  
18 journalistic and other agencies out there that were  
19 conducting their own enquiries and investigations, so  
20 huge amounts of information online and some of that  
21 obviously was reviewed by us so that we could understand  
22 whether or not it provided us with an investigative  
23 opportunity that we might explore further.  
24          **Q.** Thank you, Commander Murphy. That concludes  
25 my questioning for this tranche of evidence. As we have

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1           **Q.** So other times when those biometrics actually  
2 are not suitable?  
3           **A.** Yes, absolutely. For example, depending on  
4 the circumstances of each individual scene it may be not  
5 appropriate to take fingerprints and DNA from those  
6 scenes.  
7           **Q.** Scene walk throughs, paragraphs 125 to 126?  
8           **A.** Correct.  
9           **Q.** Media articles, paragraph 199?  
10          **A.** Yes.  
11          **Q.** Does that properly represent the sort of range  
12 of policing techniques that were considered or  
13 deployed --  
14          **A.** Yes.  
15          **Q.** -- and the evidential sources?  
16          **A.** Just on that last point, I think, on media  
17 articles, it is much broader than that as well. Clearly  
18 it is all material that might be posted open source that  
19 may well provide some useful information to us, so not  
20 just --  
21          **LORD HUGHES:** So that's researching open source  
22 material, is it?  
23          **A.** Absolutely, sir. Not just media, but more  
24 broadly.  
25          **LORD HUGHES:** In other words, you can look up

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1 said, you are due to return tomorrow to address  
2 Operation Read, the investigation into the poisoning of  
3 Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley that you have  
4 described.  
5           **A.** Yes.  
6           **MS WHITELAW:** Sir, it is a shorter day today, but  
7 we have extremely full days for the rest of the week, so  
8 it may be that all of the teams and you, sir, yourself  
9 will find it useful to have some time for discussions  
10 and to undertake further preparatory work.  
11          **LORD HUGHES:** I think even I understand that  
12 there's a good deal of work done outside the courtroom,  
13 Ms Whitelaw.  
14          Mr Murphy, I gather you are going to be coming back  
15 from time to time to, as it were, deal with particular  
16 compartments of evidence. Please feel free to go now.  
17 If you need to confer with counsel in relation to  
18 evidence which is yet to come, please feel free to do  
19 that.  
20          **A.** Thank you, sir.  
21          **LORD HUGHES:** But not please, as it were, to rehash  
22 what you have just told us. What you have just told us  
23 stands as your evidence.  
24          **A.** Sir, thank you.  
25          **LORD HUGHES:** All right? Thank you very much.

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1	All right, Ms Whitelaw. 10 o'clock tomorrow	1
2	morning.	2
3	<b>(12.16 pm)</b>	3
4	(The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am on Wednesday,	4
5	<b>16 October 2024)</b>	5
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<b>D</b>	<b>discussing</b>	47/13 47/13	<b>drop [2]</b> 3/12	44/15 75/7	89/15	<b>establish [3]</b>
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<b>died [2]</b>	<b>[2]</b> 38/5	9/6 11/9	<b>drugs [3]</b>	55/13 55/20	12/7 18/12	38/2
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<b>give... [7]</b>	<b>gone [3]</b>	72/8 75/4	16/17 19/17	19/9 23/12	<b>herself [4]</b>	39/18 46/8
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56/11 60/4	<b>good [5]</b> 4/16	32/9 84/15	44/2 47/17	44/18 46/21	<b>Hertfordshire [2]</b> 51/16	30/8
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<b>given [14]</b>	49/2 96/12	18/1 43/4	55/17 55/20	80/25 85/20	<b>high [5]</b> 33/6	95/20
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60/22 61/10	53/17	46/16 65/22	39/17 39/22	7/15 26/23	44/13	60/16
73/23 92/14	<b>Great [1]</b>	<b>happen [4]</b>	40/1 40/4	66/11 84/14	<b>hosted [1]</b>	<b>I became [1]</b>
96/16	81/2	16/6 34/10	40/5 40/9	<b>helps [2]</b>	27/2	59/2
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42/16 45/19	<b>ground [1]</b>	<b>happy [1]</b> 2/5	18/13 23/13	3/12 3/13	51/10 66/14	<b>I cannot [1]</b>
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53/23 55/8	<b>group [16]</b>	60/11 66/25	39/23 41/24	25/25 47/4	70/2 70/4	<b>I could [5]</b>
57/21 59/19	10/9 10/15	68/3 85/6	42/8 42/12	47/21 84/3	72/13 74/23	
60/20 70/23	11/8 12/22	87/20	42/22 42/25	<b>here [11]</b>	76/2 77/16	
80/25 81/12	16/2 16/11	<b>Harries [1]</b>	44/23 76/16	16/19 30/2	80/11 83/6	
81/13 91/23	17/21 19/18	23/16	77/1 77/9	30/5 43/5	83/7 83/8	
92/8 96/14	19/24 41/6	<b>has [25]</b> 2/22	85/15 85/15	50/22 56/16	85/9 88/24	
<b>Gold [3]</b> 10/3	41/25 63/13	4/22 11/11	<b>hear [15]</b> 4/2	79/17 83/25	<b>however [6]</b>	
				84/1 85/11		

