


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PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

Society for Psychical Research

VOLUME XXVI

(CONTAINING PARTS LXV, LXVI, LXVII)

1913

*The responsibility for both the facts and the reasonings in papers
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PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

Society for Psychical Research.

PART LXV.

SEPTEMBER, 1912.

PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEETINGS.

THE 139th General Meeting of the Society was held in the large Hall at 20 Hanover Square, London, W., on Monday, February 19th, 1912, at 8.30 p.m., SIR WILLIAM CROOKES in the Chair.

DR. L. FORBES WINSLOW read a paper on "The Need for Advance in Psychology."

The 140th General Meeting was held in the Queen's (Small) Hall, Langham Place, London, W., on Thursday, May 23rd, 1912, at 5 p.m., the President, The RIGHT REV. BISHOP W. BOYD CARPENTER, D.D., in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT delivered the Address which is printed below.

I.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS.

Delivered on May 23rd, 1912.

BY THE RIGHT REV. BISHOP W. BOYD CARPENTER, D.D.

I HAD much hesitation in accepting the office which I have the honour now to hold. I did not deem that I possessed the requisite original equipment or the acquired knowledge to deal worthily with the work and objects of the Society. Nevertheless, the kind and sympathetic way in which my difficulties were met by Mrs. Henry Sidgwick and Sir William Barrett awakened another feeling, and led me to fear lest churlishness or indolence might be urged against me if I sought to escape the task to which I was invited.

I occupy from the nature of the case a position somewhat different from that of my predecessors in this office. They were experts; I am not: they held high place in the world of thought; I do not.

I cannot claim that happy acquaintance with detailed experiments, or that patient study of phenomena, which were so evident in Mrs. Henry Sidgwick's Presidential Address: I cannot claim the right of continued study which would lead me to follow Mr. Arthur Balfour or Mr. Gerald Balfour into the regions of profounder philosophy: I cannot claim scientific authority, made secure by brilliant and successful investigations, which gave weight to the utterances of Sir Oliver Lodge: I cannot claim the wide range of knowledge and happy gifts of my predecessor in office: I come to you from a life whose studies have been crippled by the continuous interruptions of inevitable duties: I cannot claim to do more than put before you some thoughts which have been pressed upon me from many sides and which may give you, if not any useful contribution to your investigations,

at least the suggestion of some questions which may have occurred to the minds of others.

First, may I make my confession of faith and speak of the conviction which led me to take an interest in the work of the Society? My interest was aroused by the studiously scientific spirit which it claimed.

There are some people who are attracted to this Society by a vague hope of some startling or sensational facts: the vague and vulgar world prefers sensation to truth. But the very title adopted by the Society carries a constant caution: it is a Society for *research*, and research needs those qualities of mind and thought which we associate with the adjective scientific, viz. extreme caution in accepting evidence, rigorous investigation of facts, determined refusal of doubtful narratives, a prudent scepticism and a vigorous maintenance of mental equilibrium. The true spirit of research does not want romance: it carries a wholesome distrust of eager garrulity: it knows that the evidence of the senses is often deceptive. Whatever attractive adornments may embellish a tale, it is better to be loyal to truth than to be the victims of illusion: and as members of this Society we are not seeking copy for works of imagination: we are anxious to reach fundamental facts; we seek the gold which will stand test: we are ready to crush into powder the great masses of ignorance and superstition in which it may be embedded.

A very interesting paper was written seventy years ago by the Secretary to the Royal Institution, the Rev. John Barlow. The subject of the paper was Man's power over himself to prevent or control insanity. In 1843 men did not possess the physiological knowledge of to-day; but the suggestions made by the writer are, if I mistake not, as useful to-day as they were two generations ago. According to Mr. Barlow, the difference between the madman and the sane is not in the presence of the illusion, but in the power or want of power or resolution to examine it. The illusion is not the madness: even the mental derangement is not the madness. The resolution to discriminate is the protective power, which keeps madness at arm's length. To illustrate this position he cited the case of Dr. Nicolai of Berlin (1799). Dr. Nicolai had passed through times of much anxiety and trouble, and he

became subject to painful experiences: he saw in his room the figure of a dead acquaintance: he realized that this experience was due to some brain derangement, and he refused to yield to the illusion. As his health was re-established, the haunting presence vanished. A similar experience befell Dr. Bostock of London. In both these cases some derangement had taken place: in both cases the men possessed the vigour of mind to discriminate between fact and illusion: both were victorious in a struggle which might have ended in insanity.

Now no reasonable member of a Society whose purpose is careful research will do other than applaud the attitude of mind which so preserved its equipoise as to refuse to be terrified out of its wits, and which by holding fast its integrity was able to show that even brain derangement ought to be faced, watched and conquered, while in the conquest the true nature of the illusion was made manifest. "I took occasion" (writes Mr. Barlow) "to notice a peculiar force in man, which is capable of assuming control over this (a certain) portion of the brain; and, through it, over the greater part of the bodily functions—a force whose agency, as Professor Liebig has well observed, is entirely distinct from the vital force, with which it has nothing in common; but in so far as it is in connection with matter, manifests itself as an acceleration, a retarding or a disturbance of the 'processes of life.' We find therefore, as this acute observer (*i.e.* Dr. Liebig) goes on to state, two forces in authority together, namely, the mechanical-vital force, or as he terms it the *vegetative life*, and the source of the higher phenomena of mental existence which is of a perfectly distinct and so far superior nature, that it is able sometimes to exercise a dominion over the vital force, which nullifies its action and at all times modifies and controls it."

We should not state these matters in the same terms to-day, but their statement even in obsolete phraseology will be welcome because of the strong and vigorous good sense in which Mr. Barlow deals with illusions, and because of the clear way in which he insists on the influence which the mind can exercise over the body and its functions. We have travelled far since Mr. Barlow wrote his paper, but to me it was a surprise to find in 1843 such modern conceptions. I do not suppose that, notwithstanding our advance in knowledge, there is anything

in Mr. Barlow's substantial position which will be seriously challenged to-day, and I feel sure that the members of this Society will endorse the wisdom of his conclusions, viz. that the resolution to maintain our power of discrimination in the presence of abnormal phenomena is essential to the maintenance of our mental equilibrium. I am glad, therefore, to think that the bridle of a wholesome scepticism is always provided in this Society: the nature of the incidents and phenomena which form our stock-in-trade are of a character which might tempt the unwary or the imaginative to give free rein to their fancy. In societies as well as in individuals we need to avoid being taken captive by illusions: we need the dry light of reason: we need the persistent and trained habit which can, not only listen to, but cross-question evidence. A lawyer of unusually wide experience said to me, "There is little truth in the witness box." It is the task of the skilful counsel to extract the modicum of truth which is there. No progress will be made by rejecting all evidence as tainted on the plea that human weakness and even human wickedness may be met with in our investigations. It is a difficult task to separate the chaff from the wheat or to extract the gold from the rocky mass in which it is embedded; but if we want either the fruit of the harvest or the precious ore, we must face the difficulties, and we must possess the patience of mind which can detect some rational sequence even among irrational and inconsequential statements of fact.

We may, therefore, readily welcome all material supplied for investigation, as long as we are candid enough to publish criticisms from all intelligent sources: those who welcome Sir Oliver Lodge's happily safeguarded and suggestive lines of thought or Sir W. Barrett's careful exposition of Poltergeists, Old and New, will not resent the humorous scepticism of Mr. Andrew Lang or the healthy doubts of Count Solovovo. The last number of the *Proceedings* (Part LXIV.) seemed to me to be felicitously typical of the fitting attitude of the members of this Society.

It may be asked, and it is right that the question should be asked, whether this Society has contributed any influence of practical good to the world. The man in the street, to use a familiar and suggestive expression, may be pardoned if he looks askance at inquiries which must seem to him speculative, vague and irrelevant to life's practical activities, and he

may be forgiven if in his resentment against what he deems wasted time and energy he asks whether anything which can be translated into terms of practical value has been given to mankind as a result of these prolonged and costly inquiries. We must not be surprised that men who measure all things by utility ask—what good does it do?

Now there is one reply to this question which I venture to make—at the same time emphasizing the caution that this Society cannot be held responsible for the views of any of its officials, and that the President, even in his presidential address, can only speak for himself. One good, however, I think can be claimed as a practical result towards which the work of this Society has contributed. We passed—I speak of those who have reached threescore and ten—we passed through a period of very crude and blatant materialism some forty or fifty years ago: the pages of popular magazines blazed with the firework conclusions of scientific materialism. Matter was the fundamental fact in the universe: nothing could be done without matter: thought was only a smoke given off by heated matter: genius not merely depended for its expression upon the material in the brain, but was simply a manifestation of brain stuff. I remember being challenged by a dying man with this question: how could God think, seeing that He was spirit and therefore could have no brain? In such crude forms of thought the materialism of the day revelled. Men think differently now. Mind then was nothing but an effluvium of the brain-cells. Now we are told that “matter is a pauper-denizen of the conceptual world.”¹

To-day the attitude of science is changed: the relation of brain to thought is better understood: we realize that our physical nature puts limitations upon our opportunities of thought, and also that limits have been set to the materialist hypothesis. No sane man, indeed, will deny that our powers of thought are largely governed by brain conditions: every one recognizes the strong and constant influence of the body over the mind: we know that the power to express ourselves is not unlimited, but strictly limited by the instrument put into our care: we cannot contribute to the world more than the instrument will allow, any more than a violin can give forth

¹ See *Mind*, April, 1912, “Matter and Memory,” by E. D. Fawcett.

the sounds of a trumpet or the cymbals take the range of the organ. Live things, as Sir Oliver Lodge has reminded us,¹ cannot alter the quantity of energy, they can merely utilize available energy like any other machine. To use the image employed by a French bishop, Monsigr. d'Hulst, "The master of a house may, if he is not satisfied, discharge his servants, but the soul of man does not possess a like freedom: it must be content with the bodily organs which are in this sense his servants; but its dependence upon them goes even further; for even for the most purely intellectual processes a co-operation and co-ordination of physical powers is necessary: thought demands blood, and when the blood supply is scant and poor the energy of thought is impaired."

We may admit all this, but nevertheless the sturdy materialistic hypothesis of a generation ago has given place to a more modest and reasonable judgment. If the body has power over the mind, the mind has power over the body: the world has realized this: the very extravagances of what is called Christian Science are the evidence of the reaction which has taken place. We are not bound to leap to extremes, but we must recognize that the materialist of other days rode his hobby-horse till he killed it. Reasonable men, men of reflective powers, and men of scientific experience, who frankly acknowledge the power of the body over the mind, are nevertheless as strongly convinced of the power of the mind over the body. Professor Dubois does not hesitate to declare that the ills brought upon men through the mind are more frequent than those caused by bodily disorders. He relates that a man, through mere mental impression, caught a cold because his neighbour turned the page of a newspaper quickly and in doing so caused a slight current of air.² This may remind us that when large panes of glass were introduced into windows instead of the old-fashioned small panes, Samuel Rogers, the poet, caught cold, because being placed with his back to one of the new large-paned windows, he could not rid himself of

¹ *Life and Matter*, p. 133.

² *De l'influence de l'esprit sur le corps* (Fraulke, Berne, 1908), p. 75. See, however, Prof. Mosso on Fatigue (p 195), who noted that consciousness returns when awaking from sleep without any change in the blood circulation of the brain.

the idea that the window behind him was open. If, said a physician to me at one of our large provincial hospitals, we could calm the minds of our patients, the cure of their bodies would be more simple and rapid. Everywhere the power of mind over the body is recognized: hypnotism, auto-suggestion, and a hundred other words tell the same tale, viz. that inquiry to-day is turning more and more to the deeply interesting problem—is the mind or soul of man endowed with power to govern or modify physical nature? We do not now believe that matter is the sole antecedent and condition of mind: we are much more likely to follow out the suggestion that mind can sway matter, and the question which we are putting to ourselves is not whether it can be done; for we know that it can, but what are the limits and conditions under which mind—the human mind as we know it—can control or modify the action of the body or the physical world which environs us. And here the work of this Society has been recognized.

One very ardent advocate of the virtue of this mental power has referred his hearers to the *Proceedings* of this Society as giving the best and most helpful material for arriving at a just and wise conclusion on this matter. It cannot be denied that in the revolt against the low-levelled materialism which threatened to rob mankind of its noblest prerogatives, its most splendid inheritances, and its most inspiring outlook, this Society has played a quiet, modest and most effective part in recalling men's thoughts to the need of a more careful study of their own innermost nature, if they are to measure rightly the position which man holds and is meant to hold in the universe, and if they are to understand the significance and value of the priceless gift of life, which opens to us such wondrous opportunities of knowledge and self-culture, of hope and high endeavour.

I have thus touched on the spirit and achievements of the Society. I now must proceed with greater caution, as I do with greater hesitation, when I venture to set before you some thoughts connected with the work which lies before us.

We speak of man as human being, but man is not a completed being: he is a being in process. He is one in whose nature is held not only present consciousness but notes of the

past. If so, may not some of the exceptional phenomena which challenge investigation result from the dim inheritances or relics of old forces? But further, man is a being in process, and anticipations of the future may find place in him. May not some phenomena be accounted for as movements of nascent activities in man's nature?

To make the proposition good, it needs to be shown that—

Man is a being in process of completion,

That he still holds within his nature relics of the past,

That his is not a stationary nature, but a nature constantly acquiring powers and in doing so forming new capacities.

(1) Man is a being in process of completion:

In investigations concerning the conditions of human personality, it has been too often taken for granted that we are dealing with a completed organism, whereas I am obliged to view man as an incomplete being: he is indeed not so much a being as a becoming: he is still in the great factory of Nature.

If we ignore this point of view we shall fall into the error which, without his fault, beset Paley's argument for design. Paley started with the illustration of a watch—a piece of mechanism made and completed for a purpose: he could point to the evidences of purpose in the various parts of the mechanism and in the arrangement of the dial; but the illustration which was natural enough when Paley wrote, became no longer applicable when the great evolutionary drama was disclosed: the Universe was not like a watch—a completed machine: it was a growth, and more, it was still in process of formation: its purpose was not written there as upon a finished piece of mechanism: we were living in a Universe which was still in the making. The simple but rough argument from design could not be applied to a vast but uncompleted system. Investigations must henceforth be made with the remembrance that movement of development was still going on, and that while we might notice what has been called a dramatic tendency in the history of things, we could not so readily or so obviously speak of definite and detailed purpose. "Reality . . . is still in the making and waits part of its complexion from the future . . . the universe is still pursuing its adventures."¹

¹ Prof. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 257, quoted in *Proceedings*, Vol. XXV., p. 17.

Now, the same fact needs to be kept in mind when we examine into the nature of man: he is not yet a completed being: he is a being in process of formation. We can, with Prof. Fiske,¹ follow the history of his formation: we can go back to the long and wondrous story of those changes which tell of Natural Selection, of the influence of slight physical variations on succeeding generations, of the dawn of changes which brought psychical powers into prominence, when touch was translated into vision till a stage is reached when psychical changes became of more moment than physical. Then came that condition of animal life when strong physical resemblances might be seen allied to great psychical differences. We all realize the fact that through long periods the development of man went on: we need to remember that it still goes forward; no longer as far as we can see on the physical, but on the psychical plane. In all our inquiries concerning man this fact needs to be kept in view: we are not examining a finished organism: we are dealing with a being whose past has been a record of great physical changes, and who to-day is still the subject of such psychical changes as are leading forward to developments of power and capacity which can only be dimly guessed at now. The only difference, so far as we can judge, between the past and the present movement is that Nature is no longer concerned to develop man's physical conditions or structure: her task now is to bring humanity to a higher and truer perfection in the possession of qualities of soul whose full value can only be estimated when physical nature, as we know it, is finally laid aside.

Will any one think that psychical research offers a barren field of inquiry when once it is realized that it is in the path of psychical and not of physical development that man is now being led by the same strong and mysterious force which first fashioned and brought to perfection his physical framework?

But it is upon the simple fact that man is a being still in process of formation that I wish to fix our thoughts. The history of the past gives us witness of this: science with its clear testimony shows that through the action of what, for lack of a better word, we may call laws, there has emerged from lower to higher life man as we now know him, and that even now

¹ Fiske, *Destiny of Man*, pp. 27-8.

changes are working if no longer for his physical, yet through his physical experiences for his psychical development.

I turn, therefore, to one aspect of man's psychical growth. From the standpoint of science man is not a stationary being, but a being in process of development—the subject of growth. The same is true when we ask about man's consciousness of self: here too we meet the law of growth. Self—is there anything more certain to us than self? Each of us is daily experiencing the power of saying—It is *I* who felt this: It is *I* who did that: It is *I* who forms this judgment. In other words our life is inconceivable to us apart from this most certain thing “Self,” and yet our consciousness of self may be said to be a growth: this self is in truth a thing of which we gain conviction—not immediately, but through a repeated number of experiences: it is—as Dr. Ward has said—a product of thought, not a datum of sense. It is, shall I say? a resultant of experience.

The baby new to earth and sky,
 What time his tender palm is prest
 Against the circle of the breast,
 Has never thought that ‘this is I:’

But as he grows he gathers much,
 And learns the use of ‘I’ and ‘me,’
 And finds ‘I am not what I see,
 And other than the things I touch.’

So rounds he to a separate mind
 From whence clear memory may begin,
 As thro’ the frame that binds him in
 His isolation grows defined.

In Memoriam, xlv.

What Tennyson expressed in verse, science tells tersely in prose. “The body first of all gives to self a certain measure of individuality, permanence and inwardness.”¹

The conviction of self then is a resultant of experience: a conviction due to continuous presentations. Our sense of personality is in fact a growth, and as a growth it carries with it a history, and as a growth it may carry with it some prophecy also; for all things which grow pass through stages—

¹ Dr. James Ward, *Encycl. Brit.* Article “Psychology,” p. 84a.

in other words, they possess folded up within themselves the records of the past and the preparations for the future: the blossom is the product of months of growth: it is also the harbinger of fuller and richer developments.

It is perhaps well to consider this aspect of selfhood. We are so ready to limit ourselves by the Here and Now that we may lose sight of the truth that if we are beings we are also "becomings": our days glide on and we step from stage to stage of self-realization, and just as there was an epoch when we were without ability to realize ourselves or to express ourselves, so it may well be that our self-realization is as yet incomplete, just as we painfully know that our powers of self-expression are woefully defective: we are growths, not only in the sense that we have each individually grown, nor in the sense that the race has grown through aeons of change, but that we also are upon the platform of growth, holding within ourselves a vast and unexplored inheritance of past experiences and the potentialities of further developments—when self-realization will be yet more vivid: when possessed of a self more fully identified, and *also*, perchance, endowed with a vehicle of expression more plastic and responsive than present physical conditions can allow, we shall be able to give fuller and nobler expression to the speechless aspirations of our nature. We are but creatures in process of formation: we know not what we shall be: we scarcely even know what we are. The mystery which hangs around those wonderful convictions which we describe as Self—Personality—the Ego—the Soul—is largely due, as it seems to me, to the fact that our present life, like our ante-natal life, is embryonic as compared with that towards which we are tending. We are like people called upon to report upon a machine while it is going: we are at a disadvantage, for we want to stop it to understand how it goes. But even this illustration is quite inadequate, for a machine which is working is not subject to growth: in its case it is rapidity of movement only which thwarts our examination of it, but in regard to ourselves and our own selfhood, we are dealing with not a finished machine, but a complex organization which is still in process of development.

This strange self then we cannot, with Hume, describe as a philosophical fiction: we may call it, with Dr. Ward, a

product of thought or an idea of the reason, but we do not therefore deem it an unreality, it reveals itself too vividly for that: it possesses what we may call cross-currents—an ebb and flow of the tides of selfhood. Self does not always give us the same self-interpretations or presentations. So marked are the differences of presentations that the self was split up by some: and we heard much of dual personality—or of a soul which is *over* and separate from the soul which is *under*. The theory of an over soul¹ has had fascination for many minds: its existence was postulated to explain some phenomena or experiences which could not be explained (so it seemed) by the ordinary action of the conscious mind. Here we need to be cautious in words lest we should appear to divide what, by its very nature, must be one and indivisible.

The soul is individual: this seems to be the final word of human thought on the matter: to think otherwise is to lose hold of all anchorage for thought. I may be told that science has been obliged to abandon her faith that atoms were indivisible, and that now she is committed to a perpetual bull by enlarging upon the marvellous subdivisions which subsist in the indivisible thing called an atom. But the cases are different: the physical atom could be treated, examined, analyzed till its elusive elements were compelled to disclose themselves; but the self cannot be so dealt with, and we might as well abandon all inquiry as admit that essentially the self was other than individual. Were it so, there would be no reason for revulsion of feeling when alienist experiences were brought to our notice. We must, I think, postulate the individuality of the soul or self if we are to study its activities, conditions and moods, with any hope of advantage. It is well, therefore, to avoid any language which implies a duality or multiplicity in self. We need, however, words or phrases to distinguish between the different aspects in which the self or soul manifests its energy.

¹ Compare Dante's words,

“Whenever by delight or else by pain,
That seizes any faculty of ours,
Wholly to that the soul collects itself,
It seemeth that no other power it heeds;
And this against that error is which thinketh
One soul above another kindles in us.”

Purgatorio, iv. 1-6.

Mr. Myers chose a word which avoided the suggestion of any dualism. The subliminal self was not another self but the same self working in other conditions: this subliminal self or subconscious self has made its footing too good in human experience to be treated as an unreality or a delusion. Fechner, if I mistake not, suggested a similar thought when he spoke of consciousness being present and awake when the psychophysical activity was raised beyond the degree which we call the threshold (*On Life after Death*, p. 78 n.) I am not careful or anxious about the word by which we describe it, but of the fact that the self sometimes acts with conscious effort and at other times with unobserved effort there can, I think, be no doubt. But there does not seem to me to be any need to set up an arcanum of ideas or a Valhalla of strange potentialities in order to account for facts which are deeply interesting and at times mysteriously so, but which, if I mistake not, fall within the realm of what I may call psychical order.

We are beings still in a state of growth; and the tendency of this growth seems to be, not towards a multiple personality, but towards completed individuality. Growth in capacity takes place through repeated effort, and through such experiences comes true and full self-realization.

Man's inheritance through the past is never thrown away: it must enter into the education—or, if you prefer the words, the formation of the conditions—of his nature. But all this antecedent growth bears the mark of struggle: at every stage of the evolutionary process the marks of conflict, *i.e.* of effort, were to be seen, and though now these records slumber as it were in our nature there was a time when their tale was one of continued struggle. The truth, as it seems to me, is that the condition of progress or growth is this, that conscious effort is continuously being transformed into unconscious capacity.

Let me ask your experience on this point. We are sensible, of course, of our conscious efforts, because the very consciousness of any effort serves to impress us. But effort, though it is a witness of energy, is not the evidence of acquired capacity: it is only a step towards it. In this sense it may be said that our conscious efforts are not manifestations of our real power, but rather of our capacity to gain it. Conscious efforts are only means for the storage of power: they are needful, for

without them the accumulation of power would cease. The energy once seen in vegetable growth has been transformed into the quiescent energy which sleeps in our coal seams. Or to carry the illustration a step further, our conscious efforts are like the coaling of the ship: they will become power as coal does when once the furnaces are kindled and the steam is generated. Our conscious efforts are supplying the fuel for further activities, but the larger number of these activities will be carried on without conscious exertion. The man who has practised at the wicket, taking careful lessons from the professional cricketer, is making keenly conscious effort when he gives thought and attention carefully to carry out the instructions of the professional, but the final measure of his skill as a cricketer is when he can play the ball with such an unerring instinct that he is no longer conscious of any mental effort in determining how to play it. This is an example of conscious effort being slowly transformed into unconscious power. Illustrations might be multiplied, but it remains true that the skilled billiard player, the efficient soldier, the successful actor, the popular singer, only reach their highest when a very large part of their task is discharged without painful, conscious or mental effort. We only do things well when we don't know how we do them; but the process by which such skill is reached is through continuous exercise of conscious effort. Action in the hour of necessity must be the resultant of instinctive skill, *i.e.* power used without consciousness of effort. The good billiard player shows power without calculated effort: his power is the resultant of many conscious and calculated efforts, but for him the calculated effort is no longer needful. Conscious effort has been translated into unconscious power. He has but to will and the trained capacity answers to his will.

Our conscious powers are at work when we read, or when we think out a problem; for then we are acting like accumulators: we are storing up material for use or action. In acquisitive work we use conscious effort. In creative work of the highest order such a sense of conscious effort would be fatal to the highest results. When the great spirit of genius calls, the mind is swept into an activity in which it is no longer conscious of effort: he does not toil, neither does he spin, but the creation

of the hour is arrayed in a fashion which no conscious effort could achieve. Here the old distinction comes into service. Talent does what it can: genius does what it must. Talent is deliberate and constantly conscious of effort put forth. Genius acts under a necessity. He lisps in numbers, for the numbers come. He sings the inevitable song. He pipes but as the linnets do. There is no painful consciousness of efforts: there is no smell of the lamp on such work as this: it is ready, spontaneous, springing out of the necessity of nature: it is the splendid manifestation of great stores of power so happily stored that they are immediately available.

The unconscious power is the resultant of conscious effort: conscious effort has stored up somehow and somewhere the stores from which capacity derives her skill. There are numbers of unrecognized powers at work in the average man, of whose existence he is hardly aware and whose genesis he could scarcely trace. Is it not admitted that when dealing with our fellow-men, we come across unexpected barriers of taste, feeling, prejudice? Convictions and judgments, standards of conduct and bearing have been acquired from early training. Precept and example, often repeated and enforced, have accumulated in man's nature forces which are now unconsciously operative throughout the whole range of his life. In dealing with any fresh matter, he will meet it with the force of a number of long-stored conditions: his judgment on a new question will depend upon what has been described as his entire psychostatical conditions, his nature and stock of ideas, or, in other words, his character, habits, memory, education, previous experience and momentary mood. Does the average man deal with any new subject on the basis of pure logic? It is not his reasoning faculty only which he calls into the judgment seat: the whole mass of inherited experiences hurry to the assize and resolve to be, if not judge, at least jury in the case. "There is," says Professor James (*Psychology*, p. 327), "an everlasting struggle in every mind between the tendency to keep unchanged, and the tendency to renovate its ideas." Does not this mean that when we approach a new experience we feel divided in mind, doubting, wishing to examine and yet feeling that it is valueless unless we can bring it into automatic relationship with our previous stock of thought.

Our conscious efforts are challenged by the new thing, but we feel the necessity of transferring it into the storehouse of personal powers or capacity. In other words, we are always seeking mental food, and always feeling that the only value of it is found when it is translated into some kind of personal energy.

Only when this personal energy is set free from the anxiety of conscious exertion can it be said to have reached perfection. All the experiences of life, the solitudes which have been our portion, the pressure of responsibility, the weight of sorrow, the fatigue of effort, all have been of the nature of conscious exertions, and therefore have contributed to the storehouse of powers which can be used in effortless manner later on. The quiet sympathy which the sorrowful life has created no less than the ready intellect which works easily, is an instance of conscious effort transformed into unconscious power.

Hence there is being slowly formed in man—through repeated conscious efforts—an inheritance of powers and capacities which can work without the sense of strenuous effort. All the experiences of life's continuous struggle are contributing to the endowment of man with new powers. Is it then difficult to suppose that among the accumulated powers of man there may be resident capacities which can come into play without conscious effort? The range of automatic powers increases with our development. Continually the conscious effort passes over to man's nature a fresh heritage of automatic power—which enriches his personality and contributes even more and more to his self-realization. He is only free in the exercise of self when he can achieve without the servitude of continuous effort.

This constant transference of effort into power is building up personality: it is enlarging the realm of self. All Nature's method is in the direction of building up into an intelligible unity—not in the direction of dislocating powers: her policy is continuous unification, not separation; and as she follows it, the range of powers which are bestowed upon man increases; and it would not be strange if new capacities were thus brought within the sovereignty of his soul, and with the increase of new capacities enjoyed by countless individualities new phenomena might spring into notice. The completion of personality would

mean the extension of powers, and the manifestation of these powers would give rise to new phenomena.

We are beings in a state of growth: the treasure-house of a wonderful past is ours: often out of the unexplored treasure-house of our ancient inheritance there may come to us messages from the dim past which fill us with wonder, but which need not be counted incredible, for they are the breathings of forgotten experiences of the race. As an inscription in some unknown character is dug up among the ruins of some ancient shrine, so there may come to us some undecipherable expression of facts or methods of life which belong to a past which has gone out of human recollection. "Every element in an experience is correlated with some alteration in the nervous system, and we must infer that some kind of residue or impression, chemical or physical, is left in the neurones in consequence of which they have a disposition to reproduce, when again stimulated, the original experience, whether an idea or physiological reaction."¹ Without being materialists we must surely admit that whatever is built up with our bodily framework must constitute a part of our life's equipment, and may tend to become a suggestive factor in our activities. As those with whose very nature the past has been wondrously built we must be liable to influences arising from our physical relationship with the past. How closely the past does intertwine itself with our organism may be realized when we read Dr. Alexander Hill's account of pre-natal growth.

In a few days or weeks or months a drama is acted which has taken geological aeons to rehearse, for every individual recapitulates in its growth the successive stages to which its ancestors attained and at which they severally stopped. What explanation could the teacher of fifty years ago give of the gill-slits, or tail, or a hundred other resemblances to lower vertebrates which the human embryo presents in the course of its development? They are by no means necessary preparations for adult structure. They never can be useful. Not infrequently they are mischievous. Man's organs reach their permanent form by many a roundabout road. These digressions are indicative of the tenacity of Nature's memory. She can attain her

¹Dr. T. W. Mitchell, *Proceedings*, Vol. XXIV., p. 667. Review of Dr. Morton Prince's paper on "The Psychological Principles and Field of Psychotherapy."

goal only by tracing over again—with a jump here and a short cut there it may be, but without letting go of the clue—the path which she followed when she first discovered it.

Thus the conditions into which we are born are conditions which are instinct with the power of a great past. In a sense different from that of the ancient writer, God has set the world, as it were, in our heart. Is it surprising then that at times glimpses of the past should show themselves? May not the unexpected phenomena of human life sometimes find their explanation in the coming to the surface of some ancient stratum of experience? As an earth-shock may thrust up some rock which tells us the story of earlier earth movements, may not some startling event in life call into activity some long buried aptitude of our slowly built nature? There may, indeed, be stored within us forces which some strange experience may vivify and liberate. The explanation of some strange capacities of our nature may be locked up in the bosom of the past.

Are not some of the phenomena which demand investigation probably due to the activities of obsolescent organs, or of capacities which have been weakened but not wholly suppressed in the process of civilization? May we not in this way account for the power which some show in the use of the Divining Rod? Does not the instinct which warns animals of the approach of the storm or the impending earthquake find its counterpart in human beings? and do not both find their explanation in the experiences which from the past are still stored up in the very physical framework which man and animals inherit? It is no part of wisdom to laugh at the expression or manifestation of instincts, whose existence is derived from and throws light back upon the story of developing life. When the seafaring man declares that he is warned of the proximity of ice by his sense of smell, it seems to be no mark of intelligence to ridicule the suggestion. Inquiry is wiser than ridicule. It does not seem to me passing strange that in the vast community of mankind there should be found scattered individuals in whom the relics of past instincts are still strong enough to be factors serviceable in life as we know it.

But if we are beings still in the making, is it beyond the

range of probability that anticipations of the future may be discovered? If embryonic life contains records of the past, does it not also contain prophecies of the future? In the sacred casket wherein the dawning life lies enshrined there is written not only the story of the past, but the anticipations of the future. Nature is beforehand with her work. Judged by present necessities, we find organs provided which serve no purpose. In the secluded existence where light does not shine, eyes can fulfil no function: within those closed doors, shut out from the converse of men, ears have no exercise; yet in that dim life shut off from sunshine and the song of birds, organs of sight and sound, of taste and smell are to be found. They serve no purpose as yet, but they are prophetic of a life in which they will play a great and serviceable part. Nature works not only in preserving relics of past experience, but in storing up forces in anticipation of future needs. Process and capacities are produced without their object being apparent: one day they become of service: they are made for a condition of existence which is to come.

And may it not be that our present life compared with the future life is an embryonic life? May there not be faculties and powers which are now being formed whose full significance and value will only be evident when we pass into a life of new conditions? If so, would it be a strange thing if these nascent capacities sometimes made their presence felt within the experience of the life present? The embryonic life is cut off from the world as we know it, but it is not wholly passive: stirrings and movements, which cut across normal experiences, make themselves felt. Is it impossible to suppose that the growing forces, which beneath the surface are being prepared for the wider life of the hereafter, may make themselves felt in ways which are not those of commonplace life? May not some phenomena, which we cannot classify according to normal usage, be the dawning activity of powers and capacities which will only be fully ours hereafter? The stirrings of such capacities are but the movement of forces, which are real, but whose meaning and purpose cannot be fully understood till the conditions have arisen which make these activities natural and intelligible. For the present, therefore, any manifestation of these growing powers must be reckoned as super-normal.

Briefly, if we are beings in process of formation, movements may be expected which presage future conditions as well as those which bear witness to conditions which are passing away. As becomings, the mark of what has been, as well as of that which will be, may now and then rise to the surface. If the plane of evolution is no longer physical, but psychical, these movements which are anticipative of future conditions of life must be expected within the psychical realm. The life towards which we tend is one which will be largely free from physical conditions as we now know them. The forces which will be operative in that life are not created out of things physical: their origin is to be found in our psychical activities: volitions, thoughts, resolutions, actions, habits are the matrix out of which will spring the characteristic capacities which will be ours in the life of new conditions. Only then will the new self emerge from the discipline and formative influences of our present life; and that new self will be endowed with powers and capacities, which will be great or small, mean or noble, according to our habits here, but which will be fitted at least for use and service in the life in which the natural has given place to the spiritual.

The suggestions which I have ventured to make will indicate the line which I think the work of our Society ought to pursue. While being strictly vigilant against fallacious representations of phenomena, vigorous in examining all facts and circumstances brought to notice, it ought to hold a mind open enough to welcome hints and helps from every quarter: it ought to be as stern in rejecting what is irrelevant as it should be keen to perceive the importance which may lurk in what is insignificant. "Though truths in manhood darkly join," we are none the less entitled to search out such truths and bring them to light; and in this search we shall render to the body that which is the body's and to the soul that which is the soul's. We shall be just and even-handed, to rob neither our physical nor our spiritual nature of its due, but we shall recognize that in a being compact of body, soul and spirit, the resultant of long ages of growth and development, powers and capacities may be lodged which are not always explicable by present knowledge; we shall be awake, therefore, to mark those effects which show the working of interacting human powers.

Every substantial form, wrote Dante,

Every substantial form that segregate
 From matter is, and with it is united
 Specific power has in itself collected,
 Which without act is not perceptible,
 Nor shows itself except by its effect,
 As life doth in a plant by the green leaves.

And while pursuing with a careful and open mind the fascinating investigations which are our task, we may perhaps well call to mind the caution which one, who was more ready to welcome super-normal phenomena than most of us are, nevertheless gave to the world: "Sometimes a little chink does open, suddenly and quickly close again, in the gate, generally shut up, between this world and the next, the gate which only death is to open for good and ever. Nor is it well for us to peep through those chinks before the time. But such exceptions from the rule of our present life are still in harmony with the greater rule which comprehends both this life and the life hereafter. . . . However, all those things are no signs of a healthy life. For in this life we have only to work out our bodies for the hereafter, not to see or hear with the eyes and ears of the hereafter. A flower when opened before its time will not thrive. And though our belief in a life to come may be supported by such occasional glances caught in this life, it must not take its foundation on them. A sound and healthy belief is founded on argument."

Such are the counsels of Fechner,¹ to which perhaps we may add our hope that in the process of human development new capacities may slowly unfold themselves, and if the sunset of life gives mystical lore, the advancing age of the world may bring a quickening of perceptive and intuitional powers.

The soul's dark cottage, battered and decayed,
 Lets in new light thro' chinks that time has made:
 Stronger by weakness, wiser, men become,
 As they draw near to their eternal home.
 Leaving the old, both worlds at once they view,
 That stand upon the threshold of the new.

¹ Fechner, *Life after Death*, pp. 79-81.

And the new, when it dawns, will not find our nature shattered and decayed, but so endowed with richer, nobler powers that the life which opens before us will be one in which our reinvigorated nature will pass to the pursuit of better tasks with glad energy, widened outlook, and unabated hopefulness.

II.

A MONTH'S RECORD OF AUTOMATISMS.¹

By MRS. A. W. VERRALL.

THE automatic phenomena described in the following paper are of various types, but all came under my personal cognisance within about a month, between the middle of July and the middle of August of the year 1907. Their main interest consists in their variety and their frequency during a particular period. In all the cases, my daughter or I was concerned, but where cross-correspondences were produced, our scripts were not always in the same relation to one another, sometimes one and sometimes the other appearing to take the initiative. Nor was the automatism always of the same kind; besides automatic script we employed the method of table-tilting by two persons. The experiments seem to have resulted in the production not only of cross-correspondences, but of statements, subsequently verified, about events unknown to the automatists.

I have narrated the four incidents in their chronological sequence, appending a short general discussion of the inferences which may be drawn as to their origin.

I. DREAM, DAWN AND DIANA.

This group of phenomena is somewhat complex, and it will be simplest to describe the various automatic phenomena as they occurred, adding to the scripts for the sake of clearness explanations derived from subsequent investigations, and explaining what at each point was the normal knowledge of each automatist concerned. I begin with a script of my own written during my absence from home.

¹Part of this paper was read at a meeting of the Society on December 8th, 1910.

M. V. July 14, 1907. 11 p.m.

nec non sine adiutore Deo—quis custodivit.¹ Unless God guard the house, the watchman watcheth but in vain.² Domini canes conantur.³

On the table a letter lies white roughish paper not square. The news has disturbed you—oh you of little faith—wait a happy issue.⁴

But you write not want I want [sic]. Dream pictures give the idea. Do nolbe [sic] things not dream them.⁵ Then comes Queen Mab, the queen of fairy dreams. Dream through the lightening darkness of your night, with glimpses of the real remembered waking—no it should be different. Dream through the growing whiteness of the dawn—*aube* is the word—you had that before—the white mountain—*Mons Albanus*—and the dream of dawn, the dream that is the truth. Say dreamer say.

A slumber did my spirit seal⁶—but in a dream came the knowledge. Now write the word

DREAM.

It is obvious at once that the main point of this script is the word “dream.” It occurs nine times, as noun or verb, and the word dreamer once. Moreover, emphasis is given by the large writing of the final word DREAM.

A secondary idea running through the script is “dawn.” This word actually occurs twice, the French word *aube* once, and the Latin derivative *albanus* once; while the “lightening darkness” and “growing whiteness” represent the same idea.

The allusion to *aube* and *mons albanus* which has “been before,” refers to an earlier script (of February 18, 1907), considered by Mr. Piddington to contain a cross-correspondence with Mrs. Piper on the word “arrow,”⁷ but this was not known to me when the script of July 14 was produced.

¹ “And not without God as helper—who has guarded?”

² Cf. *Ps.* 127, 1, 2.

³ “The Lord’s dogs (*i.e.* the Dominicans) make endeavour.” In the *Golden Legend* three explanations are given for the meaning of the name Dominic as “keeper of our Lord.”

⁴ This paragraph had no meaning for me.

⁵ C. Kingsley. ⁶ Wordsworth.

⁷ *Proc.* Vol. XXII., p. S2.

The next script for the purpose of this paper,¹ also produced while I was away from home, is that of

M. V. July 17, 1907. 1.5 p.m.

Ching China to Japan. Unfold the tale. nusquam impedit tibi quod ceteris saepe impedit: cum vocavero, tu audies.²

From hill to hill the call resounds
The shepherds drive their flocks.

And the grey clouds above like the grey sheep below slowly move homewards along the darkening ways of night. Guardian of the parting ways, bring home in safety ewes and lambs!

The fleecy flocks move peacefully round the watching moon, and so the night passes—with the DAWN comes a streak of colour in the sky—and then wakes ‘Sweet Auburn loveliest village of the plain.’³ Again what is aubanel but a morning song.

All points the same way—and the scented eve and twilight grey are followed by the rosy fingered Dawn.

And the black bat Night is flown.⁴

But keep what you write, and light will come to you some day. I wish I could talk to you again, but perhaps that will come. All this next month listen and write. . . .⁵

Keep your thoughts free.

This script repeats with emphasis the “dawn” of the last script. The word occurs twice, once in large letters, and the two words “Auburn” (in Goldsmith’s line) and “aubanel” (not an actual word) suggest the French word *aube*, which had occurred in the earlier script. The main idea then of this script is “dawn,” just as that of July 14 was “dream.” Both these words, as will be seen, were subsequently the subject of cross-correspondence.

¹One other script intervened, on July 15, but it deals with other matters, mainly non-evidential.

²“That which often hinders others will nowhere hinder you; when I shall call, you will hear.”

³Goldsmith, *The Deserted Village*.

⁴Tennyson, *Maud*.

⁵The sentences omitted are of personal application, and serve to determine the attribution of this script to Myers_v.

But before describing the sequel, I must here digress to comment on some points in the script of July 17, which seem to have been veridical.

The phrase "guardian of the parting ways, bring home in safety ewes and lambs" recalls to a classical student two aspects of the same goddess, namely, Diana. Diana is at once a patroness of parting ways—*cross-ways*—and the protector of young animals. A third aspect of the same goddess is introduced by the watching moon. So that a subsidiary idea running through the earlier part of the script is "Diana."

This of course I noticed at the time, and I supposed it to refer to Mrs. Forbes, whose Christian name, Diana, has been referred to more than once in my earlier script.¹ Accordingly, at my next opportunity, at the end of August, when Mrs. Forbes was staying with me, I asked her what she had been doing in the middle of July. She had been staying with a friend in the middle of the Yorkshire moors.² She told me that between July 1 and the middle of the month there was a great sheep-shearing going on all around her, fifteen hundred sheep sheared, great bleating and calling of ewes to lambs, and much fear lest the lambs should be separated from the ewes.

It thus appears that there was some reason for the connexion in the script of Mrs. Forbes's name with a description of shepherds driving their flocks, of the call resounding from hill to hill, and of the invocation to the goddess Diana, protector of young animals, to bring home in safety ewes and lambs. I had myself never been in the North of England in July or in any summer month, and had no idea that the allusion to ewes and lambs could be in any way appropriate at so late a season of the year.

But there is, I think, another, and perhaps more definite, link of connexion in this script with Mrs. Forbes. Mrs. Forbes sketches, and her sketch-book often serves as a sort of diary of her occupations and interests. When she came to stay with me at the end of August she showed me her sketches made during July, 1907, and before I had said anything about the script of July 17 she drew my attention to a sketch

¹ Cf. *Proc.* Vol. XX., p. 222.

This I learnt first from a letter received on July 30, 1907.

which she had made of Yorkshire moors, seen at sunset, and with a crescent moon. The date, attested by the note on her sketch, was July 17. So that on the very day on which my script had made reference to Diana and the moon, Mrs. Forbes had made a sketch of a crescent moon, amid surroundings of the type described in the script.

It will be noted that the moon of the script does not suggest, though it does not exclude, a crescent moon; the picture suggested by the word "watching" is that of a moon full, or nearly so, at any rate of a moon at night, not of a crescent moon at sunset. This point is of some interest in view of the sequel.

So far then for the veridical contents of this script, as subsequently ascertained. I pass on to my next script, also written during my absence from home. It is as follows:

M. V. July 20, 1907. 11 p.m.

Venditor spernit agrum pulchellum sed emptor inuenietur qui thesauros conditos in medium proferat. Audi et tu.¹

Bonaventura is the name and then write Desiderio. Desiderium semper pro amico—pone desiderium. spes et fides sorores illae inter se coniunctae amicum tibi reddere praevalent.² O death where is thy sting? Beyond our darkness there is light. The impenetrable seeming gloom is full of light. Look light wards listen to the rippling sound of the long light waves breaking on the beach.

Tell Helen I said so lately quite lately—she will understand. . . .³

The opening paragraph of this script may be taken as a symbolic indication that it is not such nonsense as the automatist supposes, but will some day be found to have a point. Possibly that point is contained in the next word, "Bonaventura." This conveyed nothing to me at the time, but in February, 1911, Mr. Piddington drew my attention to two

¹ "The seller despises the pretty bit of land, but a buyer will be found to bring forward into our midst its hidden treasures. Do you too hearken."

² "Longing [there is] always for a friend; lay aside longing. Hope and Faith, those sisters, joined together, have power to restore to you your friend."

³ The sentences omitted refer to personal matters.

facts: (1) that Bonaventura is the Franciscan who in Dante's *Paradiso* (*Par.* XII. 28 ff.) pronounces a eulogy on Dominic, and (2) that the preceding M. V. script of July 14—already seen to be connected with the script of July 20 by its references to "lightening darkness," etc.—alludes to the Dominicans.

Mr. Piddington further suggested that a reason for the introduction of Dominic's Order into the script of July 14—the script which emphasises the word *Dream*—may be found in the prophetic dreams which legend associates with St. Dominic, and the founding of that Order. These prophetic dreams are mentioned by Bonaventura in close connexion with his name;

"la sua mente . . . nella madre
lei fece profeta." (ll. 58, 59);

"la donna . . .
vide nel sonno il mirabile frutto
ch'uscir dovea di lui e delle rede
e perchè fosse, quale era, in costruito,
quinci si mosse spirito a nomarlo
del possessivo di cui era tutto.
Domenico fu detto." (ll. 64-70.)

The details of the dreams, not mentioned by Dante, are as follows:

Dominic's mother, before his birth, dreamt that she bore a black and white dog (*canis*) with a lighted torch in his mouth: while his godmother dreamt that on his brow was a star that illuminated the world: or, according to another version, on his brow and on the back of his head were two stars which lighted the East and the West.

If, as seems probable, the words in the script of July 20, "Bonaventura is the name," point to a reminiscence of Dante's *Paradiso*, the form taken by the simile in the introductory symbolism may be determined in the same way. For Bonaventura, immediately after naming Dominic, describes him as a husbandman or cultivator of land:

"ed io ne parlo
sì come dell'agricola," (ll. 70, 71.)

and a similar comparison recurs several times in the following lines. Thus he is set "to go round the vineyard," "to fight

for that seed wherefrom" grew the Order, and from him came the streams "whereby the Catholic orchard is watered."¹

I have read the *Paradiso* more than once, though I am not so familiar with it as with other parts of the *Divina Commedia*. But the word Bonaventura did not recall this passage to me, though I of course recognised an allusion to the Dominicans, in the *Domini canes* of July 14. I had no recollection, however, of any prophetic dreams in connexion with Dominic, never having taken any interest in either hagiology in general or Dominic in particular.

In consequence of the directions in the script of July 20, on my return home on July 22, I asked my daughter if she had lately been writing automatically, and heard that she had not tried for script since the end of June, 1907. On July 23, I read her the above-quoted M. V. script of July 20, and she began again to write automatically, and continued writing pretty regularly for a month or two.

Two of her scripts seemed to me when I saw them on Aug. 1, 1907, to present points of contact with my scripts of July 14 and 17, which were not known to her. The points are as follows:

H. V. July 25, 1907. 10.30 p.m.

... The only road is by the freedom of thought which belongs to those who are born free.

This recalls the "keep your thoughts free" of my script. The point is a small one, and would be hardly worth noting if it stood alone. But taken in conjunction with a passage in the next following H. V. script, it suggests a supernatural connexion with the M. V. script.

H. V. July 26, 1907. 10.15 p.m.

... The eye of fate is never closed, it watches even in the blackest darkness.

Per tenebras ad lumen,² the casement slowly grows a glimmering square.³

¹ The same idea is found in the *Golden Legend*, where Dominic is called the "keeper of the vineyard or the flock of our Lord."

² "Through darkness to the light." ³ Tennyson, *Tears, idle tears*.

The Latin words reinforce the idea which had emerged in my script of July 14, "the lightening darkness of your night," while the quotation from Tennyson closely reproduces the next sentence in that script, "the growing whiteness of the dawn," the line in question being part of a description of the approach of dawn in the chamber of death:

Ah, sad and strange, as in dark summer dawns
The earliest pipe of half-awaken'd birds
To dying ears, when unto dying eyes
The casement slowly grows a glimmering square.

It is true that the general idea of light beyond darkness was suggested to my daughter by my script of July 20, which I had read to her, but I think that there is evidence of supernormal knowledge of the M. V. scripts of July 14 and July 17 (which had not been read to the automatist) for two reasons:

- (1) the selection (on July 26) of a quotation which is at once closely parallel to a sentence in the script of July 14—"the *growing* whiteness"—and contains an implicit allusion to the word emphasised in the script of July 17, "Dawn";
- (2) the introduction (on July 25) of a sentence—"the thoughts of the free"—recalling a similar sentence in the script of July 17.

