

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT UFO INTELLIGENCE PAPERS DOCUMENT PACKAGE 10

**A CAREFULLY SELECTED SERIES OF FORMERLY CLASSIFIED
INTELLIGENCE PAPERS DEALING WITH THE PHENOMENON OF
UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS:**

CONTENTS INCLUDE:

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INTERCEPT OVER TAIWAN. UFO REPORTS FROM KOREA AND
CHINA. CITIZENS AGAINST UFO
SECRECY - (NSA) THE LEGAL BATTLE. NASA'S EXPLORATION
OBJECTIVES - 2001 - MARS AND THE MOON.**

DIA, NAVSPUR, MOD LISTINGS

CONTENT: 64 PAGES

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Archives for UFO Research
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SE-600 11 Norrköping
Sweden

2010

UFO MAGAZINE

The documents contained in this booklet are authentic reproductions. Some are taken from formerly classified intelligence files obtained under the American Freedom of Information Act. We do not retouch or alter any such documents and therefore they are the best available copies.

Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY,
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 80-15

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This Freedom of Information Act case is before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff is seeking all documents in defendant's possession relating to UFOs and UFO phenomena. Defendant has provided some material but has withheld other material pursuant to various FOIA exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). The bulk of the material withheld consists of communications intelligence reports, which defendant asserts are protected by Exemptions 1 and 3 of the Freedom of Information Act. Four documents at issue are not communications intelligence reports; defendant has withheld one of these documents in its entirety, and portions of three others, pursuant to these exemptions, and exemptions 5 and 6.

The Court first carefully reviewed the public affidavit of National Security Agency official Eugene Yeates and then, after receiving plaintiff's opposition, examined personally a top secret affidavit from Yeates, submitted by defendant in camera. The public affidavit provides a general statement of the defendant's position that is strongly bolstered by the extremely detailed, 21-page in camera filing. On the basis of these affidavits, the Court finds that the claimed exemptions have been properly and conscientiously applied.

The communications intelligence reports clearly relate to the most sensitive activities of the defendant and thus fall squarely within the protection of Public Law 86-36, 73 Stat. 63 (1959). The in camera affidavit provides the

kind of detail approved in Hayden & Fonda v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1331, 1339-91 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3730 (U.S., May 12, 1980). The Court finds that release of this material could seriously jeopardize the work of the agency and the security of the United States. Under the standards set forth in Hayden & Fonda, the claim of Section (b)(3) exemption must be granted in its entirety. No consideration needs to be given the additional claim for protection under Exemption 1. The standards of Public Law 86-36 have been met.

The Court also finds that the affidavits support nondisclosure for the four documents that are not intelligence reports. Defendant has provided plaintiff with much of the contents of these documents and also has provided a description of both the documents and the deletions. The various claims under Exemptions 1, 3, 5 and 6 as to these documents are proper. The withheld portions either are not responsive to plaintiff's request or are properly exempted.

Throughout the Court's review of this material, the Court has been aware of the public interest in the issue of UFOs and the need to balance that interest against the agency's need for secrecy. The in camera affidavit presents factual considerations which aided the Court in determining that the public interest in disclosure is far outweighed by the sensitive nature of the materials and the obvious effect on national security their release may well entail.

The Court has been mindful of the Court of Appeals' view on in camera review of documents in FOIA cases, see Allen v. CIA, No. 20-1380 (D.C. Cir., filed Nov. 12, 1980), but the Court finds in its discretion that the public and in camera affidavits submitted here are amply sufficient to make such review of the documents unnecessary.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. The case is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.


UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

November 18, 1980.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

*Filed by [unclear]
[unclear] on 10/7/80*

CITIZENS AGAINST UNIDENTIFIED-)
FLYING OBJECTS SECRECY,)
)
Plaintiff,)
v.)
)
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY,)
)
Defendant.)

Civil Action No.
80-1562

IN CAMERA
AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE F. YEATES

County of Anne Arundel)
) ss:
State of Maryland)

Eugene F. Yeates, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. (U) I am the Chief, Office of Policy, of the National Security Agency (NSA). As Chief, Office of Policy, I am responsible for processing all initial requests made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for NSA records. The statements herein are based upon personal knowledge, upon my personal review of information available to me in my official capacity, and upon conclusions reached in accordance therewith.

2. (U) This affidavit supplements my unclassified affidavit executed on September 30, 1980 regarding all documents which have been located by NSA pursuant to plaintiff's FOIA request but which have been withheld wholly or in part by NSA. I submit this affidavit in camera for the purpose of stating facts, which cannot be publicly disclosed, that are the basis for exempting the records from release to the plaintiff.

3. ~~(S)~~ ^(U) [REDACTED], At the beginning of each paragraph of this affidavit, the letter or letters within parentheses designate(s) the degree of sensitivity of information the paragraph contains

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

The letters "U", "C", "S" and "TS" indicate respectively that the information is unclassified or is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET.

[REDACTED]

THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

4. [REDACTED] In processing the plaintiff's FOIA request, a total of two hundred and thirty-nine documents were located in NSA files. Seventy-nine of these documents originated with other government agencies and have been referred by NSA to those agencies for their direct response to the plaintiff. One document, which I addressed in paragraph 20c of my public affidavit, was erroneously treated as part of the subject matter of plaintiff's FOIA request. It is an account by a person

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

assigned to NSA of his attendance at a UFO symposium and it cannot fairly be said to be a record of the kind sought by the plaintiff. Another document, discussed in paragraph 20d of my public affidavit, was recently declassified and released to plaintiff. Two additional non-COMINT records have been released to the plaintiff with the exempted material deleted. The deletions in these documents are explained below:

a. A document entitled UFO Hypothesis and Survival Questions was released to the plaintiff with the deletion on page seven of the name of the employee who prepared the draft and a deletion of a reference to his NSA component. As I explained in paragraph 20, sub-paragraph a, of my open affidavit, information about NSA's organization or employees is protected from disclosure by Public Law 86-36 and, therefore, exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3).

b. The second non-COMINT document is a three page undated, unofficial draft of a monograph with a four page appendix by the same agency employee who authored the draft referenced in sub-paragraph a, above. This document was discussed in paragraph 20b of my public affidavit. It is entitled UFO's [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In this document, the author discusses what he considers to be a serious shortcoming in the Agency's COMINT interception and reporting procedures [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He uses the UFO phenomena to illustrate his belief that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Deletions in this document were made as follows:

- (1) All of the title after UFO, [REDACTED] and all of paragraph one, which

[REDACTED]

of the handling of UFO phenomena as it demonstrates what he believes is the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As I stated in my public affidavit (paragraph 20b), the type of candor that is reflected in this record must be encouraged especially in an intelligence Agency where the most meaningful suggestions regarding ways to promote the efficiency of the critical Agency mission will of necessity come from within. Public disclosure of such information, especially when it advances a novel theory, could have the effect of stifling candor by the risk of diminution of professional standing the employee runs if subsequently found wrong. Thus, this matter was deleted pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5).

(2) Paragraph three of this document uses a signal intelligence operation [REDACTED] to illustrate the author's point. This paragraph contains information about SIGINT activities that is currently and properly classified and thus, is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1). The material in this paragraph also concerns the organization and operational activities and functions of NSA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This material is exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) which exempts from release under the FOIA matters specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute. As noted in paragraph 20, sub-paragraph b of my public affidavit, Public Law 86-36 provides that no law shall be construed to require disclosure of the organization or any function of the NSA or any information with respect to activities thereof.