<b>I</b>	75/22	4/2	79/21 80/8	11/8 11/23	6/9 9/23 22/4	74/23 76/6
<b>I could... [5]</b>	<b>I last [1]</b> 3/4	<b>I took [1]</b>	85/9	14/11 21/4	39/13 41/12	76/9 80/11
13/7 14/14	<b>I made [1]</b>	75/10	<b>ill [3]</b> 4/1	21/10 22/18	44/13 47/20	81/11 84/20
18/23 53/16	41/24	<b>I transferred</b>	32/23 90/6	23/19 25/23	90/9	89/16 90/12
62/21	<b>I may [10]</b>	<b>[1]</b> 8/3	<b>illness [1]</b>	33/5 33/13	<b>independenc</b>	91/15 93/16
<b>I deal [1]</b> 55/4	10/16 11/5	<b>I tried [1]</b>	25/25	34/8 36/4	<b>e [2]</b> 81/4	94/19 95/11
<b>I declared [1]</b>	16/5 24/10	2/17	<b>imagine [1]</b>	38/4 39/4	84/16	95/16 95/20
42/2	27/13 29/12	<b>I underline [1]</b>	67/9	39/5 39/14	<b>independent</b>	<b>informed [4]</b>
<b>I described</b>	30/16 42/6	30/5	<b>immediacy</b>	39/21 40/7	<b>[2]</b> 80/24	24/14 32/25
<b>[1]</b> 44/9	58/6 86/8	<b>I understand</b>	<b>[1]</b> 20/20	40/10 41/16	84/11	36/3 40/16
<b>I did [11]</b>	<b>I mean [1]</b>	<b>[1]</b> 96/11	<b>immediate [2]</b>	41/17 41/18	<b>independentl</b>	<b>initial [2]</b>
10/10 15/10	70/6	<b>I understood</b>	10/7 41/23	42/2 42/7	<b>y [1]</b> 3/7	56/21 59/3
17/5 18/7	<b>I mentioned</b>	<b>[1]</b> 83/6	<b>immunity [1]</b>	42/10 43/5	<b>index [2]</b>	<b>initially [7]</b>
18/22 40/24	<b>[1]</b> 79/24	<b>I want [1]</b>	54/5	43/9 43/15	56/10 98/4	2/25 13/22
42/6 45/4	<b>I might [2]</b>	32/20	<b>impact [13]</b>	43/17 43/18	<b>indicate [4]</b>	14/2 14/2
45/25 51/18	50/14 50/21	<b>I was [11]</b> 9/5	9/23 14/10	44/1 44/2	38/13 39/22	25/5 39/17
52/9	<b>I move [1]</b>	24/25 39/8	16/17 16/17	44/5 44/7	82/23 92/14	75/2
<b>I do [5]</b> 13/14	53/14	39/9 40/12	48/2 67/23	44/10 47/14	<b>indicated [6]</b>	<b>INQ004580</b>
23/6 38/22	<b>I must [1]</b>	41/2 41/4	69/25 83/10	50/20 50/22	25/15 39/17	<b>[1]</b> 62/2
59/15 92/12	87/18	50/22 50/23	83/18 83/20	50/25 52/7	41/8 57/1	<b>INQ004908</b>
<b>I don't [3]</b>	<b>I needed [1]</b>	58/18 80/6	83/21 83/24	64/3 66/3	86/5 91/6	<b>[1]</b> 60/22
34/24 37/5	42/8	<b>I wasn't [1]</b>	85/3	78/11 78/12	<b>indicating [1]</b>	<b>INQ004909</b>
48/16	<b>I never [1]</b>	39/7	<b>impacts [3]</b>	80/8 80/14	25/16	<b>[1]</b> 61/11
<b>I explained</b>	4/7	<b>I will [8]</b> 3/25	83/15 84/23	81/23 83/10	<b>individual [7]</b>	<b>INQ004989</b>
<b>[1]</b> 44/21	<b>I perhaps [1]</b>	4/7 4/10 5/19	85/1	85/11 89/24	36/5 36/9	<b>[1]</b> 38/7
<b>I gather [2]</b>	73/23	15/24 47/17	<b>implications</b>	90/3 90/4	61/20 64/6	<b>INQ005033</b>
48/10 96/14	<b>I propose [1]</b>	51/14 92/14	<b>[1]</b> 85/22	90/18 90/24	80/21 84/25	<b>[1]</b> 33/21
<b>I got [1]</b>	48/4	<b>I work [1]</b>	<b>importance</b>	<b>incidents [12]</b>	94/4	<b>INQ005034</b>
21/12	<b>I said [1]</b>	64/10	<b>[2]</b> 74/8	9/22 9/22	<b>individuals</b>	<b>[1]</b> 35/23
<b>I guess [2]</b>	14/19	<b>I would [13]</b>	81/16	12/6 25/5	<b>[4]</b> 60/15	<b>INQ005141</b>
18/1 43/4	<b>I say [3]</b> 28/8	9/21 12/17	<b>important</b>	31/15 56/15	61/2 65/5	<b>[1]</b> 13/3
<b>I had [3]</b> 41/3	30/3 62/19	15/16 19/12	<b>[13]</b> 12/13	56/18 68/8	65/6	<b>INQ005820</b>
45/6 59/6	<b>I set [1]</b> 17/12	28/13 42/9	27/21 47/12	69/21 78/7	<b>influence [3]</b>	<b>[1]</b> 56/5
<b>I have [17]</b>	<b>I should [1]</b>	46/25 47/24	54/7 70/6	78/10 84/16	72/20 84/13	<b>INQ006055</b>
5/8 5/15 6/13	40/25	50/14 53/17	70/18 72/25	<b>include [2]</b>	84/14	<b>[1]</b> 86/11
6/14 18/4	<b>I start [1]</b>	57/3 86/8	77/8 80/20	12/5 57/17	<b>inform [4]</b>	<b>INQ006056</b>
20/16 29/14	55/9	88/18	82/16 84/10	<b>included [2]</b>	35/7 67/13	<b>[1]</b> 50/5
30/2 46/22	<b>I think [25]</b>	<b>I'm [19]</b> 7/15	84/12 85/13	52/13 54/12	80/12 84/21	<b>INQ006090</b>
49/19 51/11	8/13 11/21	7/19 10/16	<b>importantly</b>	<b>includes [1]</b>	<b>information</b>	<b>[1]</b> 5/17
53/9 54/1	12/13 13/14	14/8 19/15	<b>[2]</b> 21/25	88/7	<b>[39]</b> 21/13	<b>INQ006091</b>
72/7 73/10	16/1 17/3	27/12 37/11	54/6	<b>including [4]</b>	22/20 22/24	<b>[1]</b> 6/2
76/8 92/10	18/20 20/9	38/16 46/20	<b>impressed [1]</b>	59/21 87/1	30/13 30/21	<b>INQ006117</b>
<b>I heard [2]</b>	24/22 25/9	49/13 49/20	50/23	90/17 91/11	30/22 30/24	<b>[1]</b> 6/21
4/1 4/4	26/14 31/19	55/8 58/5	<b>inception [1]</b>	<b>incoherent</b>	33/17 35/14	<b>inquest [4]</b>
<b>I help [1]</b>	35/14 37/23	70/23 79/2	29/8	<b>[1]</b> 36/23	41/15 43/5	32/16 54/2
43/21	43/22 45/2	81/12 83/19	<b>incidences</b>	<b>incoming [2]</b>	54/12 55/22	55/14 58/12
<b>I imagine [1]</b>	52/13 52/23	91/23 92/8	<b>[6]</b> 11/4 14/1	66/7 66/8	63/7 66/17	<b>inquiries [1]</b>
67/9	56/6 60/24	<b>identified [2]</b>	20/18 26/6	<b>incorrect [1]</b>	66/25 67/1	81/24
<b>I just [3]</b> 13/9	61/19 85/20	44/24 83/1	31/23 47/15	92/11	68/24 69/1	<b>inquiry [38]</b>
28/10 37/6	94/16 95/7	<b>identify [7]</b>	<b>incident [59]</b>	<b>incredibly [1]</b>	69/2 69/6	1/20 4/18 5/6
<b>I know [1]</b>	96/11	54/17 57/9	3/5 10/1 10/4	50/23	69/18 70/13	6/2 6/21 7/12
	<b>I thought [1]</b>	57/14 62/16	10/21 10/25	<b>indeed [8]</b>	70/16 74/8	23/13 28/15

<b>I</b>	60/11	67/21 68/3	27/22 76/20	57/22	13/3 13/7	2/24
<b>inquiry... [30]</b>	<b>interaction</b>	71/6 71/10	91/15 95/10	<b>its [4]</b> 17/17	13/9 14/12	<b>know [22]</b>
30/18 31/9	<b>[1]</b> 13/20	71/12 71/14	95/22	87/12 88/6	15/16 16/5	3/21 14/23
32/16 32/18	<b>interest [1]</b>	71/17 71/22	<b>involve [1]</b>	88/9	17/6 17/25	22/5 22/8
39/24 49/4	54/5	72/1 72/19	51/21	<b>J</b>	18/8 19/12	24/1 24/4
49/25 51/6	<b>internal [1]</b>	72/21 72/23	<b>involved [16]</b>	<b>Jenny [1]</b>	20/4 21/3	32/24 34/24
51/10 53/24	48/1	73/4 74/18	12/15 31/13	23/16	21/6 23/7	37/5 37/7
54/3 55/14	<b>international</b>	75/5 75/6	32/22 38/24	<b>job [2]</b> 35/21	23/8 24/10	46/11 49/3
55/21 56/3	<b>[3]</b> 67/23	75/10 75/11	39/1 41/16	36/2	24/21 28/10	54/2 63/4
56/17 57/5	70/11 83/18	76/10 77/6	42/20 53/9	<b>John [1]</b> 2/9	29/12 30/25	63/13 63/15
57/8 57/9	<b>interviews [3]</b>	78/16 78/18	58/24 59/2	<b>join [1]</b> 51/16	32/11 32/20	69/3 69/12
57/14 57/21	92/19 92/22	79/5 79/16	66/4 76/16	<b>joined [1]</b>	33/4 33/22	75/22 76/8
57/24 58/4	93/4	79/18 79/19	77/14 86/4	51/24	35/7 35/7	89/7 92/10
58/14 59/19	<b>introduced</b>	80/7 80/12	87/4 91/9	<b>joint [11]</b>	35/25 36/8	<b>knowledge</b>
59/20 80/13	<b>[1]</b> 51/9	80/21 80/22	<b>involvement</b>	11/18 32/14	36/17 37/1	<b>[6]</b> 5/23 6/12
81/17 86/10	<b>Introducing</b>	81/18 82/2	<b>[3]</b> 7/6 28/1	55/12 55/19	37/5 37/6	7/2 30/3
88/3 97/4	<b>[1]</b> 86/20	82/4 82/10	84/8	66/21 67/6	38/22 39/2	50/11 90/9
<b>Inspector [2]</b>	<b>introduction</b>	83/5 83/12	<b>is [258]</b>	70/18 70/21	41/1 42/6	<b>known [5]</b>
38/4 58/19	<b>[2]</b> 48/5 55/7	84/8 84/14	<b>is Counter [1]</b>	70/25 74/9	43/16 43/21	2/24 26/18
<b>instance [1]</b>	<b>introductory</b>	84/22 85/13	27/6	91/17	45/1 46/1	44/17 47/10
60/25	<b>[3]</b> 7/5 51/4	85/19 87/10	<b>isn't [2]</b> 6/14	<b>JOT [4]</b> 66/20	46/24 48/17	47/17
<b>instances [1]</b>	76/1	88/16 89/22	84/10	68/13 68/15	51/11 53/16	
54/17	<b>investigate</b>	89/23 90/3	<b>isn't it [1]</b>	70/22	55/9 56/5	<b>L</b>
<b>intelligence</b>	<b>[3]</b> 27/5 73/1	90/5 90/9	84/10	<b>JOTs [3]</b>	56/9 56/11	<b>large [6]</b>
<b>[39]</b> 13/15	88/4	90/24 91/8	<b>isolated [1]</b>	66/22 81/11	58/19 59/21	71/17 75/5
22/19 24/15	<b>investigated</b>	96/2	22/18	86/7	60/20 62/1	84/2 91/8
26/11 27/5	<b>[1]</b> 25/5	<b>investigation</b>	<b>issued [1]</b>	<b>journalistic</b>	65/6 71/17	91/11 91/20
27/7 27/9	<b>investigating</b>	<b>s [46]</b> 14/16	23/25	<b>[1]</b> 95/18	73/10 74/24	<b>large-scale</b>
27/19 29/9	<b>[19]</b> 43/2	15/12 25/3	<b>issues [3]</b>	<b>journey [1]</b>	76/23 81/12	<b>[1]</b> 91/11
30/13 31/4	59/4 59/9	31/14 53/3	2/12 73/15	27/1	83/17 92/14	<b>largely [2]</b>
47/3 47/6	59/10 64/25	53/22 58/23	73/16	<b>joy [1]</b> 1/23	94/16 94/20	64/13 89/3
47/23 62/17	66/23 69/10	62/23 62/25	<b>it [189]</b>	<b>judge [2]</b> 2/4	94/23 95/1	<b>last [9]</b> 2/10
63/14 64/22	71/7 71/12	63/1 63/2	<b>it's [23]</b> 9/24	33/25	95/15 96/22	3/4 5/18
66/14 66/18	72/5 72/14	63/6 63/10	10/25 11/1	<b>July [17]</b> 15/7	96/22	23/24 43/12
66/25 67/1	72/18 72/19	63/11 63/12	11/22 12/13	22/5 25/10	<b>justice [1]</b>	64/16 92/21
67/19 68/7	73/12 75/21	64/8 64/15	26/23 26/24	25/21 25/22	85/7	93/7 94/16
69/14 69/25	80/2 80/6	64/16 65/3	30/25 34/2	39/6 40/23	<b>K</b>	<b>later [13]</b> 7/9
70/2 70/10	80/19 85/23	68/18 68/19	34/7 35/7	41/20 44/14	<b>Keith [3]</b>	13/6 20/14
74/14 80/11	<b>investigation</b>	68/20 68/21	37/4 55/19	44/15 45/1	75/15 75/17	23/11 23/13
82/4 82/7	<b>[76]</b> 13/12	69/14 69/23	67/4 68/25	45/12 46/12	75/18	30/20 38/20
87/1 88/25	13/16 13/16	72/12 74/11	69/10 70/6	60/8 61/8	<b>kept [2]</b>	39/24 42/1
89/6 89/16	13/24 14/3	76/24 78/1	73/6 75/23	62/3 62/3	40/16 40/19	46/21 48/7
89/25 90/23	14/5 14/17	81/14 82/20	77/8 82/16	<b>June [7]</b> 20/2	<b>key [3]</b> 11/21	59/20 62/20
91/10 93/7	14/18 19/21	82/23 83/8	84/9 84/12	20/2 20/3	41/6 42/9	<b>later October</b>
<b>intelligent [1]</b>	21/21 21/22	85/9 86/4	<b>item [2]</b>	22/5 24/9	<b>kill [1]</b> 3/18	<b>[1]</b> 20/14
2/1	25/11 32/7	87/2 87/13	21/25 24/5	24/24 32/24	<b>killed [1]</b> 3/15	<b>latterly [2]</b>
<b>intends [1]</b>	45/10 56/20	89/12 89/17	<b>items [4]</b>	<b>just [76]</b> 3/23	<b>kind [2]</b> 2/2	16/18 87/11
7/13	58/21 58/25	91/4 91/23	21/25 24/5	4/10 5/11	71/10	<b>law [3]</b> 63/20
<b>intensive [2]</b>	59/11 59/14	92/2 92/15	24/8 24/8	5/19 6/11	<b>knees [1]</b>	89/5 89/15
4/5 31/15	59/16 61/22	93/2 93/12	<b>iteration [1]</b>	6/13 12/3	2/20	<b>layer [2]</b> 63/9
<b>intent [1]</b>	62/12 62/13	95/19	57/25	12/7 12/24	<b>knew [2]</b> 2/7	63/12
	66/19 67/21	<b>investigative</b>	<b>iterations [1]</b>			<b>layers [1]</b>
		<b>[6]</b> 27/10				