It looks, in fact, as if the automatist's normally obtained knowledge of the M. V. script of July 20 had stimulated the production of evidence of supernormal knowledge of earlier M. V. script, and it is even possible that some such stimulus was necessary. It will be noted that the M. V. script which contained a message to be conveyed to my daughter did not introduce either of the emphasised words "Dream" or "Dawn," though if the above-suggested interpretation of Bonaventura be admitted, it implicitly alluded to both those topics.

My next script was obtained on the morning of July 30; it carries on or supplements the previous script of July 17; thus:

M. V. July 30, 1907. 10.50 a.m.

Teucro duce et auspice Teucro.¹

Rectorem post ponis quem omnium Directorem adposui. Fac auscultes.

¹Hor. *C. I.* vii. 37. "Under the auspices and leadership of Teucer."

Omnia in ordine bene dicta comprehendere potes. sed senatorium signum illud nondum percepisti—lunatum epi cothurno sigillum. Id iam saepe antea in scriptis apparuit,—tanquam inter astra per noctem serenam luna ipsa crescens.¹ The only image that I like in the Hugo poetry—the golden sickle in the gleaner's field.²

with borrowed light—and then repercussion of light in the opening passage of the Æneid. Æneas lay all night and watched the quivering light on the roof break and join.³

F W H M. quod fecit per alium fecit per se.⁴



In this script the emphasis is plainly thrown on “Moon,” and this time there is no doubt that the moon is a crescent moon, that aspect of the moon—an aspect hitherto overlooked—being represented four times in the script, namely by

(a) the senatorial crescent, a decoration on the shoe of a Roman senator;

(b) the crescent moon amid the stars;

(c) Hugo's comparison of the crescent moon with a golden sickle;

(d) the drawing of a crescent on a stick, this last being perhaps a reminiscence of a drawing of Blake's.⁵

¹ “You postpone Rector whom I have set to be the Director of all. Now listen. All that has been well said in due order you are able to understand; but you have not yet perceived the senatorial symbol, the crescent-shaped sign upon the shoe. That has often appeared in writings before now,—as it were, amid the stars on a serene night the moon herself, the crescent moon.”

² V. Hugo, *La Légende des Siècles*, *Booz Endormi*.

³ *Æneid*, VIII., ll. 18-25.

⁴ “What he has done by another, he has done by himself.”

⁵ *Gates of Paradise*, No. 9, where a man is about to climb a ladder set against a crescent moon (Gilchrist's *Life and Works of Blake*, Vol. I., p. 100).

I had at this time no knowledge of Mrs. Forbes's sketch of the crescent moon. But as the name Diana had been symbolised in earlier scripts by a crescent moon, the emergence of the crescent in this script may be accounted for—or at least may have been helped—by my having received a letter from Mrs. Forbes on the morning of July 30. I did not at the time, however, connect the crescent moon of my script with her.

I noted at the time the references in the script to Blake's drawing, Hugo's poem, and the passage from the opening of the *Eighth Æneid*. In Hugo's poem, *Booz Endormi*, in the first volume of *La Légende des Siècles*, Ruth is described as lying awake watching the moon amid the stars, and wondering

Quel dieu, quel moissonneur de l'éternel été,
 Avait, en s'en allant, négligemment jeté
 Cette faucille d'or dans le champ des étoiles.

Many years ago Mr. Myers in conversation, after a good deal of adverse criticism of Hugo's poetry, had expressed admiration of this poem, and in particular of the simile of the "sickle" in its context. No evidential value therefore attaches to this allusion in the script.

The same idea of a person lying awake at night with eyes open is suggested in what the script calls the "opening passage of the Æneid"—meaning, as I noted at the time, the opening of the Eighth Book, where the wandering thoughts of the wakeful Æneas are compared with the glancing reflexions on a metal bowl of water made by sunlight or "the image of the shining moon," which flit to and fro and strike upon the painted ceiling.¹

The script, then, of July 30, reinforces the *moon*, mentioned in an earlier script, making it a *crescent moon* and introduces Hugo's poem.

¹*Æneid*, VIII., l. 18 ff. During the sleep which follows these thoughts, Æneas is visited in dream by the river Tiber, and waking, as the god departs, sees the "rising light of the sun in heaven." So that this Virgilian passage combines with a simile introducing the moon the two ideas of Dream and Dawn. Possibly the first hint of a reference to this passage is to be found in the "Mons Albanus" of July 14. For the purpose of the dream is to announce to Æneas the approach of the "omen" which is to set a limit to his wanderings and determine the name of the long white city, Alba Longa, which his son shall found upon the slopes of the Alban Mount.

The automatic writing next to be considered involves two automatists, being produced not in script but by table-tilting on the part of my daughter and Mr. Bayfield. He and she have table-tilted on several previous occasions and produced results, some of which have been reported to this Society and published in the *Journal*.¹ Their first sitting at this time was on July 29, 1907, at 6 p.m.—the day before the above-described script.

On July 29, after some rubbish of a kind only too familiar to us all, just before leaving off, Mr. Bayfield suggested that “something evidential about some one” should be given on the next occasion. To this the table assented. Mr. Bayfield asked if it would be “about Piddington,” but the table said “No.” He then said “suggest something,” and the table replied “Mrs. Forbes.” Accordingly, on the next occasion this subject was introduced as follows:

July 30, 1907. 6 p.m. M. A. B. and H. de G. V. (M. de G. V. taking notes.)

(M. A. B. What about Mrs. Forbes?)

Torquay, she is there² — with her mother — ask her about the letter she wrote yesterday.

I was present, taking notes, as I had been on July 29, but I did not touch the table. I had received, as I have said above, a letter from Mrs. Forbes on this very morning of July 30, but had said nothing of it to either automatist. The table’s spontaneous selection on July 29 of Mrs. Forbes as the subject of a verifiable communication was recalled to me when I received a letter from her on July 30, and I awaited with interest the tilting of that day. It seems as though this interest of mine, and this only, were so far reflected by the table. The information that Mrs. Forbes was at Torquay³ was incorrect. Her letter announced that she was in the North and about to join her mother in Surrey on Aug. 1. But it was appropriate to say, “Ask her about the letter she wrote yesterday.”

¹ See, for instance, S.P.R. *Journal* for March, 1907.

² The — represents a pause in the tilting of the table.

³ So far as I know, there is no association between Mrs. Forbes and Torquay.

There followed a very short attempt to give the contents of the letter, which was incorrect. The table then passed away from this subject to its familiar pretence to give verifiable names and incidents. Then, after a considerable pause, the following occurred :

July 30, 1907. M. A. B. and H. de G. V.

(*M. A. B.* Give us anything you like of value.)

Pour être grand il suffit de connaître ce qu'on veut. Hugo.

(*M. A. B.* Where is the quotation?)

Notre Dame.¹

(*M. A. B.* Why was it given?)

Came to me when I was thinking——about Mrs. Forbes.

(*M. A. B.* Has it any connexion with Mrs. Forbes?)

Yes.

(*M. A. B.* What is the connexion?)

I don't know.

Here I told the automatists that Hugo had been referred to in my script of that morning, but that their allusion was not the same, my script referring to a poem, whereas the table had given a prose sentence. I did not at this time see any point in the statement that the phrase from Hugo had a connexion with Mrs. Forbes. Instructions were given to the table to think things over and to explain further its point about Hugo. We waited three or four minutes, and then the tilting was resumed.

A dream of life——comes in poem a dream.

(*H. de G. V.* Give it in French.)

La vie est brève.

I here recognised the first line of a verse very familiar to me, and quoted the whole verse, saying it was not the quotation in my script.

La vie est brève
Un peu d'espoir
Un peu de rêve
Et puis bonsoir.

¹The accuracy of this statement has not been tested.

I was at the time under the mistaken impression that this verse was by Victor Hugo.¹ The tilting was then resumed.

(*M. A. B.* Why did the script [*i.e.* the *M. V.* script] talk of Hugo?)
Association of thought.

(*M. de G. V.* Repeat what was told in my script [*i.e.* that this was the only simile liked by *F. W. H. M.*].)
Conversation.

(*M. A. B.* Between what two people?)
Mrs. V. Mr. Myers.

(*M. de G. V.* What was said about the quotation?)
He thought it expressed the thought best.

(*M. de G. V.* Give a word from the quotation.)
Rêve.

This ended the experiment for that day. I comment on the preceding extracts before going on to describe the next day's table-tilting.

"A dream of life," followed as it was by the line "*La vie est brève*," seemed at the time to me to have no connexion with the poem, *Booz Endormi*, referred to in my script, and certainly had no application to the actual verse there alluded to—the simile of the crescent moon. But as a matter of fact in V. Hugo's poem, Booz has a dream, a prophetic dream, foretelling that he will have a long race of illustrious descendants, he being at the time a childless widower. So that "a dream"² does "come" in the poem, and "a dream of life" is a not inappropriate description of that dream. The dream, called a "Songe," is thus introduced:

Or, la porte du ciel s'étant entre-baillée
Au-dessus de sa tête, un songe en descendit
Et ce songe était tel que Booz vit un chêne. . .

Later in the poem the word "rêve" is used:

Ainsi parlait Booz dans le rêve et l'extase.

The statements following upon the quotation, "*La vie est*

¹The poem of which this verse is part was subsequently the subject of a cross-correspondence between the Mae script and my daughter's script, as related in *Proc.* Vol. XXIV., p. 297, and Vol. XXV., pp. 320-334.

²The poem is divided into four parts, containing respectively 6, 2, 7 and 7 stanzas. The dream occupies the 7 stanzas of the third part.

bève," call for no comment; in so far as they are correct, they are not beyond a guess on the part of the automatists. Association of thought with the preceding "luna ipsa crescens" may certainly account for the introduction in M. V. script of the allusion to Hugo's poem; Mr. Myers did express his admiration of Hugo's simile in conversation,¹ and the speakers were Mr. Myers and myself. But neither of the two concluding statements are correct answers to the questions put, though they are perhaps not wholly irrelevant contributions to the subject in general; there is a certain resemblance between "expressed the thought best" and "the only simile that I like," and, as said above, the word *rêve* is contained in the poem, though not in the script.

Before the next table-tilting I read over the poem of Hugo, and removed it from the bookshelf, so that no one else should read it. I now saw what was meant by the association between Hugo and Mrs. Forbes in the table-tilting—"came to me when I was thinking of Mrs. Forbes." A similar association was shown in my own script, which combined the crescent moon and Hugo by a reference to Hugo's simile, comparing the moon to a sickle forgotten in the harvest field. The crescent moon, as I now realised, had occurred more than once in my earlier script as a symbol of Mrs. Forbes—an allusion to her Christian name, Diana. Thus on December 5, 1901, after a message from Talbot Forbes, came the words:

The tufted wheat and golden sickle not to cut,²

clearly a reference to the crescent moon, and possibly to this very poem.

At this stage, then, of the experiment I realised:

(1) that the table chose Mrs. Forbes as the subject of an experiment of evidential value on July 29, the day on which she wrote to me;

(2) that my script, produced after receiving her letter on

¹Not however, as Mr. Bayfield's question suggested, in a conversation between two people, but in a discussion on Hugo's literary merits, at a French conversation class in my house, where Mr. Myers and I represented respectively the critical and the commendatory view of Victor Hugo's work.

²See *Proc.* Vol. XX., p. 226.

July 30, connected the crescent moon, an emblem of her name Diana, with a simile in a poem of Hugo, familiar to me;

(3) that the table on July 30 connected together Mrs. Forbes and Hugo, without knowing why;

(4) that the table, challenged to say something about the contents of the poem by Hugo in my script, stated that it was about a "dream of life," and contained the word "rêve."

I did not then remember that, shortly before, my script had emphasised the word "dream." Of my impressions I said nothing to the automatists.

I pass to the next day's table tilting:¹

July 31, 1907. 11 a.m. *M. A. B. and H. de G. V. (M. de G. V. taking notes.)*

(a) (*M. A. B.* Tell us about the Hugo quotation.)

Sound expressive of thought.

(*M. A. B.* Be definite.)

Falling — sound

(*M. A. B.* Do you mean the thought of falling?)

Yes

(*M. A. B.* Say anything further to help us that you can.)

Tombe

(*H. de G. V.* We all know the French for to fall.)

(*M. de G. V.* Don't stop it; the word might be *tombeau* not *tombe*.)

De son altesse—infini —

(*M. A. B.* Can't you go on?)

No

[Here there was a long pause.]

(b) Pourvu que ton regard ton beau regard me suit je ne demande pas qu'on m'éclaire la nuit.

[Here I said that the general ideas were appropriate to the quotation in my script, but I wanted something definite. By general ideas I meant the references to *night*, *light by night*, the importance of a *look*, all of which represented ideas prominent in Hugo's poem, which is based on the Old Testament story.]

(c) Et l'horizon s'étend et la mer s'élève l'ombre profonde les ténèbres —

[Here there was another long pause. All this last portion (c)

¹ For convenience of reference, I have divided this record into parts, distinguished by letters (a), (b), etc.

had been tilted out with great slowness and apparent difficulty or sulkiness on the part of the table.]

(*M. A. B.* to *M. de G. V.* Does that make sense?)

(*M. de G. V.* Well, there's a verb wanted.)

S'approchent —

(*d*) [Another long pause, then suddenly with great briskness and speed:]

Mais le jour est là.

[We could get nothing further. We commented laughingly on the table's exemplification of its first remark, concerning the adaptation of sound to sense, by its own methods of tilting—extreme gloom and slowness during the remarks about darkness, followed by great vivacity when the break of day was announced.]

(*a*) It is characteristic of Hugo's poetry, with which both automatists were acquainted, though neither was familiar,¹ that the *sound* should be expressive of the *thought*. The next words tilted out ought to imply that this characteristic is exemplified in a line containing the thought of falling and the word *tombe*.

This I believe to be the case. When I re-read the poem with care for the purposes of this paper, I noticed that there is a line in which comes the idea of falling and the word *tombe*, and that this line is metrically arranged to express the thought by the sound. It has the four regular accents on the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 12th syllables of the Alexandrine, and moreover the punctuation and breaks between the words emphasise those accents. A line of this kind is not common in French versification,² and among the eighty-eight lines of this poem of Hugo's there is no other in which this particular rhythmical effect is obtained. The line runs:

Je suis véúf, | je suis séúl, | et sur mói | le soir tómbé. |

The next words, *de son attesse infini*, are apparently without point. They may be translated "from *or* by his infinite

¹I subsequently ascertained that neither of them had read the *Légende des Siècles*. I am myself very familiar with a good deal of Hugo's poetry, and have lectured on his metrical effects.

²A famous illustration of the effect of this particular rhythm is found in the despairing conclusion of the great dialogue between Chimène and Rodrigue in Corneille's *Le Cid*:

Que notre heúr fût si próche, et si tót se perdit.

majesty," a phrase which has no bearing upon either poem or script.¹ Possibly the flow had been interrupted by my daughter's contemptuous remark. Anyhow the table seemed to recognise its incapacity, and after a long pause broke fresh ground.

(b) The next phrases seem to mark a distinct advance towards describing the poem. The "look"—*regard*—is an important element in the story, as every one will remember. Ruth obtains Naomi's permission to glean ears "after him in whose *sight*" she should find grace (*Ruth* ii. 2); Boaz *sees* her in the field, and gives her permission to glean (ii. 6); she wonders why she has "found grace *in his eyes*" (ii. 10); and hopes to "find favour in" his "*sight*" (ii. 13). The sentence tilted by the table represents the general idea, not the words, of the poem; *regard* does not occur in the French.

The idea, too, of unlighted night,—"*je ne demande pas qu'on m'éclaire la nuit*"—fits with the description in the poem which emphasises the darkness all around, with only a crescent moon amid the stars. Ruth is waiting for

on ne sait quel rayon inconnu,
Quand viendrait du réveil la lumière subite.

Again, the metre of the poem is reproduced in this portion of the tilted sentences, which contains two Alexandrine lines:

Pourvu que ton regard, ton beau regard, me suit,
Je ne demande pas qu'on m'éclaire la nuit,

where the rhyme is obtained at a sacrifice of grammatical accuracy.

(c) The next group of words breaks away altogether from the meaning of the poem, which has no allusion to "horizon" or to "sea." These words, in fact, do not make much sense; a "widening horizon" and a "rising sea" seem unconnected with "deep shadow" or "approaching darkness." The actual words *ombre* and *profond*, do occur in the poem:

Les astres émaillaient le ciel profond et sombre;
Le croisson fin et clair parmi ces fleurs de l'ombre
Brillait à l'occident.

¹It has been suggested to me that in these words there may be an allusion to the godlike reaper—"quel dieu, quel moissonneur de l'éternel été"—who had left his sickle in the field of the stars; or the reader may, if he choose, correct *altesse infini* to *altitude infinie*.

(d) The final sentence of the script presents a certain parallelism with a line in the poem, as well as with the general idea. Boaz, meditating over his dream and the difficulty of supposing its fulfilment probable, contrasts his feeling with that of the young, whose dawn comes out of night as from a victory:

Le jour sort de la nuit comme d'une victoire.

It is noticeable that in their attempts—attempts at least partially successful—to identify the quotation from Victor Hugo alluded to in my script of July 30, 1907, the automatists produced both the words *Dream* and *Dawn*, which had been emphasised in my earlier scripts of July 14 and July 17, and which were known to me, but not to them, when the experiment was made. On July 30, they produced the word *Dream* explicitly thrice (once in French) and implicitly once (by quoting a line which rhymes to the French word), and on July 31 the statements terminated with an allusion in French to the break of day. But they did not produce the *Crescent Moon*, on which my attention was definitely fixed, and I therefore at the time regarded the experiment as not very successful. It was not till some years later that I recognised that the poem *Booz Endormi*, to which we had found allusions in both sets of writings—the M. V. script and the table-tilting—combines the ideas of Dream and Dawn with the well-known emblem of Diana, the crescent moon. For while Booz is visited by a prophetic dream, Ruth lies waiting for the dawn, and gazing at the “golden sickle” of the moon.

On the conclusion of the table-tilting on July 31, I showed the automatists my script of the preceding day, and my daughter at once said that a drawing somewhat similar to the drawing which terminates that script had occurred in a recent script of hers. She thereupon showed me the script in question, which I then saw for the first time.¹ I quote the whole script:

H. V. *June* 28, 1907. 10.30 p.m.

omnibus suppeditis abest omen²

The Canterbury bells are blossoming under the hedge lie

¹I had seen and heard nothing of H. V. script since March 17, 1907, and did not know whether she had been writing automatically or not.

²“All things being prepared (reading *suppeditatis*) the omen is lacking.”

still for a little space and listen to the fairy chimes. Lavender is sweet.

Mary [scribble] Pingott (?)

mist will show you the way.

the white lady of the

the moonlit spaces on the heather are bright with fairy lamps glittering dewdrops spread from spray to spray.

What of the hunting, hunter bold ¹



The resemblance between the drawings needs no comment; no such object had ever before appeared in the script of either automatist. "Lavender is sweet" was understood at the time by my daughter to be an allusion to the name of a pony of Mrs. Forbes's, Sweet Lavender, which had belonged to Talbot Forbes, and the allusion to hunting fits both the goddess and her namesake, Mrs. Forbes.

The rest of the script is not intelligible to me, but it is clear that three allusions to Diana (Mrs. Forbes's pony, hunting, crescent) occurred in this H. V. script, which preceded by 19 days the two allusions to Diana (guardian of parting ways, protector of young animals) in M. V. script.

Under these circumstances, I think this H. V. script, though not included in the "Month's Record" described in this paper, must be taken as belonging to the group of cross-correspondences on Dream, Dawn, Diana.

Only one other H. V. script was obtained between March 17, 1907, and July 1907, and this script, written on May 26, 1907, was also shown to me on July 31, at the conclusion of our experiment. It appears to me to have a possible connexion with the rest of the group, and I therefore quote it here:

H. V. May 26, 1907. 6.10 p.m.

Ad urbem restitutam ingreditur supplex remanet iudicium²

¹R. Kipling.

²"He approaches the restored city, as a suppliant. Judgement endures, or awaits (him)."

When the day dawns

And the light on the hills is spreading its rays,

When the upland lawns

Are spangled with dew in the morning blaze

Of a sun whose eyes

Have viewed since his sails in the West were furled

The laughter and sighs

Of a far-off people, an alien world—

Shall he gaze on me

An outcast derelict here on the seas of life?

Nay let him rather see

A beaten fighter released from the strife.

A dragon-fly blue and gold flitting hither and thither over the pool in the heat haze of a summer day, now poised now like a flash of living fire (illegible words) Monopol Hotel (illegible attempt at signature).

It is true that, as my daughter said at the time, there was nothing in her recent script resembling the sentences in the M. V. script of July 20, which I read to her; there is no "light beyond darkness," no "rippling sound of long light waves." But these phrases clearly connect with the expressions of M. V. script of July 14, and make part of the idea of "Dawn." This was not known to my daughter, so that she failed to see any point in the opening line of the verse in the H. V. script, "When the *day dawns*."

The two H. V. scripts of May 26 and June 28 are perhaps interconnected by the reference in both to "dew," or "dew-drops," and both indicate natural surroundings not inconsistent with those of Mrs. Forbes during the ensuing July; her sketch with the crescent moon shows "upland lawns," "hills," and "spaces on the heather."

I conclude the account of this somewhat complicated incident by a summary in chronological order of the automatic phenomena and the events which bear upon them. *Italics* represent the automatic phenomena; implicit or indirect references are placed within brackets.

1907.

- [A. May 26. H. V. "*when the day dawns*."
B. June 28. H. V. (*Diana*).]

- (1) July 14. M. V. "*DREAM: Dawn.*"
- (2) July 17. M. V. "*DAWN; (Diana); keep thoughts free.*"
- (3) July 17. Mrs. Forbes (Diana) finishes a sketch of the crescent moon.
- (4) July 20. M. V. "*Bonaventura; Light beyond darkness; Tell Helen.*"
- (5) July 22. H. de G. V. learns of No. 4.
- (6) July 25. H. V. "*freedom of thought.*"
- (7) July 26. H. V. "*through darkness to light; easement grows a glimmering square (Dawn).*"
- (8) July 29. H. V. and M. A. B. "*something evidential about Mrs. Forbes (Diana) to-morrow.*"
- (9) July 30. M. de G. V. receives a letter from Mrs. Forbes (Diana).
- (10) July 30. M. V. "*Crescent moon; Hugo's simile (in Booz Endormi).*"
- (11) July 30. H. V. and M. A. B. "*Hugo associated with Mrs. Forbes (Diana); Dream.*"
- (12) July 31. H. V. and M. A. B. "*Light by night; Break of Day (Dawn).*"
- (13) July 31. M. de G. V. learns of Nos. 6 and 7, A and B.

II. WATER RIGHTS. POLLUTION.

In the interconnexions just described my script appears in the main to have played the part of agent, though it is to be noted that on July 17, in so far as its contents were veridical, they represented an impression received from Mrs. Forbes, who may therefore be regarded as the agent.

In the next case my own normal thoughts seem to have impressed themselves upon two automatists, who apparently also received a veridical impression from another person. These automatists were my daughter and her cousin, Mrs. Riviere.

On July 30, 1907, my niece, Mrs. Riviere, came to stay with us in Cambridge; her husband, a barrister, was expected to join us on the afternoon of August 2, but a telegram was received from him that day saying that he had been kept in town by work and would not arrive till after 10 p.m.

My daughter and her cousin have often tried table-tilting together, and on August 2, at 9.50 p.m., during my absence

from the drawing room, they sat down to the table. The words tilted were as follows:

e fontaine

I demur to your plea your claim is void

At this point, my daughter, who was writing down the words, said that perhaps this referred to Mr. Riviere's cases, meaning the cases which had unexpectedly detained him in town.

Tilting was then resumed, and the words came

Simpkinson is claimant

Water rights.

During the tilting of these last words "water rights," I returned into the drawing room, and took notes of the following words, which were

Pollution steam laundry.

The meaning of these last words struck me at once. Just before leaving the drawing room, after 9.30 p.m., I had read in a local paper of an outbreak of enteric fever at Fulbourn Asylum, near Cambridge, and of some consequent anxiety as to the source of infection and the risk to the Cambridge water supply, which comes from the Fulbourn district. There is also a steam laundry near Fulbourn. The laundry was not mentioned in the paragraph which I had read, but at the time of an earlier outbreak of enteric at Fulbourn I had discussed with a friend the risk of contamination to users of the laundry—of whom I was not one—and it is probable that the news of this second outbreak revived in my mind a thought of possible danger from the laundry. I deliberately refrained from mentioning the outbreak of enteric to my daughter or my niece, and noticed as I left the room that the paragraph in the paper which I had been reading on the sofa was not visible.

But my precautions were rendered useless by the automatic results. There can be little doubt that the words "pollution steam laundry" were the reflexion of my thoughts. The words had no meaning for either automatist. Neither of them knew that there was anywhere any risk of pollution, or that there was any steam laundry near Fulbourn. They had not looked at the paper.

It appears as if my arrival in the room, while they were tilting the words "water rights," had diverted the automatic utterances from Mr. Riviere's supposed concerns to mine, and as if the word "water" served to effect the transition from one subject to the other.

Mr. Riviere arrived before anything further was obtained by tilting. On being asked what cases had detained him, he replied that he had been engaged in the afternoon of August 2 on a water-rights ease. But the name Simpkinson had no meaning for him.

There thus appears here to have been an attempt to produce veridical matter concerning Mr. Riviere's occupations, though, without the corroborative force of the sequel, in which my thoughts were tapped, we could perhaps not claim more for the earlier words than that they were due to a lucky guess. The name given, Simpkinson, was, as usual in our experience of table-tilting, meaningless, so that "water rights" might have been a mere shot, though I understand that water-right easements are not so common as to give much chance of success to such a random shot.

The idea of water seems to have underlain the whole incident; the opening words were "e fontaine," and both the following veridical statements concerned water. In this connexion, it is worth noting that the name of one of the automatists suggests water, and as E. is the initial of Mr. Riviere's Christian name, it is possible that the first words "e fontaine" are a symbolic reference to him.

However that may be, it is probable that the automatists had access to Mr. Riviere's thoughts, and, I think, indisputable that they tapped thoughts of mine which I had deliberately refrained from communicating to them.

III. REQUIESCAT.

In the next ease my niece and my daughter—percipients in the last incident—appear to be agents, and the part of the percipient is played by my script.

On August 3, 1907, my daughter and Mrs. Riviere, table-tilting in a room by themselves, obtained the words:

Strew on her roses roses.

These words were described as a quotation. The line being familiar—it is the first line of a poem of Matthew Arnold's called *Requiescat*—no evidential value was attached to it by the automatists and no mention was made of its appearance.

On August 14, I being then in ignorance of what had occurred, my script alluded to the same poem, thus:

M. V. August 14, 1907. 11 p.m.

...Strew on her roses roses — In quiet she reposes. Ah would that I did too.

I want Mrs [Holland] to make the same allusion to Matthew Arnold's *Requiescat*...

Here then three lines from this poem were given with the evident intention that they should form part of a cross-correspondence. A week later my script concluded with the first line of the poem, thus:

M. V. Aug. 21, 1907. 11.15 p.m.

not in direct communion but through the mind of another does the message pass. Henry Sidgwick has his share in the work—which you have not recognised...

...Sorrow had done its work. Try to see her grave Strew on her roses roses.

On August 28, 1907, my daughter and I compared our scripts, and she then told me of the table-tilting incident. On Aug. 31, her recollection of this was confirmed by the independent written statement of Mrs. Riviere, who had returned to London on August 10, before the first emergence in my script of any reference to the poem.

The poem is familiar both to my daughter and to me, and references have subsequently been made to it in both our scripts, but the emergences just described in August, 1907, were the first appearances, and, especially in view of the numerous inter-connexions between us at this time, it seems that the connexion is not accidental.

The reason for saying that Mrs. Riviere and my daughter "appear" to have acted as agents in this matter is that I subsequently learnt that in the waking-stage of Mrs. Piper's trance of March 13, 1907, a word interpreted by Mr. Piddington

at the time as "Requiescat" had been uttered, as intended for a subject of cross-correspondence, thus:

Faith hope charity
I'll give it.
Rescat resquiat.

If this is the origin of the emergence of the quotation in the table-tilting, the table-tilters may be regarded not as agents but as percipients.

IV. ANNOUNCEMENT OF COMET.

On August 9 my daughter and Mrs. Riviere appear to have produced a veridical statement concerning a comet. I quote the whole of the very odd and disjointed remarks obtained by table-tilting. Possibly readers of this paper who know more about comets than I do may be able to throw light on some of the less intelligible portions. But the opening sentences seem to admit of only one interpretation.

August 9, 1907. 9 p.m. *J. R. and H. de G. V. (M. de G. V. taking notes.)*

Quite right

(*H. de G. V.* What's quite right?)

I—meteoric sign in the east at dawn perchance some wanderer on the lonely heath had watched its phantom course across the sky.

(short pause).

lose understanding read read.

(The table refused to move, so *M. de G. V.* read over aloud what had been tilted out, and asked: Do you understand now?)

Yes.

(*M. de G. V.* Go on)

porrigit et vortex flammaram pallidus ignis coeligenae monstrum torquens — monstrosus et ipse.¹ end.

(*M. de G. V.* after reading above aloud; Give more about the meteoric sign.)

is a sign tell Piddington.

¹These ungrammatical Latin hexameters do not admit of accurate translation. They contain words that mean "a whirl of flames," "pale fire," "inhabitants of the sky," "itself a portent whirling something portentous."

(*M. de G. V.* Is there anything more?)

tot viridis textit ripas aegyptius amnis caespitibus — prae-
betque suum sic cuique — arigo.¹

(*M. de G. V.*, after reading above aloud: What is the mean-
ing of the last word?)

corn frumentum²

(*M. de G. V.* Is there any connexion with the meteoric sign
in these last statements?)

yes meteor brings fertility.

That the "meteoric sign in the east at dawn" is a comet is made clear by the Latin words in the immediately following description, *vortex flammaram*, "a whirl of flames," *torquens* "whirling," words appropriate to no other meteoric sign.

The implication in the concluding remarks seems to be that the comet is not malignant but portends fertility, such as the Nile brings to Egypt. In that case the word *pallidus* is appropriate, for a red comet seems to have been regarded by the ancients as specially malignant.³

The words "tell Piddington" are constantly used when the accompanying statement claims to be of evidential value, and were interpreted in that sense on this occasion. In view of the sequel it seems that in this case the intention was to produce not a cross-correspondence with some other automatist, but veridical matter.

On August 10, 1907, the morning after the above-described table-tilting, the *Times* and other morning papers contained notices of a comet. The paragraph in the *Times* concluded as follows:

The comet is now visible in the morning sky in the eastern quarter between 2 and 3 a.m.

There can be, I think, no reasonable doubt that the statement of the table at 9 p.m. on August 9 is directly connected with the statement of the *Times* on August 10. The question is whether any previous notice in any paper could have been seen

¹ Here again the Latin hexameters defy translation. The last word is nonsense and metrically impossible; the translatable words are as follows: "So many green banks does the Egyptian river weave with green growth (?), and so gives his own . . . to each."

² *frumentum* means "corn."

³ Cf. Virg. *Æn.* X. 272, 3; *cometae sanguinei lugubre rubent*: "bloody comets show a fatal red."

by either automatist, and particularly whether there was any reason why they should anticipate the appearance of a comet just at that date. There had been table-tilting on August 2, 3, 8, and 9, but no reference whatever to a meteoric sign or comet appeared except as above quoted on August 9.

We at once searched for notices of an approaching comet in the back numbers of all papers that we were in the habit of seeing, but could find nothing bearing on the subject. There was no mention of any comet in the evening paper of August 9 which we had seen, nor in the *Times* for a month before the date in question. The only paper in which I could find any notice of it was *Nature*—a paper which no one of the automatists ever sees, and which I went to a library to consult. The following notes represent what appeared in *Nature* in the "Astronomical News."

On June 20, it was stated that a telegram from Kiel announces the discovery of the 4th comet of this year by Mr. Daniel of Princeton on June 14.

On June 27, July 4, July 11, July 18, there were notes of the progress of "1907^d (Daniel's comet)."

On July 25, it was said to be "very probable that it will become an easy naked-eye object during August," and that on July 18 it had been seen with a small telescope at S. Kensington.

On Aug. 1 an account of its position from Aug. 3 to Aug. 19 was given with a map.

On Aug. 8 in one paragraph the comet was said to be "now approaching the naked-eye stage," and the dates of its rising on August 9, and of its approximate position on August 14, were given. In another paragraph in the same issue of *Nature*, it was said, "Daniel's comet has been visible to the naked eye since the first few days of July,¹ and is now sufficiently conspicuous to arrest the immediate attention of anyone who will look towards the eastern sky before the morning twilight becomes too strong." Then follows a description of its appearance at 3 a.m. on August 5, and its "Ephemeris" for some days, showing that its greatest brightness would be on August 22.

¹ So printed in *Nature*. But it seems clear, from the note of July 25th quoted above, that "July" is here a misprint for "August."

There does not appear from these notices in *Nature* any reason why the 9th of August should have produced an allusion to the comet rather than some other date in August—the 8th, for instance—on which table-tilting under precisely similar conditions took place. The connexion—if connexion there be—seems rather to be with the fact that the evening of the table-tilting was the evening preceding the day of announcement in more than one daily newspaper. So that the source of the automatic phenomena is perhaps to be sought in the minds of the writer or writers of the newspaper paragraphs.¹

It remains to consider whether anything can be inferred as to the source of the automatic phenomena above described. The successful results may be classed under eight heads, briefly described as:

- (1) Dream.
- (2) Dawn.
- (3) Diana.
- (4) Hugo.
- (5) Requiescat.
- (6) Water Rights.
- (7) Steam Laundry.
- (8) Comet.

Of these the three last are, or may be claimed to be, veridical statements, four of the others (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5) are cross-correspondences, and one, Diana (3), is both a subject of cross-correspondence and of veridical statement.

In the last three cases the automatists are the same, my daughter and her cousin, and the facts to which the automatists alluded were in each case known to one, or more, living mind, though no one living mind possessed the knowledge of the three facts, namely, that on Aug. 2 Mr. Riviere was occupied with a water-rights case, and that a steam laundry was in danger of pollution, and that on Aug. 9 a “wanderer” on that night might see a “meteoric sign in the east at dawn.” Moreover, the transition on Aug. 2, at my coming into the room, from legal matters to a subject recently in my thoughts, strongly suggests

¹Cf. *Proc.* Vol. XX., pp. 324-326 and 328-330 for two somewhat similar cases where M. V. script seems, in part at least, to have anticipated paragraphs in the *Giornale d'Italia* on June 27, 1902, and the *Daily Mail* on May 11, 1901.

that my mind, whether or not the original and ultimate source of the phenomena, was at least contributory. So that in the absence of further evidence it seems likely that the explanation of these three cases is to be sought in telepathy with the living.

Further, it is certain that the action of the living mind was altogether unconscious; Mr. Riviere did not know that his wife and my daughter were experimenting, and the same may certainly be said of the journalists who composed the press notices of the comet. I had definitely desired that the possibility of "pollution" to Cambridge water should not be known, and had not consciously thought of its connexion with a steam laundry.

But if access to the mind of the living without the conscious volition of that mind is responsible for these three cases, there still remains the question who or what is responsible for the selection of the particular material conveyed. Is it deliberate, or due to an accidental association of thought? As has been pointed out, the word "water" serves as a link between the contents selected from Mr. Riviere's mind and from mine on Aug. 2, and that word itself is easily associated with the name of one automatist. Again, in the last case, the comet was to be seen "at dawn," and the word "Dawn" had been very prominent in the automatic phenomena shortly before obtained. But without further evidence and more abundant material, speculation on this subject is premature.

There is no internal evidence bearing on the source to be derived from the automatic phenomena themselves; no claim is made as to the origin of the statements, and no "communicator" is named or suggested.

It is not easy to determine with certainty the starting point of a cross-correspondence, still less to discover its ultimate source. Priority of emergence may be an indication, but cannot be a proof, of priority of impression, as allowance must be made for delay in the automatic record. In the case of "*Requiescat*" (No. 5) the first emergence seems to be in Mrs. Piper's trance in March, 1907, the second in the table-tilting of my daughter and her cousin on Aug. 3, the third and fourth in M. V. script of Aug. 14 and 21. Mrs. Piper's trance-speech, which gave the word *Requiescat* as a topic for cross-correspondence, may have been the starting point. If so, a completely new form was given

to the idea by the appearance in the table-tilting of the first line of a poem called *Requiescat*, familiar to one at least of the automatists, and it was this form which emerged some days later in M. V. script. The starting point of the cross-correspondence may be located in Mrs. Piper's trance, or in the table-tilting of my daughter and Mrs. Riviere, according as we associate or do not associate together the quotation from Matthew Arnold's poem and the words "rescat resquiat."

There is little internal evidence in the automatic records themselves as to the supposed source of this cross-correspondence. Myers_V is the communicator of both my scripts,¹ and the second alludes to "Henry Sidgwick." Myers_P was the principal control of Mrs. Piper's trance on March 13, and the words "Faith Hope Charity" have constantly been associated in script with Mr. Sidgwick.² But the table-tilting makes no claim or allusion either to Frederic Myers or to Henry Sidgwick, so that the internal evidence is far from complete. And even if the internal evidence consistently specified a particular "communicator" as originating a successful cross-correspondence, much further corroborative evidence would be required before such a view could be accepted.

The other four topics (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4) are the subjects of successful cross-correspondence both individually and as parts of a whole which we may here call *Victor Hugo's Poem*, or *Booz Endormi*. Let us first consider them individually, and note the order of their emergence.

No. 1. Dream. This emerged first, explicitly and emphatically, in M. V. script on July 14;

and next explicitly in the table-tilting (H. V. and M. A. B.) on July 30.

No. 2. Dawn. This also emerged first in M. V. script, explicitly on July 14, explicitly and emphatically on July 17; next implicitly in H. V. script of July 26;

and then explicitly in the table-tilting (H. V. and M. A. B.) of July 31.

No. 3. Diana. Allusions to Diana are in no instance explicit; the name Diana does not occur. The allusions are of

¹ This is clear from the contents, but neither script is signed.

² Cf. *Proc.* Vol. XX., pp. 421-423 (published 1906); Vol. XXI., p. 224 ff.; Vol. XXIV., p. 308.

three types, (*a*) to Mrs. Forbes, (*b*) to the crescent moon, (*c*) to the classical goddess, huntress, protector of young creatures, guardian of cross-roads. They emerge as follows: first in H. V. script of June 28, allusions to all three types, (*a*) "Lavender is sweet," (*b*) drawing of crescent, (*c*) "hunting, hunter";

next in M. V. script of July 17, direct allusions to two aspects of type (*c*), "guardian of parting ways," "bring home...ewes and lambs," and indirect allusions, by means of a veridical reference to Mrs. Forbes's occupations, to types (*a*) and (*b*);

next in table-tilting (H. V. and M. A. B.) on July 29, explicit allusions to type (*a*) Mrs. Forbes;

again in M. V. script of July 30 type (*b*) "luna crescens," "golden sickle," drawing of crescent;

lastly in table-tilting (H. V. and M. A. B.) on July 30, type (*a*) "Mrs. Forbes associated with Hugo."

No. 4. Hugo. This emerged first explicitly in M. V. script of July 30;

and next, also explicitly, in the table-tilting (H. V. and M. A. B.) later on the same day, July 30.

If we accept priority of emergence as an indication of the starting-point, we shall assign Dream, Dawn, and Hugo to my script, and Diana to my daughter's. We may also note, as perhaps confirmatory of this view, that:

(No. 1) as between the two explicit references to Dream, the earlier one in M. V. script is much more emphatic than the later one in H. V. script, being marked by constant repetition and capital letters;

(No. 2) in the case of Dawn also emphasis is thrown on the emergence in M. V. script, by repetition and large writing on the second occasion;

(No. 3) the only instance of definite allusion to the three types of Diana is at the first emergence in H. V. script of June;

(No. 4) but here I can detect no difference of emphasis in the emergence of Hugo in the M. V. script and in the table-tilting by H. V. and M. A. B. on July 30.

Priority of emergence does not, as I have said, necessarily connote priority of impression, but when to priority is added marked emphasis, the claim to be the starting-point of the cross-correspondence may be said to be considerably reinforced.

I am therefore disposed, in the present state of the evidence, to regard my script as the starting-point of *Dream* and *Dawn*, and my daughter's script as the starting-point of *Diana*; there is not sufficient evidence to assign *Hugo* to either set of automatists.

But these four topics are, as I have said, parts of a single topic which includes them all—Hugo's poem, *Booz Endormi*, containing the simile of the crescent moon, and the allusions to *Dream* and *Dawn*. This poem was itself the subject of a cross-correspondence between M. V. script of July 30, and H. V. and M. A. B. tilting on July 30 and July 31. Following the line of argument as above, my script of July 30 may be regarded as the starting-point of the actual topic of *Booz Endormi*, for it is at once prior to the table-tilting allusions and more definite. If the allusions to this poem in the scripts were confined to the actual cross-correspondence on the subject produced on July 30 and July 31, I think we ought to seek the source as well as the starting-point in my script, and as the poem was familiar to me, there would be no reason to look beyond my memories and associations in order to explain the selection of this particular topic for automatic use.

But I find it impossible to separate the allusions to *Booz Endormi* from the earlier subjects of cross-correspondence, *Dream*, *Dawn*, and *Diana's Crescent Moon*. Two of those three topics my script is probably responsible for starting, namely, *Dream* and *Dawn*. But the third, *Diana*, first emerged on June 28 in my daughter's script, and H. V. script takes precedence of M. V. script in the whole series of scripts dealing with this group of topics. The H. V. script of June 28 is closely connected with my script of July 30—which contains a definite allusion to *Booz Endormi*—by the drawing of the crescent. In both scripts the crescent is placed at the end of a long stick; in one case the stick is horizontal, in the other vertical. No other drawing remotely resembling those drawings had occurred in the script of either automatist, so that these analogous and distinctive, though not precisely similar, drawings make an indisputable link between the H. V. script of June 28 and the M. V. script of July 30.

But if we see in the H. V. script of June 28 the starting-point of one of the four contributory topics—*Diana's crescent*, the crescent of Hugo's simile—we cannot here, as in the case of

my script of July 30, seek the source in the automatist's memory and associations, for the poem was not known to her. And if we account for the H. V. script of June 28 by giving the automatist credit for access to my memories and associations, we have still to consider the bearing on the whole question of Mrs. Forbes's sketch of the crescent moon on July 17, to which attention was drawn by the allusions to Diana in my script of the same day. Is this unique action of Mrs. Forbes—for on no other occasion has she ever sketched a crescent moon—to be attributed to chance, to the action of my subliminal self, or to some other intelligence directing the whole series of allusions to Hugo's poem?

As to the claims made by the documents themselves, none of the H. V. scripts are signed or offer any reason for attributing them to a particular communicator, and the same may be said, as usual, of the table-tilting (H. V. and M. A. B.). In the M. V. scripts no claim is made on July 14; Myers_v is responsible for the scripts of July 17 and July 30, while the script of July 20 is signed with a Greek capital Σ, a signature almost certainly intended to represent Henry Sidgwick.

III.

LES CORRESPONDANCES CROISÉES ET LA
MÉTHODE EXPÉRIMENTALE.

PAR JOSEPH MAXWELL, M.D.

LES dernières publications de la S.P.R. soulèvent une grave difficulté, celle de la méthode dans les Sciences Psychiques. Elle est d'une extrême importance. La méthode doit être d'autant plus sévère que l'objet d'une science est plus contesté. Pour cela, chaque détail d'une expérience doit être contrôlé, chaque fait initial doit être indiscutable. L'imagination doit être écartée avec soin de la discussion; s'il est permis de construire des hypothèses sur les faits, ces derniers ne peuvent être eux-mêmes hypothétiques.

Le point de départ du mouvement actuel se trouve dans les travaux de MM. Hodgson et Myers. L'œuvre de M. Myers est de premier ordre.

Je ne fais pas le même cas des travaux de M. Hodgson. Le jugement chez lui n'est pas toujours sûr, il est altéré par des idées préconçues. Ses conclusions ont toutes leurs précédents dans la littérature spirite et aboutissent à une contradiction (*Proceedings*, Vol. XIII., pp. 404-405): "even the best of direct 'communicators' through Mrs. Piper's trance is *partly asleep*." . . . "the consciousness producing the writing—whatever that consciousness may be . . . —is *not conscious of writing*." Quelle base peut offrir à la recherche sérieuse une communication dont le communicant n'a pas conscience? ¹

Au point de vue de l'analyse intime de la personnalité de la trance, le système de M. Hodgson conduit à une impasse. En réalité, cet observateur avait constaté un fait, déjà signalé: les processus mentaux de l'automatisme présentent beaucoup

¹ Voy., par exemple, Stainton Moses: "Communicating spirits are probably in an abnormal state." *Light*, 1882, p. 186.

d'analogie avec ceux du rêve; ils révèlent chez l'auteur des messages, quel qu'il soit, des états de conscience "oniriques." L'analyse n'a pas permis de déterminer, dans tous les cas, la source des informations manifestées par la personnalité servant de support à ces états de conscience. Les travaux antérieurs de la société ont établi que la télépathie était une de ces sources possibles.

L'étude psychologique de l'automatisme a été faite avec soin par M. Myers; cet aspect du problème a échappé à peu près complètement à M. Hodgson, qui a cherché une solution générale à toutes les difficultés rencontrées par lui. Cette solution, la théorie spirite l'offrait aisément; l'hypothèse qu'elle adopte supprime, par définition, toutes les difficultés.

La méthode inaugurée par M. Hodgson a été suivie par les récents expérimentateurs.

I.

C'est après la mort de M. Myers que le mouvement nouveau a pris naissance. Il a trouvé un apôtre admirable dans Mme Verrall.

L'étude des dernières publications de la S.P.R. doit donc commencer par l'analyse du mémoire de Mme Verrall sur son écriture automatique (*Proceedings*, Vol. XX.). C'est là qu'est l'origine des Correspondances croisées dont Mlle Johnson a plus tard formulé la théorie.

Ce mémoire n'est pas une analyse, mais un plaidoyer. Il ne pouvait en être autrement. On ne peut être juge dans sa propre cause. Mme Verrall, avec la meilleure volonté, ne pouvait être impartiale. Un médium peut décrire ses impressions subjectives, non apprécier la valeur des ses phénomènes.

Madame Verrall peut d'autant moins être impartiale qu'elle a fini par avoir foi en son écriture automatique, foi au point de provoquer l'ouverture imprudente de la lettre posthume de M. Myers. Cette confiance explique beaucoup de choses qui surprennent dans son mémoire: distractions, légères erreurs de traduction, omissions, qui ne sont pas compréhensibles si on ne tient pas compte de ce sentiment. Mme Verrall perd de vue les faits en eux-mêmes; elle n'aperçoit que les détails

favorables à sa thèse. Les autres lui échappent, complètement quelquefois. Je vais en donner des exemples.

Le 31 Janvier 1902, elle écrit :

“Panopticon σφαιρῆς ἀπιτάλλει συνδέγμα μυστικόν. τί οὐκ ἐδίδως; volatile ferrum. pro telo impinget” (Vol. XX., p. 214).

Les mots latins suggérèrent à Mme Verrall l'idée d'une lance, et elle nota, le 7 Février 1902, que Virgile emploie cette expression dans le sens de lance, “spear.”

Le 28 Janvier 1902, après une allusion à une prétendue vision de Mlle Verrall, le contrôle de Mme Piper fut invité par M. Hodgson à apparaître à Mlle Verrall avec une lance (spear) à la main. — “Why a sphere?” demanda le contrôle? — M. Hodgson répéta “spear,” et le contrôle consentit. Le 4 Février, il prétendit avoir réussi à se faire voir à Mlle Verrall avec une “sphear” [sic] à la main. La confusion entre *sphere* et *spear* persistait, dit Mme Verrall.

Mlle Verrall n'eut aucune impression, ni aucune vision. Mais “between those dates, my script (as interpreted by me at the time) said that the seeing of a sphere effected a mysterious ‘co-reception,’ and associated this statement with a reference to a spear. It seems to me that, though the proposed experiment did not succeed in the way intended, there is strong reason for thinking that my script was in some way affected by it” (Vol. XX., p. 216). Ce texte était signé d'une croix grecque que l'écriture (en Juin 1903, Vol. XX., p. 78) attribue à Rector.

L'analyse de Mme Verrall est fantaisiste. “Panopticon” ne veut pas dire la vue. C'est un mot anglais cité par Webster; il y a une association subliminale antérieure entre ce mot et sphère, dans les textes Verrall (14 Mars 1901, où figurent trois croix); συνδέγμα n'est pas un mot grec. Le texte, tel que Mme Verrall le traduit, est inapplicable aux circonstances, car personne n'a vu de sphère, et on n'aperçoit pas de co-réception.

Volatile ferrum ne veut dire *spear* que par suite d'une erreur probable de Mme Verrall. Le sens virgilien est flèche.¹

¹ Il suffit de lire les passages de Virgile (*Enéide*, IV., 71; VIII., 694) pour voir qu'il s'agit de flèches. Par exemple, IV., 71: “Qualis conjecta cerva sagitta, Quam procul incautam . . . fixit, Pastor agens telis liquitque volatile ferrum, nescius . . . hæret letalis arundo.”

Le mot latin pour lance est *hasta*, quelquefois associé à *volans* (*Enéide*, IX., 411). L'association phonétique de *Dido*, *volatile ferrum*, s'explique par des lois connues.¹ En effet, le passage de l'*Enéide* est: "Uritur infelix Dido . . . qualis coniecta cerva sagitta," etc. (voir note précédente).

Enfin, le texte de Mme Verrall est en latin. Or, nous apprenons (*Proceedings*, Vol. XXII., p. 314) que Rector-Piper ne sait pas le latin. Il y a là une singulière contradiction, si ce contrôle joue un rôle quelconque, comme tend à le croire Mme Verrall. En tous cas, il ne transmet pas l'image promise et ne s'adresse pas à la personne convenue. La croix ne signifie pas grand chose, car nous trouvons des croix dans le texte du 14 Mars 1901 où figurent aussi *Panopticon* et *sphæra*.

L'incident relatif à la communication simultanée donnée par le contrôle Talbot Forbes chez Mme Forbes et chez Mme Verrall est encore exposé avec le même défaut de méthode. Mme Verrall résume les concordances ainsi (Vol. XX., p. 223): "On a certain day 'Talbot Forbes,' in Mrs. Forbes' script, declared that he was seeking and implied that he had found another automatic writer through whom to communicate with her. On the same day a statement was made in my script about fir-trees planted in a garden which had a meaning for Mrs. Forbes and a special connexion with her automatic experiments, and the signature of this script, to which attention had been directed, represented partially the badge of Talbot Forbes' regiment, together with a sword."

Les faits n'ont pas exactement la physionomie qu'elle leur prête; "*conifera arbos*" ne veut pas dire des sapins (*fir-trees*), mais un arbre conifère. Mme Verrall substitue un nom de genre à celui d'une famille botanique et donne à son texte, par cela et par l'indication du pluriel, une ressemblance plus grande avec les faits qu'il n'est légitime de le faire.

Elle admet ensuite que le dessin représentant une croix est une épée; mais, (1) la garde d'une épée moderne n'est pas en forme de croix; (2) le mot *fir-tree* est associé incontestablement à une croix dans les textes des 25 et 26 Août, 1902.

D'ailleurs, le texte de Mme Forbes s'applique-t-il à Mme

¹ *ἑδίδως, Διδῶ, Dido, uritur, etc.*

Verrall? Dans le premier, Talbot F. écrit qu'il doit faire séance avec M. Gurney pour contrôler le sensitif et prouver à M. Forbes père que c'est bien lui, son fils, qui écrit par la main de Mme Forbes. Rien ne rappelle ces détails dans le texte de Mme Verrall, où il n'est pas question de M. Gurney.

Si on rétablit dans son intégralité le texte du 28 Août divisé en trois fragments par Mme Verrall (*op. cit.*, pp. 388, 404, 417) on constate :

(1) qu'il y est question de croix.

(2) qu'il rappelle le texte du 15 Mars 1901, "*Pollux Cappadoeus ponct tigillum.*"

(3) qu'il rappelle celui du 14 Mars 1901, "*Marmario glyptato . . . cultellario.*"

(4) Mme Verrall y voit un essai de réponse à la question des mots grecs. Si l'influence du contrôle Talbot doit être admise, comment devient-elle intelligible? Il veut prouver à son père qu'il fait écrire Mme Forbes, mais il ne s'occupe que de l'expérience de M. Verrall et d'une inscription; il ne se révèle que par la lointaine allusion "*conifera*" et le cor suspendu.

Il ne semble y avoir aucune continuité de conscience entre les textes de Mme Forbes et Verrall.

"*Omina sibimet ostendit*" est traduit par "gives its own portent." Le traducteur oublie le sens *réfléchi* de *sibimet*.

Il ne saurait être question de la compétence incontestée de Mme Verrall; elle commet ces erreurs de traduction, non par ignorance du latin, mais par suite de son état d'esprit. Persuadée de la valeur supranormale de ses textes, elle choisit inconsciemment tous les éléments de nature à confirmer sa thèse, et s'arrête à des interprétations discutables, pour peu qu'elles soient favorables; les autres interprétations, plus probables, lui échappent.

L'incident des mots grecs *μυρόπωλον ἐς ἀὼ* est instructif à ce point de vue.

En Avril 1901, le Dr. Verrall essaya de faire écrire automatiquement par Mme Verrall ces mots grecs; ils n'ont jamais été écrits, le sens n'en a jamais été donné, comme Mme Verrall le reconnaît d'ailleurs. Un expérimentateur ordinaire n'aurait jamais songé à faire état d'une semblable expérience de communication de pensée entre deux époux, vivant sous le

même toit, alors surtout que l'expérience se prolonge pendant 15 mois.

La phrase grecque est obscure : elle signifie "vers l'aurore," mais on n'est pas d'accord sur le sens de *μονόπωλος* qui signifie "à un seul cheval"; M. Verrall préfère le sens "solitaire." Ces mots sont extraits de l'*Oreste* d'Euripide; ils figurent dans un passage dont la traduction fut donnée en 1873 à un Concours auquel le Dr. Verrall prit part.

M. Verrall n'avertit pas sa femme de son expérience; celle-ci nous dit qu'il ne lui en parla pas au cours des essais faits pour reproduire les mots grecs; on verra au contraire que le Dr. Verrall laissa bientôt deviner qu'il attendait quelque chose. Dès le 16 Août 1901, après la lecture d'un texte, il dit à Mme Verrall "that he thought it [the writing] was trying to say what he wanted" (Vol. XX., p. 388).

L'examen des textes montre que l'écriture automatique a été guidée par le Dr. lui-même, qui voyait les textes, et disait s'ils étaient ou n'étaient pas intéressants pour lui. Un peu d'attention révèle les procédés de la conscience liée aux automatismes de Mme Verrall.

L'expérience commença en Avril 1901. La première allusion signalée est "Five stars in the East . . ." (16 Juin 1901, Vol. XX., p. 387).

Le 4 Juillet 1901: "Yellow is the colour of the dawn" (*Tithoni croceum linquens aurora eubile*, vers trois fois répété dans Virgile).

Le contexte cité p. 416 se réfère à toute autre chose que les mots grecs, et le Dr. Verrall n'a point dit que ce texte l'intéressait.

Le premier texte auquel il ait donné son approbation est celui du 31 Juillet (p. 388) où nous voyons, dans le fragment publié, les idées suivantes:

Longævus, senex, barba, alba, *μονοχιτωνος*, albipannosus, signifier, 7 mots comportant un grand nombre d'associations.

L'idée relative à albus, alba, blanc, est deux fois répétée, sans avoir rien de commun avec aube, aurore (barbe blanche, vêtements blancs).

Ceux d'entre mes lecteurs qui sont familiers avec la psychologie des états de conscience oniriques ne seront pas étonnés de voir surgir plus tard (13 Août 1901, p. 388) l'idée de

blancheur développée avec des jeux de mots, des allitérations et des images; ce thème aboutit à “crested cock that crows . . . —not a real bird, heraldic—with a motto—Cano, canam albam” (je chante l’aube blanche): épithète qui ne rappelle pas celle du 4 Juillet, “yellow” (jaune), mais sert de lien entre *Cano*, *canam* et *albam*.

M. Verrall n’a rien trouvé dans ce texte qui lui parut se référer à ses mots grecs. Il est meilleur juge et plus désintéressé. Depuis le 31 Juillet au moins, malgré qu’elle dise le contraire (note, Vol. XX., p. 157), Mme Verrall sait que les textes peuvent intéresser son mari (Vol. XX., p. 388).

Le texte du 16 tâtonne après l’échec. Il reprend l’idée du vieillard à barbe blanche, vêtu de blanc, le décrit avec un bâton, une boîte, quelqu’un le regarde et observe la lumière qui passe d’une fenêtre à l’autre, allant vers l’orient. A. W. V. comprendra. Le texte contenait quelques mots grecs.

Ce texte est approuvé, mais l’écrivain des textes ne sait pas pourquoi. Cela rend l’hypothèse d’une coïncidence fortuite plus probable que celle d’une action télépathique et exclut l’action d’une intelligence directrice.

L’incertitude du but de l’expérience se révèle dans le texte suivant, qui brode sur le thème “fenêtre,” mais n’obtient aucune approbation (20 Août).

Le 23, retour à l’idée du coq, assortie d’une tentative vers la description d’une inscription avec un mot grec; ce texte ne provoque aucune approbation, aussi l’idée de coq, après une émergence voilée dans le texte du 28 est abandonnée et ne persistera que dans la sélection du sens où s’orientera la conscience onirique, c’est à dire vers *can*, de *cano*, *canam*, approuvés avec le texte du 16 (malgré la non approbation du texte du 13).

L’idée de *can-o* est dissociée: la première syllabe sert de thème à des associations oniriques parallèles aux précédentes, développées dans le sens d’allusions à une chapelle et au Dr. Benson.

Texte du 28 Août 1901.

“Cups and a cross, the cross between, and a bright light falls from above upon them and him . . . AW . . . will recognise this. I speak with the tongue of brass . . . Cappa . . . Cantilupe . . . cant ilenam. Cantiaris sedile jam sedet super mundum circumspectans . . . in the east to the day light . . . it runs round a dial or font . . . glyptatus in marmoreo lapide cultellario . . . Signa sigillo. Conifera arbos in horto jam insita omina sibimet ostendit” (c'est le texte attribué à Talbot Forbes!).

Comparez :

“A cross in the east . . . Cantuar is sedile” (12 Avril 1902, p. 187).

“Sedet super scdilia circumspectans” (27 Juin 1901, p. 419).

Cantilupe and the old man in the long white robe with the unjewelled crown. This belongs to A. W. V. past master (12 Oct. 1901, p. 401).

Le texte est manifestement associé à l'ancien maître du Dr. Verrall, l'archevêque de Cantorbéry, Dr. Benson, à une chapelle (tongue of brass, font, cross, etc.) et à ses alentours.

Ce texte est approuvé; il y a quelque chose d'intelligible pour le Dr. Verrall, outre le cadran solaire, qui y est mentionné (*op. cit.*, p. 389).

Le même ordre d'idées est sous-jacent au texte du lendemain. Le texte du 28 parlait d'un mot autour d'un cadran solaire ou de fonts baptismaux (?); celui du 29 essaye de donner ce mot; “The shape of the letters is archaic . . . Cantilect . . . Cantuar €C and a heraldic bird. in colours—the light comes through, on a window to the east. more than one.”

L'idée de l'oiseau héraldique et de la chapelle persistent avec celle d'inscription; il s'agit clairement d'une verrière.¹

Les associations s'expliquent ainsi facilement. L'est, les fenêtres, le vicillard en robe blanche, les inscriptions, la chapelle, la croix, etc.

La lecture attentive des textes, après les avoir rapiécés et placés en ordre chronologique, ne laissera aucun doute sur ce point. A cette date, la conscience automatique s'oriente toujours vers la chapelle et l'inscription. Le hasard, aidé par le Dr. Verrall, va l'orienter sur le mot grec qui figure dans le passage d'Euripide.

¹ Voy. Vol. XX., p. 188. Il s'agit probablement de la chapelle de Wellington College.

Et ici, on aperçoit les procédés de Mme Verrall. Les lettres EC de son texte sont visiblement associées au Dr. Benson. Le texte du 2 Juin 1902 (*op. cit.*, pp. 426 et 302) applique EtC, $\epsilon \kappa$ au Dr. Benson. C'est bien EC qu'a écrit Mme Verrall car nous savons qu'elle a conscience des mots écrits par elle; si elle a lu EC, c'est qu'elle avait bien écrit ces lettres qu'elle considérait avec raison comme des initiales.

Mais le Dr. Verrall, préoccupé de ses mots grecs, lit EC (ες) eu grec. Dès lors, le subliminal est fixé et ες est écrit dans presque tous les textes suivants (10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16); il ne disparaîtra comme mot isolé qu'à partir du 17^e, à la suite d'essais infructueux.

Le texte du 2 Septembre ne révèle par la moindre notion des mots à transmettre, sauf l'essai suggéré ες τὸ; il insiste sur la présence du mot *vale*.

Le 4, une forte impulsion à écrire survient. Le texte précédent n'avait reçu aucune approbation du Dr. Verrall; le nouveau combine certains éléments figurant dans des textes approuvés antérieurement, des mots grecs en *μνο-*, rappel du 31 Juillet; EC, rappel du 19 Août; la draperie blanche, rappel du 16 Août. Des idées sont essayées; le nom Charles, Chalfont, un endroit près d'une rivière, puis le personnage associé à la draperie blanche (16 Août). Ce texte est approuvé.

Le même jour, le nom de M. Balfour est substitué à Chal; "esagi" est écrit en vieux caractères grecs, puis le mot "sunto." Pas d'approbation.

Le 7 Septembre "seven in a row—or was it five—away in the east like stars. Mol es to . . . there are o and l before the es. ολ-ες. Tender es fusa—a long word like that,—foreign, Indian I think—Banipal and Assur . . . Asta, aster."

Ce texte ne paraît pas avoir intéressé le Dr. Verrall; l'écriture automatique, toujours aiguillée sur ολ-ες qui ont figuré dans des textes approuvés, part de quelque chose comme moleskin, l'apparence non le sens, et revient à l'idée d'oiseau mais avec des associations clairement oniriques. "Pye is a bird too but not ours" éveille évidemment l'impression de pie, oiseau français; le mot "gasur" rappelle l'italien gazza, pie, magpie, pye en anglais; "dailey is more like, daily bent, — — — is how it goes and the first rhymes to ā. Find the herb moly that will help."

Rien ne se rapporte aux mots choisis par le Dr. Verrall. L'apparition de *moly* s'explique par les associations oniriques. Pie français, pye anglais (paï, comme paille en français) éveillent chez Mme Verrall l'idée d'ail, qui est représenté par d-ail-ey, d-ail-y ; — — — est la quantité de *allium* en latin, qui est l'équivalent de ail (*garlic*). De là à *moly* l'association est évidente, l'*allium moly* est une belle plante indigène à fleurs jaunes. On comprend que *moly* conduise à a-lli-um dont la première voyelle rime bien avec *a*.

Cette explication simple ne se présente pas à l'esprit de Madame Verrall qui nous en propose une autre, supranormale bien entendu. Le texte ne lui avait paru avoir aucun sens, mais en 1905, elle découvrit que le concours de 1873 comprenait la version d'*Oreste* où se trouve *μόλιον* ἐς ἄω et comme épreuve de vers latins, la traduction du passage de Milton (*Comus*), finissant par "That moly which Hermes once to wise Ulysses gave."¹

Il y a là une coïncidence, curieuse si l'on veut, mais l'émergence *Moly* me paraît avoir une cause plus naturelle et par conséquent plus probable. L'explication que j'ai proposée rend compte de tous les détails du texte, ils sont incompréhensibles dans le système supranormal de Mme Verrall.

Le Dr. Verrall déclara que ce texte constituait un progrès.

Le 12, l'écriture prend *μολ-ες*, naturellement, comme thème : le Thibet intervient, sans doute par association onirique à termes latents (mollis . . . woollen, woollen . . . cloth) Thibet . . . Pye est repris : "Pye gives one clue, but there is another—a dark man who smoked."

L'écriture automatique bat les buissons. Pye est un indice, comme l'homme brun, ce qui ne s'accorde pas avec l'explication de Mme Verrall au sujet de la finesse avec laquelle Pye est introduit pour représenter la lettre π .

¹L'explication donnée par Mme Verrall de l'émergence de Pye est celle-ci ; l'écriture, "after stating correctly that 'm comes before the es agiles' . . . goes on to introduce the 'p,' a conspicuous omission in its previous attempts to represent *μόλιον*. This it did in a very quaint fashion . . . without betraying any notion that what was wanted was the Greek letter Pi, it suddenly remarked : Pye is a bird too" . . . (Vol. XX., p. 162), etc.

Cela ne semble pas sérieux. L'idée de la lettre π n'apparaît pas le moins du monde.

Les textes ne se rapprochent un peu de l'idée d'aurore que le 12 décembre, au milieu d'erreurs sans nombre.

Je ne retiendrai que deux incidents : le premier est relatif au texte du 18 Septembre, qui est un message pour une dame ; Mme Verrall en utilise une partie (p. 206) pour justifier des allusions à une dame Archdale. Il est plus probable que le "her" est cependant Mme Forbes. En tous cas, il s'agit d'un message relatif à "a knife—on a table, with letters engraved upon it—not English— $(-y \cup \pi \pi \sigma \uparrow)$ the letters look like that. It is a friendly wish. Ask her . . ."

Il est clair que ces mots ne concernent pas du tout l'expérience ; "cependant," dit Mme Verrall, "le texte" s'empara de l'unique idée non encore représentée, celle de cheval, dans le sens ordinaire de *μονόπωλος*. Le mot suggère *εὐππος* qui a de bons chevaux. Pendant que Mme Verrall écrivait, son mari essayait de l'impressionner. Il est possible que l'apparition des lettres grecques soit due à une transmission de pensée, mais cela est incertain. Nous savons que M. Verrall traduit *μονόπωλος* par solitaire. Pourquoi l'idée de cheval est-elle transmise ? Il y a là un point difficile à comprendre.

Le sens général du contexte rend improbable l'explication donnée par Mme Verrall ; il suffit de s'y reporter.

S'il y a une action télépathique, elle se produit d'une manière qui rappelle tout à fait les correspondances croisées du type mosaïque et, comme l'a fait observer M. Pigou, cette action télépathique ôte tout fondement aux théories de Mlle Johnson sur ce genre de correspondances.

Le second incident est l'aveu que l'écriture automatique fait elle-même de son ignorance. "What is the word he wants to complete. neither you nor I know it. so it is hard to get. It all belongs to him but not to me, his friends but not mine. No one here knows but one and her I have not met. I will ask Arthur . . ."

Jusqu'au dernier moment l'écriture n'a rien perçu des mots grecs, car le dernier texte cité parle d'Hannibal, de Sagonte, de "molens," et finit, symboliquement sans doute, par "no nono" (Vol. XX., p. 392).

C'est sur cette mauvaise expérience que Mme Verrall se fonde pour dire que son texte a essayé de reproduire tantôt le

sens, tantôt le son des mots grecs (Vol. XX., p. 159). Elle est trop favorable à ses essais. Je ne puis voir par exemple une approximation de *μονόπωλος* dans, "blow hot, blow cold" (p. 393).

De plus, la télépathie, telle que nous la connaissons, ne transmet ordinairement pas des alternatives. On peut transmettre le son, la forme, tout élément sensoriel, ou l'idée abstraite. Si M. Verrall donne un sens à *μονόπωλος* il n'en transmettra pas deux. Cependant (p. 392) Mme Verrall nous indique la double traduction de *εὖπιπος* ou *εις ιπιπος*, soit qui a un bon cheval, soit qui a un seul cheval, lecture alternative d'un mot douteux, si on veut l'idée de cheval. Si l'on préfère l'idée de solitaire, elle résulte de ces mots, "alone with God and none other," et de ceux-ci, "Planet or play net illustre vagatur coelo sine comite."

Je doute que l'on puisse prendre au sérieux ces arguments. C'est l'inauguration du système des interprétations symboliques dont on verra le développement ultérieur.

Il y a encore un autre facteur qui est important, car il explique bien des coïncidences.

On compte, dans les textes publiés, 234 mots ou idées différentes. Une analyse admettant l'approximation morphologique, phonétique, symbolique et idéologique peut trouver à coup sûr, dans l'immense quantité de matériaux que fournissent 234 idées et leurs combinaisons, une certaine proportion de concordances.

Quant aux faits exacts concernant des détails étrangers aux mots, objet de l'expérience, je doute qu'ils aient une valeur supranormale. Leur connaissance subliminale s'explique, notamment les détails relatifs aux examens du Dr. Verrall. Je ne vois pas comment Mme Verrall peut sérieusement soutenir qu'il n'en a jamais été question entre elle et son mari. J'admets qu'elle n'a aucun souvenir conscient de conversations à ce sujet; cela ne prouve pas que de pareilles conversations n'aient jamais eu lieu.

Les méthodes d'analyse de Mme Verrall se montrent encore clairement dans l'incident Constable.

Mme Verrall reconnaît que l'expérience a échoué; cependant elle trouve dans l'indication répétée de prénoms en "ia" une tentative pour arriver au mot "fuchsia," que contenait la lettre

dont elle devait donner médianiquement le sens, et pense que son texte du 3 Novembre 1902, jour où M. Constable écrivit la lettre, objet de l'expérience, décrit l'état d'esprit de ce monsieur (voy. Vol. XX., p. 170). En effet, le texte (p. 171): "suggests:

- (1) an utterance from a stranger,
- (2) a division of a task between two persons,
- (3) the obtaining of a clue from some one (masculine),
- (4) an effort of some one other than myself (feminine) to give words."

Ce texte, qui demeure inintelligible pour Mme Verrall, s'il ne se réfère pas à M. Constable, se réfère manifestement à Mme Forbes et aux contrôles.

Le 3 Novembre 1902 Mme Verrall (p. 239) reçoit une lettre de Mme Forbes contenant un message: "(Myers) sees the words, not so strong as your son's writing, but clearer. Will you be sure—you—tell Mrs. Verrall to be sure I am the writer . . ." etc.

À cette époque il y avait des essais de correspondance télépathique entre Mmes Verrall et Forbes: par exemple, texte du 27 Octobre 1902 (p. 238):

"Mrs. Forbes has the other words—piece together. Add hers to yours."

31 Octobre 1902 (p. 238):

"She has had some words incomplete, to be added to and pieced and make the clue."

Le 7 Novembre 1902 (p. 240):

"Your message comes through Mrs. Forbes."

Comparez maintenant le texte intercalaire du 3 Novembre: (a) "None the less through others not known speaks the fate. (b) I will give the words between you neither alone can read, but together they will give the clue he wants . . . hers are in English and will fill the gaps—Wait some time for hers," etc.

La première phrase paraît un de ces apophtegmes fréquents dans l'écriture automatique. Elle est inapplicable à M. Constable, qui ne rendait aucun oracle. Le reste est la continuation du courant d'idées indiqué dans les textes des 27 et 31 Octobre. "He" est le contrôle de Mme Forbes, et le "clue" est manifestement celui que vise le texte du 31 Octobre:

la répartition des mots est clairement entre Mmes Forbes et Verrall.

Cela sauterait aux yeux si Mme Verrall avait joint à son commentaire le texte complet qu'elle commente.

La seconde expérience avec M. Constable montre encore le même procédé (Vol. XX., p. 172).

Mme Verrall se trompa, mais indiqua, soit dans son texte, soit dans les commentaires l'accompagnant :

- “(1) that the contents of the letter were less important than the circumstances of the experiment ;
- (2) that the experiment was suggested to M. Constable by some one else ;
- (3) that the experiment was connected with *the* sealed envelope (*i.e.* the Myers envelope which there was a question of opening), and meant as a preliminary trial ;
- (4) that the sealed envelope sent me was one of two and the less important.”

Dans son mémoire, Mme Verrall omet de nous indiquer un point capital, que la lecture de l'appendice révèle ; elle assistait au dîner du Conseil où M. Constable parla de l'ouverture de la lettre de M. Myers (p. 400). Mme Verrall répondant à M. Constable, assure qu'elle n'a pas entendu la conversation à table, étant assise à l'autre bout, et qu'elle ignorait qu'on eût agité la question de l'ouverture d'une enveloppe scellée.

Ce détail ôte toute valeur à l'expérience. Mme Verrall n'a certainement pas conscience d'avoir entendu cette conversation, mais peut-elle affirmer qu'aucun mot ne lui en est parvenu ? Qu'elle n'a rien surpris “subconsciemment” de cette conversation, fort naturelle dans les circonstances, et qui l'intéressait directement ?

Ces quatre impressions sont correctes dans leur ensemble, dit-elle (p. 173). M. Constable cependant écrit : “I think the experiment was not suggested to me by anyone—I worked out the idea myself” (p. 399).¹

¹ Voyez, au même point de vue, l'évolution qui s'est produite dans l'esprit de Mme Verrall à l'occasion des textes des 8 Juillet et 25 Novembre 1901, qui émanent manifestement du même communicateur, M. Balfour. L'incident raconté parut imaginaire ; plus tard, Mme Verrall découvrit, sur une indication imprécise de son écriture, dans la Biographie du Professeur Sidgwick, un incident analogue concernant M. Sidgwick et Sir G. Trevelyan. Elle arriva insensiblement à attribuer au premier des textes qu'elle avait d'abord attribués à M.

Je terminerai en analysant deux cas intéressants. Dans la nuit du 11 au 12 Mai 1901 deux jeunes gens veillent dans un chambre hantée, à Londres; ils entendent et voient les portes s'ouvrir à diverses reprises. Ils avaient répandu de la craie (ou chaux?) en poudre sur le plancher et constatèrent des empreintes semblables aux traces des pattes d'un gros oiseau. Le même jour, Mme Verrall avait écrit: "... calx pedibus inhaerens difficultatem superavit . . ." et dessiné un gros oiseau à tête humaine grotesque, suivi d'un V entre deux traits —V—. Au-dessous est écrit *et hoc genus omne* (p. 328).¹

Le fait est fort curieux, car il a un rapport assez vague avec un article du *Daily Mail* publié sur ce phénomène de hantise deux ou trois jours après. J'ai eu l'occasion d'observer des cas de ce genre, dont on trouve un autre exemple p. 324 et suivantes.

Ce fait est trop imprécis pour avoir une valeur probante. Calx a deux sens, et l'oiseau dessiné est une caricature. Ces deux détails uniques d'identification sont douteux.

Le second incident nous ramène aux questions de méthode, auxquelles j'attache une grande importance. Le 11 Déc. 1901: "Frost and a candle in the dim light Marmontel he was reading on a sofa or in bed—there was only a candle's light. She will surely remember this. The book was lent not his own—he talked about it" (Vol. XX., p. 331).

Le 17 Décembre: "... Marmontel is right. It was a French book, a Memoir I think. Passy may help Souvenirs de Passy or Fleury. Marmontel was not on the cover—the book was bound and was lent—two volumes in old-fashioned binding and print. It is not in any papers—it is an attempt to make someone remember—an incident" (Vol. XX., p. 332).

On trouve d'autres fragments de ce texte, pages 375 et 405.

Un ami de M. Verrall, en Février suivant, lut à Paris les Mémoires de Marmontel, dans son lit ou étendu sur deux

Balfour, dont la signature et l'écriture sont imités; circonstance bien invraisemblable si le contrôle est M. Sidgwick. (Voy. notamment pp. 26, 27, 152, 185, 225; comparez avec 278).

¹ Il y a peut-être entre la caricature et le texte un lien classique, réminiscence de la satire d'Horace: "Ambubaiarum collegia, pharmacopolae Mendicij, *mimi*, *balatrones*, *hoc genus omne*."

ehaises ; dans le volume il était question de la découverte, à Passy, d'un panneau qui se trouvait mêlé à une histoire intéressant Fleury.¹ "It will . . . be noted" (dit Mme Verrall) "that the script in December, 1901, describes (as past) an incident which actually occurred two and a half months later, . . . an incident which at the time of writing was not likely to have been foreseen by anyone."

Sur quoi se fonde-t-elle pour considérer ce texte comme une prédiction ? Si on l'étudie, on trouve 14 détails ; 5 sont exacts, 8 faux, 1 douteux :

- Exacts :*
- (1) Marmontel.
 - (2) Lecture au lit.
 - (3) Fleury.
 - (4) Passy.
 - (5) Mémoires.

- Faux :*
- (6) Le nom de l'auteur est au dos de la couverture.
 - (7) Pas de gelée.
 - (8) Trois volumes et non deux.
 - (9) Reliure qui n'est pas neuve, mais qui n'est pas ancienne.
 - (10) Il n'y a aucune femme dans l'incident.
 - (11) Il ne s'agit pas d'un souvenir.
 - (12) Souvenirs de Passy ou Fleury.
 - (13) Pas de sofa, des chaises.

- Douteux :* (14) Le livre n'est pas prêté.

Les détails 2 et 3 sont d'une grande banalité et ne présentent aucun intérêt par eux-mêmes. Ils ne prennent quelque valeur que par leur association avec les autres détails. Mais

¹Je dois à la courtoisie de Mme Verrall la précision de l'incident auquel elle fait allusion. C'est la découverte de la plaque de cheminée mobile par laquelle le Maréchal de Richelieu s'introduisait chez Mme de la Popelinière. Je n'avais pas songé à identifier cet incident bien connu, car le Cardinal de Fleury ne joue aucun rôle dans cette histoire (the finding at Passy of a panel connected with a story in which Fleury plays an important part. Vol. XX., p. 333).

Le seul rôle joué par le Cardinal de Fleury a été d'obliger La Popelinière à épouser sa femme. Il n'a rien de commun avec l'histoire de la plaque mobile, à mon avis. (Marmontel, *Mémoires*, I. 238, ed. Jonaust, Paris, 1891, 3 vol. in 16°.)

la prophétie est si vague, si indéterminée qu'elle se réalisera si *n'importe qui, n'importe où, n'importe quand* lit au lit à la lueur d'une bougie, des mémoires où les noms de Marmontel, Passy et Fleury seraient cités.

Il y a une multitude de solutions possibles.

Un fait domine l'incident. Il ne s'agit pas d'une prophétie, mais d'un évènement passé, dont une dame se souviendra. Ce sens est tellement clair que Mme Verrall a pensé qu'il était question de Mme Sidgwick et s'est renseignée auprès d'elle.

Il ne faut pas dire, et Mme Verrall ne le dit d'ailleurs pas à cette occasion, que les contrôles sont indépendants du temps. L'écriture automatique de Mme Verrall est pleine d'allusions précises au temps (pp. 371-373). Aussi tourne-t-elle la difficulté. "It is possible that what the writing intended to convey was that when the actual incident was spoken of in the presence of the writer—as it was on March 1st, 1902, by Mr. Marsh—'she would surely remember' that this incident had been described in the script" (p. 335).

Peut-on admettre un pareil système? Il est opposé au sens naturel des mots. La meilleure preuve est la phrase, "it is not in any papers," indication contradictoire avec l'idée d'une prophétie. Quelque simplicité que l'on prête de temps en temps aux contrôles, on ne saurait aller jusqu'à admettre qu'ils prennent soin de préciser qu'un évènement à venir n'est pas dans les gazettes.¹

Il serait facile de multiplier les exemples de ces interprétations forcées, qui n'indiquent pas un état d'esprit de chercheur sans parti pris. Comment, par exemple, admettre sérieusement la discussion de Mme Verrall soutenant que son texte a élaboré une ingénieuse allusion à Syringa en parlant de M. Hodgson, d'Orotava, d'Oriona, de couronne d'Ariane et de Bérénice? Pourquoi? Le syringa est botaniquement le *Philadelphus Coronarius*. Ses allusions à Oriona, etc., sont des essais pour arriver à la couronne d'Ariane (?) et au mot *coronarius*. Quant à l'autre constellation, la chevelure de Bérénice, c'est une allusion implicite à Ptolémée Philadelphie, et par suite à *Philadelphus*!

¹Voyez sur les conditions de validité d'une prophétie, la juste sévérité de M. Piddington, *Light*, 1903, p. 447.

Nous avons ici un des premiers exemples de la méthode analytique par rébus et calembourgs.

Ceux qui auront la patience d'étudier minutieusement le travail de Mme Verrall remarqueront les défauts suivants :

Traduction quelquefois contestable ;

Textes arbitrairement découpés ;

Substitution d'un sens indirect ou allégorique au sens direct ;

Imprécision, vague, ambiguïté ;

Banalité des détails ; par exemple : il y a un portrait encadré dans la chambre ; le médaillon est attaché à une chaîne, et il a été donné après la confection du portrait.

Il fait mauvais temps, etc.

Aucun compte n'est tenu de la cryptomnésie.

Affirmations sans fondement suffisant.

II.

L'étude du rapport de Mlle Johnson révèle les mêmes défauts de méthode.

La première constatation que l'on fasse est la manière superficielle dont elle se renseigne sur les sources normales des textes de Mme Holland. Chez cette sensitive, la cryptomnésie joue un rôle considérable et Mlle Johnson en cite des exemples (Vol. XXI., p. 286 et ss.). Malgré cela, et malgré qu'elle soit avertie de l'impossibilité d'atteindre la conscience subliminale du sujet en interrogeant sa conscience normale (Vol. XXI., p. 389), elle commet constamment cette erreur. Je crains que Mlle Johnson ne soit pas très familière avec les récentes recherches faites sur la psychologie du subconscient. La dissociation de la conscience qu'elle soupçonne dans l'automatisme (Vol. XXI., p. 263) est signalée depuis longtemps.

Ce manque d'informations spéciales ôte beaucoup de valeur aux analyses de Mlle Johnson. Cependant, elle aurait pu, avec un peu d'attention, acquérir la conviction que Mme Holland connaît les *Proceedings* et le *Journal*. Voici les raisons qui me déterminent :

Le 7 Mars 1906, Mme Verrall donne un texte concernant Mme Holland, avec des détails banals, indéterminés ou faux.

Puis elle écrit des vers contenant des réminiscences du poème de Tintadgel, de Roden Noël (Vol. XXI., p. 317).

Ce texte est communiqué à Mme H. qui ne voit rien pouvant s'appliquer à elle: les vers ne lui suggèrent rien. Mais ils inspirent son texte du 11 Mars 1906; là on voit apparaître la date du 26 Mai 1894, mort de M. Noël, et une dissertation paraissant émaner de lui et du Dr. Sidgwick.

Le 14, le texte écrit "Eighteen fifteen four five fourteen—Fourteen fifteen five twelve. . . . See Rev. 13-18. but only the central 8 words . . . H. S. R. N. June 1st 1881—" Le texte de l'Apocalypse est "car c'est le nombre d'un homme." Mlle Johnson suivit le conseil du texte et trouva, ce qui était facile, Roden Noël. "I found afterwards," ajoute-t-elle, "that Mrs. Holland had not looked up the text and had no idea of what it was or of what the numbers meant."¹ Cela est bien invraisemblable, le nom de M. Hodgson ayant été donné un mois auparavant par le même procédé (Vol. XXI., pp. 304 et 305): et le procédé venant de lui être expliqué (p. 321).

La source du texte de Mme Holland est l'article nécrologique paru dans le *Journal S.P.R.* en Juin 1894 sur M. Noël et signé H. S. (*Journal*, Vol. VI., p. 262). La date de la mort, 26 Mai 1894, est indiquée. On trouve de plus les analogies suivantes, entre autres:

Nécrologie.

Riddle of the painful Earth . . .
He never gained the ear of
the general public . . .
The delight of natural beauty
and of the physical life.

Texte.

Riddle of death.
The quest was more to me
than the prize.
The inherent truth and
Beauty into which all the in-
evitable uglinesses of existence
finally resolve themselves.

Le texte contemporain du 7 Mars nous donne la même impression. On y voit

¹ Comparez: "The medium asked me who was Bob Sawyer, so it is clear that she has never read Pickwick" (*Light*, 1905, p. 389). "He gripped my hand with a Forester's grip well known to him . . . This was to me a very good test, as Mr. B. (the medium) assured me that . . . he did not know the sign" (*Light*, 1908, p. 246). Mlle Johnson n'est pas plus exigeante.

“Brittleworth—Brickeldale. Britleton—No—not him and not James—Brit—Brittle Brick Brickleton—Hugo—H. M. Minster Berg. Hugo . . . R. . . H” (Vol. XXI., p. 306).

En lisant le *Daily Express* du 8 Mars, Mme H. qui n'avait pas deviné le nom, pourtant bien connu, de Münsterberg, est frappée par le nom de Lorberg, et le signale à Mlle Johnson.

Nous trouvons dans le volume XIV. des *Proceedings* une critique du Prof. Hugo Münsterberg, dans laquelle l'auteur, M. Schiller, cite les noms de James et de Hodgson, que nous avons déjà dans le texte du 7 Mars: James, Hugo Münsterberg et R. H., initiales s'appliquant certainement à Hodgson.

Ce n'est pas tout. Le nom de Lorberg figure dans le même volume (XIV., p. 215), dans un article de Mlle Johnson “On Chance Coincidences.” Or, ce nom a provoqué l'attention subliminale de Mme Holland, justement à l'occasion du texte où se trouvent cités les trois autres noms associés dans la même partie du volume XIV. Dans cet article encore, nous trouvons (p. 199) les noms: *Brett, Shuttleworth*.

L'origine cryptomnésique de cette quadruple association n'est pas douteuse et Mme Holland, dans la mesure où les preuves humaines ont quelque valeur, a certainement parcouru les articles de Mlle Johnson et de M. Schiller, ou en a lu des comptes-rendus, et l'a oublié.

Remarquons combien il serait naturel que Mme Holland ait lu les *Proceedings* et le *Journal*, et combien il est improbable qu'elle n'ait pas eu cette curiosité.

Voici un exemple qui concerne le *Journal Light*:

Le 6 Février 1906, Mme Holland écrit un texte où l'on trouve: “This scribe . . . thoughts of this scribe—Medium is not the best word . . .” (Vol. XXI., p. 283).

Ce texte communiqué à M. Piddington lui parut supranormal: Le mot Scribe, est associé à Mme Verrall; or, M. Piddington, à la fin de Janvier, l'avait proposé à Mme Verrall pour désigner le contrôle. Il ne connaît pas d'exemple de ce mot ainsi employé (*ib.*, p. 284). Plus tard cependant, il eut connaissance d'un livre peu répandu, publié en Amérique, *Letters of a Spirit*, dans lequel l'automatiste s'appelle le scribe.

Le mot avait été déjà employé dans *Light*, notamment le 17 Octobre 1896; un écrivain signant *Scriba*, critique dans un article le mot “automatique” dont la *S.P.R.* fait usage.

Un grand nombre de faits, qui nous sont présentés comme supranormaux, peuvent n'être que de simples cas de cryptomnésie ; par exemple, l'adresse du Dr. Verrall (*Proc.*, Vol. XI., p. 190 ; Vol. XII., p. 124) ; une toux nerveuse, un homme grand (*Proc.*, Vol. VI., pp. 584, 585, 586), etc. Il y aurait des recherches psychologiques intéressantes à faire sur les sources normales spirites des textes automatiques des médiums de la S.P.R. ; cette recherche n'a pas été sérieusement faite.¹

Mais, dit Mlle Johnson, l'origine réelle des textes est moins importante que l'apparition des coïncidences observées entre Mme Verrall et Mme Holland. Soit, mais alors, pourquoi insister constamment sur l'impossibilité où est le sensitif d'avoir normalement connaissance des faits indiqués par lui ? Pourquoi en faire état comme dans la correspondance Roden Noël (Vol. XXI., p. 387) tout en reconnaissant la faiblesse de l'argument ?

Analysons donc le meilleur cas de correspondance croisée entre Mmes Verrall et Holland, *Ave Roma Immortalis*. "A number of details . . ., quite unintelligible to herself, were given by Mrs. Verrall, while a single *other* important detail, clinching the whole matter, was given by Mrs. Holland, accompanied by a remark implying that Mrs. Verrall had

¹Voy. encore l'association entre M. Everard Feilding, son voyage en Malaise et l'article sur le Spiritisme Malais, de Skeat (auteur de *Malay Magic*), *Proc.*, Vol. XVII., pp. 290-298. L'apparition, dans le texte du 9 Février, 1906, de "K. 57 [a Christian name]" (Vol. XXI., p. 304) est explicable normalement. La lettre L est employée, suivie d'un numéro pour désigner une certaine catégorie d'hallucinations locales. Or, la lettre K précède immédiatement la lettre L ; une substitution analogue à celle qui dissimule le nom de M. Hodgson au commencement du texte l'explique bien simplement. Cela est d'autant plus vraisemblable que nous voyons encore "K. 37 not in the Appendix" dans une texte du 1^{er} Avril, 1906 (Vol. XXI., p. 346) : ce qui fait penser à *Human Personality*, où la plupart des cas sont cités, sans être préfixés cependant de la lettre et du chiffre : l'apparition de ce détail conduit aux Publications de la S.P.R.

Le texte précédant immédiatement "K. 37" porte : "Give her father's love. The little grave." Or dans *Human Personality*, Vol. II., p. 37, il est question d'un père qui est enterré, et qui apparaît à sa fille.

La lettre K. figure dans l'article de Mlle Johnson (*Proc.*, Vol. XIV., p. 186). Comparez aussi le texte du 11 Avril 1906. L-1559, L. 579, donné comme le numéro d'une automobile (Vol. XXI., p. 365). En Mars 1905, Mlle Johnson a communiqué à Mme H. le texte du 15 Mars 1905 de Mme Verrall, où l'on voit "K. L. Jan. 11" (Vol. XXI., p. 255).

been purposely kept in the dark," dit Mlle Johnson (Vol. XXI., p. 387).

Les textes de Mme Verrall sont donnés pp. 297 et ss.

2 Mars 1906.

- (1) Non tali auxilio invenies quod velis non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis . . .
 (2) Primus inter pares (3) ipse non nominis immemor. (4) Cum eo frater (5) etsi non sanguine (6) animo consanguineus (7) ii ambo tibi (8) per aliam (9) vocem mittent . . .

4 Mars 1906.

- (10) Pagan and Pope. (11) The Stoic persecutor (12) and the Christian. (13) Gregory not Basil's friend ought to be a clue . . . (14) Pagan and Pope and Reformer (15) all enemies as you think. (16) Crux significationem habet. (17) Crucifer qui olim fertur. . . .

5 Mars 1906.

- (18) Leonis pelle sumpto (19) claviger (20) in scriptis jam antea bene denotatus. Corrigenda sunt quaedam. Ask your husband he knows it well. (21) Stant inde columnae (22) relicta Calpe. jam finis. No you have left out something (23). Assiduo lectore columnae.

J'ai numéroté les mots ou idées utiles, pour éviter des redites. (1) Est-ce une allusion au siège de Troie (*En.* II., 521). Son association avec (2) et (4) donnèrent au Dr. Verrall l'impression que le texte avait en vue le tableau de Raphael "St Léon arrêtant Attila." Il indiqua à Mme Verrall le vers de l'*Enéide*, et appliqua *primus inter pares* au Pape; chose douteuse.

Reconnaître la fresque de Raphael sur ces détails indéterminés :

- (1) Impuissance de Priam à sauver Troie ;
 (2) Le premier entre ses pairs, non oublieux de son nom ;
 (3) Avec lui son frère, sinon par le sang, du moins par l'esprit ;

c'est faire preuve de beaucoup de perspicacité.

Le reste du texte est inconciliable avec l'opinion du Dr. Verrall. Si *primus inter pares* s'applique au Pape St-Léon, *cum eo frater, etc.*, ne s'applique pas à St-Paul. D'un autre côté il est difficile d'appliquer à St-Pierre le "*primus inter pares ipse non nominis immemor.*"

Enfin, le texte annonce que les deux personnages indéterminés enverront à Mme Verrall un mot par une autre. On verra que ce n'est ni St-Pierre ni St-Paul, ni St-Léon qui envoient un message.

L'émergence de l'idée du Pape dans les textes des 4 et 5 Mars est due à la suggestion du Dr. Verrall (Vol. XXI., p. 299). Sa femme sait qu'il voit où le texte veut en venir; il y a un pape, un frère par l'esprit, un siège. C'est là-dessus que le texte brode; l'idée d'un siège de Rome, résidence du pape, éveille l'idée de païens ou de réformes et rappelle les papes St-Grégoire (qui réussit à écarter les Lombards à la fin du vi^e siècle), Grégoire VII. (assiégé par l'Empereur Henri, grand réformateur, Grégoire XIII. (réformateur du calendrier), et St-Léon (assiégé par Attila). On trouve ces indications mêlées vaguement et associées à Hercule (Claviger, Columnae, Calpe).

Le 7 Mars, Mme Holland donna un long texte où se trouvent mélangées au moins 70 idées différentes, susceptibles d'associations nombreuses. On lit: "Ave Roma immortalis. How could I make it any clearer without giving her the clue? How cold it was that winter—Even snow in Rome—we might have stayed at home, etc." (Vol. XXI., p. 295).

Mlle Johnson trouve là un cas de correspondance typique. Il n'est pas impossible, dit-elle, que l'idée de Rome ait été transmise télépathiquement par M. Verrall, mais alors pourquoi Mme Holland a-t-elle ajouté: "Comment pouvais-je le rendre plus clair sans lui donner l'indication?" Cela n'était pas dans la conscience de M. Verrall.

Au point de vue de la télépathie le raisonnement de Mlle Johnson est contestable; M. Verrall a eu le sentiment traduit par le texte, puisqu'il a dit à sa femme qu'il voyait où l'écriture voulait en venir, mais qu'il a gardé le silence sur l'indication précise, l'épisode peint par Raphael.

La télépathie n'est pas nécessaire; il y a une simple coïncidence. M. Myers est mort à Rome, et on trouve de

nombreuses références à Rome dans les textes publiés de Mme Holland: le contexte montre beaucoup d'erreurs et de contradictions difficiles à comprendre s'il y a une intelligence unique dirigeant les communications.

L'analyse du cas "*Eheu! fugaces*" conduit aux mêmes conclusions. On nous dit que le texte de Madame Verrall (cité Vol. XXI, p. 363) répète plusieurs fois l'idée de *fuite*. On peut contester cette interprétation qui serait fondée sur la description d'un enlèvement imaginaire. Je vois bien l'idée d'une promenade que font ensemble des personnes indéterminées, en voiture, avec de la neige, un brillant soleil, le bruit des clochettes et du fouet; mais je n'aperçois pas la fuite, ni l'enlèvement. On ne choisit pas pour fuir, ni pour enlever, un brillant soleil, on ne claque pas du fouet et on ne garnit pas les harnais de sonnettes, c'est l'évidence même. Mme Verrall fait allusion à une promenade en voiture, dans l'Engadine, si Maloja traduit le seuil de Maloggia, orthographié à l'anglaise.

Viennent ensuite l'idée de chauve-souris qui s'enfuit (ou s'est envolée), une dame est seule. Puis: "There is an effort to have the same words this time"; enfin: "On bat's wings rides Queen Mab." Le seul mot répété est "bat," chauve-souris.

Le même jour, Mme Holland écrit: "A great black shadow and the sound of a wailing wind—Eheu fugaces!"

Cela suffit à Mlle Johnson pour nous assurer qu'il y a une correspondance croisée. L'idée de fuite si richement décrite par Mme Verrall est résumée dans un seul mot latin par Mme Holland, comme on l'a observé(?) dans le cas "*Ave Roma.*"

La seule idée de fuite observable dans le texte de Madame Verrall est relative à la chauve-souris. Elle n'a aucun rapport avec l'idée d'ombre noire et de vent qui gémit, exprimée par Mme Holland. Les mots latins, qui se trouvent dans tous les recueils de citation (p.ex. Wood), expriment seuls l'idée correspondante, mais l'expression en est fort différente, car Horace ne veut peindre que l'écoulement rapide des années. C'est l'idée de vitesse, non de fuite qui inspire ses vers.

L'émergence du latin s'explique par le désir d'avoir un message semblable à celui de Madame Verrall dont les textes sont fertiles en mots latins. On trouve l'indication du désir

que j'indique dans une lettre écrite par Mme Holland (Vol. XXI., p. 364).

Mlle Johnson fait donc dire au texte de Mme Verrall plus qu'il ne contient, ou autre chose que ce qu'il dit; ensuite, elle s'appuie sur une concordance éloignée, douteuse quand au sens, et dont l'un des termes est une locution latine devenue proverbiale. D'un autre côté elle oublie que le contrôle annonce qu'il essaye de transmettre les *mêmes mots*, car Mmes Verrall et Holland écrivent le même jour, après convention. Or, chose significative, il n'y a aucun mot latin dans le texte de Mme Verrall, tel qu'il est publié, ce qui est contraire à ses habitudes. En revanche, Mme Holland cite du latin, ce qui est également contraire à ses habitudes. On voit dans ce petit détail la trace d'un effort subconscient, qui aboutit à des résultats contradictoires, et exclut manifestement l'idée d'une intelligence directrice.

Une méthode prudente devrait tenir compte des éléments que je signale, et éviter de considérer comme démontrés des faits douteux ou indéterminés. Or on constate trop souvent ce vice de raisonnement chez Mlle Johnson. En voici d'autres exemples.