(3) Paragraph four of the memorandum states the conclusions and recommendations of the author. While it talks of the ability of the Agency employees to deal with unusual phenomena it is not responsive to the plaintiff's request

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

regarding UFO or UFO phenomena. In any event, as I stated in my public affidavit (paragraph 20b), the subject matter of that paragraph is exempt from disclosure because it contains the employee's specific recommendations for addressing the problem responding to surprise material. For the reasons stated in sub-paragraph (1) above, these recommendations are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5). One specific recommendation suggests an operational approach to solving the problem which reveals NSA activities and is, therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3) as explained above.

(4) The final deletion is in appendix A, paragraph of this report. This section talks about [REDACTED] and does not include any reference to UFO or UFO phenomena and is, therefore, not responsive to plaintiff's request. Nonetheless the subject matter of sub-paragraph 10 is currently and properly classified. Thus, even if it were deemed to be within the scope of plaintiff's request, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1).

(S) [REDACTED] COMINT REPORTS

5. (TS) [REDACTED] The remaining one hundred and fifty-six records being withheld are communications intelligence (COMINT) reports which were produced between 1958 and 1979. For purposes of my discussion here, these records are organized into three groups based upon the source of the report.

a. One hundred and fifteen of these reports were produced by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(1) Two of the records at issue here were produced

[REDACTED]

(2)

[REDACTED]

b.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

in exchange for the sharing of technology and COMINT information.

c. The remaining thirty-nine COMINT documents were produced by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. (U) All of the COMINT reports are in either message or summary format. A report in message format contains a single underlying communication presented in a classic cable format, i.e., the verbatim text of the particular transmission, preceded and followed by "externals" consisting of: data about the sender and the recipient; the dates and times of transmission; and other technical information. A summary, as the label suggests, provides in summary form the contents of a single message or of a small number of related intercepted communications, often accompanied by some technical data.

7. (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8. (TS)

[REDACTED]

a.

[REDACTED]

b.

[REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

c.

[REDACTED]

d.

[REDACTED]


e.

[REDACTED]


~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

9. (TS) NSA-originated reports - Thirty-eight documents are the direct product of NSA SIGINT operations and one document describes classified SIGINT activities. These documents can be further described as follows:


a. The document describing SIGINT operations repo




b. One record is a 1973 report which




c.




d.



e.



f.




EXEMPTION OF THE COMINT REPORTS


10. (S-) A primary and often overriding consideration regarding the classification of COMINT reports is that the need to protect communications intelligence sources and methods is greater than the need to protect sensitive contents of the underlying intercepted messages. Nevertheless, no portion of the contents of COMINT reports may be disclosed, where, as here, revealing the information would have the effect of identifying

~~TOP SECRET~~

for the target communicators the specific communications that had been intercepted and exploited. One hundred and fifty-four of the COMINT reports being withheld are the product of intercept operations.



11. (TS-CCO) The communications sources involved in this case -- which are specified or implicitly identified in the COMINT reports being withheld by NSA



~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]


(b)

[REDACTED]


(c) As I have stated in my open affidavit, when alerted to the extent of NSA's capability, and if given information from

~~SECRET~~

which inferences could be drawn as to the processing methods used, foreign intelligence services would be able to evade or defeat portions of NSA's present foreign intelligence efforts



12. The disclosure of other records at issue here, would result in the loss of the intelligence information




The value of the intelligence data collected from these sources is obvious.


(a)



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(2)



SECRET

[REDACTED]

13. ~~CS~~

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION OF THE WITHHELD COMINT REPORTS

14. ~~(S)~~ As I have indicated in paragraph 17 of my op affidavit, I have determined that the one hundred and fifty-six ~~reports~~ reports relating to COMINT activities at issue here are based on intercepted communications of foreign governments or SIGINT operations and, thus, remain properly classified. In conducting this review I have weighed the significant need for openness in government against the likelihood of damage to our national security at this time and have determined that each record should continue to be classified. No meaningful portion can be segregated from the records without revealing classified information about the intercepted communications underlying the COMINT reports. Because each record and each portion thereof is properly classified under Executive Order 12065, it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1).

15. ~~(S)~~ ~~These~~

These functions and activities of NSA are particular types of matters that may be withheld under 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3), since Section 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

of Public Law 86-36 permits the Agency to refuse to release them. In this case, the COMINT reports reflecting those functions and activities must be withheld to avoid compromising the efficacy of the sources of COMINT information involved.

16. (S-~~TOP SECRET~~) Information about the interception, processing and exploitation of the foreign communications underlying the records being withheld by NSA is classified information

~~TOP SECRET~~ the unauthorized disclosure of which is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §798, paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4). This information because it is prohibited from disclosure by statute, is exempt from release under the FOIA pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3).

17. (U) As stated in my public affidavit, the information that would be disclosed by these records is information about intelligence sources and methods protected from unauthorized disclosure under 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3). The reports are therefore exempt from release under Exemption 3 of the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3).

18. (U) In view of the foregoing, and in order to protect existing sensitive and important foreign intelligence sources and processing techniques vital to the national security, I certify that disclosure of past and present foreign intelligence communications activities of NSA revealed in the records the plaintiff seeks would endanger highly valuable sources of foreign intelligence.

19. (U) Finally, I respectfully request that the Court treat this affidavit in the same secure manner as it has been handled in submission to the Court; and to return it to appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice as soon as possible after review by the Court. The Department

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

of Justice will retain custody of this document under the Court's seal, subject to any further orders of this Court or any other court of competent jurisdiction.

Eugene F. Yeates

EUGENE F. YEATES
Chief, Office of Policy

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
14th day of October 1980.

Lerald S. Sweet
NOTARY PUBLIC

My commission expires on July 1, 1982.

CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION REPORT	
TO: (For Collection Manager's Use) TDAR 67		NUMBER TOP SECRET	IR DATE 76 03 01
THRU:		SICR NUMBER/OTHER REFERENCE	DATE IR RECD BY ADDRESSEE 76 03 13
SUBJECT (U) UFO fighting		TARGET COUNTRY (S) KN/HLS	DATE IR RECD BY EVALUATOR 70 04 20
			IR ORIGINATOR 562d MAB

NOTE TO EVALUATOR: Do not complete this evaluation unless you have responsibility for subject matter in the Report. Write appropriate number in boxes below:

A. USABILITY 1. GREAT 2. MODERATE 3. SLIGHT 4. NONE (See Remarks) <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 10px auto;">3</div>	B. VALIDITY 1. PROBABLY TRUE 2. CANNOT JUDGE 3. DOUBTFUL (See Remarks) <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 10px auto;">2</div>	C. HOW MUCH OF THIS INFORMATION IS BEING REPORTED FOR THE FIRST TIME 1. ALL 2. MOST 3. SOME 4. NONE <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 10px auto;">3</div>
D. WAS REPORT RECEIVED BY REQUIREMENT SUSPENSE DATE 1. YES 2. NO 3. NOT APPLICABLE <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 10px auto;">3</div>	E. REASON FOR EVALUATION 1. SICR OR DIRM III 2. REQUEST BY COLLECTOR 3. SELECTION BY COLLECTION MANAGER 4. INITIATIVE <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 10px auto;">3</div>	F. IF REPORT WAS IN RESPONSE TO A SICR OR DIRM III ITEM, IT SATISFIED REQUIREMENT 1. COMPLETELY 2. PARTIALLY 3. NOT AT ALL <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 30px; height: 30px; text-align: center; margin: 10px auto;">4/1A</div>

REMARKS: Use this space to amplify responses checked above. Comment, when appropriate, how reporting could be improved, how the information was or will be used, include suggestions for follow-up.

Although it is a distinct possibility that large balloons can be used as delivery systems for men/weapons, the fact that these may be meteorological sounding balloons must be considered. Further information concerning the height, altitude rate of rise, and character of movements of the objects would aid in the evaluation of the usability and validity of this report.

GROUP ~~TOP SECRET~~
Downgraded 12 year
interviews: not
automatically declassified

Insert special security markings and downgrading information. NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION		GROUP 3	
EVALUATOR'S ORGANIZATION FTD / FORT 4	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	DATE EVALUATED 28 Apr 70	NAME OF EVALUATOR J. P. WARGO

K420

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL		DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION REPORT	
TO: (For Collection Manager's Use)	IR NUMBER	IR DATE	
		70 03 07	
	SICR NUMBER/OTHER REFERENCE	DATE IR RECD BY ADDRESSEE	
	Ence	70 03 13	
THRU:	SUBJECT	DATE IR RECD BY EVALUATOR	
FDARM	WVFO fighting	70 03 27	
	TARGET COUNTRY (S)	IR ORIGINATOR	
	KN/US	502 d m Sn	

NOTE TO EVALUATOR: Do not complete this evaluation unless you have responsibility for subject matter in the Report. Write appropriate number in boxes below:

A. USABILITY 1. GREAT 2. MODERATE 3. SLIGHT 4. NONE (See Remarks)	B. VALIDITY 1. PROBABLY TRUE 2. CANNOT JUDGE 3. DOUBTFUL (See Remarks)	C. HOW MUCH OF THIS INFORMATION IS BEING REPORTED FOR THE FIRST TIME 1. ALL 2. MOST 3. SOME 4. NONE
3	1	1
D. WAS REPORT RECEIVED BY REQUIREMENT SUSPENSE DATE 1. YES 2. NO 3. NOT APPLICABLE	E. REASON FOR EVALUATION 1. SICR OR DIRM III 2. REQUEST BY COLLECTOR 3. SELECTION BY COLLECTION MANAGER 4. INITIATIVE	F. IF REPORT WAS IN RESPONSE TO A SICR OR DIRM III ITEM, IT SATISFIED REQUIREMENT 1. COMPLETELY 2. PARTIALLY 3. NOT AT ALL
	3	1

REMARKS: Use this space to amplify responses checked above. Comment, when appropriate, how reporting could be improved, how the information was or will be used, include suggestions for follow-up.

THE OBJECT COULD CONCEIVABLY BE A RECONNAISSANCE OF ECM PLATFORM. However, This is not likely.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 23 MAR 1992
BY CDR USAINSCOM/FOPO
Auth Para 2-603 DoD 5200.1-R

NO ORIGIN
DISSEMINATED
04/11/11

Insert special security precautions or markings and downgrading information.

EVALUATOR'S ORGANIZATION	CLASSIFICATION	DATE EVALUATED	NAME OF EVALUATOR
FDPCR	CONFIDENTIAL	14 APR 70	MAJ T. Vandeverter

C. 467

D. ~~(S)~~

E. ~~(51)~~

[illegible]

#0451

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

NOT WITHIN SCOPE
SUBC 552 (b)(5)(D)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: COMMUNIST CHINA
 2. SUBJECT: (U) Unidentified Flying Objects Over South China
 3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED] 5USC 552 (b) (2)
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 17 Jul 68
 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: TAIPEI, Taiwan, 26 Jul 68
 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F, B, F INFORMATION 6
 7. SOURCE: [REDACTED] undisclosed sources 5USC 552 (b) (1)
 8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED] 5USC 552 (b) (2)
 9. DATE OF REPORT: 19 AUG 1963
 10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
 11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED] 5USC 552 (b) (2)
 12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp 5USC 552 (b) (6) & (b) (7) (C)
 13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]
 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [Signature] J. L. WEIGAND Colonel, MI CO, 500th MI Gp

15. SUMMARY: COMPLETE TEXT

(~~C-NFD~~) On 17 Jul 68, seven unidentified flying objects (UFOs) were sighted in the skies over areas of [REDACTED] (coord unk) attempted to intercept them without success.

(This report is marked ~~NOFORN~~ DISSEM because it originated with a foreign government.)

(Evaluation Reports, DD Forms 1480, prepared on this IR will be classified at least [REDACTED])

Field Comment: (~~C-NFD~~) 5USC 552 (b) (1) Above report was extracted from the Daily Intelligence Summary, dated 25 Jul 68, published by the [REDACTED] agency evaluated the above report as C-3.

Comment of Preparing Officer: (~~C~~) [REDACTED] for earlier information on UFO sightings.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Item #15 cont'd:

None

20

48/92

UFB

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: COMMUNIST CHINA

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

5USC552 (b) (2)

2. SUBJECT: (U) Unidentified Flying Objects Over South China

5USC552 (b) (2)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 19 AUG 1968

19 AUG 1968

5USC552 (b) (2)

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED]

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 17 Jul 68

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

5USC552 (b) (2)

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: TAIPEI, Taiwan, 26 Jul 68

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F, B, INFORMATION 6/1

7. SOURCE: Staff officer of [REDACTED] from undisclosed sources

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

15. SUMMARY:

COMPLETE TEXT

(C-NFB) On 17 Jul 68, seven unidentified flying objects (UFOs) were sighted in the skies over areas of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (coord unk) attempted to intercept them without success.

(This report is marked NOFORN DISSEM because it originated with a foreign government.)

(Evaluation Reports, DD Forms 1480, prepared on this IR will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL.)

Field Comment: (C-NFB) Above report was extracted from the Daily Intelligence Summary, dated 25 Jul 68, published by the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] agency evaluated the above report as C-3.

Comment of Preparing Officer: (C) See [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] for earlier information on UFO sightings.

Aug 68

012 002 Aug 68

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

1
1
6
2
1

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

None

30

5USC552 (b) (2)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

July 23, 1990

53/92

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:
FOI/Privacy Office

England

Dear [REDACTED]

This is in response to your June 6, 1990 letter, to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), requesting records pertaining to Unidentified Flying Objects or related phenomena, under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Title 5 U.S. Code 552. The DIA, on June 19, 1990, forwarded your letter with copies of one Army-originated record, retrieved from their files, for a decision as to the releasability of the information to you. This correspondence was received in this office on July 18, 1990.

We have reviewed the information in the Army record and have determined the portion relating to UFO's is releasable to you. A copy is enclosed for your use. Duplication fees are waived.


Information has been deleted from this record which is administrative in nature, to include internal report numbers, reference numbers, and access numbers, which are for internal agency use only. The release of this information would significantly risk circumvention of agency regulations, and is exempt from public disclosure under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(2) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office for necessary processing within 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. Your appeal will then be processed to the appellate authority. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

The remainder of the information does not pertain to UFO's and is not within the scope of your request. Further, this information is currently and properly classified.

If you have any further questions regarding this action, please feel free to contact this office at any time. Please refer to case #1005F-90.

Sincerely,


Robert J. Walsh, Jr.

Chief

Freedom of Information/Privacy Office

Enclosure

CHINA

Lpt: 2842074464

CHINA (Sinkiang) - A: AIR

Source: A middle-aged local Russian peasant who saw the object described below.

Map: Series GSGS 4695 (1:1,000,000), Sheets 239 (Edition 2-GSGS) and 243 (Edition 1).

5USC 552 (b) (1)

UFO in sky over northern Sinkiang

Date of Information: July/August 1960

1. On two occasions at 10 or 11 p.m. in about July/August 1960 source, who at the time was in [redacted], northern Sinkiang, saw an unidentified flying object (UFO) in the night sky. On each occasion, when he first saw it, it appeared to be approximately above KCM, which was about one hundred kilometres (in a straight line) north north-west of [redacted] and it flew at great speed south south-eastwards passing at a great height directly above [redacted] and continuing beyond in a straight course.

2. In appearance, the UFO was a luminous sphere which illuminated the sky above. It appeared to be revolving on its own axis, and its colour seemed to be at times mauve, at others a pale shade of mauve and at yet others a very pale yellow or white. It was very large and to the observer gave the impression of being ten or twelve times greater in diameter than the full moon. Its size, however, appeared to diminish progressively after passing over [redacted] and its luminosity to die down until it vanished from sight completely, i.e., to the observer it appeared as if the UFO did not vanish from sight because of distance but because it ceased to be luminous and therefore ceased to be visible at night. The total time from the moment the observer first saw the UFO on each occasion to the moment it vanished from sight was not more than three minutes.

~~SECRET~~

2/2

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN GOVTS EXCEPT UK & AUSTRALIA

125001257D

Country: **CHINA**
Subject: (U) Unidentified Flying Object
D.I.: Jul-Aug 60
PL & Date Acq: — 5USC 552 (b) (1)
Eval: R-6
Source: [REDACTED]

Info Spec: PG/gsk
Distr: DWT(d)/BIP/DWT(1)/DWT(a)/7A/7A(b)/
DWA(d)/TCS(c)/T-2/DWP(h)

Rpt: [REDACTED] 5USC 552 (b) (2)
D.R.: 18 December 1964
No. Pages: 1 5USC 552 (b) (1) & (b) (7)
Ref: —
Originator: [REDACTED]
Prep by: [REDACTED]
LtCol03
Appr Auth: J. L. WILLARD, Colonel,
G3 US Army Liaison Officer

Entire Report

SUMMARY: (3) Attached [REDACTED] covers an unidentified object in the sky over Northern Sinking.

5USC 552 (b) (1)

1. Attached
1 (S) 2185/64

Entire Attachment

Overt Intelligence
Report No. 2183/64

Copy No.....59
Date of Report: 4 December 1964

1/2

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION AND DOWNGRADING

SECRET

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH
IS OF SUCH A NATURE THAT THE DISCLOSURE OF ITS CONTENTS TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON OR PERSONS
COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS HEREBY
DECLARED THAT THIS MATERIAL IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS
EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN GOVTS EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY

(C)(2)

Country: CHINA
Subject: (U) Unidentified Flying Object
D.F.I.: July 60
PL & Date Acc: —
Eval: R-6
Source: [REDACTED]

Rpt: 2842074464
D.R.: 18 December 1960
No. Pages: 1
Ref: —

Originator: [REDACTED]
Prep by: [REDACTED]

Appr Auth: [REDACTED]

Info Spec: PG/gsk
Distr: [REDACTED]

Entire Report

Summary: (U) Attached [REDACTED] covers an unidentified object in the sky over Northern Sinkiang. (C)(1)

1. Attached:
1-(U) 2185/60

Entire Attachment

Copy No. 59

Date of Report: 4 December 1960

(C)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CHINA

Rpt: 2842074464

CHINA (Sinkiang) - A: AIR

Source: A middle-aged local Russian peasant who saw the object described below.
Maps: Series GSGS 4695 (1:1,000,000), Sheets 239 (Edition 2-GSGS) and 243 (Edition 1).

UFO in sky over northern Sinkiang (C)(1) Date of Information: July/August 1960

1. On two occasions at 10 or 11 p.m. in about July/August 1960 source, who at the time was in [REDACTED], northern Sinkiang, saw an unidentified flying object (UFO) in the night sky. On each occasion, when he first saw it, it appeared to be approximately above KCM, which was about one hundred kilometres (in a straight line) north north-west of [REDACTED] and it flew at great speed south south-eastwards passing at a great height directly above [REDACTED] and continuing beyond in a straight course. (C)(1)

2. In appearance, the UFO was a luminous sphere which illuminated the sky above. It appeared to be revolving on its own axis, and its colour seemed to be at times mauve, at others a pale shade of mauve and at yet others a very pale yellow or white. It was very large and to the observer gave the impression of being ten or twelve times greater in diameter than the full moon. Its size, however, appeared to diminish progressively after passing over [REDACTED] and its luminosity to die down until it vanished from sight completely, i.e., to the observer it appeared as if the UFO did not vanish from sight because of distance but because it ceased to be luminous and therefore ceased to be visible at night. The total time from the moment the observer first saw the UFO on each occasion to the moment it vanished from sight was not more than three minutes.

(C)(1) ~~SECRET~~

2/2

006

34

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: NATIONALIST CHINA

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

USC552 (b) (2)

2. SUBJECT: (U) Investigation on UFO Sightings Over Off-Shore Islands and TAIWAN Strait

9. DATE OF REPORT: 14 OCT 1968

14 OCT 1968

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

USC552 (b) (2)

3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED]

USC552 (b) (2)

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

(U)(3)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Jul - Aug 68

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

USC552 (b) (1)

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: TAIPEI, Taiwan, 23 Sep 68

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F B INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

7. SOURCE: Staff officer [REDACTED]

USC552 (b) (1)

15. SUMMARY:

(C) A technical investigation team composed of [REDACTED] officers investigated reports of numerous unidentified flying objects (UFOs) sighted over TAIWAN Strait and the Offshore Islands since 17 Jul 68 and concluded they were man-made satellites, "flying saucers," electronic jamming devices, or psychological warfare balloons. The [REDACTED] team was assisted in its investigation by [REDACTED] stationed on KINMEN (Quemoy) Island (2427N/11823E). *Three Chinese Nationalist...*

USC552 (b) (1)

(Evaluation Reports, DD Forms 1480, prepared on this IR will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL.)

(C) A technical team composed of [REDACTED] officers investigated reported sightings of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) over TAIWAN Strait and the Offshore Islands on 12 and 13 Aug 68. They were assisted by [REDACTED] stationed on KINMEN (Quemoy) Island (2427N/11823E), one of whom was named Mr. Smith; the other was not identified in the team's official report. The following information is the substance of the report, which was [REDACTED]. *Three Chinese Nationalist...*

USC552 (b) (1)

a. Starting on 17 Jul 68, UFOs have been sighted flying over KINMEN (Quemoy) Island (2427N/11823E) daily between 1915 and 2130 hours and sometimes between 0400 and 0500 hours. They flew mostly from east to west and sometimes

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. CONTROLLING DATA:

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

Item 113 continued:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

USC552 (b) (2)

5

USC552 (b) (2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: NATIONALIST CHINA

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

2. SUBJECT: (U) Investigation on UFO Sightings Over Off-Shore Islands and TAIWAN Strait

9. DATE OF REPORT: 14 OCT 1968

5USC 552 (b) (2)

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED]

11. REFERENCES: DIRM LP2, 4E5c, 6B7d

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Jul - Aug 68

12. ORIGINATOR: 500th MI Gp

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: TAIPEI, Taiwan, 23 Sep 68

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F, B INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

7. SOURCE: Staff officer of a [REDACTED]

15. SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

5USC 552 (b) (1)

(1182) 687 (1-6204)

J. L. WEIGAND
Colonel, MI
CO, 500th MI Gp

5USC 552 (b) (1)

15. SUMMARY:

(C) A technical investigation team composed of three [REDACTED] officers investigated reports of numerous unidentified flying objects (UFOs) sighted over TAIWAN Strait and the Offshore Islands since 17 Jul 68 and concluded they were man-made satellites, "flying saucers," electronic jamming devices, or psychological warfare balloons. The [REDACTED] team was assisted in its investigation by two [REDACTED] stationed on KINMEN (Quemoy) Island (2427N/11823E).

(Evaluation Reports, DD Forms 1480, prepared on this IR will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL.)

5USC 552 (b) (1)

(C) A technical team composed of three [REDACTED] officers investigated reported sightings of unidentified flying objects (UFOs) over TAIWAN Strait and the Offshore Islands on 12 and 13 Aug 68. They were assisted by two [REDACTED] technicians stationed on KINMEN (Quemoy) Island (2427N/11823E), one of whom was named [REDACTED] the other was not identified in the team's official report. The following information is the substance of the report, which was written in Chinese and dated 1 Sep 68:

a. Starting on 17 Jul 68, UFOs have been sighted flying over KINMEN (Quemoy) Island (2427N/11823E) daily between 1915 and 2130 hours and sometimes between 0400 and 0500 hours. They flew mostly from east to west and sometimes

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. COMPILING DATA:

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

Item #15 continued:
500th MI GP

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

5USC 552 (b) (2)

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

PAGE 2

ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

757 227
JUSC552 (b) (2)

JUSC552 (b) (2)

from north to south at an estimated altitude of 20,000 to 100,000 feet. Their speed approximated that of a "man-made satellite," and sometimes "a little faster" (EN: Sic, but no actual speed figure was reported). The team members personally observed six UFOs on 12 Aug and four on 13 Aug 68.

b. The UFOs appeared to be as bright as a star (EN: Magnitude not given) and remained in sight from a minimum of one to two minutes, to a maximum of five to ten minutes. They flew a straight course unaffected by wind velocities. Similar UFOs have been sighted also over MATSU (2609N/11956E) and TAIWAN.

c. The [REDACTED] on the technical unit took some photographs of the UFOs, but they were not clear enough for analysis.

d. On the basis of the investigation, the team expressed the belief that the UFOs possibly were satellites, "flying saucers," electronic jamming devices, or psychological warfare balloons. The UFOs sighted on 13 Aug were referred to as "man-made satellites" by both [REDACTED] one of the [REDACTED] representatives, and the [REDACTED] personnel.

Comment of Preparing Officer: (C) The above information forms the substance of a report on the UFOs [REDACTED] members of the investigating team. It is assumed that the [REDACTED] have made their own report of the investigation. The term "man-made satellite" appears in the [REDACTED] and in one reference in the report it was stated that these UFOs were flying "a little faster" than a "man-made satellite." For an earlier report on the UFOs see [REDACTED] subject: UFO Sighting in Taiwan Strait.

2078 UFO 92

(NOBLE)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

PAGE 2

OF 2

PAGES

ORIGINATOR

500th MI Gp

Leave Blank

from north to south at an estimated altitude of 20,000 to 100,000 feet. Their speed approximated that of a "man-made satellite," and sometimes "a little faster" (EN: Sic, but no actual speed figure was reported). The team members personally observed six UFOs on 12 Aug and four on 13 Aug 68.

b. The UFOs appeared to be as bright as a star (EN: Magnitude not given) and remained in sight from a minimum of one to two minutes, to a maximum of five to ten minutes. They flew a straight course unaffected by wind velocities. Similar UFOs have been sighted also over MATSU (2609N/11956E) and TAIWAN.

5USC 552 (b) (1)

c. The [REDACTED] on the technical unit took some photographs of the UFOs, but they were not clear enough for analysis.

d. On the basis of the investigation, the team expressed the belief that the UFOs possibly were satellites, "flying saucers," electronic jamming devices, or psychological warfare balloons. The UFOs sighted on 13 Aug were referred to as "man-made satellites" by both [REDACTED] one of the two [REDACTED] technical representatives, and the [REDACTED] technical personnel.

Comment of Preparing Officer: (C) The above information forms the substance of a report on the UFOs prepared in [REDACTED] members of the investigating team. It is assumed that the [REDACTED] members have made their own report of the investigation. The term "man-made satellite" appears in the [REDACTED] report as [REDACTED] and in one reference in the report it was stated that these UFOs were flying "a little faster" than a "man-made satellite." For an earlier report on the UFOs see 500th MI Gp message [REDACTED] (NOTAL), subject: UFO Sighting in Taiwan Strait.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

This report contains unprocessed information. It should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)/ NORTH KOREA (NK)	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 221 0123 70
2. SUBJECT: (U) SIGHTING OF UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS (UFO)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 7 March 1970
3. ISC NUMBER: 722.300	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2.
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Feb 70	11. REFERENCES: DIRM:1.A.3.a
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: PUSAN, ROK 13 Feb 70	12. ORIGINATOR: 502d MI Bn/Avt/83677/B-1 <i>Robert L. Off</i>
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>C</u> INFORMATION <u>6</u>	13. PREPARED BY: ROBERT L. OFF 2LT, MI
7. SOURCE: Official, ROK Intelligence Agency	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Spencer G. Stanley Jr.</i> SPENCER G. STANLEY JR. Colonel, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT IS REQUESTED (Leave Blank)

1. This report concerns reported sightings of UFOs on the ROK east coast and north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
2. (U) Because of the sensitivity of Source, the information in this report is not releasable to foreign nationals.

1. On 10 and 11 February 1970 a meeting of all commanding officers (CO) of ROK Air Force (ROKAF) Security Units (SU) throughout the ROK was held at ROKAF Headquarters in SEOUL, ROK. At that meeting the ROKAF Chief of Staff gave those in attendance a highly-classified briefing concerning recent sightings of UFOs in KANGWON-do, ROK.

2. Since the beginning of 1970 ROKAF radar stations along the eastern coast of the ROK in KANGWON-do have been sighting (detecting) maneuvers of large balloon-shaped objects at high altitudes just north of the extreme Eastern Sector of the Korean DMZ. On several occasions these UFOs, which the ROKAF officials are assuming to be dirigibles because of their shape and speed, have penetrated ROK air space, traveled in a southeasterly direction over KANGWON-do

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1 DIA
- 2 CINCPAC
- 8 G2, USARPAC
- 15 G2, EA
- 17 502d MI Bn
- 1 5th ADVON
- 1 6499th SAG
- 2 508th USASA
- 1 OSI DO 45
- 2 PACAF
- 1 Chief, KMAC

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE

- 3 EMB RI
- 1 EMB DAO
- 3 G2, 2d INF Div
- 2 G2, 7th INF Div
- 1 G2, I US Corps
- 1 J2
- 1 AAD
- 1 COMNAVFORJ
- 1 J3, PSY WAR
- 1 557th ENGR
- 1 OSI DO 45

167

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NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)/ NORTH KOREA (NK)

2. SUBJECT: (U) SIGHTING OF UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS (UFO)

3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED] SJC552 (b) (2)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Feb 70

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: PUSAN, ROK
13 Feb 70

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 6

7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

9. DATE OF REPORT: 7 March 1970

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED] SJC552 (b) (2)

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] SJC552 (b) (2)

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

15. SUMMARY:

EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT IS REQUESTED

1. (C-NOFORN) This report concerns reported sightings of UFOs on the ROK east coast and north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

2. (U) Because of the sensitivity of Source, the information in this report is not releasable to foreign nationals.

1. (C-NOFORN) On [REDACTED] February 1970 a meeting of all [REDACTED] throughout the ROK was held at [REDACTED] Headquarters in SEOUL, ROK. At that meeting the [REDACTED] gave those in attendance a highly-classified briefing concerning recent sightings of UFOs in KANGWON-do, ROK.

2. (C-NOFORN) Since the beginning of 1970 [REDACTED] along the eastern coast of the ROK in KANGWON-do have been sighting (detecting) maneuvers of large balloon-shaped objects at high altitudes just north of the extreme Eastern Sector of the Korean DMZ. On several occasions these UFOs, which the [REDACTED] are assuming to be dirigibles because of their shape and speed, have penetrated ROK air space, traveled in a southeasterly direction over KANGWON-do

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTER. AS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE

[REDACTED]

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SJC552 (b) (2)

SJC552 (b) (2)

40

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classified and Control Markings)

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1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)/ NORTH KOREA (NK)

2. SUBJECT: (U) SIGHTING OF UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS (UFO)

5USC 552 (b) (2)

3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED]

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

9. DATE OF REPORT: 7 March 1970

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: DIRM:1.A.3.8

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Feb 70

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: PUSAN, ROK
13 Feb 70

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 6

7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

SPENCER C. STANLEY JR.
Colonel, MI
Commanding

5USC 552 (b) (1)

15. SUMMARY:

EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT IS REQUESTED

1. (C-NOFORN) This report concerns reported sightings of UFOs on the ROK east coast and north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

2. (U) Because of the sensitivity of Source, the information in this report is not releasable to foreign nationals.

5USC 552 (b) (1)

1. (C-NOFORN) [REDACTED] a meeting of all [REDACTED] (SU) throughout the ROK was held at [REDACTED] At that meeting the [REDACTED] Chief of Staff gave those in attendance a highly-classified briefing concerning recent sightings of UFOs in KANGWON-do, ROK.

2. (C-NOFORN) Since the beginning of 1970 [REDACTED] radar stations along the eastern coast of the ROK in KANGWON-do have been sighting (detecting) maneuvers of large balloon-shaped objects at high altitudes just north of the extreme Eastern Sector of the Korean DMZ. On several occasions these UFOs, which the [REDACTED] officials are assuming to be dirigibles because of their shape and speed, have penetrated ROK air space, traveled in a southeasterly direction over KANGWON-do

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]

5USC 552 (b) (2)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE

3 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]
1 [REDACTED]

... affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
NO DISSEM
(Classification and Control Markings)

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1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)/ NORTH KOREA (NK)
2. SUBJECT: (U) SIGHTING OF UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS (UFO)

8. REPORT NUMBER: 5USC552 (b) [REDACTED]

9. DATE OF REPORT: 7 March 1970

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: 5USC552 (b) (2) [REDACTED] (b)(3)

3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED] 5USC552 (b) (2)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Feb 70

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: PUSAN, ROK
13 Feb 70

13. PREPARED BY: 5USC552 (b) (2) [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

7. SOURCE: [REDACTED] 5USC552 (b) (1) c

15. SUMMARY: EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT IS REQUESTED

1. (U) This report concerns reported sightings of UFOs on the ROK east coast and north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

2. (U) Because of the sensitivity of Source, the information in this report is not releasable to foreign nationals.

1. (U) On [REDACTED] a meeting of all [REDACTED] throughout the ROK was held at [REDACTED] Headquarters in SEOUL, ROK. At that meeting the [REDACTED] gave those in attendance a highly-classified briefing concerning recent sightings of UFOs in KANGWON-do, ROK.

2. (U) Since the beginning of 1970 [REDACTED] along the eastern coast of the ROK in KANGWON-do have been sighting (detecting) maneuvers of large balloon-shaped objects at high altitudes just north of the extreme Eastern Sector of the Korean DMZ. On several occasions these UFOs, which the [REDACTED] are assuming to be dirigibles because of their shape and speed, have penetrated ROK air space, traveled in a southeasterly direction over KANGWON-do

16. INFORMATION BY ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED] 5USC552 (b) (2)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE

[REDACTED] 5USC552 (b) (2)

DD FORM 1396

CONFIDENTIAL
NO DISSEM

REPLACES DA FORM 1396, 1 MAR 68, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 71

167

5USC552 (b) (2)

42

CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. 2 221 0123 70
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR

(Classification and Control Markings)

502d MI Bn/dwt/83677/B-033

(Leave Blank)

and then exploded. ROK efforts to recover debris subsequent to the explosions have been unsuccessful.

3. The ROKAF Chief of Staff speculated that if current maneuvers of the UFOs prove to be successful, then NK may use the self-propelled balloons for dropping agents, propaganda, or even epidemic germs into the ROK. His briefing and speculation caused consternation among the ROKAF SU CO's because this was the first report they had had of such penetrations.

COMMENTS: / The information in this report was furnished by a medium-level member of a ROK intelligence agency in the PUSAN, ROK area, and who has been reporting on an irregular basis for the last four years.

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(Classification & Control Markings)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED] 5JSC552 (b) (1)
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

and then exploded. ROK efforts to recover debris subsequent to the explosions have been unsuccessful.

3. (e-NOFORN) The [REDACTED] speculated that if current maneuvers of the UVs prove to be successful, [REDACTED] this briefing and speculation caused consternation among the [REDACTED] because this was the [REDACTED]

COMMENTS: (e-NOFORN) The information in this report [REDACTED]

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification - Confirmed Markings)

5USC 552 (b) (2)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR

502d MI 2n/dwt/83677/B-033

and then exploded. KOK efforts to recover debris subsequent to the explosions have been unsuccessful.

3. ~~(C-NOFORN)~~ The ~~[REDACTED]~~ Chief of Staff speculated that if current maneuvers of the UFGs prove to be successful, ~~[REDACTED]~~

his briefing and speculation caused consternation among the ROKAF SO CO's because this was the first report they had had of such penetrations.

COMMENTS: ~~(C-NOFORN)~~ The information in this report was furnished by a member of a ~~[REDACTED]~~ in the ~~[REDACTED]~~ area, and who has been reporting on an irregular basis for the last four years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

5USC552 (b) (2)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

and then exploded. ROK efforts to recover debris subsequent to the explosions have been unsuccessful.

3. [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] speculated that if current maneuver of the UFGs prove to be successful, [REDACTED]

his briefing and speculation caused consternation among the [REDACTED] because this was the [REDACTED]

COMMENTS: [REDACTED] The information in this report [REDACTED]

5USC552 (b) (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1396-1, 1 AUG 66
AND DA FORM 1396, 1 AUG 66 WHICH
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 67. PFC-JM

13 r

EXPLORATION PROGRAM PLAN

Michael D. Griffin
Associate Administrator for Exploration

December 12, 1991

INTRODUCTION

Near-Term Strategy

- Conduct small-scale precursor missions to assemble required data and to demonstrate management ability to:
 - Do it on budget
 - Do it on time
- Minimize engineering complexity and cost, accept additional risk
- Self-imposed funding cap on all projects

SEI EARLY ACHIEVEMENT SUMMARY

MISSIONDESCRIPTION

Lunar Scout

Lunar topography and
gravity satellite with laser
altimeter and sub-satellite

Lunar Resources

Lunar chemical and resource
mapping satelliteCommon Lunar
LanderDelivery system to soft-land
surface rovers and experiments
(200 Kg) on lunar surface

LONGER-TERM

- Need to be prepared for success
 - Good precursor missions can lead to desire for next step
- Initiate serious engineering studies regarding return to the Moon and establishment of a Moonbase
 - RFP for Lunar transport/lander by FY 1995?
- Need to understand technologies required for Moonbase and Mars expedition
- Continue to emphasize management discipline

APPROACH

- Easiest approach to accomplishing budget and schedule goals is going with known performers inside and outside NASA
- By developing two similar projects we can establish a benchmark and proving ground for developing techniques and procedures that will enhance NASA's competitiveness

PRECURSOR MISSIONS/OBJECTIVES

- Lunar resource map
- Lunar terrain map
- Lunar gravity map
- Navigation aids
- Communications relays
- Lunar lander capability



Office of Exploration

EXPLORATION OBJECTIVES

Dr. Michael D. Griffin
Associate Administrator for Exploration

February 7, 1992

NUMBERS OF UFO SIGHTINGS REPORTED TO THE MOD

1959 - 22	1976 - n/k
1960 - 31	1977 - n/k
1961 - 71	1978 - 750
1962 - 46	1979 - 550
1963 - 51	1980 - 350
1964 - 74	1981 - 600
1965 - 56	1982 - 250
1966 - 95	1983 - 390
1967 - 362	1984 - 214
1968 - 280	1985 - 177
1969 - 228	1986 - 120
1970 - 181	1987 - 150
1971 - 379	1988 - 397
1972 - 201	1989 - 258
1973 - n/k	1990 - 209
1974 - n/k	1991 - 117
1975 - n/k	

WE COULD
PRINT
THESE
(USE 5%
REPRODUCTION
FIGURES)

Note 1 - Figures prior to 1959 not known

Note 2 - 96 sightings so far this year

DATE	TIME	WIND	TEMP	WIND	TEMP	WIND	TEMP	WIND	TEMP
900302	104427.71	33.27	94.56	226.52	1460.1	001001	0.	000	
900302	112738.10	32.81	114.31	217.59	4135.0	011000	0.	000	
900302	114032.78	31.99	120.52	214.62	1980.7	100100	0.	000	
900302	114511.19	31.72	80.77	255.54	969.2	011101	0.	000	
900302	114655.86	32.19	83.18	253.56	7253.2	111000	0.	000	
900302	121101.76	33.51	100.50	242.28	7534.1	111000	0.	000	
900302	122101.54	33.16	92.65	252.64	3502.7	110000	0.	000	
900302	122930.10	31.03	77.08	270.33	596.2	001001	0.	000	
900302	123932.25	33.41	102.56	247.37	536.1	110000	0.	000	
900302	124541.78	33.10	92.20	259.27	991.5	110101	0.	000	
900302	130308.28	33.24	94.01	261.83	1012.0	111001	0.	000	
900302	132648.95	32.18	118.74	243.04	324.6	110000	0.	000	
900302	135253.23	32.78	114.37	253.95	2406.2	001100	0.	000	
900302	141240.27	33.38	97.36	275.92	998.0	111101	0.	000	
900302	141620.38	29.85	71.61	302.58	1752.8	111101	0.	000	
900302	142125.92	33.42	100.85	274.62	340.0	000101	0.	000	
900302	143819.34	33.30	106.63	273.08	214.7	110000	0.	000	
900302	145658.52	33.49	101.47	282.90	3104.0	011000	0.	000	
900302	145818.47	32.87	113.31	271.41	1171.3	110000	0.	000	
900302	151827.06	33.23	108.07	281.69	335.3	110000	0.	000	
900302	152518.64	33.42	98.39	293.10	1440.7	111101	0.	000	
900302	153348.87	32.60	87.01	305.60	708.1	011101	0.	000	
900302	155509.25	32.18	119.13	279.93	2084.4	110000	0.	000	
900302	155632.73	32.69	114.67	284.64	144.2	110000	0.	000	
900302	155818.90	32.73	114.41	285.34	474.0	110000	0.	000	
900302	160055.46	33.46	101.24	299.17	1724.8	110001	0.	000	
900302	162911.04	33.46	102.04	305.45	2045.5	011000	0.	000	
900302	163311.94	33.12	110.75	297.75	1623.6	101000	0.	000	
900302	163818.84	32.87	89.57	320.21	346.0	011000	0.	000	
900302	163934.10	33.21	108.61	301.49	766.5	111101	0.	000	
900302	164612.06	33.02	111.76	300.00	1815.1	111101	0.	000	
900302	164612.67	33.02	111.69	300.07	1806.6	000101	0.	000	
900302	165717.42	33.42	100.63	313.91	547.3	010100	0.	000	
900302	165953.33	33.37	96.28	318.91	2678.9	111000	0.	000	
900302	171103.84	33.33	107.89	310.11	4659.0	001101	0.	000	
900302	172317.10	33.46	104.29	316.77	4740.0	010100	0.	000	
900302	173240.95	23.33	52.05	11.36	5784.9	001100	0.	000	
900302	175449.51	33.45	97.89	331.08	4211.2	101101	0.	000	
900302	182944.42	31.21	77.68	.04	3125.0	010100	0.	000	
900302	184808.37	31.61	122.76	319.57	3395.1	111001	0.	000	
900302	190208.31	30.61	127.89	317.95	4578.4	010100	0.	000	
900302	191111.62	28.02	64.84	23.27	7078.1	000101	0.	000	
900302	191302.70	33.32	106.37	342.20	343.1	110000	0.	000	
900302	192521.47	32.18	83.79	7.86	1057.8	000101	0.	000	
900302	192953.62	33.17	93.04	359.75	1433.2	101101	0.	000	
900302	193534.10	25.35	57.16	37.00	2587.6	001101	0.	000	
900302	200102.86	32.32	84.49	16.11	2031.4	101101	0.	000	
900302	200600.59	33.47	101.89	359.96	2607.3	000101	0.	000	
900302	202115.68	33.42	105.76	359.91	4766.4	011101	0.	000	
900302	202402.99	33.43	104.76	1.61	2329.2	100100	0.	000	
900302	202501.52	30.49	74.12	32.49	5531.1	101100	0.	000	
900302	203223.99	33.00	91.05	17.41	360.2	011000	0.	000	
900302	203801.91	33.25	94.39	15.48	1460.7	101000	0.	000	
900302	204236.53	31.78	121.55	349.47	798.0	110000	0.	000	
900302	211539.93	33.28	93.92	25.39	5027.2	010100	0.	000	
900302	211640.62	33.18	93.84	25.73	344.0	011000	0.	000	
900302	212338.03	31.88	81.93	39.38	226.3	000101	0.	000	
900302	213031.52	33.26	107.35	15.69	214.0	110000	0.	000	
900302	213051.28	33.34	96.00	27.12	1048.0	101101	0.	000	
900302	214801.76	32.92	112.60	14.82	780.9	101000	0.	000	
900302	214843.77	33.24	94.97	32.63	226.3	010100	0.	000	
900302	215919.95	33.41	104.44	25.82	719.3	110000	0.	000	
900302	220240.53	31.95	81.90	49.20	2910.1	101100	0.	000	



NAVAL SPACE SURVEILLANCE CENTER
DAHLGREN, VIRGINIA 22448-5180

IN REPLY REFER TO

5700
Ser 11/256
MAY 02 1990

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
England

Dear [REDACTED]

This refers to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 5 April 1990 in which you request unknown data and information concerning the NAVSPASUR operating system.

The following information is provided and corresponds to the requests in your letter:

A listing of unknown NAVSPASUR observations is attached. The data span is from 2 March 1990 to 1 May 1990.

The mission of NAVSPASUR is: to maintain a constant surveillance of space and provide satellite data as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and higher authority to fulfill Navy and national requirements. NAVSPASUR is comprised of equipments performing three operational functions. First, data acquisition of satellites is performed by a complex of three transmitting and six receiving stations located on a great circle across the southern United States. Next, satellite detection and correlation with predictions is performed by digital computers at the NAVSPASUR Headquarters in Dahlgren, Virginia. Lastly, data storage, retrieval, and updating of orbital elements of past, present, and future paths of all known orbiting objects are performed by the computer center at NAVSPASUR Headquarters.

The address is:

HQ USSPACECOM/J3SOS
Cheyenne Mountain Complex
Peterson AFB, Co. 80914-5000
ATTN: Lt. Dupourque

The fees associated with processing your request are waived.

Sincerely,

R. C. King
R. C. KING, CDR, USN
Executive Officer

Encl:

(1) Listing of Unknown NAVSPASUR Observations

During the past several years, a significant amount of effort has been expended by representatives of both the public and private space sectors in examining alternative civil space exploration goals and strategies, and in examining the role of exploration in the overall context of the nation's future space program. In addition, recent budget deliberations involving Congress and the Administration have provided a lively forum for debating the relative merits of national investments in space exploration.

From such study and debate has emerged a consensus - that the expansion of human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit is both an appropriate and inevitable long-term focus for the nation's space program. The scientific, technological, and educational returns that will flow from a return to the Moon and expeditions to Mars will provide an important foundation for the nation's economic and social development in the twenty-first century.

There is not, however, similar consensus on the specific steps by which our exploration activities should proceed. Particularly lacking is any agreement on the next steps: objectives for the next five years, as opposed to the next fifty. As a step in forging such an agreement, this program plan outlines our near-term strategy - our assumptions, technical and policy objectives, and related programmatic plans - for moving aggressively forward with the nation's future in space.

Near-Term Strategy and Technical Objectives

The nation is not currently in a position to initiate a large-scale, major human space exploration program. We are all aware of the many competing priorities for Federal expenditures, and recognize the necessity of proceeding in a manner that realistically reflects a constrained budget environment. This involves not only selecting the right objectives and missions, but also conducting any activity in such a way as to maximize the return on our nation's investment; not only doing the right things, but doing things right.

Given this reality, our near-term exploration strategy is two-fold. First, we need to start small: to develop and conduct small-scale, robotic/automated precursor missions designed to fill gaps in our scientific and technological knowledge - "doing the right things." Second, we need to do it with a management culture that can be relied upon to "do it right" - on budget and on time. Only then will precursors give way to piloted missions.

Specifically, studies to date have indicated that small-scale precursor missions can be mounted to provide the following data or capabilities for later missions:

- Resource Maps. Information regarding the nature and distribution of lunar and Martian resources will have a major impact on subsequent exploration activities. For example, resolving the debate about the presence of water ice at the lunar poles would be a major factor in locating a lunar base.

- Terrain Maps. Terrain maps on the order of five meters resolution will be required to assist in the determination of suitable landing sites, the planning of lunar and Martian traverses, and the conduct of other surface activities.
- Gravity Maps. The Apollo missions experienced navigational difficulties in low lunar orbits resulting from insufficient understanding of the Moon's gravitational field. Additional characterization of both the lunar and Martian gravitational environments is desirable before full-scale human exploration activities are initiated.
- Navigation Aids. Prior lunar missions relied on a combination of ground tracking stations and spacecraft onboard systems for navigation. A more effective approach would be to emplace a constellation of radio navigation beacons in lunar and Martian orbit, tying both inertial space to orbit and locations on the surface to orbit. Such a network would enable precise, real time position determination, offering greater accuracy at less cost.
- Communications Relays. An orbiting communications satellite - or even a network of such satellites - could be used by subsequent missions to relay data from the lunar and Martian surfaces back to Earth (and vice versa), resulting in lighter and less expensive vehicles and reduced dependence on Earth-based communications facilities.
- Landers and Rovers. The requirements discussed above can be satisfied by spacecraft orbiting the Moon or Mars. However, filling all of the data gaps will require a capability to land payloads of roughly 200 kilograms on the lunar and Martian surfaces to deploy rovers, conduct surface and sub-surface sampling activities, and perhaps return surface samples to Earth.

The data requirements and mission support capabilities listed above are in rough order of priority, though this is not that critical, given that all of the requirements eventually must be satisfied. And, while most (if not all) of these requirements pertain equally to the Moon and Mars, starting with lunar missions makes sense in terms of leveraging existing knowledge and ease of access, as well as ultimately preparing for a permanent base on the Moon.

Pursuing a strategy beginning with these small-scale precursor missions offers numerous benefits. Each mission makes sense in the near-term. All return good science and/or engineering data or provide a needed capability, and all affect planning for human missions to follow.

Utilizing several smaller missions, as opposed to one large mission, minimizes both technical and programmatic risk. The engineering complexity of a mission increases dramatically with the number of payloads involved. Since cost increases along with complexity, keeping the number of payloads to a minimum keeps costs down and improves the chances of a problem-free mission. Having a number of smaller missions also prevents the possibility of a major failure derailing the entire program, and provides multiple opportunities to build effective management discipline.

Policy Objectives: Other "Agendas"

To build this discipline, we plan to utilize a range of traditional and non-traditional management approaches, providing us with information on the relative effectiveness of each approach and stimulating competition among various components of the exploration community. These approaches potentially include:

- Conducting missions on a fully commercial basis. Thirty years ago, the Federal government enjoyed a monopoly on the technical know-how required to conduct space operations. Today, this expertise also resides in an emerging commercial space industry. Rather than contracting for every piece of hardware, the government now has the option to contract for products.
- Conducting missions entirely "in-house", i.e., using personnel from government and government-captive labs belonging to NASA, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and other government entities. Such in-house projects have traditionally served as the training ground for developing young scientists and engineers, and have been few and far between in recent years as the government has increasingly relied upon contractor personnel to design, build and test its space missions.
- Conducting missions using the conventional government/prime contractor relationship - but avoiding the pitfalls of inappropriate micromanagement. The government needs to be a "smart buyer", but rather than sending civil service personnel to micromanage projects - and forcing contractors to hire more people to interact with these "overseers" - the government also needs to know when to trust the private sector to do the job right.
- Conducting missions with the participation of an international partner. There are many nations around the world that have, or are in the process of developing, substantial space-related capabilities. By working with such countries we will be able to leverage that know-how to further our exploration objectives; international participation will also further U.S. foreign policy goals.

We will also endeavor to tap the expertise of the academic community by soliciting university involvement where appropriate.

Resource Requirements

Currently, our plan is to conduct one to two missions of the more traditional variety, and contract for one commercial "data buy." As each of the missions is in the \$100 million class, the investment for this set of precursor activities would not exceed \$300 million over four fiscal years. This is a far cry from the numbers typically assumed for initiating an exploration program. And, such a series of smaller precursor missions is more responsive to the requirements of a "go as you pay" budgetary environment: each mission adds value on a stand-alone basis, making it possible to conduct a meaningful exploration activity by opting for some, or for all, of the planned missions.

L457

Longer-Term Plans

While a series of small-scale precursor missions is the appropriate near-term strategy, activities must also begin in anticipation of larger-scale human missions. We need to be prepared for initial efforts toward developing hardware for human missions.(e.g., a lunar transport/lander) within the next three to four years.

Simultaneously, we need to increase our understanding of the many technologies required for longer-term exploration objectives, such as a base on the Moon and an expedition to Mars. Key areas include lightweight materials, nuclear power and propulsion technologies, life sciences research, radiation protection technologies, and life support systems.

With respect to project execution, we will continue to search for and use the most innovative and cost-effective approaches available, including approaches to project management, procurement, and mission development and operations. Only by refusing to be bound to past ways of doing business will we be able to mount a robust exploration program and deliver the return on investment the nation expects and deserves.

Summary

The bottom line is that we need to start now. Small-scale precursor missions are required to both fill in data gaps and develop management expertise. Each of the missions addressed above contributes to meeting our ultimate exploration goals; each is within our technical and financial reach. With this strategy, space exploration is a program we can afford to start; in fact, we can't afford not to start.

PRECURSOR MISSIONS

- Each mission makes sense in the near-term
 - All return good science and/or engineering data: no stunts
 - All can affect planning for human missions to follow

- Pieces not too big
 - Multiple opportunities for success
 - Avoids possibility of major failure
 - Minimizes engineering complexity/cost
 - Satisfies "go as you pay"

OTHER MISSION "AGENDAS"

- Conduct at least one mission with international participation
- Conduct at least one mission using commercial space capabilities — "Manage to Outcome"
- Conduct at least one mission entirely in-house (i.e., Federal Labs)
- Conduct one mission using conventional government/prime contractor relationship — but avoid micromanagement
- Solicit university involvement where appropriate