<b>L</b>	13/18 17/10 17/22 23/3 33/6 36/1 39/11 40/5 45/20 66/21 67/25 72/17 73/8 87/19	<b>live [1]</b> 2/8 <b>living [2]</b> 2/9 3/7 <b>local [22]</b> 10/8 10/15 10/17 11/18 11/19 12/15 13/17 16/12 17/2 17/10 17/18 17/22 18/1 18/5 19/25 20/19 23/3 25/4 27/1 30/7 44/8 77/15	<b>lots [1]</b> 78/5 <b>loved [2]</b> 2/18 3/1 <b>loving [1]</b> 2/6 <b>low [1]</b> 23/20 <b>LRF [1]</b> 45/22	<b>managed [1]</b> 24/10 27/13 62/15 <b>management</b> <b>[8]</b> 13/25 14/7 26/4 45/22 52/14 73/15 74/20 77/20	<b>manager [3]</b> 38/4 40/10 73/3 <b>Managing [1]</b> 71/24 <b>manner [1]</b> 2/20 <b>mantra [1]</b> 24/19 <b>many [6]</b> 2/3 17/24 18/9 50/22 50/22 53/18 <b>March [14]</b> 8/7 8/14 9/3 10/6 10/6 19/17 22/12 22/17 23/17 58/17 58/18 60/13 65/15 65/16 <b>Mark [3]</b> 65/9 65/22 73/24 <b>Martin [1]</b> 39/24 <b>mass [1]</b> 69/17 <b>material [12]</b> 28/14 30/17 33/14 53/25 54/4 55/1 55/21 56/1 56/17 57/17 94/18 94/22 <b>matter [1]</b> 54/24 <b>matters [4]</b> 28/22 53/18 56/25 88/4 <b>may [29]</b> 9/22 10/11 10/16 11/5 15/23 16/1 16/5 17/24 18/15	23/17 <b>meeting [16]</b> 1/24 41/25 42/14 42/16 42/18 42/19 43/10 66/21 66/22 67/2 67/6 67/14 67/18 67/25 68/1 68/5 <b>meetings [10]</b> 12/19 18/6 18/21 67/17 68/9 75/8 76/6 77/12 77/13 81/10 <b>members [2]</b> 70/10 89/8 <b>membership</b> <b>[2]</b> 12/4 62/17 <b>memory [1]</b> 42/23 <b>mention [3]</b> 15/23 32/11 77/10 <b>mentioned</b> <b>[14]</b> 12/21 18/4 18/8 18/20 21/21 28/10 33/22 65/4 65/25 68/17 79/14 79/24 84/9 84/23 <b>message [1]</b> 23/24 <b>messaging</b> <b>[1]</b> 39/23 <b>Met [1]</b> 49/14 <b>Metropolitan</b> <b>[8]</b> 28/4 32/15 52/3 55/12 55/25 58/10 64/7 65/10 <b>Metropolitan</b> <b>Police [1]</b> 65/10 <b>M15 [29]</b> 63/5 63/19 63/21 66/14 67/2
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<b>scale [3]</b>	61/10 62/1	83/19	50/18 79/17	74/23 81/11	34/9	16/21
82/22 83/10	86/11	<b>selected [1]</b>	87/11	91/15 91/16	<b>simultaneous</b>	<b>sits [2]</b> 22/25
91/11	<b>searches [2]</b>	20/19	<b>Sergey [1]</b>	<b>she [23]</b> 1/7	<b>[1]</b> 91/10	71/13
<b>scenario [1]</b>	81/25 92/15	<b>selfless [1]</b>	61/20	1/22 1/23 2/1	<b>since [4]</b> 8/10	<b>sitting [1]</b>
35/5	<b>searching [1]</b>	2/1	<b>serious [1]</b>	2/2 2/3 2/5	52/11 70/24	12/21
<b>scene [8]</b>	85/23	<b>send [1]</b>	87/20	2/12 2/13	86/21	<b>situation [1]</b>
34/23 34/25	<b>second [9]</b>	75/11	<b>seriously [1]</b>	2/21 2/24 3/1	<b>single [1]</b> 2/4	69/18
38/12 81/24	21/4 25/22	<b>senior [30]</b>	39/16	3/6 3/10 3/22	<b>SIO [18]</b> 59/7	<b>situational [1]</b>
92/15 93/2	26/7 34/14	9/6 18/18	<b>service [24]</b>	4/1 4/2 4/5	71/16 72/15	43/11
94/4 94/7	38/11 42/2	59/4 59/8	9/24 20/6	4/6 37/1 37/4	72/16 72/20	<b>six [1]</b> 70/24
<b>scenes [10]</b>	78/10 79/23	59/10 64/1	22/25 22/25	47/21 47/23	72/23 72/25	<b>six years [1]</b>
16/15 32/8	80/4	64/5 64/10	23/1 28/4	<b>short [3]</b> 1/5	73/3 79/24	70/24
42/11 44/15	<b>seconded [1]</b>	65/25 66/10	33/8 33/9	4/13 48/25	80/24 81/3	<b>skills [1]</b>
44/24 74/20	52/2	66/23 67/25	33/10 33/11	<b>shorter [1]</b>	81/5 81/8	78/19
77/18 79/19	<b>secondly [2]</b>	68/10 71/7	33/15 34/1	96/6	81/9 81/21	<b>Skripal [14]</b>
85/17 94/6	10/5 57/8	71/12 72/5	35/18 35/19	<b>shortly [2]</b>	82/3 82/13	8/7 8/14 9/3
<b>SCG [34]</b>	<b>section [2]</b>	72/14 72/17	36/3 36/19	4/6 47/1	82/14	10/7 20/9
10/11 11/5	3/23 89/21	72/18 73/11	36/21 36/21	<b>should [11]</b>	<b>sir [59]</b> 1/4	21/23 22/1
11/6 11/16	<b>secure [2]</b>	73/14 73/19	37/8 37/13	5/6 6/5 33/21	4/16 5/13 6/2	22/17 40/7
12/21 12/25	61/24 62/15	73/25 75/21	37/24 44/11	35/23 38/4	6/20 7/12	42/4 43/3
13/8 13/11	<b>secured [2]</b>	80/2 80/6	66/23 86/13	40/25 49/24	9/11 9/11	46/10 50/18
13/21 13/25	44/18 60/18	80/18 83/8	<b>services [10]</b>	50/2 50/4	10/16 11/1	87/11
14/18 15/7	<b>security [15]</b>	86/13 86/22	16/24 30/14	50/6 57/15	11/13 17/25	<b>Skripal's [1]</b>
15/13 15/13	13/12 26/12	<b>sense [3]</b>	44/1 44/2	<b>shown [1]</b>	21/6 21/15	79/17
15/18 15/20	30/14 53/24	80/11 83/3	44/3 53/12	50/24	25/23 29/12	<b>Skripals [6]</b>
16/4 19/1	54/21 59/14	95/10	67/19 71/2	<b>shutting [1]</b>	32/5 34/7	14/23 19/2
24/1 26/5	63/18 64/25	<b>sensible [1]</b>	77/15 89/25	42/10	37/14 37/19	19/14 19/21
41/22 45/22	66/23 69/19	23/7	<b>session [1]</b>	<b>signature [6]</b>	38/19 41/20	78/2 81/18
46/13 74/18	70/5 71/1	<b>sensitive [8]</b>	76/1	5/18 5/20	48/18 48/20	<b>Skripals' [2]</b>
74/25 75/8	86/13 87/20	53/20 53/24	<b>sessions [1]</b>	6/22 6/24	49/8 49/19	58/25 60/13
75/8 75/10	88/8	54/4 54/8	20/16	50/6 50/8	50/2 50/14	<b>slight [2]</b>
76/3 76/6	<b>see [24]</b> 2/17	55/2 57/17	<b>set [10]</b> 2/22	<b>signed [2]</b>	50/21 55/4	16/19 42/6
76/10 76/25	2/18 28/1	63/7 69/24	17/12 32/15	6/14 6/14	55/20 56/16	<b>slightly [3]</b>
77/5 77/21	29/22 33/22	<b>sent [1]</b> 40/3	41/25 51/13	<b>significant</b>	58/3 58/11	63/6 76/10
<b>SCG's [1]</b>	34/13 34/18	<b>separate [2]</b>	54/11 55/13	<b>[14]</b> 9/23	58/12 61/4	90/11
14/25	38/8 38/11	80/21 81/3	59/22 78/3	31/15 36/20	62/4 62/15	<b>slow [1]</b>
<b>school [1]</b>	56/9 61/5	<b>separately [2]</b>	88/19	37/7 44/23	65/9 65/19	37/11
2/16	61/13 62/7	57/13 76/25	<b>sets [2]</b> 12/25	65/20 67/22	65/22 66/17	<b>slowly [2]</b>
<b>science [3]</b>	63/14 65/18	<b>September</b>	88/6	69/25 70/25	67/11 70/8	27/12 63/16
17/13 76/16	66/6 66/12	<b>[7]</b> 8/11 8/22	<b>setting [1]</b>	71/3 72/22	72/15 73/6	<b>smaller [1]</b>
76/20	67/13 69/1	15/7 20/24	71/21	83/6 83/18	73/24 74/13	63/13
<b>scientific [6]</b>	69/17 71/11	46/13 61/17	<b>several [3]</b>	88/15	83/18 88/25	<b>smallest [2]</b>
17/12 17/19	80/24 89/7	61/23	57/21 59/6	<b>signs [2]</b>	92/12 92/17	31/20 31/22
17/20 18/12	95/9	<b>September</b>	72/6	22/11 22/21	93/4 93/7	<b>smiling [1]</b>
75/13 76/25	<b>seek [1]</b> 95/4	<b>2014 [1]</b> 8/11	<b>severe [1]</b>	<b>Silver [1]</b>	94/23 96/6	2/5
<b>scientists [1]</b>	<b>seeking [2]</b>	<b>sequence [2]</b>	36/6	9/19	96/8 96/20	<b>so [151]</b>
76/18	62/14 85/25	34/11 93/1	<b>shall [1]</b> 66/6	<b>similar [4]</b>	96/24	<b>SO13 [2]</b> 52/2
<b>screen [9]</b>	<b>seeks [2]</b>	<b>Sergeant [1]</b>	<b>share [2]</b>	37/12 45/4	<b>sister [1]</b> 3/2	52/7
	56/14 80/7	19/22	66/14 66/24	68/25 69/23	<b>sit [3]</b> 1/13	<b>SO15 [10]</b>

<b>S</b>	41/14 43/21	30/12 30/18	17/11 75/13	23/14 23/16	<b>strategy [5]</b>	<b>such [6]</b> 10/1
<b>SO15...</b> [10]	60/15 61/6	30/21 35/18	<b>staff [4]</b>	24/12 33/4	12/25 13/2	10/4 30/12
28/4 32/15	65/16 92/21	<b>Soviet [1]</b>	71/25 78/9	38/1 38/25	16/21 68/15	69/24 75/5
49/13 49/18	<b>sort [6]</b> 69/16	88/13	85/16 85/18	40/21 43/22	71/14	76/16
52/8 53/9	71/11 81/13	<b>speaking [2]</b>	<b>stage [3]</b>	45/3 46/21	<b>streets [1]</b>	<b>suffered [1]</b>
53/19 55/12	81/25 84/15	79/20 81/10	32/21 48/4	47/2 49/24	83/22	50/20
66/8 75/12	94/11	<b>special [13]</b>	75/7	49/25 50/4	<b>strength [1]</b>	<b>suffering [1]</b>
<b>SO15's [2]</b>	<b>sorts [1]</b>	27/2 28/11	<b>stages [3]</b>	50/10 51/14	95/8	35/2
63/25 64/18	12/12	28/16 28/25	57/21 63/16	54/12 54/13	<b>strict [1]</b>	<b>sufficient [3]</b>
<b>social [1]</b>	<b>sought [3]</b>	29/6 29/23	85/10	59/23 62/10	63/15	62/15 78/19
2/22	40/8 87/17	30/7 30/10	<b>stand [11]</b>	67/16 69/15	<b>strived [1]</b>	79/4
<b>solace [1]</b>	88/2	31/4 35/21	1/11 1/14 5/2	70/4 78/14	2/4	<b>suitable [2]</b>
3/15	<b>sounds [1]</b>	36/2 44/4	15/19 28/15	79/12 86/9	<b>structure [8]</b>	48/20 94/2
<b>some [35]</b>	58/7	51/25	28/19 28/25	86/12 87/5	16/3 26/24	<b>sum [1]</b> 91/2
3/10 5/13	<b>source [4]</b>	<b>Special</b>	29/24 31/3	87/9 89/21	42/3 44/9	<b>summarise</b>
6/20 12/14	25/25 94/18	<b>Branch [7]</b>	41/21 49/7	91/20 92/6	63/6 63/24	<b>[3]</b> 21/18
14/12 16/5	94/21 95/3	28/16 28/25	<b>stand-alone</b>	<b>statements</b>	72/4 78/8	43/22 89/19
18/20 22/13	<b>sources [6]</b>	29/6 29/23	<b>[1]</b> 29/24	<b>[4]</b> 5/6 5/7	<b>structures [5]</b>	<b>summary [11]</b>
22/20 23/7	69/19 91/19	30/7 31/4	<b>standing [1]</b>	5/10 5/11	15/21 16/3	6/19 7/8 14/7
24/10 26/23	91/21 92/1	51/25	22/22	<b>states [4]</b>	17/2 68/25	19/16 23/14
27/13 30/21	92/9 94/15	<b>Special</b>	<b>stands [2]</b>	36/19 69/8	78/3	25/7 33/3
31/1 31/8	<b>south [29]</b>	<b>Branches [1]</b>	15/18 96/23	69/12 78/18	<b>Sturgess [31]</b>	46/21 46/25
42/8 54/7	26/16 26/18	27/2	<b>start [6]</b>	<b>stating [1]</b>	1/5 1/10 1/12	56/11 58/5
54/12 62/19	27/8 27/11	<b>specialist [4]</b>	10/17 42/21	36/14	1/13 1/17	<b>superintende</b>
62/21 65/23	27/15 27/16	64/3 65/4	43/8 55/9	<b>statistical [1]</b>	1/18 4/9 7/11	<b>nt [12]</b> 9/19
69/11 69/12	27/17 27/18	65/11 78/9	73/11 73/23	41/9	15/9 19/5	10/1 39/10
70/22 70/24	27/24 28/2	<b>specialists</b>	<b>started [1]</b>	<b>status [2]</b>	25/10 25/16	39/10 40/6
72/20 74/21	29/8 29/11	<b>[1]</b> 53/2	80/17	19/12 62/11	32/23 34/5	58/20 74/5
80/23 89/1	29/16 29/18	<b>specific [4]</b>	<b>starting [2]</b>	<b>steps [3]</b>	37/2 41/18	75/7 76/5
91/10 92/13	30/12 30/18	10/25 18/3	2/12 25/3	13/11 14/10	44/16 45/11	79/25 81/8
94/19 95/20	30/21 35/18	71/7 77/18	<b>starts [1]</b>	85/11	46/11 46/24	82/18
96/9	55/13 55/20	<b>specifically</b>	86/15	<b>still [11]</b> 2/8	47/6 47/10	<b>supervision</b>
<b>somehow [1]</b>	58/10 59/8	<b>[1]</b> 32/16	<b>state [15]</b>	2/16 19/22	47/20 50/16	<b>[1]</b> 73/11
46/9	59/9 74/6	<b>specifics [1]</b>	62/22 63/9	21/20 21/23	77/25 82/10	<b>supplementar</b>
<b>Somerset [1]</b>	75/22 79/16	30/19	63/11 64/14	22/6 29/23	86/1 87/12	<b>y [2]</b> 5/25
29/6	79/25 80/19	<b>specified [1]</b>	64/16 65/2	30/6 43/2	90/6 96/3	7/13
<b>something</b>	82/19	23/23	66/19 68/19	65/22 78/1	99/3	<b>support [9]</b>
<b>[11]</b> 11/12	<b>south west</b>	<b>spend [1]</b>	68/21 69/23	<b>stood [3]</b>	<b>Sturgess' [7]</b>	55/20 73/8
13/13 17/11	<b>[4]</b> 27/8	3/10	71/5 84/5	19/18 23/18	8/19 22/4	77/19 78/15
17/19 30/25	27/16 29/11	<b>spending [1]</b>	84/9 86/23	42/5	23/11 47/4	79/24 80/2
32/12 34/4	29/18	2/19	88/17	<b>strand [1]</b>	54/2 85/2	90/16 90/23
47/11 66/20	<b>South-East</b>	<b>spent [1]</b>	<b>stated [4]</b>	16/20	86/18	95/5
67/23 95/11	<b>[14]</b> 26/16	52/6	36/12 40/1	<b>strategic [17]</b>	<b>style [1]</b> 83/4	<b>supported [3]</b>
<b>sometimes</b>	26/18 27/11	<b>spoke [4]</b> 3/4	41/7 41/9	10/9 10/15	<b>subject [1]</b>	1/7 2/14 89/2
<b>[6]</b> 67/9 68/6	27/24 28/2	3/5 30/8 30/9	<b>statement</b>	11/19 12/2	55/2	<b>supporting</b>
70/1 70/11	55/13 55/20	<b>spoken [2]</b>	<b>[48]</b> 1/7 5/12	16/2 16/11	<b>subsequently</b>	<b>[3]</b> 32/7
76/9 95/8	58/10 59/8	15/4 40/9	5/22 5/25	19/18 19/24	<b>[2]</b> 40/21	56/25 77/6
<b>soon [1]</b>	74/6 75/22	<b>sprayed [1]</b>	5/25 6/6 6/11	41/5 41/25	52/19	<b>supports [1]</b>
80/16	79/16 79/25	3/12	6/15 6/19	52/21 67/24	<b>substantially</b>	56/17
<b>sorry [9]</b> 12/9	82/19	<b>spread [1]</b>	6/20 7/8 7/13	71/21 72/17	<b>[1]</b> 67/11	<b>sure [8]</b> 7/15
17/10 27/14	<b>South-West</b>	74/12	13/5 14/8	72/23 73/6	<b>substantive</b>	11/2 11/9
	<b>[5]</b> 29/8	<b>STAC [2]</b>	17/8 19/16	75/3	<b>[1]</b> 8/21	41/10 49/20

<b>S</b>	<b>tailed [1]</b> 16/9	91/21 91/25 93/19 94/12	56/14 56/20 58/9 58/21	49/8 49/12 49/15 49/22	91/14 92/7 93/14 94/21	80/12 80/16 82/9 89/1
<b>sure... [3]</b> 76/12 83/19 85/12	<b>take [15]</b> 1/11 2/17 10/2	<b>television [1]</b> 71/11	58/23 58/24 62/22 63/1	50/13 51/1 51/2 55/3	<b>That's July</b> <b>[1]</b> 62/3	<b>there [78]</b> 4/3 5/18 5/19
<b>surrounded</b> <b>[1]</b> 2/3	16/13 27/12 37/21 39/2	<b>tell [8]</b> 7/17 33/4 38/25	63/17 64/2 64/6 64/11	56/10 56/13 58/15 62/13	<b>their [18]</b> 4/5 7/6 14/24	6/22 6/23 11/21 13/8
<b>suspect [1]</b> 47/21	45/16 58/20 72/23 73/5	41/1 46/1 58/5 65/6	64/12 64/13 66/19 67/4	66/6 66/11 79/14 82/21	16/13 16/18 27/3 27/8	14/3 15/21 16/7 20/8
<b>suspected [1]</b> 84/8	76/13 80/24 85/11 94/5	74/7 <b>telling [1]</b> 34/8	68/1 68/11 68/18 68/21	88/22 91/5 91/18 95/24	30/22 33/12 38/2 48/2	22/5 22/19 23/1 23/8
<b>suspects [6]</b> 59/11 59/17 59/22 62/20 80/15 82/3	<b>taken [10]</b> 13/11 14/10	<b>temporary [1]</b> 8/15	69/10 69/18 69/24 70/7	96/20 96/24 96/25	61/2 62/16 62/17 71/7	24/6 24/15 25/9 25/9
<b>swabbing [1]</b> 93/22	21/7 32/23 36/10 37/4	<b>tend [1]</b> 67/12	71/5 71/15 74/6 74/10	<b>that [518]</b> <b>that's [81]</b> 6/7 7/15 8/1	76/25 87/5 95/19	27/1 27/16 27/18 29/23
<b>sweating [1]</b> 36/14	39/15 75/6 83/20 95/12	<b>tends [1]</b> 88/24	74/18 75/5 75/22 78/6	8/9 8/12 10/12 11/13	<b>them [14]</b> 24/9 30/15	33/13 33/18 33/23 35/22
<b>Swindon [2]</b> 10/8 10/14	<b>takes [2]</b> 70/21 71/17	<b>term [2]</b> 36/2 52/20	79/16 80/1 82/19 86/5	12/20 15/6 15/25 17/20	30/23 37/15 37/16 44/6	36/20 37/23 38/17 39/19
<b>sworn [5]</b> 4/22 5/1 49/5 99/4 99/5	<b>taking [5]</b> 3/9 47/5 63/16	<b>terminology</b> <b>[1]</b> 29/17	87/2 88/10 <b>terrorist [3]</b> 53/6 53/9	19/11 19/13 20/7 23/2	47/16 60/7 62/16 72/21	39/22 40/14 42/22 42/23
<b>symptoms [6]</b> 22/21 34/16 35/4 36/5 36/13 36/23	<b>talked [6]</b> 17/2 27/15	<b>terms [20]</b> 10/5 13/20	65/1 <b>terrorists [1]</b> 69/11	25/18 25/18 25/22 26/8	77/17 78/24 79/2 91/23	43/4 43/25 45/18 46/16
<b>system [3]</b> 11/10 31/3 31/4	72/7 74/7 76/7 76/8	16/16 16/19 20/21 28/14	<b>test [1]</b> 40/16 <b>testing [1]</b> 41/8	27/7 28/23 32/5 32/13	<b>themselves</b> <b>[2]</b> 4/11	46/24 47/6 47/11 47/12
<b>systems [2]</b> 31/6 76/1	<b>talking [3]</b> 16/3 29/2	30/16 30/20 47/12 57/9	<b>tests [1]</b> 25/15	32/19 35/18 36/7 37/12	<b>then [58]</b> 2/25 11/4	47/15 47/20 47/22 50/2
<b>T</b>	37/1 <b>taste [1]</b> 49/7	58/13 60/7 69/2 69/6	<b>Thames [2]</b> 26/14 55/25	37/14 37/19 37/25 50/7	11/23 13/1 13/22 14/3	50/6 54/16 55/16 56/10
<b>tab [9]</b> 5/14 6/2 6/4 6/4 6/5 6/6 6/20 50/2 50/4	<b>TCG [2]</b> 13/1 40/7	77/10 77/19 78/6 78/6	<b>than [6]</b> 11/1 67/9 67/11	52/1 52/16 52/22 52/25	14/4 16/13 16/18 20/10	62/8 65/8 65/19 66/16
<b>tab 11 [2]</b> 50/2 50/4	<b>TCGs [1]</b> 11/7	78/22 88/20 <b>terrorism [76]</b> 12/5 13/23	68/21 71/19 94/17	53/8 53/13 54/1 54/9	20/20 21/8 21/9 23/16	69/16 70/25 71/3 71/6
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<b>tab 7 [3]</b> 6/4 6/6 6/20	55/19 57/5 57/8 57/14	26/2 26/9 26/10 26/15	5/2 5/5 5/8 5/9 5/15 7/4	56/4 56/8 56/24 56/25	29/7 29/13 30/8 30/11	74/25 75/9 77/3 78/2
<b>table [2]</b> 42/9 42/12	58/12 58/21 66/21 66/22	26/10 26/15 26/19 26/22	7/16 9/15 15/4 17/9	57/12 57/19 58/2 58/11	30/14 31/6 31/11 34/21	79/23 83/17 84/2 84/25
<b>tactical [6]</b> 11/7 12/22 12/22 13/2 22/16 71/21	67/6 71/12 71/17 72/1	27/4 27/7 27/17 27/18	18/2 19/17 21/17 23/9	59/2 59/8 59/12 60/14	35/1 36/9 36/19 37/1	85/1 85/5 87/18 90/8
	77/22 78/5 78/7 88/1	28/2 28/5 28/8 28/22	25/24 27/20 31/10 32/20	60/16 60/24 62/2 62/3	37/3 37/22 39/22 40/4	95/16 95/17 95/18
	<b>teams [3]</b> 67/12 77/4	29/8 29/11 32/6 42/12	33/18 35/2 35/13 36/17	63/23 64/21 66/11 67/6	42/13 48/15 52/3 52/6	<b>there's [18]</b> 6/5 11/2 11/4
	96/8 <b>technical [3]</b> 16/22 17/12	42/20 43/1 45/7 45/15	37/21 41/19 43/24 45/4	69/21 72/3 73/1 73/5	52/11 57/8 58/16 60/18	11/9 11/24 11/24 15/19
	75/13 <b>technically</b> <b>[1]</b> 60/25	45/16 49/13 49/18 50/15	48/3 48/7 48/8 48/9	73/18 73/21 78/21 80/14	60/19 61/10 65/21 65/25	16/10 34/10 37/7 44/4
	<b>techniques</b> <b>[5]</b> 91/19	52/10 53/1 53/12 53/15	48/18 48/19	81/23 82/5 82/6 84/20	66/9 67/12 73/14 73/19	63/9 66/17 67/20 84/8

