OPN HAYMAKER Effects

Objectives & Measures of Effectiveness

- AQ no longer views NE Afghanistan as a safe haven:
  - Marginal Disruption

- Loss of key AQ members / enablers:
  - Marginal Disruption

- Local opposition to to AQ members / enablers:
  - Localized Disruption

- Exodus of key AQ:
  - Minimal Disruption

**Effects against AQ and TB enablers in Kunar and Nuristan are considered temporary without a long-term, persistent campaign**

**OPN HAYMAKER (01 Jan 2012-28 Feb 2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ops</th>
<th>EKIA</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
<th>JP</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enabled Ops</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kinetic Strikes</td>
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<td>219</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
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**Senior Nuristan Taliban Detainee**
Ahmad (OBJ BRANDYWINE)

"Hands down, the scariest/most intimidating message for the Taliban, at any level, from fighter to Taliban senior leadership, is anything to do with drones or aerial bombings. The Taliban has no way to defend against them and they are certain to end in absolute destruction of whatever their target is."

**OPN HAYMAKER: Massing sustained kinetic effects to deny AQ sanctuary in Konar & Nuristan**
HAYMAKER Campaign Effects Update

AQ Setbacks in Konar/Nuristan
- AQ/TB enablers feel significant pressure from Strikes
- Waygal disrupted, network shifting to other areas of Konar
- (OBJ SMOKESCREEN) orders temporary halt to fighter movement into AFG
- AQ Media/Facilitation network assessing way ahead for support to AQ in Konar based on losses
- TB increasingly equate AQ presence with Kinetic Strikes
- 18 AUG Kinetic Strike Network Reflections “The Chapa Darah Network is Finished”

Objectives & Measures of Effectiveness

1. AQ No Longer Views Konar / Nuristan as Alternative Safe Haven: Temporary Disruption
2. Afghan-based AQ Members are Captured / Killed / Displaced: Marginal Disruption
3. Taliban Dynamic Enablers unable to Provide Sanctuary: Significant Disruption

Effects against AQ and TB enablers in Kunar and Nuristan are considered temporary without a long-term, persistent campaign

HAYMAKER Operations (01 May – 15 Sep 2012)

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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th># Ops</th>
<th>EKIA</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>48%</td>
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<td>70%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
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</table>
**Objectives & Measures of Effectiveness**

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**OPN HAYMAKER** (01 May 2012 – 05 Feb 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ops</th>
<th>EKIA</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
<th>JP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Combined/Enabled Ops</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kinetic Strikes</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>220</td>
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"Hands down, the scariest/most intimidating message for the Taliban, at any level, from fighter to Taliban senior leadership, is anything to do with drones or aerial bombings. The Taliban has no way to defend against them and they are certain to end in absolute destruction of whatever their target is."

*Effects against AQ and TB enablers in Kunar and Nuristan are considered temporary without a long-term, persistent campaign*
Manhunting Basics

- **HUMINT**  These aren’t the terrorist you’re looking for
- **IMINT**  FMV is your friend ... and enemy
- **SIGINT**  May I ask who’s calling, please?
- **ABI**  More layers are preferred
- **SNA**  More connections aren’t always best
- **IPB**  Yep, IPB
- **F3EA**  Can we stop adding letters?

- **Kinetic v. Direction Action**
1 FIND: Development Ops continuous look at the next ridgeline's targets
2 FIX: Current Ops daily hunt for near certainty
3 FINISH: Current Ops handoff to FIRES
4 EXPLOIT: Future Ops nightly task of ingesting the day's collect
5 ANALYZE: Future Ops layering of IMINT, HI, SI to prep Current Ops' next day's FIX
## OPN HAYMAKER
### Success Criteria – Before and After

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>August 2011 – HAYMAKER 1.0 IOC</th>
<th>February 2013 – HAYMAKER 2.0 IOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loss of key AQ members/enablers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- K/S successfully killed approximately one AQ target per year; AQ easily reconstitutes.</td>
<td>- HAYMAKER efforts succeeded in killing/capturing few key AQ targets. Improvement over pre-HAYMAKER efforts, but pace of successes needs to be faster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local opposition to AQ members/enablers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Little to no local opposition to AQ; AQ entrenched in key Taliban networks.</td>
<td>- Nascent developments in some valleys indicate locals are tiring of AQ efforts to root out spies as a perceived method to stopping strikes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exodus of key AQ</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relatively free movement to/from PAK at AQ's discretion.</td>
<td>- Few individuals have returned to Pakistan due to routine operational necessity and continue to support AQ efforts both in AFG and externally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AQ no longer views NE Afghanistan as a safe haven</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- AQSL discussions specifically focused on utility of AFG as a safehaven – movement of families, construction of AQ-specific infrastructure.</td>
<td>- Sporadic reporting of concern over viability of safehaven overshadowed by AQSL discussions of post-2014 sanctuary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OPN HAYMAKER
Functional Teams

