Date: 06/25/98

Page: 1

#### JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Released under the John

F. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).

Case#:NW 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

RECORD NUMBER: 145-10001-10185

AGENCY: NSC

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 126

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR:

FROM:

TO: THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

TITLE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

DATE : 00/00/00

PAGES: 5

SUBJECTS: CONSEQUENCES OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION:

RESTRICTIONS: 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/23/98

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:


NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

> 2016 MAR

DATE:

### SPECIAL HANDLING






MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation
MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation
MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special
Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement
is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention
(in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment),
effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to
this request, the requirement has been divided into its
separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)




- c. Major units involved in the initial assault include:
  Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an
  armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/
  wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together
  with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter
  squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.
  - d. Principal equipment includes:
  - (1) Army Artillery units and armor (including about 275 tanks.)

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

# IOP SECRE SPECIAL HANDEINE NOFORM



#### 3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a. Army - None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping.

c. Air Force - In order to land the maximum number of airborne troops in the minimum time fourteen Air Force

Reserve troop carrier squadrons (C-119) were originally included in the airlift plan however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day.

- d. Marines None.
- e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands.
- 4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within 10-15 days. Subsequent to gaining such control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits.

16,21

# IOP SECRE SPECIAL HANDENE NOFORN

a. When the assault forces have been committed to the Cuban operation, the strategic Army forces in CONUS would be short the supporting forces for the remaining five division. It is estimated that the Army Airborne two division force yould be available for other operations 5-30 days after with rayal from Cuba. The equivalent of an Army division force from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces and remain on the island to perform counterguerrilla operations and conduct military government activities. This force will be progressively withdrawn as the new Cuban government increases in effectiveness.

b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability that deployed with the Sixth Fleet) will be enga fully during the initial phase of the operation. requirement for amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counterguerrilla activity until order has been restored. It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days. About 50 per cent of the Pacific amphibious troop lift capability will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of These ships would be available for other operations in the Pacific about 15 days after the withdrawal of the Pacific Marines from Cuba. In addition to the amphibious troop lift capability the initial requirements for sealift will include MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration. Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the nitial 10-20 days of the operation. estimated that combat-ready status of

21

d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed.

Marine expeditionary brigade within 30 days of withdrawal.

withdrawal combat-readiness of the Pacific Command

TOP SECRIC SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

e. CONAD air defense capabilities in southeast United
States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air
Force forces brought into the area for this operation. Therefore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is
anticipated.

#### 5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction.

- a. The military reaction will be determined in large measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency in their use, at the time of US military intervention.
- b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare.
- c. Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States. All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to guard against any such attempts at retaliation.
- d. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for counteraction will improve if Soviet's continue to provide the Cubans with additional military equipment and training. Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities.

### TOP SECRE SPECIAL HAND IN NOFORM

### 6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation.

- a. The duration of a US military presence in Cuba is contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support a defeated Castro might receive for the conduct of residual guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an effective friendly Cuban government.
- b. Following the establishment of essential military control of the island, a substantial US military commitment may be required in Cuba for a significant period of time. Post assault tasks will include restoration of law and order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations.
- c. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above, it is planned that the post assault military presence initially will consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with such other sea and air support as may be required. This will be reduced gradually in size as the effectiveness of the new Cuban government increases. Thereafter, a lengthy period of providing military assistance is anticipated.