<b>T</b>	<b>They're [1]</b>	41/17 41/20	80/8 81/13	10/2 14/19	<b>took [9]</b>	65/13
<b>there's... [1]</b>	68/23	42/8 45/2	82/17 85/1	15/20 15/24	13/23 14/4	<b>transparent</b>
96/12	<b>they've [1]</b>	46/21 48/4	85/6 85/10	18/17 19/14	21/4 26/2	<b>[1]</b> 87/17
<b>thereafter [1]</b>	34/24	49/24 50/22	86/2 86/18	19/23 21/4	45/2 53/2	<b>trawls [1]</b>
14/5	<b>thing [2]</b> 4/6	50/25 51/4	89/24 94/1	21/19 22/2	75/10 77/21	93/12
<b>therefore [1]</b>	81/25	53/24 54/10	94/5	24/4 24/7	77/23	<b>treatment [1]</b>
88/3	<b>things [5]</b>	55/4 55/5	<b>thought [5]</b>	25/9 26/22	<b>tool [1]</b> 83/3	44/20
<b>these [15]</b>	56/22 69/3	56/6 56/13	4/2 11/11	26/25 27/17	<b>top [8]</b> 13/8	<b>tried [1]</b> 2/17
8/17 12/6	69/11 77/18	56/16 58/5	37/1 37/6	27/23 28/12	36/22 61/6	<b>true [6]</b> 5/22
19/7 25/2	95/7	58/7 59/19	75/25	31/5 33/12	61/13 62/8	6/11 6/16
38/3 47/13	<b>think [25]</b>	61/6 62/15	<b>thousands [1]</b>	34/7 35/16	73/20 73/23	6/17 7/1
47/13 47/15	8/13 11/21	62/23 64/3	3/18	36/13 38/2	84/2	50/11
53/18 65/3	12/13 13/14	65/15 65/23	<b>threat [16]</b>	38/13 39/8	<b>topic [1]</b>	<b>try [2]</b> 18/1
78/10 80/4	16/1 17/3	66/9 69/9	62/23 63/10	40/11 41/3	46/19	48/1
82/22 85/16	18/20 20/9	70/8 74/5	63/11 64/14	41/23 42/2	<b>topics [1]</b>	<b>trying [4]</b>
91/4	24/22 25/9	74/13 75/5	65/2 66/19	42/23 42/24	57/9	31/7 79/21
<b>they [68]</b>	26/14 31/19	75/25 76/11	66/25 67/13	43/2 43/14	<b>totally [1]</b>	85/6 85/7
2/18 3/10	35/14 37/23	76/17 78/14	68/2 68/20	44/17 45/9	2/14	<b>Tuesday [3]</b>
5/24 6/8 6/9	43/22 45/2	79/15 80/7	68/22 69/23	46/2 48/11	<b>touched [1]</b>	1/1 40/22
10/20 11/8	52/13 52/23	80/8 80/8	70/5 70/14	48/11 48/20	14/20	44/14
12/16 13/23	56/6 60/24	81/17 82/25	70/15 71/6	52/6 52/24	<b>tragedy [1]</b>	<b>turn [4]</b> 5/12
14/23 15/1	61/19 85/20	83/1 83/2	<b>threats [4]</b>	54/24 64/3	3/14	5/19 70/14
15/2 16/23	94/16 95/7	83/2 83/4	64/17 86/23	74/6 81/13	<b>tragically [2]</b>	86/7
17/21 19/7	96/11	83/6 83/11	88/9 89/16	83/25 84/4	85/2 90/6	<b>twin [1]</b> 85/5
20/12 20/13	<b>third [6]</b> 6/6	84/16 85/8	<b>three [10]</b>	96/9 96/15	<b>train [1]</b>	<b>two [28]</b> 2/10
22/3 25/6	28/9 31/22	86/12 87/5	1/22 4/21 5/5	96/15	72/14	7/19 9/13
25/17 27/9	34/15 37/23	87/9 90/4	35/2 60/10	<b>timeframe [1]</b>	<b>trained [1]</b>	14/16 15/5
30/21 30/23	61/20	90/13 93/17	64/12 81/14	23/23	23/5	20/12 21/10
34/25 35/19	<b>Thirdly [2]</b>	95/11 95/13	82/17 82/20	<b>timeline [1]</b>	<b>training [1]</b>	29/7 29/14
35/20 36/3	15/6 57/13	95/25	93/7	15/1	72/16	33/11 36/7
36/9 36/10	<b>thirds [1]</b>	<b>those [54]</b>	<b>through [17]</b>	<b>timelines [1]</b>	<b>tranche [1]</b>	36/12 39/15
36/13 36/25	36/7	5/7 5/9 5/11	4/3 26/5	93/2	95/25	41/7 42/14
41/10 43/2	<b>this [99]</b> 1/4	9/17 9/24	30/15 31/25	<b>times [3]</b>	<b>tranches [1]</b>	47/10 47/15
43/7 45/9	1/18 2/11 7/5	12/3 12/12	45/21 56/3	28/14 51/6	51/7	50/19 51/12
45/17 46/9	7/12 10/5	12/14 15/23	57/10 57/21	94/1	<b>transcript [5]</b>	60/10 64/4
47/14 50/12	11/10 13/5	16/21 18/3	68/1 72/16	<b>timing [1]</b>	5/16 12/8	64/16 67/8
57/16 57/19	14/15 14/16	18/21 22/9	74/24 76/4	25/15	33/21 35/24	68/9 75/9
59/25 60/1	14/17 16/8	23/22 40/4	76/5 83/8	<b>today [7]</b> 2/8	50/5	77/4 80/5
61/3 61/4	16/14 16/17	44/24 48/3	86/6 86/8	5/10 49/15	<b>transfer [2]</b>	91/16
61/18 62/24	21/12 21/18	53/3 56/18	93/2	74/17 75/4	8/2 52/8	<b>two-thirds [1]</b>
64/8 65/21	23/9 23/19	56/21 57/10	<b>throughout</b>	88/17 96/6	<b>transferred</b>	36/7
65/23 67/3	23/20 24/4	59/25 60/5	<b>[4]</b> 53/2 58/4	<b>together [8]</b>	<b>[2]</b> 8/3 15/2	<b>two-way [1]</b>
68/1 71/9	24/7 29/1	60/18 60/20	76/17 85/19	2/19 3/10	<b>transferring</b>	91/16
71/21 72/16	30/3 30/9	61/1 61/3	<b>throughs [1]</b>	10/18 12/1	<b>[2]</b> 73/24	<b>type [1]</b>
73/5 77/1	30/10 33/1	61/16 63/12	94/7	18/11 66/24	73/25	73/15
83/16 86/7	33/16 33/17	63/20 64/16	<b>Thursday [1]</b>	70/9 90/2	<b>transition [3]</b>	<b>types [3]</b>
86/21 86/21	33/21 34/4	65/6 66/22	7/14	<b>told [4]</b> 33/12	65/9 89/1	68/9 72/6
86/24 87/3	34/7 35/19	68/7 68/20	<b>Tim [1]</b> 41/5	39/12 96/22	89/3	92/8
87/16 88/2	35/23 36/1	69/10 69/14	<b>time [59]</b>	96/22	<b>transitioned</b>	<b>U</b>
89/4 89/7	37/9 38/18	76/11 76/13	2/19 3/10	<b>tomorrow [3]</b>	<b>[3]</b> 65/24	<b>UK [10]</b> 26/10
95/5	40/12 41/11	77/10 77/14	3/11 8/5 8/6	81/1 96/1	66/2 66/9	53/10 63/11
	41/14 41/17	78/7 78/22	8/18 9/7 9/11	97/1	<b>transitioning</b>	
					<b>[3]</b> 64/4 65/5	