Current Ops (24hr cycle)
- Targeting Officer
- NGA analyst
- SIGINT analysts
- ITCs
- FMV screeners

Future Ops (48hr cycle)
- HAT
- D7/D13
- 11th IS
- CIA
- SIGINT analysts
- Intel. analysts
- FMV screeners
- NSA-Washington
- NSA-Georgia
- CNOS

Development Ops (+48hr cycle)
- DIA Sr. analyst
- NGA Targeteer

36 total personnel attached to TF EAST
OBJ LETHAL BURWYN – QARI MUNIB

Target Data

- **Objective**: 3.1.1: Neutralize Taliban Shadow Leadership

- **Characterization**: Taliban Sub Cdr
  - Exercises command and control over specific portion of organization
  - Reports to senior leaders
  - Has operational autonomy
  - Manages the network and executes guidance

- **Significance**:
  - Qari Munib is a Taliban subcommander operating in Pech District responsible for numerous attacks on CF/ANSF. He is associated with numerous Taliban district shadow governors, relays guidance and provides BDA on attacks to TB officials in Pakistan.

- **Derogatory Reporting**:
  - 30OCT12: Munib planned to inform unidentified associates regarding casualties from a reported attack on 30 OCT on Manogay base. (GQ011351515601267698)
  - 29OCT12: Munib instructed likely Taliban associates to stay busy utilizing Pikas and PKMs. (GQ01135151308464915, GQ0113515148823505821)
  - 29OCT12: Munib instructed Taliban associates to likely execute attacks, to including IEDs, for the next two days against an unidentified base. (GQ0113515323257403)
  - 19OCT12: Munib prepared two IEDs for upcoming attacks. (ACODEX/M1/S00,EC/PP/293,14042)
  - 3OCT12: Qari Munib planned to pick up his explosives in Marawara District which were sent by [QUICKSBURG]. (ACODEX/M1/S00,EC/PP/282,14352)
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  - 3SEP12: Qari Munib planned to pick up his explosives in Marawara District which were sent by [QUICKSBURG]. (ACODEX/M1/S00,EC/PP/282,14352)

- **Ethnicity/Nationality**: Pashtun

- **TGT List**: JPEL: JTL: Pending Approval

- **Intelligence Value**:
  - The c/k of Qari Munib would decrease attacks on CF/ANSF in central Kunar. Qari Munib could provide information on other senior TB members in Narang and Pech districts.

- **IO**:
  - Influence patterns of life IOT facilitate C/K opportunities
  - Disrupt C2 network
  - Reduce popular support to restrict FOM
  - Post-Op Mitigation: Yes
TF East – Request for Kinetic Strike Approval

LETHAL BURWYN – Priority Targets

Desired Results
Kill Qari Munib (LETHAL BURWYN)

Military Value:
- Qari Munib is a Taliban subcommander operating in Pech District responsible for numerous attacks on CF/ANSF. He is associated with numerous Taliban district shadow governors, relays guidance and provides BDA on attacks to TB officials in Pakistan.

Derogatory Reporting:
- 30OCT12: Munib planned to inform unidentified associates regarding casualties from a reported attack on 30 OCT on Manogay base. (GQP01135157601257698)
- 29OCT12: Munib instructed likely Taliban associates to stay busy utilizing Pikas and PKMs. (GQP01135151308946915, GQP011351468823565821)
- 29OCT12: Munib instructed Taliban associates to likely execute attacks, to including IEDs, for the next two days against an unidentified base. (GQP011351513233257403)
- 19OCT12: Munib prepared two IEDs for upcoming attacks. (ACODEX/M1/500,EC/PP/293,14042)
- 19OCT12: Qari Munib planned to pick up his explosives in Marawara District which were sent by [QUICKSBOURG]. (ACODEX/M1/500,EC/PP/282,14352)
- 30SEP12: Qari Munib planned to meet with a weapons dealer to buy a PKM. (ACODEX/M1/500,EC/PP/274,23322) 1AUG2012: [FLATHEAD] coordinated with Qari Munib for an attack that would start the next day intended and was intended to take over three separate districts. (ACODEX/M1/500,EC/PP/215,06432)