Mme Verrall, 21 Mars 1906, écrit: "Posilippo, and a terrace there, blue sea beyond the marble balustrade" (Vol. XXI., p. 334).

Une heure auparavant, Mme Holland avait écrit: "M. saw a real place that last time but she has never seen the place itself and did not describe it very clearly."

Les deux textes ne coïncident pas, puisque Mme Holland écrit à 10 heures 10, alors que Mme Verrall n'a pas encore écrit. De plus Mme Verrall n'a rien vu, à moins que l'analogie ne permette de prendre le mot *see* comme synonyme de *write*. Quant à la description, elle est applicable à cent mille endroits où il y a des terrasses, avec des balustrades de marbre dominant la mer.

Le texte de Mme Holland est encore erroné, si on le compare à celui de Mme Verrall, en ce sens que si la description est insuffisante, le nom de l'endroit est donné; il est donc clairement reconnaissable.

Il est vrai que Mme Verrall n'est pas allée à Naples et n'a pas vu le Pausilippe, mais, si le texte de Mme Holland voulait

avoir le moindre sens, il devait faire allusion à un évènement supranormal; décrire un endroit connu n'a rien d'extraordinaire; il fallait donc que la description s'appliquât à un endroit inconnu de Mme Verrall.

Je n'attache pas d'importance à l'allusion à Marseille; Mesdames Verrall et Holland étaient en correspondance.

L'émergence des allusions à M. Noël a été déterminée chez Mme Holland par la lecture des textes de Mme Verrall, où il est question de "Tintagel and the sea that moaned," etc. Mme Holland n'avait d'abord pas reconnu la réminiscence, mais Mlle Johnson, deux ans plus tard, communiqua de nouveau les vers de Mme Verrall à Mme Holland (6 Février 1908, Vol. XXI., p. 325) qui reconnut Roden Noël cette fois. Cela éveilla l'attention de Mlle Johnson qui demanda des explications: "Did you say Roden Noel because you remembered that *you* had had references to him . . . or do you think that you subliminally recognised the verses?"

Et Mme Holland a répondu que le nom de Roden Noël lui a été transmis *télépathiquement* par Mlle Johnson.

Il est difficile de prendre cela sérieusement, puisque la reconnaissance subliminale, certaine dans le cas cité, explique les concordances dont on fait des correspondances. Cependant Mlle Johnson se contente de cette explication (Vol. XXI., p. 326); Mme Holland a une excellente mémoire normale pour la poésie; si elle avait lu Roden Noël elle s'en serait souvenue, et aurait reconnu la source de ses allusions!

Comme logique cela laisse à désirer; d'ailleurs, l'incident abonde en illogismes, et je signalerai la question: "Croyez-vous avoir reconnu subliminalement les vers?" Comment peut-on le savoir, si la reconnaissance a été subliminale, et quelle valeur aura une réponse négative? "We can only interrogate their supraliminal consciousness," dit Mlle Johnson, page 389.

C'est dans les textes de Mesdames Verrall et Holland que Mlle Johnson a découvert le principe des correspondances croisées,¹ sur lesquelles s'appuie la croyance à l'intervention

¹On trouve dans la littérature spirite de curieux précédents; voy. Mlle F. J. Theobald, "Similar messages through different mediums," *Light*, 1881, 41, 54, 63, 171; comparez les messages complémentaires reçus de Benjamin Coleman par M. Newton en Amérique et M. S. Moses à Londres, *Light*, 1884,

posthume de M. Myers et des membres décédés de la S.P.R. La définition est donnée, p. 375. "We do not get in the writing of one automatist anything like a mechanical verbatim reproduction of phrases in the other; we do not even get the same idea expressed in different ways,—as might well result from direct telepathy . . . we get . . . a fragmentary utterance in one script, which seems to have no particular point or meaning, and another fragmentary utterance in the other, of an equally pointless character; but when we put the two together, we see that they supplement one another, and that there is apparently one coherent idea underlying both, but only partially expressed in each."

Cela exclut la possibilité de la télépathie entre personnes vivantes, car il est difficile de supposer que la perception télépathique d'un fragment pourrait conduire à la production d'un autre fragment, dont le rapport au premier ne sera reconnu qu'après une comparaison attentive.

La preuve de la survie a jusqu'ici été cherchée dans les souvenirs conservés; ceux-ci ne peuvent être vérifiés qu'au moyen des souvenirs d'une autre personne, forcément vivante, et par conséquent cette personne peut être l'agent inconscient de la télépathie. Le contrôle ne peut songer à communiquer des renseignements sur sa vie actuelle; on ne pourrait pas les vérifier, cela est possible pour les vivants et, c'est en cela que consiste la différence fondamentale entre la télépathie provoquée par les vivants et les morts.

Les correspondances croisées permettraient aux Esprits une sorte de télépathie relative à des faits actuels: les événements correspondants sont inconnus de toute personne vivante puisque le sens et la portée des messages demeurent incompris des médiums eux-mêmes, jusqu'au moment où la comparaison des textes les révèlent. La preuve de ces faits contemporains se trouve dans les écrits et par conséquent, la méthode employée tend à satisfaire toutes nos exigences.

Telle est la thèse de Mlle Johnson.

Tout cela est une affirmation que l'examen des cas retenus ne justifie pas. Sur huit cas, faible récolte, Mlle Johnson

54. À ce sujet M. Moses écrit: "He (B. Coleman's spirit) gave the evidence of a plan, a scheme of work underlying the apparently dissociated phenomena, that marks the interference of a spirit with our world, etc."

reconnaît que le premier, le texte Selwyn (texte connu de bien des vivants) n'est pas probant. Le second cas, notes de musique, peut-être de la télépathie simple. Le 4^e, Roden Noël, comme le reconnaît à la fin Mlle Johnson (p. 387) peut avoir une explication naturelle.

Il reste les cas : (3) "not in the Electra" and "Henry was not mistaken." (5) Ave Roma ; (6) Posilippo ; (7) Eheu fugaces ; (8) Fawcett.

Le cas (8) est une coïncidence de noms, les personnes désignées par les automatistes ne sont pas les mêmes, et les détails qui permettent à Mme Verrall de reconnaître sa cousine, Mme Fawcett sont : (1) une allusion à Broadlands qui concerne M. Myers, (2) "F. a blue jewel." C'est insuffisamment déterminé.

Quant au cas No. 3, il peut servir d'introduction aux correspondances croisées que signalent les travaux ultérieurement publiés.

Le 6 Février Mme Holland essaye d'écrire des mots grecs, inintelligibles d'ailleurs (Vol. XXI, p. 310). Le 9, Mme Verrall donne un texte contenant du grec, notamment une citation d'Eschyle, *Agamemnon*, 124-125. Le 19 "... Ask for the volume . . . She will know." Le 20, "Get her to write *αἴλιον αἴλιον* and the rest."

Le 21, les deux médiums se rencontrèrent dans le bureau de Mlle Johnson et Mme Verrall fit encore allusion au livre que Mme Holland ne connaissait pas ; c'est une traduction d'Euripide, par M. Murray. L'écriture automatique de Mme Verrall se trompa donc ; il est curieux de noter qu'au même moment, on jouait à Londres une traduction de l'*Electre* d'Euripide, par Murray.

Un texte du 28, ne contient encore aucune allusion intelligible pour Mme Holland. Le même jour celle-ci donne un message où l'on compte *171 idées différentes* ; combien de correspondances pourraient s'y greffer si l'on suivait la méthode de Mlle Johnson ?

On y lit "Not in the Electra. M. will know better." C'est l'allusion au vers grec, qui en effet n'est pas dans l'*Electre* de Sophocle ni dans celle d'Euripide, comme le sait M. (Mme Verrall). "It may be taken to apply to the Greek line quoted by Mrs. Verrall for the third time on February 28th. . . . There

is a certain point, Mrs. Verrall thinks, in mentioning the *Electra* in this connexion, because the *Electra* (of Sophocles or Euripides) is equivalent to the second play of the Æschylean Trilogy, of which the *Agamemnon* is the first; so that Mrs. Holland's script might be taken to mean: the line is in the Trilogy, but not in the second play (= *Electra*), which was true."

C'est ainsi qu'on transforme en chose précise une déclaration ambiguë. En réalité, Mme Holland pouvait dire "Not in the *Electra*—M. will know better" sans se compromettre; les textes de Mme Verrall contiennent souvent des citations grecques, et il y a une infinité de chances pour que ces citations soient empruntées à d'autres sources que l'*Electre*; l'idée de cette dernière pièce se présentait d'ailleurs toute seule à l'esprit, puisqu'on la jouait à Londres. Tout cela est conforme, comme procédés et sources, aux lois psychologiques les plus communes des phénomènes automatiques.

Rien ne permet d'admettre l'interprétation de Mme Verrall. On ne trouve pas la moindre indication de l'idée de trilogie.

Les allusions de Mme Holland, impliquées dans le mot *Electra*, sont indéterminées.

Ce n'est pas sur des interprétations pareilles que l'on peut établir un raisonnement scientifique. Malheureusement, le mode de raisonnement s'est généralisé. Mlle Johnson montre que le principe des correspondances croisées est contenu explicitement dans les textes de Mme Verrall; l'invention de l'interprétation analogique ou symbolique revient encore à cette automatiste.

III.

Le rapport de M. Piddington marque un pas en avant dans l'application de cette singulière méthode.

Ce rapport résume les concordances observés entre Mme Piper, Mlle et Mme Verrall et Mme Holland. 74 séances de l'une, 63 textes de Mme Verrall, 17 de Mlle Verrall, 38 de Mme Holland sont analysés. On voit combien cela représente de mots susceptibles de concorder. On a chez les trois dernières, plus de 2.500 centres d'associations explicites, ou implicites. Quant aux idées exprimées par Mme Piper, il est difficile de les évaluer à moins de plusieurs milliers.

M. Piddington a trouvé, dans cette masse de documents, 24 concordances seulement dont quelques unes sont complexes. La moisson demeure bien maigre. Il est regrettable que les expérimentateurs, sauf Mme Sidgwick, ne nous donnent aucune indication sur la proportion des succès aux insuccès. Nous savons seulement (Vol. XXII., p. 23) que sur 18 mots choisis par les expérimentateurs, pour être transmis, un seul réussit à l'être.

Les correspondances croisées signalées par M. Piddington concernent quelquefois des mots si communs, que leur survenance à des époques, même rapprochées, dans plusieurs textes ne signifie rien. Tels sont Steeple—Hope—Star—Arrow—Giant and Dwarf—Laurel wreath—Violets—Cup—Spirit and Angel—Mountains, Seas, Lakes, Rivers—Music—Azure, Horizon.

Pour faire la partie belle aux expérimentateurs, j'analyserai seulement leurs meilleurs cas.

Celestial Halcyon Days.

Le 15 Janvier 1907, Myers-Piper prétend avoir donné à Mme Verrall; "Celestial Halcyon Days" (Vol. XXII., p. 103).

Mme Verrall ne se souvenait pas d'avoir lu ces mots (qu'elle n'a jamais obtenus en réalité). Le 22 Janvier elle écrit un texte où figure le mot inusité "supern" et Mme Verrall se souvient d'avoir eu *trois ans et demi* auparavant le mot *supernal*. Le 3 Juillet 1903, elle avait écrit une communication relative à la paix, à la contemplation sur de hauts sommets et finissant par "the storm and whirlwind consume the blue clear space between the worlds, but the supernal peace is undisturbed."

"The fundamental idea of halcyon days, nous dit-on,—an interval of calm between storms—seems to be represented in the words 'the storm and whirlwind consume the blue clear space between the worlds.' The main point of the script, however, seems to be that while halcyon days in this world are transitory, in the celestial world they are unending."

Cela suffit aux expérimentateurs pour établir une correspondance; Mme Verrall avait bien exprimé, dès 1903, l'idée indiquée par le contrôle.

En admettant que le texte de Mme Verrall ait le sens

allégué, sa citation par Myers-Piper ne prouve absolument rien, car ce texte figure au Vol. XX., p. 64. On y trouve (texte et note) les mots "stillness in the air," "peace," "storm and whirlwind." Mme Piper connaît le mémoire de Mme Verrall (Vol. XXII., p. 106). L'expression "halcyon days" signifie les jours de calme entre les tempêtes du solstice d'hiver, et dérive de la fable mythologique de Ceyx et Alcyone. Elle est citée dans Webster.

La source de l'information est normale, "but even if this was the case," dit M. Piddington, "it is difficult to imagine that any part of the consciousness of Mrs. Piper, who is entirely without classical scholarship, should have summarised [Mrs. Verrall's script] in the words 'Celestial Halcyon Days.'"

Cela est au contraire probable; l'idée de "celestial" a son origine dans "the rest of the heaven" (Vol. XX., p. 64, note); les mots de Mme Piper sont une traduction maladroite du texte de Mme Verrall; un érudit n'aurait pas traduit "*the supernal peace is undisturbed*" par "*Celestial halcyon days.*" Les jours halcyoniques étant étymologiquement une période de deux semaines, entre les tempêtes du solstice d'hiver, ils signifient un temps de calme passager, idée contraire à celle de *supern* dans le texte de Mme Verrall.

Quant au moyen par lequel l'écriture automatique rappelle à Mme Verrall son texte antérieur, c'est un cas classique de cryptomnésie, tout au plus.

On voit à quoi se réduit ce phénomène. Les indications données par Mme Piper existaient dans un texte imprimé connu d'elle. Le rapporteur raisonne comme les personnes qui se fondent sur l'apparente incapacité des médiums pour attribuer leurs messages à des esprits.¹

*Crossing the Bar*² et l'incident ἀπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων.

Frappée de la vraisemblance de la personnification Myers-Piper et de la connaissance que ce contrôle avait des parties inédites de son écriture automatique, Mme Verrall imagina une expérience cruciale pour démontrer que Myers-Piper avait accès aux souvenirs personnels de feu M. Myers. Elle demanda au contrôle de traduire les trois mots grecs ci-dessus cités; ils

¹ Les curieux pourront comparer le texte de Mme Verrall à *Spirit Teachings*, Memorial Edition, pp. 178, 179 et notamment 180, ligne 1 à 3.

² Ce poème de Tennyson est deux fois cité dans *Light*, 1890.

servent d'épigraphe à une ode de Myers à Tennyson, publiée dans *Fragments of Prose and Poetry*. On nous assure que Mme Piper n'en a pas connaissance. Pour le démontrer M. Piddington nous cite (Vol. XXII., p. 109, footnote) le résultat d'une enquête faite . . . en Amérique; mais Mme Piper a pu voir ce livre soit chez les amis de M. Myers, soit au siège de la S.P.R. soit dans une bibliothèque. En effet, le fascicule LI. des *Proceedings*, paru en Décembre 1906, contient une analyse de ce livre; de plus, le rapport de Mlle Johnson indique comment Mme Holland a pu consulter sans difficulté l'ouvrage de M. Myers dans une bibliothèque de Londres (Vol. XXI., p. 246).

La réponse complète comportait (1) la traduction; (2) une allusion au poème de Myers sur Tennyson; (3) une allusion à Plotin et à la dernière partie de *Human Personality*.

Le contrôle (Vol. XXII., p. 142) voulut, dès le début, savoir ce que les mots avaient "*to do with our experiments?*".

Mme Verrall lui apprit ceci "*I think you have spoken of them to me before, or something like them.*" Indication précieuse qui fut utilisée.

Dès le lendemain, Mme Verrall crut trouver des allusions. La phrase "*haven of rest*" fut mentionnée comme pouvant lui rappeler des souvenirs de M. Myers. A la fin de la séance il y eut des allusions aberrantes à "*Larches*" et "*Laburnum*" qui évoquent chez Mme Verrall l'idée de Tennyson. Ces associations paraissent être personnelles à cette dame et rien n'indique que M. Myers les connût.

Le rapporteur insiste cependant sur le mot *Larch* qui figure dans un poème de Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, XCI., où il y a une allusion à l'Aleçon (Martin-pêcheur) "*the sea-blue bird of March.*" Cela rappelle la correspondance "*Celestial Haleyon Days.*"

Il est probable en effet que le contrôle s'en est servi; il a utilisé le mémoire de Mme Verrall; cela semble résulter de l'équivalence "*rest of Heaven*" (Vol. XX., p. 64, note) et "*Haven of Rest.*" L'allusion à "un siège, sur lequel il s'asseyait" (Vol. XXII., p. 144) rappelle étonnamment "*The corner of the seat . . . where he always sat*": ce qui implique l'idée d'un vaste siège (Vol. XX., p. 239).

Nous avons là une origine normale des allusions, à *haven*

of rest; elles ont été provoquées par la phrase de Mme Verrall "Vous m'en avez déjà parlé" qui limite le cercle des recherches du contrôle.

De plus, *Larches* et *Laburnum* sont indiqués comme "I mentioned larches to you before", ce qui est le rappel d'une prétendue transmission de M. Myers à Mme Verrall. *Laburnum*, écrit *Laburman*, est dépourvu de contexte. Rien ne suggère l'idée d'une réponse aux mots grecs.

M. Piddington examine ensuite les allusions que Mme Verrall fait elle-même à sa question. C'est là une méthode déconcertante, puisque cette dame *a posé la question et connaît la réponse*. Les expérimentateurs ne semblent pas s'apercevoir que les concordances qui pourront survenir entre Mme Verrall et Mme Piper ne dépasseront pas désormais les possibilités de la télépathie. Je crois inutile de suivre M. Piddington dans ses commentaires sur les réponses que Mme Verrall se fait à elle-même. L'intérêt de l'expérience ne va pas au delà des concordances observés entre les deux médiums.

Le 6 Février, M. Piddington lit une lettre de Mme Verrall, qui félicite les contrôles des excellentes réponses données par eux les 29 et 30 Janvier. "Especially F. W. H. Myers seems to me to have shown on January 30 that he understood my three Greek words." C'est donner une indication au contrôle qui a parlé de jours aleyoniques le 30. Il se fixe dans le cycle d'idées associées à ces mots.

Le 6 Mars, Myers-Piper annonce qu'il avait fait dessiner à Mme Verrall un triangle dans un cercle. Ce signe devait servir à marquer des correspondances croisées.¹ M. Piddington demande aussitôt (Vol. XXII, p. 148) quand ce signe a été tracé et quels sont les mots *transmis en même temps*. Rector répond qu'il ne sait pas si on pourra indiquer la date, mais le mot pourra l'être. Et il ajoute aussitôt "cloudless, sky, horizon." Quoiqu'en dise M. Piddington (Vol. XXII, p. 149) Rector répond manifestement à la question qui vient de lui être posée.

Mais M. Piddington a l'esprit prévenu à tel point qu'il explique ainsi la difficulté éprouvée par lui à lire le mot "horizon"; "'sky' is not a word which one would expect to

¹ "You wish me to make a sign when giving a word at Mrs. Verrall's, also at Mrs. Holland's?" Mr. Piddington—"Yes," etc. (Vol. XXII. pp. 36-7).

find immediately followed by 'horizon'" (Vol. XXII., p. 149). Webster définit pourtant horizon "the apparent junction of the earth and sky."

Au réveil Mme Piper prononça ces mots "moaning at the bar when I put out to sea. . . . Arthur Hallam. Good-bye, Margaret"; ce qui indiquerait une correspondance croisée avec Mme Verrall. Certains d'entre eux sont d'une lecture incertaine, mais on peut admettre les indications de M. Piddington, qui déclare que, suivie des mots ci-dessus, la phrase "cloudless sky beyond the horizon," est une paraphrase de *ἀπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων*.

On ne peut laisser passer cette affirmation sans réserves. Les efforts tendant à démontrer que l'adjonction de "beyond the horizon" à "sky" est faite pour traduire *οὐρανὸς* et le distinguer de *ἀήρ* est de l'imagination pure. Un érudit n'aurait pas traduit *ἀκύμων* par "cloudless" (M. Myers le traduit "Let Heaven itself be still").

Pour justifier l'appropriation de la paraphrase aux mots grecs, on invoque encore la concordance apparente entre les textes de Mme Verrall, établissant un parallèle entre Plotin et Tennyson, citant *In Memoriam* et *Crossing the Bar* et les allusions faites par Mme Piper, au stade du réveil, à ces poèmes.

Cette association existait dans l'esprit des expérimentateurs, son émergence dans les écrits ou les discours de Mme Piper ne dépasse donc pas les ressources connues de la transmission de pensée. M. Piddington a trop d'expérience pour ne pas apercevoir cette objection. Il y répond ainsi :

Je n'avais pas, à la date du 6 Mars, vu les textes de Mme Verrall qui, le 11 Mars, développent le parallèle entre l'extase telle que la décrivent Plotin et Tennyson.¹ Je ne connaissais que l'allusion faite par Mme Verrall à *Crossing the Bar*; je n'avais pas distingué la citation d'*In Memoriam* (6 Mars). Je ne suis donc pas l'agent, puisque je n'avais pas la notion de ces concordances, sauf pour *Crossing the Bar*.²

¹ Mme Verrall publie une dissertation qui semble faire bon marché des propres paroles de Tennyson; le poète s'entraînait en répétant tout bas son nom (*Ancient Sage*), il ne demande pas que l'air soit immobile. ("The air that smites his forehead is not air but Vision"—*Holy Grail*.)

² *Crossing the Bar* est une expression familière aux spirites. C'est le titre du Ier Chapitre des *Letters from Julia*, de M. Stead.

“To suppose that subconsciously I grasped the real significance and connection of these oracular scripts and passed my knowledge on to Mrs. Piper is *too strained a hypothesis* for me to have patience with. If the knowledge shown in Mrs. Piper’s trance was obtained from any living person it was from Mrs Verrall” (Vol. XXII., p. 128, note). L’hypothèse qui indigna M. Piddington, p. 128, devient raisonnable, p. 129, dès qu’il s’agit de Mme Verrall. “One must assume either that Mrs. Verrall’s subconsciousness had worked out the connection between *In Memoriam* and *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* some five or six days before she normally grasped it—a perfectly reasonable hypothesis,” etc. Cette hypothèse, en effet, est la plus vraisemblable.

L’analyse de ce cas révèle le manque de sang-froid des opérateurs (Vol. XXII., p. 163). Le contrôle parle de ses efforts pour transmettre un mot commençant par D. Mme Verrall s’écrie aussitôt: “*I know the word. I told it to my husband yesterday. Shall I say it?*”—“*Yes what is it?*”, répond Myers-Piper—“*Dante.*” Dante a beau figurer parmi les grands visionnaires cités par M. Myers, il est clair que l’émergence de son nom a été directement suggérée par Mme Verrall.

D’ailleurs, le contrôle en est toujours à *Halcyon days*. Il veut indiquer l’auteur des mots grecs, il le connaît bien et l’a donné déjà en réponse, à l’occasion du poème *Halcyon days*, etc. Il est évident que Myers-Piper est dans la plus complète ignorance de la vraie réponse, bien qu’il affirme avoir répondu (Vol. XXII., p. 164). M. Piddington ajoute “However wanting in definiteness many of the statements . . . were, it is important to note that Mrs. Verrall at the time took the references to St. Paul and Swedenborg to be connected with her question about the authorship of the Greek words, in spite of the fact that at the time she failed to see any relevance in them.”

La conviction des expérimentateurs est donc faite d’avance. Bien que Swedenborg et St-Paul soient représentés comme des correspondances déjà donnés, on ne s’attache pas aux paroles du contrôle; on cherche une allusion symbolique et on la trouve dans ce fait que ces noms figurent dans le passage où les mots grecs sont traduits. Je ne crois pas qu’il soit possible de prêter aux contrôles à la fois une connaissance merveilleuse des choses et une grande maladresse à les exprimer. Nous ne connaissons

leur pensée que par son expression, et nous n'avons pas le droit de négliger cette expression pour nous attacher seulement à des coïncidences de mots. D'autant plus que St-Paul a déjà fait l'objet d'une correspondance croisée.

L'origine supranormale de ces mots n'est donc pas certaine ; encore le doute ne peut-il subsister que pour Swedenborg. Mais, en admettant même ce doute comme favorable à la thèse des expérimentateurs, il n'en reste pas moins clair que Mme Verrall sait ce que doit être la réponse, puisqu'elle cherche des allusions au passage de *Human Personality* où ces noms sont mentionnés (Vol. XXII., p. 132). On demeure toujours dans le domaine de la télépathie, et il ne semble pas que les expérimentateurs en aient conscience, car ils estiment que le contrôle montre "The vigilance, real or admirably simulated, of a trained experimenter, as anxious as Mr. Podmore himself to eliminate thought-transference from the sitter." On peut juger du bien fondé de cette observation (Vol. XXII., p. 129, note 1).

En tous cas, le contrôle s'aperçoit des erreurs qu'il fait ; la froideur de Mme Verrall à la séance du 29 Avril l'avertit qu'il se trompe, et après avoir clos l'incident le 29 en disant, "Amen ! Amen at last !", il la rouvre dès le lendemain et il dit timidement Homère. "*Omer's Illiurd* ; it is the name of the author" (Vol. XXII., p. 166). Mlle Johnson cache mal sa surprise, mais le contrôle persiste dans son absurde réponse, qu'il renouvelle à l'arrivée de Mme Verrall, et il exprime l'opinion que sa réponse aux mots grecs est complète (p. 167). Mme Verrall laisse voir son désenchantement ; pas de félicitations cette fois, mais, des réponses clairement mécontentes. Je crois avoir répondu complètement dit le contrôle : "Very likely, yes, I think so," réplique glacialement Mme Verrall.

Le contrôle voit qu'il a fait fausse route, et il change aussitôt de réponse : Pa... (que l'on prend pour Platon), Soc, Socratese, et Homère.¹ Mme Verrall persiste dans sa froideur et le contrôle hésite, il peut avoir répondu, mais il réfléchira encore.

On voit, qu'au 30 Avril, Myers-Piper est encore dans l'ignorance absolue. Il se trompe lourdement, si on prend ses réponses dans leur sens naturel. Mais la méthode symbolique

¹ Voyez l'association de Platon, Homère et Socrate dans un entrefilet de "*Light*," 1906, p. 192, signé V. Cela peut être aussi une correspondance.

permet de trouver la vérité désirée, au milieu de ces erreurs offertes. Homère, l'*Iliade*, Pa transformé en Platon et Socrate sont très appropriés, parce que, dans le *Criton*, Platon raconte la vision de Socrate; une femme vêtue de blanc lui apparaît et lui dit un vers de l'*Iliade* d'Homère. La preuve résulte des recherches de Mme Verrall; son écriture automatique porte le 1er Mai, "*Eagle soaring above the tomb of Plato.*" C'est une phrase du passage cherché de *Human Personality*; là il est question de Swedenborg, Dante, St-Paul; dans les 33 dernières pages, le mot *Vision* avec une majuscule est employé deux fois¹; la première à l'occasion de la vision de Socrate, la seconde fois à propos de Plotin. Cela paraît décisif à Mme Verrall. Seule une intelligence familière avec les deux derniers chapitres du livre pouvait voir une connexion entre la vision de Socrate et celle de Plotin.

On est un peu déconcerté par tant de subtilité, on perd de vue le texte, et on ne voit pas les erreurs de fait qui sont à la base de l'ingénieuse construction de Mme Verrall et de M. Piddington. On ne se rend pas compte d'une chose bien simple. Myers-Piper répond à tort et à travers. Homère, Socrate, Pa, sont donnés comme le nom de l'auteur des mots grecs, il n'est pas question de vision, ni de *Human Personality*; Myers cherche à nommer l'auteur. M. Piddington n'a pas le droit de prêter aux mots du contrôle un sens manifestement étranger au contexte.

D'ailleurs l'assimilation est fantaisiste. La vision de Socrate n'a rien de commun avec l'extase, ni avec ses conditions atmosphériques. L'extase, consciente et philosophique de Plotin, n'est pas l'extase somnambulique, ni même mystique religieuse proprement dite. La vision est cliniquement une hallucination sensorielle; or la philosophie mystique enseigne que le caractère de l'intuition directe, survenant dans l'extase, est d'être un phénomène de l'entendement, presque dépouillé d'éléments sensoriels. Il peut y avoir des extases sans vision, comme des visions sans extase.

La discussion de Mme Verrall peut être ainsi résumée: si nous négligeons le sens direct des réponses de Myers nous trouvons qu'il cite, le 29, trois noms qui figurent page 291

¹ Voy. *Vision*, ainsi écrit par M. Myers, dans d'autres circonstances, *Journal*, Vol. IX., p. 290.

de *Human Personality*; qu'il cite, le 30, Pa (pris pour Platon), Socrate et Homère cités également dans les derniers chapitres du livre.¹ Donc, il fait allusion à ce livre, et il fait allusion à l'Extase parce que Swedenborg, Dante et St-Paul sont des extatiques, et que, le livre parle de la vision de Socrate et d'un vers de l'*Iliade*. Que d'allusions possibles avec ce système!

Mme Verrall oublie que c'est elle qui a suggéré Dante, auquel le contrôle ne songeait pas; que c'est elle qui complète l'allusion au nom de Swedenborg; que St-Paul est une correspondance récente, qu'enfin les noms de Socrate et de Pa... ne sont que des tâtonnements provoqués par son attitude.

Le nom de *Plotin* ne fut donné que le 6 Mai, à Mme Sidgwick, qui l'attendait, car Mme Verrall avait déjà indiqué à Mlle Johnson et à Mme Sidgwick qu'il y avait des allusions à *Human Personality* dans les séances du 29 et du 30 Avril, et qu'il ne manquait plus que le nom de Plotin.

En réalité, l'expérience a duré du 15 Janvier au 6 Mai, près de *quatre mois*; Mme Verrall et les autres expérimentateurs connaissaient les réponses cherchées. Elles ont été obtenues péniblement, avec des erreurs grossières et prolongées; jamais la traduction exacte des mots grecs n'a été donnée, les expérimentateurs ont signalé par leur attitude les erreurs du contrôle qu'ils ont inconsciemment guidé. Sur ces faits M. Piddington se fonde pour assurer que "Myers-Piper gives various answers . . . all intelligent and all but one provably correct. . . . Besides this, Myers-Piper shows that he knows that Myers-Verrall had previously shown knowledge of his (Myers_P) answer. . . . The facts . . . emerged in a manner which indicates that the intelligence responsible for their emergence was as intimately conversant with the closing chapters of *Human Personality* as Frederic Myers, its author, must have been" (Vol. XXII, p. 139).

Il ne faut pas être difficile en matière de preuves pour admettre ces conclusions que l'analyse des faits dément détail par détail.

¹ Pourquoi ne sont-ils pas simplement empruntés au *Journal Light*?

*Light in West.*¹

Je ne discuterai pas les raisonnements littéraires de M. Piddington et me bornerai à montrer ses points faibles, ainsi que les sources normales des concordances relevées. Je suis l'ordre du tableau I., page 280, Vol. XXII.

(1) Hercule furieux d'Euripide (Mme V. 4 et 25 Mars). Le 8 Avril Mme Holland cite le nom des personnages de la traduction de Browning, insérée dans *Aristophanes' Apology* (Vol. XXIV., p. 25). M. Piddington se fonde sur la réunion de ces noms pour démontrer l'intervention d'une intelligence directrice.

Mais Euripide et l'Hercule furieux sont mentionnés au Vol. XX., p. 61 des *Proceedings*. Mme Holland possède Browning, et M. Piddington reconnaît qu'elle a pu parcourir l'apologie bien qu'elle dise ne l'avoir pas lue (Vol. XXIV., p. 25).

(2) Euripide, Mme Piper 8 Avril, Mme Verrall 4 et 25 Mars.

Source normale, voy. Vol. XX. p. 61.

(3) Browning's *Herakles*, voy. ci-dessus No. 1.

(4) Umbrae, Shadow, Shades, εἰδῶλον.

Mme Verrall 25 Mars, Mme Holland 27 Mars.

Voy. *Human Personality*, Vol. II., p. 290. Mme Holland parle de Shadow seulement dans le sens de ombre opposée à lumière. Ce mot est très banal.

On voit dans "Peter is the second one" une allusion à St-Pierre, implicitement désigné par Mme Verrall dans le symbole d'Hercule *claviger* et de Janus (Vol. XX., p. 258). Comparez avec Ave Roma Immortalis, Vol. XXI., pp. 297, 299.

(5) Shadow, Tenebrae, Spirit: banalités.

(8) Géryon d'Euripide, et Géryon de Dante.

Ces mentions isolées ont été obtenues en présence de Mme Verrall. La table dicta d'abord "*geryoneshefollostlalemo*"; Mme Verrall fit observer que cela ne signifiait rien. La table recommença: "*Geryontes mefistoles probemium*" que Mme Verrall lut *problem*. Invitée à s'expliquer la table suivit l'indication et dicta: "*mefistofiles and geryon double aspect of one problem.*"

¹ *Light in the West* est le titre d'un journal spirite publié aux États Unis (*Light*, 1885, 543).

Mme Verrall a donc provoqué le développement d'une série d'idées contenues dans Geryones, elle commente et interprète ensuite ce message édifié avec sa collaboration et trouve deux allusions : (1) à Géryon du Dante, à cause de l'apparition de Mefistofiles qu'elle assimile à Méphistophélès, dont le Dante n'avait certainement pas entendu parler ; (2) à Géryon grec, monstre tué par Hercule. Géryon est mentionné dans l'*Hercule Furieux*, donc il y a une allusion implicite à cette tragédie. Les deux arguments sont typiques. L'un repose sur un anachronisme amusant, l'*italianisation* de la création germanique de Goethe, la confusion du XIII^e et du XIX^e siècles. L'autre sur une indétermination, car Géryon est cité dans bien des auteurs, notamment Virgile, *Enéide* VII. et VIII., 202. On voit l'abus résultant de ces méthodes d'analyse. Un mot comporte une allusion implicite à tout l'ouvrage où il se trouve. La réunion de Géryon monstre infernal à Mefistofiles, approximation onirique de Méphistophélès, personnification du diable, a son origine dans l'idée sous-jacente d'Enfer.

(9) Hercule comme type de l'Union de l'Est et de l'Ouest.

Ce point représenté comme une allusion explicite, ne résulte pas du texte du 25 Mars, de Mme V. Il en est déduit par M. Piddington après cinq pages de commentaires (Vol. XXII., pp. 253-257). Cette théorie est d'ailleurs fort contestable.¹

M. Piddington voit une allusion à cette idée dans les mots "The Constellation of Orion" ; il y arrive par un raisonnement d'une subtilité extraordinaire, qu'on peut lire dans le Vol. XXII., pp. 273 et s.s.

Je crois qu'il y a une simple allusion banale dont on trouve un précédent dans le Vol. XX., p. 248. Avec le système de M. Piddington on pourrait trouver des correspondances partout, Orion rappellerait l'*Est*, par l'Aurore qui lui rendit la vue, Diane (cas XIV.), *Giant and Dwarf* (cas VIII.), *Arrow* (cas VII.), etc., sans compter tous les livres où il est cité.

(10) Crossing of the Hellespont (par Hercule, et Xercès) Mme V. 25 Mars, p. 252. Il y a une allusion implicite à

¹ Voici le schéma du raisonnement : Claviger, porte massue et porte clés, rappelle Hercule et St-Pierre, et Janus à qui Ovide donne cette épithète. Ces personnages représentent tous l'union de l'Est et de l'Ouest. Hercule, divinité orientale et occidentale, St-Pierre, Oriental qui devint le premier évêque d'Occident, Janus, qui voyait à la fois l'Est et l'Ouest. M. Piddington, grâce à l'interprétation symbolique, trouve tout cela dans l'unique mot *Claviger*.

ce passage, de l'Hellespont dans le texte Holland du 8 Avril. Savez-vous pourquoi? Parce qu'il y est dit: Marthe devint comme Marie et Lia comme Rachel. En effet (Vol. XXII., pp. 265-268), il est question de Lia et Rachel au XXVII^e chant du *Purgatoire*, et au chant XXVIII., qui suit, on voit une allusion à la traversée de l'Hellespont par Xerxès!

Ici encore il suffit d'un nom ou deux, banals d'ailleurs car les épisodes de Marthe et Marie, de Lia et Rachel sont du classique très usé, pour que l'on s'autorise à retenir comme allusion implicite tout incident figurant, non plus dans le même chant, mais dans le même poème.

En réalité, il n'y a qu'une idée dans le texte de Mme Holland, l'identification des contraires, qui est deux fois indiquée dans le mémoire de Mme Verrall, pp. 129 et 131 (Vol. XX.).

(11) (12) (13) *Est et West* sont des banalités. Leur apparition à des intervalles de 15 à 20 jours dans différents textes ne signifie rien, on trouve ces mots à chaque instant. On voit dans *Proc.*, Vol. XX., p. 392, un liste d'allusions à *East*, dans les textes de Mme Verrall, liste d'ailleurs incomplète.

(14) (15) L'identification de l'Est et de l'Ouest et des contraires à son origine dans *Proc.*, Vol. XX., pp. 129 et 131.

La citation Verrall du 8 Avril est: "The words were from Maud, but you did not understand. Rosy is the east, and so on." Elle ne peut faire allusion au texte de Mme Holland du 27 Mars "Birds in the high hall Garden, not Maud Sylvia," qu'elle ne connaissait pas normalement; l'idée de Maud est explicite dans le texte Holland.

M. Piddington, constatant l'erreur de citation (le vers est Rosy is the *West*), y signale une correspondance croisée antithétique (*sic*) avec "Light in West" dit quelques heures auparavant par Mme Piper. L'antithèse est ingénieusement effectuée par l'erreur de citation dont le but est de souligner le mot important.

Où arrivera-t-on vraiment si tout devient un argument? Si l'erreur devient une combinaison ingénieuse, utilisable au même titre que la vérité? Si la concordance résulte non seulement des ressemblances mais aussi des dissemblances? Enfin si l'allusion implicite peut être justifiée, par les moyens que l'on sait?

On peut ajouter que le poème de *Maud* est deux fois cité par Mme Verrall (Vol. XX.) et que les vers "Come into the

garden Maud, for the black bat, night, has flown," etc., sont dans *Sesame and Lilies* de Ruskin (§ 94). Ils ont été utilisés déjà dans la correspondance *Eheu fugaces* entre Mmes Verrall et Holland (Vol. XXI., p. 297).

(17) Orion est une banalité (Mme Holland, 8 Avril).

(18) Aphrodite est encore une banalité mythologique.

(19) Cythérée (qui constitue sans doute la correspondance avec Aphrodite dit le 8 Avril par Mme Piper au réveil) se divise en Cythérée déesse, et Cythérée planète. On y trouve des allusions implicites, parce que: (a) la déesse Aphrodite, c'est Vénus ou Cythérée, (b) l'allusion faite par Mme Holland le même jour à Lia et Rachel implique une allusion au XXVII^e chant du *Purgatoire*, ce qui implique une allusion au vers où l'on voit "C'était je erois l'heure où Cythérée," etc.; donc c'est une référence implicite à Cythérée que de dire Lia et Rachel! (Vol. XXII., pp. 265, 266).

(20) La rivière du Léthé et la Montagne du Purgatoire sont des lieux communs. Ici, nous trouvons une extraordinaire application de la méthode d'interprétation symbolique.

Le 6 Avril 1907 Mme Verrall écrit un texte (Vol. XXII., p. 237) où l'idée de peinture est *quatre fois répétée*, "the painting of Letherbridge . . ., Lether bridge. . . . The water . . . gains volume as it rushes to the sea . . . a broadening river by the storied mount, an open lake beside the lawns of LEA."

La savante automatiste reconnaît le Léthé dans la peinture du pont de Lether et le Purgatoire de Dante aux mots "La montagne étagée" et Lea.

M. Piddington dit, page 263: "I took *Mrs. Verrall's script of April 6th*, . . . to be . . . various ways of expressing one idea, namely, the Wordsworth Country. Mrs. Verrall however had placed another interpretation on her script of April 6th."

Cette contradiction n'embarrasse pas M. Piddington. Il admet son interprétation et il admet aussi celle de sa collaboratrice. "That . . . a script should possess a double referenee will not, I hope, seem to be an improbable hypothesis" (Vol. XXII., p. 264).

Et voilà ce qu'on nous propose sérieusement. Symboliquement, le texte de Mme Verrall fait allusion au Purgatoire, où il y a une rivière et une montagne, et au pays de Wordsworth, le district des laes, où il y a des rivières, des montagnes, des collines

et des lacs, signalement qui s'applique à tous les pays montagneux. On remarquera le procédé d'interprétation des expérimentateurs. Mme Verrall ne retient que "Lether," qu'elle corrige en Léthé, "storied mount," et "Lea" qu'elle prend pour Leah. Tout le reste du texte est négligé, malgré son importance mise en relief par la répétition,

Painted feather.

Fetherbridge.

Painted Severn bridge.

Painting of Severn bridge.

Painting of Letherbridge.

Le th er Bridge.

Painting 4 fois, *bridge* 5 fois répété, sont négligés complètement, malgré ce qu'on nous dit de la répétition comme indice de correspondance; Mme Verrall néglige aussi toutes les allusions à rivières, collines, vallées, mélèzes, pins, mer, lacs qui ne rappellent pas le Purgatoire de Dante. M. Piddington au contraire, poursuivi par son idée, ne relève que les détails alpestres. La peinture et le pont passent inaperçus.

Est-ce une analyse sérieuse? Ne doit-on pas, en étudiant un texte, tenir compte de tous ses éléments, sans exception?

C'est ainsi qu'on en arrive à nous présenter des identifications assez fantaisistes pour que les experts nous disent l'un: c'est le Purgatoire de Dante, l'autre c'est le pays pittoresque de Wordsworth, et qu'ils se mettent d'accord pour nous dire sérieusement: c'est tous les deux.

Bien entendu, il y a encore une correspondance croisée avec le Purgatoire et le Léthé. Tout à l'heure les mots Lia et Rachel signifiaient implicitement Cythérée; ils ont signifié Géryon, le méphistophélique; ils signifient maintenant, toujours implicitement, la montagne du Purgatoire, où Dante voit Lia en rêve, et le Léthé qui coule le long du Purgatoire.

(21) *Paradiso, Paradise.* Mot encore banal. L'allusion à Dante résulte du mot "Lost Paradise Regained" qui rappelle Milton (Mme Verrall 3 Avril, Vol. XXII., p. 227); *Paradiso* est dans le texte du 8 Avril de Mme Holland.¹

¹ M. Piddington a oublié une importante correspondance entre Mme Holland, Mme Verrall et Mme Piper (Vol. XXII., pp. 228, 262, 269). Elle explique même Roland et les Val, allusions demeurées insondables. Roland, c'est le preux mort à Roncesvalles ou Roncevaux, comme le montre les Val; inversion

(22) Purgatorio est une correspondance implicite résultant 1° de la mention de "painting of lether bridge," etc., parce qu'elle signifie le Léthé et implique le Purgatoire (Mme Verrall, 6 Avril), et 2° des mots Leah et Rachel (Mme Holland, 8 Avril) qui signifient le Purgatoire (Vol. XXII., pp. 227, 262, 265)!

(23) Le 29 Avril, au réveil, Mme Piper (Vol. XXII., p. 279) dit "Dante's *Inferno*." M. Piddington oublie de nous apprendre qu'il a été question de Dante plusieurs fois au cours de la séance de ce jour (Vol. XXII., p. 163). *Le mot Dante a été introduit par Mme Verrall*. On voit combien son émergence est facilement explicable. Or l'*Enfer* du Dante est une œuvre que l'on peut connaître de nom, sans être un lettré. La correspondance est encore ici assurée par l'utile Géryon, toujours celui de Méphistophélès.

(24) (25) Daffodils (narcisses) se divise en deux espèces: celle de Tennyson, dont le tableau ne nous indique pas les correspondances; elles résultent sans doute des allusions à *Maud* (Vol. XXII., p. 273) où l'on voit ces vers:

The shining daffodil dead and Orion low in his grave.

And the shining daffodil dies, etc.

Cela conduit aux narcisses de Wordsworth, cités au réveil le 17 Avril par Mme Piper (Vol. XXII., p. 233), et implicitement rappelés par les allusions à Wordsworth "I wandered lonely, etc." (Vol. XXII., p. 232, Mme Piper) et par l'allusion aux montagnes, lacs et rivières (et Purgatoire) du texte de Mme Verrall (6 Avril, p. 263).

(26) Wordsworth Country, résulte de ce texte, implicitement suivant M. Piddington.

(27 à 29) Silvia, Harold, Léopold sont les noms des trois enfants de M. Myers, Mme Holland cite Silvia et Léopold, les 27 Mars (Vol. XXII., p. 261) et 16 Avril (Vol. XXII., p. 278); Harold est cité le 8 Avril par Mme Piper.

Ces noms étaient connus de tous les médiums.

En examinant toutes les correspondances, on leur trouve (1) des sources normales imprimées, la plupart très connues; (2)

de Valles pour Roncesvalles; cette adjonction exclut Roland furieux de l'Arioste et nous fixe sur le Roland du Dante, *Paradis*, chant XV. L'interprétation vaut celle de Lia et Rachel.

le plus grand nombre résulte d'interprétations arbitraires; (3) sur les 26 correspondances 10 ont pour objet des mots très communs: comme Spirit, Shadow, Umbrae, East, West, Daffodils, ou banals: Euripide, Orion, Hercule, Cythérée, Aphrodite, etc.; (4) les idées un peu originales (1, 14, 15) sont probablement empruntées aux textes de Mme Verrall, ou inspirées par elle (7 et 8).

Je ne trouve aucune valeur à cette série de correspondances, où l'élément supranormal me paraît même très douteux.

Le Message Latin.

M. Piddington a posé une question en latin, dont les contrôles n'ont jamais pu donner une traduction exacte et l'expérience a duré cinq mois! Ce fait a déjà été signalé: mais M. Piddington enregistre comme un succès une réponse interprétée symboliquement par lui, négligeant l'inexactitude des réponses directes. C'est un procédé difficile à accepter.

Comme pour les mots grecs, la réponse aux mots latins est donnée par Mme Verrall, qui connaît la question. Cette expérience, destinée à démontrer l'action d'une intelligence extérieure aux médiums, devient une simple transmission de pensée, car tout le monde va chercher à faire répéter par Mme Piper ce qu'a déjà dit Mme Verrall.

C'est M. Piddington qui aurait découvert le premier la réponse que sa collaboratrice avait écrite. C'est un passage de Browning (*Abt Vogler*) "Out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star,"¹ et c'est une réponse symbolique à la question: "donnez-nous par deux médiums différents deux communications, entre lesquelles aucune connexion n'apparaisse, donnez ensuite une communication par un troisième médium, révélant le lien latent existant entre les deux premières."

L'appropriation du symbole ne signifie rien, étant données l'érudition et l'intelligence de Mme Verrall. La convenance des allusions de Mlle Verrall ne doit pas être retenue davantage, pour des raisons évidentes. Seules les réponses du contrôle peuvent intéresser.

¹Ces vers servent d'épigraphe à une conférence de M. Podmore, "Miracles and Prophecies," *Light*, 1882, 151.

Le 27 Février,—la question était posée depuis le mois de Décembre,—il donne une traduction, encore fausse, que M. Piddington accueille fort mal.

“J. G. P. You say you have replied. I am quite prepared to believe it, *but tell me in what messages your reply is given*” (Vol. XXII, p. 334). C'est indiquer au contrôle qu'il doit chercher dans ses messages antérieurs. Il répond aussitôt :

“In my messages reported here and through Mrs. Verrall.”

“That agrees with what I thought,” dit M. Piddington, “but give . . . some important point from them [the messages].”

Myers-Piper revient à Halcyon days, aux poèmes auxquels il a fait allusion, à Evangelic, à Syringa.

“Quels poèmes ?” continue M. Piddington.

“B my own Browning . . . Horace . . . chiefly Browning's lines as given through Mrs. Verrall and another which I referred to before.”

“I think you are making it clear,” dit M. Piddington, qui continue à prodiguer les indications, au point que le contrôle déclare (p. 335) :

“I understand that you asked me to reply referring to my utterances through Mrs. Verrall.”

Le 6 Mars, l'expérimentateur donne des renseignements encore plus clairs (p. 336).

“You have, I believe, given an answer worthy of your intelligence,—not to-day, I mean, but some time back—but . . . *you* must explain your answer at this light.”

—Oui répond le contrôle.

J. G. P. “*You could do it in two words.*”

“*Yes, I understand.*”

J. G. P. “*Well?*”

“*Hope, Star.*”

J. G. P. “*Well? Yes?*”

“*Browning.*”

J. G. P. “*Exactly. It could not be better.*”

“*That is my answer.*”

M. Piddington : “Now, Myers, I can't thank you enough. that is what I have been waiting for.”

Peut-on concevoir une méthode moins sûre ? Le contrôle n'a même pas eu à chercher, on lui a donné tous les renseignements.

M. Piddington le sait bien. Il dit en note, que s'il a donné une indication en disant vous pouvez répondre en deux mots, il ne l'a pas fait exprès; que d'ailleurs la réponse est en *trois* mots. Il suffit de lire le texte pour voir que le contrôle est embarrassé: il est pressé par M. Piddington et il choisit *celle de ses correspondances qui se rapproche le plus de l'indication*. A cette époque, il sait que quatre correspondances ont réussi. *Library, my own name, et Mme Sidgwick* n'est pas la réponse au message latin, c'est évident. Restent *Arrow*, qui n'a qu'un mot, et *Browning, Hope, Star*, ou *A triangle within a circle*; mais ceci est le signe convenu des correspondances, et n'est pas un mot. C'est une figure. Par conséquent Myers-Piper *ne pouvait pas choisir autre chose que Browning, Hope, Star*, qui étaient indiqués.¹

Mais M. Piddington demandait deux mots; aussi Myers-Piper ne lui donne que Hope et Star, et c'est sur l'insistance de l'expérimentateur (Well? Yes? p. 336) qu'il ajoute Browning. Cela prouve qu'il ne comprenait pas pourquoi sa réponse était juste, car le nom de Browning est la partie la plus importante de cette réponse. Hope et Star se trouvent dans beaucoup de poèmes.

De semblables tâtonnements se sont produits pour arriver au titre du poème. Le contrôle est si peu fixé qu'il cite d'abord le poème de Browning *My Star* (p. 337), puis laborieusement *Evelyn Hope*; ce qui indique clairement la nature de ses opérations mentales. Le contrôle George Pelham explique les erreurs par la *stupidité* de Rector (p. 340) qui ne sait pas le latin (p. 314).²

Le poème de *Browning* qu'il a en vue est celui qui contient Hope et Star. Réponse peu intelligente car plusieurs poèmes de Browning contiennent ces mots communs.

¹ Cela n'empêche pas que Myers_P a essayé aussi le triangle et le cercle, pour compléter sa réponse, quoiqu'en dise M. Piddington. Comparez Vol. XXII, pp. 345 et 343. Pourquoi a-t-on supprimé dans la question, p. 345, les mots "I was going to add to a poem," cités p. 74?

² Les contrôles de M. Piper ne sont pas ceux de Stainton Moses dont ils ont pris les noms. Rector est d'après M. Moses, St. Hippolyte, martyr, évêque d'Ostie. Comment ce prélat a-t-il oublié le latin? (*Light*, 1896, p. 267). Prudens est Plotin (*Light*, 1896, 291). Ces éléments ont leur importance quand on veut raisonner sur l'identité des contrôles spirites de Madame Piper, ils rendent bien suspectes les personnifications qu'ils représentent.

On lui a fait comprendre, par la froideur de l'accueil, que les réponses *My Star* et *Evelyn Hope* ne sont pas bonnes (Vol. XXII., pp. 340, 347); il cherche autre chose, tente *Andrea del Sarto*, autre poème de Browning (Vol. XXII., p. 344), et s'accroche à la correspondance réussie "Triangle et cercle," qui le conduit à *Ring* (p. 345) "qui le fait penser à un poème." Evidemment Myers_P pense à essayer *The Ring and the Book*, ce qui explique sa réponse "not exactly to a poem . . . but it suggested a poem." C'est en effet un titre général comprenant divers poèmes, notamment Pompilia et Giuseppe Caponsacchi.¹ M. Piddington écarte cette idée en disant, à propos de *Ring* et *Circle*, "The Latin message does not refer." Ce qui éclaire le contrôle; le cercle ne devient plus qu'un simple lien d'association (p. 346).

Tenace, M. Piddington (13 Mars) insista pour avoir une réponse claire; il ne l'obtint pas. Mme Sidgwick dirigea les séances suivantes; le contrôle manifesta la plus complète ignorance du poème où il avait trouvé la réponse donnée à Mme Verrall. Le 20 Mars, il parle d'un poème de Browning où les étoiles et la vie se rencontrent; il bat les buissons et au lieu de répondre, interroge: vous comprenez bien de quel poème je parle?

— Oui répond Mme Sidgwick. Au sujet d'étoiles.

Le contrôle ne quitte pas cet ordre d'idées et parle le 8 Avril d'un poème de Browning aux Étoiles, il y mêle Wordsworth, et essaye, peut-être, "Pisgah-Sights" ("Pi . . . it begins with P. and Sai. P. is right." *Pisgah-Sights* II finit par "Star that now sparklest." (Il y a aussi un poème intitulé *Pippa passes.*)

Mme Sidgwick corrige le contrôle en lui apprenant que P. est erroné (Vol. XXII., pp. 362-363). Rel est alors proposé ("A Lovers' Quarrel," "Hervé Riel," "Martin Relph"). Fatigué de ces efforts inutiles, le contrôle ne dit plus rien de bon; il revient à la question le 17 Avril, et rappelle sa mauvaise réponse "I wander lonely," "lonely wandering star" et propose indirectement: Confession (poèmes de Browning: Confessions, The Con-

¹ Où l'on trouve (Ed. Tauchnitz) *Soar to the sky* (Plato, p. 41), Assisi (49), moaned low (51), Mars (57), St-Peter, St-James, St-John (67), Silver eup (34), Paradise (102), wings of music (108), Peter and Paul (121), one point of the circle (130), Shadow (133), sans compter Star et Hope. La fin de Pompéïa est très appropriée.

fessional) Chapel, et Siazies, Siaz, Siaraz—“*La Saisiaz*¹ dit Mme Sidgwick.”—“Oui.”

La réponse ne provoque aucune approbation (“All right,” “I see”). Le contrôle voit son erreur et bat la campagne. Il revient à Pe, Pi, puis à la Saisiaz, clairement résumée ainsi : “the poem in which he was left alone and later it all came to him.”

Le 22 Avril il propose indirectement “Saul,” autre poème de Browning, en citant “as star follows star.”

Enfin il approche du but ; il a essayé, toujours indirectement *Rabbi ben Ezra* ; *Death* (sous la forme grecque Thanatos) ; *Tyrannus* (*Instans Tyrannus*) (17 Avril) ; *passes* (*Pippa passes?* 8 Avril) ; *May* (23 Avril) ; *Spirit and Angel* (*The guardian angel*, 8 Avril, nettement associé à la réponse au message latin, voy. p. 220).

Or, dans le “Pocket volume” de Browning (London, Smith Elder, 1910) on remarque (fin de la page vi, et commencement de la page vii) les titres suivants : *The guardian Angel*, *Abt Vogler*, *Rabbi ben Ezra*, *Confession*, *May and Death*, *Pisgah Sights*, titres tous plus ou moins clairement proposés, et mal accueillis. Restait cependant *Abt Vogler*. Mme Piper, le 24 Avril dit, en réponse aux mots “quel est le poème”—“Vol is right.” Réponse inexacte, mais qui contient quelques lettres du mot Vogler (Vol. XXII., p. 286) ; Mme Sidgwick encourage le contrôle, qui se risque plus tard à une approximation plus précise, “volgar” (p. 371).

“I think I see,” dit Mme Sidgwick.

Le contrôle continue, “vol, . . . V M, . . . A B volugevar” ; les encouragements ne cessent pas (“*You have got something like the name of a poem. It is not quite right, but . . . You’ve really very nearly got it.*”)

“Volugur Abt.”

“. . . I am quite satisfied.”

Mais Myers est encore si peu fixé, qu’il cite un vers de *Saul*.
— Abt. Vo.

¹ Le découpage des procès-verbaux est un déplorable procédé ; cela ôte aux phénomènes leur physionomie réelle, et rend très difficile l’analyse des contextes. Si on compare les pages 286, 295, 366, etc., on voit que la Saisiaz se mêle à *Cloudless, sky, horizon* ; le contrôle essaye de placer sa réponse aux mots grecs. En effet il y a une raison à cela, car on lit dans la Saisiaz (p. 155 ad. cit.) “our sky from cloud as clear.” Le contrôle raisonne ses essais. Voy. la note suivante.

Et c'est Mme Sidgwick qui dit Vogler.

Le contrôle a essayé quatorze réponses au moins et est arrivé à *Abt Vogler* probablement en se rappelant vaguement une table des matières; il y a été guidé d'ailleurs pas à pas, mais il y est arrivé sans comprendre pourquoi, car il ne sait pas encore où se trouve la réponse contenue dans le poème. En voici la preuve.

Dès le 24 Avril, Mme Verrall demande des précisions (p. 376); Myers-Piper, après beaucoup de banalités, cite un passage qui devait être naturellement choisi par quelqu'un comprenant le message latin de la manière inexacte, dont Myers-Piper et G. Pelham ont donné des échantillons. Leurs traductions finissaient par ces mots: "nous convaincre de votre survie." C'est sur une idée de cette nature que se fixe le contrôle et il cite, assez mal d'ailleurs, les vers où il est parlé des morts qui ont passé par le corps et sont partis, mais qui reviennent, une fois encore, respirer dans un vieux monde, etc. (1er Mai, p. 379); Myers-Piper est donc logique avec lui-même, il déclare que c'est le passage (p. 386), auquel il a fait spécialement allusion et qu'il a essayé de transmettre. Il s'en souvient spécialement comme ayant été l'objet d'une référence dans les textes de Mme Verrall; ces affirmations sont accueillies sans enthousiasme par Mme Sidgwick, *qui s'informerait auprès de Mme Verrall* (p. 387) révélant, par cela seul, que ce n'est pas la réponse attendue; celle-ci n'aurait, en effet, exigé aucune vérification.

A la séance suivante, Myers-Piper essaye autre chose, comme quelqu'un qui a réfléchi au poème et s'efforce de deviner le vers; le mot *hope* n'est pas dans le texte; *star* y est deux fois, dans la strophe IV., dont le vers tronqué a été accueilli froidement, et dans la strophe VII. dont on attend la citation. C'est naturellement encore à ce dernier que pensera le contrôle; et c'est si bien au mot *star* qu'il pense, que le mot *sound* n'est pas prononcé; mais Mme Sidgwick hésite dans la lecture (p. 388) et le contrôle craint de se tromper; il passe alors à une autre idée, se rapprochant de la seconde proposée par lui, et il fait allusion au vers: "And the emulous heaven yearned down, made effort to reach the earth, As the earth had done her best, in my passion, to scale the sky." Il insiste là-dessus, répète plusieurs fois *sky*, qui a fait partie d'une correspondance croisée antérieure, et *passion*; Mme Sidgwick lui dit alors qu'il

n'a pas besoin de continuer; le contrôle persiste à donner ciel et passion comme caractéristiques du vers: c'est encore l'investigatrice qui lui fait savoir: "The line I wanted was the one about the 'star.'"—"Yes I know," répond le contrôle, "but I am only explaining in my passion to reach you as clear as the sky. I quote it out of, if instead of the fourth framed a star." Et il insiste encore sur *étoile* et revient à son explication ingénieuse de la fausse citation concernant passion.

Le mot "sound" (son), fut donné au stade de réveil.

Voilà le résumé d'une des plus belles performances du contrôle; il est visible qu'il a tâtonné, battu les buissons et été finalement guidé par les expérimentateurs eux-mêmes. Les extraits que j'ai cités montrent les fautes opératoires commises, et l'exposé de l'expérience révèle son inutilité complète. La réponse était connue de tout le monde, et la seule chose qui puisse surprendre c'est de voir la difficulté éprouvée à la donner. Le succès ne pouvait en tous cas rien prouver de plus qu'une transmission ou une lecture de pensée.

Enfin, et c'est là le plus grave reproche que l'on puisse faire aux expérimentateurs, il n'est pas permis de dire sérieusement qu'une traduction symbolique doive être préférée à une traduction littérale. Quand les erreurs de celle-ci sont manifestes, elles ne sauraient disparaître parce qu'une réponse en symboles est donnée.

Ce n'est pas tout. Si l'on se reporte à la page 415 du mémoire de M. Piddington, on constate des faits de nature à rendre très suspectes les réponses de Mme Piper. La bonne foi de ce remarquable sujet est hors de cause, mais est-elle responsable de ses trances? De ses automatismes? J'aurai à examiner cette question plus loin; je signalerai simplement les faits suivants:

Mme Piper dit à Mme Sidgwick, qu'elle n'avait pratiquement rien lu de Browning, qu'elle croit aussi éloigné que Shakespeare (7 Mai). Le lendemain elle a réfléchi: M. Stead lui a envoyé un choix de poésies de Browning; Minerva, la plus jeune des demoiselles Piper a quelques volumes de ce poète.

Le 26 Mai, Mlle Reid, qui habitait avec Mme Piper, dit l'avoir vu parcourir un volume de Browning appartenant à Minerva. Il y avait environ un mois de cela. C'est le 24 Avril que le poème est cité (p. 415).

Le 29 Mai, Mme Piper dit à Sir Oliver Lodge qu'elle connaît *Evelyn Hope*, the *Flight of the Duchess*; elle ne connaît pas *Abt Vogler* que Lodge vient de lui lire. Elle a une belle édition de Browning chez elle en Amérique. Les demoiselles Piper cependant ont appris *Abt Vogler* à la pension (p. 416).

Le rapporteur ne fait aucun commentaire sur ces faits qui auraient cependant mérité une discussion sérieuse.

L'émergence occasionnelle d'états somnambuliques larvés est une hypothèse dont les investigateurs ne paraissent pas avoir eu le soupçon.

Il en est de même de la mémoire latente. A lire leurs rapports, on se persuade qu'ils sont peu au courant des phénomènes de cryptonésie.

Par exemple, M. Piddington (Vol. XXIV., p. 17) cite comme preuve de la ressemblance des contrôles Myers avec le véritable Myers, une série de concordances entre les automatismes et les écrits de cet auteur. La prudence commande de considérer ces ressemblances comme l'indication d'une origine normale. Ce sont des souvenirs latents, très naturels chez des personnes fort au courant de l'œuvre de M. Myers.

M. Piddington l'admet (Vol. XXIV., p. 19), mais il insiste sur le caractère supranormal de l'érudition classique de Mme Piper, qui s'intéresse peu aux choses littéraires. Examinons donc les connaissances littéraires des contrôles Piper.

C'est Mme Verrall qui a pris soin d'analyser ce point. Il convient de noter qu'aucun des investigateurs ne s'est préoccupé des acquisitions que Mme Piper avait pu faire dans des lectures, ailleurs que chez elle: revues, livres, journaux, ou dans des conversations. Et il y a un détail qui est de nature à retenir l'attention. M. Hodgson avait le goût de la poésie et aimait à déclamer des vers (Vol. XIX., p. 370). Peut-on savoir ce qu'il a lu à Mme Piper dans sa longue collaboration avec elle? M. Myers déclamait aussi des vers pendant les séances.

Il y a là des possibilités sans nombre pour le jeu de la mémoire latente.

Il est impossible de fournir la preuve de l'ignorance de Mme Piper; ce n'est pas en causant avec elle que l'investigateur prudent peut se renseigner, comme le fait M. Dorr (p. 45); celui-ci se contente de dire qu'il avait "found in general talk that Mrs. Piper knew nothing of Milton's, but *Paradise Lost*."

Il lui lit un extrait de *Comus*, facile à reconnaître, car c'est le morceau classique "Sabrina fair, etc.," cité dans les Anthologies (Gems, 412); *Comus* avait un intérêt particulier pour le groupe des investigateurs, car on le jouait à Cambridge cette année (V. Vol. XXIV., p. 199); Mme Piper a-t-elle ignoré ce détail?

Quant à l'érudition du contrôle, en voici des spécimens: Le 31 Mars on lui lit la traduction d'*Agamemnon*. "Zeus a ordonné que l'on n'arriverait à la sagesse que par la triste route de la souffrance, etc." Myers dit qu'il comprend, et commente ce vers, d'après Hodgson, de la manière puérile et incorrecte que voici: "Troubles and trials, and the better you go through them, the better your [life] here; and if you don't develop, it's your own fault" (p. 47).

Il faut 15 jours à Myers-Piper pour reconnaître la traduction de son frère, et il en commente le sens comme on sait.

On a un exemple du parti pris de Mme Verrall dans son résumé, p. 52. Il faut l'étudier. Elle omet d'indiquer les détails suivants: "*O Zeus, troubles and trials*" sont dans le passage antérieurement lu à Mrs Piper (*drear road of Pain*); "*He'd sing of the Odes*" ne veut pas dire "*great chorus*"; "*wrote three plays*" veut dire *a écrit trois pièces* et non pas "*trilogie*"; Eschyle a écrit environ 70 tragédies et nous en possédons sept. Mme Verrall se contente trop facilement d'à peu près.

Même ignorance au sujet d'Ajax et d'Ulysse, qui se rattachent au cycle des allusions empruntées à Ovide. Ajax, Ulysse et l'idée de bateau sont associés dans *Métamorphoses*, XIII., 5 et suiv. Ajax dit "*Agimus . . . ante rates causam et meeum confertur Ulysses.*" Mais il y a une inintelligence complète du caractère d'Ajax, dont Mme Piper fait un dieu, théorie que Mme Verrall essaye vainement de justifier (p. 54, note 1).

Parthénon, Pallas Athena, Virgin's chamber, est la paraphrase banale des Encyclopédies populaires; on lit dans Nuttall's "Means the chamber of the maiden Goddess, that is Athena."

Les incidents de l'*Enéide* sont encore plus démonstratifs. On demande le 25 Février à Hodgson de traduire "*arma virumque cano*") ce qu'un élève de dix ans pourrait faire. Il est obligé d'appeler Myers à son aide; ce dernier ne traduit pas les mots banals et reconnaissables, mais donne le sens général des traductions du commencement de l'*Enéide*.

Mme Piper, qui pour n'être pas littéraire a cependant appelé ses filles Alta et Minerva, connaît vaguement l'*Enéide*, mais s'embrouille, et dit des inexactitudes que Myers n'aurait jamais suggérées, même télépathiquement. Par exemple Junon est en colère contre Enée qui a bâti une ville, elle contribue à détruire cette ville, ce qui oblige Enée à s'enfuir (p. 66).

Il n'est pas juste de considérer comme des preuves d'érudition classique l'association de Didon et d'une fête, de Neptune et du Trident. Ce sont choses trop banales. Neptune calmant la tempête est un lieu commun; c'est dans l'*Enéide* (I., 135) que se trouve le célèbre "*Quos Ego!*" L'incident fait le sujet de nombreux tableaux ou gravures.

Le "considerable knowledge" de Virgile que signale Mme Verrall n'existe pas; c'est une connaissance rudimentaire, mal coordonnée; elle reproduit les formes de souvenirs rappelés, par ce que c'est justement de la cryptomnésie, ce qui explique les cas où les souvenirs ont été opposés aux indications de M. Dorr; enfin les erreurs ne sont pas dues à l'oubli ni à la confusion, mais bien à une science incomplète et primaire.

M. Piddington s'est spécialement occupé de l'analyse de quelques incidents, notamment les réponses faites à cette question; "Que vous rappelle le Léthé?"

Le problème était le suivant: Des indications sont données, visiblement empruntées aux *Métamorphoses*; ont-elles leur source dans les souvenirs de Mme Piper ou sont elles inspirées par feu M. Myers?

Le premier point repose sur une démonstration négative. M. Piddington nous assure que ni Mme Piper ni M. Dorr n'ont lu Ovide. Ce dernier en effet l'a demandé à Mme Piper, qui ignore jusqu'au nom d'Ovide (Vol. XXIV., p. 140). Ayant ainsi interrogé le médium et l'investigateur, M. Piddington est satisfait et il se croit en mesure d'affirmer l'ignorance de l'un et de l'autre (Vol. XXIV., p. 142). Cela fait douter du sens critique de l'expérimentateur, car son enquête est *absolument inutile*; il se renseigne sur la mémoire personnelle consciente, non sur la mémoire subliminale, la seule intéressante. Il faut noter d'ailleurs que les demoiselles Piper ont consulté, en pension, des livres de mythologie où se trouvent les indications données par le médium (Vol. XXIV., pp. 142, 143).

Qu'importe aussi l'ignorance des dames Verrall en ce qui

concerne Ovide? (pp. 121-123). Si la télépathie est possible pourquoi la limiter aux dames Verrall?

D'ailleurs, l'étude des cas rend à peu près certaine l'existence de phénomènes de simple cryptomnésie. Les indications données par Mme Piper existent dans de nombreux livres, traductions, études mythologiques, dictionnaires variés. M. Piddington ne prouve pas et ne peut pas prouver ce fait négatif: Mme Piper n'a jamais rien lu ni entendu là-dessus.¹

Le second point qu'il faudrait prouver est l'inspiration due à l'influence d'un contrôle Myers dirigeant tous les automatistes.

D'abord, dit M. Piddington, (p. 123), nous observons chez Mme Piper des procédés comparables à ceux dont Mmes Verrall et Holland nous ont offert des exemples. La réponse à la question du Léthé contient des mots discontinus qui paraissaient inintelligibles avant la *découverte* de deux passages littéraires (*Enéide* VI., 703-723 et *Métem.* XI. etc.) où ces fragments se trouvent incorporés et où ils peuvent trouver un lien d'unification cohérente.

Le raisonnement est critiquable; parler de la *découverte* de deux passages aussi connus, est fait pour surprendre, car le bachelier qui ignorerait ces passages classiques pourrait être refusé à ses examens. Le lien entre les allusions de Mme Piper et leur source classique existait indépendamment du contrôle Myers, et il faut autre chose que l'enquête inopérante de M. Piddington pour démontrer que les nombreuses sources d'information normale doivent être écartées.

Si on examine les quatre exemples cités comme établissant l'existence de ce procédé inintelligent d'identification posthume, qui consiste à reproduire dans une communication des allusions banales aux manuels de mythologie, ou aux poèmes qu'apprennent les écoliers, on reconnaît que M. Piddington présente comme certains, des faits hypothétiques, ou comme supra-normaux, des faits normaux.

Le 1er cas est le mot *claviger* (Vol. XXIV., p. 124); la *découverte* (!) que ce mot est employé par Ovide dans le sens de "porte-clés" (*Fastes* I., 228) et de porte-massue, apprit (*a*) que le texte de Mme Verrall du 25 Mars 1907, se référait

¹L'épisode de Ceyx est lié à l'origine de l'expression *halycon days* qui joue un grand rôle dans les expériences de Décembre 1906 à Juin 1907.

à Janus, (b) éclaire un texte de Mme Holland du 8 Avril, (e) des paroles de Mme Piper du même jour.

(a) Claviger est une allusion à Hercule, peut-être à Janus, mais Mme Verrall connaît les *Fastes* (XXIV., 121) sur lesquelles elle a fait un cours en 1881; elle rappelle ce double sens dans son mémoire (Vol. XX., p. 61).

M. Piddington y voit une allusion symbolique à l'Union de l'est et de l'ouest; mais c'est une interprétation que lui a inspiré le texte de Mme Holland, selon tout probabilité.

(b) Aucune lumière n'est jetée par le texte de Mme Verrall sur celui de Mme Holland, qui indique *clairement* l'identification des contraires, idée qui n'apparaît pas dans le texte Verrall.

Cette idée est développée d'ailleurs dans le mémoire de Mme Verrall (Vol. XX., pp. 129-131).

(e) *Light in West*, auquel fait allusion M. Piddington, ne concorde pas avec le texte Verrall du 25 Mars, qui ne l'éclaire pas. Il faut de l'imagination pour y voir "une correspondance antithétique" (*sic*) avec le texte Verrall du 8 Avril qui porte par erreur "rosy is the east" au lieu de "rosy is the west."

(2) Le second cas est la mention de Lia et Rachel dans le même texte Holland, du 8 Avril. J'ai montré l'abus fait de l'allusion implicite dans ce cas.

(3) Le troisième est encore dans le texte de Mme Verrall du 8 Avril; il se confond avec les précédents (identification des contraires).

(4) L'allusion à *Aristophanes' Apology* de Browning est une coïncidence cryptomnésique; l'*Hercule Furieux* d'Euripide étant justement mentionné dans le volume XX., p. 61, à l'occasion du mot clavis, et d'un texte où le double sens de Claviger (Vol. XX., p. 423) est signalé.

(5) C'est le cas du Léthé, où les allusions sont encore empruntées à un texte imprimé.

Aussi, peut-on faire remarquer à M. Piddington que ce n'est pas le contrôle Myers, qui a employé la même méthode (?) avec les trois médiums, mais M. Piddington, qui trouve des analogies grâce à la méthode qu'il applique à tous les cas: l'interprétation symbolique. Ces procédés paraissent difficilement acceptables; il est impossible de suivre le rapporteur dans une discussion dont les points de fait sont aussi douteux.

Quant à sa comparaison des contrôles Myers avec M. Myers, elle me semble aussi peu fondée que possible.¹ Il est certain que M. Myers savait tout ce que les médiums ont dit de vrai; mais il est non moins certain que ce n'est pas lui qui place la course de Marathon dans les jeux olympiques (Vol. XXIV., p. 105); qui dit "latin for sleep" (détail révélant l'usage d'une traduction "cave of sleep" et non "cave of 'the god' somnus"); qui met un arc et des flèches dans la main d'Iris; qui ne sait rien d'Ajax ni d'Ulysse; qui écrit Styx, *sticks*; qui dit de Pygmalion, "greek play," par association subliminale avec l'opéra moderne de Galathée, ou la pièce de Gilbert, etc.

En réalité, tout ce que Mme Piper débite au sujet du Léthé et d'Ovide est marqué au coin d'associations oniriques cryptomnésiques. Si M. Myers inspirait le médium, il n'aurait pas parlé de Pomone, de Janus, de Saturne, d'Olympe, de Neptune, d'Ajax, d'Ulysse, de Centaures, de Cyclopes, de Sibylle, de Méduse, de Pygmalion. Tout cela est dans les *Métamorphoses*. Janus et Saturne: histoire de Picus (XVI., 1, 320 et s.); Pomone et garden (XIV., 623); Ajax et Ulysse, bateaux (XIII.); Cyclopes et Centaures (XIV., IX., XII.); Sibylle (XIV.); Neptune, Troie, trident (XI.); Méduse (IV., 780 s.), etc. Il n'y a pas d'associations logiques et intelligentes dans tout ce "déballage"; les souvenirs des *Métamorphoses* sont déroulés pêle-mêle avec une prédominance *des liens de contiguïté*.

Mme Piper a certainement connaissance des *Métamorphoses* d'Ovide; cette connaissance a pu disparaître de sa conscience normale, c'est pour cela que les mots qu'elle prononce sont sans association logique et ont tous les caractères de l'imagination onirique. Ce trait est bien marqué dans les allusions à Sibylle, Muses, Grâces, Héro, Phyllis, Olympe, Mercure qui figurent dans les poèmes de Virgile; aucun lien raisonnable n'apparaît dans le mélange de ces noms disparates.

Il ne faut pas nous présenter comme l'indication d'une érudition quelconque (Vol. XXIV., p. 147) l'emploi de Sibylle au pluriel, ni l'association d'Icare et d'Anchise; ce dernier détail est du reste convaincant; il démontre la nature illogique du lien entre les noms propres; ils n'ont qu'une association matérielle de *contiguïté* (VI^e chant de l'*Enéide*). Je ne puis

¹ Il semble que la famille de M. Myers ait une impression opposée à celle des expérimentateurs. (Voy. lettre au *Times*, citée dans *Light*, 1908, p. 526).

comprendre qu'on transforme ce caractère onirique en signe d'intelligence réfléchi.

Mais les raisonnements de M. Piddington ne réclament aucune précision ; nous en avons souvent la preuve.¹ Un des exemples les plus curieux de l'à peu près scientifique dont se contentent les expérimentateurs, se trouve dans les allusions que l'on nous montre, dans les textes de Mme Verrall, à l'ode d'Horace. Le contrôle Myers_P a commis pas mal d'erreurs dans cet incident, transformant oniriquement Odes en Odesies et Odyssée (Vol. XXII., p. 381), et n'indiquant jamais clairement l'ode dont il veut parler ; mais M. Piddington n'en est pas embarrassé. Il serait difficile d'embarrasser un dialecticien auquel il importe relativement peu que l'allusion soit à la réincarnation, comme le pense Mme Verrall, ou à la supériorité de la vie future comme le croit M. Piddington (Vol. XXII., p. 407). Des raisonnements fondés sur des à peu près aussi indéterminés sont bien faibles.

Pour étayer son interprétation de la réponse symbolique qu'aurait donnée Myers_P en faisant allusion aux poèmes publiés de M. Myers, M. Piddington a cherché, dans les textes anciens de Mme Verrall, les mentions directes ou indirectes relatives à l'ode d'Archytas. Il en retient une qui mérite d'être examinée. Le 12 Mars 1901, *cinq ans plus tôt*, Mme Verrall aurait écrit *adscripta glebis* : le 27 Avril *ascripta es glebae*, o libera animam, etc. (Vol. XXIV., pp. 163, 164). C'est la traduction latine de "earth-bound" ; on se demande par quelle combinaison d'associations, Mme Verrall a pu y voir une allusion à l'Ode d'Horace ? Voici comment elle y est arrivée. Elle accepte la traduction proposée par certains commentateurs du mot grec *ἐπάρουρος* qui existe seulement dans l'*Odyssée*. Il est placé dans la bouche d'Achille, qui aimerait mieux être paysan travaillant pour un modique salaire chez un homme pauvre, que de régner sur les ombres. Or le commentateur applique une phrase latine employée pour définir un état social du moyen âge, à un état social antérieur de vingt-cinq siècles,

¹ Voy. par exemple Vol. XXIV., p. 12. On trouve une allusion au poème de Browning "My Star" dans ces mots Androsace, Carthusian, Candelabrum. Il est indifférent à la conclusion que Candelabrum soit une fleur ou un chandelier ; androsace est un nom de *genre*, on l'applique à une *espèce* (alpine, androsace rubra je crois).

dans lequel le serf inscrit à la glèbe n'existait pas, au moins à ma connaissance. Il n'y avait pas de registres fonciers et les droits immobiliers s'établissaient par témoignage (voy. par exemple la loi de Gortyne 1, 2, 14, 17, 18). L'idée d'"adscriptus" n'est pas impliquées dans ἐπάρονος que les dictionnaires traduisent par *rusticus*. L'esclavage d'ailleurs, au temps d'Ulysse, n'était pas compatible avec le salaire dont parle Achille. Si je ne me trompe, le commentateur dont Mme Verrall accepte la paraphrase commet une erreur juridique et étymologique. M. Myers n'aurait pas commis cette dernière, car il connaissait bien la langue grecque.

Une analyse précise des faits conduit à des conclusions fort différentes de celles que M. Piddington propose (Vol. XXIV., p. 168).¹ Non seulement l'intelligence automatique n'est pas celle d'un helléniste et d'un lettré, mais on peut montrer qu'elle est empreinte des caractères propres aux opérations mentales oniriques, telles qu'elles apparaissent dans les processus subliminaux inférieurs. J'essayerai de le démontrer, pour répondre à l'invitation du rapporteur lui-même.

Je veux auparavant analyser encore quelques correspondances parmi les plus remarquables. J'emprunterai à Mlle Johnson le cas "sevens" dans lequel les nouvelles méthodes conduisent aux résultats les plus imprévus. Je laisserai de côté des banalités comme Janiculum, yellow, blue flowers, church, etc. Il y a quelques cas de télépathie probable, tel que l'incident de la fiole de poison oubliée dans le laboratoire des fils de Sir Oliver Lodge (Vol. XXIV., p. 216). Savonarole est un cas intéressant pourtant (*ibid.*, p. 211); Mlle Verrall habille les chartreux en noir, erreur que n'admet pas Mme Verrall; elle en conclut qu'il y avait d'autres moines dans la procession. Sur deux ou trois détails banals, elle reconnaît la procession décrite dans *Romola*. A la même époque, 8 Octobre, Mme Holland écrit "ask his daughter about the dream—grey monks of long ago," ce qui n'a rien de commun avec une procession et fait allusion à un rêve. Il n'y a donc visiblement aucune

¹M. Myers ne penserait pas autrement, si j'en juge par ce qu'il écrivait dans le *Journal, S.P.R.* août 1885: "The gross want of comprehension of the subjects inquired about, and the palpable blunders which the replies contain, seem to me to preclude us from regarding the case as affording evidence of the guidance of a scientific spirit."

continuité de conscience entre le contrôle de Mme Holland et ceux des dames Verrall; la concordance assez vague résultant de l'allusion banale à des moines ne dépasse certainement pas les limites d'une coïncidence fortuite.

"Sevens" (Vol. XXIV., p. 222) nous transporte dans des sphères plus élevées. Sept automatistes font allusion au nombre mystique sept, nombre banal, et dont tous les occultistes ont abusé. D'abord Mme Piper: M. Dorr lui répète en Avril et Mai 1908 un quatrain en mauvais latin, que les membres du Tavern Club de Boston imprimaient sur leurs menus. Hodgson en était membre; mais comme contrôle il ne peut donner une traduction correcte. Il commet des erreurs qui révèlent l'influence de la conscience normale de Mme Piper: par exemple, *mori* est traduit par *custom* (*habitude*) et non par *mourir*. Erreur explicable, à cause de la prononciation, qui rapproche ce mot de "*more*," *custom*, *habit*, en latin; Webster donne, avec la traduction, les expressions courantes anglaises, *more* Hibernico, *more* majorum, *more* suo; *propositum* est traduit par "*habit*" par simple attraction. Ce contre-sens est utilisé comme correspondance croisée, alors que son apparition est explicable normalement.

Dans les vers latins il y a "*angelorum chorus*" que Mme Piper traduit par "*Angel band*."

Le 8 Mai, au réveil, Mme Piper prononce "*Habit, We are Seven, Clock! Tick, Tick, Tick, Stairs*." Mlle Johnson y voit une allusion à un poème de Longfellow, "*The Old Clock on the Stairs*," mais c'est simplement une allusion à la pendule de l'escalier du Tavern Club (see *Proc.* Vol. XXV., p. 298).

Le 12 Mai "*We are seven*" est attribué à Wordsworth, mais le contrôle ajoute: "*but we were seven in the distance as a matter of fact*." Puis il prétend, inexactement je crois, avoir donné divers messages à Mme Verrall.

Le 27 Avril 1908, Mme Verrall écrit des chiffres où figurent bien en évidence les nombres 3, 6 et 7. Ce n'est pas rare dans ses textes (voy. Vol. XX., pp. 245, 272, 321, No. 9, 12, 14, 15, 27; p. 418, No. 13 d., etc.).

Le 8 Mai, elle écrit des vers, après avoir lu Dante; elle fait probablement allusion à Virgile. On y voit "*Blest are the messengers . . . borne far aloft on oarage of their high*

wings, etc.” Ces anges qui planent, soutenus par leurs ailes, rappellent à Mlle Johnson . . . l'échelle de Jacob décrite par Dante !

Mlle H. Verrall à son tour écrit :

Le 29 Avril : the figure 3 that seems wanted.

Le 4 Mai : 8, eight, Δ a triangle.

Le 11 Mai, un texte que l'on trouvera page 228, Vol. XXIV.

Le commentaire de ce texte fait par Mlle Johnson est déconcertant. Il y est question de l'échelle de Jacob ; d'une toupie qui tourne, plusieurs couleurs qui se fondent en une seule en tournant. Cette allusion a un jeu commun, devient pour Mlle Johnson, à qui Mme Verrall le suggère, la roue mentionnée au X^e chant du *Paradis*. Rien ne légitime cette interprétation ; mais Mlle Johnson la prend comme point de départ d'un enchaînement allégorique qui conduit à des cercles accomplissant leurs révolutions, à Iris, à l'arc en ciel, mentionné dans le texte de Mlle Verrall. De là nous passons à Platon et au Mythe d'Er, qui nous amènent aux huit sphères célestes et à d'autres correspondances.

Toutes ces hypothèses paraissent peu solides ; il est fort possible que Mlle Verrall n'ait aucune connaissance de Dante ; elle ne l'a jamais lu, dit-elle. Mais on peut connaître un poète sans l'avoir lu, alors surtout qu'il a la célébrité du Florentin. Qui n'a pas vu les gravures de Gustave Doré ? Je ne puis penser qu'une jeune fille aussi instruite ignore complètement la *Divine Comédie* ; il est inutile d'insister, car Mlle Johnson admet la possibilité d'une simple influence télépathique entre les dames Verrall.

Toutefois, les allusions sont fort incertaines ; rien ne permet de voir dans ces mots “the seven branched candlestick it is an image . . . seven candles united in one light and seven colours in the rainbow too,” une allusion à la procession décrite dans le XXIV^e chant du *Purgatoire*. Les seuls points de contact sont les sept flambeaux (candles) unis en une lumière et les sept couleurs de l'arc en ciel. Ce sont là des détails d'une grande banalité, alors surtout qu'il venait d'être fait mention dans le texte du chandelier à sept branches. Les autres détails ne concordent pas. Dante ne parle pas des sept églises ni du chandelier à sept branches, Mlle Verrall ne parle pas des sept nymphes, tout indiquées pourtant, ni des vieillards,

ni des quatre animaux. Il y a une absence complète d'identification; Mlle Johnson et Mme Verrall reconnaissent le passage à des détails indéterminés. En réalité, le texte de Mlle Verrall est une paraphrase du nombre 7, elle le termine par le mot de Mme Piper, "We are seven."

La quatrième contribution à la correspondance est dûe à une dame Frith; en Janvier 1908, Mme Verrall fit une expérience qui ne donna pas les résultats cherchés; "can R. H." c'est-à-dire le contrôle Hodgson "say what are his associations with the words, 'Climb the mount of Blessing.'"¹ La réponse fit allusion au mont Pisgah d'où Moïse aperçut la terre promise. On voit une référence à Dante et à la montagne du Purgatoire, d'où Virgile aperçut le Paradis, où il ne pouvait entrer. Les derniers mots de la réponse sont "till the mystic seven² lights up the golden candlestick of dawn." Il y a une concordance avec le texte de Mlle Verrall, que Mme Verrall connaissait depuis le 6 Juin. La question posée le 14 Février 1908 ne reçut une réponse que le 11 Juin, soit quatre mois après, ce qui est une mauvaise condition d'expérimentation.

Mme Holland intervient ensuite; le 15 Juin 1908, elle rêve au chiffre 6; le 23 Juillet elle écrit: "there should be three at least in accord, and if possible Seven" . . . "take this for token 'green beyond belief' . . . Not only on the ocean may the Green Ray appear."

La répétition du mot "green" impressionna Mlle Johnson; elle chercha ce que cela pouvait signifier et trouva . . . une nouvelle allusion à Dante! Il semble ici que les limites de l'indétermination soient atteintes. L'idée de vert est une référence au XXXI^e chant du *Purgatoire*, parce que, là, il est parlé des yeux d'émeraude de Béatrice. Toute autre couleur aurait également été une aussi bonne allusion, si vert correspond à l'émeraude, rouge aurait correspondu au griffon, ou aux sept personnages couronnés de fleurs rouges, blanc aux vieillards couronnés de lys, jaune aux chandeliers d'or, etc. Le mot le plus banal suffit, on le voit, à établir une correspondance.

Enfin, le 25 Novembre, Mme Holland après avoir vu Mlle Johnson, écrivit: "then an octave struck the *answer*," citation de Browning (Vol. XXIV., p. 241).

¹ Ces mots avaient fait l'objet d'un article de *Light*, 1906, p. 16.

² *The mystical number seven*, *Light*, 1907, p. 306.

Mme Home joue le sixième rôle. Le 24 Juillet 1908, elle dit, étant entrancée: "seven times seven and seventy-seven" et conseilla de communiquer ces mots à Mlle Johnson.

La dernière allusion à 7 est dûe à M. Piddington qui, le 13 Juillet 1904, avait écrit une lettre "posthume" (*sic*). Elle faisait connaître son intention, s'il survivait, de communiquer à un sensitif le nombre 7.

"'The seven lamps of architecture,' 'the seven sleepers of Ephesus,' 'unto seventy times seven,' 'we are seven,' and so forth." 7 est un "tic" chez lui, une habitude, "habit" (*ibid.*, p. 244).

Evidemment, il y avait là un phénomène supranormal. Cette croyance était confirmée par le rêve de Mme Holland, à qui on avait montré en songe un vieux carnet, où étaient écrits ces mots, "Since in 1872 a dear friend chose as a sign by which to communicate with me the figure 6, I, in my turn, will try, in the time to come, to send the figure 6,— simply the sign of 6" (*ibid.*, p. 238). Un nombre était indiqué comme le sujet d'une communication posthume. La coïncidence ne portait que sur ce point, puisque les deux chiffres ne concordent pas, mais le choix d'un nombre dans ce but parut à M. Piddington une chose difficile à deviner. Enfin Mme Piper avait parlé de "habit" et de "tick," ce qui rappelait encore les expressions de la lettre posthume.

Ce n'est pas tout. Mlle Johnson nous apprend que le phénomène était préparé depuis quatre ans. Au moment où M. Piddington écrivait sa lettre, Mme Verrall produisait un texte, ". . . it is something contemporary that you are to record—note the hour—in London half the message has come" (*ibid.*, p. 246). Il est évident que c'est une allusion à la lettre de M. Piddington; cette dernière en effet ne contient que des références à 7, Dante n'y apparaît pas. Donc il n'y a que la moitié du message total dans la lettre.

Cette interprétation est appuyée sur le texte de Mlle Verrall du 15 Juillet 1904, où on lit "Deficit omne," ce qui peut être regardé "as equivalent to Mrs. Verrall's more definite statement" (Vol. XXIV., p. 248).

Voilà donc une correspondance croisée où 7 automatistes se rencontrent sur le mot 7, plus ou moins combiné avec des allusions à Dante.

Si on analyse avec impartialité le système de Mlle Johnson, on trouve d'abord que les allusions à Dante sont incertaines, comme je l'ai indiqué, sauf pour Mme Verrall, qui lisait, au moment de la production de ses textes de 1908, le *Purgatoire*. Chez Mlle Verrall on ne trouve que l'échelle de Jacob, sept flambeaux et sept couleurs de l'arc en ciel, ce qui est insuffisant pour déterminer l'allusion avec certitude. Il faut remarquer au surplus que, dans le texte de Mme Verrall, il n'y a pas d'allusion à l'échelle de Jacob : ses anges planent soutenus par leurs ailes, tandis que les anges de Jacob montent et descendent sur leur échelle ; les deux images ne concordent ni dans leur expression verbale ni dans leur sens, sauf sur le thème "anges," qui est banal. De même, il faut beaucoup de bonne volonté pour voir une allusion au *Purgatoire* dans les mots le mystique sept et le chandelier d'or, green beyond belief, the green Ray, et seven times seven.

"The mystic seven" est une banalité. Le caractère mystique du nombre 7 est un lieu commun pour tous ceux qui se sont occupés des soi-disant sciences occultes. Mme Blavatsky (*Secret Doctrine* I., 114), parle des "Seven mystic sages." Près de cinq colonnes sont consacrées à ce nombre dans l'Index (pp. 257-260).

Quant à "Seven times seven," ou 49, c'est une réminiscence de Stainton Moses. On voit, *Light*, 1897, p. 183 : "when we commenced to influence you . . . we told you of an organised band of 49 spirits who were concerned in the working of our plan." Et, 1892, p. 189 : "seven circles of seven spirits" sont attachés à M. Moses. Imperator en est le chef.

Le journal *Light* est une véritable mine d'allusions aux textes médianiques. J'en recommande l'analyse à Mlle Johnson et à Mme Verrall. La première verra (n° du 5 Novembre 1904) une analyse de *Fragments of Prose and Poetry* de Myers où est cité le passage reproduit par elle "from ten to sixteen, etc." Il y a toute une série de relations entre East et West dans le même volume : "there is something mysterious in the leaning of the East towards the West just now (29 Oct. 1904) ; Light cometh from the East (1904, p. 270) ; where farther East and farthest West meet . . . ; the light has moved away from the East" (*ibid.*) ; "Pharaoh's daughter" est même imprimé, p. 224. Il ne semble pas que les expérimentateurs anglais aient pensé

à cette source normale de renseignements qu'est la littérature spiritualiste. Ils y auraient trouvé à peu près toutes leurs correspondances croisées. C'est dans l'œuvre de M. Moses, que personnellement j'admire beaucoup à cause de son élévation morale, que l'on trouve la source du message de Mme Home, et de bien d'autres.

Donc, pas d'allusion certaine à Dante : le contraire est probable et j'indique la source vraisemblable de sept fois sept.

Quant aux correspondances sur ce nombre, elles sont vraiment trop banales pour n'être pas explicables par de simples coïncidences.

La lettre de M. Piddington n'ajoute rien à ces circonstances ; aucune des idées qu'il voulait transmettre n'a été reproduite. De plus, il faut conserver notre bon sens et ne pas lui imposer de trop lourds sacrifices. Dans le message de Mme Verrall du 13 Juillet, rien n'indique l'idée d'une communication à M. Piddington. Sa lettre n'est pas un message arrivé à Londres, mais bien l'annonce d'un message qu'il transmettra s'il le peut après sa mort. L'idée du texte de Mme Verrall est inapplicable à la lettre de M. Piddington. A cette date, Mme Verrall essayait de correspondre avec Mme Forbes (Vol. XX., p. 267), et on trouve le mot message appliqué à Mme Forbes le 23 Novembre 1903, les 25 Janvier, 21 et 28 Décembre 1904 ; une allusion à la difficulté de transmettre les mots grecs (du *Symposium*) par cette dame est faite le 15 Juillet (Vol. XX., p. 408). Telle est probablement la véritable allusion au message à demi arrivé à Londres.

Enfin, pourquoi penser que Myers-Verrall fera une prédiction admirable à quatre années de distance et révélera les pensées de M. Piddington, alors que dans le même texte il se trompe complètement sur sa propre lettre posthume ? Cela est bien peu vraisemblable.

On pourrait faire des critiques semblables sur les autres détails de la correspondance, cela allongerait inutilement l'analyse. Je finirai en signalant le long espace de temps qui s'écoule entre le commencement et la fin de la correspondance, plus de quatre ans, et les délais qui séparent les interventions des différents médiums. Cela rend leurs concordances inutilisables pour une démonstration scientifique de leur réalité, à moins de se fier implicitement à eux, ce qui est une erreur de méthode.

La correspondance sur *Sesame and Lilies* est d'une grande banalité; j'en dirai autant de *door* et de *key* que nous retrouvons d'ailleurs dans les expériences faites avec Mme Willett. Là, Sir O. Lodge n'a pas expérimenté avec la prudence à laquelle il nous a accoutumés.

Il demande, par lettre, au contrôle de Mme Willett, ce que lui rappelle le Léthé. La réponse ne fut obtenue qu'au bout de quatre mois; le médium a conservé pendant tout ce temps la lettre de Sir Oliver Lodge.

Je pense pourtant que Mme Willett n'a pas fraudé; la médiocrité des réponses prouve qu'elle ne s'est pas renseignée, et elle nous donne des détails établissant sa sincérité.

Il y a trois ordres de faits à analyser dans ces expériences: d'abord l'indication du nom de M. Dorr: elle est due à l'imprudence de Mme Verrall qui avait averti "les contrôles de Mme Willett (*sic*)" des bons résultats donnés par les séances de M. Dorr avec Mme Piper (Vol. XXV., p. 125). Dans les indications données par Mme Verrall sur ses communications avec Mme Willett, cette information n'est pas signalée, il me semble; l'omission d'un renseignement aussi important serait un grave oubli.

L'émergence du nom de M. Dorr ne dépasse donc pas les limites de la divination subliminale, et je ne vois aucun élément supranormal dans ce fait, malgré la mise en scène accompagnant sa production.

Le second point est la connaissance que le contrôle Myers montre des expériences faites avec Mme Piper. Sur ce point, il est visible qu'il connaît simplement ce qu'a lu Mme Willett (au moins les volumes XXI. et XXII. des *Proceedings*) et qu'il se trompe sur la portée des expériences de M. Dorr. Ce dernier (Vol. XXV., p. 127), dit-il, désire que le contrôle montre "different aspects of thought underlying which unity is to be found." Ces phrases sont empruntées à Mlle Johnson: "the statements . . . of one writer were by no means a simple reproduction . . . of the other but seemed to represent *different aspects* of the same idea (Vol. XXI., p. 373); there is . . . one coherent idea *underlying* both" (Vol. XXI., p. 375); on trouve l'idée de "*access to knowledge shown elsewhere*" dans le rapport de M. Piddington. M. Dorr voulait surtout examiner les souvenirs classiques de Myers-Piper (Vol. XXV., p. 120);

Mme Willett attribue à M. Dorr les pensées et les expressions de Mlle Johnson et de M. Piddington qu'elle connaît normalement.

Quant au troisième point, il concerne justement les souvenirs classiques de Myers-Willett. Celui-ci ne dit rien d'Ovide, mais est plein d'allusions Virgiliennes; or Mme Willett a lu les études de Myers sur Virgile et possède un ouvrage sur le poète latin. Il est naturel que l'on trouve des réminiscences des unes et de l'autre.

(1) "*Once only does the soul descend the way that leads to incarnation*" (Vol. XXV., p. 123), est inspiré par *Spirit Teachings* plutôt que par Tennyson. "*Christ existant in the ages past descends to incarnation* (p. 259-260, Memorial Edition); *Reincarnation . . . was not true*" (*Light*, 1893, p. 76).

(2) "*The blending of the essence with the instrument*" ne rappelle pas *mens agitât molem*, mais plutôt "*Veiling in human flesh the radiance of his pure spirit*" (Memorial Edition, p. 259).

(3) "*Tu Marcellus eris*" est une banalité.

(4) "*In valle reducta*" est emprunté à un texte Mac (Vol. XXV., p. 137), où était indiquée la source de la citation: VI^e chant de l'*Enéide*. L'association du rameau d'or, des colombes et des ombres est donc naturelle et normale, étant donnée cette indication. Ces mots figurent d'ailleurs dans des textes publiés aux *Proceedings*, Vols. XXI., XXII.

(5) "*the door to which I found no key*" (Vol. XXV., p. 130) est emprunté à Omar Khayyam, soit; mais la citation est banale et il y a une série d'articles dont ces mots forment le thème dans *Light*, 1905, p. 99; *the Key, an allegory*, by Mme d'Espérance. Des savants ne peuvent ouvrir la porte d'une chambre secrète: un enfant arrive disant "I have found the key . . . and lo! the door was open." L'allégorie est reprise, p. 124 et 155. Il semble que Myers-Willett y fasse allusion.

(6) La mention d'Haggi Baba a été rattachée par les commentateurs au conte d'*Ali Baba*; en réalité, l'émergence de ce nom dépend entièrement de *door* et de *key* et se relie à une publication de James Morier *The adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan*, où il est question de porte et de clé (S.P.R. *Journal*, Vol. XV., p. 101). L'allusion au conte des quarante

voleurs n'existe pas, car aucune clé n'ouvrait la porte de la caverne des voleurs : elle obéissait à une formule magique seulement. Nous avons encore là un exemple d'interprétation hâtive, comme dans l'attribution à Tennyson d'une citation empruntée à un hymne religieux (conf. Vol. XXV., p. 140 et *Journal*, Vol. XV., p. 104).

Dans le texte du 10 Février (Vol. XXV., p. 148) nous trouvons des associations normales : Lydia, et l'Ode d'Horace, bien connue (I., 8e) ; Sénèque, Ulysse, qui n'ont aucune association avec le Léthé. Sénèque a écrit un livre pour consoler sa mère Helvia, mais il a fait au Sénat l'apologie du meurtre d'Agrippine et n'est pas cité comme un modèle de piété filiale.

Ulysse rencontre sa mère Anticlée lorsqu'il évoque les morts, mais ce fils pieux ne laisse sa mère approcher de lui qu'après avoir terminé ses affaires avec Tirésias. Business is business (*Odys.* XI., 88-89).

L'émergence de *Nightingale* s'associe avec le Léthé, à cause du 4e vers de l'ode de Keats, qui est très connue (Gems, 228). Il est possible que Mme Willett connaisse le fameux passage des *Géorgiques* "Qualis . . . Philomela sub umbra," et dans ce cas Ulysse, les ombres, Philomèle, le Rossignol, etc., sont des associations oniriques de type connu. Mais je ne pense pas que l'allusion à Keats soit correcte, parce que ce poète, dans son ode au rossignol, dit que son esprit s'endort dans l'oubli tandis que le contrôle veut montrer qu'il n'a rien oublié. Il n'y a donc qu'un lien verbal (*Lethwards*) entre l'idée de Keats et l'idée différente de Myers-Willett.

Voilà ce qu'une analyse simple fait penser ; voici ce qu'imagine Mme Verrall : l'allusion à Shelley est expliquée par les mots *onec more ye Laurels* qui sont empruntés au *Lycidas* de Milton, prototype de l'*Adonais* de Shelley, dans lequel on lit (strophe XVII.), *Thy spirit's sister, the lorn nightingale. . . .* Ce qui est une allusion voilée à l'ode de Keats !

Comme dans l'*Adonais* on trouve Echo, Hyacinthe et Narcisse dont a parlé Mme Piper dans les séances Dorr, l'allusion est manifeste. C'est intentionnellement que Myers-Willett n'a pas nommé Ovide (Vol. XXV., p. 159) :

Tout cela est contenu implicitement dans Shelley et *onec more ye Laurels*.

On trouve cependant ces mots ailleurs que dans *Adonais* ;

voyez Narcisse, Hyacinthe dans *The Sensitive Plant*; Hyacinth, Echo, Apollo, sont dans *Prométhée*. Toutes ces allusions sont banales.

Il suffit à Mme Verrall pour relever une correspondance, qu'il y ait l'indication d'un poème, par une citation, du nom d'un autre poète et une analogie quelconque entre la première œuvre et le second poète. Une pareille manière de raisonner n'est pas sérieusement discutable, car on peut trouver toutes sortes de correspondances dans des conditions aussi indéterminées.

En réalité, Mme Willett écrit une foule de réminiscences empruntées aux *Proceedings*; Shelley, Keats, Writ in water (Vol. XXI., p. 355), Laurels, Scribe, Sybil, flavicomata, Waters of Babylon, Zion, l'allusion à l'ombre d'Achille, etc., figurent dans ces documents. On ne trouve rien d'original dans les textes de Mme Willett, tout est emprunté, ou banal.

Quant aux connaissances littéraires du contrôle Myers-Willett, elles sont manifestement d'ordre inférieur. Il confond les deux Ajax; la traduction de *ἐν δὲ φαεὶ καὶ ὄλεσσον* n'est pas "though it should blind me," mais "détruis moi (si tu le veux) mais à la lumière."

Il faut prendre garde à l'imagination. Je vais en montrer les dangers pratiques en indiquant à Mme Verrall une correspondance imaginaire dans laquelle elle trouvera les plus surprenantes coïncidences. C'est en examinant les textes Mac que cette démonstration peut se faire.

Le 16 Mars (Vol. XXIV., p. 297) Mlle Verrall cite un quatrain, inexactement attribué à Victor Hugo, parle de la rose de Saron, de "Gautier, and Hugo, those together types to be compared. Unless there is a possibility of setting the two side by side there would be no opportunity."

Le 27 Juillet le texte Mac porte "A little love and then the joy fades and the rose is crumpled and withers up—fane.—French (fané) . . . hollow and mortal vain is life without a meaning."

Cela rappelle à Mme Verrall une poésie de "Victor Hugo" qui lui est très familière, et dont sa fille a cité la première stance; "La vie est vaine, un peu d'amour, un peu de haine et puis bonjour." Les souvenirs de Mme Verrall (Vol. XXIV., p. 298) sont en réalité incertains, car le quatrain n'est pas

de Victor Hugo, il est d'un poète peu connu, M. de Montenaeken ; il est cité dans *Tribby*, roman de Du Maurier, paru en 1894 (Vol. XXV., p. 321). Cela n'a été découvert que plus tard, car sur le moment, Mme Verrall écrivit à Mlle Mac pour lui demander si son texte ne lui rappelait pas *un poème de Hugo* ; et Mlle Mac de répondre affirmativement ; l'allusion lui avait paru familière.

L'original était donc connu de toutes les parties ; le fait intéressant pour Mme Verrall, est la correspondance croisée à laquelle il sert ; sa fille cite une strophe et Mlle Mac l'autre. Il n'y a pas de simple coïncidence, parce que la mention d'une rose, qui apparaît dans les deux textes, les fixe et les relie (Vol. XXIV., p. 299).

La comparaison conseillée entre Gautier et Hugo préoccupa Mme Verrall ; "(it) would be completely justified," dit-elle, "if, for instance, there existed poems by Hugo and Gautier characteristic of their respective authors and referring to the topic which is the subject of the poem whose second stanza is quoted in the script—the emptiness and brevity of life" (Vol. XXV., p. 322). Des recherches furent faites et elles aboutirent aux résultats suivants : rien dans l'œuvre poétique de Gautier ni dans celle de Hugo ne rappelait la citation.

Mme Verrall fut alors mise sur la voie par son écriture automatique ; elle avait eu communication des procès-verbaux des séances Piper, de Juillet 1910, le 22 Septembre de la même année. Le mot *méditation* y figurait comme étant l'objet d'une correspondance croisée. Il y était mis en vigoureux relief. Je cite les passages des procès-verbaux sur lesquels j'attire spécialement l'attention du lecteur (Vol. XXV., pp. 331-332).

8 Juillet : (au réveil) "Myers, Meditation" (puis des vers sont dits ; on ne saisit que) : "meditation . . . sleeping dead. Laurels round . . . ever grow. Meditation links it." (Les vers sont repris) : "chureyard tree . . . walked with gorgeous feet . . . about the sleeping dead. Meditation links it. Life open peace completes the semblance . . ."

Le 16 : "Meditation . . . connects it." Lodge fait observer qu'il n'a pas trouvé de poème intitulé "Meditation." "Meditation comes out in Mrs. Holland's also will appear at Mrs. W's. Wait for it." Sur demande de Lodge, le contrôle, qui est Hodgson, reprend les vers ; il écrit : "Elegy . . . as through

the graveyard's lone retreat my Meditation led Slow I walked with cautious feet above the sleeping dead." Interrogé sur le poème dont provient la citation, le contrôle répond "Elegy." "Do you mean Gray's Elegy?" "Yes" (suggestion fautive aussitôt acceptée). "But Meditation will play a most interesting part and the last two lines" seront donnés "through both lights" (médiams) etc.

Le mot méditation apparaît immédiatement après la lecture des procès-verbaux dans les textes de Mme Verrall; le 4 Octobre, notamment: "Samaritan . . . M" (et une lettre qui est nettement un P) ". . . Meditation is a good long word in M— . . . ask about the Golden Numbers. It seems impossible to get you to distinguish sometimes between your thoughts and ours,—and you constantly overlook idiosyncrasies wh. ought to tell you who the writer is—" (Vol. XXV., p. 324).

Le 10 Octobre: ". . . Meditation, Fancy's child—no sweet Meditation heavenly maid . . . there are Augustine's Meditations—but they are not what I want. It is a purely poetic association with the word. Pacing in the cloister slow no cloister's shade, etc" (*ibid.*, p. 324).

La lumière se fit dans l'esprit de Mme Verrall en Janvier 1911; elle lut un livre d'Edith Wharton qui faisait allusion à l'axiome de Gautier (?) "Gautier's axiom"; la phrase de l'auteur anglais contrastait la rose et le laurier. En même temps elle examina l'écriture automatique de sa fille et y trouva des coïncidences avec la sienne, notamment des instruments à cordes étaient l'objet de diverses allusions, et "toute la lyre" de Hugo était citée.

Le 27 Janvier, elle trouva l'axiome (?) dans un poème de Gautier intitulé Méditation:

"Ce qui charme s'en va, ce qui fait peine reste
La rose vit une heure et le cyprès cent ans."

Elle trouva les trois conditions remplies: poème caractéristique de l'auteur (affirmation faite pour surprendre un familier des poèmes de Gautier); allusion à la brièveté de la vie (mais non à sa vanité), portant le titre Méditation.

Restait à comparer Hugo et Gautier. Dans "Toute la Lyre" elle trouva une pièce de vers dédiée à Gautier; puis une autre, *Épigramme d'enfant*, où l'idée de la brièveté de la vie

est présentée sous un jour contraire à celui que éclaire la "Méditation" de Gautier :

"Qu'as-tu donc fait pour que ta vie
Ait sitôt mérité la mort?"

Le choix du mot "rose" pour fixer la correspondance s'explique aussi, car la rubrique du poème de Gautier est empruntée à Malherbe. "Ce monde où les meilleures choses ont le pire destin" est un passage de l'Ode célèbre où se trouve le vers "Et rose elle a vécu ce que vivent les roses, etc."

Mme Verrall estime que ces allusions subtiles à Gautier et à Hugo révèlent une connaissance de leurs œuvres bien supérieure à celle qu'elle et sa fille en ont; elle reconnaît qu'avant d'avoir écrit les textes cités, elle avait parcouru la table des matières des ouvrages des deux poètes français, et que par conséquent l'émergence de "Méditation" et de "Toute la lyre" peut s'expliquer en partie, mais il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'au moment où les textes de Mlles Verrall et Mac ont été produits, en 1908, leur ignorance était encore complète, en ce qui concerne *Méditation* de Gautier et *Épithaphe d'enfant* de Hugo.

A ces documents, que cite Mme Verrall, j'ajouterai pour la discussion qui va suivre, un texte d'elle du 5 Octobre 1910, contemporain de ceux qu'elle analyse, et qui rentre dans la série des coïncidences fortuites que je vais faire connaître au lecteur.

(Dessin d'une croix) "How often has the tune been played before? then say minstrel the minstrel was infirm and old" (dessin de deux harpes) "toute la lyre. No you do not get the shape—ap hoel—I do not think you have got the first word at all. What you have is the second group. Hoel's lays. That is better."

Il y a dans la discussion de Mme Verrall bien des détails qui paraissent très particuliers à un Français modérément instruit dans la littérature contemporaine. L'axiome de Gautier par exemple ne lui rappelle rien de précis, et il ne songerait pas à la fragilité de la beauté. La comparaison entre Gautier et Hugo lui paraîtrait pleine d'insurmontables difficultés.

Il y a autre chose; la lecture des textes de Mme Verrall et de Mme Piper attirerait son attention sur un autre poète, dont le nom est étroitement associé à "Méditation": Lamartine. Il

verrait dans les allusions à Gautier et à Hugo non une invitation à chercher dans l'œuvre de ces poètes, mais une indication invitant à examiner la littérature française, examen qui résultera de la comparaison des types et fournira l'occasion prévue.

Le texte de Mme Verrall contient M P, méditations poétiques, interprétation confirmée par le texte du 10 Octobre "une association purement poétique à méditation." Il verrait dans la préface du "Dernier chant de Childe Harold" qui fait partie des "Méditations Poétiques" de Lamartine, ces mots "*Harold est un enfant de l'imagination.*" ("Fancy's child.") Il trouverait 19 lettres dans le nom d'*Alphonse de Lamartine*, et 19 est le total des *nombres d'or*; dans "ap hoel" il verrait un anagramme incomplet d'Alphonse.

Appliquant son hypothèse au texte de Mme Piper, il chercherait une élégie dans les Méditations, et la trouverait, pièce XI., *Nouvelles Méditations*. Là, il reconnaîtrait le thème général cherché par Mme Verrall, la vanité et la brièveté de la vie, *les deux idées y sont exprimées et non une seule comme dans Gautier.* Il serait frappé d'abord par le premier vers :

"Cueillons, cueillons *la rose* au matin de la vie
Des rapides printemps respire au moins les fleurs."

Et encore :

"Hâtons-nous d'épuiser la coupe de la vie
Pendant qu'elle est entre nos mains

Soit que le laurier nous couronne

Nous allons échouer tous au même rivage
Qu'importe au moment du naufrage
Sur un vaisseau fameux d'avoir fendu les airs
Ou sur une barque légère, etc."

Ce n'est pas tout ; si nous feuilletons les *Méditations* nous trouvons des vers dont la séance du 16 Juillet donne la paraphrase ; cela est intéressant, parce que nous les trouvons dans la suite de Childe Harold, écrite par Lamartine, ce qui est un lien entre la littérature anglaise et française.

Comparez en effet les extraits donnés plus haut avec ces vers, pris dans la stance XXXVIII :

“ *Harold ralentissant ses pas silencieux*
 S’assied sur un tombeau : *Quelle paix en ces lieux*
 Dit-il, et que *ces morts dont je foule la pierre*
Dorment profondément dans leur lit de poussière
 L’espace qu’en ces lieux *je couvre de mon pié*
 A suffi pour ces saints etc.”

Harold est le nom d’un des enfants de M. Myers.

On retrouve donc toutes les idées exprimées par le contrôle Myers chez les deux médiums, Mme V. rappelle Childe Harold ; Mme Piper, ce poème et Élégie ; enfin Mme Piper ramène par cette Élégie la correspondance aux textes Mac et H. Verrall, par la mention de la rose et le thème de l’élégie.

On remarquera dix-neuf coïncidences entre le poème et les textes, dont quelques unes sont très frappantes et portent sur les idées et les mots. Il est évident que nous sommes en présence de coïncidences fortuites, que la banalité de certains sujets, comme rose, brièveté et vanité de la vie, tombeaux, pas silencieux, sommeil des morts, laurier, élégie, etc., explique facilement, mais il y a d’autres rencontres plus curieuses, telles que “ *méditations poétiques,*” “ *Harold enfant de l’imagination.*”

Il me semble que cette correspondance est encore mieux établie que celles dont le *Purgatoire* de Dante nous est cité comme un exemple.

On voit, ainsi, où peuvent conduire la méthode symbolique, l’interprétation et l’imagination.

METHODS.

We have now to deal with criticisms of a more general nature. They involve questions, the solution of which is of vital importance for the future of Psychical Research.

It has been already pointed out that the phenomena of the S.P.R. automatists, whose work is under consideration, are liable to a serious objection. They are not, as a rule, really proven by objective evidence. We must admit the automatists’ good faith.

I have the greatest confidence in their truthfulness and I am personally quite ready to believe that they are not guilty of any collusion. The remarks which I am about to make do not apply to the experimenters or the mediums individually; they have a wider range and are above personalities.

The value of an experiment, according to Dr. Sidgwick (*Proceedings*, Vol. V., p. 401-402), is worthless when the possibility of conscious or unconscious fraud is not excluded.

I need not insist on the fact that such a condition is not fulfilled by the latest experiments. The automatists might have exchanged letters, combining beforehand their correspondences; the investigators could not be aware of their underhand agreement to fraud. The medium's good faith must be implicitly admitted as an element of the experiment.

If the respectability of the well-known ladies and gentlemen who are either mediums or investigators is held to make such an admission legitimate; then I fear that we forfeit the right of doubting other honourable people's statements in similar circumstances. The S.P.R. cannot claim the monopoly of honesty and good faith for their mediums or enquirers.

Having gone so far, they are not entitled to impose on other experimenters the rules which they do not observe in their own experiments. They give thus a bad example, and lose the right of criticising the value of sittings held according to their own standard.

Rules must be binding for every one. Scientific research knows no privilege. If we are to make exceptions for certain mediums, we cannot, without giving offence, refuse to treat other mediums as we treat our own, whosoever they may be.

Instances of that grave defect of method are easy to give. When Sir O. Lodge, who is, as a rule, a very prudent experimenter, left a letter during four months in the hands of a medium before getting an answer, he forgot the rules wisely drawn by Professor Sidgwick. The medium had simply to read the question when she got the letter, and she had plenty of time for preparing an answer.

No better provisions were made against unconscious fraud. We know very little as yet of the psychological conditions in which the automatist's mind moves itself. There are many varieties of unconscious fraud, some being connected with

abnormal states of consciousness, some being simply dependent upon prejudice, bias, monoideism; the latter are hardly frauds, though we cannot draw the line between these and the former ones. And this fact is not easy to grasp, when one is not familiar with the psychological phenomena of trance, crepuscular states of consciousness and ordinary absent-mindedness, lack of attention, or bias. Between these typical forms of the loss of the sense of reality (*sens du réel*) there are a number of boundary and complicated forms; and, according to the degree of dimness to which the normal consciousness sinks down, we have various forms of unconscious fraud.

I fear that psychical researchers are not quite familiar sometimes with the difficulties which are encountered in the study of these psychological states, chiefly the *crepuscular states of consciousness*.

We find them in some diseases of the brain or of the nervous system, chiefly in hysteria and epilepsy. But they are not, by themselves, a pathological symptom, no more than automatism is a symptom of hysteria. They are easy to observe in healthy persons.

When a question is put to an entranced medium, if the answer is not immediately given, we leave, in the medium's subliminal, the seed of a desire, and the latent desire may induce an impulsion, and a transitory trance, if the seed has been deposited during the trance. Auto-suggestion, like hetero-suggestion, tends to the production of the state of consciousness, during the carrying on of the impulse, which obtained when the suggestion was given, or the cause of the self-suggestion was born.

Can we suspect such transient states of consciousness in the mediums of the S.P.R.?

Mrs. Piper is quite trustworthy; how can we adjust this fact with the other one, her perusal of Browning? She may have been in a transitory trance while looking through the volume; the trance was self-induced, and owed its cause to the questions which had been asked during the sittings.

This is only an hypothesis, but I feel sure that its possibility will not be denied by neuropathologists. The experimenters have completely overlooked such possibilities; they have not taken care to exclude them; their conclusions are founded on

facts which are not free from the suspicion of unconscious fraud.

Such impulses may occur without a complete trance; a simple crepuscular state may obtain, that is an obnubilation of the normal consciousness.

These crepuscular states of consciousness may be very short, the shading off of the normal self may be very light; it does not alter the case and, as a rule, there is a consecutive amnesia.

Lighter grades of dimming are to be observed in the normal consciousness, when one is absent-minded. It seems, at first sight, hardly credible that a simple absence or lack of attention may be held as a psychological state of the same order as impulses, motor automatisms or trances. If we are to consider them from a general point of view, taking in all their characteristics, we cannot naturally perceive the features which are common to all. Their connexion appears, however, when we take into account the relations between the normal consciousness and the subliminal, or rather, as I propose to say, the organic or general consciousness. In that case, we note always a diminution of the former, the field of which is narrowed.

It is usually associated with a loss of the sense of reality. We observe such narrowing of consciousness in deep thought, and we know that genuine motor automatisms may then take place. In our states of abstraction, we are apt to leave things in the wrong place and to forget where we put them. Such a loss of memory is a real amnesia.

I do not pretend to say that the automatists may have looked abstractedly into a book and picked up the knowledge which they showed afterwards in their script, with amnesia of the act through which it was gained. I have no reason to suspect automatisms of this kind in the facts which we are analyzing.

The study of the states of *distraction*, as they say in French, and of the consecutive amnesia is, however, full of meaning. We forget the greater part of what we do, and see, and hear, and read. A few days, or a few months, or a few years, blot our memories; but this is true only of our normal memory; it seems probable that our organic

memory keeps the record of every perception stored up by our senses. Though not generally accepted, this hypothesis is very likely true. We know that our subconscious memory is in any case infinitely richer than our conscious one; the latter has no knowledge of the stores accumulated in the former, and there are no means of gauging the first through the second, though the reverse may be possible.

And, here, we get at a serious defect in the methods used by the experimenters. They are always asking from the mediums information about their conscious or normal knowledge, and seem to believe that such information is adequate. I use the word *seem*, as some of them are well aware of the utter inutility of their enquiries (Vol. XXI., p. 387). Why, then, do they take so much pain to ascertain what are the conscious recollections of the automatists? The scripts are not the product of the normal consciousness, but grow out of the subconscious self, the potentialities of which may, and probably do, depend on the forgotten experiences of their whole life.

Two other points may be considered in connexion with those losses of memory. The first is the impossibility of ascertaining what a medium does not subconsciously know. It is already difficult to gauge the extent of his knowledge; the difficulty becomes immensely greater when we have to prove that he does not know something. We are confronted by a *negative fact*, which cannot really be proven. We may infer that a given knowledge is out of the medium's reach, but we cannot prove our assumption.

Secondly, we cannot know whether the knowledge displayed by a medium's automatism has a supernormal source or is due to "cryptomnesia"; this is, the consequence of the first point above discussed.

A third point is even to be taken into account, always in connexion with the losses or gains of memory related to abnormal states of consciousness. Some of the experimenters hold that the trance consciousness of Mrs. Piper, for instance, is shut from the normal one. They think that the two fields are completely apart one from the other.

I am not disposed to agree with them. We have but one means of testing the links between normal and abnormal states of consciousness, and it is by an analysis of their respective

memories. And a first observation must be made; the relative amnesia is without doubt a *functional*, not an *essential* one. It can be compared with amnesia in cases of hysteria. And even in such cases we note a modification of the language, for instance, in Pitre's "Ecmnesia." The trance does not show a serious alteration of language. The medium may speak with a different accent, he may use a particular style of expressing himself; these changes are superficial; the bulk of the speaking material is not altered.

If the memories of the normal consciousness were absolutely shut from the trance personality, we should observe "mnesic aphasia," that is the loss of speech, through loss of memory, as we note it sometimes in neuropathology. The conservation of speech shows that the relative amnesia is not deeply rooted.

And there is evidence that the trance consciousness draws sometimes its supply from the normal stores. We can find an instance, I think, of the fact in the Dorr sittings, when Myers_p put on the track of the Olympic games, spoke of the modern Marathon races. Such a blunder is manifestly borrowed from the normal personality's memory.

I fear that the whole conception of the psychological condition of the trance, to use Mr. Dorr's words, of its depth, not of its genuineness, held by the experimenters are not quite satisfactory. My conclusions, if they impair the worth of the latest experiments about cross-correspondence and literary knowledge, do not impair the worth of the former experiments made with Mrs. Piper, whose good faith is not suspected. Her trance remains genuine, but its depth is not such as some experimenters believe it to be; and by depth, we must understand Mr. Dorr's peculiar meaning, that is, its depth in relation to the normal consciousness.

The experimenters seem to ignore the work done outside the society. I am not sure that here "things are not what they seem," but still their conclusions would have more weight if they were grounded on a knowledge less superficial in appearance.

Unfortunately, there are other reasons for suspecting the experimenters of a little superficiality. Their statements are sometimes hasty. A great number of these statements had to be corrected. I may add to the examples given above,

Mrs. Verrall's commentary on Mrs. Holland's script of November 10, 1909. She sees in "O singer of Persephone from the far meadows desolate hast thou forgotten Sicily" allusions to Tennyson's Demeter and Persephone, while the verses are a quotation from Oscar Wilde's *Theocritus* (S.P.R. *Journal*, Vol. XV., p. 105). The implicit reference to "Nightingale" is consequently very doubtful.

From these examples may be gathered the feeling that the conclusions founded upon such weak and doubtful references are very uncertain, not to say more. And the feeling becomes a rational impression when other symptoms of superficiality are met with, examples of which I have given.

The experimenters have an unconscious tendency to adapt the facts to their opinions and wishes, not to suit the latter to the first.

Miss Johnson gives an amusing example of her onesidedness. The incident is so extraordinary that it stands as a token of sincerity; but I fear that Miss Johnson did not perceive its humorous side.

On March 28, 1906, Mrs. Holland gave a description of Mr. Roden Noël "clear eyes under a broad brow a shock of grey hair that was still thick, etc." The description tallies with a portrait published in Mr. Noël's collected poems. Mrs. Holland is not aware of having ever seen the portrait; Miss Johnson states that the poet's personal appearance was *correctly described* (Vol. XXI., p. 324). Miss Noël wrote (Vol. XXIV., pp. 5-6) that *the description was not very accurate*; her father's hair was "very thin latterly, though curly, and it was hardly grey." But Miss Johnson knows better. "My own recollection of the one occasion on which I saw him is that his hair was then decidedly thick and curly, as shown in the portrait prefixed to his *Collected Poems*." Here we have another instance of the analyst's mental process. She saw Mr. Noël once only, but has more faith in her own recollection than in the fresh and safer memory of the poet's daughter.

I point out all these little facts in order to show the new experimenters' "mentality." They are acting upon faith and enthusiasm, but they do not appear to be guided by calm and unprejudiced reason. The careful reader will find a number of similar instances.

And I may say it again most expressedly, there is not the slightest doubt in my mind about the sincerity and the good faith of the mediums or of the analysts. They are unconsciously guided by their feelings and their sentiments, and they are not in a position sufficiently broadminded to perceive what does not fit with their immediate wants. They suffer from a kind of monoideism, which tends to the overlooking of any fact contrary to their own notions, provided of course that such facts be not too striking.

The danger arising from such tendencies is the more serious the more we deal with impressions, not with facts. And here we encounter the gravest peril of the new methods. They are ultimately founded upon analogy and symbolism. The duty of Psychological Researchers, true to the old and prudent spirit of the founders of the Society, is to protest against the introduction of methods in which imagination plays too great a part.

Analogy and symbolism may have their proper value when used in their proper places; but they are outside the realm of scientific inquiry. Symbols, when they are fixed by tradition, as the case may be in Religion, Art, Secret Societies, etc., may have a definite meaning. In other cases they have not, and one finds in the symbol what one has already put into it.

A very remarkable instance of the resources offered by symbolism is shown in Mr. Piddington's Report (Vol. XXII., p. 182).

A knot of blue ribbon is "no more than a first attempt to get the name John." Why? Because there is a piece of poetry in which occur both the name John and the words "a bunch of blue ribbon." Can we really seriously discuss such arguments? The damage would not be great if we had to deal only with sporadic illustrations of the new method. Unfortunately we meet with it everywhere.

The worst point of this method is its indetermination. There are a number of solutions to such indeterminate problems. Mr. Piddington is, however, well aware of the necessity of precision. He gives us some very good rules on the subject in his answer to some criticisms (*Light*, 1904, p. 447) about the prediction of the Servian assassinations. "The central fact of a prediction must be beyond intelligent anticipation; the prediction

must contain *a sufficient number of detailed statements about the time, place and other circumstances to justify its fulfilment, being attributed not to chance coincidence or some other known cause.*"

What are we to think of Mrs. Verrall's intimation of future events according to these rules of evidence? And what are we to think of cross-correspondences, when there are such constant discrepancies about the time? Where is the "one rule for all" standard?

I fear that if the new method is allowed to obtain in our experiments, our conclusions might lose much of their evidential value.

We must not forget that psychical phenomena, either of the physical or of the intellectual type, are very difficult to investigate. I do not wish to vindicate here the value of the first, I want only to point out that both types seem to have the same apparent origin, our subconscious self, and that the study of the latter is still more complicated than the investigation of the former. If physical phenomena be observed, we have only to guard ourselves against illusion and deception. But if we can observe them again and again, we can gradually narrow the field of uncertainty, we have to deal with a material fact.

In intellectual phenomena, on the contrary, we are confronted by a great number of unknown data, the darkest of which are the subliminal memories and faculties of the mediums. We cannot test them with any degree of certainty, especially when we deal with known or published facts.

And we must not think that if we meet with fraud in the physical phenomena, we do not meet with it in the intellectual. Frauds are easier to practise, consciously or unconsciously in the latter, and they are more difficult to detect.

And there is a double form of fraud in the intellectual type of phenomena,—the medium's fraud and the control's fraud. If an entranced medium gives a spurious physical phenomenon, we say that there is cheating and deceit. We should not hold in every case the normal personality responsible for the fraud; but as a rule we make no distinctions and we discard the medium, though the responsibility may

fall exclusively on the somnambolic personality, that is on the so-called control.

A fraud, in the physical type of phenomena, is a kind of lie; when we detect lies in the messages of the control, what are we to decide? Is there an essential difference between a lying control and a cheating one? I might here write many things about control-psychology, but I want only to show the analogies and the difficulties. Cross-correspondences, such as we have them now, are particularly open to criticism of this nature.

The evidence collected is, I think, unable to demonstrate the fact of spirit agency. We want a proof, and we must be exacting in our tests; the system of cross-correspondences is founded upon negative facts; the mediums have *no* knowledge of the antecedent publications, they have *not* heard of them, they have *not* practised deception, they have *not* exchanged letters, they have *not* met, and got useful information, etc. Negative facts are an unsafe basis, for they are always liable to be discarded when we get a positive one.

A positive fact, on the contrary, stands by itself and has a permanent value. We want such facts and such proofs. Cross-correspondences cannot give them. Cases like the incidents quoted by S. Moses (Abraham Florentine, Mrs. Abercrombie, etc.) are more striking and have a stronger evidential value. The same might be said of Mrs. Piper's early experiments. (See Mr. Hyslop's paper, *Jour. Am. S.P.R.*, September, 1909.) They do not exclude the possibility of telepathy, or of clairvoyance, but the cross-correspondences do not exclude it either. M. Pigou has, I think, clearly shown that even cross-correspondences of the mosaic type may be due to fragmentary telepathic thought-transference.

I do not see how we could prove that telepathy cannot explain fragmentary and complementary thought-transference, even if we admit that the cross-correspondences quoted possess always such a character, which I think not.

The line of enquiry followed by the experimenters seems to lead to "nowhere"; ineffectual in their possible results, their methods of investigation appear to be defective from a technical point of view. Too many questions are asked at the same

time; an experimenter takes a dream for a real event, another forgets the question asked some weeks before, etc. The controls are too often guided so benevolently that they need not fish. (Hope, Star and Browning, Dante, Abt Vogler, etc.)

Lastly, I fear that the new style of phenomena may not agree with Mrs. Piper's mediumship. In some of the sittings the experiment amounted simply to thought-transference (*ἀπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκίμων*, Plotinus, the Latin Message), but she gave the correct answer with much difficulty. Her former sittings were, I think, singularly more interesting. It would have been better not to interfere with her controls and her style of mediumship. Imperator, Prudens (Plotinus), Rector (St. Hippolytus), Doctor (Athenodorus), Mentor (Algazzali) are certainly not the same controls as their similarly named ones of Mr. Moses, and are painfully inferior to them.

Since Mr. Hodgson's lamented death it seems that the old form of mediumship, the trance-utterance, is regaining its lost ground. The best results have been given in the waking-stage, during which the old verbal automatism is used.

The same might be said of Mrs. Holliand. Her imitation of Mrs. Verrall's scripts does not appear to be really desirable. The safest course to take, in dealing with automatic phenomena, is to leave the manifestation alone as much as possible. The only conditions on which we must insist are those concerning the sincerity and good observation of the phenomenon; these conditions excepted, it is better to watch the spontaneous development of the facts without attempting to guide them according to our limited views. We have almost everything to learn about automatism, and it might be safer, and more scientific, to study first the laws governing automatic mental processes. When we know them, we shall be better prepared for grasping the problem of their supra-human causes. In such a study many points, however, are worthy of attention. Their interesting features are not sensational, and are, of course, far from the main point at issue, but I fear that we must study carefully the psychological process involved in the various modes of automatic expression before we are really able to investigate their spiritual kernel.

The difficulty lies in the identity of the communicating intelligence. It is sometimes quite easy to trace the source of

the message, which, in nine cases out of ten, is in the automatist's own mind.

In the tenth case, we cannot discover the spring from which flows the information, but we are not entitled to conclude, from our inability to trace the normal source of knowledge, that a supernormal one must be admitted. For reasons already explained, we cannot rely on the automatists themselves for instructing us; we have to deal with their subconsciousness, and the normal self is not aware of the amount of knowledge stored up in the subliminal memory.

Hence the radical objection which is to be made to cross-correspondences. They may serve as evidence for telepathy, but they cannot go farther, and even in these narrow limits they are not of great value. They concern words, or ideas, which are to be found in books easily obtainable. All the literary references, of which the latest papers make so much, seem to me consequently very uncertain evidence.

Moreover, we are not in a position to exclude the possibility of various modes of supernormal acquisition of knowledge, such as clairvoyance; even in the Spirit hypothesis how can we be sure that we are in touch with the real personality purporting to communicate and not with a personating spirit?¹

But I am not prepared to discuss such remote possibilities. I allude to their existence in order to show how many difficulties creep into the investigation of spirit agency.

Our immediate work, I think, ought to be chiefly directed to the study of the psychological processes of automatic messages.

Errors, and their cause, are very instructive. No serious study of the subject appears to have been made. I believe that the experimenters whose work I am criticising are well qualified for achieving serious progress in our knowledge of these psychological questions; we must clear them up before gaining a sure ground; we cannot hope to make any safe advance without such preliminary work.

¹Prudenee grows with increasing experience. Here is M. Stainton Moses's opinion on Spirit-Identity: "At the time I should not have seriously questioned the identity of these Beings. But there are problems connected with the question of identity which are ponderously difficult, and I am by no means sure that we have the means of settling them," *Light*, 1884, p. 252.

Mrs. Verrall, Mrs. Holland, and the other automatists are intelligent, cultured, observing minds. They are endowed with remarkable powers, which give them every facility for a study, the necessity of which I am advocating.

How ought to be conducted such a work? Many methods might be used, and I am not prepared to discuss their value.

I have observed cases similar to Mrs. Verrall's or Mrs. Holland's experiences. For instance, I have a very curious record of messages concerning the Russo-Japanese war, untrue almost without exception, but anticipating sometimes the false news given by the papers. I noticed cases akin to this one in Mrs. Verrall's report.

Why does such false news creep into the scripts? Is there a special telepathy, originated in the mind of the newsmonger? Is there a selective telepathy, acting according to affinities of race, culture, civilisation, and propagating its waves in certain directions rather than in others? The problem is difficult and complex, but there are simpler ones.

Can we get at the real process of telepathy? Sir Oliver Lodge has already shown how important would be the solution of the question. Well, the study of errors can give us some insight into the process.

For instance, in Miss Johnson's first report, Vol. XXI, pp. 346-348, we read that Mrs. Holland tried to get some impressions by psychometry; she held a glove and had the impression of "Lincoln. The bronze is out of place."

The owner of the glove (which had belonged to the late son of Mrs. Forbes) had a bust of Washington, which at the time was out of its usual place.

Here we have a curious error. Lincoln and Washington were both Presidents of the U.S. of America. We are led to think, in this case, that no sensory image was transmitted; Washington and Lincoln were not alike. We suspect then that a mere idea was conveyed, that of a bust, and of a President of the American Republic. But why Lincoln?

The emergence of this name is perhaps due to a working out of the root impression by the conscious self or by the strata of the subliminal which are nearer to the normal consciousness.

An observation of mine points to such an explanation. A

medium—not a professional one—describing the sitter's grandmother, with sufficient accuracy, gave her name as "*Clémentine.*" The answer was noted as incorrect, the real name being "*Augustine.*" But the family used to call the dead lady *Maman Tine*, and in the familiar nickname we have the three last syllables of the wrong name. *Clémentine* is, I think, almost the only usual name terminating in "mentine" in French.

Is there a kind of correction worked out by the mind, in those cases of supranormal perception, correction which could be compared with the building of an illusory optical image out of disconnected blots or shapes?

The same study could be made in cases where impressions get mixed up, when, for instance, a person is correctly described, but is depicted with the dress of another. How does the mixing up creep in? Observations, if repeated and carefully made, might give clues to the process.

Some observations seem to show that the percipient gets an impression, not of an abstract idea, but of a concrete element of the image. Things seen by the supposed agent, when he was very young, are sometimes described by the sensitive as larger than they were really: in one case, the description of a room was incorrect, inasmuch as what was on the right side was said to be on the left, and *vice versa*. The sensitive seemed to see an inverted image, as in a looking-glass. Did he perceive something like a print of the former perception existing somewhere in the agent's brain?

In the same case, the sensitive said that "butterflies were pinned to the wall of the room, above a desk." There were no *butterflies*, but on the wall was hung a picture, "*La femme aux papillons.*" The idea of *butterflies* was only picked up and interpreted either by the conscious or unconscious mind. It might be possible to discover which of the two parts of the mind is responsible for these interpretations: such a knowledge would be full of meaning.

Thus the study of errors may be very useful, and we can investigate their modes, processes, and perhaps even their causes with some chances of success. A French author, Mr. Duchatel, published last year a book on Psychometry, where the subject is tackled.

It is not necessary, however, to show how many things may be investigated in the unknown fields of Psychological Research; the work is as yet at its beginning. But we must keep strictly to sound methods, give imagination and fancy a wide berth, and study simple questions before trying to solve the most complicated ones. . Il ne faut pas mettre la charrue devant les bœufs.

EDITORIAL NOTE ON DR. MAXWELL'S PAPER.

THE interpretation of the automatic writings which have been presented to the Society of recent years, and the interconnexions between them, constitute so complicated a problem that there are probably few—even among our own members—who have attempted to work at it seriously, and there are fewer still who have favoured us with any systematic observations thereon. We welcome, therefore, the above contribution from Dr. Maxwell, who will be well known to most of our readers as the author of *Les Phénomènes Psychiques*.

His paper is clearly the result of a painstaking study of the large mass of published material; and as such clearly merits a reply. We shall reserve the publication of this reply to a later Part of *Proceedings*; but meanwhile it may be well to point out in general terms that Dr. Maxwell's paper contains mistakes as to facts, and that his criticism is to a large extent based on a fundamental misapprehension of the views of the writers whom he is criticising as to what is and what is not evidential of supernormal activity. Their aim has been to give, if not a complete, at least a representative, view of the phenomena as a whole, and not only of their evidential aspect. This was pre-eminently the case with Mrs. Verrall's report on her own script, while she and all the other writers have emphasised again and again the subjective element in a large proportion of all the scripts.

In so doing they have acted consistently with the general principle of the S.P.R., which does not confine itself to the publication of "evidential" facts, but includes in its survey whatever incidents appear to be of psychological interest or instructive in any way, no matter whether they tell for or against a supernormal hypothesis. This has been so long the practice in S.P.R. publications that it is not always considered necessary to state in so many words to which category a fact is supposed to belong, especially as this may often be a

matter of opinion. The great majority of our readers have probably understood this practice; but it seems clear that Dr. Maxwell has not understood it.

Thus, for instance, he brings forward various incidents as evidence of cryptomnesia (subliminal memory) as though the writers he is criticising had ignored this explanation; whereas, as a matter of fact, in nearly every instance, they have either explicitly stated or allowed it to be understood that they regarded those incidents as probable or possible examples of cryptomnesia. If there is any difference between them and Dr. Maxwell in this matter, it is that they are sometimes less confident than he is that cryptomnesia is a *complete* explanation in a given case, and so have been careful to lay before the reader all the evidence in their possession, whether it told for or against that explanation. An extract from Miss Johnson's First Report on the *Automatic Writing of Mrs. Holland* may perhaps suffice to put the reader on his guard against accepting too readily the charge that Dr. Maxwell has brought against them of having paid too slight attention to the possibilities of cryptomnesia:

“The whole study of this case tends to confirm the view that no statement in automatic script that has ever [previously appeared] in print, or is of such a nature as to be known to a good many people, can be regarded as really good evidence of supernormal knowledge.”¹

In replying to Dr. Maxwell, an effort will be made to explain further the general principles that have guided the writers in their exposition and discussion of the scripts, as well as to deal in some detail with Dr. Maxwell's criticisms of individual cases.

¹ *Proceedings*, Vol. XXI., p. 368.

IV.

THE LATIN MESSAGE EXPERIMENT.

BY MRS. ANNA HUDE, PH.D. (COPENHAGEN).

ONE of the most interesting experiments described by Mr. Piddington in his well-known paper, *A Series of Concordant Automatismes*, is no doubt the one called *The Latin Message*.¹ But at the same time it is one whose value has been much disputed; Mr. Podmore in his last work, *The Newer Spiritualism*, made it the subject of a destructive criticism, based on the assertion that the Piper-Myers never understood the message; Mr. Bayfield, in his review of the book, subscribes to this assertion.² This is what I myself must do; but with the conclusions drawn from it by the two authors I entirely disagree, and I should be glad to give here my reasons for so doing.

Readers of the *Proceedings* will remember the outlines of the experiment. In Latin, and in purposely intricate and difficult sentences, the trance-personality called Myers_p is asked to try a new and complex type of cross-correspondence by giving to two mediums two different messages, with apparently no connection between them, and afterwards to a third medium a third message revealing the hidden connection. Some time after the transmission of this message Myers_p asks Mr. Piddington whether Mrs. Verrall has received his reference to *Hope*, *Browning*, and *Star*, and thus directs his attention to a script of Mrs. Verrall's where Browning's poem *Abt Vogler* is mentioned. Mr. Piddington reads *Abt Vogler*, and there finds a passage which seems to him to symbolise in an appropriate and ingenious manner the idea of the co-operation of the three mediums expressed in the Latin message; in music, the poet says, the gift is allowed to man "that out of three sounds

¹*Proceedings*, Vol. XXII., pp. 312-416.²*Ibid.* Vol. XXV., p. 78.

he frame, not a fourth sound, but a *star*." As, moreover, the script begins with the word *Aster* (*i.e.* star), and Miss Verrall a few days after its production has drawn a star, it seems probable to Mr. Piddington that Myers_P has in this way meant to answer the message, and that all that is now wanting is his affirmation through Mrs. Piper of this being really the case. A couple of months pass with no definite result; but at last the name *Abt Vogler* is spelt out; a fortnight later the line about the fourth sound and the star is given. And in two sittings with Sir Oliver Lodge Myers_P clearly states that this line contains his answer to the Latin message.¹

Thus presented, with a great many details omitted, the experiment looks fairly successful. But there is one circumstance which cannot be omitted. When Myers_P in his two meetings with Sir Oliver Lodge shortly recapitulates the whole experiment, he shows no comprehension whatever of its leading idea; he knows of no cross-correspondence save the simple one between two mediums, *viz.* Mrs. Verrall and Mrs. Piper.² But, this being the case, how is the line about the fourth sound and the star to be accounted for? No longer a symbol of the co-operation of three mediums, it has lost its meaning in relation to the message. And yet Myers_P has quoted it as an appropriate reply.

No doubt it is some such train of thought that has, for instance, made Mr. Balfour³ declare "that he feels inclined to put the *Abt Vogler* incident in the class of thought-transference from those present"; Mr. Podmore⁴ goes further, and sums up the result of the whole experiment in the verdict "that the Piper-Myers is an intelligence of distinctly inferior capacity"; and Mr. Bayfield, in his review, says that the incident "has always seemed to him peculiarly damaging to his claims." But is it possible to acquiesce in this result? Has not every reader who has followed Myers_P through the numerous dialogues where the Latin message is dealt with felt

¹ "The lines which I quoted before [*viz.* 'instead of a fourth sound came a star'] were the most appropriate I could find."

² "He wished me to give a message through Mrs. Verrall and this light concerning the *same* subject."

³ *The Hibbert Journal* of Jan., 1909, p. 259.

⁴ *The Newer Spiritualism*, p. 254.

that qualities are there displayed not to be accounted for by thought-transference nor bearing the stamp of mental incapacity? It is true that the issue of the experiment is self-contradictory, and can only be explained on the presumption of some misunderstanding having taken place between the trance-personality and the experimenters. But, if we review its different phases in the light of the whole of it, I believe we shall find that such is the case; moreover, that the misunderstanding will be the means of revealing the trance-personality as more independent and, perhaps, more intelligent than a successful experiment might have done. Along these lines, then, I beg the readers to accompany me, though the task cannot, I fear, be so easy as I could wish.

The message, which I think it necessary to give *in extenso*, runs as follows:

Diversis internuntiis quod invicem inter se respondentia jamdudum committis, id nec fallit nos consilium, et vehementer probamus, Unum accesserit gratissimum nobis, si, cum duobus quibusdam ea tradideris, inter quae nullus appareat nexus, postea quam primum rem per tertium aliquem ita perficias, ut latens illud in prioribus explicetur.

The literal translation into English is as follows:

As to the fact that for some long time past you have been entrusting to different intermediaries things which correspond mutually between themselves, we have observed your design, and we cordially approve it. One thing besides this most agreeable to us will have happened if, when you shall have delivered to two particular persons things between which no connection is apparent, afterwards as soon as possible through some third person you so complete the matter that that which was latent in the first two may be revealed.

The message was dictated in small portions in five sittings from Dec. 17, 1906, to Jan. 2, 1907. It appeared to be extremely difficult for the trance-personalities to catch the sound of it. Again and again the words and sentences had to be repeated, long after the whole of it had been delivered. Thus *jamdudum committis* was spelt out twice on Jan. 16: most of the message was repeated on Jan. 23; the first sentence on Feb. 19, with a special repetition of *jamdudum*;

and the last sentence on Feb. 27 and later. And yet it seems to have reached Myers_P in fragments only; a natural consequence of its being, presumably, transmitted orally through an intermediary who did not himself (or herself) understand one word of it. It is true that Mr. Piddington at the beginning of the experiment had asked "Rector" if he had any means of registering permanently the words dictated to him; but Rector had made no answer, and from many following incidents it is evident that he did not do this, but repeated the Latin "by sound".¹ On account of this slow and uncertain method of transmission all efforts for a long time must be directed to the translation of the message, as a necessary introduction to its being replied to. On Jan. 2, while the last sentence was still incomplete, Rector said: "Hodgson is helping Myers with his translation"; a little later Myers_P himself expressed his willingness to translate the Latin. On Feb. 27 he said that he had wished to translate the whole message into English; in his own opinion he had then translated the beginning of it. That the trance-personalities might have accomplished the feat, if all the words had reached them correctly, is made probable among other things from an incident which took place on Feb. 19. Mr. Piddington was repeating some of the Latin to Hodgson_P on behalf of Myers_P; when he had pronounced *jamdudum committis* Hodgson_P asked for "the next to the last word" to be repeated once more. Mr. Piddington now told him that the first syllable was "spelt like the English word *jam*—preserves." "Oh yes, I understand, Marmalade," Hodgson_P exclaimed—and the difficulty was conquered; the word once really grasped its meaning was understood immediately, for at the following sittings *jamdudum* was rightly translated "long since". At the same time, if a simple syllable like *jam* was so difficult to grasp, it is no wonder that a correct transmission of the whole message proved impossible.

Under these circumstances Myers_P of course could not for a

¹See his remarks to Dr. Hodgson on Feb. 25, 1903: "We do not clearly see the registering as thou dost. We repeat by sound" (*Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., p. 555). Mr. Piddington informs me that Rector or Hodgson_P somewhere claimed to be able to make a permanent register, but perhaps this could not be done immediately.

long while think of answering the message; several times he begged Mr. Piddington to be patient with him.¹ But an impression of its general meaning he had no doubt received. An utterance to Mr. Piddington on Jan. 23 points to this: "I believe," he says, "I can send you a message which will please you, if I understand it [the message] clearly." The conception he had formed appears in his first attempt to reply. *The idea he got*, he says on Feb. 20, repeating it on Feb. 27, *was that he should be a messenger*, an intermediary. It is the word *internuntiis* he has misheard as *internuntius* and applied to himself, while in the message it is used to designate another kind of intermediaries—the mediums or automatists. The consequences of his being led to think of himself as an intermediary between the living and the dead, between earth and "heaven", will appear later. That he got no further in his understanding of the message was for one thing² due to the fact that the part referring to the third medium at this point had, so to speak, disappeared from the problem. On Jan. 23 Myers_P had told Mr. Piddington that he would like to go over "the first and second sentences" of the message; Mr. Piddington had then repeated it from the beginning as far as *nexus*. Possibly Myers_P thought that he had now got the whole message;³ in any case the difficulties of transmission make it unthinkable that its final sentence should have been understood at an earlier date; thus for a time it was completely lost sight of.

This was the situation immediately before the production of Mrs. Verrall's script of Jan. 28, destined to play a prominent part in the history of the message. A fortnight later, on Feb. 11, the following conversation took place between Myers_P and Mr. Piddington:

M. Did she [Mrs. Verrall] receive the word Evangelical?

Mr. P. I don't know, but I will enquire.

¹ See on Jan. 15 and 16, Feb. 6 and 12.

² Another ground for his acquiescing in his first conception of the message is to be found in the circumstance that Mr. Piddington, to prevent him from guessing the real point of it, had, on Jan. 16, highly recommended cross-correspondences of the simple type. Myers_P had, in this way, been led to regard them with increased interest; *vide* Rector's remark on Jan. 22 (*Proc.*, Vol. XXII., p. 231): "Myers is specially interested in taking messages."

³ Cf. p. 155, note.

M. I referred also to Browning again.

Mr. P. Do you remember what your exact reference to Browning was?

M. Yes. I referred to Hope and Browning. I also said Star.

He was interrupted here, but before departing said: "Meanwhile look out for Hope Star and Browning."

In the sittings of Feb. 27 and March 6 it became evident that *Erangelical* was a mistake for *Evelyn*, this name together with *Hope* being the title of one of Browning's poems, while *Star* referred to another, *My Star*; but of course it was impossible to suspect this at that time. Mr. Piddington found in Mrs. Verrall's script of Jan. 28 both *Star* (Aster) and, among divers quotations from Browning, the line "the hope that leaves the earth for the sky," where *hope* had been substituted for "passion", and by means of this substitution, perhaps, the more emphasised. So on the following day he told Myers_P that "the message he said he gave to Mrs. Verrall about Browning, Star and Hope" had come out clearly. Myers_P was very pleased to hear this, and it will be seen that afterwards he felt sure that *Evelyn Hope* and *My Star* had appeared in a script of Mrs. Verrall's.

About a week after this incident, on Feb. 20, Myers_P made his first attempt to reply to the Latin message. It was with extremely different preconceptions that he and Mr. Piddington came together on this day—Mr. Piddington filled with the idea that the message had already been answered; Myers_P hesitating, conscious that his understanding of it was incomplete.¹ As might be expected, the result was small. Myers_P began:² "The idea I got was that I should be a messenger and hand through [i.e. *committere*] coherent messages [i.e. *invicem inter se respondentia*] to you"; but as Mr. Piddington remained silent—only asking for repetition of an illegible word—he interrupted himself and said: "I will go over my utterances again and repeat them here to you." This it was agreed upon should be done a week later.

¹See his utterances on Feb. 11: "I will let you know at our next meeting how far I have understood"; and on Feb. 27: "As far as I could understand, and I may have to think it over again . . ."

²Of course I must abbreviate the extracts, skipping repetitions and the like; but I trust that the reader will find I have omitted nothing that has any bearing upon the question.

And this time he is determined to give his opinion. On the whole, it is characteristic of the Latin message case that the trance-personality, when at a standstill, far from making guesses or feeling his way, simply defers his answer to a later sitting, and in the mean time seems to go on with his own train of thought. On Feb. 27 Myers_P, on meeting Mr. Piddington, immediately reverts to the question. Assuming as before that it is *he* who is the *internuntius* of the message, he gives the following version of its beginning: "Although you as intermediary have long since united mutually ideas, you fail," continuing without reference to the actual words: "to convince us of your existence." *Jamdudum* has here found its place as "long since", and "united mutually ideas" shows better than the earlier translation—"coherent messages"—that *invicem interesse respondentia* has been comprehended. *Quod* has been taken to mean "although"; "you fail" is a mistake, caused probably by the Latin word *fallit*: a mistake, however, which is the outcome of a most logical reasoning. Myers_P has no knowledge of the plan about the third medium, and, therefore, must believe that it is a simple cross-correspondence he "as intermediary" is asked to bring about; this is what he has "long since" done; accordingly, something must be wrong with his former experiments. How necessary it is for him to state things logically is seen from the paraphrase of the same sentence he on May 27 gives to Sir Oliver Lodge. Then he has long ago understood that the message contained no blame against him; so he gives the beginning of it in the following words: "You have long since been *trying* to assimilate ideas." It is "failed" in disguise—indispensable if the want of a new cross-correspondence should be properly explained.

This much for the translation. Even Mr. Podmore admits that it would be impossible to give it without some knowledge of Latin. The mistake of it—the belief of Myers_P that his performances were thought unconvincing—was, however, destined to have far-reaching consequences. It led him to mention a few of these performances, and among them Browning's poems *Evelyn Hope* and *My Star*. The importance of this will appear from an extract of the conversation held on Feb. 27 between himself and Mr. Piddington. Myers_P has given his "translation" and continues:

Now I believe that since you sent this message to me I have sufficiently replied to your various questions to convince the ordinary scientific mind that I am at least a fragment of the once incarnate individual whom you called Myers.

Mr. P. You say you have replied. Tell me in what messages your reply is given.

M. In my messages reported here and through Mrs. Verrall. The poems, the Halcyon days, Evangelic. . . .

Mr. Tell me what poems.

M. Chiefly Browning's lines as given through Mrs. Verrall.

Mr. P. Thank you very much. I think you are making it clear; but I want you to make it completely clear. I think if you can get through a clear and complete answer to my Latin message you will have forged a new and strong link in the claim of evidence for survival of bodily death.

M. I understood that you asked me to reply referring to my utterances through Mrs. Verrall.

Mr. P. Now I think you have done enough for to-day in the matter of replying to the Latin message.

Myers_p then asked for the last sentence of the Latin to be repeated, which was done. Afterwards Mr. Piddington said:

I want to say that you have, I believe, given an answer worthy of your intelligence—not to-day, I mean, but some time back—but the interpretation must not be mine. *You* must explain your answer at this light.

M. Yes.

Mr. P. You could do it in two words.

M. Yes, I understand.

Mr. P. Well?

M. Hope Star.

Mr. P. Well? Yes?

M. Browning.

Mr. P. Exactly. It couldn't be better.

M. That is my answer.

Mr. P. I can't thank you enough. That is what I have been waiting for.

M. Well what I wished was to translate the whole message for you into English. But from your kindness in replying to my request in repeating the whole of the last sentence so

that each word reached my understanding clearly and concisely I am able with Pelham's help to reply to-day.

Mr. P. Translate into English certainly, if you like. . . . In telling me that "Browning, Hope and a Star" contains your answer to the Latin message you have given an answer which to me is both intelligible and clear; but still I should like you to bring out one more point still, so as to leave no doubt in any one's mind of your meaning.

M. My Star. Evely. . . . I am too [weak] to tell it to-day. My thoughts wander. . . .

Seen in the light of later developments, it will probably be clear to all readers that Mr. Piddington and Myers_P have spoken of quite different things. Myers_P does not mean that he has answered the Latin message, but mentions his replies to Mr. Piddington's *various questions* and the cross-correspondences between Mrs. Piper and Mrs. Verrall as performances that are not quite despicable. When in the midst of this Mr. Piddington reverts to the Latin message, he doesn't seem to comprehend why the conversation has been turned that way, but says with some astonishment: "I understood that you asked me to reply referring to my utterances through Mrs. Verrall," *i.e.* to the cross-correspondences. And beginning now to suspect that Mr. Piddington is speaking of something he doesn't understand, he asks for a repetition of the last sentence of the message. Afterwards Mr. Piddington praises him for the reply already given, but adds that he must explain it through Mrs. Piper. Myers_P tries to escape with a vague "Yes," but Mr. Piddington continues: "You could do it in two words." It is fatal, but not to be wondered at, that Myers_P believes that Mr. Piddington has in mind the two words of the cross-correspondence that has formerly been spoken of as a great success—*Hope* and *Star*. Evidently he is unable to understand his enthusiasm on receiving them,¹ and quite at a loss when asked to "bring out one more point." He

¹At this point he offers to reply, then and there, remarking that the whole of the last sentence has now reached his understanding, thus implying that he has not understood it before. As his offer is not accepted, it is impossible to conjecture what and how much he has really grasped. To judge from later sittings, and from the manner in which the *first* sentence was received, it has been fragments only (cf. p. 169, note 1).

makes a feeble attempt to explain, faltering out at last the real titles of the two poems, and leaves the matter there for the time being.

As usual Myers_P apparently does some thinking before he goes to another meeting. Meanwhile, I want to point out how strongly the view taken above is confirmed by the conversation, on March 6, between Mr. Piddington and the trance-personality "George Pelham", who seems determined to throw a little light upon the case. "Did he [*i.e.* Myers] tell you about My Star?" he asks. "He did," Mr. Piddington replies; "can you explain about My Star?" "Yes it was a poem he had on his mind of Browning's." "And why had he this poem on his mind?" "He said because it was one of his test experiments with a lady in the body to whom he refers as V. He also had another: Evelyn—Evelyn Hope." "Is that the explanation of the word which came out here as Evangelical?" "Yes."

Nothing could be clearer. Afterwards George Pelham repeats the "translation" given by Myers_P of the beginning of the message, adding to it as follows: "Now if you can give a clear message through Mrs. V. and reproduce it here it will convince." A little later he says: "And the answer was that he had given a message, viz. Browning Star Hope, and reproduced it *here*." This is what George Pelham feels justified in concluding from the sitting of Feb. 27 where Mr. Piddington had praised Myers_P for his answer through Mrs. Verrall, and afterwards warmly thanked him for the repetition of the three words. Mr. Piddington replies: "You show a general knowledge of the meaning of the message; but one special point you have not brought out. The answer he gave to Mrs. Verrall was clever and characteristic; but though he has referred to that here, he has not made it clear *here* why it was so appropriate."

In these words Mr. Piddington has confirmed the conception of the Latin message as referring to cross-correspondence between Mrs. Verrall and Mrs. Piper; he has stated that he believes it to have been answered through Mrs. Verrall and a reference to this answer to be contained in the words *Hope, Star* and *Browning*. From this moment the actual message has lost all importance. George Pelham, on asking for a repetition of

the "lines in Latin" which referred to the "special point", got the last sentence spelt out; but it is evident that small use was made of the fragments which eventually came through,¹—the trance-personalities taking it for granted that they contained much the same as Mr. Piddington's own utterances. What in this way was put into them may be seen from the version Myers_P, on May 27, gave of the message to Sir Oliver Lodge; "he [Mr. Piddington] mentioned my own words in it," he says, "viz. the survival of bodily death"; this expression from the title of Frederic Myers's great work had been used by Mr. Piddington on Feb. 27 in connection with the message.²

Thus Myers_P never got to know what Mr. Piddington had really wanted him to do. A new direction was given to the experiment, and Myers_P had got a quite new task before him. After the sitting of Feb. 27, and still more after George Pelham's conversation with Mr. Piddington, he could not help seeing that the latter, when speaking of "Hope Star Browning", had meant something different from what he had himself done. When George Pelham had left, Rector says: "I understand it was a cross-correspondence message and to her [Mrs. Verrall] he gave the same words that I brought out here"; and Myers_P adds: "it was the poem in which Hope and Star came out," thus showing that he no longer thinks that Mr. Piddington had referred to the two poems which had been the subjects of his own experiments, but has begun to comprehend that Mrs. Verrall's script contained another Browning poem about *hope* and *star*.

A question which here presents itself is that of the relation of Myers_P to the script of Mrs. Verrall. It is a question, however, that can only be answered through the solving of the larger problem—that of the identity of Myers_P. Here it must suffice to say that Myers_P himself claims to take a part in the production of the script, and that his claim is supported by the knowledge of it which he no doubt displays. How far it is probable that he can have acquired this knowledge in other ways—by mind-reading or through the utterances of the experimenters—the study of the case itself must show. Provisionally it must be allowable to adopt the first alternative.

¹ *U.* p. 169, note 1.

² *U.* p. 154.

But, even if we suppose that part of Mrs. Verrall's script is due to impressions received from the personality who claims to be Myers, he could not know for certain whether those impressions came really through; "I am very pleased to hear that she fully registered the thoughts I indubitably gave her," he says once, when told of a success.¹ And no doubt he might in the course of time forget some of his attempts. In the present case, it must be remembered that no script of Mrs. Verrall had for Myers_p the importance which Mr. Piddington ascribed to one of them—that of being the *answer* to the Latin message. Neither could it be of much help to him to have learned that *Hope* and *Star* played a part in the poem, if he had not thought specially of these words when he gave it.

With *Browning*, however, it was quite different. There is every reason to believe that the Latin message had made Myers_p think of Browning, as he himself says later. The message had made him realise his position as an intermediary between two worlds; such a thought might well have filled his mind with recollections of words and lines from this poet that speak of earth and heaven and the intercourse between them, and induced him to attempt to bring them out in a script of Mrs. Verrall's. Such a script had been produced; and he seems to know of its existence even if he could have only a general notion of its contents.

The script is that of Jan. 28, 1907, spoken of above, and runs as follows:

Aster [star]

τερας [wonder]

the world's wonder

And all a wonder and a wild desire.

The very wings of her

A WINGED DESIRE

ὑπόπτερος ἔρως [winged love]

Then there is Blake

and mocked my loss of liberty.

But it is all the same thing— the winged desire ἔρως ποθεινός
[passion] the hope that leaves the earth for the sky—Abt

¹ *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., p. 55.

I have tried to trace the thoughts of Myers_p after the sitting of Feb. 27. But of course he couldn't at once feel certain that he was on the right track. When on March 13 Mr. Piddington asked for a clear answer, he said openly: "I think I can get your idea and when it is quite clear to me I shall give my answer. I believe I get a glimmer of what you wish." At this time he is groping his way, so to speak. At the beginning of the sitting he himself had introduced the question, saying: "I understood your reference to the poem in your Latin message to me which led me to refer to Browning, and the circle gave me a better understanding of it, as it came to me through this light. I helped Mrs. Verrall to draw it." As Mr. Piddington did not understand this utterance, Myers_p added: "Re-read the part where you refer to the poem," and, Mr. Piddington now denying that the message referred to a poem, he continued: "Not exactly to a poem, but it suggested a poem to my mind. Hence B H S etc." With this correction the utterance may be taken to mean: "I understood your reference to *another life* [*i.e.* to 'messenger'] in the message which [reference] led me to refer to Browning; as this reference came to me through Mrs. Piper [*i.e.* through the mention of 'Survival'] the remembrance of the circle [*i.e.* of the script of Jan. 28] made me understand it." Later in the sitting Mr. Piddington asked him to make it clear why the passage given to Mrs. Verrall and described through Mrs. Piper as "Browning, Hope and Star" furnished an excellent answer to the message. Mr. Piddington himself points out that he ought not to have said "the passage", as the line about the star was not quoted in Mrs. Verrall's script; at all events Myers_p must needs take it to mean the *poem*. "Poem?" he asked, "I understand she [Mrs. Verrall] got it in my answer, but I did not give it here; is that what you say?" This is a concise statement of his view of the case: he has given through Mrs. Verrall quotations from a poem or the title of a poem which he has not given through Mrs. Piper. What he now wants is to have the correctness of this conception confirmed. When Mr. Piddington asks him to give "a detailed reference to a particular passage," he answers vaguely: "Oh yes I understand," and the sentence is altered to: "I want you to give more details through this light." This at last is something he can understand. It is with evident joy that he

answers: "I see now what you wish me to [do]: repeat or give more words perhaps. I understand and will go over it and do so. I for the first time clearly understand your special point¹. You have at last made me understand, I am glad to say." This is his last meeting with Mr. Piddington, but he has now got a firm basis to stand upon. It seems clear to him that one of the *Browning* poems referring to another life—*i.e.* to hope of Survival—which he, impressed by the thought of being an intermediary, has quoted through Mrs. Verrall—a poem about stars, too—has been taken by Mr. Piddington to be a direct answer to the message, and that by showing his knowledge of it, by "repeating or giving more words perhaps," he can complete the cross-correspondence message wanted from him.²

At the first sitting, on March 20, with Mrs. Sidgwick, who had taken the place of Mr. Piddington, Myers_P displays great eagerness to get his view confirmed by the new leader of the

¹ This expression dates from the conversation with George Pelham (*v.* p. 150).

² A curious mistake occurred at the sitting of March 13, Myers_P transferring to the Hope-Star-incident a number of details belonging to another case. On Feb. 12 Mr. Piddington, after telling him that "Browning, Star and Hope" had come out in Mrs. Verrall's script, added that he had succeeded besides in getting through a communication which he himself had denied having seen, but which Myers_P had asserted he had given together with his own name; it referred to a conversation between the late Mr. Myers and Mrs. Sidgwick. A few days before, on Feb. 5, Myers_P had been in a great hurry; Rector explained that he was going to give a message to Mrs. Verrall. On Feb. 11 Myers_P connected this hurry with the above-mentioned script where his name was given—as a matter of fact this script was produced on Feb. 4, but this mistake is of no account here—saying to Mr. Piddington: "Did I not tell you I would go to Mrs. Verrall? Did I not refer to that?" On the next day Mr. Piddington excused his own mistake, and with great pleasure acknowledged that Myers_P had given the communication and signed it with his name; Myers_P was very glad at having succeeded. Later, however, he confused the two things he had been praised for on Feb. 12. When on March 13 he is trying to recollect the script of Jan. 28 and of the circle he says: "I helped Mrs. Verrall to draw it," and adds: "and signed my name to it," and afterwards: "It [the Latin message] suggested it [the poem] so strongly I rushed off to Mrs. Verrall, gave it her, rushed back here and although you did not understand it at the time, you did *later*, if I remember rightly"; all three circumstances—the signing of the name, the hurrying from one medium to another, Mr. Piddington's not having understood at first—being transferred from one successful case to the other. Mr. Piddington's answer: "Yes that is quite right" confirmed him in his mistake, and on April 8 the hurrying from Mrs. Piper to Mrs. Verrall once more was connected with the writing of the poem.

experiment. He immediately begins: "I told Mrs. Verrall about Browning, hope of [survival of] bodily death. . . . No not quite understood. I said I told her of the passage in Browning's poems where stars and life meet." "Stars and life" is at a later sitting repeated as "*this* life and the stars"; accordingly life means *life after death*; "hope of bodily death" is probably abandoned on account of the words omitted; in any case the expression shows how Myers_p had combined *Hope* with his own idea of the point of the message. He goes on asking Mrs. Sidgwick whether she knows which poem he had referred to: "You remember Browning's poem I was fond of and to which I referred?" "You remember the poem I referred to, do you not?" and as she answered vaguely: "Yes you referred to poems of Browning": "But you do understand which one?" It is evident that he wants to be sure of its being one special poem Mr. Piddington is thinking of. Of course he doesn't ask her what poem it is. On the contrary, he puts the question almost as if he himself knew the name of it; his uncertainty on this point he must prefer to conceal while he is still searching his memory for the answer.

Mrs. Sidgwick's replies to the utterances of Myers_p, on March 20, had been too vague to help him. But for the sitting of April 2 Mr. Piddington had furnished her with two written questions to be answered by him, of which the first gave him the assurance that he wanted. "Mr. Piddington says," Mrs. Sidgwick read, "you promised to try to tell us what particular poem of Browning's you meant to refer to by the words Browning, Hope and Star." Myers_p replied: "Oh yes. I am glad you remind me of this so clearly. I will answer this at our next meeting. Meanwhile I will think it over." The simple question had confirmed him in his opinion and held no disturbing elements like those which had confused him before; so, leaving aside the second question which referred to "the passage", he on the very next occasion when Mrs. Sidgwick was present alone, on April 8, made his first attempt to answer about "the poem".

His answer was that it was Browning's poem *La Saisiaz* the message had made him think of. "Do you remember the Latin message?" he began; "I thought I could tell you that I specially thought of the poem about the stars which read thus," afterwards describing it in a manner that sufficiently

shows what he is thinking of: "one of Browning's poems which he wrote to a friend," "lonely wandering," "which had also hope." This long poem, as will be remembered, has for its sole subject the possibility of another life; ending with a vision of *Hope*, whose arrow pierces the cloud of doubt. Myers_P, however, was far from sure of having found the right poem; "I *thought* I could tell you" is indicative of his uncertainty; "specially" shows that he had thought of more than one. And of course Mrs. Sidgwick's surprise must add to his doubts. So at the sitting of April 17, though in no way trying to cover up his mistake—on the contrary spontaneously reverting to *La Saisiaz*, and this time succeeding in giving the name—he has evidently ceased to regard it as *the* poem and is once more searching his memory. But it will be seen what significance this attempt has even through being a failure. *Abt Vogler* Myers_P *might* have got by mind-reading; *La Saisiaz* cannot be thus explained, while it is easily accounted for on the supposition here adopted.

Probably Myers_P has thought of other possibilities,¹ which are, however, now rejected, as at this point he has found the poem—*Abt Vogler*. At last it has come to his memory, and on April 24 he succeeds in getting through the difficult German name. That he is right now he has not the slightest doubt; Mrs. Sidgwick's thanks tell him so, but he is also himself fully satisfied; for even this poem, which he can now be certain of having quoted through Mrs. Verrall, more than anything expresses the idea that for him has been the central thought of the message. "The thing which impressed me

¹I cannot help believing that Myers_P has thought of the sentence "A cloudless sky *beyond the horizon*" as possibly belonging to Mrs. Verrall's script of Jan. 28. On March 6 it is connected with the circle; on April 10—after the attempt with *La Saisiaz* on April 8—it is mentioned again; on April 15 Myers_P says that "it was brought to his mind because of Piddington's message," and on April 17 he explains: "it came out I believe with a star being drawn (*v. p.* 168) . . . horizon yes which comes from the poem." Before April 24, however, he has seen that this was a mistake: *horizon* does not belong to Mrs. Verrall's script with the poem. The sitting of that day begins with Hodgson_P asking if "horizon" did not come out at Mrs. Verrall's *later* than the lines of Browning's poem; and when afterwards Myers_P happens to say "Hope Star Horizon," he immediately corrects himself, saying: "Horizon comes elsewhere," and asking Mrs. Sidgwick to excuse the confusion. Later he doesn't return to the Horizon-sentence, having now found *Abt Vogler*.

most was the lines beyond the grave," he goes on when he has got the name through and expressed his joy; he would have added something, but, as implied by Rector and confirmed at a later sitting, some words are left out here. Afterwards he—as Rector has it—"tries to explain a little about the poem," speaking of the resemblance between his own experience and Abt Vogler's "doubts and fears, then his acceptance of God and faith in him."¹ Now he believes himself to have performed his task, and asks: "Now can I do more to help you than give other messages?" But Mrs. Sidgwick, who has not got the explanation of his choice of the poem expected by Mr. Piddington, answers: "I should like you to say exactly why that poem was so appropriate as an answer to the Latin message." Myers_P repeats: "Because of the appropriate conditions mentioned in it which applied to my own life; and nothing I could think of so completely answered it to my mind as those special words." That he is speaking of the words "beyond the grave" and the lines left out by Rector is made clear in the following sittings. It is Abt Vogler's faith in a future life he has thought of and, above all, the lines about the dead who return to earth!

Mrs. Sidgwick got no other reply that time; but Myers_P did not forget that at the end of the sitting she had seemed less content than when he had first spoken of *Abt Vogler*. So when he met with her again, on May 1, he at once began: "I am anxious to-day to clear one or two things. Do you remember my reference to the poem? Did you wish to ask anything more? Do you remember when I said I had passed through my body and returned? I tried to give it clearly, but was not sure that you understood." And as Mrs. Sidgwick asks: "Do you mean you gave the name of the poem?" he goes on: "Oh yes. I mean I tried to give another part also which referred to completed happiness in this life and the possibility of returning to the old world again to prove the truth of survival of bodily death." All that the message has meant to him is given in this single sentence. But he feels the absence of sympathy and says entreatingly: "Mrs. Sidgwick, dear old friend, do you hear me at all?" "Yes," she answers, "and I think I shall understand." He makes a last effort,

¹*Abt Vogler*, Stanza IX.

exclaiming: "I believe you will when I tell you I have returned to breathe in the old world which is not however better than our new."¹

This time he believes himself to have answered completely; no lack of enthusiasm on the part of the experimenters can make him doubt the sufficiency of this response. So at the next meeting, on May 6, it is not he who reverts to the message; on the contrary, he says *à propos* of another question: "and the Latin I have previously answered through both lights sufficiently for you to understand that I have really answered at last." When Mrs. Sidgwick replies: "The Latin message, as you know, refers to cross-correspondences, but also to something more, and there is a line in *Abt Vogler* which we think you had in your mind as describing that something more," he at first doesn't understand. "Did you say line?" he asks; "[of the] poem?" He has ceased to think of it now and is unprepared to return to it. "I remember the message as referring to my giving proofs of survival of bodily death through cross-correspondence messages... I could not help thinking of Browning." Only after a time he is able to repeat his former reply,—that the point where the poem suggested itself to him was this: "those who passed beyond do return, those beyond mortal vision."² This and no other is the central point to him; the message asked him to prove the survival of bodily death; he had done so by returning as a messenger from the life beyond.

And what a faithful and untiring messenger he is! Before the sitting of the next day he has meditated upon Mrs. Sidgwick's words and comprehended that he cannot yet have done all that was wanted of him. And, certainly, there is one thing which in his eagerness to explain his choice of *Abt Vogler* he has in the later sittings quite lost sight of: the

¹ *Abt Vogler*, Stanza v. : "The wonderful Dead who have passed through the body and gone, but were back once more to breathe in an old world worth their new."

² Afterwards Mrs. Sidgwick, who did not recognise the quotation, suggested that it might apply to another question,—that of the Horace Ode. Myers accepted her suggestion; but he had not before given the slightest hint of so applying it, and his compliance can in no way alter the main fact,—that the lines about the return of the dead were quoted—in two sittings, moreover—in answer to the Latin message.

Star. Of course it had been clear to him that the Hope-Star-poem must in some way be connected with stars; at the first sittings with Mrs. Sidgwick he had described it as referring to life after death *and* stars; in *La Saisiaz* he had unsuccessfully tried to introduce them ("poem about the stars,"¹ "which he wrote to a friend about star and hope"), and as to *Abt Vogler*, he once mentions "his questioning and the answer through his seeing a star"; it is only a passing remark, but the mistake—which is not at all like Myers_P—may be due to the idea of a star as part of the poem. But the star had another significance for him, which appears for the first time at the sitting of April 8 when he tried to give *La Saisiaz* as the poem of Mrs. Verrall's script. He had done his best to explain that he spoke about the poem that was his answer to the Latin message. He strove to make clear which script he was referring to. "I made a circle," he said, "as it suggested it to my mind," and immediately added: "I then drew or tried to draw a star yes through the other light [*i.e.* Mrs. Verrall] and I did so so you would understand that I understood the message. . . . I drew it so you would understand that I did it. Also a crescent." He has here spoken of three different figures. To understand this it will be necessary to revert to an incident slightly referred to before² which had preceded the production of Mrs. Verrall's script of Jan. 28.

On Jan. 16 Mr. Piddington had spoken to Myers_P as follows³:

"Myers, when you send a message to, say, Mrs. Verrall, and then a similar message to Mrs. Holland, could you not mark each with some simple but distinctive sign—say, a triangle within a circle?"

Myers_P had replied:

"I think I understand. You wish me to make a sign when giving a word at Mrs. Verrall's also at Mrs. Holland's, the same sign."

¹I should think, however, that some of the *Stars* are due to Rector's inability to grasp the name *Saisiaz*. Once, on April 8, the script has *S'tars*, and Rector answers "Yes" when Mrs. Sidgwick asks whether it is *Stars*, but Myers_P exclaims: "I wish you could hear what I am saying," which points to the answer being wrong. On April 17 the script has *Siazies*, and afterwards: "To the Stars. *Siacriez*."

²*V.* p. 159.

³*Proc.*, Vol. XXII., p. 36.

It will be seen that Myers_p had comprehended that the triangle within a circle was mentioned only by way of exemplification; that this was also the case with the mediums he is sure to have understood, although not clearly stating it. And in the following time he seems to have made several attempts to carry out the idea. It is true that the drawing in Mrs. Verrall's script of Jan. 28 is used as an illustration to the quotation from *Abt Vogler*, which correctly runs: "On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven a perfect round." But the thought of thus illustrating it may have come to his mind through Mr. Piddington mentioning the figure; when on March 6 he speaks to him of his attempt to draw a triangle within a circle he adds: "as you suggested"; thus he seems to have made a double use of it.¹

From the beginning, however, Myers_p seems to have preferred another sign. Mrs. Verrall herself never drew a star; but her script of Jan. 28 begins with the words *Star Sign*; on Feb. 6 she writes "five pointed star"; Miss Verrall's script of Feb. 3 has the following words and figures:


the crescent moon

remember that



and the star

and that of Feb. 17:



that was the sign she will understand

when she sees it.

Imperfect as they are, in view of his later utterances these seem attempts to carry out Mr. Piddington's plan. But he seems to have thought of the crescent as another sign; thus he makes the mistake of connecting it with the star when on April 8 he for the first time mentions this figure, though the crescent

¹On March 13 he mentions the circle as "a connecting link"; on April 8 he says: "I made a circle, as it [*i.e.* the message] suggested it to my mind."

has no place in the script of Jan. 28. The parallel use, however, of the two words confirms the conception that on this occasion the star too is mentioned as a sign only.

Returning, then, to the sitting of April 8, it is clear that Myers_P had called attention to the star as a sign used by him to make it understood that it was he who impressed Mrs. Verrall when "the poem" was quoted ("so you would understand that I did it," *i.e.* wrote it). Evidently he didn't know that on that occasion no star was drawn, but only the word *aster* written, and Mrs. Sidgwick's answer: "Yes, there was a star drawn," confirmed him in his opinion. Thence onwards he unhesitatingly connects the star with the script of "the poem", while the circle is no more mentioned. On April 24, immediately before his efforts to give the name *Abt Vogler*, a star is drawn and he exclaims: "I remembered Vol [*i.e.* Vogler] as it [the star] came to my memory." But it is as the *sign* that it makes him recollect *Abt Vogler*. When he quotes from the poem, it is no star but the return of the dead that fills his thoughts.

Mrs. Sidgwick, however, has not been satisfied with his quotations; she has asked for *a line* which is not among them. Then he remembers the star which of course must not be wanting in the Hope-Star-poem. And he succeeds in recalling a line about a star. It is not among those which have impressed him; indeed his remembrance of it is faint. But its significance, he believes, is that of referring to the *sign*. So he strives to reproduce it at the sitting of May 7. A star is drawn, and alluding to another line from *Abt Vogler*, he says: "In my passion to reach you as clear as the sky I quote: if instead of a fourth¹ framed a star—came a star. And," he adds, "to make it clearer I drew a star. This completes my answer to the Latin message, if you have received all my words clearly. In my passion to reach you clearly I have made Rector try to draw a star for me so there can be *no mistake*. When I quoted to Mrs. Verrall I drew the star so as to make it *clearer* and I wished Rector to reproduce it in connection with the words in the line."

Thus at last Myers_P has really "completed his answer". But the message is reverted to in his very interesting dialogues with

¹ "Sound" gets through in Mrs. Piper's waking-stage and later.

Sir Oliver Lodge on May 27 and June 2, 1907. In the former he explains that Mr. Piddington had wished him to prove conclusively the survival of bodily death by giving a message through Mrs. Verrall and Mrs. Piper concerning the same subject; the message had suggested Browning to him, and from its last sentence¹ he had got: "Instead of a fourth sound came a star." At the sitting of June 2 he is more explicit, and though it will be seen that he is unable to reproduce the message so as to give a meaning to it, at the same time a clear light is thrown upon the development of his own conception of it.

He begins by saying that Mr. Piddington had said: "If you will give me a message, not a message really but a sign of some kind through the lights, corresponding message which I cannot mistake, I shall consider it the greatest proof of your survival of bodily death," adding: "Hence my reason for drawing a star." But he seems to discover that he has here confused the message with Mr. Piddington's request to him about the sign (on Jan. 16); so he reverts to the beginning, giving a fairly correct translation of the first Latin words. "The message in Latin was this," he says. "For a long time you have been assimilating ideas one with another through different lights,² but what is most important of all if to prove the survival of bodily death is for you to give in a certain way a sign." He perceives that he is on the wrong track once more and alters the last sentence: "But what we want is for you to give us proof in such a way as to make your proof conclusive."

No, he cannot make it clear! So he leaves aside the message and describes the experiment from his own point of view: "I wish you would follow me now for a moment. Remember when Piddington gave me his message the special point in it was

¹ Of course Myers_P must connect "the line" with the last part of the message. From the sittings of April 17 and May 27 it is seen that he had caught at least some words from the last sentence: nullus—appareat—perficias—illud—prioribus; probably he had taken them to mean that he should *make apparent* and *complete* more than in former messages. *Complete* is a word he often makes use of in connection with the Latin message.

² Here for the first time Myers_P has correctly translated the words *diversis internuntiis*; this part of the message—the only one which had really come through before Mr. Piddington's idea gave a new direction to the experiment—he has thus been able to understand completely, though he did not succeed in doing so at once.

for me to give definite proof through both lights. The first thought I had was to repeat a few words or lines of Browning's poem, but in order to make it still more definite I registered a star, and the lines I quoted to you before [on May 27] were the most appropriate I could find." Here in a few words Myers_p gives the outlines of the whole experiment from the moment, on March 13, when he had said that he for the first time clearly understood what Mr. Piddington wished him to do: "to repeat or give more words of Browning's poem." Ever since he had tried to do this; with the words from *Abt Vogler* about the returning dead he had believed that he had solved the problem. Perceiving that more was wanted he had drawn the star and quoted "the line," not knowing what Mr. Piddington had seen in it and not having thought of it before. To the last his recollection of it is imperfect.

It is true, then, that Myers_p has neither understood nor replied to the Latin message. But had he not performed a greater task? He had found a meaning where an ingenious but unfounded idea had brought confusion; he had clung to his own thought in spite of all discouragement; he had in a beautiful manner illustrated his understanding of the message, such as it was. Naturally he must believe that it *had* a meaning; the incongruities he explained through the difficulties of the transmission.¹ Thus it became possible that in his own way, though of course guided by the sympathy or want of it with which his words were received, he could obtain a result that satisfied both himself and the experimenters. His identity may be questioned; his intelligence seems to me indisputable.

¹Of course Rector was made responsible; "I *did* have a time of it in making him understand my meaning," Myers_p says to Sir Oliver Lodge (*Proc.*, Vol. XXIII., p. 249).

NOTE ON MRS. HUDE'S PAPER.

By J. G. PIDDINGTON.

MRS. HUDE may be right in her contention that Myers_p and I were at cross-purposes over the Latin Message experiment. It was, anyhow, unfortunate that I read into Mrs. Verrall's script of Jan. 28, 1907—no matter whether justifiably or not—an answer to the Latin Message; for, whether I would or no, from Feb. 19, 1907, onwards, I could not help expecting Myers_p to confirm my interpretation of this script.

But I am dissatisfied with my conduct of this experiment for other reasons.¹

I did my best, of course, to give no hints to the trance-personalities which might help them to guess either the meaning of the Latin or the general purport of the experiment. Some of my critics say I did give hints, and so enabled the trance-personalities to score a partial success. Other critics take the view that the trance-personalities showed no signs of having understood the object of the experiment: from which it seems to follow, either that I gave no useful hints, or that, if I did, the trance-personalities did not turn them to account.

I suspect that the truth lies between these two extremes; and that, while I may have given—though quite accidentally and unintentionally—one useful hint (see *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., p. 336, footnote), more than once, in our efforts to avoid helping the trance-personalities, both Mrs. Sidgwick and I did the precise opposite and misled them.

The main error, in my opinion, lay partly in an experiment of this kind being conducted by experimenters who knew the

¹In speaking of myself only I am not forgetting Mrs. Sidgwick's share in the conduct of the experiment. But Mrs. Sidgwick hardly had a free hand. She was in the difficult position of having to carry on an experiment, for the initial stages of which I, and not she, was responsible. Consequently blame must attach to me and not to her for any faults in the experimentation.

answer required; and partly in their having to conduct it with trance-personalities, who need encouragement if they are to do their best, who are inclined to "fish," and who can *talk back*.

One learns by experience, and had I to carry out another experiment of the kind I would not do it with Mrs. Piper, but with Mrs. Holland or Mrs. Verrall, whose "communicators" can't talk back.

In dealing in such a case as this with trance-personalities like Mrs. Piper's, it is difficult for the experimenter to avoid committing one or both of two blunders: he will be likely either to "give himself away," or to mystify unfairly and so discourage the trance-personalities.

One result of conducting the Latin Message experiment under the conditions obtaining in Mrs. Piper's trance was the accumulation of a large mass of material—much of it consisting of "cross-questions and crooked answers." Of so voluminous, unwieldy, and labyrinthine a character is the material thus accumulated, that we need not be surprised if various interpretations can be placed upon it, all more or less possible. Though my own reading of the facts seems to me, on the whole, less unsatisfactory than other interpretations of them that have been offered, considering the nature of the evidence, I doubt whether the problem is ever likely to receive a convincing solution. Hence I am inclined to deprecate further discussion of the case as a whole. If it deserves further attention at all, I think that various episodes contained in it would offer a more profitable field for study.

Although I have read Mrs. Hude's paper with some degree of adhesion, I must protest against one point in it.

She makes certain phrases which I have connected with the Horace Ode Question form part of the answer given by Myers_p to the Latin Message. The phrases in question are these:

"passed out of their bodies and gone," "every peak and point" (*Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 377-378), "the possibility of returning to the old world again," "peak followed star," "I have returned to breathe in the old world which is not however better than our new" (*id. ib.*, pp. 379-380), "Those who passed beyond do return," "Passed through body and gone" (*id. ib.*, pp. 385-386).

I do not think that Mrs. Hude has paid sufficient attention

to the fact that on April 24, 1907, the Horace Ode Question was put to Myers_P for the third time, and on April 30, 1907, for the fourth time, and to the fact that before it was put the fourth time Myers_P had spontaneously announced his intention of answering it on May 1, 1907. I cannot go over all the ground in detail again; but if the reader will study carefully the relevant extracts from the Piper sittings of April 24 and 30, and May 1, 6 and 7, 1907, given in *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 376-393, and what I have to say about them on pp. 402-404 of the same volume, and in my third paper on the Horace Ode Question (see above, pp. 201 and 233-235), I believe he will not accept Mrs. Hude's interpretation, and will agree with me that Myers_P meant to connect these phrases, not with the Latin Message, but with the Horace Ode Question; and did so, not as Mrs. Hude says, in consequence of a hint given by Mrs. Sidgwick, but on his own initiative.

If Myers_P did not connect these phrases with the Horace Ode Question, or dissociate them from the Latin Message, as clearly and explicitly as could be wished, I believe that was due to the fact that Mrs. Sidgwick and Miss Johnson, as was only natural in the circumstances, were under the misapprehension all the time that these phrases, being reminiscent of *Abt Vogler*, must be meant to apply to the Latin Message. Their misapprehension tended to unsettle and perplex Myers_P somewhat; but I claim that on the whole he came successfully through the ordeal, and indicated with sufficient clearness that he meant these particular phrases to form part of his answer to the Horace Ode Question.

V.

A HITHERTO UNSUSPECTED ANSWER TO THE
HORACE ODE QUESTION.

By J. G. PIDDINGTON.

I saw the spiritual city and all her spires
 And gateways in a glory like one pearl—
 No larger, tho' the goal of all the saints—
 Strike from the sea.

Tennyson, *The Holy Grail*.

FIVE years ago a question was put to Myers^p about an Ode of Horace; and already twice (*Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 397-407, and Vol. XXIV., pp. 150-169) I have dealt with the answers to it. For returning to the subject once again I offer three excuses. First, this case, in my opinion, in spite of its complexities and in spite of the conjectural character of some parts of my interpretation of it, constitutes some of the best evidence we possess, not merely of the supernormal but also of the identity of a professing communicating spirit. Secondly, I know of no published case more difficult to explain on any hypothesis that postulates the action of living persons only to the exclusion of the dead. And thirdly, fresh light has been thrown on the whole subject by certain scripts of Mrs. Verrall's written in 1907 whose connexion with the Horace Ode test-question has until quite recently remained unsuspected. The present paper is mainly devoted to the discussion and interpretation of the new evidence furnished by these scripts; though, in order to render the new evidence intelligible, it will be necessary first to recapitulate some of the chief points of my two earlier papers.

The whole business of the Horace Ode Question was started—at least so far as the normal activities of any of us were concerned—by Mrs. Verrall's coming across on January 1,

1907, an old letter of Frederic Myers's¹ in which he had expressed himself to Dr. Verrall in the following terms:

The first 6 lines of Archytas [*i.e.* Hor. *C. i.* 28] have entered as deeply as almost any Horatian passage into my own inner history.²

The discovery of this letter led Mrs. Verrall to ask me to put the following question to Myers_P: "Which Ode of Horace entered deeply into your inner life?"; and this question I put on January 23, 1907.

No answer was given or attempted so long as I was in charge of the Piper sittings. But on April 17, 1907, Mrs. Sidgwick, who had taken my place, repeated the question,³ and Myers_P at once replied: "Oh! yes, . . . I recall the question and I had Ode to Nature on my mind, but as I thought I loved another ode better I did not reply until I could say it more clearly. Do you remember immortality [*sic*] . . . I thought I could answer."

Neither Mrs. Sidgwick nor I saw any sense in this answer. Mrs. Verrall was told nothing about it; and, as will appear later, it is all to the good that she was kept in ignorance of it.

This, however, was not the only answer.

On April 29 and May 1, 1907, Myers_P quoted, not quite correctly but recognisably, the two following passages from Browning's *Abt Vogler*:

. . . the wonderful Dead who have passed through the body
and gone,

¹When Mrs. Verrall read this letter of Myers's on January 1, 1907, she was reminded by it of the reminiscences of Hor. *C. i.* 28 in her scripts of March and April, 1901 (for which see *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 162-166, and below, pp. 171, 181, 226 and 227). That as a matter of fact her normal memory was thus stimulated is not, however, a point of much importance; for we should in any case have been bound to assume that the reading of the letter provoked a subconscious recollection of the content of these scripts.

²It should be observed, by the way, that Myers spoke, not of any purely literary or pedantic interest in the "Archytas" Ode, but of its emotional or moral influence on him.

³Mrs. Sidgwick repeated the question at my suggestion. I had written to her on April 15, 1907, as follows: "Perhaps [an answer] has been given since I left; but if not, I think it should be pressed for, not only because the question is a good one to ask, but also because reference to it might very possibly produce a spontaneous cross-correspondence with Mrs. Verrall."

But were back once more to breathe in an old world worth
their new;
and

Not a point nor peak but found and fixed its wandering star;
and on May 6, 1907, definitely connected the former, and
may be fairly said¹ to have connected the latter also by
implication, with his answer to the Horace Ode Question.²

Mrs. Sidgwick, on May 4, 1907, told Mrs. Verrall of the
allusion to these two quotations on May 1, and Mrs. Verrall
thought that the first of the two might have been used to
identify the "Archytas" Ode, which has an incidental allusion
to the reincarnation of Euphorbus as Pythagoras.

At that time Mrs. Verrall thought, and ever since she had
come across the letter to her husband had thought, and for
nearly a year to come continued to think, that it was this
allusion to reincarnation that had specially interested Frederic
Myers in the "Archytas" Ode.³ Consequently the first *Abt*
Vogler quotation seemed to her a not unpromising attempt at
identifying the Ode.

We pass on now to a year later.

On this side of the Atlantic I was at work on the Piper
records of 1906-1907, and on April 25, 1908, I interpreted
the first answer given by Myers_P, viz.: "I had Ode to Nature
on my mind. . . . Do you remember Immortality?", as mean-
ing that a poem of Frederic Myers's, entitled *Ode to Nature*,⁴
contained echoes of Hor. *C.* iii. 4,⁵ and that another poem of
his, entitled *Immortality*,⁴ contained echoes of Hor. *C.* i. 28,
the "Archytas" Ode. While I thought the connexion between
Ode to Nature and Hor. *C.* iii. 4 was merely incidental, I
argued that between *Immortality* and the "Archytas" Ode

¹ See for a summary of the facts, *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 402-403.

² In view of what follows (see pp. 204-206 below), it should be noted that in
each of these quotations from *Abt Vogler* is involved the idea of the dead
being in touch with the living, and of both mutually influencing each other.

³ This supposition of Mrs. Verrall's was clearly wrong, for Myers says in the
letter that it was "the first 6 lines" of the Ode that had entered deeply into
his inner history, and the allusion to Pythagoras does not come in these lines.

⁴ These two poems appear in *Fragments of Prose and Poetry*, pp. 127 and 172
respectively.

⁵ See *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 401-402.

there were not only incidental coincidences of expression, but also and chiefly a connexion of thought as well. Myers, I suggested, in *Immortality* was re-echoing, and, as the verbal coincidences indicated, consciously re-echoing, the gloomy presentiments about man's destiny to which Horace gives utterance in the "Archytas" Ode.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Mr. Dorr was having sittings with Mrs. Piper, and putting to Myers_P a number of questions on literary and classical subjects. In the course of answering them Myers_P, between February 25 and May 26, 1908, in a very ingenious manner¹ clearly identified the Ode which had formed the subject of the Horace Ode Question. This he did off his own bat, quite independently of any hint or help from Mr. Dorr, who did not know that any question about an Ode of Horace had ever been put to Myers_P. Moreover, Myers_P, it would seem, connected the "Archytas" Ode with those lines in the Eleventh Book of the *Odyssey* where Achilles says to Odysseus when they meet in the Under-world: "Nay, speak not comfortably to me of death. . . . Rather would I live—*ἐπάροπος*—attached to the soil (or, "above ground") as the hireling of another, than bear sway among all the dead that be departed":² words obviously in harmony with the sentiments of the "Archytas" Ode and *Immortality*, and out of harmony with those expressed in *Abt Vogler*.

We pass on now—nearly a year—to February, 1909, at which time I was working at the records of the Dorr-Piper sittings of 1908. The references which they contained to the Horace Ode I discussed in a paper entitled "A Prelude and a Sequel to the Horace Ode Question." What I called the "Prelude" was some very early scripts of Mrs. Verrall's written in 1901, a few weeks after Myers's death. Conjoined in them were quotations from the "Archytas" Ode and allusions to the words of Achilles which I have just quoted: the allusions being effected by means of the phrase *adscriptus glebae*, "bound to the soil," which is one rendering of *ἐπάροπος*.

These early scripts of Mrs. Verrall's thus seemed to fall into line not only with the Horace Ode references in Mr.

¹For details see *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 157-158.

²See *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 155-156, 159-160.

Dorr's Piper sittings of 1908, but also with the answers to the Horace Ode Question given by Myers_P in 1907,—at least with those answers as I interpreted them in February 1908, without reference to the contemporaneous Dorr sittings or to Mrs. Verrall's early scripts of 1901.

But besides the quotations from the "Archytas" Ode and the allusions to Achilles' words, there were, I suggested, in these early scripts of Mrs. Verrall's, allusions to Myers's *Immortality* and to another poem of his, called *On a Spring Morning at Sea*: a poem which was not published till 1904, and which Mrs. Verrall, to the best of her belief, never saw until it was published in *Fragments of Prose and Poetry* (p. 54).