<b>U</b>	21/12	4/6	55/18 55/25	38/22 48/16	23/11 38/18	52/2 53/11
<b>UK... [7]</b>	<b>Union [1]</b>	<b>urine [1]</b> 40/3	56/3 57/6	<b>wanted [1]</b>	46/21 48/7	58/24 59/10
63/18 63/20	88/14	<b>us [40]</b> 2/14	57/10 57/13	40/19	65/23 96/7	61/16 61/18
63/25 64/15	<b>unit [10]</b>	3/14 4/19	58/8	<b>war [2]</b> 64/16	<b>weekend [7]</b>	65/7 73/3
64/20 64/22	26/19 27/17	7/17 14/12	<b>verbatim [1]</b>	64/17	39/15 65/8	74/12 76/12
83/2	27/19 28/15	18/9 24/16	43/19	<b>warning [1]</b>	65/13 65/15	76/18 76/19
<b>ultimately [4]</b>	29/9 29/11	32/7 33/4	<b>vernacular [1]</b>	39/25	65/17 65/18	76/21 77/7
20/22 24/19	74/6 75/22	34/8 34/24	29/25	<b>warrant [2]</b>	65/20	77/13 78/1
29/3 36/19	80/1 82/19	35/7 36/3	<b>version [1]</b>	60/24 60/25	<b>weeks [1]</b>	78/4 78/8
<b>unable [1]</b>	<b>units [2]</b> 27/4	36/9 38/25	57/25	<b>warrants [2]</b>	62/20	79/4 83/13
34/15	27/7	41/1 43/16	<b>very [39]</b>	60/19 60/20	<b>weird [1]</b>	83/15 83/25
<b>under [11]</b>	<b>unknown [1]</b>	46/1 49/10	1/15 2/2 2/17	<b>was [252]</b>	36/16	84/25 85/18
10/19 27/2	46/8	55/23 56/11	3/1 4/9 5/9	<b>wasn't [5]</b>	<b>welcome [1]</b>	85/22 87/3
28/17 28/21	<b>unless [2]</b>	60/4 65/6	7/4 9/15	22/19 32/25	1/13	91/10 91/25
44/1 44/8	1/14 84/13	69/2 69/12	13/15 14/15	39/7 78/18	<b>welfare [1]</b>	92/1 94/12
63/20 64/5	<b>unlikely [1]</b>	70/13 74/7	16/15 31/23	80/22	2/15	95/17 95/18
64/17 74/19	69/10	76/12 78/24	32/7 32/21	<b>watch [1]</b>	<b>well [19]</b> 3/15	96/15 96/21
80/18	<b>unprecedente</b>	79/9 82/21	42/10 42/21	1/24	11/5 12/12	<b>weren't [4]</b>
<b>underline [1]</b>	<b>d [1]</b> 83/11	84/20 84/20	43/8 45/4	<b>way [8]</b> 21/18	16/16 34/24	47/14 52/23
30/5	<b>unresponsive</b>	88/19 91/14	46/11 48/9	36/7 48/4	37/8 54/22	83/15 85/1
<b>underlying</b>	<b>[2]</b> 34/15	94/19 95/21	48/19 49/15	62/21 69/23	58/6 62/2	<b>west [12]</b>
<b>[1]</b> 54/18	36/15	95/22 96/22	63/4 63/14	74/15 75/9	76/4 77/8	27/8 27/16
<b>underneath</b>	<b>until [6]</b>	96/22	68/4 68/25	91/16	82/17 83/19	27/17 27/18
<b>[1]</b> 17/23	20/13 33/1	<b>use [5]</b> 29/17	69/13 69/25	<b>ways [2]</b>	83/23 85/6	29/8 29/11
<b>understand</b>	46/13 51/24	36/2 60/11	71/3 74/17	55/24 66/16	87/4 87/23	29/16 29/18
<b>[9]</b> 3/17 15/1	57/24 97/4	80/11 83/2	75/6 76/17	<b>we [214]</b>	94/17 94/19	30/12 30/18
48/2 76/7	<b>unusual [1]</b>	<b>used [5]</b>	78/22 83/17	<b>we're [17]</b>	<b>wellbeing [1]</b>	30/21 35/18
80/10 83/9	24/8	21/25 24/5	84/2 84/16	13/6 23/9	85/18	<b>Westminster</b>
87/23 95/21	<b>unwell [3]</b>	29/25 83/3	85/2 91/20	23/12 26/7	<b>went [3]</b>	<b>[1]</b> 60/16
96/11	39/17 46/6	92/1	96/25	28/7 29/2	14/24 36/25	<b>what [78]</b> 9/6
<b>understandin</b>	47/21	<b>useful [2]</b>	<b>vessel [1]</b>	29/2 31/22	39/22	9/16 9/21
<b>g [7]</b> 26/9	<b>up [19]</b> 1/8	94/19 96/9	22/5	32/1 35/5	<b>were [75]</b>	12/16 12/17
30/5 30/5	17/13 24/8	<b>user [3]</b> 2/25	<b>via [1]</b> 34/1	38/19 66/13	3/19 8/8 8/14	14/12 14/19
30/11 31/2	24/20 24/24	47/7 47/23	<b>victim [1]</b>	70/1 70/12	9/3 12/16	14/20 14/20
77/7 88/19	32/15 33/20	<b>users [2]</b>	92/17	80/25 81/13	13/23 14/23	15/3 16/6
<b>understands</b>	37/11 38/17	47/10 47/17	<b>victims [3]</b>	85/13	15/12 16/1	17/6 17/10
<b>[1]</b> 55/5	41/22 41/25	<b>using [1]</b>	79/20 92/19	<b>we've [3]</b>	16/3 20/12	18/25 19/4
<b>understood</b>	46/9 55/13	83/21	92/22	34/14 36/22	21/20 23/22	21/2 21/2
<b>[2]</b> 76/21	60/21 62/1	<b>usual [1]</b>	<b>view [2]</b> 51/5	91/16	24/6 24/23	22/14 22/15
83/6	78/3 86/11	31/14	89/13	<b>weapon [3]</b>	25/14 25/16	22/22 22/22
<b>undertake [4]</b>	91/2 94/25	<b>V</b>	<b>village [1]</b> 2/7	60/12 83/2	27/2 27/10	24/3 24/18
15/6 16/25	<b>update [2]</b>	<b>Valley [2]</b>	<b>vitality [1]</b>	83/22	31/6 31/13	26/25 27/7
45/21 96/10	40/22 56/18	26/14 55/25	70/18	<b>Wedana [7]</b>	33/12 36/11	29/13 31/6
<b>undertaken</b>	<b>updated [4]</b>	<b>variety [1]</b>	<b>W</b>	19/9 79/10	38/5 38/14	31/24 32/5
<b>[7]</b> 19/25	36/9 40/14	86/24	<b>Wales [2]</b>	79/15 80/14	40/2 40/13	35/1 35/20
20/15 20/18	40/19 40/21	<b>various [3]</b>	20/6 26/25	81/8 81/17	40/16 40/21	35/25 36/12
20/24 57/4	<b>updates [1]</b>	10/20 18/5	<b>walk [1]</b> 94/7	82/15	42/12 42/17	38/16 38/22
80/23 86/24	66/15	31/12	<b>want [9]</b> 1/14	<b>Wednesday</b>	42/20 42/23	39/12 41/24
<b>undertaking</b>	<b>upon [5]</b> 9/23	<b>Verbasco [11]</b>	13/9 28/10	<b>[2]</b> 44/15	43/2 44/15	42/9 42/15
<b>[1]</b> 71/25	9/23 27/10	32/13 32/17	30/20 32/20	97/4	44/24 47/13	43/12 43/16
<b>undertook [3]</b>	41/21 89/6	55/9 55/11	35/24 37/7	<b>week [9]</b> 7/9	48/12 50/19	43/19 43/24
14/3 17/3	<b>upsetting [1]</b>			20/16 21/7	50/23 50/25	46/1 48/16

