

CONFIDENTIAL

7 26 84

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : Memorandum For the Record

DATE: 3 March 1966

FROM :

[REDACTED]

use 8-1966

SUBJECT: Foundation for Orphans in Greece, Inc. - file

S 72684

1. The subject organization is an American organization, founded in 1951 by Lillian Karika, a US citizen of Greek extraction, whose address as of 1960 was 250 West 57th Street, New York City. The address of the organization in 1951 was 11 Broadway, New York City.

2. In 1953, the organization's President, Mr. (fnu) Jackson, requested recognition of the organization from the US Department of State as a fully authorized voluntary foreign aid group. The Bureau of Internal Revenue recognized the organization as a charitable organization as early as 1951.

3. A check by OS of Department of State records, disclosed that State requested security name checks on the organization's officers. No derogatory information was developed. Files of OS disclose some slightly derogatory information on Lillian Karika.

4. Mrs. [REDACTED]

has been informed of the above information.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL Copy F/B-1966 of above

CONFIDENTIAL

72684

ATTN :

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS

24 October 1958

Chief, Contact Division. M

1005-72684

LAWSON, William — United States Delegate to All African People's Conference

1. A public relations man concerned primarily with foreign accounts reports that after the defeat of Mohammed Mahgoub in his bid to become President of the UN Assembly, Ibrahim Anis, the Sudanese Ambassador to the United States, commented on some of the "crackpot" ~~ideas~~ expressed by a William Lawson. Anis felt that Lawson had ~~some~~ very peculiar ideas. Lawson had stated that Mahgoub could not possibly have expected to win the UN election since all the influential newspapers in the United States are Jewish-owned and would be opposed to Mahgoub's election. Apparently, Lawson is a public relations man who has formed an organization to conduct such business for African countries.

2. Lawson, according to Anis, will be one of the United States delegates to the All African Peoples Conference to be held in Accra from 3-12 December 1958. Our contact suggested that in view of Subject's viewpoint, he might be an individual to watch with regard to this conference.

3. This information has been forwarded to CI.

4. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to [redacted] Extension 2202

[redacted] 172684  
Source: Edward L. Moss

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SECRET

F-7-26-84

AFM

Director, Domestic Contact Service  
Support Staff  
Chief, Washington Field Office


WAS-5-8-68  
7 October 1968

Abdul Karim Boudachi, Syrian

A-7-26-84

1. [ ] of Washington Field Office 6 October 1968 received a telephone call from his contact Edward K. Moss of Moss International, Inc., public relations consultant, with whom he met an hour later and who furnished the following information.
2. That same morning Moss had received a phone call, and later visited at the home of a Foreign Service Officer, not on duty with the area, on special assignment, not political, for the last several years. The unnamed Foreign Service Officer, "with lifetime experience with Near and Middle East," is "almost a private embassy to some of his friends of the area." He had not wanted to use his official State channels for reasons which "will be obvious from the following". He asked Moss if he could deliver the pertinent data to a representative of the CIA. Moss thought he could but meanwhile put in a call to an unnamed Assistant Secretary of State, again "not in the area", but had thus far been unable to reach him. Where upon he telephoned [ ]. He may later have told the story to the Assistant Secretary; he would also have mentioned his contact with CIA.
3. The State Department official mentioned had met at the current meeting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), one Abdul Karim Boudachi, a Syrian by birth and presumably by current nationality, a former Syrian Cabinet Minister several times over, now in Washington for the IBRD/IMF meetings accompanying Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia. The Prince is said to be a nephew and son-in-law of King Faisal and Boudachi claims "to speak for King Faisal" in the following matter. Boudachi says he fled Syria "at the advent of that country of the radical left", presumably, "only a few years ago", quoting Moss; he now travels, he says, on a Saudi Arabian diplomatic passport. Boudachi is staying in room #311 of the Madison Hotel in Washington.
4. Boudachi claims that he is the leader, or one of the leaders, of a group planning a revolution or coup d'etat in Syria with the support of the "vive elements of the Syrian Army, and of Saudi Arabia", of course. He wants the US Government to know of his plans, presumably

SECRET



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- 2 -

HA3-516-68

7 October 1968

In a general way, "so that when the event occurs this government will not have to lose time learning the identity of the new Syrian government leaders", still quoting Moss. Dandachi "wants nothing more", at least at this time.

5. Dandachi misrepresents the State Department and insists on telling his story to the CIA. This despite the statement by Dandachi that he knows and likes our current Ambassador in Saudi Arabia. Either the Foreign Service Officer mentioned, nor Moss, is supposed to have offered Dandachi any encouragement in his enterprise other than to endeavor to convey an expression of his interest to the CIA. Moss, of course, expects no reply from Oakley. On the other hand, he may meet Dandachi 5 October with regard to other business. If so, he will report to [ ] his impressions. Dandachi also expressed interest in talking to "Congressman Russell of Texas"; Moss thinks this is a garbled reference to Senator Russell of Georgia.

6. By coincidence [ ] spoke a few minutes later with Clark Westard of DQ/tech who immediately telephoned John Eddy of DQ/P. Eddy in turn telephoned [ ] who gave him Dandachi's Washington Address. The implication was that Eddy would contact "our ex-friend". Certainly Dandachi was told known to Eddy.

7. WFO considers the matter closed to this office except, perhaps, for a supplementary report from Moss as mentioned in paragraph 5 above.

V. J. [ ]

21 OCT 1968


21 OCT 1968

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SECRET



F-7-26-84

Director, Domestic Contact Service  
Attn: International Division (Africa Desk)

NAS-105-66  
31 January 1966

Chief, Washington Office

Edward K. Moss Interest in Africa/Proposed Meetings with  
Finance Ministers for Paramount International Coin Company

A-72684

1. Edward K. Moss is an old contact of the Washington Field Office, having been a good source on African affairs when his public relations firm periodically represented emerging nations' embassies. In recent years some of those activities were reduced and Moss is now serving as Deputy Assistant Director (for Public Relations) of the White House Committee on Civil Rights, 1800 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

2. At his suggestion, [ ] lunched with Moss on 27 January 1966. It was apparent that Moss considers his present assignment comparatively uninteresting and is looking towards the next move. He did not exactly say it, but he might be receptive to a consultant assignment with CIA on African affairs. He modestly admits, supported by his long time assistant Mrs. Julia Callini, that he is one of the few U.S. experts on the area, one who has considerable first-hand connections with African political leaders. He did accompany then Vice-President Nixon on his tour of Africa and would not be averse to going the same when Vice-President Humphrey may take the same route.

3. In addition to this, Moss may take a trip of about a month's duration to many of the African countries in February 1966. He said that last week former Governor Mike de Salle became president of Paramount International Coin Company, Columbus, Ohio. It is the largest organization devoted to coinage of all kinds for collectors. De Salle is particularly interested in Mint sets and is in process of working out arrangements with various foreign governments to handle mint sets of their coinage on an exclusive distributorship basis internationally. The countries would set an arbitrary value on the sets, i.e. US\$20 for coins which might actually cost US\$2 to produce. Less about twenty percent commission to Paramount, the national treasuries would retain the profits. It appears that this program may be having obvious appeal to some Finance Ministers and De Salle, who knows nothing of Africa, has asked Moss to accompany him for the negotiations involved.

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Page 2

WAS-105-66  
21 January 1966

4. Should there be any reaction to either of Mass' projects, please inform the Washington Field Office. He will be debriefed after his African trip in any case, but there may be some matters of specific interest because of his planned contacts with various and other African cabinet officials.

cc: Chief,

INITIALS

DATE

FILE CHECKED

PROCESSED

A-72684

F-72684

Edward K. Moss, Moss International Corporation, Public Relations Specialists

CA-54-20

Chief, Washington Office

S-72684

C/S

2382

WAB-352-65

20 May 1965

Chief, Contact Division  
Attn: Support Branch

SECRET

WAB-352-65  
20 May 1965

SUBJECT: Edward K. Moss, Moss International Corporation, Public Relations Specialists

1. [ ] of the Washington Field Office arranged luncheon 23 April 1965 at Decor House for Mr. Edward K. Moss of Moss International Corporation, public relations specialists; his confidential assistant Miss Julia Collini, and [ ] of US Station. The purpose was to discuss Moss' African diplomatic contacts with CI-61-20 in view.

2. Moss is now employed more or less full time as a public relations consultant for the Office of Economic Cooperation. However, he still maintains some diplomatic contacts.

3. Graham informed Wiley by telephone 19 May 1965, that there apparently is no immediate interest on the part of US Station to exploit Moss. However, they do wish to keep him "in reserve" for possible future use in entertaining Africans, especially Africans, diplomats. Any such contacts will be made through this office.

SECRET



15 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT : New Case 37997

CASE

1. [ ] advised that he had received request from [ ] of WH Division, who in turn had received request from Tom Parrott of the White house, and formerly of CIA, requesting that [ ] meet with a source of [ ] concerning a Mr. FIA Boeri of Americas Production Ind., Miami, Florida.

Apparently Boeri, through one of [ ] contacts, had approached Parrott, seeking Agency aid for Boeri's organization.

2. [ ] suggested that a case be assigned to the matter, and he would submit a report. The above case number was passed to [ ]

[ ]

ISF

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F.72684

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division

DATE: 4 January 1960

FROM : Chief, Washington Office


SUBJECT: *use 5-72684*  
Julia Cellini - Contact with Rumanian Finance Minister

*A.72684*  
1. In late November 1959, Julia Cellini, Assistant to Edward K. Moss, Public Relations, attended a dinner party where she was introduced to the Deputy Finance Minister of Rumania. This individual was in Washington for consultations with the International Bank, ICA, State, etc. He asked her what he should see in Washington, and she recommended the usual places, plus Charlottesville. *5-20359*

2. The following week she was invited to a farewell dinner for the Rumanian Cultural Attache, whom she had previously met. The Deputy Finance Minister came up, remembered her name and said that he had seen everything she had recommended, including a weekend at Charlottesville. He had taken along his superior, the Finance Minister, and at the party, introduced him to Miss Cellini. The conversation was in French, although the Minister did understand English.

3. The Minister asked her what else to see during their remaining week, and she recommended the Monastery, Mt. Vernon, etc. He thereupon asked her to accompany them to lunch, and she explained that she could not, that she worked. On Friday, the Minister called her to accompany them on the trip to Mt. Vernon on Saturday. She did not wish to do so, but could not gracefully get out of it. On Saturday it was raining and the trip was called off when she said she could not join them on Sunday. The Minister called her once more before leaving Washington.

4. This memorandum is written for the record of the fact that both the Minister and Deputy Minister of Finance had shown considerable interest in Miss Cellini, in the event that it might be of any use at some future date.



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F. 72684

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division  
Attn: 

DATE: 11 September 1959

FROM : Chief, Washington Office

File Index

SUBJECT: Vacancy for Secretary in Embassy of Guinea

A-72684

Edward K. Moss notified this office today that the Ambassador from Guinea is in the process of setting up his Embassy in Washington, having returned to the U.S. last week. He is looking for a chancery, an embassy, and a residence, as well as his basic staff.

2. He requires a female secretary, whom he states must be attractive, with shorthand abilities in French and English. She must not be a French citizen or have had employment by the French Government. Her salary would be in the vicinity of \$400 a month, tax free. A white woman is preferable.

3. Moss said that the Ambassador has had difficulty in locating such a person and has asked Moss to help, so that anyone we wished could properly be introduced through this means. Moss pointed out that, since the girl would be the first employee of a small staff, she would attain a very important position. He felt that this might be significant in that Prime Minister Toure is politically "on the fence". Toure himself will be in Washington on a State visit on 25 October 1959.


4. Please inform this office of any reaction to this suggestion.

25 Sept

advised that they have copies of possibilities they are checking - but no firm answer - hope we can bring out.

10 Feb 60

no word from  on suggestions  
advised each P.O. that we were filing - had no suggestions.  
that was



11 Sept  
 advised and will advise of any interest or suggestion.  
P.V.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

72684

Chief, Washington Office

19 December 1958

Chief, Contact Division (WE/N)

New Case 29271 - Biographic Data on [redacted]

Use 5-72684

1. FP Staff desires to make an assessment of [redacted] since she might be of operational use. Her name was brought to FP's attention by OO-A-3, 117, 581 (WASH-11755), provided by your source Edward K. West.

A 72684

2. Any data that you can provide on subject's personality, education, traits, political views, etc. would be helpful to FP for making such an assessment.

147A

INDEX SOURCE FILE

SECRET

FROM: EDWARD K. MOSS, Inc.  
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.  
Washington 6, D. C.

FOR: THE EMBASSY  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

*Index = file*

*✓ 72684*  
*Edward K. Moss*

*Reject A 72684*

*11/27/58*

HOLD FOR RELEASE:  
AFTER 5:00 P. M., E. S. T.  
THURSDAY, NOV. 27, 1958

STATEMENT OF THE AMBASSADOR  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

Dr. Ibrahim Anis, Ambassador of the Republic of The Sudan, today reaffirmed his country's friendship for the United States in a statement issued on the eve of his departure for Khartoum, scheduled originally for early this month but delayed until tomorrow because of the formation of a new government in The Sudan earlier this month.

Dr. Anis' statement follows:

"I would like to thank the American public and especially the American press for the thoughtful consideration with which they received and appraised the news of the recent developments in my country. Thanks to your refusal to jump to hasty conclusions and make comparisons with events in other countries which would not apply to The Sudan, the relations between our countries have not been strained as they might have been through misunderstanding and we remain today good friends.

"The Government of my country was changed because partisan strife between political parties threatened to bring about a demoralization of our people and a loss of confidence in our ability as a nation to preserve the principles of freedom and independence to which our people are determined to adhere.

"A government of stability, including both military and civil leaders acting with the approval of the spiritual leaders of our country, has assumed responsibility to the people to resolve our internal problems and to maintain cordial relations with all other countries as befitting a free and independent, democratic Republic. It has assumed the responsibility in a peaceful and orderly manner without impairing the rights of dissident elements or freedom of movement of any of our citizens or visitors to our country. It has assured complete freedom of the press. It has pledged itself to be bound by and give full effect to the agreements into which the Republic of The Sudan has entered since our independence nearly three years ago.

(MORE)

"In doing this my country has not been moved by external pressures or by any feeling of unfriendliness towards other countries. On the contrary, our Prime Minister, El Ferik Ibrahim Pasha Abboud, and his Government will work to improve these relations on the basis of mutual respect, friendship and mutual interest.

"Paramount among the problems of relations with other countries to which our Government will address itself will be to give expression to the conviction of every Sudanese that it is of utmost importance to bring about a fair division of the waters of the Nile which flow from our country into Egypt and which are of great importance to the economic development of both nations.

"Our new Government has now been recognized by virtually every other country, including your own. As my nation's representative in the United States since our independence I have seen the steady growth of closer relations and greater understanding between our countries. I am made confident by the recent events in my country and the sympathetic response to them by your country, that these cordial relations will endure and, indeed, can now be made even more strong.

"It is my pleasure that my diplomatic career began and ended with my service as Ambassador to the United States. It is a happy coincidence that my last day in the United States is Thanksgiving Day. For me it is a day on which I give thanks for all the wonderful friends I have made here. It is a day on which I congratulate all Americans for the friendship they have extended to me and to my country. Although I am returning to private life, I want them all to know I shall never cease my efforts to bring about increasingly close relations between our two nations."

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A copy of this material is filed with the Department of Justice where the required statement under the Foreign Agents Registration Act is available for public inspection. Registration does not indicate approval or disapproval of this material by the United States Government.

72684

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, Contact Division  
Attn:

13 November 1958

Chief, Washington Office

Case 28946 - William Lawson

CASE

REFERENCE: Our memorandum dated 22 September 1958,  
subject as above

A-72684

1. Our source, Edward E. Moss, was recontacted regarding further information on William Lawson.

2. Moss is certain that the Lawson referred to in our memorandum of 22 September 1958 is William Lawson. Moss heard about him through the Sudanese Ambassador who had commented that Lawson's views were bad for international relations. All that Moss knows is that Lawson is a US Negro, who lives in Philadelphia. He had nothing further to add to the information included in our September memorandum.

3. Please close this case for the Washington Office.

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72684

05 NOV 1958

ATTN:

Chief, Washington Office

Chief, Contact Division, (Alien)

New Case 28946 William Lenson

CASE

REF:

Your memorandum dated 22 September 1958, subject as above

HE/A, ED/P, is interested in an individual named James Lenson, who may be the same person as described in reference. James Lenson lives in New York City. It would be appreciated if you could obtain any further background information on William Lenson from your source, especially in regard to the possibility that William and James Lenson are one and the same.

Estimate: 000

## Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - Alien Chrono
- 1 - M/C
- 1 - Index
- 1 - Case 28946

188



72684

21 OCT 1958

Chief, CI  
 ATTN: [redacted]

Chief, Contact Division, OO

William Lawson - United States Delegate to All African Peoples' Conference

1. A public relations man concerned primarily with foreign accounts reports that after the defeat of Muhammad Mahgoub in his bid to become president of the UN Assembly, Ibrahim Anis, the Sudanese Ambassador to the United States, commented on some of the "crackpot" views expressed by a William Lawson. Anis felt that Lawson had some very peculiar ideas. Lawson had stated that Mahgoub could not possibly have expected to win the UN election since all the influential newspapers in the United States are Jewish owned and would be opposed to Mahgoub's election. Lawson apparently is a public relations man who has formed an organization to conduct such business for African countries.

2. Lawson, according to Anis, will be one of the United States delegates to the All African Peoples' Conference to be held in Accra from 5-12 December 1958. Our contact suggested that in view of Lawson's viewpoint, he might be an individual to watch with regard to this conference.

3. This information will be forwarded to the Office of Security.

4. Any further inquiries pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to [redacted] on Extension 2775.

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee  
 1 - Alien Chrono  
 1 - M/C  
 ✓ 1 - Index  
 1 - [redacted]

FILE: Edward K. MOSS

SSS: [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

72684

Chief, Contact Division  
 Attai:

22 September 1958

Chief, Washington Office

William Lawson

1. At a meeting with Edward K. Moss, a public relations man concerned primarily with foreign accounts, on 19 September 1958, he reported at length on his activities with the Sudanese prior to, and after the election of the president of the US Assembly.

2. In the recess after the defeat of Mohammed Mahgoub, the Sudanese Ambassador to the US, Ibrahim Anis, remarked on some "crackpot" views expressed by a William Lawson. Lawson apparently is a public relations man, who has formed an organization to conduct such business for African countries. Anis felt that Lawson was full of very peculiar thoughts and had stated that Mahgoub could not have possibly expected to win the UN election, since in the US all influential newspapers are Jewish-owned and would be opposed to Mahgoub's election.

3. Lawson, according to Mahgoub, will be one of the US delegates to the All African Peoples' Conference to be held in Accra during October or November 1958. The participants will be African and people of Negro descent now living in other areas of the world.

4. Moss suggested that in view of Lawson's narrow viewpoints he might be an individual to watch with regard to this conference.

CONFIDENTIAL

72684

SECRET

7 January 1958

ATTN:

Chief, SE/Greek  
Room 1415, "J" Bldg.

Chief, Contact Division, OO

CD/00 Case 29271 -

P  
E-72634

REF : OO-A-3,117,581 and Timmon/Areson conversation of 15 December 1958.

1. We have received a response to your verbal request of 15 December 1958 for further biographic information on [ ]

2. [ ] is described as rather unattractive physically, in her 40's, chunky and unkempt. This impression is dissipated when she begins to speak, which is done with great animation. However, she abuses the English language to such a degree that it is hard to believe that she could have passed the New York Bar. She is obviously restless, energetic and ambitious, with apparently no interests outside of work. She is always furiously working on some scheme or other, in addition to her Greek bank project. She was recently involved in the management difficulties at the Hotel 2400 in Washington and is also considering managing an Italian singer on a US tour. These divergent efforts seem to be typical. Source has never heard her comment on politics or her education, but she apparently is strongly pro-US. She was most upset when she heard a story in Greece that she was negotiating for the purchase of her bank by a group through the Banc-du-Ford, which group was reportedly Communist. She caused quite a commotion in the US Embassy in Athens to be sure that there was no misunderstanding of her position.

3. Source believes that Mr. O'Brien of the US Embassy in Athens should know a good deal about her, and that there have also been several detailed accounts about her and her activities in the Greek press.

4. For further inquiries, please call [ ] Extension 2747.

H. M. ASHCRAFT

INDEX SOURCE FILE

Edward K. Moss

A 72684  
SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

7-26-84

## N-O-T-I-C-E

THE FOLLOWING OOA-S REPORTS DATED BETWEEN  
1 OCTOBER 1958 AND 1 JULY 1964 AND CONTRI-  
BUTED BY THIS SOURCE HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED  
TO THE ARCHIVAL REPORTS FILE. DIRECT IN-  
QUIRIES TO THE REPORTS DESK OF CONTROL  
BRANCH.

3,134,679		
3,169,028		
3,174,832		
3,225,450		

I-M-P-O-R-T-A-N-T

N-O-T-E

**SECRET**  
WHEN FILLED IN

72684

# PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY																								FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY															
A. FIELD OFFICE					B. REPORT NUMBER					C. FORWARDED					D. CASE NUMBER					E. DISSEMINATED					F. RECEIVED					G. REPORT NO.									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32								
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7. SUBJECT AND AREA																																							
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(Sudan)																																							
8. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "F" Number)																																							
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9. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "F" Number)																																							
Edward K Moss Moss International Inc. Washington, D.C.																																							
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15. EDITORIAL COMMENT																																							
16. FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS																																							
THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY)																																							
17. EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DATE)																																							
18. FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE																																							
YES NO																																							
19. P. O. CHIEF																																							
20. EDITOR																																							
21. BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF																																							

72684

DATE OF BIRTH: 01/20/1962

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

COUNTRY Sudan

REPORT NO. OO- B-321/14577-64

SUBJECT Sudanese Ambassadors to US and UN  
Assess Recent Government Change in  
Sudan

DATE DISTR. 24 Dec 64

NO PAGES 1

## REFERENCES

DATE OF October - November 1964

INFO. 22

PLACE & October - November 1964

DATE ACQ

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, who has close relations with the two Sudanese diplomats. He is a specialist in the public relations of new African countries with the US.

1. The Sudanese Ambassadors to the US and to the UN are both quite happy with the recent change in government in their country. They strongly discount Communist influence and stress the continuity and stability of most personnel and of government policies.
2. The basic underlying issue which provoked the change was corruption centering around the "axis" of the Deputy Defense Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. President Abboud himself was on several occasions so "fed up" with the situation that he resorted to the "Nehru tactics" of absenting himself and threatening resignation. He did not dare fire the two Ministers. Eventually others became so unhappy with the situation that they took it out of Abboud's hands.
3. The Communists have badly overplayed their hand, with a power play far beyond their real strength. The failure of their effort to provoke a coup d'etat by announcing without foundation an army move to assume power, merely displayed their weakness and thus foreclosed for some time at least any possibility of their exerting great influence.
4. It is hard to judge which of the two political parties will be victorious in the forthcoming elections but the odds appear to favor the Umma. In any case, with either party in power, and with the interim government at present, every sign points to continuity of policy and of stability. Instructions to the two diplomats mentioned are in this category. Other evidence is found in the continuing normal procedure with routine diplomatic transfers. The new Foreign Minister is at least as pro-US as his recently ousted predecessor. He probably leans much more to the US.

end

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3-00

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

U-20

تذکرہ

[illegible]

# INFORMATION REPORT

AD-00000000000000000000000000000000

4.80X 8 2462 8 8 10 104647 M

### RESEARCH DESIGN

The dissemination of this document is limited to certain members of the USMC command personnel, and to those personnel of the USMC who are in accordance with paragraph 4 of DND 1000.0. It is not to be disseminated to other personnel.

**SECRET**  
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PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS	FOR FIELD USE ONLY	FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY
1. SUBJECT AND AREA <b>Houghue-Boligny Seeking Orientation of Guinea to West</b> <i>del. 5/1/62</i> <b>Guinea/Ivory Coast</b>	2. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) <b>Same as source.</b>	3. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) <b>Edward K. Moss</b> <b>Howard Chase &amp; Edward K. Moss International, Inc.</b> <b>Washington, D.C.</b>
4. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address) <b>Anne Michaels</b> <b>Asst to Edward K. Moss</b>	5. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "H" →	6. CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE L O F AS 16 DELETE PART 2 OF S. D. DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
7. FIELD REMARKS <b>Moss mentioned that a member of the Ghana Embassy told him that there is a new and unwritten code among the former French colony representation in Washington. It is that the ambassadors of Soviet oriented countries wear their native dress at official functions, while those favorable to the West wear western attire.</b>	8. EDITORIAL COMMENT <b>220 B</b> <b>7B</b> <b>FLEX</b> <b>CASE</b> <b>X-PR</b> <b>NO eval</b> <b>FILES</b> <b>KD</b> <b>com</b>	9. NOT DISSEMINATED 1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN 2. TOO GENERAL 3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES 4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS 5. COMPARED WITH
10. FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OF AGENCY) EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAY)	11. FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES NO	12. BRANCH STAFF CHIEF

FORM  
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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Guinea/Ivory Coast

REPORT NO. OO- B-3,229,490

SUBJECT Houphouet-Boigny Seeking Orientation of  
Guinea to West

DATE DISTR. 3 July 1962

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 14 May 62

PLACE &

DATE ACQ. 14 May 62

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, public relations specialist.

In recent weeks his firm has been conducting negotiations with the Ambassador of Guinea regarding possibilities of representing that country in the US.

Subsource:

1. In recent weeks we have been negotiating with the Guinean Ambassador to the US, Dr Seydou Conte, regarding the possibilities of doing some work for his government in the US.
2. During one of these meetings at the Guinean Embassy about 14 May 62, Ambassador Conte received a telephone call from Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast, in New York City. The conversation was conducted in French and was obviously a continuation of previous talks on the same subject. The two men were discussing ways, means, and desirability of persuading President Toure to reduce further his connections with the Soviet Bloc and to align his country with the West.
3. There was no attempt on the part of Ambassador Conte to conceal the tenor of the conversation from my associate in his office. He could easily have taken the call in another room or excused himself temporarily. It is probable that he wished to be overheard.
4. We have speculated over why Houphouet-Boigny negotiated personally and directly with the ambassador during a visit to the US. The reason undoubtedly is that Conte has the ear and confidence of Toure and is the best qualified member of the Guinean diplomatic service, as evidenced by his appointment to Washington.
5. Conte has indicated to us that Guinea is not too pleased with the type and quality of aid from the Soviet Bloc and has come to realize that the most stable and significant economic development from abroad since independence has been the US aluminum installation. Conte himself impresses us as being an African first but very pro-US and West.

-end-

29 AUG 1962

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Group 1

Excluded from automatic  
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STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI AEC

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F. SUBJECT AND AREA <b>Reaction of Khrushch to Secretary Kharter's Charge, Ghana</b>		G. SOURCE		H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)																																		I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)				J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL				K. DISSEMINATION CONTROL			
		Same as source		<b>Edward K. Moss</b> <b>Howard Chase &amp; E. K. Moss International, Inc.</b> <b>1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.</b> <b>Washington, D. C.</b>																																						1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS 2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS 3. NON USIB AGENCIES FOR DIS STUDIES				4. DISSEMINATION CONTROL 5. DISSEMINATION CONTROL 6. DISSEMINATION CONTROL			
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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Ghana	REPORT NO.	OO- B-3,160,73
SUBJECT	Reaction of Nkrumah to Secretary Herter's Charge	DATE DISTR.	14 October 1960
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	

DATE OF INFO. Week of 1 Oct 60  
 PLACE & DATE ACQ. Week of 1 Oct 60

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, public relations specialist.  
 Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. During the sessions at the United Nations [week of 1 Oct 60] I was in frequent touch with Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, the Finance Minister of Ghana, and was able, I believe, to get the true reaction of President Kwame Nkrumah to Secretary Herter's remark lumping Nkrumah with the Communists.
2. Gbedemah told me that Nkrumah has no personal regard whatsoever for Lumumba of the Congo, but regards him merely as an individual tossed up by political tides - basically "an empty head". However, Nkrumah's badly phrased remarks were intended to convey his real views which are, according to Gbedemah, that the new countries of Africa must develop strong national government, or else they will revert to regional or tribal chaos. Nkrumah, therefore, feels strongly that the United Nations has given its support to the anti-Lumumba factions, just because it does not like him nor his actions, thereby furthering a split around the duly installed Prime Minister.
3. Nkrumah's personal reaction to Secretary Herter's remark was one of deep hurt and anger. In effect, he now feels that "if the US does not understand what I am trying to do, to hell with it". During the past year Nkrumah was coming out of his sulk at the US over his bad press on arrests, etc in Ghana, but this incident has set him back again and has played into the hands of the pre-Soviet faction in his country.
4. Efforts were made to have Nkrumah appear on the Dave Garroway television show, with prepared questions approved by him, to clarify his views on the position of the neutrals. It was also arranged for him to be in one of the future debates planned by NBC, in which he could expound on the future role of non-African states in Africa. This would be filmed in Accra, or anywhere he wished, with an opponent agreeable to him. Gbedemah urged both prospects to Nkrumah and was refused flatly, through general annoyance and personal frustration.
5. As a sidelight to this matter, I also talked to the prospective Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone (upon attaining independence) and to several Indians. All expressed shock at the apparent US misunderstanding of what the Africans feel about the importance of strong central governments in the new states.

- end -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC	OTHER
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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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7.26.64

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COUNTRY	Ghana	REPORT NO.	CORRECTION: OO-D-3,104,696
SUBJECT	Finance Minister Believes Lack of US\$5 Million US Loan Will Turn Nkrumah to USSR	DATE DISTR.	26 September 1960
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	13 Aug 60		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	13 Aug 60		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, public relations specialist.

Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

[On the sixth line of paragraph one this reports reads US\$104 million but should read US\$84 million. Please make the correction on your copy.]

- end -

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC				
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Edward K. Moss Edward Chase & Edward K. Moss International, Inc. 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Washington, D. C.																																																		
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While the basic facts of this report are known to US officials, the personal views, talk with Mkrumah, and rift in the party could not be expressed publicly, by Gbedemah in his official capacity.																																																		
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	<b>F. SUBJECT AND AREA</b>															
	Conversation with Lev D Emelianov, Chief of Security Section, UN Secretariat (USER)															
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Edward K. Moss Public Relations 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. A72684																
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<b>P. O CHIEF</b>											<b>EDITOR</b>					
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PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS		FOR FIELD USE ONLY																				FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY												
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<b>P. SUBJECT AND AREA</b>  Indication of Strained Relations Between Governments of Ghana and Guinea/Conversation with Koula A Obedemah, Ghanaian Finance Minister (Guinea/Ghana/Liberia)																						<b>FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY</b> RECEIVED DO DATE 10239												
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		A. SUGGESTED SERIES		B. FIELD OFFICE		C. REPORT NUMBER		D. CASE NUMBER		E. RECEIVED		F. REPORT NO.		G. OTHER		H. DISSEMINATION		I. TYPE CODE		J. NOT DISSEMINATED													
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B		C WASH		126721026		X-164		102793143128																									
<p>F. SUBJECT AND AREA</p> <p>Recall of Carlos Romulo as Ambassador to US/Appointment of Ex Finance Minister, Philippines</p>																																	
<p>G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)</p> <p>Same as source</p>																																	
<p>H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)</p> <p>Edward K. Moss Public Relations 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Washington, D. C.</p>																																	
<p>I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)</p>																																	
<p>J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED OR NEED TO KNOW TO:</p> <p>1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS</p> <p>2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS</p> <p>3. FOR USE AGENCIES FOR HIS STUDIES</p>																																	
<p>K. FIELD REMARKS</p>																																	
<p>L. EDITORIAL COMMENT</p> <p>Adm. requested of Oct. 3009</p> <p>Adv copy to OCT. Oct:</p> <p>Al. This looks like a first class report from a source in the know.</p> <p>IDENTI</p>																																	
<p>M. FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS</p> <p>THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY)</p> <p>N. EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS)</p> <p>O. FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES NO</p> <p>P. C/S F. O CHIEF</p> <p>Q. EDITOR</p> <p>R. BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF</p>																																	

☐ TOP SECRET

☐ SECRET

☒ CONFIDENTIAL / - 72684

INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION REPORT EVALUATION

DATE FORWARDED

28 Oct 59

TO: (Routing Agency)  
CCL: Attn: [ ] 2273 Waco building

REPORT NO.

00-0-3,143,133

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FIELD NO.

C(FE/P)126.2

PLEASE COMPLETE THIS FORM AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY IF DESIRED TO FORN  
MAXIMUM VALUE AND TIMELY GUIDANCE TO THE COLLECTOR OF THIS INFORMATION. EVALUATIONS  
ARE REQUESTED TO ENTER 2 COPIES TO THEIR CIA LIAISON OFFICE BY THE FOLLOWING DATE

(I) VALUE OF THIS REPORT	ACCURACY OF CONTENT	IMPORTANCE OF RECEIVING FURTHER REPORTS ON THIS SPECIFIC SUBJECT
<input type="checkbox"/> 1. FILLS A PRIORITY NEED	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. CONFIRMED	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE
<input type="checkbox"/> 2. OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. PROBABLY TRUE	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. OF VALUE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3. POSSIBLY TRUE	<input type="checkbox"/> 3. OF IMPORTANCE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 4. OF SLIGHT OR NO VALUE	<input type="checkbox"/> 4. DOUBTFUL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 4. OF SLIGHT IMPORTANCE
<input type="checkbox"/> 5. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	<input type="checkbox"/> 5. PROBABLY FALSE	<input type="checkbox"/> 5. NO INTEREST; NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION DESIRED ON THIS SUBJECT
<input type="checkbox"/> 6. NO DATA PERMITTING JUDGMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> 6. CANNOT BE JUDGED	

(PLEASE EXPLAIN BASIS FOR YOUR EVALUATION IN SECTION III BELOW)

(II) COLLECTOR'S QUESTIONS TO EVALUATOR

D 2 NOV 1959  
D 2 NOV 1959

(III) EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS (Use additional sheets as necessary)

This office has no other information tending to support or confirm the rumor that Romulo will be removed in early 1960 as ambassador to the US. This report is considered possibly true inasmuch as reports of this nature are received from time to time. Romulo is not considered a personally popular figure with the Philippine government or people, or particularly with the Garcia administration although his personal role in convincing Garcia to expect much higher economic aid in connection with the president's visit cannot be given too much weight. It is considered that Garcia was given adequate information about aid possibilities and that inflated expectations were Garcia's own tactics to pressure the US. Romulo's possible replacement by Romualdez cannot be evaluated other than that the latter is in favor with Garcia. Appointment of Cunderno as Secretary of Finance seems doubtful as he is over retirement age; his relief as Central Bank Governor is frequently rumored and Romualdez mentioned as a possible successor. Replacement of Romulo would raise speculations about strained US-PI relations, but would probably not actually be indicative of a less friendly PI attitude.

(IV) EVALUATOR'S FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS OR GUIDANCE TO COLLECTOR ON SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT (Note: Unless formal requirements as follow, collection of information in reply to questions on this evaluation sheet will be undertaken only as convenient or available.)

None.

FORMAL REQUIREMENT IS BEING FORWARDED

SIGNATURE

DIVISION

DATE

☒ FORMAL REQUIREMENT IS NOT BEING FORWARDED

AA/OCI

29 Oct 59

# 72684

## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY **Ghana**

REPORT NO. OO- B-3,154,656

SUBJECT **Finance Minister Believes Lack of US\$5 Million US Loan Will Turn Nkrumah to USSR**

DATE DISTR. 22 August 1960

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 13 Aug 60

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 13 Aug 60

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, public relations specialist.

Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. Konka Agbali Gbedemah, the Finance Minister of Ghana, spent the week of 7 Aug 60 in Washington, primarily seeking loans for the Volta River project, which has now been scaled down to a practical size. Discussions with US officials and bankers led to agreements to advance funds for the next five years, at the end of which time the dam will be producing power. The total cost will be US\$168 million, of which Ghana itself will put up US\$18 million. The World Bank will advance US\$40 million at 5 3/4 percent interest, the Development Loan Fund US\$25 million at 3 1/2 percent interest.
2. Gbedemah wanted US\$5 million more from the DLF because the job cannot be carried out without it. Faced with a gap of US\$19 million, Gbedemah, on his own authority, offered to add US\$14 million to Ghana's contribution by taking 1/1 million per year out of current income. This, however, still leaves the necessary US\$5 million.
3. The Finance Minister is leader of the pro-Western group in Ghana, but there is a powerful faction of high Ghanaians, headed by Kojo Botsio, Minister of Agriculture, that continually urges President Kwame Nkrumah to stop dealing with the West and to turn to the USSR. Gbedemah feels strongly that if he does not get the additional US\$5 million, he will not be able to maintain the pro-West position in the battle, the ground having been cut out from under his feet, particularly for comparatively so small an amount. He realizes that this plea to the US is regularly made by small countries seeking aid, but he impressed me as being sincere about the true urgency of his mission for Ghana.
4. He pointed out that the Volta project is a good bankable one, and the loan will be paid back out of proceeds from resulting power. He said that Ghana has never before asked the US for a nickel; is not now looking for a grant but a businesslike loan. Even if the power matter failed for some unexpected reason, the country could and would pay the debt. Gbedemah pointed to the national budget which increased from 129 million ten years ago to 1104 million in 1960, all from taxation. The Ghanaian Government has put 1150 million in development projects during this period from current income. It has done no borrowing, has no external debt, and has about 1100 million invested in the UK. The economy is sound.

S-E-C-R-E-T

2 SEP 1960

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FB	AEC				
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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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**LIMITED**

5. Gbedemah was profoundly disturbed when he talked to me on 11 and 13 Aug 60. We have known each other well for a long time, yet he has never before "let his hair down" as he has on this matter. He must report to Nkrumah on Friday morning, 19 Aug 60, regarding the success or failure of his mission. He talked by telephone to the President 11 Aug 60 but did not tell him about the US\$5 million shortage, merely saying that there were still a few difficult details. Nkrumah replied that Ghana would not be put into the position of beseeching the US for the loans - he would rather give up the whole thing and turn elsewhere. Gbedemah is sure that if he must report to the President that he has returned without the additional US\$5 million, that Nkrumah will immediately have his secretary call the Soviet Ambassador.
6. The Finance Minister told me that there had been considerable unhappiness in Ghana when Nkrumah decided to become President rather than remaining Prime Minister. If the discontent over this among high party members had been allowed to break out, the opposition could have exploited the schism and the government would have fallen. The conflict was contained within the cabinet and at the highest party levels, but the tension and danger remain. Gbedemah said that Nkrumah is an egotist and some powerful people do not like his self-glorification. Gbedemah commented that "Nkrumah's days are numbered" but would not enlarge further.
7. Gbedemah is convinced that if the US\$5 million is not committed, "it will be the straw to break the camel's back". He does not know why the IMF was so adamant in the matter, but says that "this is a question of saving a country for the cost of a B-47 bomber". Nkrumah, he assured me, is leaning more and more away from the West, and failure to get the loan from the US will finally make the President turn to the USSR for the entire amount. The Soviets will surely agree to such an opportunity, so that the US position in Ghana is "hanging in the balance" in the next few days. Gbedemah is still hopeful that he will have favorable word, before he has to report to Nkrumah in Accra, that the US\$5 million has been granted, but he does not think this will really come to pass.

- end -

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-E-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY: USSR

REPORT NO.

OO- B-111111

SUBJECT: Conversation with Lev D. Emelianov,  
Chief of Security Section, UN Secretariat

DATE DISTR

6 Nov 1959

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO: early Oct 59

PLACE &amp; DATE ACQ: early Oct 59

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, public relations specialist.

Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. I obtained a reception in New York in early Oct 59 and was introduced to Lev D. Emelianov, Chief of the Security Section of the Soviet UN Secretariat. As he is now in his mid-fifties, speaks excellent English, is an interesting conversationalist, and has a warm, friendly personality. He has been with the UN Secretariat for about a year, but has recently been assigned as Chief of the Security Section. Apparently, he speaks several Eastern European languages in addition to English, for he commented that he had refused an assignment to a Spanish speaking country because he did not know the language and would be ineffective, and had requested instead an assignment to Western Europe for the UN. His assignment to the UN had followed.
2. The thing which I found most interesting about Emelianov was the fact that he is the first Soviet with whom I have talked who has frankly and openly stated that press and public information media in the Soviet Union are tightly controlled. This control, he said, is absolutely mandatory at this time to build the Soviet state, that the people are not ready for a free press. He further admitted that there is much erroneous information put out by Soviet information media, but that this is a means to an end. He then launched into the present Soviet line that both of our governments had made serious blunders, but that there was no reason why an equitable understanding could not be reached between us. I asked him what justification there was for his government's action in Hungary. He replied that the Soviets had committed some serious blunders in handling the Hungarian revolt, but that there were many facets to this situation which we Americans did not understand. He did not elaborate further, but he did comment that his wife would be joining him soon, and that I must be their dinner guest, at which time we could discuss many leaves more fully.
3. Emelianov is currently engaged in his leisure time in an exhaustive study of US literature. I asked him how he selected his reading material and he told me that if the reviews of a book in the "New York Times", "Tribune", "Time", etc. were all favorable, he read the book. Books were also recommended to him. He was most impressed with Mitchell's "Onyx With the Wind", which he said had given him a deeper understanding of this period of US history than anything he had read. Among American poets, Walt Whitman, he felt, was the greatest, a man who understood true democracy, and a man who would have been equally famous in the Soviet Union.

C-O-E-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

3 DEC 1959

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FB	AEC		
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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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4. I learned very little of Eseljanov's background. He did tell me that he had been born and reared on a farm outside of Moscow where his father still resides. He appeared very sincere in his deep affection for his father, whom he said he visited at every opportunity. He said his father loved poetry and had made him spend many hours of his youth memorizing the works of famous Soviet poets, his father's theory being that one could not really love and understand his country and his people without a knowledge of his country's literature. Eseljanov impressed me as a man who had a very deep love for his country and people aside and apart from any ideological consideration.

- and -

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY **Philippines** REPORT NO. **OO-B-3,143,138**

SUBJECT **Recall of Carlos Romulo as Ambassador to US/Appointment of New Finance Minister** DATE DISTR. **4 Nov 59**

NO PAGES **2**

REFERENCES  
**Supplemental to OO-B-3125330**  
**Guide 104-FRL**

DATE OF INFO. **Sep 59**

PLACE & DATE ACQ. **Sep 59**

SOURCE **Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.**

**Has been informally consulted by two friends concerned with developments in the Philippines. One is a US businessman of many years standing in the area and the other is a Filipino who was very close to President Magway and his administration.**

1. I have been informed by one whom I consider a reliable source in the Embassy of the Philippines that Carlos Romulo will be relieved of his post as Ambassador to the US in early 1960. Though there have been other minor annoyances which have contributed to President Carlos Garcia's disaffection with Romulo e.g. Romulo's recent appearance in US magazine advertisements endorsing the Lincoln automobile, Garcia's real loss of faith in Romulo came after Garcia's return to the Philippines from his US visit in the Summer of 1958 with assurances from Romulo that considerable US economic aid would be forthcoming in the near future [See OO-B-3125330].
2. Romulo's removal as Ambassador has been delayed because he is a symbol of US/Philippine friendship, and Romulo has let it be known to Garcia that his removal as Ambassador will certainly lend much credence to anti-US charges levelled against the Garcia administration. Garcia will have to find another assignment with some prestige for Romulo in the Philippines.
3. I am told that the new Ambassador to the US will be Eduardo Z. Romualdez, the president of the Philippine National Bank. Romualdez was in the US for the World Bank meetings this month [September 1959] and I met and talked with him. I was very favorably impressed with him. He recognizes the need of the Philippine Government for good public relations representation in the US, and has stated that funds for such a public relations program should be supplied by the Central Bank of the Philippines. He cited the assistance which could be rendered by a competent US public relations firm in advising the Philippine Government in regard to the preparation and presentation of economic surveys to the Development Loan Fund in support of Philippine requests for economic aid.
4. I understand that Romualdez avoided any contact with the Philippine Embassy while in Washington. The Embassy called him to inquire why he had not visited the Embassy; he excused himself because of the press of business matters. The real reason, I understand, for his failure to visit the Embassy was his desire to avoid any embarrassing situation or to give the impression that he was previewing his future post.
5. My friend in the Philippine Embassy also informs me that it is rumored that

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT



C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

OO-B-3,143,133

2

there soon will be a new Finance Minister in Garcia's cabinet. Miguel Cuaderno, Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, is named as the successor to the post. This does not sound right to me, for Cuaderno is in an extremely important position as Governor of the Central Bank, and is reportedly doing an excellent job.

- end -

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

F-728-84

## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY:	Guinea/Guinea/Liberia	REPORT NO.	OO-B-3,142,797
SUBJECT:	Indication of Strained Relations Between Governments of Ghana and Guinea/ Conversation with Komla A Gbedemah, Ghanaian Finance Minister	DATE DISTR	19 October 1959
		NO. PAGES	4
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO	Late Sep - Oct 59		
PLACE & DATE ACQ	Late Sep - Oct 59		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, public relations specialist.

Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. I have been in touch with the Ghanaian Embassy for several weeks in regard to the state visit of President Sekou Toure of Guinea, which will begin on 26 October 1959. In view of the fact that Guinea has no embassy or chancellery in Washington, the Ghanaian Embassy was instructed by its government to render every service possible to Ambassador Telli Diallo of Guinea to insure the successful state visit of Toure. Telli, who presented his credentials in June 1959 and then returned to Guinea, came back to the US only six or seven weeks ago. He has been in New York almost constantly since his return to the US, and from all appearances, was not too concerned with Toure's impending visit.
2. Since my firm had done public relations work for the Ghanaian Embassy in the past, they contacted us to assist them in locating appropriate real estate in Washington for the Embassy of Guinea. We selected several good properties and Telli came down from New York to inspect them. He left without making any decision, saying he would be back again to look at the properties. Meanwhile, the Ghanaian Embassy was becoming rather anxious in regard to arrangements for Toure's visit, and Telli was apparently unconcerned, issuing no instructions for Toure's itinerary while in Washington, no arrangements for receptions, etc. Telli simply left, saying he would be back. Time passed and Telli did not return. The Ghanaian Embassy was becoming quite anxious, and their task was doubly hard because of Ambassador W. H. Chapman's recall to Ghana. (Chapman's recall, incidentally, was supposed to have been temporary. I understand that he was recalled because it was discovered that he was conniving with the political opposition in Ghana.) The announcement was then made that William Evaristo Quao Halm would be the new Ambassador to the US, but Halm had not arrived during the period that the Ghanaian Embassy was trying to pin down Telli to discuss arrangements for Toure's visit. The Ghanaian Embassy was becoming a little annoyed.
3. In late September 1959 I discussed this problem with Ghana's Finance Minister, Komla A Gbedemah, who was in the US for World Bank meetings, and his reaction was that he did not believe that Telli had funds to purchase an embassy property, and that he was embarrassed. As a result of Telli's unavailability and the understandable annoyance of the Ghanaian Embassy, Ambassador Halm on his arrival in Washington

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

REF ID: A66126

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was instructed to be polite to Telli and to Toure's party on arrival, but to attempt to give no further assistance and to let the visit fall on its face, so to speak.

