

SECRET

Job # 66-449 (Box 18)
File # 19-124-27
Volumes: 6 booklets reviewed

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMWORLD Operation

1. Description:

In addition to the booklets, the box contained tapes and photos. The memos dealt mainly with AMWORLD planning, status reports and personnel and logistical needs. This was Agency support to the Revolutionary Recovery Movement headed by Dr. Manuel ARTIME, a paramilitary organization dedicated to bringing about the overthrow of the CASTRO Government. Operations against Cuba were tentatively scheduled for December 1963, but most of the strikes took place in November 1963. 24

ARTIME in Oct/Nov 63 felt that [redacted] support and [redacted] role in AMWORLD were reportedly blown to CASTRO by a Costa Rican Communist, AGUILUZ. ARTIME claimed that the information was inadvertently leaked by the [redacted] and the [redacted] to the DRE delegate who was in frequent contact with AGUILUZ. 24

2. Findings:

- a. Memo for the Record by Henry Hecksher, 10 July 63: Wash., D.C. Meeting with ARTIME

ARTIME related events anteceding the Bay of Pigs invasion. MANUEL RAY had just arrived in the U.S. from Cuba. He enjoyed strong Department of State support. It was his intent to get the U.S. to withdraw support from the FRD and to obtain control over the training camps himself. VARONA's and CARILLO's intention was to see the FRD go down. Hecksher said he masterminded RAY's defeat and RAY knew it. Hecksher or A-1?

- b. Memo by Henry D. Hecksher, on AMWORLD Meeting in Washington, 7 to 10 Nov 1963. Subject; Dr. La Saga

LaSaga was the MRR delegate in the U.S. while ARTIME

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was imprisoned in Cuba (following the Bay of Pigs invasion). ARTIME demoted La Saga. La Saga described by Hecksher as one of most intelligent men he had ever met. It was La Saga's firm position that while President Kennedy was in power it would be impossible to defeat CASTRO.

- c. Memo by Hecksher re AMWORLD Meeting in Baltimore 30 Nov to 1 Dec 63, Subject: Kidnapping of Cuban Dignitaries Abroad

AMJAVA-4 () mentioned that some consideration was being given to plans involving the abduction of Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Cuban Delegate to the U.N. , as an act of reprisal or of taking hostages. Such plan, he understood was also being hatched by the Somozas in order to obtain the release of Picado / Gen. SOMOZA's pilot, in Cuban prison. We told AMJAVA-4 that we could not approve any act of violence directed against a Cuban diplomat connected with the U.N.

- d. Memo by Carl E. Jenkins re AMWORLD Meeting in Baltimore, 9 February 1964, Estimage of Op Readiness Status

This deals with AMWORLD operations in 1964 . Page 4, para 3, as Jenkins saw it, AMWORLD

could continue with what appeared to be generally sound approach to developing the personnel and physical assets they will require for effective ops. They can do this and still mount small, simple, quick in and out ops, such as low risk sabotage, abduction or assassination, release and exfil of prisoners, etc., within a period of three months.

- e. Memo By Carl E. Jenkins re AMWORLD Meeting in New York 15-16 February 1964 - ARTIME Op Philosophy and Concepts

ARTIME predicated his planning on the assumption that the overthrow of CASTRO's regime would be preceded by a long and hard war. ARTIME planned to accomplish his objectives thru commando teams; infil teams, and guerrillas. Commandos thru raids, abductions, assassinations, targetted against G-2 informants, agents, officers, foreign Communists, to lift the morale of people inside Cuba.

- f. Memo by [redacted] re AMWORLD Meeting in Miami 28-29 June 1964, Delivery of Sensitive Material to AMWORLD

AMJAVA-4 mentioned as reasonably attributable sources to cover CIA support (air drop by CIA aircraft to AMWORLD bases), several including Mafia. Rumors of Mafia support of AMWORLD had long pervaded the AMWORLD organization. ARTIME claimed to have been contacted in the past by the Mafia for the sale of arms.

They discussed an air drop attributable to an AMWORLD training exercise. ARTIME would tell Gen. SOMOZA that he intended to make certain practice airdrops. The drop would be at night and made from a two-engine CIA aircraft. "For variety, certain air deliveries could be made attributable to Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, or the Mafia."

- g. Memo by Carl E. Jenkins re AMWORLD Meeting in New York, 4/5 Dec 1964: Report on AMJAVA-4 Visit to Europe

AMJAVA-4 said that Rolando CUBELA Secada was the rep. of the internal group with whom ARTIME was expected to meet. The dissident group consists of a number of officers, one group from the DR headed by CUBELA, another group from the 26th of July Movement headed by Cdte. Efigenio AMEIJERAS, Vice Minister of Armed Forces. Maj. Guillermo GARCIA, commander of the Cuban Western Army, was recognized as the leader of a regular army group who would not participate in the plotting but would come in with his group after the elimination of Fidel CASTRO. AMJAVA-4 and Nilo Messer, AMWORLD rep. in Spain were convinced that CUBELA was not entirely moved by ideological motivation. CUBELA was due to arrive in Madrid between the 10th and 15th of December.

- h. Memo by Nestor D. Sanchez re AMWORLD Meeting in West Palm Beach, Fla. 3 Jan 65

ARTIME was to provide CUBELA with a silencer for the FAL; if that was possible, ARTIME was to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment device which he would be able to carry and place next to Fidel CASTRO. ARTIME was to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no one, including CUBELA, would know ARTIME's location. ARTIME planned to return to Paris the end of January before CUBELA's return to Havana. At that time they were to formalize their previous agreements and ARTIME would give CUBELA what he had requested.

- i. Memo by Nestor Sanchez AMWORLD Meeting West Palm Beach, Fla. 3 Jan 65 re Second Mtg Between ARTIME and CUBELA in Madrid on 30 Dec 64
otherwise

CUBELA said that Sergio del VALLE would join a group to oppose the Communist Party, on the condition of the death of Fidel CASTRO / he was unwilling to participate in any kind of coup. CUBELA gave ARTIME the details and exact locations where Fidel spent every Saturday and Sunday and specifically every Sunday at Varadero. CUBELA said that the Americans wanted him to take a radio into Cuba which he would not do. The Americans also wanted him to organize a coup, or organize a group of officers, battalions and regiments in order to carry out a coup against Fidel. CUBELA said the only thing he was capable of doing was trying to get rid of Fidel CASTRO. He was able either to shoot him with a silencer or place a bomb in some place where Fidel would be. CUBELA wanted to know the exact location of the cache before he returned to Cuba so he could memorize the info.