<b>W</b>	<b>whereas [3]</b>	86/9 88/7	27/13 29/1	30/10 33/16	96/12	<b>wouldn't [1]</b>
<b>what... [33]</b>	13/24 68/13	91/21 96/18	30/19 31/4	39/20 58/21	<b>worked [10]</b>	12/15
51/24 55/10	69/16	<b>while [4]</b>	32/12 33/22	63/9 63/25	9/13 32/18	<b>writing [1]</b>
55/17 56/11	<b>whereby [2]</b>	65/23 78/1	34/13 34/17	71/10 74/17	41/3 52/10	1/19
56/20 58/6	15/19 29/6	85/12 91/8	38/8 39/24	74/25 77/4	55/20 74/14	<b>written [1]</b>
58/16 60/23	<b>whether [5]</b>	<b>Whitelaw [13]</b>	44/17 46/21	77/21 78/5	74/17 77/22	20/21
62/11 69/1	22/5 24/5	4/15 4/17	47/17 49/21	86/13 86/22	83/5 86/21	<b>wrong [2]</b>
71/7 72/4	35/20 91/24	4/23 5/4	51/14 52/20	89/24	<b>working [12]</b>	58/6 58/6
72/8 72/10	95/22	10/13 48/22	54/23 56/9	<b>without [3]</b>	10/23 26/11	<b>Y</b>
73/2 75/2	<b>which [89]</b>	49/3 49/9	58/3 58/22	54/25 84/13	45/18 51/21	<b>years [6]</b>
75/12 76/8	1/8 6/20 7/7	92/4 96/13	62/19 63/4	87/19	52/6 64/22	2/10 7/24
76/13 76/21	9/22 10/2	97/1 99/4	65/18 66/12	<b>witness [39]</b>	66/21 71/1	51/12 53/7
77/15 78/11	11/7 11/10	99/5	66/22 69/11	1/4 5/6 5/7	74/9 75/20	70/7 70/24
78/25 79/21	11/25 13/8	<b>who [41]</b> 1/5	71/6 71/10	5/9 5/11 5/12	87/1 92/24	<b>yes [208]</b>
84/15 85/14	13/13 15/12	2/24 9/7 9/19	71/16 73/7	5/14 6/3 6/6	<b>works [4]</b>	<b>yesterday [1]</b>
85/15 90/12	16/22 17/12	9/24 14/4	83/19 83/19	13/5 13/6	63/21 72/1	14/22
90/12 91/17	17/12 17/19	14/17 14/20	84/17 84/18	14/7 17/8	86/6 90/2	<b>yet [1]</b> 96/18
92/21 96/22	17/20 17/23	16/13 20/17	85/20 86/3	23/14 26/8	<b>world [2]</b>	<b>you [324]</b>
96/22	18/16 20/1	23/22 39/10	88/3 88/25	28/9 49/23	71/18 84/18	<b>you're [3]</b>
<b>what's [10]</b>	20/2 20/24	39/24 40/6	89/2 92/10	49/25 50/4	<b>world's [1]</b>	35/8 37/5
10/3 11/7	22/15 22/25	40/7 40/9	92/14 96/9	50/10 51/4	83/25	73/2
13/16 27/4	23/8 23/18	41/5 41/14	<b>Wiltshire [56]</b>	51/14 54/11	<b>worst [1]</b>	<b>Young [1]</b>
27/6 34/17	24/11 24/16	44/7 50/25	7/6 7/10 7/20	59/23 62/10	35/5	40/9
35/4 84/17	25/4 26/4	63/16 63/19	8/2 8/3 10/8	69/15 70/4	<b>would [56]</b>	<b>youngest [1]</b>
88/19 89/3	27/6 28/1	64/6 65/6	10/14 12/5	78/14 79/12	1/22 2/12	2/16
<b>when [24]</b> 2/5	28/10 28/15	65/10 66/1	12/6 13/22	86/9 86/12	3/22 4/2 9/21	<b>your [88]</b>
3/21 4/5 8/2	30/14 30/17	69/1 72/18	14/2 15/14	86/15 86/20	10/2 11/25	4/19 5/12
11/11 13/23	31/3 31/25	73/14 74/3	15/14 16/23	87/4 88/23	12/4 12/13	5/14 5/20
14/20 15/13	32/7 32/21	75/8 76/21	18/5 18/24	89/4 91/20	12/17 14/13	5/23 6/3 6/12
17/7 23/10	33/7 35/14	77/9 81/9	19/20 19/23	93/4 93/12	15/16 16/4	6/18 6/24 7/2
25/15 28/24	35/17 38/13	83/9 85/16	22/7 22/10	<b>witnesses [2]</b>	16/6 16/13	7/6 7/8 7/12
29/22 33/4	38/23 39/20	85/22 86/12	23/10 25/3	46/22 79/20	17/10 19/12	7/17 8/5 9/1
42/13 45/15	39/23 40/2	86/18 89/7	26/3 28/11	<b>word [1]</b>	22/23 23/6	10/5 13/9
45/20 46/16	41/16 41/21	89/9	28/16 28/18	11/21	24/13 24/14	13/20 14/7
67/20 69/9	42/1 42/10	<b>whole [1]</b>	28/21 28/25	<b>wording [1]</b>	28/13 30/23	15/4 15/12
76/19 85/21	42/14 42/17	1/19	29/4 29/22	15/17	39/11 42/9	17/8 18/10
94/1 95/3	42/24 42/25	<b>whom [1]</b>	30/9 30/20	<b>words [2]</b>	43/7 45/9	19/15 19/16
<b>where [26]</b>	44/5 44/9	82/14	31/19 32/2	58/9 94/25	45/16 45/21	23/14 23/15
2/7 2/7 11/23	44/17 45/7	<b>why [3]</b> 27/10	32/17 32/22	<b>work [27]</b>	46/25 47/11	24/22 25/4
14/20 15/1	47/16 49/20	28/1 75/25	32/25 33/4	14/25 31/6	47/24 48/20	25/6 26/9
16/7 25/10	49/24 52/2	<b>wide [1]</b>	33/9 33/10	31/8 32/1	50/14 53/17	33/3 38/1
25/18 25/22	54/4 55/14	86/24	35/20 38/2	46/13 58/8	55/16 57/3	38/17 38/24
27/8 29/2	55/24 57/14	<b>wider [4]</b>	40/10 42/19	62/23 63/4	64/14 74/15	40/20 40/20
34/11 39/19	57/18 57/25	30/13 39/23	42/21 44/18	63/4 64/10	75/2 75/16	42/17 43/21
42/2 54/17	62/22 63/3	42/14 86/3	45/13 46/17	66/24 70/10	75/25 76/4	45/3 45/3
61/1 63/13	66/18 72/11	<b>Wifi [1]</b> 93/21	46/23 47/3	71/18 72/25	76/13 77/1	46/20 46/25
73/7 77/7	72/12 74/9	<b>will [54]</b> 1/8	47/9 47/25	75/12 76/19	77/5 77/11	47/2 48/5
77/13 79/22	74/16 77/21	1/23 3/25 4/7	48/5 74/19	77/16 80/10	77/12 78/9	48/11 48/14
84/8 84/16	80/6 80/18	4/10 5/19	79/7 93/17	82/6 82/7	83/6 83/7	48/15 49/10
88/4 89/4	81/16 81/20	10/11 14/6	<b>within [19]</b>	83/8 84/13	83/8 86/8	49/23 49/24
92/4	82/3 82/6	15/24 18/9	10/18 21/20	86/7 88/24	88/18 95/4	50/2 50/8
	82/9 82/13	18/16 19/9	23/23 24/12	89/4 96/10	95/8	



**Y****your... [34]**

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51/10 51/13  
51/14 51/15  
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**yourself [4]**

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**Yulia [4] 8/7**

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**Z****zoom [1]**

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