4. I was, nevertheless, still interested in the Toure visit from a professional standpoint, and could not believe that arrangements were not being made *TO TAKE CARE OF TOURE'S PARTY, WITH THE DEPARTMENT* of State put out an itinerary on Toure's visit on 19 October 1959. I knew that someone had to be making arrangements. I learned that Ambassador Telli had come down from New York for one day the week of 12 October 1959 with a public relations man of Olin Mathieson, but that Telli had not gone near the Ghanaian Embassy. I assumed that Olin Mathieson was performing the services offered by the Ghanaian Embassy. I contacted friends in Olin Mathieson and was informed that because of their extensive aluminum project in Guinea they were handling no publicity for the Toure visit, nor were they arranging for any state functions in Washington. Olin Mathieson had supplied a French-speaking secretary to assist Ambassador Telli during the course of legal transactions involving, I am told, the purchase of a very fine building in New York -- this would tend to discredit Gbedemah's assumption that Telli did not have funds for purchase of an embassy in Washington -- but Olin Mathieson had done no public relations work for Telli. Telli, I was informed, had requested funds for public relations from President Toure, but had received no reply.
5. I then called several hotels in Washington to determine whether or not any arrangements had been made for receptions at which Toure would be host. The Mayflower Hotel is handling a Toure reception for a thousand guests on 27 October 1959. I asked who was handling the arrangements for the reception and was referred to a Counsellor of the Liberian Embassy. The reason for Ambassador Telli's disregard for the repeated and frantic inquiries from the Ghanaian Embassy in regard to Toure's visit immediately became apparent. In my opinion, this deliberate snub of the Ghanaian Embassy is indicative of very strained relations between the governments of Ghana and Guinea. Further, Ambassador Halm of Ghana has not yet presented his credentials, so he is still in Washington in an unofficial capacity. I am sure that he does not intend to present his credentials until after Toure's visit. In this way, he successfully avoids being identified in any official capacity with Toure's visit.
6. After my brief chat with Finance Minister Gbedemah at the World Bank meetings, I had dinner with him the following week in New York. Though he does not receive the public recognition abroad enjoyed by Kojo Botsio, Ghana's Minister of Economic Affairs, Gbedemah is recognized in Ghana as Nkrumah's right hand man and most influential adviser. Everything of major importance done by Nkrumah has been discussed with Gbedemah, and has his approval. He has Nkrumah's respect to the point where he is apparently quite independent in his actions. This was illustrated to me in our discussion of the meeting of African leaders last summer [1959] in Liberia. According to Gbedemah, he had strongly advised against Nkrumah's attendance at the conference and had flatly refused to accompany Nkrumah. Gbedemah said that the conference was a major set back for Nkrumah, where Nkrumah's dream of African Federation had been successfully punctured by President William Tubman's moderation policy and urgings that any final decisions be delayed until the next meeting in 1960 when the leaders of new independent African states would be present. President Toure of Guinea - supposedly federated with Ghana - supported Tubman. I told Gbedemah I found this hard to understand and asked him for his personal opinion of Toure. I was annoyed at his reply, for Gbedemah, though a direct and frank individual, is not given to making derogatory statements about other heads of state.
 

*Gbedemah, as of Toure. The man is a crook, a demagogue and an opportunist.*

- end -

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	INDIA	REPORT NO.	OO-B-3,143,144
SUBJECT	Comments of Finance Minister Desai on Bombay and Calcutta Food Riots/January Elections in Kerala	DATE DISTR.	10 November 1959
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Sep 59		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Sep 59		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, public relations specialist.

Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. I talked with Finance Minister Morarji Ranchhodji Desai on the occasion of his visit to the US for the World Bank meetings in Sep 59. Desai, who was formerly Chief Minister of Bombay, and is presently Jawaharlal Nehru's right hand, told me that the Indian Government had conclusive proof that the recent food riots in Bombay and Calcutta were communist-inspired. Failure of food prices to decline in Bombay and Calcutta when India has just harvested a bumper food crop, he said, was directly attributable to communist activities in the farming area villages around the two cities. Communist agitators have convinced the farmers that to guard against any food shortage in their villages next year [1960], and to insure higher prices for their crops when they do sell, that the crops should not be sent to the cities for marketing. This, according to Desai, quite naturally forced food prices in the cities to remain at a high level. The communist agitators then incited and organized the riots in the cities against the high cost of food.
2. I asked Desai what chance the communist party had of returning to power in Kerala when elections are held in early 1960. His reply was that the communists did not stand a chance of re-election, that the people of Kerala were completely disillusioned, and under no circumstances would vote for the return of a communist government in Kerala.

- end -

CONFIDENTIAL

4 DEC 1959

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Guinea/Ghana/Liberia

REPORT NO

00-B-3183, 497

SUBJECT Indication of Strained Relations Between Governments of Ghana and Guinea/Conversation with Komla A Gbedemah, Ghanaian Finance Minister

DATE DISTR

NO. PAGES

2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO.

Late Sep - Oct 59

PLACE 2

DATE ACQ Late Sep - Oct 59

UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, public relations specialist.

Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. I have been in touch with the Ghanaian Embassy for several weeks in regard to the state visit of President Sekou Toure of Guinea, which will begin on 26 Oct 59. In view of the fact that Guinea has no embassy or chancery in Washington, the Ghanaian Embassy was instructed by its government to render every service possible to Ambassador Diallo Telle of Guinea to insure the successful state visit of Toure. Telle, who presented his credentials in Jun 59 and then returned to Guinea, came back to the US only six or seven weeks ago. He has been in New York almost constantly since his return to the US, and from all appearances, was not too concerned with Toure's impending visit.
2. Having done public relations work for the Ghanaian Embassy in the past, they contacted my firm to assist them in locating appropriate real estate in Washington for the Embassy of Guinea. He selected several good properties and Telle came down from New York to inspect them. He left without making any decision, saying he would be back again to look at the properties. Meanwhile, the Ghanaian Embassy was becoming rather anxious in regard to arrangements for Toure's visit, and Telle was apparently unconcerned, issuing no instructions for Toure's itinerary while in Washington, no arrangements for receptions, etc. Telle simply left, saying he would be back. Time passed and Telle did not return. The Ghanaian Embassy was becoming quite anxious, and their task was doubly hard because of Ambassador C H Chapman's recall to Ghana. (Chapman's recall, incidentally, was supposed to have been temporary. I understand that he was recalled because it was discovered that he was conniving with the political opposition in Ghana.) The announcement was then made that William Harrison Quao Halm would be the new Ambassador to the US, but Halm had not arrived during the period that the Ghanaian Embassy was trying to pin down Telle to discuss arrangements for Toure's visit. The Ghanaian Embassy was becoming a little annoyed.
3. In late Sep 59 I discussed this problem with Ghana's Finance Minister, Komla A Gbedemah, who was in the US for World Bank meetings, and his reaction was that he did not believe that Telle had funds to purchase an embassy property, and that he was embarrassed. As a result of Telle's unavailability and the understandable annoyance of the Ghanaian Embassy, Ambassador Halm on his arrival in Washington was instructed to be polite to Telle and to Toure's party on arrival, but to attempt to give no further assistance and to let the visit fall on its face, so to speak.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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4. I was, nevertheless, still interested in the Toure visit from a professional standpoint, and could not believe that arrangements were not being made to take care of Toure's party. When the Department of State put out an itinerary on Toure's visit on 19 Oct 59, I knew that someone had to be making arrangements. I learned that Ambassador Telle had come down from New York for one day the week of 12 Oct 59 with a public relations man of Olin Mathieson, but that Telle had not gone near the Ghanaian Embassy. I assumed that Olin Mathieson was performing the services offered by the Ghanaian Embassy. I contacted friends in Olin Mathieson and was informed that because of their extensive aluminum project in Guinea, they were extending whatever assistance and courtesy they could to Telle, but that they were handling no publicity for the Toure visit, nor were they arranging for any state functions in Washington. Olin Mathieson had supplied a French-speaking secretary to assist Ambassador Telle during the course of legal transactions involving, I am told, the purchase of a very fine building in New York -- this would tend to discredit Gbedemah's assumption that Telle did not have funds for purchase of an embassy in Washington -- but Olin Mathieson had done no public relations work for Telle. Telle, I was informed, had requested funds for public relations from President Toure, but had received no reply.
5. I then called several hotels in Washington to determine whether or not any arrangements had been made for receptions at which Toure would be host. The Mayflower Hotel is handling a Toure reception for a thousand guests on 27 Oct 59. I asked who was handling the arrangements for the reception and was referred to a Counsellor of the Liberian Embassy. The reason for Ambassador Telle's disregard for the repeated and frantic inquiries from the Ghanaian Embassy in regard to Toure's visit immediately became apparent. In my opinion, this deliberate snub of the Ghanaian Embassy is indicative of very strained relations between the governments of Ghana and Guinea. Further, Ambassador Halm of Ghana has not yet presented his credentials, so he is still in Washington in an unofficial capacity. I am sure that he does not intend to present his credentials until after Toure's visit. In this way, he successfully avoids being identified in any official capacity with Toure's visit. I do not believe, however, that any open rupture is imminent between the two governments. It would do Kwame Nkrumah's dream of federation no good to have the first African state with which he has formed a federation blow up in his face; I believe he will bide his time until the next meeting of the heads of African States in Liberia next year [1960].
6. After my brief chat with Finance Minister Gbedemah at the World Bank meetings, I had dinner with him the following week in New York. Though he does not receive the public recognition abroad enjoyed by Kojo Botsio, Ghana's Minister of Economic Affairs, Gbedemah is recognized in Ghana as Nkrumah's right hand man and most influential adviser. Everything of major importance done by Nkrumah has been discussed with Gbedemah, and has his approval. He has Nkrumah's respect to the point where he is apparently quite independent in his actions. This was illustrated to me in our discussion of the meeting of African leaders last summer [1959] in Liberia. According to Gbedemah, he had strongly advised against Nkrumah's attendance at the conference and had flatly refused to accompany Nkrumah. Gbedemah said that the conference was a major set back for Nkrumah, where Nkrumah's dream of African Federation had been successfully punctured by President William Tubman's moderation policy and urgings that any final decisions be delayed until the next meeting in 1960 when the leaders of new independent African states would be present. President Toure of Guinea - supposedly federated with Ghana - supported Tubman. I told Gbedemah I found this hard to understand and asked him for his personal opinion of Toure. I was annoyed at his reply, for Gbedemah, though a direct and frank individual, is not given to making derogatory statements about other heads of state. Gbedemah said of Toure, "The man is a crook, a demagogue and an opportunist".

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY India

REPORT NO. OO- D-3,133,928

SUBJECT Indian Ambassador to US Seeking  
Cabinet Post Through Anti-US Statements

DATE DISTR. 6 July 1959

NO PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 22 Jun 59 and earlier

PLACE &

DATE ACQ 22 Jun 59 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, public relations specialist.

Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. Indian government and business visitors to the US have been aghast in recent weeks at the anti-US statements of the new Indian Ambassador Mahomed Ali C Chagla. These include charges against US shipments of arms to Pakistan. The Indians feel that the Ambassador is being highly undiplomatic and cannot believe that he is acting under orders from home.
2. On 22 Jun 59, I talked with an important Indian industrialist, who formerly held a high post in the Indian Government and is quite close to Jawaharlal Nehru. He told me flatly that the Ambassador is following an independent line and is not under Nehru's instructions, although it may be possible that he has tacit consent to proceed. I received the impression that the Indian Government is not too happy with the situation but has not yet instructed the Ambassador to desist. Nehru is always inclined not to interfere with his diplomatic representatives unless they get completely out of line.
3. My informant said that he thinks the real reason for the Ambassador's actions is a personal one. Chagla probably recognizes the fact that he is one of the last of the old Muslim leaders whose career dates back to the fight for independence. At that time he was a strong supporter of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, but broke with Jinnah when he supported a partition of India into two separate countries. Chagla then joined the Congress Party with Nehru and became the Chief Justice of Bombay. Now, he has political ambitions for a Cabinet post. He is making the brash statements primarily for home consumption to accomplish his desire.
4. I was also told that the Ambassador is trying to take credit privately for the fact that the US Congress has moved to send less arms aid abroad.

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7 AUG 1959

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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**C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L**

COUNTRY India

REPORT NO. 00- B-3,122,919

SUBJECT Socialist Leader's Views on Important  
Issues to India

DATE DISTR. 19 June 1959

NO PAGES 2

## REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 4-5 May 59

**PLACE &**

DATE ACQ 4-5 May 59

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, public relations consultant.

Source's firm specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. During a conference in the US on Indian economic development on 4-5 May 59, I had several opportunities to talk informally with the Indian Socialist Party leader, A Mehta. Under questioning, he told me that the Socialist Party actually coincides almost 99 percent with the beliefs of the Nehru Government, but disagrees on aspects of policy and administration. In effect, his is just another "opposition" party. Socialism in India means equality of opportunity and not too great a concentration of wealth in anyone's hands. He pointed out that he is for private enterprise and used as an example the fact that he persuaded the Indian Government to get out of the fertilizer business and permit it to be handled by private enterprise. He believes that business should do the jobs for which it is capable and the government handle those it cannot.
2. At the time of the Tibetan revolt, he demanded that Nehru make a firm policy against Communist China. Now, he is glad that Nehru did not do so because the Prime Minister knew that any such move would jeopardize the flight of the Dalai Lama, which he had been privately informed was then in progress. Mehta added that the Tibetan incident has had more effect on Indian public opinion than any event since Independence. The people at all levels are deeply shocked. He agrees that the Indian Government must maintain its position of non-alignment officially, but the people and public servants can continue to have strongly anti-communist sentiments. India is at last aroused to the danger of communism, which it was not at the time of the distant Hungarian repression.
3. He felt that the situation in Kerala State was primarily because of a "botch" by the Congress Party. He thought that the communists won the initial election because the people voted in protest against the Congress Party. They were not communist sympathizers but were merely disgusted with the government. Communist success the second time was traceable to much the same situation - second rate Congress Party candidates and ineffective policies. He is certain that the communists cannot long remain in power in Kerala if the Congress Party will put up good people. During these statements, it was obvious that, though an anti-communist himself, Mehta was not particularly concerned over Kerala. He regarded it almost as an example that elective democracy is actually working in India.
4. Mehta is concerned over Nehru's drive to implement the new cooperative farming plan. He agrees that India must increase farming production but this plan will not be popular. Anything which affects peasant ownership of land cannot get

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written permission of the originating office has been obtained.

going in India. He commented that the leading motive for murder in India is dispute over land tenure. He thinks that some sort of marketing cooperative would be more effective.

5. He was most anxious for a reconciliation between India and Pakistan. He felt that this was inevitable but should be very soon. While in the US, he had a quiet conference with the Pakistani Ambassador on this subject and told me that he frequently makes trips to Pakistan itself, to talk to its leaders. Mehta felt that Nehru may be coming around to drop his personal anti-Pakistan feelings, which were brought about largely by what he considered ill use by Pakistan at the time of the Kashmir crisis. Mehta also believes that the Tibetan revolt has made both the Indians and Pakistani more conscious of the fact that they must get together to solve their problems.
6. Mehta agreed that the West had taken the correct steps in the cold war to contain communist might and aggression. However, he did think that there must be some method by which the strains of the cold war could be relaxed.

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY    Philippines	REPORT NO.    OO-    E-3,125,330
SUBJECT    Ambassador Romulo the Main Cause of misunderstandings with US	DATE DISTR.    10 Mar 59
	NO. PAGES    2
	REFERENCES    Guide 164 - PRL

DATE OF INFO.    24 Feb 59 and earlier  
 PLACE & DATE ACQ.    24 Feb 59 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE:    Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

Has been informally consulted by two friends concerned with developments in the Philippines. One is a US businessman of many years standing in the area and the other is a Filipino who was very close to President Magsaysay and his administration.

1. Two friends of mine, who are in close touch with developments in the Philippines, are most concerned about the present strained relations between that country and the US. One is a US businessman with many years' experience in the country and the other is a Filipino who was very close to President Magsaysay and still has important political connections with the Garcia regime.
2. They have told and fairly convinced me that the main cause for the rift between the countries is the Philippine Ambassador to the US, Carlos Romulo. I could not believe this at first because it seemed to be so completely out of character.
3. The story is that prior to the arrival in the US in June 1958, of President Carlos Garcia, Romulo had been forwarding messages that a substantial US loan was a foregone conclusion and he could personally arrange it, in effect by a few telephone calls. After President Garcia reached Washington, Romulo told him that he had the commitment for US\$100 million, which was not true. At a meeting with President Eisenhower, President Garcia mentioned the needs of the Philippines and Eisenhower replied in general terms about the US desire to be helpful. This Garcia interpreted as confirmation of Romulo's statement about the loan. Garcia cabled his government to this effect and also made statements to the press at the time of his departure.
4. When the loan was not forthcoming, Garcia became bitter and was strengthened in his beliefs by further misleading cables from Romulo that the US was not living up to its agreement, that he was working on it, etc. It was not until Garcia went to Japan [December 1958] and had an opportunity to talk to my Filipino friend that he got the true state of affairs. He asked my friend what was happening in the US and was told of Romulo's activities.

90 MAR 1959

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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5. Now, Garcia is in a dilemma. He himself would look foolish for having been taken in by his own ambassador, should he come out with the truth and make Romulo the scapegoat. This is a position he cannot take without further weakening his own snaky administration. Further, Garcia cannot fire or remove Romulo, without the necessary explanation, because it would then appear that he had given in completely to his anti-US faction by removing the best Filipino friend the US has had by proved record.
6. My friends say that Romulo has resorted to these desperate tactics because he knows that many of his countrymen wish him removed. He does not wish to return to the Philippines and does not want to lose his ambassadorship. For this reason, he has continued to fabricate or to mislead his own government and to foster the difficulties between the two countries. My friends are convinced that Romulo must be removed in some manner for the good of the Philippines. They support the Garcia administration, because it is legally in power, but their view is the long one. There will be an election in two years and the problems between the US and the Philippines, which are largely misunderstandings, must be solved before it might be too late for the next administration to repair the damage.

- end -

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## INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION REPORT EVALUATION

DATE FORWARDED

3 March 59

TO:

GCI Agent Miss M. Kreimer

REPORT NO.

W-8-3,125,320

FROM:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FILE NO.

C(FEP)10009

PLEASE COMPLETE THIS FORM AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY IF DESIRED TO PROVIDE  
REVIEW AND GUIDANCE TO THE COLLECTOR OF THIS INFORMATION. EVALUATION  
IS REQUESTED TO RETURN TO THE COLLECTOR BY THE FOLLOWING DATE:

(I) VALUE OF THIS REPORT	ACCURACY OF CONTENT	IMPORTANCE OF RECEIVING FURTHER REPORTS ON THIS SPECIFIC SUBJECT
<input type="checkbox"/> 1. FILLS A PRIORITY NEED	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. CONFIRMED	<input type="checkbox"/> 1. OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE
<input type="checkbox"/> 2. OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. PROBABLY TRUE	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE
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<input type="checkbox"/> 6. NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> 6. CANNOT BE JUDGED	

(PLEASE EXPLAIN BASIS FOR YOUR EVALUATION IN SECTION III BELOW)

## (II) COLLECTOR'S QUESTIONS TO EVALUATOR

24 MAR 1959

## (III) EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS (Use additional sheets as necessary)

Difficult to give a categorical evaluation of this report since it probably contains an element of truth, but it certainly not the whole story. It is well known that Romulo spends considerable time boosting his own ~~stature~~ value to Philippine government's relations with US, and it is probable that he often misleads his government in the hope of undercutting his enemies at home. It is not known to what extent Romulo tried to convince Garcia that sizeable US loans were in the bag, but Garcia had plenty of warning from US officials prior to his trip that this was not the case. Romulo's position with his own government is certainly shaky and it is unlikely that his opinions are given heavy weight by the Garcia government. He may be a factor in present US-PI difficulties, but the reasons for present strained relations are more complex than any misunderstandings caused by Romulo.

## (IV) EVALUATOR'S FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS OR GUIDANCE TO COLLECTOR ON SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT (Note: Unless formal requirement is to follow, collection of information in reply to questions on this evaluation sheet will be undertaken only as convenient or available.)

None.

FORMAL REQUIREMENT IS  
BEING FORWARDED

SIGNATURE

DIVISION

GCI/AA

DATE

6 March 59

X FORMAL REQUIREMENT IS  
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# 72654

## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Liberia/International	REPORT NO.	OO- B-3,120,667
SUBJECT	Speculation of Communist Effort to Switch Foreign Registry of US Shipping	DATE DISTR.	9 January 1959
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	29 Dec 58 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	29 Dec 58 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. The international maritime boycott, which became effective in December 1958, against the "flags of convenience" of US-owned vessels registered under foreign nations, has caused considerable consternation within the Liberian Government. Liberians realize that the countries involved (Liberia, Panama, Honduras, Dominican Republic) have been made to look like co-conspirators with the US ship operators to defraud the US of revenue and taxes and to avoid the standards of US maritime law. With the continuance of such a boycott, the Liberians fear that their international reputation will be increasingly hurt.
2. I have learned that in the case of Liberia, the blanket condemnation is not justifiable because the wages of ship crews under Liberian law are the highest after those of the US and the US maritime code of safety was adopted by Liberia verbatim. The operation of Liberian registered vessels is quite effectively administered according to those regulations, and, as a general rule, Liberian consuls inspect every Liberian flag vessel calling in their areas.
3. While this data is undoubtedly known, there is another factor involved. Liberia has the fourth largest fleet in the world under its flag, including the majority of the best and newest US tankers. In the event of war, Liberia has a standing agreement with the US that these vessels will be switched to US authority without formalities. Such an agreement does not exist under other foreign flag arrangements. Some individuals concerned with the Merchant Marine feel, therefore, that this boycott is a highly desirable technique on the part of the communists (probably influential in some of the unions involved). It will be used to switch these vital US vessels to a foreign flag, which would be considerably less accessible in a national emergency, so that the US would not have prompt and effective control over necessary shipping.
4. The Liberian Government cannot understand why the US Government does not publicly state that it has approved the Liberian flag operation, and there is certainly the prospect that a continuance of this situation will hurt US/Liberian relations.

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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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DISSEMINATION limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC, and FBI, and, within State and Defense, to the specific assignments, other than those involving: (1) personnel and higher echelon staffs; (2) immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or other personnel on short-term assignments who are not normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense, unless the approval of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director.

**C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L**  
**NO FORN/NO DISSEM ABN/LIMITED**

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS		FOR FIELD USE ONLY															FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY																								
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C/S		P. O. CHIEF															EDITOR																								

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Somalia/Ethiopia/Italy

REPORT NO. OO- A-3,120,868

**SUBJECT**      **Apparent Italian Preference to Deal  
with Ethiopia Instead of Somalia**

DATE DISTR. 5 January 1959

NO. PAGES 1

## REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 29 Dec 58 and earlier

PLACE &  
DATE ACQ **29 Dec 58 and earlier**

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. The negotiations in the US during December 1958 working towards a conclusion of the Development Loan Fund loan to Somalia produced what appears to me an interesting development. Ostensibly, the Italians have been backing and assisting Somalia in this effort and are encouraging all steps towards the independence of that country. In the latter part of December [1958], the loan in question reached a point where it was about to be approved. Officials of the Fund merely requested some additional facts finally to justify the financial commitment. This could easily have been provided by the Italian negotiator, but despite explanations to him in English and Italian, he appeared not to understand the issue involved. At the crucial time, it was learned that he had returned to Italy for a visit, so that the loan will not be granted at present and a considerable delay will certainly be involved.
2. This loan, while comparatively small, is of considerable importance to Somalia. The attitude of the Italians could be charged to ineptness; however, I personally question if this is the case or whether it is possible that the Italians would prefer to work more closely with Ethiopia than with Somalia on the border and other questions.
3. I have also heard a rumor that Haji Ferah Ali Omar, Minister of Economic Affairs for Somalia, has been working closely with the Italians and has made a deal that, in return for Italian support of his being made Prime Minister upon granting of independence, he will continue to serve Italian interests.

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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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F. SUBJECT AND AREA		<p><i>Reaction</i> <i>Opinion of American Diplomat to Congo</i> <i>(Dillon/Ross)</i></p>																																								<p>EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD</p>				<p>RELEASED NO. DAY MO.</p>			
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H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)		<p><i>Edward K. Mason</i> <i>Public Relations</i> <i>1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.</i> <i>Washington, D. C.</i></p>																																								<p>EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD</p>				<p>RELEASED NO. DAY MO.</p>			
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<b>INFORMATION REPORT</b>		This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.	
PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY <b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b>		REPORT NO. <b>00- A-3,118,477</b>	
COUNTRY <b>Sudan/Egypt</b>	DATE DISTRIBUTED <b>8 December 1958</b>		
SUBJECT  <b>Reaction of Sudanese Diplomat to Coup</b>	NO. OF PAGES <b>2</b>		NO. OF ENCL. <b></b>
	SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT OF <b></b>		
DATE OF INFORMATION (Date of source or date on which source or sources furnished information) <b>21 Nov 58</b>		RESPONSIVE TO <b>OO/C Guide 104 PRL</b>	
PLACE AND DATE ACQUIRED (By source) <b>21 Nov 58</b>			
<b>THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION</b>			
<p><b>SOURCE</b> Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. During a conversation with Ambassador Ibrahim Anis, Sudanese Ambassador to the US, we speculated upon developments supporting the recent political coup in his country. I gathered that Dr Anis had not suspected such a move, although he stated that the Khalil Government had become increasingly worried about control of the country with the Parliament to convene on 24 Nov 58. This Parliament had no clear majority, and Abdullah Khalil feared that there would be resulting chaos which would have a destructive effect on the confidence of the citizens. He was afraid that there would be serious demoralization because of political infighting.</li> <li>2. Anis personally feels, without any confirmation as yet, that Khalil probably called in General Ibrahim Abboud to effect an apparent coup. Both men are such close friends that Anis feels certain that the political move was arranged between them.</li> <li>3. The new government apparently has an internal setup closely paralleling the Khalil government's. There are the same political divisions, but now a military facade has been erected to insure continuation of the policies already established. There probably will be no change in external or internal objectives. Anis stated that Muhammad Mahjub, former Foreign Minister, had planned to place members of his party in important embassies abroad. The Ambassador felt that this would have been a mistake, although it would have been a method of extending party control. Under the present government, career appointments will probably be maintained, although it is possible that El-Mahdi will arrange for some of his relatives to obtain diplomatic stations.</li> <li>4. Anis is convinced that General Abboud is non-political and a patriotic Sudanese, who will remain in power only until present problems are solved. These consist primarily of internal instability due to the bickering in political factions and the Nile water negotiations with Egypt, which must be determined without Sudan losing out to Egypt. When these problems are solved, Anis feels that Abboud will call for elections with the hope of forming a Parliament with a majority party. In talking to Sudanese representatives at the UN during the week of 17 Nov 58, I got some contrary opinions that the military government may remain a long time and eventually lose its temporary nature in favor of a formal government.</li> <li>5. The Sudanese Minister of Commerce, according to Anis, recently visited Cairo in order to ingratiate himself with the pro-Egyptian element in the Sudan for his own political stature and he also wished to make a sufficient show of negotiations with the Egyptians to tumble the Khalil Government. This same minister had raised strong objections to the US development loan of US\$30 million. Anis stated that the Sudanese attorney for the Greek owner of the proposed textile mill in the Sudan had gone to Khalil over the head of the Minister of Commerce urging the Prime Minister to accept this aid. The attorney is now the new Foreign Minister.</li> </ol>			
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and, in view of his past efforts and the fact that he has a financial interest in the mill, will certainly approve such US aid. In fact, when Anis returns to private business, he will be the wholesale distributor for the textile mill. He laughingly said that the new Foreign Minister is torn between keeping Anis in the US as an Ambassador or getting him home as quickly as possible to help in the business.

6. Anis expressed his great concern about the coloration of the news regarding the coup which has been appearing in the US press from Cairo sources. He said that those stories have had a pro-Isaiah tinge, although the US press has been very objective in general. Anis remarked that the Sudanese public is greatly influenced by Egyptian propaganda and told the story about attending a soccer game with Khali in the Sudan in 1957. Although the Sudanese team won over the Egyptian team, Cairo Radio reported that the Egyptians had won. Khali commented that even the Sudanese who had attended the game would soon believe that they had lost because they are so gullible to Cairo Radio.

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<h2 style="margin: 0;">INFORMATION REPORT</h2>	
PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY <div style="text-align: center;"><b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b></div>	
COUNTRY <b>UAR/Egypt</b>	REPORT NO. <b>00-B-3,117,467</b>
SUBJECT  <div style="text-align: center;"><b>Plan for US-Egyptian Chamber of Commerce</b></div>	DATE DISTRIBUTED <div style="text-align: center;"><b>21 November 1958</b></div>
	NO. OF PAGES <div style="text-align: center;"><b>1</b></div>
	NO. OF ENCL. <div style="text-align: center;"><b>0</b></div>
DATE OF INFORMATION (Date or dates, or a between which, events or conditions described in report existed) <b>12 Nov 58 and earlier</b>	
PLACE AND DATE ACQUIRED (By source)  <b>12 Nov 58 and earlier</b>	
<b>THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION</b>	
SOURCE <p>Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.</p> <p>He is acquainted with the Commercial Counselor of the UAR Embassy in Washington.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. I recently met the Commercial Counselor of the Embassy of the UAR. This individual struck me, or tried to convey the impression, as being neutral towards the UAR Government. He even implied that Gamal Abdul Nasir's tactics were making his life difficult in fulfilling his dedicated mission of economic development of the Egyptian sector.</li> <li>* /presumably, source refers to Hassan El Abd/</li> <li>2. The Counselor surprised me by saying that he had quietly approached and "lined up" twenty substantial US companies which are ready to enter into commercial operations in Egypt as soon as such a move would be feasible. The Egyptian has been strongly advocating that there is ample room and much opportunity for US business in his country.</li> <li>3. One of his projects is to establish a US-Egyptian Chamber of Commerce. This would be done entirely as a private arrangement without participation of either government. On this basis, he feels that factual commercial information would then be obtained and exchanged on a free basis, which would give a higher degree of creditability to businessmen of both countries than any government-sponsored organization. This would further serve to create enough confidence to reestablish normal commercial activity.</li> <li>4. He had gone so far as to have letterheads printed, with the idea of establishing the first headquarters in Cairo, but is now considering the advantages of initial steps being taken in the US. My impression is that the project is quite far along towards possible fruition.</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;">- end -</p>	
<b>08 JAN 1959</b>	

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[SEE BOTTOM OF PAGE]

SPECIAL CONTROLS, IF ANY

## INFORMATION REPORT

PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY

Sudan/Egypt

SUBJECT

Sudanese Ambassador's Views on Aswan Dam  
and Nile Waters Problem

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

REPORT NO.

00- B-3,117,579

DATE DISTRIBUTED

24 November 1958

NO. OF PAGES

2

NO. OF ENCL.

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT #

RESPONSIVE TO

OO/C Guide 164

PRL

DATE OF INFORMATION (Date of disclosure or between which events or conditions described in report related)

11 Nov 58

PLACE AND DATE ACQUIRED (By source)

11 Nov 58

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. I had a chat with my acquaintance, Dr Ibrahim Anis, Sudanese Ambassador to the US, on 11 Nov 58. I asked him whether the Sudan would object to Egypt's building the high Aswan Dam on its own territory. He replied that the Sudan could not object, but that, of course, the dam size would then have to be limited, as would the water storage area and resulting electric power made available by the dam. Such a development would not cause real trouble with the Sudan so long as the whole operation was kept well within the Egyptian border.
2. He said that the Egyptians had admitted that if the two countries were one, they would build a series of low dams, and then some lower version of Aswan. He felt that this was a telling argument against Egypt's present dam position, since that plan is the same as now advocated by the Sudan. It refutes the Egyptian line that the Sudan is a lawless nation which has abrogated the treaty on use of Nile water. Nonetheless, the Ambassador could not conceive any set of circumstances which would cause a truly serious rupture between the two countries, though Egypt tries to promote propaganda crises. He is sure that Gamal Abdul Nasir would never resort to military force against the Sudan and rather naively added that he did not think that there had been any serious Egyptian-inspired subversion attempts within the Sudan. His opinion is that Sudanese-Egyptian relations will never reach a crisis in fact because both countries wish to maintain at least the semblance of Arab brotherhood.
3. We then discussed the Egyptian propaganda assault on the Sudan over the Nile waters, and the fact that the Sudan had never publicly told its version of the Nile dispute. There is some consideration by the Sudanese Government of preparing a "white paper" on the subject, and possibly inviting prominent foreign newsmen to Khartoum for a perambulating press conference. This would include two or three days of guided tours, conducted by the Foreign Minister, to show on the ground the effects on the Sudan of the Aswan Dam. These plans have not been approved as yet, and may not be, because of the fear by the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador that such a move might prejudice Egyptian negotiations.
4. The Ambassador said that both he and the Foreign Minister are worried that the US is seemingly unconcerned over the Nile problem of the Sudan. Its concentration now is to counter the efforts of the announced Soviet aid to Egypt to start the Aswan Dam and the Sudan aspect is being overlooked at an important time. The Ambassador semi-seriously recommended that the US should grant the Sudan US\$100 million so that it could go ahead with its own dam projects. This would serve the purpose of countering the Soviet grant to Egypt and would still indicate US interest in progress for Arab states.
5. He remarked that the recent US loan-development fund for the Sudan had produced considerable political opposition within the country. He blamed this entirely on mishandling by his own government and said that the announcement and explanation to the people made it appear that the Sudanese Government had "sold out" or had

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Given away economic rights to the US for US\$30 million. This false impression and its effective use by the opposition, he felt, would prevent acceptance of any more such loans for some time to come.

- end -

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<b>F. SUBJECT AND AREA</b> <p align="center"><b>Press Statement of the Ambassador of the Republic of the Sudan, Ibrahim Anis (Sudan)</b></p>																																<b>EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD</b> MO. DAY YR. 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 17288									
<b>G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)</b> <p>Edward K. Moss          Public Relations          1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.          Washington, D. C.</p>																																<b>TYPE OO-C</b> 48 <b>NOT DISSEMINATED</b> 48 GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER									
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<b>FIELD REMARKS</b> <p>Attached will not be released until after 6:00 PM, Thursday, 27 Nov 58.</p>																<b>EDITORIAL COMMENT</b> <p><i>Since we received this at noon on the 28th, we see no purpose in disseminating it.</i></p>																									
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<b>EDITOR</b>																																									

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The "major US company" mentioned in paragraph five, line one, is The Koppers Company. The "US technical firm" mentioned in paragraph five, line six, is The Blaw-Knox Company.																						Copies sent directly to PP/EAD, DDP, State, and OCI.																																																																																																																											
Moss stated that this report may be colored by Lillian Karika as an interested party. He understands that some of the background information has been reported by her to Mr. O'Brien of the US Embassy in Athens.																						1849																																																																																																																											
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PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY <b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b>		REPORT NO CO - <b>A-3,127,581</b>	
COUNTRY <b>Greece</b>		DATE DISTRIBUTED <b>19 Nov 58</b>	
SUBJECT <b>Problems of Reactivating Bank of Kios</b>		NO. OF PAGES <b>2</b>	NO. OF ENCL <b></b>
DATE OF INFORMATION (Date or dates, on or between which, events or conditions described in report existed) <b>Nov 58 and earlier</b>		SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT # <b></b>	
PLACE AND DATE ACQUIRED (By source) <b>Nov 58 and earlier</b>		RESPONSIVE TO <b>OO/C-</b>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION</b></p> <p><b>SOURCE</b> Officer of a US public relations firm which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. I have had several conversations with Lillian Karika, a US citizen of Greek descent, who worked for Greek War Relief and became friendly as a result with many important Greeks. After World War II she learned of the Bank of Kios, which had been an effective organization but had been caught in the postwar inflation and had become inactive, though not liquidated. By negotiation with its private Greek owners she acquired 99.6% of the stock, and thereby became the first US citizen to control a Greek bank through the instrument of a New York City holding company.</li> <li>2. The Bank of Kios owns, free and clear, two iron mines in Greece (one about worked out and not now economical, and the other rich in both iron and nickel), an insurance company and some real estate in Greece. Assets are estimated to be between US\$3-5 million. The main problem is that the bank owes the Greek Government US\$1 million, but is otherwise out of debt.</li> <li>3. She attempted through various methods and negotiations to reactivate the good mine. She had surveys made, indicating good quality ore, and at one time had arranged with a German concern to supply equipment and technical personnel in return for royalties on ore produced. She also had dealings with the French Banc du Nord for further financing, but learned that it was fronting for a Communist organization which wanted to participate. These attempts have not succeeded to date because she could not conclude any final arrangements until the debt to the Greek Government had been eliminated.</li> <li>4. Though many Middle East businessmen would welcome a US-owned bank operating in Greece, she has been unable to obtain any medium or long range development loans without exorbitant interest rates. One offer she has been hesitant to accept came from a Canadian firm, which offered to advance her US\$650 thousand which would settle the Government claim for US\$1 million. In return she would have had to agree to buy US\$3 million worth of gold bullion owned by the Canadian firm in Mexico. The terms were that she would pay about US\$31.50 per gold unit, bring it to Greece and then resell it to the Canadians at US\$32.50. She does not know the reason for the deal except that possibly the Canadians wanted to transfer the bullion to Israel on a percentage arrangement of the sales price.</li> <li>5. At one stage, a major US company [ ] took two thousand tons of iron ore for testing in the US, and when it proved out well she thought she would have a regular supply arrangement. It turned out, however, that the company has a deal with Niarchos to supply Greek-made steel plate for his new Greek shipyard, with the help of another important US technical firm [ ]. These companies were not interested in working with her but had other plans. She learned that they had hopes of acquiring her mining property through the Greek Government. The syndicate officials did meet.</li> </ol>			
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in Athens on 23 Jun 58 for this purpose but came away empty handed.

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<b>INFORMATION REPORT</b>					
PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY <b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b>					
COUNTRY <b>Sudan</b>			REPORT NO. <b>OO- B-3,113,732</b>		
SUBJECT <b>Background of Mahgoub's Candidacy for US Presidency and Reaction to Defeat</b>			DATE DISTRIBUTED <b>2 October 1958</b>		
DATE OF INFORMATION (Date or dates, on or between which, events or conditions described in report started) <b>16 Sep 58 and earlier</b>			NO. OF PAGES <b>2</b>		
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			SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT #		
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**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION**

**SOURCE**

Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

Has negotiated with the Sudanese for some time about the possibility of handling some of their public relations work in the US.

- For some time I have made overtures to the Sudanese about conducting public relations work in the US for their country. They regularly stated that they would like such assistance but did not have the funds to support a proper program. Early in September 1958 the Sudanese Ambassador to the US, Ibrahim Anis, received a cable from Khartoum ordering him to do everything possible to inform the US public in favor of the election of Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, to the presidency of the 13th United Nations General Assembly. In this, the Sudanese Government had two objectives - to obtain this honor for Mahgoub and to call attention to the Sudan and its position in world affairs.
- The Sudan has endeavored to maintain a position of strict neutrality since obtaining its independence and has tried to avoid any foreign entanglements. The main reason has been that the Sudanese Government recognized the gravity of the task of vital domestic economic development and felt that all energies must be spent in that direction. It joined the Arab League primarily from the standpoint of "brotherhood" but has still tried to remain completely neutral as a nation. The fact that the Council of the Arab League decided to support Mahgoub in the UN was based mostly on the fact that the Arabs considered Charles Malik of Lebanon, the other major candidate, too pro-west and anti-Arab in his views and orientation.
- In a meeting with Mahgoub before the UN election, he commented that he was puzzled by the phobia of the US people over pan-Arab nationalism, Gamal Abdul Nasir and communism. He said that the US today equates Arab nationalism and pride with Nasirism, when in fact, Arab nationalism has been a fact for years before Nasir. He added that the Sudan has had its troubles with Nasir's Egypt but he did not personally believe that Nasir had organized actual plots to overthrow the Sudanese Government. Mahgoub also remarked on repeated offers of Soviet aid to the Sudan during the past year. He said that he had frequently challenged the Soviet ambassador to be more concrete and had always been given some sort of excuse. The ambassador recently said under a similar attack that he was going to Moscow and would have something definite to say on his return.
- During the period leading up to the election, the majority of the Asian, Arab and independent African states backed Mahgoub's candidacy because they considered his to be an unencumbered position, while Malik has become identified with the US. In addition, this support was given to prove, by his election, the emergence of the influence of small nations in the UN, as differentiated from the current leadership of the giants. Until Sunday, 14 Sep 58, the Mahgoub group had pledged enough to make it believe he would win. But at that point the US started actively to campaign for Malik. This move was resented by Mahgoub. Although he

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recognized the US need to honor its pledge to support Malik, he believed that US activities far exceeded the commitment to Malik. The Sudanese, however, were not so irritated as the Arab states, which felt that the US was trying to influence them to desert the man of their choice in favor of the US selection. They considered this directly contrary to President Eisenhower's suggestion that the Arabs should do everything possible to solve their own problems.

5. Mahgoub told me he was sure of thirty-nine votes, with five more probables and some additional possibilities an hour before the election. The Scandinavian countries informed him the day before that they would not vote for Malik. South America had divided in opinion and would not vote as a bloc. Of these, Mahgoub had six pledges of support but in the final count, he ended without a single vote from Latin America as a result of what he called "threats" from the US. The Ghana delegate felt that he had a higher duty than to support the UK, as a member of the Commonwealth, in voting for Malik. Liberia had been the first nation in Africa to back the Eisenhower Doctrine and to support the US landings in Lebanon, but it too felt that a neutral moderator should be elected.
6. The Sudanese were upset by the anti-Mahgoub rumors, which they are convinced were fostered by the US, that the Sudan is pro-communist and pro-Arab. These stories were common in the UN in the final days before the vote and went so far as to say that Mahgoub himself was a pro-Nasir stooge, despite his record. The Sudanese do not consider themselves "neutral on the side of the USSR", and in fact have an effective anti-communist law. They feel that their country's reputation was blackened unjustly by these rumors and the resulting election. It may now be hard to combat Soviet propaganda opportunities in the Sudan, such as claims that the US opposed a black Moslem in favor of a white Christian and that the USSR backed the Sudan while the US supported the other side to its own national interest. Mahgoub fears that it will be hard for the Sudanese people to resist such propaganda in their disappointment at the outcome of the election. He is certain that the Sudanese papers will be full of Soviet-instigated anti-US material and the main job will be to "cool off" the public.
7. Mahgoub believes that the Arab nations will be most irritated at Malik's election, but that it will take some time to determine actual effects. He asked me whether the US was interested in justifying its policy regardless of the consequences or was it truly interested in making friends in Africa. He felt that the US had much possibly to lose and really little to gain by such apparent intervention in favor of one man, Malik, who is not even supported by his own Lebanon. Mahgoub was certain that General Shehab did not endorse Malik, as was reported in the US press. Shehab always issues public statements as written communiqués, which did not occur in this instance. A US correspondent had telephoned Shehab for a story and in conversation Shehab had casually mentioned that Malik was a Lebanese and he wished him well. The ultimate story did not appear in the Lebanese press because Shehab himself controls censorship in that country. In fact, the Lebanese press endorsed Mahgoub even more than did the Sudanese papers.
8. The Sudanese Foreign Minister assured me that personally he admires and likes Malik. Malik's wife was raised in Khartoum and the two men have known each other for many years. Mahgoub commented that before he left the UN the last time Malik had told him that he would withdraw his own candidacy if Mahgoub should be supported by the Arab states. This did not come about and my impression from personal talks with Mahgoub was that the whole affair ended in sorrow for him rather than in anger. He and his colleagues had hoped to gain more world prestige and knowledge about the Sudan, but now fear that its carefully fostered neutral stance has been eclipsed by the stories that Mahgoub was pro-communist. Mahgoub told me that he now plans to stay through the early part of the UN session and then will do what he can to keep Sudan public opinion on an even keel. He added that there might be another chance for him to be elected president of the Assembly.

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PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY <b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b>		REPORT NO. <b>00- B-3,110,747</b>	
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**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION**

**SOURCE**

Officer of a US public relations firm, which specializes in publicity for foreign governments and industries.

1. When Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, planned to visit the US (July-August 1958), I was interested to see that Kooma Agbelli Gbedemah was not included in the party. He was left at home to "tend the store". However, on arrival in Washington, Nkrumah found that the arrangements for US financial assistance were not so far advanced as he had thought and requested that Gbedemah fly over to attend meetings as Minister of Finance for Ghana.
2. I have known Gbedemah for some time and understand that he is really the "right hand" of Nkrumah. The two men are completely different types who need and complement each other. There is no real love lost between them but both have a great respect for the other. The other ministers dislike Gbedemah for his influence over the Prime Minister. Gbedemah admitted to me that he can push matters just so far in the other ministries and then must be extremely careful not to have his colleagues think he is trying to intrude in their spheres of influence. Nkrumah, too, is conscious of this jealousy and tries to conceal the extent of the Finance Minister's importance. It is very common for Nkrumah to discuss a matter with a Minister and then turn to Gbedemah for his advice as well. At the conclusion of the visit to Washington, Nkrumah asked Gbedemah to accompany him for the rest of the trip, but the minister refused, saying that Nkrumah could do the hand shaking, but he thought it would be a waste of time for himself and preferred to go back to Ghana. Gbedemah is the only official who would dare to refuse a Nkrumah request.
3. Gbedemah is an interesting personality. He is very un-African and is almost an amalgam of Africa, the US and Europe. He is truly an intellect by African or almost any standards, with wide ranging interests in many fields. The Minister is extremely well-read, spending two to four hours nightly with a book. He scoops up material of all kinds wherever he goes and his powers of retention are excellent. His preferences are for information of a practical rather than theoretical nature, and his thinking tends to be towards the possible rather than merely the desirable.
4. The Finance Minister thinks favorably of some sort of an African Federation but only in terms of the future, perhaps in 40-50 years. He is one of the few African leaders who seems to recognize the eventual importance of Nigeria after it achieves its independence. He realizes that one day it will exploit its riches and be a real power for the present he thinks that an independent Nigeria will not be a unified nation initially, but actually three political units of the West, South and North, with a loose single government structure on top. The central government will be weak and ineffective for some time for lack of experienced personnel and because of area rivalries. However, because of Nigeria's future potential, Gbedemah already makes a point of going out of his way to cultivate Nigerians.

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9. Gbedemah, I feel, is biding his time over the long range. He will certainly be a power in West Africa. Although he probably has personal political ambitions, at present he is most at home as a behind-the-scenes policy maker. There is a possibility that, in the event of the fall from power or the death of Akrumah, he might become Prime Minister. Gbedemah told me during his current visit to Washington that he fears Kojo Botsio, the Minister of State, looks too much in Akrumah's reflected glory. Botsio spends most of his effort carrying favor with the Prime Minister and has not been developing the leadership qualities or experience needed to replace Akrumah effectively for Ghana should that become necessary. Gbedemah is concerned over what might happen with Botsio as head of the government, although there seems to be no doubt that Botsio is now the most popular of the two.

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