Supporting Intelligence (VID):
- Single User/VID: I: 49357 0546Z 30OCT12

Proposed Action and Collateral Damage: LOW
- Target is considered SINGLE-USE and CDE is assessed as LOW

IO Effects:
- Media effect: unlikely
- Political sensitivities: unlikely
- Population blowback: unlikely

CAT 1 Concerns:
- None
MISSION: TF East conducts a kinetic strike against Qari Munib (LETHAL BURWYN) in the Dar-ye Pech District, Kunar Province on 04 November 2012 in order to degrade the insurgent network in Kunar Province and enable the Battle Space Owners freedom of maneuver in RC-East.

SIGNIFICANCE: Qari Munib (LETHAL BURWYN) is a Taliban sub-commander operating in Dar-ye Pech District responsible for numerous attacks on ANSF and coalition forces. Qari Munib is associated with numerous Taliban district shadow governors, relays guidance, and provides BDA on attacks against Taliban officials in Pakistan.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1. ~0230z GR76 reported SI at BDL compound for OBJ LETHAL BURWYN.
2. GR76 SI/IMINT correlated 5xMAMs left the compound and proceeded 150m SW of BDL compound. 5x MAMs remained static from 0320z-0740z at this location.
3. 0523z SKYRAIDER correlated SI activity on OBJ LETHAL BURWYN and established IMINT signature.
4. 0740z OBJ LETHAL BURWYN proceeded up ridgeline with 2xPAX and re-entered BDL compound. SKYRAIDER maintained IMINT lock on the compound.
5. 0819z OBJ LETHAL BURWYN departed BDL Compound, SKYRAIDER confirmed PID of IMINT signature.
6. 0835z SKYRAIDER engaged OBJ BURWYN resulting in 1xEKIA. TF East observed multiple PAX transport remains away from strike site.

RESULTS: JP—Pending EKIA, 1 x TOTAL EKIA

SKYRAIDER (MQ-9) correlates TI in open terrain

SKYRAIDER (MQ-9) engages TI and confirms 1 x EKIA
TF East has currently identified 8 NAIs in Waygal Valley associated with al-Qaida, foreign fighters, and key Taliban enablers.

- Through focused collection and development, TF East will identify additional NAIs to map out enemy networks in Waygal Valley.
- TF East will identify POL activity at these NAIs to discern signatures of al-Qaida, foreign fighters, and Taliban leadership using layered intelligence collected over extended ISR soaks coupled with SI and HI atmospherics.
Waygal Valley Engagement Areas – in work
Waygal District, Nuristan, AF
OP WAYGAL – Operational Targeting Criteria

Waygal District:

- **Maturity of HUMINT network – HIGH.**
  - HI networks have developed over the past 12-18 months. HAT and OGA have myriad complementary sources, some of whom may be able to trigger our operations.

- **Quality of established NAlS – HIGH.**
  - We currently have high fidelity on 8x NAlS in Waygal. This speaks to the level of historic HI, SI, FMV development in the valley.

- **Depth of SIGINT start points – MED.**
  - A third of our active targets have good selectors. NSA-W has taken on SI development in Waygal, greatly enhancing our understanding of the SI environment.

- **Number of active targets – HIGH.**
  - Over a dozen active targets across 3 villages, most of whom are JTL'd or could easily be. Known AQ Arabs are on this deck.

- **H-value* – HIGH.**
  - Waygal is an historic AQ sanctuary. The targets there are not only senior-level Taliban facilitators and hosts, but Arabs themselves.
  - Faruq al-Qahtani and Dost Mohammad and their entourages frequent Waygal.
  - Elimination of these targets will provide demonstrable measures of success.

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**HAYMAKER Value (H-Value) is the assessed return on investment of achieving success in a named operation**
TF 3-10 Mission Statistics (16 SEP 11 – 16 SEP 12)

- Total Missions: 2,082
- Night Ops: 1,848 (88.8%)  1,909 (91.7%)
- No Shots Fired: 1,948 (93.6%)
- Target Individuals:
  - 709 (34.1%)
  - 1,239 (59.5%)
  - 173 (8.3%)
  - 14 (0.67%)

SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO//FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG