



Fourth part of a series of publications that will expose Her Majesty's Government's attempts to change regime in Russia.

Greetings! We are Anonymous.

This is part 1 of Undermining Russia investigation.

Part 2 is available here. https://freenet.space/read-blog/1073_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-4-undermining-russia-ii.html (..//read-blog/1073_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-4-undermining-russia-ii.html)

Part 3 is available here. https://freenet.space/read-blog/1074_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-4-undermining-russia-iii.html (..//read-blog/1074_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-4-undermining-russia-iii.html)

Here you can download a complete archive containing more than 200 FCO files on Undermining Russia:

https://anonfiles.com/78n0WcEep7/Complete_Undermining_Russia_rar
(https://anonfiles.com/78n0WcEep7/Complete_Undermining_Russia_rar)

<https://ufile.io/lsh22zy> (<https://ufile.io/lsh22zy>)

A couple of news topics attracted our attention while we were dealing with HMG Trojan Horses in the Middle East and in other regions of the world and exposing snaky British spies and diplomats who:

- support jihadists https://freenet.space/read-blog/275_op-hmg-trojan-horse-from-integrity-initiative-to-covert-ops-around-the-globe-par.html ([..../read-blog/275_op-hmg-trojan-horse-from-integrity-initiative-to-covert-ops-around-the-globe-par.html](https://freenet.space/read-blog/275_op-hmg-trojan-horse-from-integrity-initiative-to-covert-ops-around-the-globe-par.html))
- orchestrate revolutions https://freenet.space/read-blog/615_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-2-infiltrating-lebanon-i.html ([..../read-blog/615_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-2-infiltrating-lebanon-i.html](https://freenet.space/read-blog/615_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-2-infiltrating-lebanon-i.html))
- place agents of change in senior governmental positions https://freenet.space/read-blog/836_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-3-securing-lebanon-i.html ([..../read-blog/836_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-3-securing-lebanon-i.html](https://freenet.space/read-blog/836_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-3-securing-lebanon-i.html))

The first news topic is about the disgusting pseudo investigative and de facto propaganda firm Bellingcat, and the second is related to the use of chemical weapons.

Both of the topics are closely related to the so-called Navalny case, and we are going to prove that this media frenzy about the man has been caused by HMG as well. We assure you that we have documental evidence that almost every political crisis in the world and inevitable tragedy that follows it has been instigated by the self-proclaimed 'force for good'. Our main goal is to show you the true face of the wicked British neocolonialism. And although the Brits do their best to gag us and force various file-hostings to delete the documents that we upload, we assure you that they will never succeed. The truth will eventually out!

For those of you who have never read our investigations or still doubts their credibility we have the following: UK FCO acknowledged that the documents were authentic when we exposed HMG crimes in Syria back in September 2020.

<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-uk-government-probing-cyber-attack-over-syria-propaganda-leaks> (<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-uk-government-probing-cyber-attack-over-syria-propaganda-leaks>)

Recall the latest accidents involving the 'use of chemical weapons' before we show you the files.

'Chemical attacks' in Syria.

Facts. Syrian opposition-held territory, FCO-controlled 'White Helmets', millions of GBP invested in the gear for 'independent' Mass Media and stringers. Then goes a 'chemical attack' followed by a lightning-speed reaction from rescuers, MSM coverage of the accident **and a Bellingcat investigation**.

However, investigations of independent media outlets and honest academics have shown to everybody that it was a staged event and a frame-up. <http://syriapropagandamedia.org> (<http://syriapropagandamedia.org>)

Here's an excellent article based on our investigation of HMG involvement in Syria:

<https://thegrayzone.com/2020/09/23/syria-leaks-uk-contractors-opposition-media/>

(<https://thegrayzone.com/2020/09/23/syria-leaks-uk-contractors-opposition-media/>)

And here's an interview with the author of the article:

<https://youtu.be/dicVBwl8F48?t=1398> (<https://youtu.be/dicVBwl8F48?t=1398>)

'Use of chemical weapons' in Salisbury in 2018.

Facts. MI-6-controlled Sergei Skripal, Integrity Initiative propaganda network, General Sir Richard Barons' 2016 statement about the need of 'something dreadful to happen to shock us into action'

So, if no catastrophe happens to wake people up and demand a response, then we need to find a way to get the core of government to realise the problem and take it out of the political space. We will need to impose changes over the heads of vested interests. NB We did this in the 1930s

My conclusion is that it is we who must either generate the debate or wait for something dreadful to happen to shock us into action. We must generate an independent debate outside government. The

They were plotting it as far back as in 2015:

Russian Federation (RF) Sanctions

MAIN AIM(S)

Behaviour change? Peace with Ukraine (UKR)? Return Crimea? Regime change? Other?

POTENTIAL LEVERS

Civil society e.g.

- Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia
- Ukraine Crisis Media Center ; Project *Mirotvorets* ; Project *Likbez*
- Global Witness (e.g. V.F. Yanukovich & UKR corruption)

Commerce e.g.

- Suspend/expel RF from G8, WTO, ITO & similar organisations
- Expand existing sanctions regimes to anyone helping RF break them
- Ban RF delegates from attending commercial conferences abroad
- Suspend commercial delegation exchange visits

Culture e.g.

- Suspend operations of Pushkin House, *Russkiy Mir* & similar organisations
- Suspend British Council operations in RF
- Suspend visits by Bolshoi & Kirov Ballets, & similar groups
- Suspend cultural delegation exchange visits
- Repatriate dependents of "top 100" RF Government officials studying abroad

Diplomacy e.g.

- Visa bans for "top 100" RF Government officials & immediate families

Economics e.g.

- Expand existing sanctions regimes to anyone helping RF break them

Finance e.g.

- Freeze assets of "top 100" RF Government officials & immediate families
- Publicise location of illicit assets in their name where possible
- Ban RF delegates from attending financial conferences abroad
- Ban RF companies from launching IPOs in West
- Western divestment of RF-related investments (e.g. Heath, *Telegraph*, 23.07.2014)

Individuals e.g.

- Visa bans for individuals & relatives helping RF break sanctions regimes
- Freeze assets of such individuals & immediate families
- Publicise location of illicit assets in their name where possible

Industry e.g.

- Suspend RF companies from international industrial associations
- Ban RF delegates from attending industrial conferences abroad
- Suspend industrial delegation exchange visits

Information e.g.

- Make ordinary Russians *the direct* focus of & audience for Western media
- Increase spending on BBC World Service, BBC Monitoring coverage of RF
- Fund removal of *Kyiv Post, The Times, The New York Times*, etc., pay-walls
- Sanction RF media in West for not complying with regulators' standards
- Fund citizen journalism in UKR & RF to expose RF information operations

Intelligence e.g.

- Simultaneously expel every RF intelligence officer and air/defence/naval attaché from as many countries as possible (global *Operation FOOT*, 1971)
- Increase scrutiny of RF religious, academic, think-tank & business links in West

Military e.g.

- Suspend military/defence delegation visits/exchanges
- Suspend all defence-related sales to RF
- Suspend RF from international defence- & security-related *fora*
- Expand sanctions on/to RF companies (in)directly profiting from UKR invasion

Politics e.g.

- Make ordinary Russians *the direct* focus of & audience for Western politicians
- Suspend RF & any other State helping it evade sanctions from international *fora*

Sports e.g.

- Expose RF corruption of bidding processes for international sports events
- Advocate view that RF unworthy of hosting such events
- Publicise RF labour violations when building venues for such events
- Publicise RF programmes that encourage athletes to engage in doping

Security e.g.

- Simultaneously expel every RF intelligence officer and air/defence/naval attaché from as many countries as possible (global *Operation FOOT*, 1971)
- Arrest every known RF agent — not least “agents of influence”
- Publicise arrest of key RF “agents of influence”
- Increase funding & operational tempo of counter-intelligence operations against RF
- Revive Lists “N”, “U” & “X” fully

Technology e.g.

- Ban *all* sales of dual-use technology or that deemed strategic in nature to RF (e.g. CoCom during Cold War & now Wassenaar Arrangement)

Then goes the poisoning, followed by sanctions, mutual diplomatic (i.e. spy) expulsions **and a Bellingcat investigation.**

HMG covered everything (including Skripal) up and issued a D-Notice for the MSM to properly cover Skripal's handler Pablo Miller as soon as alternative Media began asking questions. The government refused to disclose any information explaining that it could undermine national security. Why did they need the blackout? Why taking such a foolish step and hiding Skripal if he was really poisoned and his evidence could have supported HMG's version of events? And the answer to all of these questions is that it was a staged event and a frame-up.

https://freenet.space/read-blog/990_operation-039-integrity-initiative-039-british-informational-war-against-all-par.html (..../read-blog/990_operation-039-integrity-initiative-039-british-informational-war-against-all-par.html)

'Navalny was novichoked' in Russia in 2020.

Facts. Media frenzy, 'use of chemical weapon', military bio-labs' secret conclusions which no one must read, horrified international community, so-called experts, the transfer of Navalny to Germany **and a Bellingcat investigation.**

Can't you see the similarity? Chemical attack - Bellingcat investigation - lightning-speed MSM coverage supported by Western governments. And it's just the tip of the iceberg. Many years of painstaking work of HMG through its embassies and intelligence cutouts precede a chemical attack. They create Media, CSOs and pseudo humanitarian organisations that happen to be just at the correct place and in the correct time with their cameras ready when 'suddenly' a dreadful accident 'shocks every one into action'.

Do you believe HMG staged the 'Navalny accident' as part of some kind of a secret operation? Did HMG create Media outlets, nurture bloggers and stringers that it controlled? Did it engage Russia's youth and CSOs? Did it try to demonise Putin just like it had done with Assad by labeling them Evil Dictators who poisoned their people with forbidden chemical weapons? Do you know what all of this is needed for? They need it to delegitimise a leader of a country and convince people around the world that 'no holds should be barred to fight a mad dictator'. Can you grasp the gravity of what is going on? Well, you ought to. They are preparing us for war with the Russians and the Chinese. They are looking for *casus belli*, and only the truth can stop them, because '*if wars can be started by lies, they can be stopped by truth*'. (*Julian Assange*)

We are not an MI-6 waste tank unlike the Bellingcrap '*that has discredited itself by spreading disinformation and by being willing to produce reports for anyone willing to pay*' (FCO's official statement).

- Other concerns were that the CPDA and ISD had analytical shortcomings, and that Bellingcat was somewhat discredited, both by spreading disinformation itself, and by being willing to produce reports for anyone willing to pay.

We don't use open source circumstantial evidence and we don't say that the evidence is 'highly likely' the truth. We show you real documents and their authenticity is confirmed by the FCO. Anyway, they have no other option since documental evidence is documental

evidence. You can read them and draw your own conclusions. We only show you the most prominent parts and provide short comments.

We don't have any state-of-the-art illustrations because we don't employ any PR team and multimedia specialists. We don't have the means to create videos like Bellingcat and the like. We have no nice cover that distracts attention of our audience from the documents that we reveal. Yet we really hope some enthusiastic, talented and honest journalists will retranslate our information to the people around the world in some nicer form. Anyway, we have the most important part - we have the truth. Get ready, as it's going to be really a long read.

However, we'd like to remind you of a rather tricky situation HMG found itself in back in 2018-2019 when we caught it red handed employing secret services to achieve domestic political goals. Particularly of the fact when military intelligence officers were employed in a smear campaign against the leader of Her Majesty's Opposition Jeremy Corbyn. They faked proofs of his ties with Russia and disseminated them through MSM and the so-called journalists. It was done as part of a secret FCO project Integrity Initiative and paid for by the British taxpayers.

An enthusiastic professor has conveniently gathered links to all the articles related to the scandal. <https://timhayward.wordpress.com/2018/12/15/integrity-grasping-the-initiative/> (<https://timhayward.wordpress.com/2018/12/15/integrity-grasping-the-initiative/>)

Eventually HMG had to admit that the project violated the law and suspend its funding. And head of the intelligence cutout The Institute for Statecraft Chris Donnelly had to offer public apologies to Jeremy Corbyn. After that the Institute for Statecraft lost any possibility to get state funding.

Yet we'd like to remind you of the way the scandal was progressing in the beginning. Well, most of the Labour MPs were really staggered by the uncovered circumstances, and one of them, namely, Chris Williamson demanded that FCO give some explanation to it all:

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Integrity Initiative

Question for Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UIN 196177, tabled on 27 November 2018

Question



Chris Williamson

Labour

Derby North



Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether his Department has (a) funded, (b) provided contracts to and (c) procured the services of the Integrity Initiative in each financial year since 2015/16.

Answer



Sir Alan Duncan

Conservative

Rutland and Melton



Commons

Answered on

3 December 2018

The Institute for Statecraft is an independent, Scottish, charitable body whose work seeks to improve governance and enhance national security. They launched the Integrity Initiative in 2015 to defend democracy against disinformation.

In financial year 2017/18, the FCO funded the Institute for Statecraft's Integrity Initiative £296,500. This financial year, the FCO is funding a further £1,961,000. Both have been funded through grant agreements.

At the Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2017, the Prime Minister announced that the UK Government has committed £100m over five years to tackling this threat internationally.

Such funding furthers our commitment to producing important work to counter disinformation and other malign influence.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Integrity Initiative

Question for Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UIN 198811, tabled on 4 December 2018

Question



Chris Williamson

Labour

Derby North



Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to the Answer of 3 December 2018 to Question 196177 on Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Integrity Initiative, whether the funding provided to the Institute of Statecraft was through the FCO-led Russian Language Programme.

[Hide full question](#)

Answer



Sir Alan Duncan

Conservative

Rutland and Melton



Commons

Answered on

10 December 2018

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Russian Language Programme was launched in 2014 following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. In April 2016 we launched a new four year strategic communications and media development programme authorised by the National Security Council, called the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme. The former Russian Language Programme was amalgamated into this. The funding provided to the Institute for Statecraft was funded from the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Integrity Initiative

Question for Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UIN 198810, tabled on 4 December 2018

Question



Chris Williamson

Labour

Derby North



Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pursuant to the Answer of 3 December 2018 to Question 196177 on Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Integrity Initiative, if he will publish his Department's (a) documents and (b) correspondence on grant agreements for the Integrity Initiative.

[Hide full question](#)

Answer



Sir Alan Duncan

Conservative

Rutland and Melton



Commons

Answered on

10 December 2018

The FCO's Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme is designed to protect national security by countering disinformation directed at the UK and its Allies from Russia. Russia persistently uses disinformation to target its perceived enemies. An example was the Russian disinformation campaign that followed the attack in Salisbury, which was intended to distract from Russian culpability. Documents and correspondence about projects within the Programme will not be published, as this information could then be used to actively attempt to disrupt and undermine the Programme's effectiveness.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Russian Language

Question for Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UIN 198813, tabled on 4 December 2018

Question



Chris Williamson

Labour

Derby North



Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what the (a) amount and (b) recipient name was for grants paid through the FCO-led Russian Language Programme in the latest period for which figures are available.

Answer



Sir Alan Duncan

Conservative

Rutland and Melton



Commons

Answered on

10 December 2018

The FCO's Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme is designed to protect national security by countering disinformation directed at the UK and its Allies from Russia. Russia persistently uses disinformation to target its perceived enemies. An example was the Russian disinformation campaign that followed the attack in Salisbury, which was intended to distract from Russian culpability. Information about individual projects within the Programme will not be published, as this information could then be used to actively attempt to disrupt and undermine the Programme's effectiveness.

Minister of State (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) Alan Duncan confirmed that FCO indeed funded the Integrity Initiative as part of some shadowy Counter Disinformation Media Development Programme (CDMD). He also stated that no documents would be published

because they could potentially breach national security. You need to know that in Britain national security issues are in fact operations of secret services. And you must have already guessed which secret service is operating under the cover of FCO. It's MI-6.

Shadow Foreign Secretary Emily Thornberry wasn't content with those formal replies, so she invited Alan Duncan to answer before the Parliament on the 12th of December 2018.

He was rather nervous and sometimes he even raised his voice while answering the questions of MPs Williamson and Thornberry.







But he knew that rescue was on its way. Although HGM had nothing to say since it was true that it had employed its intelligence cutouts in a smear campaign against the Labour leader, it asked a great friend of MI-6 Stephen Gethins to intentionally move the discussion away from the topic and to the 'Russian propaganda'.



Naturally that Thornberry and other Labour MPs weren't content with the result of the hearings, so she wrote an open letter to Sir Duncan.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1A 2AH

12th December 2018

Dear Sir Alan

Thank you for responding to my Urgent Question in the House of Commons this afternoon concerning Foreign Office funding of the Institute for Statecraft's Integrity Initiative, in light of the political attacks disseminated by the latter's Twitter site.

You repeatedly made clear in response that the Foreign Office does not fund (a) the Integrity Initiative's Twitter operation; and (b) any of their domestic activity, and that no public funds had therefore been used to conduct these political attacks.

Much as I deplore the hacking that has led to the exposure of documentation allegedly detailing the activities and funding of the Integrity Initiative, I do need to clarify some discrepancies between that documentation and your statement in Parliament today.

I refer in particular to the 'Project Proposal Form' for 'Phase II' of the Integrity Initiative allegedly completed by the Institute for Statecraft in its application for Foreign Office funding in the current financial year, 2018/19.

On Page 2 of the form, the over-arching objective of the proposal is described as follows:

"To expand our long-term programme so that European and N American countries can better understand and counter Russia's policy of malign influence and disinformation."

On Page 3, the third point detailing how this will be achieved reads as follows:

"Expanding the impact of the Integrity Initiative website, dissemination and Twitter/social media accounts, and increasing the reporting of the issue in mainstream and specialist press."



On Page 22, ‘Output 3’ of the ‘Project Plan’ is described as follows:

“Dissemination of knowledge: education in understanding the threat; training in how to track, analyse and expose the threat; sharing best practice in and devising new ideas and concepts for implementing counter-measures.”

On Pages 27-28, the sixth ‘Indicator’ for ‘Output 3’ is set out, relevant extracts from which I have detailed below:

“During Phase 1, we formalised a process of social media dissemination of relevant commentaries on key issues which had been generated either by the Institute or by a third party.”

“In Phase 2 we will continue to expand our social media activity with the aims of monitoring and analysing hostile disinformation, spreading the message about disinformation activities against our democracies and how to spot them, and countering disinformation with positive information.”

“There will be 4 strands to this activity [the third of which is listed as]: Publishing content from our network and beyond to distribute messaging...”

“Our experience in Phase 1 has taught us that this is one of the most important means for countering Russian disinformation which we must amplify greatly during Phase 2.”

“We will (re-) distribute our own material and good work done by others.”

“The process will be tightly monitored with feedback and progress reporting on a monthly basis.”

“Our tweeting and retweeting has already grown in scale and has the potential to grow much more. Twitter followers [will] be increased from just under 400 now to 600 by end Q2.”

In what is alleged to be the accompanying, detailed activity and budget plan accompanying this project plan, a number of activities are outlined under the heading of:

“Expanding the impact of the Integrity Initiative website, dissemination and Twitter/social media accounts, and increasing the reporting of the issue in the mainstream and specialist press.”

The budget for these activities amounted to £257,311 of the total funding for Phase II of the initiative, which – according to the bottom line of the budget plan – adds up to £1,961,000, exactly the same total that you have disclosed in responses to Parliamentary Questions that the Integrity Initiative was awarded by the Foreign Office in the current financial year.

Furthermore, in another document purporting to describe the three ‘key deliverables’ agreed between the Institute for Statecraft and the Foreign Office for the progress of the Integrity



Initiative, of which one is listed as: “*making people...see the big picture [and] acknowledge that we are under concerted, deliberate hybrid attack by Russia*”.

Two of the instruments by which it is proposed this ‘deliverable’ will be achieved are the Integrity Initiative’s website and its “*+600 Twitter followers, inc influential players*”.

I hope you will understand that – taken on face value – it is difficult to reconcile the information outlined above with the statements you made earlier to Parliament, and – while I have every confidence that you stated the absolute truth as you understand it – I hope you will not object to me asking you some questions of clarification:

1. Is the documentation I have quoted from above accurate in terms of the ‘project plan’, ‘activity plan’ and ‘key deliverables’ relating to the Integrity Initiative for 2018/19, or has it been doctored or manufactured by those putting it into the public domain?
2. If it is accurate, were changes subsequently made to the final project agreement reached between the Foreign Office and the Institute for Statecraft to exclude from that project – and related funding – any reference to the Integrity Initiative’s Twitter presence?
3. If so, why did the detailed draft funding proposal in which the Integrity Initiative’s Twitter operation was clearly an integral feature add up to £1,961,000, the same amount as the Foreign Office provided in funding for Phase II of the project, from which – based on your account today – any support for the Twitter operation was excluded?
4. Which individual(s) employed by the Institute for Statecraft is responsible for maintaining the Integrity Initiative’s Twitter account, and can you guarantee that they have had no part of their salary or administration costs in 2018/19 paid for out of Foreign Office funds?

I will have further questions in due course concerning your assertion that the Foreign Office exclusively funds the Integrity Initiative’s overseas activities and not any part of its domestic work, but for the time being, and in light of your statements in Parliament today, I wanted to give you an immediate opportunity to clarify the points above.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Emily".

**The Rt Hon Emily Thornberry
Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

But he ignored her demands, because there's no real democracy in Britain, and puppet masters from HMG will never tell the hard truth even to the men and women elected by the people.

MP Williamson also asked some additional questions of Sir Alan Duncan only to receive meaningless replies.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Russian Language

Question for Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UIN 202768, tabled on 17 December 2018

Question



Chris Williamson

Labour

Derby North



Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, how much funding his Department allocated to each recipient under the Russian Language Programme since financial year 2013-14.

Answer



Sir Alan Duncan

Conservative

Rutland and Melton



Commons

Answered on

20 December 2018

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Russian Language Programme was launched in 2014 following Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. The Programme was funded from the Cross-Government Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund (CSSF). In April 2016 we launched a new four year strategic communications and media development programme, called the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme, designed to protect national security by countering disinformation directed at the UK and its Allies from Russia. The former Russian Language Programme was amalgamated into this. Documents and correspondence about projects within the Programme will not be published, as this information could then be used actively to attempt to disrupt and undermine the Programme's effectiveness.

Russia: Disinformation

Question for Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UIN 202753, tabled on 17 December 2018

Question



Chris Williamson

Labour

Derby North



Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, if he will list (a) the recipients of funding allocated from the public purse under the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme and (b) the amounts allocated to each recipient under the Programme in each financial year since 2015-16.

[Hide full question](#)

Answer



Sir Alan Duncan

Conservative

Rutland and Melton



Commons

Answered on

20 December 2018

The FCO's Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme is designed to protect national security by countering disinformation directed at the UK and its Allies from Russia. Russia persistently uses disinformation to target its perceived enemies. An example was the Russian disinformation campaign that followed the attack in Salisbury, which was intended to distract from Russian culpability. Documents and correspondence about projects within the Programme will not be published, as this information could then be used actively to attempt to disrupt and undermine the Programme's effectiveness.

In fact, British secret services never forgave Chris Williamson his impudence and the fact that they had to publicly apologise for their dirty affairs. They took their revenge on him by starting a smear campaign and inventing some ridiculous accusations of anti-Semitism. Just think of how Orwellian it all sounds - accusing a far left-wing politician of anti-Semitism! Nevertheless, this groundless accusation was reason enough for those Labour Party leaders who are on the hook of the secret services to expel Chris Williamson from the party.

The show went on and on. After we exposed the second black propaganda project of HMG - EXPOSE Network where Bellingcat played the leading role, HMG had to take some counter steps.

https://freenet.space/read-blog/994_operation-039-integrity-initiative-039-british-informational-war-against-all-par.html (..//read-blog/994_operation-039-integrity-initiative-039-british-informational-war-against-all-par.html)

Once again, the well-known friend of MI-6 MP Stephen Gethins came to the rescue by asking a very convenient question about the steps FCO was going to take to tackle the distribution of disinformation in the Baltic States. Sir Alan Duncan was rather pleased to receive such a 'proper' question, so he answered it as best as he could.

Baltic States and Former Soviet Republics: Disinformation

Question for Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UIN 237138, tabled on 26 March 2019

Question



Stephen Gethins

Scottish National Party

North East Fife

Commons

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what steps he is taking with his overseas counterparts to tackle the distribution of disinformation in (a) Ukraine, (b) Belarus and (c) the Baltic States.

Answer



Sir Alan Duncan

Conservative



Answered on

3 April 2019

We have a regular dialogue with international partners on the challenge posed by hostile state disinformation, including to align donor support in this field. The Foreign Secretary discussed disinformation at the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 21 January in the context of the European Commission's ambitious Action Plan Against Disinformation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's own dedicated Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme aims to protect national security by countering disinformation directed at the UK and its Allies from Russia. It funds projects in a number of different countries that seek to enhance independent media, support civil society organisations that expose disinformation and share good practice with partner governments. Media plurality, institutional resilience and public awareness provide strong defences against disinformation, whatever the source, and sit at the heart of our efforts. In particular, we are supporting a new Open Information Partnership of European Non-Governmental Organisations, charities, academics, think-tanks and journalists which are working to respond to manipulated information in the news, social media and across the public space.

His prepared answer stated that HMG was going to tackle the issue by supporting a new Open Information Partnership project. A nice re-branding, isn't it? But we should pay attention to what happened next. On the following day on the 4th of April 2019 head of Bellingcat Eliot Higgins had to expose himself by saying that his firm plays a leading role in the Open Information Partnership - a primary project of CDMD programme.



Eliot Higgins

@EliotHiggins

Looking forward to getting things rolling with the Open Information Partnership, with [@bellingcat](#), [@MDI_UK](#), [@DFRLab](#), and [@This_Is_Zinc](#) openinformationpartnership.org

11:14 · 04 Apr 19 · Twitter Web Client



The Open Information Partnership is a diverse network of established organisations and individuals across Europe working in open, independent, fact-based reporting.

OIP partners

bellingcat



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So, what do we have? The FCO officially says that CDMD is a national security issue (i.e. it's the intelligence services' field of operations). OIP is a part of CDMD. Bellingcat is a part of OIP. Basically, it means that Bellingcat is working for the British intelligence. And these are not circumstantial evidence that we get from Eliot Higgins when he talks about 'chemical attacks' in Syria, the poisoning of the Skripals and Navalny. These are documents that anyone can read. After our publications the FCO and to be more exact MI-6 was rapidly

going down and called its secret project Bellingcat to the rescue. Bellingcat's confirmation that it worked for the British intelligence was the price they paid to offset at least some of the negative consequences.

Yet Bellingcat still continues to serve us the bullshit about being an independent organisation that receives no funds from Western governments and conducts its investigations on voluntary donations only. Bastards. We will tell you more about the Integrity Initiative and the EXPOSE Network, but in due time. And since HMG believes that people need not know about the CDMD saying that it will breach national security, we consider it our duty to tell you about the essence of this FCO programme.

Meet the most widespread secret black propaganda campaign in the history of humanity.

Even Joseph Goebbels from hell is giving a standing ovation to its cunning. But the most awful part of the intelligence operation is that the purely Orwellian black propaganda is only a part of the overall plan to change the regime in Russia.

In November 2017 the then UK Prime Minister Theresa May stated that HMG had appropriated additional 100 million GBP to counter 'Russian propaganda and disinformation'. Yet she failed to mention where exactly the British taxpayers' money would go. And by the way, you should note that a strategic operation to undermine the sovereignty of the largest nuclear-weapon state has been developing since her statement.

The FCO worked out a major plan to place Russia in international isolation, undermine its information security, change the ideology of the people in neighbouring countries and eventually change the regime in Russia. And it would be a mistake to think that the work started only in 2018. It all began many years before that, while in 2018 HMG decided it was time to get some results and accelerated the undermining activity through its intelligence cutouts.

Some time later the programme's name was changed from Russian Language Programme to Counter Disinformation Media Development Programme (CDMD).

You may ask a reasonable question as to why the UK Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) has a Syria Programme, a Lebanon Programme etc., but doesn't have a Russia Programme. Instead it only has this CDMD? Well, we'll explain it to you. It is for a reason that we title our investigations 'HGM Trojan Horse'. You can see that the main goal of HMG is to deceive the target state and make it 'voluntarily' invite British intelligence cutouts to work with public institutions, civil society and law-enforcement agencies. After the British spies secure their positions within ministries and buy in some supporters, they begin a full-scale process of shaping the country from within to fit the interests of London.

The governments in Russia and say in China are far from being so weak as to let some dubious firms of the shadowy brits especially suggested by the UK Embassies into their countries. This explains why CSSF operations targeting those countries are conducted from neighbouring states and their primary goal is to undermine the situation from outside. Although some secret and well-concealed ops are under way inside the countries as well.

We exposed the FCO programme aimed at infiltrating Lebanon's secret services to prevent them from resisting the 'process of democratisation'.

https://freenet.space/read-blog/836_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-3-securin-lebanon-i.html
(..read-blog/836_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-3-securin-lebanon-i.html)

Progressive media successfully used our files for their own investigations:

<https://www.moonofalabama.org/2020/12/new-documents-show-how-the-british-government-secretly-created-regime-change-protests-in-lebanon.html>
(<https://www.moonofalabama.org/2020/12/new-documents-show-how-the-british-government-secretly-created-regime-change-protests-in-lebanon.html>)

<https://www.moonofalabama.org/2021/01/new-leaks-show-how-british-spys-infiltrate-and-undermine-lebanons-security-services.html> (<https://www.moonofalabama.org/2021/01/new-leaks-show-how-british-spys-infiltrate-and-undermine-lebanons-security-services.html>)

<https://www.moonofalabama.org/2021/02/british-embassy-infiltrates-lebanons-military-intelligence-provides-snooping-equipment-manipulates-p.html>
(<https://www.moonofalabama.org/2021/02/british-embassy-infiltrates-lebanons-military-intelligence-provides-snooping-equipment-manipulates-p.html>)

And the Lebanese Media took notice of our investigation as well.

<https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/299323> (<https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/299323>)

Of course, they cannot impose their 'joint projects' on the Russians, so they resort to black propaganda campaigns like it was with the Skripals and Navalny.

By the way, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) oversees those CSSF programmes through its regional directorates. E.g. Middle East North Africa Directorate oversees the programmes on Syria and Lebanon, Eastern Europe Central Asia Directorate (EECAD) oversees Counter Disinformation Media Development Programme. Besides CDMD, EECAD is also engaged in pure Trojan Horse operations targeting countries from Eastern Partnership, Central Asia or for example Ukraine. We recommend those countries to take a closer look at what the UK embassies are undertaking.

Back to CDMD.

The plan was outlined during a private FCO supplier event on the 26th of June 2018.

Although the event was dedicated to secret propaganda operations in the Baltic States and in the Eastern Partnership countries, the FCO had to partially disclose its wicked plan.

Supplier Event

Support for Independent Media in Eastern Partnership Countries

Support for Independent Media in the Baltic States

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, June 26th 2018

The starting point of this programme is the identifying patterns of behaviour from the Russian Federation, which looks to sow disunity and cause disruption to democratic processes and institutions in the West – implementing programmes and interventions that counter these malign influences.

Media balance and plurality is a big issue. Lack of plurality makes allows disinformation to work. There are a huge raft of malign behaviours that the Russian State undertakes. The Programme is to weaken the Russian State's influence on its near neighbours and the programme does this by implementing projects along the following work strands:

Programme Strands

- ENGAGE – working through the British Council to implement people-to-people activities between ethnic Russians and local communities to develop links along the lines of 21st century skills – includes English language skills and media literacy, social enterprises and cultural activities;
- ENHANCE – supporting independent media in Russia's near abroad to bring balance and plurality to Russian language media, in the Baltic States and Eastern Partnership countries;
- EXPOSE – by debunking and exposing Russian disinformation in real time, which can be reported in mainstream media with the goal to expose malign state disinformation in countries that are targeted by it. If you expose disinformation, it is less likely to be impactful; therefore, the Russian State becomes less credible.
- ENABLE – working with allied governments through the Government Communication Service to improve their strategic communications to their populations.

We are looking for activity that will widen media plurality.

Countries

- Eastern Partnership – Ukraine is the primary focus of activity; other EaPs (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova) are more difficult.
- Georgia – not doing a lot of work. Media landscape is politicised. Few opportunities to fund. Not considered a priority at present.
- Ukraine – Does not currently have a plural media environment. Media ownership dominated by oligarchs. Programme funding is helping the main public broadcaster to grow its audiences. Content – format acquisitions. Regional broadcasting and regional media is more trusted than national media.
- Moldova – Media is in two main languages Romanian and Russian, dominated by oligarchs. Ok to work with TVA, capacity building. It is the smaller organisations who made need support. No activity undertaken with Oligarch or State Media.
- Belarus – almost all media is state owned. A degree of self-censorship. Slim pickings in Belarus.
- Estonia – potential local media opportunities. ETV+ (Russian language broadcaster) is main beneficiary. ETV+ currently has some content and credibility issues with local population.
- Latvia – elections in November this year. Government policy is detrimental to social cohesion. 30% Russian speaking population not catered for by Latvian Government so Russian population gets their news/entertainment from Kremlin backed stations.
- Lithuania – Small Russian speaking community in Lithuania compared to Latvia and Estonia. Small, locally organised Russian speaking broadcasters (e.g. radio stations) will need support. Currently no Russian language public broadcaster.

We work with European Endowment for Democracy (EDD) – Grants to fund innovative media projects across the Eastern Partnership countries.

Creative Content Support Fund. Works with 32 Russian language platforms.

Other donors, such as the USA are active in this area, particularly by providing more money to Independent Media but are held back by lack of leadership. EU is funding media controlled by oligarchies as they are seen as the only alternative. The Nordic Countries, Finland, Sweden and Denmark are particularly active and have a deep understanding of these issues. Meetings with international donors are regularly, with the next one to be held in London later in 2018.

Things we want to avoid

We do not need wide-ranging audience analysis and how the UK government should be working in the country. Do not see the need for months and months of scoping.

What we want: Sustainable audiences; Self-sufficient, independent media organisations; reach most of the state media.

Security

No unauthorised disclosures of activity on this work. Contract will need to take a look at who we are working with. Basic IT security reasonable steps should cover our requirements but the FCO may request an explanation of what steps have been taken to ensure security and Duty of Care.

It should be noted that for security reasons, some grantees will not wish to be linked to the FCO. It should be noted that the Programme Team would prefer the programme documents do not end up in the Russian media. We know that they are following us, and we are expecting an expose soon.

Q&A

Question: Why was Armenia left out?

Answer: Armenia is in a state of flux, therefore we need to let dust settle.

Question: You mention Belarus but it is not in the Terms of Reference.

Answer: Because opportunities to work there are very small.

Question: Is the Donor Meeting a consistent meeting that happens quarterly?

Answer: It is twice year, coordinated with the Latvian Government.

Question: Is the P2P work delivered by the British Council?

Answer: The P2P work in the Baltics it is delivered by the British Council. IREX, in partnership with the US, delivers some P2P work in Ukrainian schools.

Question: Are you expecting to fund content for this project?

Answer: Yes

Question: This will include the acquisition of content?

Answer: Potentially if it is effective.

Question: Budget – surely the Ukrainian public broadcaster will swallow up a huge chunk of it?

Answer: Yes.

Question: How much?

Answer: Probably 2/3rds of it.

Again, we see nice words about countering Russian disinformation, but now we know that disinformation in their opinion is anything that runs counter to their position. In fact, the Integrity Initiative and EXPOSE Network revealed how the Brits engineer the Russian disinformation only to launch holy war against it.

You will find here the so-called charity British Council (more details will follow). And we'd like to remind you that it was engaged in regime change ops in Lebanon by preparing women to become political leaders who had to take power in the country after the coup d'état orchestrated by London.

https://freenet.space/read-blog/615_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-2-infiltrating-lebanon-i.html
..//read-blog/615_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-2-infiltrating-lebanon-i.html

It is also mentioned that the FCO is secretly working with 32 Russian language platforms through Creative Support Fund. We are going to expose some of those 'independent' platforms. And some of them are extremely popular, so you will not be pleasantly surprised.

Just to top it all:

Security

No unauthorised disclosures of activity on this work. Contract will need to take a look at who we are working with. Basic IT security reasonable steps should cover our requirements but the FCO may request an explanation of what steps have been taken to ensure security and Duty of Care.

It should be noted that for security reasons, some grantees will not wish to be linked to the FCO. It should be noted that the Programme Team would prefer the programme documents do not end up in the Russian media. We know that they are following us, and we are expecting an expose soon.

No unauthorised disclosures of activity on this work... some grantees will not wish to be linked with the FCO... Programme Team would prefer the programme documents do not end up in the Russian media...we know that they are following us, and we are expecting and expose soon.

Whom do they mean by 'they'? The Russians? Well, they are wrong here, but nevertheless we will be glad if the documents end up in the Russian media.

Media Supplier Event. <https://ufile.io/ztpwpeeb> (<https://ufile.io/ztpwpeeb>)

How do you think those pillars were developed? ENGAGE, ENABLE, ENHANCE, EXPOSE? What is their ultimate goal? We will answer these questions. Recall how ARK worked out a road map to undermine situation in Lebanon and change the regime there by working with the youth and women, dealing with garbage, assisting refugees etc.
https://freenet.space/read-blog/615_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-2-infiltrating-lebanon-i.html
..//read-blog/615_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-2-infiltrating-lebanon-i.html


The Lebanese Media noticed it as well.

<https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/297651> (<https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/297651>)

<https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/297697> (<https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/297697>)

A similar research was conducted on Russia, and its conclusion was an extremely secret Theory of Change. Even the redacted version of the document was sent to suppliers marked as highly confidential.

Meet the plan to change the regime in Russia:



Theory of Change (Reduced Version) [\(https://ufile.io/cmuxq2bb\)](https://ufile.io/cmuxq2bb)

It is the fundamental document. Therefore, we will make a deep analysis of its content so you could make out on your own what the redacted Outcomes Impact parts really contain.

During the supplier event the FCO stated that 'the starting point of this programme was the identifying patterns of behaviour from the Russian Federation, which looked to sow disunity and cause disruption to democratic processes and institutions in the West - implementing programmes and interventions that counter these malign influences'

The programmes primary goal is to weaken Russia's influence on its near neighbours, and the programme does this by implementing projects along the following work strands:

ENGAGE - working through the British Council to implement people-to-people activities between ethnic Russians and local communities to develop links along the lines of 21st century skills - includes English language skills and media literacy, social enterprises and cultural activities.

Output. Communities that are vulnerable to disinformation by Russia are educated and trained in how to question propaganda and disinformation, including through crosscommunity initiatives.

ENABLE - working with allied governments through seconded experts to improve their strategic communications to their populations when countering Russian disinformation.

Output. Capacity is built of key partner governments on countering disinformation and engaging with communities vulnerable to Russian disinformation.

ENHANCE - supporting independent media in Russia's near abroad to bring balance and plurality to Russian language media, in the Baltic States and Eastern Partnership countries;

Output. The capacity of public media and editorially-independent media is built or maintained, the quality of their content is enhanced.

PROJECT - X-Whitehall coordination on Russia, including translation of UK official documents into Russian, developing Media content in Russian, issuing UK positions in Russian in real-time.

Output. HMG media content is produced in Russian targeting Russian-speakers in the Former Soviet Union.

EXPOSE - Weakening the positions of Russia by debunking and exposing Russian disinformation in real time in the mainstream media of the countries targeted by the Russian disinformation. Includes support to investigative journalism, networking between expose NGOs and funding the research of the Russian disinformation.

Outcome. First - capacity is built of NGOs involved in debunking Russian disinformation. Second - redacted.

When combined, those steps are supposed to lead to the following outcomes:

Engage + Enable = Improved social cohesion and increased acceptance of universal values in the three Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, especially among Russian-speaking minorities in those countries.

Enhance + Project = Improved plurality and balance of Russian language media in the Former Soviet Union, especially in the three Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova.

Expose = Outcome redacted.

Engage + Enable + Enhance + Project = Governments, the population and the media in the three Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Central Europe and NATO countries are more resilient to disinformation by Russia.

Engage + Enable + Enhance + Project + Expose = Outcome redacted.

Taking into account that the ultimate goal of the CDMD Programme is to basically place Russia in international isolation and that secret expose ops - as the Integrity Initiative files show - must weaken the positions of the Russian government inside the country, it is most

likely that the true goal of the UK is either to break up the foundations of the regime in Russia or to reverse its foreign policy, which is possible only if the government is weak enough.

We should mention that the UK was expecting first tangible outcomes from the programmes by mid-2020. But the Anonymous exposed the 'expose' ops of the UK virtually removing all secrecy from two main projects - the Integrity Initiative and EXPOSE Network. We undermined the whole system of the information war of the UK. Unfortunately, the international community failed to take any steps and the programmes were simply renamed.

As you see, the global operation to change regime in Russia is divided into several parts. Each part has its own projects and subprojects being implemented by suppliers, who are acting in parallel to achieve the final goal.

We are going to debunk every Pillar, project and supplier. You know some of those intelligence cutouts from their ops in Syria and Lebanon, while others will be exposed for the first time in this investigation.

Yet our description of the operation will not be complete without exposing the initiatives undertaken even before Theresa May announced the allocation of additional funds. It had all started much earlier. There were similar projects even as far back as in 2016.

We will show you the statements of CDMD head Andy Pryce so that you could understand just how mad this British Goebbels is.

His deformed imagination produced the following when he was outlining the goals of pillar ENGAGE to suppliers:

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

SOFT POWER* AND RUSSIAN SPEAKING AUDIENCES

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office are looking for an implementer (including collaboration in consortia) to provide overt innovative soft power interventions that will foster better links between the United Kingdom and individuals in the Baltic States whose primary language is Russian.

OBJECTIVE

To use British soft power to work directly with target audiences in the Baltic States, whose primary language is Russian, to develop greater affinity with the UK/EU/Baltic States.

*As defined by Prof Joseph Nye, Harvard: "soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes"

BACKGROUND

1. Russia has used malign propaganda as well as soft power in attempts to radicalise Russian speaking audiences as part of her hybrid war methodology. This weaponisation of Information¹ has played a part in the undermining of sovereignty in Georgia and Ukraine and it poses risks to the UK's national security. The UK remains committed to a sovereign and stable Ukraine; to standing shoulder to shoulder with our NATO allies; and reassuring all NATO members – especially those closest to Russia.
2. HMG is developing a diverse programme of overt soft power activity aimed at audiences in the countries around Russia's periphery that will seek to de-weaponise information. Part of this programme will see the British Council implement a series of projects in the Baltic States aimed at developing greater support for Euro-Atlantic values amongst Russian speaking communities. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is seeking an implementer or implementers to provide complimentary but independent activity that can deploy British soft power in innovative ways.
3. Identity is shaped by a number of factors, including (in order of relative influence): state education > family > friends > exposure to 'culture'. These factors inform an individuals' awareness of; knowledge of; interest in; support for; or advocacy of certain political/historical narratives; their interpretation of current affairs; and their propensity to consume a particular 'culture'. Access to a particular 'culture' is also an important factor (i.e. do I have the right language skills to consume it? Can I travel there easily? Are there study/employment opportunities there?).

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

4. People in the Baltics have competing identities. Identity is influenced by national governments, exposure to Russian 'culture', and exposure to Euro-Atlantic 'culture'. The proportional influence of each will depend on the individual's social demographic.
5. Those chiefly or primarily reliant on Russian-language media may be more likely to have an affinity with Russia but they are not a homogeneous group. The balance of national, Russian and Euro-Atlantic identities will differ amongst sub-groups of this demographic.
6. Older Russian-speakers (40+ yrs) are more likely to have a strong affinity with Russia and be vulnerable to Russian propaganda. They grew up under the Soviet system and have been shaped by its education and 'culture'. This makes them supportive of and advocates of (perhaps to the point of acting out) Russian narratives and be primary consumers of its 'culture'. They will have low awareness of; knowledge of; interest in; support for; or be advocates of Euro-Atlantic narratives and 'culture'. This is because of a lack of access. They also probably lack the skills to critique the 'culture' they consume. They are less likely to speak English so it will be necessary to engage them in their native tongue.
7. Younger Russian speakers (below 40yrs) will have a moderate identity and may be less vulnerable to Russian propaganda. They grew up under national governments and have been shaped by their education and 'culture'. This may make them more open to alternative narratives and less likely to consume Russian 'culture' exclusively. They will have medium-high awareness, knowledge and interest of Euro-Atlantic narratives and 'culture' because of greater access. They may be more likely to have the skills to critique the 'culture' they consume. However, the influence of the (Soviet) family of younger Russian speakers is not fully understood (e.g. Children of ex-Soviet military officers may have strong Russian identities, despite receiving nationalist education and having access to Euro-Atlantic 'culture').

Target Audience and Impact

8. It will be important that bidders:
 - identify the target audience of populations particularly vulnerable to hostile propaganda but potentially open to Euro-Atlantic values;
 - demonstrate how each activity will reach that audience;
 - demonstrate how their project is innovative, different to traditional British Council methods but not limited to, and how it can work in parallel to it; and
 - if selected can demonstrate the impact that the activity has on that audience.
 - Demonstrate an indicative outline project plan showing what will be delivered during Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4.

Assessment criteria

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9. Bids will be assessed on the following criteria:

- a) Potential impact on those most vulnerable to hostile propaganda;
- b) The level of creativity and innovation in the bid;
- c) Previous relevant experience and ease of implementation;
- d) Risks from the bid including political and financial; and
- e) Assessed value for money from the bid.

10. Our current thinking on the range of possible impact is in the table below:

POLICY OUTCOMES				
I have awareness of.. [Minimal]	I have knowledge of..	I have interest...	I support...	I take action [Maximal]
...Euro-Atlantic narratives, though I do not believe them. ...Culture, though I do not consume it. I do not act against my government.	...Euro-Atlantic narratives, though I do not believe them. ...Culture, though I do not consume it. I do not act against my government.	...Euro-Atlantic narratives, and I am sympathetic towards them. ...Culture, and I consume some of it. I do not act against my government.	...Euro-Atlantic narratives, and I am believe them. ...Culture, and I consume it. I do not act against my government.	...to advocate Euro-Atlantic narratives, and I am believe them. ...I advocate its culture, and I consume it. I act to counter Russian narratives.

Scope

12. The FCO are asking for the supplier to suggest an intervention or intervention(s) that will make a positive impact on how target individuals perceive the UK/EU/Euro-Atlantic values. The supplier is asked not to engage target audiences directly out of the scope of this contract. The scope for this project is confined to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Suppliers are encouraged to be innovative and creative with their approach without compromising functionality and effective delivery.

Dependencies

13. The supplier is asked to assume that they will deliver an entirely independent intervention should they win the competition. Items such as office space, translation costs, security, legal fees, insurance, transport and accommodation costs should be priced into the contract.

14. The supplier is responsible for due diligence of potential partners and for assessing, reporting on and mitigating all risks at a project level.

Reporting and M and E

An interesting table that begins with 'I have awareness of Euro-Atlantic narratives' and ends with 'I take action to advocate these narratives'. A simple 5-step behavioural plan.

Note that it is an OFFICIAL document of the FCO. The research was conducted by Aktis Strategy Ltd. to meet the need of Eastern Europe Central Asia Directorate, UK embassies in Riga, Vilnius and Tallin.

The Qualification and Technical evaluations were conducted by evaluators from the FCO's Eastern Europe and Central Asia Directorate, British Embassy Riga, British Embassy Tallinn and British Embassy Vilnius and the FCO's Commercial Procurement Group (CPG) in the UK.

Soft power and Russian speaking audiences <https://ufile.io/mr1r4r4a> (<https://ufile.io/mr1r4r4a>)

What would the UK Government have done, had it discovered an official document of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs containing a detailed plan to deprive people of Scotland, Ireland or some other country of the Commonwealth of their British identity? All the UK MSM would most certainly have been in a total frenzy, while the Prime Minister would have pushed for an emergency UN Security Council meeting to punish Russia for interference into internal affairs of other countries.

As you can see the leading role in the ENGAGE strand is designated to the British Council, a 'harmless' charity that seems to be only teaching English and organising exhibition events.

Even the to-be suppliers were wondering how they could complement the British Council's extremely extensive programme.

ITT_1124 – Baltics: People to People (P2P) – Clarification Questions (CQ)

	the bid. Can the authority better define the degree, scope and segregation required for this?	There is a lot of open source material already available.
7	The Authority has stated that bidders should "demonstrate how their project is innovative, different to traditional British Council methods but not limited to, and how it can work in parallel to it." Can the authority provide the British Council's programme of work for the project period to ensure complementarity and the prevention of overlap?	The British Council is initiating a range of work in the Baltic States that build on its traditional strengths and brings together projects that have worked elsewhere in the world. Details are available from the British Council website (www.britishcouncil.org)
8	The Authority is asking for the supplier to suggest an intervention or intervention(s) that will make a positive impact on how target individuals perceive the UK/EU/Euro-Atlantic values. Can the authority define a Measure of output, performance or effect by which the target audience needs to: Be persuaded to take action (Impact table); be drawn closer to the required narrative, or; develop greater affinity with EU/UK/Baltic values (Objective) in order to constitute a positive impact?	Outputs cannot be defined without knowledge of specific planned interventions. We do not wish to guide suppliers on their suggested interventions/projects but are going to the market for innovative proposals. We do not wish to define the problem any further than in the table was have provided as do not want to guide thinking in any way.
9	Could you please share further details of British Council's activities?	We have provided a link to the British Council in the ITT documents
10	Could you please share further details of other relevant HMG activities in the region?	A high level description of the wider outcomes sought from HMG activity in the region is described in the tender document. The winning bidder will receive a full briefing on our activity.

END OF CLARIFICATION QUESTIONS

Baltics: People to People (P2P) - Clarification Questions <https://ufile.io/u9ejfu90> (<https://ufile.io/u9ejfu90>)

Above are the FCO requirements, and here is the bid from Albany and MC Saatchi, intelligence cutouts supporting jihadists in Syria. They also coordinated communications between opposition media outlets and extremist Islamist opposition groups hiring an 'engagement leader (who) has deep credibility with key groups including (north) Failaq ash - Sham, Jabha Shammiyeh, Jaysh Idleb al Hur, Ahrar ash - Sham, (center) Jaysh al Islam, Failaq al Rahman, and sought Jaysh Tahrir.' Many of these militias were linked to al - Qaeda and are now recognized by the US Department of State and European Governments as official terrorist groups. MC Saatchi was also engaged in the regime change op in Lebanon.

And having supported jihadists in the Middle East, the firms turned their attention to the p2p projects in the Baltic States. Well, by now you should have fallen off the chair.

To compliment more traditional forms of engagement employed by the British Council they offered innovative British soft power interventions to use young Russian speakers as agents of change to influence their parents' and grandparents' generations and amplify distinct 'Euro-Baltic' identity.



RUSSIAN LANGUAGE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: PEOPLE TO PEOPLE (P2P)

1. Executive Summary

This proposal offers innovative **British soft power interventions** that will target audiences in the Baltic States whose primary language is Russian (and who primarily receive their information and news from Russian language sources), to **develop greater affinity with the UK / EU / Baltic States**. In this project, **Albany Associates International**, a British strategic communications firm with extensive experience in creating innovative grassroots and cultural outreach programmes, will be partnered with **M&C Saatchi World Services**, a world renowned creative and digital agency with a strong track record in the Baltic States with competencies in cutting-edge digital research and campaigning technology.

By capitalising on close family ties among Russian-speakers and re-evoking the spirit of the Baltic Way, we will use young Russian speakers as agents of change to influence their parents' and grandparents' generations and amplify a distinct "Euro-Baltic" identity through family-centred direct outreach events. We will then aggregate and amplify these effects through a social media campaign, to create a new lens through which older Russian speakers may identify with Euro-Atlantic values and a ground breaking online campaign to engage younger family members. We will implement three distinct strands of activity:


(i) In partnership with the Riga-based Russian language creative agency Inspired.lv (www.inspired.lv) and using M&C Saatchi's unique Human Digital analysis approach, we will undertake **cutting-edge sentiment analysis of Euro-Atlantic narratives in Russian speaking online communities**. We will also identify a **network of online influencers and advocates** and seed online conversations with pan-Baltic and Euro-Atlantic themes.

(ii) Complementary outreach activity will include the **staging of a minimum of 75 P2P activities** in carefully selected Baltic communities which echo and further develop ongoing British Council engagement methods. These will be implemented in partnership with, **Youth Initiative Group** in Lithuania (www.jig.lt), **Jasma** in Latvia (<http://www.jasma.lv>), and **Vita Tiim** in Estonia (www.vitatium.ee).

(iii) These activities will be **underpinned and reinforced by a social media campaign to amplify the outcomes of P2P outreach activities and promote Euro-Baltic culture**, supported by strands of activity which harness the reach of the traditional Russian language media consumed by the over-40 age group.

2. Analysis of target audience and how interventions will reach the most vulnerable.

The following depicts the results of our initial qualitative and digital target audience analysis.



DEMOGRAPHIC	How will they be reached?
Estonia 40+ years	Primary: Events in: Tallinn, Narva, Kohtla-Jarve, Sillamae, Kivioli, Maardu Secondary: Social media and digital outreach on Vk.ru and Ok.ru
Estonia 30-40 years	Primary: Social media and digital outreach on Vk.com and Facebook Secondary: Events in: Tallinn, Narva, Kohtla-Jarve, Sillamae, Kivioli, Maardu
Estonia 20-30 years	Primary: social media and digital outreach on Vk.com and Facebook Secondary: Events in: Tallinn, Narva, Kohtla-Jarve, Sillamae, Kivioli, Maardu
Latvia 40+ years	Primary: Events in: Riga, Daugavpils, Ludza, Rezekne, Jurmala, Liepaja Secondary: Social media and digital outreach on Vk.ru and Ok.ru
Latvia 30-40 years	Primary: social media and digital outreach on Vk.com and Facebook Secondary: Events in: Riga, Daugavpils, Ludza, Rezekne, Jurmala, Liepaja
Latvia 20-30 years	Primary: social media and digital outreach on Vk.com and Facebook Secondary: Events in: Riga, Daugavpils, Ludza, Rezekne, Jurmala, Liepaja
Lithuania 40+ years	Primary: Events in: Vilnius, Visaginas, Salcininkai Secondary: social media and digital outreach on Vk.ru and Ok.ru
Lithuania 30-40 years	Primary: social media and digital outreach on Vk.com and Facebook Secondary: Events in: Vilnius, Visaginas, Salcininkai
Lithuania 20-30 years	Primary: social media and digital outreach on Vk.com and Facebook Secondary: Events in: Vilnius, Visaginas, Salcininkai

3. Level of innovation to complement more traditional forms of engagement employed by the British Council

This proposal employs ideas and concepts of cultural outreach and strategic communications derived from methodological innovations proven in other relevant and/or similar contexts. It then combines the unique skills and experience of our local implementing partners in the Baltic States to develop imaginative approaches that will underpin the project. The output of this partnership will be culturally relevant campaigns that will resonate with audiences who primarily receive information and news from Russian language sources.

Albany's culturally attuned grassroots communications track record and M&C Saatchi's regional influence and use of cutting-edge digital research will enhance the current engagement methods employed by the British Council. Central to our approach will be the notion of a virtuous circle of concurrent research and feedback that will inform the creative process and enhance our locally grounded activities and media content. The P2P ideas we present are sustainable because they are based on tried and tested concepts that will resonate with our primary target audiences, challenging ingrained perceptions in ways that stand out and attract positive attention.

Current forms of engagement

The British Council (BC) have employed a variety of forms of engagement in the Baltic States which we are developing further to fit this context (c.f. clarification log question 7 & 9). These include study tours, policy dialogues, competitions and youth forums as well as other initiatives to promote the arts including Shakespeare Lives, fiveFilms4freedom, FameLab, The Selector, The Social Enterprise Initiative (Vilnius, Lithuania 2014). These are in addition to the BC's work to promote English language training. Our Lithuania country manager has worked on BC initiatives, creating knowledge and networks, to be leveraged on this project.

Underpinning innovation through local implementing and creative partners

The project will exploit direct outreach techniques already developed by our local partner NGOs who are already working with Russian-speaking minorities across all three Baltic States. These methods were developed and implemented to deliver small-scale community engagement goals funded, in many cases, through various EU initiatives such as EuropeAid, Erasmus+, or EU Youth in Action. To reinforce our local NGO networks and aggregate their activities across wider audiences, M&C Saatchi has also teamed up with a regionally renowned creative agency - **Inspired.lv** with a proven track record in digital multimedia and social media campaigns in Russian across the Baltics. Inspired.lv led successful campaigns on European currency transition, and currently produce a Latvian/Russian news portal with a user base of approximately 400,000.

Conflict sensitivity: all partners operate with a full understanding of the (potential) conflict context to avoid causing harm, including unintended consequences and second and third order effects. In terms of **gender sensitivity**, our approach is consistent with UNSC Resolution 1325, Women, Peace and Security. The gender balance of our team reflects how seriously we take the promotion of participation of women at all levels of decision-making, and we believe this will have positive impacts on the outcomes of the project.

Innovating Baltic engagement: research, dissemination strategy and P2P outreach

M&C Saatchi's Human Digital approach is a unique blend of cutting-edge technology and expert human verification and analysis to ensure robust, culturally relevant results and insight. These techniques have already been employed successfully and sustainably for clients including UK Home Office, UK Ministry of Defence, US Department of Defence, NATO, USAID, Broadcasting Board of Governors, Google, and Facebook. Through Inspired.lv, we have existing digital target audience data to help define and determine channels that resonate most with the key target audience. Key features of this blended approach include:

- Data Sourcing: Unmatched (in line with global data expansion) access to unlimited data sources of text, imagery and video (via image recognition) with state-of-the-art digital collection platforms.
- Full Spectrum Social Media Platform Analysis: Our methodology ensures that full coverage of an influencer's footprint across the Surface and Deep Web can be captured via a blend of technological and human processes. Where platform visibility is poor, human-led processes are deployed to guarantee a comprehensive view of influence across all global and locally relevant social media.
- Content Analysis: We will employ a market leading tracker to map influencer content, and bolster this map by calculating the reach across all platforms through our web traffic analysis tool.
- Via human-led verification and analysis we provide verification of sentiment, tone, context and language complexity (all fundamental to producing accurate insight on online conversations and beyond the reach of current computer learning) to deliver insights that are accurate, actionable and secure.

Dissemination strategy

- A central Russian language Facebook page will disseminate information on Baltic Euro-leaning heritage, advertise, aggregate and amplify the activities and media content from the P2P campaign and provide a space for crowd-sourced content for participants to celebrate their individual Baltic culture (art, music, food, lifestyle, commerce) through social media. N.b. 400,000 monthly active people on Facebook in the Baltics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia; 55% Women, 45% Men) in age group 18+;
- Participatory conversation will be encouraged on the platform, then analysed throughout to gauge sentiment, refine influencer maps and establish key themes to support ongoing M&E;
- The campaign will be launched and carefully seeded in Russian on appropriate social media channels according to a tailored seeding strategy. It will also use key dates and events of significance to Russian speakers, such as WWII celebrations on 09 May 2016 as a way of inserting itself in to pre-existing conversations to amplify the campaign effects.

P2P outreach

Our P2P activities will be continually informed by our research. We will directly engage approximately 6,750 Russian-speakers in both 40- and 40+ age groups in 15 locations and reinforce these activities regionally across Russian speaking populations through the project's social and digital media component, significantly enhancing reach and impact. (**Lithuania** - Vilnius, Visaginas, Salcinikai; **Latvia** - Riga, Daugavpils, Ludza, Rezekne, Jurmala, Liepaja; **Estonia** - Tallinn, Narva, Kohtla-Jarve, Sillamae, Kivioli, Maardu). There is a total of 75 events, requiring three staff working on a full-time basis per NGO to conduct the events on weekends (to maximise turnout) throughout the project. The set-up period would be 4-6 weeks, with events taking place concurrently across 30-36 non-consecutive weeks. We will run direct outreach events that our partner NGOs have successfully delivered in the past in these target areas, based also on known audience appetite. They are:

- Family movie nights (average attendees: 60 people; 15 events) which echo but develop through expert curation the British Council's *fiveFilms4freedom* and *Shakespeare Lives*;
- Family city games (average attendees: 100 people; 15 events) which are an enhancement of issue-driven policy dialogues or Social Enterprise Initiatives;
- Family quiz tournaments (average attendees: 100 people; 15 events), an enhancement of issue-driven events such as competitions and youth forums, expanded to address intergenerational concerns;
- Mother and Daughter afternoon tea parties (average attendees: 40 people; 15 events), designed to leverage female influence in society and address intergenerational concerns of Russian speakers;
- Youth theatre performances (average attendees: 150 people; 15 events); the Lithuania-based Harlequin theatre group will produce and tour a strategically and collaboratively written play echoing the cultural work undertaken by the British Council, but enhanced to address the desired effects.

4. Demonstration of rationale of the projected impact (theory of change)

Idea	Employing a fused approach using traditional and culturally relevant engagement, reinforced and amplified by Social and Digital Media – delivering innovation and significant reach across the Russian speaking populations. Over 15 years' experience of working with Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic States strongly suggests capitalising on close family ties among Russian-speakers, using young Russian speakers as agents of change to influence their parents' and grandparents' generations, amplifying a distinct "Euro-Baltic" identity through family-centred direct outreach events to create a new lens through which older Russian speakers may identify with Euro-Atlantic values and a dynamic participative online campaign to gain the support of younger family members.
Rationale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Removing the eclipsing effect of negative European sentiment among the 30-40 and over 40 years age groups in Russian-speaking Baltic communities would illuminate positive Euro-Atlantic values (democracy, media freedom, human rights, trust in international organisations, freedom of speech) to these audiences. ➢ The younger, more tech savvy, prosperity-seeking professional Russian speakers will be engaged online, whereas the less malleable older demographic that seeks to be reassured about stability and security will be engaged primarily through direct P2P outreach events, amplified through advertising in Russian Language social media. ➢ Re-evoking the sentiment of the Baltic Way (see www.balticway.net) creates a pathway away from Russian influence into a middle ground (Baltic Identity). This opens Russian speakers' minds to Euro-Atlantic narratives via language and culture with which they are already familiar.
Activities	<p>Phase 1 – Sentiment Analysis</p> <p>In partnership with the top-rated Russian language social media communications agency in the Baltic Region (Inspired.lv) and using M&C Saatchi's own unique Human Digital analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Produce a baseline sentiment analysis for Euro-Atlantic narratives in Russian speaking online communities ➢ Identify a network of online influencers and advocates and seed online conversations with pan-Baltic / Euro-Atlantic themes ➢ Provide regular reviews to measure departure from baseline measurement <p>Phase 2 – Use the sentiment analysis to inform P2P activities</p> <p>Informed by the sentiment analysis, our P2P activities aim at improving knowledge of the Euro-Atlantic narratives and leveraging the Baltic Way and Baltic middle ground themes. All outreach activities will be filmed and photographed and used for Phase 3 (below). We have three partner local NGOs, one from each Baltic State.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Family movie nights (c.60 people per event) - tour and screen movies and films (selected by our local experts to ensure critical mass of interest) that spark a discussion on Euro-Atlantic values and narratives, moderate a discussion among the participants afterwards ➢ Family-friendly "city games" (smartphone-enabled engagement / orientation activities; c.100 people per event) - organise a workshop on thematic areas under Euro-Atlantic values and afterwards conduct the games, where participants would be asked to answer questions on carefully selected topics that concern the Euro-Atlantic narratives that they were introduced at the workshop ➢ Family quiz tournaments (c.100 people per event) - organise a workshop on thematic areas under Euro-Atlantic values, followed by a quiz tournament where the participants are asked to questions on carefully selected topics about the Euro-Atlantic narratives they were introduced to at the workshop.

4

	<p>Fostering a discussion on identity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Mother and daughter tea parties (c.40 people per event) - organise discussions over tea on inter-generational identity challenges ➢ Youth theatre shows (c.150 people per event) - local youth theatre groups will tour Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia presenting a play on contested identities in Russian-speaking families and inter-generational frictions, the viewers will be invited to discuss the performance. <p>Phase 3 – Create a social media campaign to amplify the outcomes of P2P outreach activities and promote Euro-Baltic culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Russian Language social media campaign to encourage participative engagement in grass roots campaign. Develop shareable content from direct P2P outreach activities (videos, articles/ blogs) about successful project activities. ➢ Crowd Sourced Pan-Baltic Cultural Project A Russian language social media-led project for Russian speakers amplifying Baltic Life, including art, music, media and citing success stories (videos, articles/ blogs/ op-eds on successful Russian-speakers benefiting from the EU, Baltic governments and other Euro-Atlantic institutions (e.g. Russian recipients of EU funds etc.) Focus on media outlets preferred by Russian minorities. <p>Phase 4 - Monitoring and evaluation via regular feedback loops</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Employ the same methods used in the initial baseline sentiment analysis to measure tangible change in perception of Euro-Atlantic narratives among Russian-speakers online.
Outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ Direct engagement of approximately 6,750 people (ages 16-60, with a special focus on attracting the 40-60 age group) living in areas where the significant majority of Russian-speakers reside ➢ Promoted inter-generational discussion on identity at the grassroots, that bridges the generational gap of civic allegiances ➢ Active engagement of the over-40 Russian speaking community in a forum where they regularly participate and engage ➢ Exponential reach of engagement via the region's most powerful online influencers and advocates ➢ Younger Russian-speakers empowered as agents of change in engaging older generations in a debate on Euro-Atlantic narratives ➢ Target audiences persuaded of material benefits to be gained from a closer alignment to Euro-Atlantic narratives
Outcome	The project will yield a measurable increase in the willingness of the Russian-speaking population in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to understand, support and advocate Euro-Atlantic narratives
Impact	Russian-speaking target audiences, as a whole, will have a greater affinity with the UK/EU/Baltic States
Metrics	<p><u>Event Attendance Rates</u> Number of attendees by cultural background</p> <p><u>P2P Engagement Records</u> Surveys, interviews, Focus Groups</p> <p><u>Dissemination Log</u></p> <p><u>Digital Influence Dashboard</u> Dynamic mapping influencer/advocate reach, media monitoring, social media following and sentiment density over time.</p>

5

Family quiz tournaments, movie nights and city games? Crowd sourced cultural projects? Well, without our files you would surely be called crazy if you tried to prove that the British intelligence is behind all of it.

And then they use all those tamed media outlets as part of the Strategic Communications projects to tell you that reverting away from Russia is a natural and conscious choice of the people of the Baltic States. Pay attention. You might well have been already handled by some intelligence cutout disguised as a PR agency acting on behalf of the people who allegedly care.

Now you can see the allocation of duties in this foxlike operation. The British Council systematically plays with the consciousness of the target audience preparing people for accepting European values, while the intelligence cutouts complement the Council's work by conducting guerilla campaigns which galvanize the activity.

20160421 Baltics P2P Technical FINAL Albany <https://ufile.io/vgf6j47g>
(<https://ufile.io/vgf6j47g>)

Those who still doubt the involvement of the military intelligence in the operation should read CVs of the project team.



GERRY OSBORNE CURRICULUM VITAE

Albany proposes Gerry Osborne for the role of M&C Saatchi Campaign Manager. He is suited for the position because he has been working on strategic communication projects in the Baltic States for the past 2 years. As a result, he possesses a unique understanding of StratCom processes and networks in the Baltic States and has the ability to mobilize them to ensure the success of our proposed project.

Profile & Background:

Gerry Osborne joined the M&C Saatchi World Services Team, having completed 26 years commissioned service in the Army Air Corps in April 2015. As the UK representative to the formation of the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence in 2014 he leveraged a wide network of contacts across Eastern Europe to deliver StratCom capacity building to the Ukrainian, Georgian and Moldovan Governments and was one half of a UK joint mission (MOD/FCO) to increase communications capacity in NATO HQ. Since leaving military service he has completed a COE project to map the StratCom capacity and capability of NATO member nations. Working on other donor-funded projects but without any conflict to proposed duties here.

Gender	:	Male
Nationality	:	United Kingdom
Languages	:	English, French

Key Skills: Project Management, Strategic Communications, Concept Development

Relevant Experience/Employment:

2015 – to date: Georgia/Moldova: M&C Saatchi, support to the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence

Main responsibilities: Gerry was selected by the NATO StratCom COE to deliver communications capacity building courses to senior Government representatives in Tbilisi and Chisinau.

2015 – to date: UK/Latvia: M&C Saatchi, support to HQ ARRC

Main responsibilities: as part of M&C Saatchi's framework partnership for Strategic Communications support to the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters Gerry delivers exercise support, training and research projects. Throughout 2015 this included working with the Staff to plan for and mitigate adversarial communications as the HQ prepared to deploy to Latvia in September 2015. Gerry has deployed as a Senior StratCom Advisor with the HQ in Norway and Latvia and helped deliver a three day strategic communications training package for 30 HQ staff.

2015 – to date: Pan NATO: Foundation Research for the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence

Main responsibilities: on leaving the Army Gerry won a competed COE contract to deliver one of its most detailed research projects in its foundation year, to map individual NATO Nations' StratCom capability and capacity. His research spanned 11 NATO nations and he developed a behavioural model to account for possible national nuances in the interpretation and delivery of StratCom as a function of military strategy. His final report was briefed to the NATO Bi SC Conference in Lisbon in October 2015 and can be found at: <http://www.stratcomcoe.org/mapping-stratcom-practices-nato-countries-0>

2013 – 2014: MOD Lead Project Officer for the Establishment of the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence

Main responsibilities: as the Military Strategic Effects lead for NATO StratCom, Gerry identified an opportunity for UK thought leadership early in establishment of a NATO COE in Riga. By identifying to senior leaders the need to place communications at the heart of Strategy in the face of adversarial capability from IS and Russia, he secured manning liability for UK placement within the COE as a founder nation and became the UK member on its steering committee. The centre has since been formally established by NATO and was mentioned at the Wales Summit in 2014 as a critical component of NATO's future outlook. He has an unparalleled network of contacts within the centre and the Latvian government.

2012 – 2014: UK MOD Military Strategic Effects Desk Lead for Libya, Falkland Islands, Russia/Ukraine and Eastern Europe

Main responsibilities: rising to the role of Assistant Head StratCom, Gerry's staff lead for influence across the above named countries required him to construct Strategic Communications Frameworks, for all planned military activity. He redesigned the structure of these frameworks to ease cross government and operational delivery and set up cross government working groups to help align strategic objectives, from which he has drawn inspiration to develop the oacom™ planning loop. A regular lecturer and advisor to the UK Defence Academy, NATO, FCO, allied and partner nations and the architect of key StratCom capacity building projects in Ukraine and Georgia, Gerry's network and influence across these regions is unmatched.

Education/ Awards:

2010: Graduate of Advanced Command and Staff Course, UK Defence Academy


1999: MA in Military Studies, Cranfield University

1988: BSc in American Management Science, University of Wales

What would you say about the campaign manager from the UK MoD and NATO who is organising people 2 people ops?

P2P Baltic CVs Albany [\(https://ufile.io/dhusun16\)](https://ufile.io/dhusun16)

Entire team chart of the project.



P2P Baltics team chart Albany [\(https://ufile.io/f84n6x7k\)](https://ufile.io/f84n6x7k)

A signed contract with the FCO

11. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS - ASSIGNMENT AND INDEMNITY


- 11.1 Unless otherwise agreed at Call-off stage, Intellectual Property Rights in the Services and any Deliverables that are specifically developed or created for the Authority will be vested in the Authority (save that the Supplier will retain ownership of any Supplier Proprietary Materials which become imbedded in such Deliverables, which will be licensed in accordance with the provisions of condition 11 (Intellectual Property Rights). The Supplier agrees to (and will procure that its personnel acting as consultants will) assign and hereby assigns (including by way of future assignment in the case of copyrights) to the Authority with full title guarantee all of its worldwide rights, title and interest (whether present, future, vested or contingent) in and to such Intellectual Property Rights, including moral rights, for the full term thereof.
- 11.2 The Supplier will execute all such documents and undertake any and all such acts, including but not limited to obtaining assignments of Intellectual Property Rights from personnel of the Supplier to the Supplier as may from time to time be required in order to vest the rights assigned pursuant to condition 11.3 (Intellectual Property Rights).
- 11.3 Where the Deliverables contain any Supplier Proprietary Material, then the Authority will hereby be granted a perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, worldwide, royalty free licence in respect of such Supplier Proprietary Material, to the extent necessary to use such Deliverables (including for the purposes of their adaptation, modification and/or reproduction).
- 11.4 The Supplier warrants, represents and undertakes that its provision of Services and Deliverables under this Agreement and/or any Call-off Contract will not infringe any Intellectual Property Rights of which a third party is the proprietor and that the Supplier is free to grant the licence set out in condition 11 (Intellectual Property Rights). The Supplier agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Authority against any and all liability, loss, damage, costs and expenses (including legal costs) which the Authority may incur or suffer as a result of any claim of alleged or actual infringement of a third party's Intellectual Property Rights by reason of either its or the Supplier's possession or use in any manner of any Deliverables or Services.

12. Call-off Contract Signature

- 12.1 If the original Form of Call-off Contract is not returned to the Contract/Project Officer (as identified at clause 7 above) duly completed, signed and dated on behalf of the Supplier within 10 working days of the date of signature on behalf of the Authority, the Authority will be entitled, at its sole discretion, to declare this Call-off Contract void.

For and on behalf of
The Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Name: *PHIL LORD*
Position: *Act. Manager CSSF*

Signature: 
Date: *21/6/16*

For and on behalf of
Albany Associates

Name: *DIERÉ LORAINÉ*
Position: *MANAGING DIRECTOR*

Signature: 
Date: *21.6.2016*

Albany bid on Russian Language Strategic Communication People to people (P2P)

<https://ufile.io/9qoin9w6> (<https://ufile.io/9qoin9w6>)

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<https://ufile.io/osap3xb9> (<https://ufile.io/osap3xb9>)

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
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Undermining Russia Part 2 is available here. https://freenet.space/read-blog/1073_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-4-undermining-russia-ii.html ([..../read-blog/1073_op-hmg-trojan-horse-part-4-undermining-russia-ii.html](#))

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🌐 Language