

With 5 years’ experience in Lebanon, three years’ experience in Morocco and extensive work with security sector agencies (SSAs) across the region, including in the Indian Ocean, we understand that relationships matter. The UK has invested heavily in enhancing law enforcement partner capacity and capability, building a hard-earned network of contacts and a deep level of trust. It is critical these relationships are maintained, broadened and deepened through this project.

Added Value: *Our team is already operating on the ground in Lebanon and Morocco with robust, established, trust-based relationships, meaning our strategy is based on ‘what works’ in the complex political stakeholder environments in each jurisdiction. These relationships have been developed strategically over time, informed by continual **political economy analysis and stakeholder engagement planning.***

Genuine partnership with SSAs in each of the three jurisdictions is dependent on the perception that partners are committed, credible and ‘in it for the long haul’. Our team has these relationships, built over many years, and solidified through consistent attention to issues that are important to the End Users. This involved being ready to respond to requests for advice when they were made, in the languages that the officers worked in, and almost always face-to-face. *Our track record is clear in this regard and our relationship strategy and team composition reflects the requirements of availability, language and appropriateness.*

We have a strong track record of quickly building sincere and effective relationships with key stakeholders. We fully understand and acknowledge that the Authority will lead on all strategic engagement, and we stand ready to leverage, broaden and deepen our own existing trusted relationships to support the strategic objectives of the HMG in each country of operation as required, and in close coordination with Authority representatives.

Country	Stakeholder	Access & Influence
Lebanon	Lebanese Armed Forces, Directorate of Military Intelligence (LAF DMI)	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Internal Security Forces (ISF)	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Directorate of General Security	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Military Tribunal (Judiciary)	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Maldives	Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) of the Maldives Police Service (MPS)	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO)	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Maldivian Judicial System	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Morocco	General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST)	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Public Prosecutor’s Office	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Moroccan Judiciary	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
UK	Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Home Office	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
	Crown Prosecution Service, NPCC and College of Policing	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

As well as direct trust-building with individual counterparts it is critical to understand the organisational politics of the SSAs, both internal and contextual. For example, although it is simplistic to label the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the ‘Christian security force’, it is true that State authority partly flows along confessional lines, and that strategic decisions, senior appointments and resource allocation are viewed through a confessional-political lens. According to the Constitution, the Army Commander must be a Maronite (Brigadier General Antoine Suleiman Mansour, the Director of LAF DMI, is also a Maronite), the Chief of Staff a Druze, and the Secretary General of the higher Defence Council a Sunni etc. That said, the LAF has been defining itself as the only truly ‘supra-sectarian’ institution in Lebanon and its ranks, including at directorate level, are filled with Shi’a and Sunni Muslims. In addition to external political factors, understanding the ‘hidden wiring’ of any organisation is important for sustaining positive dynamics through the tough processes of change. Our existing knowledge, coupled by continually updated Political Economy Analysis (PEA), has helped us successfully navigate the complex landscape of Lebanese and Moroccan security for the last five years.

In Lebanon, our work to build evidence gathering capability with the LAF DMI initially met with resistance because of DMI suspicions about project purpose. We worked closely with the Embassy team to analyse reasons for these blockers and understand the root causes of beneficiary concerns. Based on this analysis, our Team and the Embassy were able to align engagements, messaging and purpose, significantly de-risking the project for DMI. Our Team Leader has now been allocated an office within DMI HQ.

Added value: *Our wider Lebanon team includes a small number of well-regarded and highly-networked former LAF, ISF and General Security officers, who work as consultants to advise our teams on how to engage in a constructive way which aligns with organisational and individual incentives and perspectives, facilitate introductions and meetings, and help us avoid the pitfalls and obstacles which many international projects encounter. Similarly, through our ongoing counter-violent extremism work in Northern Morocco and provision of training on effective evidence handling and bomb scene management to Moroccan Law Enforcement, we also enjoy established relationships with many of the government institutions that will benefit from this uplift in capability, including the Judiciary.*
Continual PEA and stakeholder engagement planning to sustain positive relations through the challenges of change:

As a core deliverable to the Authority, during the Inception Phase we will carry out an in-depth stakeholder mapping and analysis to understand pinch-points, blockers and champions, and will update this every month as a component of the monthly internal review cycle. Our stakeholder mapping methodology determines power dynamics, formal and informal authority structures, incentives, and how key post-holders relate to one another within and across the political landscape. This generates a live and continually updated political picture, enabling the project team to manage and navigate the complex canvases in each jurisdiction, informing every stakeholder engagement and underpinning conflict-sensitive delivery of each activity. This proven approach has **three key benefits**:

- ▶ Ensuring that project decisions are based on the analysis of dynamics, not of actors as static entities. Simple engagement strategies such as ‘inform’, ‘consult’ or ‘empower’ assume generally fixed attitudes and perspectives. By continuously mapping underlying drivers the project team and the Authority will be able to more effectively plan stakeholder engagements based on current circumstances.
- ▶ Maximising project effectiveness by focusing on key influencers who sit at central nodes of the stakeholder network, and who can act to inhibit coherence or break potential deadlock.
- ▶ Leveraging data for adaptation and lessons learning. Stakeholder engagement feeds our evidence base of ‘what works’ to minimise negative blockers, lack of buy-in and unintended consequences.

In Morocco, we developed a formal strategy for engaging a key quasi-government partner – the Mohamedia League of Islamic Scholars (‘the Rabita’) – which we shared with the Authority to address concerns about the potential negative impact of their involvement in the programme, despite them being a key stakeholder. Specifically, our strategy centred on developing a strong and positive working relationship with the Rabita, ensuring they are appropriately briefed on those aspects of the project the Authority is content for them to be briefed on, and that we are able to continue to use their considerable experience and connectivity across Morocco to help shape the project while ensuring they play a facilitating role rather than a disruptive one.

Added value: this approach will support the UK’s **Political Access & Influence** objectives with each of the beneficiary agencies, ensuring that any access and influence developed by the project team directly benefits Embassy relations with host government entities.

Managing lack of buy-in through the different phases of the programme: Whilst we have a very strong track record of relationship management, and high confidence in the success of our approach detailed above – the complex political and institutional landscapes in each of the three countries of operation in will likely present engagement challenges throughout the programme lifecycle. This could be through a shifting focus onto other duties, change in senior personnel or internal political dynamics. Regardless of the reasons, we are highly experienced working in environments with fluctuating levels of beneficiary engagement, and deploy a range of approaches to minimise the risk of any delay to implementation:

- i. Pause delivery in areas where actions may not produce outputs or lead to outcomes; for example: it is possible to populate a training session with beneficiary personnel for the purpose of delivery; but if lack of senior buy-in means they are not the right people, then it is money wasted (our iterative and adaptive planning will ensure resources are appropriately focused elsewhere to ensure programme momentum is not lost).
- ii. Analyse the reasons for reduced buy-in and develop appropriate mitigation measures; in many cases this is about either an individual protecting his or her interests; or a perception of ‘isomorphism’, with lip service paid to western concepts which are not considered useful in practice. Once we understand motivations, tailored mitigations can then be developed.
- iii. Realign delivery with individual and organisational incentives. Our full approach is to support locally led change, but continual adaptation to ensure alignment with current circumstances and pressures is essential.
- iv. If obstacles persist, report clearly and quickly to the Authority, including for discussion of potential UK embassy intervention if the issue is at policy/political level, in line with our risk management processes.

Recognising the critical importance of cultural sensitivity and intelligence. Our international team are highly experienced across a wide range of different operating environments and cultures, and Torchlight’s consultancy approach ensures that all delivery works *with the grain* of existing cultural and political norms. We recognise that each country presents a specific cultural environment and that project success depends on awareness of and sensitivity to a range of social, historical and structural factors. In Lebanon, Morocco and the Maldives, it is easy for western interlocutors to run into obstacles through unconscious cultural insensitivity. In particular, seeking to import a foreign way of doing things, presenting a ‘superior’ or didactic demeanor and showing insufficient regard to local ways of doing things can quickly sour relations; although local stakeholders are unlikely to say ‘no’ to project proposals, they can meet with passive resistance. Our cultural sensitivity and intelligence in this project are operationalised through two key competencies:

- ▶ We do not seek to export the ‘British way’, but rather base all planning and delivery proposals on existing practice. Although some of these practices may appear sub-optimal there is without exception a sound logic for existing norms. We therefore take the time to understand that logic, and to work with the grain of local custom, taking an evolutionary approach which co-creates project deliverables with local stakeholders starting with problem analysis and introducing elements and principles of UK best practice in a way which informs thinking and products which are locally owned.
- ▶ Our international advisers all have multiple years of experience operating overseas and are closely familiar with the need to exercise a high level of cultural intelligence. *For Torchlight, the most important consultancy skill is listening*, and we offer consultancy training as well as cultural briefings in advance of deployment. We encourage staff members to learn at least the basics of the local language, including funding group tuition where there is sufficient demand.