In this latter poem Myers has prefigured the life to come in terms of the rosiest optimism, painting a picture of it as much opposed as can be to the melancholy that pervades the forebodings of Horace in the "Archytas" Ode, of Homer in the Eleventh Book of the *Odyssey*, and of Myers himself in *Immortality*.

By conjoining in these early Verrall scripts allusions to Achilles' words from the Eleventh Book of the *Odyssey*, to the "Archytas" Ode, and to the poems *Immortality* and *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, Myers_V meant, I suggested, to compare and contrast the various views about the next life represented in these various poems.

This completes the epitome of the old evidence. Before, however, I begin to discuss the new evidence, it will be convenient to show what the verbal coincidences are between *On a Spring Morning at Sea* and Mrs. Verrall's four early scripts of 1901.

COINCIDENCES BETWEEN "ON A SPRING MORNING AT SEA" AND FOUR EARLY SCRIPTS OF MRS. VERRALL'S.

In estimating what the coincidences are worth the reader must bear in mind that the four scripts all belong to the very earliest stages of Mrs. Verrall's development as an automatic writer, are spasmodic in style, and are most markedly inferior both in coherence and grammatical construction to her later scripts; and that consequently the coincidences may appear more indeterminate than they otherwise would.

The first of the four scripts has the following string of words: *Postridie* [on the morrow] *morgenstern* [morning star] *opus* [work] *rosca* [rosy] *angelica* [angelic].

The fourth script has *omnia ibi plana, omnia rosea suffusa luce vel caccis bene* [*e*]videntia oculi autem tui caligine circumfusi; which means, "There all is clear, all bathed in rosy light, plain even for the blind to see—but thine eyes are shrouded in darkness."

If in place of *opus* (meaning "work") *opabus* (meaning "opal") is read, we get five coincidences with leading words in the first five lines of the poem *On a Spring Morning at Sea*.

Thus:

"And such a sight as this is, I suppose,
Shall meet thee *on the morrow* of thy death;
And pearl to sapphire, *opal* into *rose*,
Melt in that *morn* no heart imagineth
Fair as when now *thine eyes* thou dar'st not close"

The foregoing were all the coincidences between the four scripts and the poem which I cited in my second paper on the Horace Ode Question (*Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 166-167). I had, however, discovered more coincidences than these, but refrained from publishing them in deference to the advice of Mrs. Sidgwick and Mrs. Verrall, who thought them too fanciful to gain credence, if not to be true. But the discovery of similar, though not identical, verbal coincidences between the poem and a script of Mrs. Verrall's written long before the coincidences between the poem and the four early scripts of 1901 were noticed (see pp. 185-186), emboldens me to publish here the cancelled sentences from my second paper. They ran thus:

Nor were these [*i.e.* the coincidences described above and on pp. 167-168 of *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV.] the only attempt in these four scripts to give leading words from the poem. Not without misgiving—for I am only too well aware how preposterous such an interpretation will seem to all but those who have made a close study of the peculiar mental processes exhibited in automatic writings—I venture to put forward the following suggestion: That the two Horatian quotations in the script of March 12, 1901 [quoted in full in *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., p. 163], *Splendidior vitro o fons* and *cras ingens iterabimus aequor* are the form into which the automatist rendered

three leading words from the poem, namely, "spring" and "glassy sea." The scribe, whose thoughts were at the same time occupied with an Ode of Horace's, was, I conceive, trying to impress on the automatist's mind the words "spring" (the season) and "glassy sea." The message was misinterpreted and entangled by the automatist, and emerged in the form of two Horatian quotations embodying the words *fons* (spring of water), *vitro* (glass) and *aequor* (sea).

Thus far the deleted passage. To it I now add the following points:

- (1) The conjunction of *splendidior vitro o fons* and *eras ingens iterabimus aequor* may have been suggested, or at any rate aided, by the assonance between *eras donaberis* (part of the third line of the Ode which begins *O fons Bandusiac, splendidior vitro*) and *eras . . . iterabimus*;
- (2) *Cras ingens iterabimus aequor* may have suggested itself as an appropriate quotation, because it introduces not only the word *aequor* ("sea") but also the word *eras* ("to-morrow" or "on the morrow"): both leading words in the poem;
- (3) An instance of "spring" being used equivocally, as I suggest *fons* (a spring of water) was here, occurs in Miss Verrall's script of Nov. 19, 1908, where the drawing of a mechanical spring is followed by the words "a spring—spring the season also both will serve."

The Horatian quotations, then, in the script of March 12, 1901, represent, I suggest, an attempt at three words in the following couplet of the poem:

"Ay! there some jewelled visionary *spring*
Shall charm the strange shore and the *glassy sea*."

So much for the verbal coincidences. But there is besides, I suspect, a coincidence *in subject* between *On a Spring Morning at Sea* and the four early scripts of 1901. In her report on her own script from the time of its inception to the end of 1904 (*Proc.*, Vol. XX., pp. 1-432) Mrs. Verrall writes:

There occur from time to time in the script descriptions . . . which seem to relate to a visionary dwelling place, a kind of Elysian Fields or Isles of the Blest. . . . Though the first unmistakeable description

of an "Isle of the Blest" did not appear till nearly two years after the inception of the script, there are among the quite early writings fragments which suggest that some such idea had been seeking expression earlier in the subliminal consciousness (*id. ib.*, p. 112).

As illustrations of these early fragments she then proceeds to quote and discuss her scripts of March 11, March 29, and April 27, 1901. Of this last she says :

On April 27, 1901, some one, probably myself, is reproached with having a mind too much fixed on this earth, and urged in language reminiscent of Horace's Ode to Archytas, and of Lucretius' address to Epicurus, to let the soul soar to the regions of the sky, "where all is clear, all bathed in rosy light" . . . (*id. ib.*, p. 113).

Since Mrs. Verrall included the script of April 27, 1901, in her list of scripts descriptive of some Abode of the Blest,¹ we are, I think, justified in including what for convenience' sake I have called "the four early scripts of 1901" in the same category, for the script of April 27, 1901, is one of these four, and (for reasons explained on p. 167 of *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV.) the other three unquestionably form part of a *suite* with it. Hence, since *On a Spring Morning at Sea* describes a vision of the Abode of the Blest, there is a coincidence of subject between it and the four scripts, as well as coincidence in phraseology.

The reader should, however, keep his judgement about these coincidences in suspense for the present. Further on (see pp. 185-186) I shall show that six years later two other scripts of Mrs. Verrall's, connected like those of 1901 with the "Archytas" Ode, likewise contain coincidences with *On a Spring Morning at Sea*. The fact that coincidences with the poem thus exist in two different sets of scripts, both connected with the "Archytas" Ode, increases the probability that the coincidences in both sets with *On a Spring Morning at Sea* are not accidental. I am sorry, both for my own sake and the reader's, that I have had to spend so much time over the question of these particular coincidences; but from a theoretical point of view so much depends on the character of them (*i.e.* whether they are fortuitous or purposive) that detailed discussion could hardly be avoided.

¹See also *Proc.*, Vol. XX., pp. 377-379 and 340-345.

DISCUSSION OF THE NEW EVIDENCE.

We are now free to examine and discuss the scripts of Mrs. Verrall's—five in all—which constitute the new evidence. They are reproduced below in chronological order, and, in accordance with the numbering adopted in a complete collection of Mrs. Verrall's scripts prepared for private use, are numbered respectively 136, 171, 176, 178 and 180.

I shall refer to these scripts by their numbers, as this is a far more convenient plan than reference by dates.

(136) (February 12, 1907. 11 a.m.)

The voyage of Maeldune faery lands forlorn and noises of the western sea.

thundering noises of the western sea.

It is about Merlin and Arthur's realm Merlin's prophetic vision—

'all night long

mid thundering noises of the western sea'

and how he would not go—the passing of Arthur.

And then the island valley of Avilion

where blows not any wind none nor ever falls the least light—
no not that but you have the sense

there falls no rain nor snow nor any breath of wind shakes the
least leaf.

I will try to get the idea elsewhere conveyed—but it is hard and
I know I have failed before.

Why will you not put the signature?

Surely you know now that it is not you.

F.W.H.M.

(171) (April 29, 1907.)

Victor in Poesy Victor in Romance
and Lord of Human Tears—

think of the phrase 'fine flower of poesy'—and again 'posy of
a ring'—pro patria [for fatherland] is written on a circle, not I
think a ring. But I mean a wider thing, a universal country, the
mother of us all,

Not 'O fair city of Cecrops,'
but Oh fair city of God.

That gives one clue—I have long wanted to say that—I tried before— I spoke of Athens, but you did not complete.

Golden City of God. The city of Cecrops is violet and hoary—look back at that. The Universal City is all colours and no colour, but best described as a golden G L E A M.

(176) (May 7, 1907.)

Nec non tibi etsi ceteris.


[To you if not to others.]

Write in a small regular hand without ever taking the pencil off the paper. It makes it easier to keep the attention to the immediate subject of communication.

But you cannot work like that.

Spires of flame like the tops of cypress trees,

cypress tops against a pearly sky no movement. It is the sky of early morning but there is no sun. There is a building and a tower on the left, white faintly white but the colours are hardly visible



Dance

with dances and delight.

That is different altogether.

May 13 thirteen has been given you for a date.

Tell Helen to try for the answer then—and after that you shld [*sic*] write no more till we give the word.

(178) (May 13, 1907.)

ε^ο and αιολος [gleaming] and ιάλλειν [to brandish].

There is some play upon those words.

The gleaming light.

The light that gleamed on sea and shore

The light that never was on sea or shore

Ask about the pearl pearl I think—the pearly light of dawn,
in orient pearl in pearly contours lost

The gates of pearl

No you do not get it quite right.

It should be about the dawn, a dawn of pearl,

pearl and mother of pearl gives the idea—and all the glow of the Orient in their opalescent radiance of soft light.

(180) (June 24, 1907. 10.45 p.m.)

Regina vespertino cruore omnes tentavit vias nusquam invenit.
[The queen with bloodshed at evening tried all the ways, but nowhere found one]

They keep the even tenor of their way—

Drops was to be written

pearly drops

like liquid pearls dissolved in sparkling cup

By the swarthy queen of Egypt

I am dying Egypt, dying

And so take up the tale—

Antony and Cleopatra.

THE CONNEXION BETWEEN 176 AND 178.

In discussing and collating these five scripts, I think it will be best not to adhere to chronological order, but to take first 176 and 178.

176 has "a pearly sky . . . the sky of early morning"; while 178 has "the pearly light of dawn . . . It should be about the dawn, a dawn of pearl."

176 has "there is no sun," while 178 has "the gates of pearl." These two phrases seem to be reminiscent of the following passages from the *Revelation of St. John the Divine*:

And the twelve gates were twelve pearls; every several gate was of one pearl. . . . And the city had no need of the sun . . . to shine in it: for the glory of God did lighten it. *Rev.* xxi. 21, 23.

They need no candle, neither light of the sun; for the Lord God giveth them light.¹ *id.* xxii. 5.

Another sign of connexion between these two scripts is that in 176 the automatist is reminded of an injunction given in a previous script (that of May 1, 1907) to write on May 13, the date of 178.²

Then both 176 and 178 contain several words and phrases, either identical with, or closely corresponding to, words and phrases in Myers's poem *On a Spring Morning at Sea*.³ Thus:

<i>Scripts.</i>	<i>Poem.</i>
"Pearly sky no movement" (176)	"And <i>pearl</i> to sapphire, <i>opal</i> into rose, <i>Melt</i> in that <i>morn</i> "
"It is the sky of early morning" (176)	"the strange <i>shore</i> and the glassy <i>sea</i> "
"a dawn of pearl" (178)	"the <i>heaven's repose</i> "
"PEARL" "opalescent radi- ance" (178)	"A spring <i>morning at sea</i> "
"sea and shore" "sea or shore" (178)	
"liquid pearls dissolved" (180) ⁴	

¹The words "there is no sun" in 176 have, I believe, a double significance. See below, pp. 198-199.

²The injunction in the script of May 1, 1907 (174) runs as follows: "I want you to try a special experiment. On May 13 wait for a message I cannot tell how it will reach you—but there is some special interest in that day . . . Don't ask more—a veil is best—but in the end you will understand and find the record complete." For the full text of this script see pp. 238-239.

³See Note A, p. 211.

⁴Later on (p. 189) I shall justify the insertion here of an extract from 180 by showing that between 178 and 180 a very close link exists.

I believe that the misquotation in 178 of Wordsworth's line, "The light that never was on sea or land," was purposive, the substituted words "sea or shore" serving to introduce two words from *On a Spring Morning at Sea*. If it was not purposive, it is not easy to account for, since the line in its proper form is very well known, and had only a few weeks earlier (Feb. 20, 1907) been correctly given in a script of Mrs. Verrall's (140), except for the transposition of "land" and "sea."¹

THE CONNEXION BETWEEN 136, 171 AND 178.

Next let us turn to 136 and 171.

136 speaks of "Merlin's prophetic vision," "the passing of Arthur," and "the island valley of Avilion where . . . falls no rain nor snow."

At the time when this script was written Mrs. Verrall did not understand the meaning of "Merlin's prophetic vision," but five weeks later—on March 15, 1907—she interpreted it as an allusion to Tennyson's *Merlin and the Gleam*, which she read for the first time on that day.

171 has "a universal country, the mother of us all, Not 'O fair city of Cecrops,' but Oh fair city of God . . . Golden City of God. The universal City is all colours and no colour, but best described as a golden GLEAM."

In her contemporaneous, or nearly contemporaneous, notes on 171 Mrs. Verrall gives a reference back to *Merlin and the Gleam* mentioned in her note on 136. So "Gleam" serves as a connecting link between 136 and 171. But "gleam" occurs thrice explicitly in 178, and once implicitly, because the context of "the light that never was, on sea or land" is

Ah! THEN, if mine had been the Painter's hand,
To express what then I saw; and add *the gleam*,
The light that never was, on sea or land.

So the word "gleam" links together not only 136 and 171, but 178 also.

Before I point out further links between the five scripts, let me go back again for a moment to the context of "the light that never was, on sea or land." In the poem from which these

¹This script is quoted and discussed in Note B, pp. 212-213.

words come—*Elegiac Stanzas suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle in a Storm*—occur the following lines:

Four summer weeks I dwelt in sight of thee:
I saw thee every day; and all the while
Thy Form was sleeping on a glassy sea.

The fact that these lines are part of the context of a quotation occurring in 178 tends to confirm my theory that 178 presents coincidences with *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, since both poems contain the words “glassy sea.”

THE CONNEXION BETWEEN 171, 176 AND 178.

I was explaining, before this digression, how 136, 171 and 178 are linked together by the word “Gleam.” I now proceed to point out that 171, 176 and 178 are also connected together: the link in this case being made by means of allusions in all three to the description of the Heavenly Jerusalem in the 21st chapter of *The Revelation of St. John the Divine*. 176 seems, as I have already mentioned, to allude to the Heavenly City’s having no need of the sun, and 178 to its gates of pearl; while the phrase in 171 “Golden City of God” recalls vv. 13 and 21: “the city was pure gold, like unto clear glass,” “and the street of the city was pure gold, as it were transparent glass.”

In support of my theory that these coincidences with the *Apocalypse* are not due to chance, I would point out: first, that the imagery of the 21st chapter of *Revelation*, like that of *On a Spring Morning at Sea* (with which poem 178 presents coincidences of word and phrase) is drawn from jewels and colours; and, secondly, that the “sea of glass” that was before the throne of God (*Rev.* iv. 6) recalls both the “glassy sea” of *On a Spring Morning at Sea*:

Ay, *there* some jewelled visionary spring
Shall charm the strange shore and the glassy sea;

and the “glassy sea” of Wordsworth’s *Stanzas suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle in a Storm*:

and all the while
Thy Form was sleeping on a glassy sea.

And this coincidence with the Wordsworth poem is not a merely verbal one. There is a real connexion of thought as well, for the sight of Peele Castle reflected in the glassy summer sea brings to the poet's mind the thought of Heavenly or Elysian calm :

Thou shouldst have seemed a treasure-house divine
Of peaceful years ; a chronicle of heaven ;

and

A Picture had it been of lasting ease,
Elysian quiet, without toil or strife ;
No motion but the moving tide.

136, 176 AND 178.

Now let us turn for a moment to 136, 176 and 178. 176 and 178, I have suggested, allude to *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, the poem in which Myers has painted a vision of the next world, and also to the 21st chapter of *Revelation* wherein is described the Heavenly Jerusalem. 136 mentions the Island of Avilion, which was "in Welsh mythology the kingdom of the dead," and at a later date became "an earthly paradise in the western seas" (*Encl. Brit. s.v. Avalon*). Visions of another world form, then, a common subject of these three scripts. I have mentioned three of these visions, but I believe that indirect allusion to a fourth is involved in the quotation from Tennyson's *Morte d'Arthur*, which follows the mention of the Island of Avilion in 136. This quotation—I give it in its correct form, instead of in the form in which it appears in the script—is as follows :

the island-valley of Avilion ;
Where falls not hail, or rain, or any snow,
Nor ever wind blows loudly.

These lines are Tennyson's version of a passage in the Fourth Book of Homer's *Odysssey* (ll. 566-568), where Proteus says to Menelaus :

But thou, Menelaus, son of Zeus, art not ordained to die . . . , but the deathless gods will convey thee to the Elysian plain and the world's end . . . , where life is easiest for men. No snow is there, nor yet great storm, nor any rain ; but always ocean sendeth

forth the breeze of the shrill west to blow cool on men (Butcher and Lang's Translation).

So I think that 136 may be said to contribute implicitly a fourth vision of the Heavenly City.

THE CONNEXION BETWEEN 178 AND 180.

In 180, the next script but one after 178, there is a reference to the story of Cleopatra's first melting a pearl ear-drop and then drinking it in Antony's honour, and this is followed by a quotation—"I am dying, Egypt, dying"—from Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*.

In 178 occur the words "in orient pearl" and "PEARL pearl mother of pearl gives the idea—and all the glow of the Orient."

In Shakespeare's play Antony sends as a gift to Cleopatra an "orient pearl"; and the coincidence establishes clearly, I think, the close connexion between 178 and 180.

The connexion between 178 and 176 has already been explained, and accordingly I feel justified in treating 176, 178 and 180 as what may be called a *suite* of scripts.

THE CONNEXION BETWEEN A POEM OF MYERS'S ENTITLED "VENICE" AND 176, 178 AND 180.

In January 1912, I told Mrs. Verrall of my theory that 176 and 178¹ contain allusions to *On a Spring Morning at Sea*. In reply she pointed out to me that in these two scripts there seems to be also a verbal coincidence with another poem of Myers's named *Venice*. Thus, while 176 has "a pearly sky" and 178 mentions the sea and "a dawn of pearl," in *Venice* occurs the phrase "her melted Pearl of sky and sea."

Seven considerations, all unnoticed by Mrs. Verrall, support her conjecture, and go to show that the coincidence is not accidental.

First, the reference to "pearly drops like liquid pearls dissolved" in 180—a script, which, as we have just seen, forms a

¹I said nothing to Mrs. Verrall about 180, because at this time I had not noticed its close connexion with 176 and 178.

suite with 178 and 176—may be taken to represent an attempt at the “melted Pearl of sea and sky” of *Venice*.¹

Secondly, the symbols, with which 178 opens, may be the first letters of the word “Venice.” The first is a capital V, and the second a Greek epsilon (=English short e).

Thirdly, in Mrs. Verrall’s script of January 18, 1908 (223) occur the words: “The Orient splendours of the dawn The pearl of sea and sky no not that.” The conjunction of “Orient,” “dawn” and “pearl” here seems to connect this script with 178, which likewise has “Orient,” “dawn” and “pearl”; and the phrase in 223, “The pearl of sea and sky,” is very like the phrase in *Venice*, “melted Pearl of sky and sea.” Moreover, the fact of this phrase in 223 being followed by the comment, “no not that,” suggests to any one familiar with the mannerisms of Mrs. Verrall’s script that the phrase thus negatived has *previously* emerged in some other script. As a matter of fact it had not; but I would suggest that the scribe had intended to get this phrase recorded in 176 or 178, and thought that either the actual phrase or something very like it had been recorded.²

Fourthly, Mrs. Verrall’s script of February 20, 1907 (140), which is connected with 178 by means of a Wordsworth quotation common to each (“The Light that never was, on sea or land”), contains reminiscences of some lines in Shakespeare’s *Merchant of Venice*, and a connexion with Venice is thereby suggested. Moreover, 140 opens with the word “Chiaroscuro,” which in the form “Clear-obscure” occurs in Myers’s *Renewal of Youth* in reference to Tintoretto’s pictures, some of which, as we shall see later (pp. 197-199), are almost certainly referred to in the poem *Venice*.³

Fifthly, the script of May 1, 1907 (174)—the script, that is, in which Mrs. Verrall was enjoined to “wait for a message” on May 13, the date of 178—opens with the word “Evangel”;⁴

¹ It also serves, as I have already suggested (see p. 185), to represent the similar expression in *On a Spring Morning at Sea*: “And *pearl* to sapphire, opal into rose *Melt*.” Besides this verbal similarity between the two poems, I hope to show later (see p. 206) that a connexion of thought also exists between them.

² For full details on this point, see Note C, pp. 213-214.

³ For the text of 140, and comments on it, see Note B, pp. 212-213.

⁴ For the text of this script, see pp. 238-239.

and by means of this word seems to refer back to the only other script of Mrs. Verrall's between January 1905 and May 1910, in which the word "Evangel" is found. This script, written on October 27, 1905, presents some curious coincidences with Myers's poem *Venice*.¹

Though by itself any one of these five considerations may not be very cogent, cumulatively they seem to me to have very considerable force.

The sixth and seventh considerations in support of a connexion between 176 and *Venice*, being full of complexities, will best be dealt with in separate sections.

COMPARISON OF 176 WITH A PASSAGE IN GEORGE SAND'S
LETTRES D'UN VOYAGEUR.

The sixth consideration is the most cogent; though I did not discover the facts on which it is based until the whole of this paper (except, of course, the paragraphs in which it is explained) and the appendices were completed.

The opening pages of the second chapter of George Sand's *Lettres d'un Voyageur* (pp. 34-40 in the edition published by Michel Lévy Frères, 1869) are occupied with a description of a dream which the Traveller (George Sand herself, of course) has experienced again and again from early childhood onwards. When the dream begins the dreamer is sitting on a desolate shore. A bark approaches, and he is hailed by unknown friends aboard it. He joins them, and off they sail to an enchanted land, beautiful beyond description; and here, singing and crowned with flowers, they frolic through scented woodlands. At this point the dreamer wakes; but when awake he cannot recall either the looks or names of his dream-companions, or the words of their songs. "Who," he asks, "are these unknown friends who come to summon me in my sleep and lead me into fairy land?" He debates whether they are spirits of the dead, or ghosts of old loves, or dim prefigurements of loves to be, or merely the creation of an active imagination? Though he returns no certain answer to

¹For the text of the script of October 27, 1905, and comments on it, see Note D, pp. 215-217.

his own question, he seems to lean towards a mystical interpretation of his experience :

Je brûle de savoir s'il y a dans les songes quelque sens prophétique, quelque révélation de l'avenir, soit pour cette vie, soit pour les autres.

And again,

Mon rêve . . . ressemble à la terre libre et vierge que je vais cherchant, et que je peuple d'affections saintes et de bonheur impossible. . . .

Then he goes on to describe how, seated one evening in the Giardini Pubblici at Venice,

il m'est arrivé . . . de me trouver en réalité dans une situation qui ressemblait un peu à mon rêve . . .

. . . Le petit promontoir planté à l'anglaise est si beau, si touffu, si riche de fleurs, de parfums et d'aspects, que je me demandai si ce n'était pas là le rivage magique que mes rêves m'avaient fait pressentir. Mais non, la terre promise est vierge de douleurs, et celle-ci est déjà trempée de mes larmes.

And then comes the following passage (quoted—with slight variations of text—in Hare's *Venice*, p. 121 of the 2nd edition):

Le soleil était descendu derrière les monts Vicentins. De grandes nuées violettes traversaient le ciel au-dessus de Venise. La tour de Saint-Marc, les coupoles de Sainte-Marie, et *cette pépinière de flèches* et de minarets qui s'élèvent de tous les points de la ville, se dessinaient en aiguilles noires sur le ton étincelant de l'horizon. Le ciel arrivait, par une admirable dégradation de nuances, du rouge-cerise au bleu de smalt; et *l'eau, calme et limpide comme une glace*, recevait exactement le reflet de cette immense irisation. Au-dessous de la ville elle avait l'air d'un grand miroir de cuivre rouge. *Jamais je n'avais vu Venise si belle et si féerique. Cette noire silhouette, jetée entre le ciel et l'eau ardente* comme dans une mer de feu, *était alors une de ces sublimes aberrations d'architecture que le poète de l'Apocalypse a dû voir flotter sur les grèves de Patmos quand il rêvait sa Jérusalem nouvelle*, et qu'il la comparait à une belle épousée de la veille.

Peu à peu les couleurs s'obscurcirent, les contours devinrent plus massifs, les profondeurs plus mystérieuses. *Venise prit l'aspect* d'une flotte immense, puis *d'un bois de hauts cyprès* où les canaux s'enfonçaient comme de grands chemins de sable argenté. Ce sont là les instants où j'aime à regarder au loin. Quand les formes s'effacent,

quand les objets semblent trembler dans la brume, quand mon imagination peut s'élaner dans un champ immense de conjectures et de caprices, quand je peux, en clignant un peu la paupière, renverser et bouleverser une cité, en faire une forêt, un camp ou un cimetière; . . . alors je jouis vraiment de la nature, j'en dispose à mon gré, je règne sur elle, je la traverse d'un regard, je la peuple de mes fantaisies.

Let me compare the phrases which I have underlined with 140, 171, 176 and 178; and the whole passage with the closing lines of Myers's *Venice*:

George Sand.

- (1) "cette pépinière de flèches"
—"Venise prit l'aspect . . .
d'un bois de hauts cyprès"—
- (2) "l'eau, calme et limpide
comme une glace"
- (3) The whole passage quoted
above.
- (4) "Cette noire silhouette—
sa Jérusalem nouvelle."

Scripts and *Venice*.

- (1) "Spires of flame like the
tops of cypress trees, cypress
tops against a pearly sky"
(176).
- (2) "The glassy sea" implicit in
the Wordsworth's quotations
in 140 and 178. (Cf. also
"the glassy sea" of *On a
Spring Morning at Sea*, and
the "sea of glass" of the
Apocalypse.)
- (3) "but she [*i.e.* Venice]
Dreams in her melted Pearl of
sky and sea.
For me too dreaming let the
sunset fire
Shade the dark dome and pierce
the pillared spire!" etc.
(Myers's *Venice*.)
- (4) The allusions to the New
Jerusalem of the *Apocalypse*
in three scripts (171, 176,
178), which, for various
reasons already cited or to be
cited, I connect with Myers's
poem about Venice, written
at Venice, and called *Venice*.

It seems to me not unlikely that when writing the last stanza of his poem *Venice* Myers, who was a great admirer of George Sand's works and had written an essay on her, in which the *Lettres d'un Voyageur* are highly, if briefly, praised (*Essays Modern*, p. 87), had this passage in his mind.¹

That the intelligence responsible for 140, 171, 176 and 178 knew the George Sand passage I can hardly doubt.²

The reader will not be in a position to appreciate the full force of these parallelisms, and especially of the fourth, until he reaches the end of this paper. When, arrived at that point, he realises how close a parallel my interpretation of Mrs. Verrall's scripts presents with the passage in the *Lettres d'un Voyageur* about Venice and the vision of the New Jerusalem, let him remember what I have said above and now repeat and emphasise: namely, that my interpretation of the new evidence presented in this paper was completed in its present form before I knew of the existence of the George Sand passage, and before I knew that she, or for that matter any writer, had ever traced any sort of relationship between the vision of the New Jerusalem and Venice.³

¹ He probably knew it in the original; but it is not unlikely that he came across it in Hare's *Venice* during his stay at Venice in 1900. He was, I know, fond of Hare's *Rome*, and had it in Rome with him on one of his last visits there. I do not know that he had Hare's *Venice* with him at Venice in 1900, but in view of his fondness for Hare's *Rome*, it seems a likely conjecture that he had.

² As the allusion to the *Lettres d'un Voyageur* in *Essays Modern* shows, Frederic Myers may well have known the passage. Had Mrs. Verrall ever read it? On June 3, 1912, she wrote, in answer to my enquiries: "I am sure I have never read Hare's *Venice*. . . . I have never been or planned to go to Venice, and I have no knowledge of any books about Venice, except Ruskin's *Stones of Venice*, and an old Baedeker." Then, on June 6, 1912, having looked up the passage first in Hare's *Venice* and then in the original, and after looking through *Lettres d'un Voyageur* generally, she wrote: "Nothing in it was in the least familiar, and no faintest recollection suggested that I had any previous acquaintance with it."

³ Since writing the above I see that, according to Ruskin (*St. Mark's Rest*, ch. I. and II.), the Venetians, as a result of their conquest of Tyre and of their acquisition under treaty from Baldwin II. of a street in the city of Sion, came to associate their own city with the *civitas Dei* of the 86th Psalm. I have also come across a passage in *Modern Painters* (quoted in Hare's *Venice*, p. 9) which suggests that in Ruskin's mind the New Jerusalem of *Revelation* and Venice were associated:

"A city of marble, did I say? nay, rather a golden city, paved with emerald. For truly, every pinnacle and turret glanced and glowed, overlaid with gold, or bossed with jasper."

176 AND THE POEM "VENICE."

It would have been convenient for all concerned had I been able to reprint at this point the full text of the poem *Venice* as it appeared in *Fragments of Prose and Poetry*, pp. 121-122. But as permission to do so has been refused, my readers must either refer to the book for the original poem, or content themselves with the following paraphrase of it in prose :

With good reason one of the Venetian painters placed the guardian Margaret between Doge and Doge ; and represented the Madonna and Child as smiling from "a soft and whirling glory" upon Venice, and the Doges as kneeling before them and hearing the words *Pax tibi, Marce Evangelista meus*, and as so deeply enraptured that their earthly city and its buildings fade from their sight, eclipsed by the glory of the Heavenly Visitants, who throng to welcome them.

The saints truly were with these faithful Doges. Angels are but discarnate men that have passed to a higher sphere ; and we too may have visions of their vanished light and know that without us their joy cannot be complete. If we hold fast to our belief in them we shall obtain grace from them. They foresee our fates and look forward to our rejoining them ; they still share our quenchless aspirations ; they still love, and still are fair.

Venice now slumbers, and her old fights and politics are but remote memories. Her fame still lives, but she herself only dreams "in her melted Pearl of sky and sea." Would that I too might dream, and see the rays of the setting sun pierce between the pillars of the spire and throw the dome into deeper shade, until at last night and peace bring with them the fulfilment of the cosmic promise, and my soul dreams itself into the celestial dawn !

176 has "There is a building and a tower on the left, white faintly white but the colours are hardly visible," these words being followed by drawings, evidently meant to represent the building and the tower on the left of the building. The poem *Venice* speaks of the distant view of Venice which forms the background of some picture or pictures :

Till for the grave enraptured kneeling man,

 Thro' that clear vision fades, remotely fair,
 The imperial City of all his earthly care,
 Whose few last arches glimmer,—

When Mrs. Verrall pointed out to me the verbal coincidences with the poem *Venice* in 176 and 178, it occurred to me that the words, "There is a building and a tower on the left,"¹ and the two drawings in 176 might be meant to represent the distant view of "the imperial City" in the background of the picture or pictures described in the poem. Though I had not the faintest notion at that time as to what picture is the subject of the poem *Venice*, I communicated this conjecture to Mrs. Verrall, and, with a view to testing whether there was anything in it, asked her if she knew what picture it was that had inspired the poem.

Mrs. Verrall in reply told me that in the autumn of 1908 she had taken a good deal of trouble (for reasons which have nothing to do with the subject of this paper) to identify the picture described in *Venice*. As a result of her own enquiries and of investigations made at Venice by a friend on her behalf, she had come to the conclusion—which she had duly recorded at the time of forming it—that the poem was "based, not on a special picture, but on the general type of pictures in the Ducal Palace."

With this conclusion I find myself, after a long investigation, in complete agreement.

Two considerations especially have convinced me that Myers in the poem *Venice* is referring not to one particular picture, but to a general type. The first of these considerations is the actual words of the poem:

Till for the grave enraptured man,
 Grimani, or Priuli, or Loredan.

If the poem were referring to a single picture, these words could only mean that the poet had forgotten exactly what

¹Grammatically these words may mean either that both building and tower are on the left of something unnamed, or that there is a tower on the left of the building. The second meaning is much the likelier of the two, because the drawing places the tower on the left of the building.

Doge it was that figured in the picture, and that he hadn't troubled to identify him. Now, no poet could surely be quite so easy-going and casual as that! The meaning must be that the poet has in mind a whole class of pictures in which one Doge or another is represented in a kneeling attitude before the Virgin or the Holy Child. This type of picture is "frequently to be met with," says Rio,¹ "in private collections, in the churches, and above all in the Ducal Palace, in which these allegorical compositions, intended to express the close alliance between Religion and the State, seem to have been purposely multiplied."

The second consideration is that in spite of enquiries made on the spot by Mrs. Verrall's friend and others, and of searches through works of reference, guide-books and picture-catalogues by Mrs. Verrall, Miss Johnson and myself, we have failed to trace any one picture at Venice which comprises all the details mentioned in the poem.

On the assumption, then, that the details given in the poem are not to be found in any one single picture at Venice, but may be found scattered over various pictures belonging to the special type just mentioned, I propose, first, to state what the details are, and then to look for them in examples of the type in question.

The details are these: the Madonna and Holy Child with Saints and Angels in a "whirling glory"; St. Mark and the motto of Venice, *Pax tibi, Marce, Evangelista meus* (rendered in the poem, "My peace be with thee, Mark Evangelist"); a Doge or Doges (*e.g.* a Grimani, Priuli or Loredano) kneeling before the Madonna and Holy Child; a distant view of Venice; and "the guardian Margaret" "set 'twixt Doge and Doge."

In Tintoretto's "Doge Loredano praying to the Virgin" (Plate 1), we find the Madonna, "the thronging welcome of the Blest" and the "whirling glory"; the Doge Loredano kneeling before the Madonna; St. Mark and the motto of Venice; in the background, a view of Venice; arches, and, as 176 says, "a building and a tower on the left." But there is no Holy Child, and no St. Margaret "set 'twixt Doge and Doge."

In the picture by Palma Giovine (Plate 2), we find the

¹Quoted in Hare's *Venice*, p. 43.

Madonna with Christ (but not as a Child); two Doges, the brothers Lorenzo and Gerolamo Priuli, kneeling; a "whirling glory"; St. Mark; a distant peep of Venice; arches in the remote distance; "a building and a tower [the Campanile] on the left." But there is no St. Margaret, and the motto of Venice does not appear.

In Titian's "Grimani kneeling before Religion" (Plate 3), we find a "whirling glory"; Doge Grimani kneeling; St. Mark; and a distant view of Venice. But there is no Madonna, no Child, no St. Margaret, and no motto of Venice.

The picture of the Doge Mocenigo kneeling before Christ (Plate 4) shows a view of Venice in the background, and the motto of Venice on the open book to the right of St. Mark's lion.

Tintoretto's picture of the Virgin in Glory and the Doge Nicolo da Ponte (Plate 5) contains the Virgin and Child, the kneeling Doge, St. Mark, the "whirling glory" and the "thronging welcome of the Blest," and a distant peep of Venice.

Carpaccio's "Lion of St. Mark" (Plate 6), though displaying only the motto of Venice, and a view of Venice with the Campanile on the left, may, I think, have contributed to the composite impression which Myers received, and recorded in the poem, during his stay in Venice.

Tintoretto's "Espousals of St. Catherine" (Plate 7) shows the Madonna and Child, a kneeling Doge (F. Dona); St. Mark; a "whirling glory" (of which, however, only part is shown in the reproduction); the guardian Saint Catherine (not Margaret); in the middle distance on the right some arches; and beyond them in the background, buildings and a tower.

Immediately preceding the reference in 176 to the building and the tower on the left, come these words: "a pearly sky no movement. It is the sky of early morning but there is no sun." I am inclined to see in them an allusion to the lighting of the pictures described in *Venice*. In none of the examples reproduced here, and in no examples of the same type that I have examined, is the sun visible. The natural light in the backgrounds seems, so far as I can judge, to be that of a calm, early morning sky. The foregrounds are so lit by the glory of the Heavenly Visitants, that the earthly

citizens "need no candle, neither light of the sun."¹ Or, as the poem says:

"Thro' that clear vision fades, remotely fair,
 The imperial City
 and all the rest
 Whelmed in that thronging welcome of the Blest."

On the whole, the pictures which fit the poem best are Tintoretto's "Doge Loredano" and "Espousals of St. Catherine."

It will be noticed that no example is given of a picture showing St. Margaret, whether "set 'twixt Doge and Doge" or not.

I am entirely puzzled by the reference in the poem to St. Margaret. Why, in the first place, is she called "the guardian"? Venice has, or has had, several guardian or patron saints—*e.g.* St. Theodore, St. Justina, St. Catherine, St. Mark—but St. Margaret is not one of them. Then, what does "set 'twixt Doge and Doge" mean? Does it mean a picture wherein St. Margaret is represented with a Doge on either side of her? If so, I can only say that enquiries made at Venice, and careful search through catalogues, have so far failed to reveal any such picture at Venice; or, indeed, any picture showing St. Margaret with any Doge. Or, does it mean that there is a picture of St. Margaret with pictures containing portraits of Doges on either side of it? If so, the only picture of St. Margaret that I have been able to trace in the Ducal Palace is one by Tintoretto showing her in company with St. Louis and St. George; and, if the guide-books can be trusted, this picture is not flanked on either side by portraits of Doges.

I do not, of course, assert that "there's no sich a" picture; though I am bound to say that, if there be, it is of a retiring disposition, and that as great mystery seems to surround it as surrounded the "lady of the name of Harris."

Should there prove to be no picture at Venice of St. Margaret "'twixt Doge and Doge," then the only suggestion I can offer is that Myers mistook Tintoretto's St. Catherine for St. Margaret. He might have been misled by the pearls which, among other jewels, St. Catherine is wearing, for in sacred pictures St. Margaret is sometimes represented with pearls (*margaritae*) in

¹See p. 185.

her hair. Tintoretto's *St. Catherine* hangs in the *Sala del Collegio*, where hang, too, several pictures containing portraits of Doges; and this might perhaps be held to explain "'twixt Doge and Doge."

Still, whatever be the true explanation of the reference to St. Margaret, I think it is hardly open to dispute that Myers in *Venice* was thinking of a type of picture, and that the examples reproduced above belong to this type. So far I feel on firm ground. But I do not feel equally sure that a connexion exists between the drawings in 176 and the buildings which form the backgrounds of some of the pictures we have been discussing. I do, indeed, suggest that there may be a connexion; but I lay more stress on the verbal coincidences between 176, 178 and 180 on the one hand and *Venice* on the other, and on the five considerations adduced in their support in the last section but one, and still more on the sixth consideration discussed in the last section. The drawings in 176 and the accompanying text—"There is a building and a tower on the left, white faintly white but the colours are hardly visible"—do show a certain correspondence with some of the backgrounds of the pictures; but I do not wish to press the coincidence, or to treat it as more than an auxiliary argument.

The conclusion I draw from the facts dealt with in this and the two preceding sections is that 176, 178 and 180, partly by means of verbal coincidences, partly by coincidences of subject, and partly by means of graphic coincidences, were intended to refer to *Venice*. But if so, what was the object of the reference?

THE OBJECT OF THE REFERENCE TO "VENICE," AND THE MEANING OF THAT POEM.

My answer to that question will not be intelligible unless I first recall some facts and theories published in my two previous papers on the Horace Ode Question, and unless at the same time I disclose an essential fact relating to 176 which I have hitherto withheld.

The Horace Ode Question was first put to Myers_p on Jan. 23, 1907. It elicited no response till April 17, 1907, when, on its being repeated, Myers_p gave his first answer—"I had Ode



TINTORETTO.—DOGE LOREDANO PRAYING TO THE VIRGIN.



PALMA IL GIOVINE, — PRAYER OF THE DOGES LORENZO AND GEROLAMO PRIULI.



TITIAN.—DOGE GRIMANI KNEELING BEFORE RELIGION.



DOGE LUIGI MOCENIGO KNEELING BEFORE THE SAVIOUR.



TINTORETTO.—THE VIRGIN IN GLORY AND DOGE NICOLÒ DA PONTE.
Photograph by Anderson, of Rome. Reproduced by permission.



CARPACCIO.—THE LION OF ST. MARK.



TINTORETTO.—THE ESPOUSALS OF ST. CATHERINE.

to Nature on my mind. . . . Do you remember Immortality?". Of this answer Mrs. Verrall knew nothing, and in it no one saw any sense until a year later. No meaning being apparent in this first answer, on April 24, 1907, Mrs. Sidgwick again put the question; and on April 29, 1907, Myers_p said he would give his answer on May 1, 1907.

In the waking-stage of Mrs. Piper's trance of April 29, 1907, —at which Mrs. Verrall was present—came the words "Myers . . . passed out of their bodies and gone [thrice repeated] every peak and point . . . star Abt." On May 1, 1907, Myers_p said "Do you remember when I said I had passed through my body and returned . . . those words were lingering in my memory and I gave it as peak followed Star"; and at the end of the sitting made a spontaneous reference to Horace's Odes (see *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 379-381). The intention was clearly to quote the following lines from *Abt Vogler*:

Not a peak nor point but found and fixed its wandering star,

and

the wonderful Dead who have passed through the body and
gone,

But were back once more in an old world worth their new.

On neither occasion were the quotations definitely connected with any particular subject. It should, however, be noted that the first time they occurred was during a sitting at which Myers_p had announced his intention of answering the Horace Ode Question on May 1, 1907; and the second time was during a sitting held on that particular day. Anyhow, on May 6, 1907, Myers_p definitely and without any beating about the bush did connect the *Abt Vogler* lines with the Horace Ode.

Meanwhile on May 4, 1907, Mrs. Verrall happened to meet Mrs. Sidgwick when she (Mrs. Sidgwick) was engaged upon writing out the record of Mrs. Piper's trance of May 1. Mrs. Sidgwick read out to her parts of the record, and among others the part where Myers_p gave the words "passed through my body and returned." It struck Mrs. Verrall at once that these words (which, by the way, neither she nor Mrs. Sidgwick at that time recognised as being reminiscent of *Abt Vogler*) might have been

intended as an allusion to the case of reincarnation mentioned in the "Archytas" Ode.¹

We now come to May 7, 1907, the date of Mrs. Verrall's script, No. 176.

On the morning of May 7, 1907, Mrs. Verrall, before beginning to try for script, deliberately read and fixed her attention on the "Archytas" Ode. Her idea—recorded contemporaneously—was that if Myers_P had meant "passed through my body and returned" to refer to the reincarnation of Pythagoras mentioned in the "Archytas" Ode, he might make his intention plain and unmistakable by giving through Mrs. Piper some distinctive word such as "Pythagoras" or "Panthoides"; and that this might be facilitated by her fixing her mind on the Ode. The reasons which thus led her to fix her attention on the "Archytas" Ode before writing automatically, she recorded in two notes: the first written at 10.55 a.m., five minutes before the script began, the second at 11.30 a.m., just after the script was finished.²

Now, although it is perfectly true that the object of Mrs. Verrall's experiment was not to bring about an explanatory reference in her own, but in Mrs. Piper's script, yet the fact remains that her script of May 7, 1907, was written just after her mind was purposely concentrated on the "Archytas"

¹Mrs. Verrall made the following note in her diary on May 4, 1907: "From what Mrs. S[idgwick] told me this morning of the sitting of May 1, I think there may be something about the Ode of Horace (i. 28) for which I asked. There was a sentence suggesting re-incarnation, but no connexion with Horace, though Horace was referred to in the course of the sitting."

Why, it may be asked, had it not occurred to Mrs. Verrall on April 29, when she heard the words "passed out of their bodies and gone" uttered in the waking-stage, to connect them with the "Archytas" Ode? Possibly it was because "passed out of their bodies *and gone*" does not, as does "passed through my body *and returned*," suggest reincarnation; but much more probably it was because on April 29 the Horace Ode Question had passed so completely out of her mind that even when Myers_P made an explicit reference to it she did not understand what he was talking about (see p. 234).

²It may occur to students of this case to ask why in my two previous papers I never made any reference to this experiment of Mrs. Verrall's. The reason is that I never realised until January 1912, that she ever had made any such experiment. I never saw the *original* sheet of paper on which the script of May 7, 1907, and the two accompanying notes were written, but only a typed copy, in which Mrs. Verrall's two contemporaneous notes were compressed into the following inadequate summary: "Before writing above script, I had fixed my attention on Hor. *Ode*. i. 28." This brief note escaped my observation until January 1912.

Ode, and that after the script was finished her thoughts at once reverted to it. Of the hundreds of scripts which she has written, before and after this date, she has never written a single other one under similar conditions: that is to say, with the "Archytas" Ode or the Horace Ode Question specially and definitely in her mind. Hence it cannot be said that I have picked a script at random out of hundreds of others, or picked one simply because it happened to suit my book. I think, on the contrary, that I can fairly claim that I have fixed upon the only script of Mrs. Verrall's, which, apart from internal evidence, there is any reason for connecting with the "Archytas" Ode.

From Mrs. Verrall's point of view her experiment of May 7, 1907, failed. But the remainder of this paper will be largely taken up with an attempt to show that nevertheless it did have a successful result, though the result was quite different from the one she aimed at, and was achieved in a manner the very reverse of what she expected. Mrs. Verrall was looking for an answer in Mrs. Piper's script: the answer came in her own. She thought the answer would consist of an allusion to reincarnation, and the event belied her. She hoped that the result of her experiment would be to confirm her own interpretation of the *second* answer given by Myers_P; whereas, as we shall see, it did not do so, but instead fell into line with, and so confirmed, the *first* answer of Myers_P (which had nothing to do with reincarnation), although Mrs. Verrall did not know what this first answer was, nor indeed that a first answer had been given at all.¹

Six days after making the experiment in connexion with 176 described above, Mrs. Verrall wrote 178; and then six weeks later 180.² These three scripts, as I have already explained,

¹ From the theoretic and evidential point of view, too much stress cannot be laid on the fact that Mrs. Verrall wrote 176 and its sequels 178 and 180 in entire ignorance of the first answer of Myers_P ("I had Ode to Nature on my mind . . . Do you remember Immortality?"); many months before the only people (Mrs. Sidgwick and myself) who knew of this first answer, saw any sense whatever in it; and two years before any one suggested any sort of link between the "Archytas" Ode and *On a Spring Morning at Sea*.

² After May 13, 1907, the date of 178, Mrs. Verrall gave up writing script till June 19, 1907. 180 was the second script she wrote after resuming. So between 176 and 178, and 178 and 180 (as the numbers show) only one script intervened respectively.

form a *suite*, and contain allusions to *Venice* and *On a Spring Morning at Sea*.

As I have already (see *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., p. 168, and above, p. 178) twice explained what in my view was the meaning underlying the combination of allusions to *On a Spring Morning at Sea* and the "Archytas" Ode when discussing the allusions to both found in Mrs. Verrall's early scripts of 1901, I need now only say that I place the same interpretation on the occurrence of allusions to the same poem in a *suite* of scripts, of which the first (176) is closely associated with the "Archytas" Ode by reason of Mrs. Verrall's experiment.

The way is now clear to answer the question which I left unanswered some time back: "What was the object of the reference to *Venice*?"

I am indebted to Mr. Gerald Balfour for being able to supply what I hope will seem to be not only a plausible but a convincing answer. I felt sure that 176, 178 and 180 do allude to *Venice*; but, as I could not understand the poem, I not unnaturally failed to see any reason for the allusions. Mr. Balfour interpreted the poem for me, and at the same time showed me why the allusions to it were appropriate. The poem is obscure, perhaps intentionally obscure; but I have no doubt that Mr. Balfour is right in his interpretation of it, which, rendered into my own language, is this:

It was a true instinct that led the Venetian painters to portray their Doges in a setting in which were embodied both the Heavenly City of their spiritual aspirations and the City of their "earthly care," the one gradually eclipsing the other and more transient interest. It was a true instinct, because "the wonderful Dead who have passed through the body and gone" are still mindful of those "militant here on earth"; not, indeed, restricting their interest to a merely passive sympathy, but rather actively guiding and inspiring the "race of men." Moreover, this "communion of saints" is no one-sided fellowship, for the spirits of "just men made perfect" need our love and remembrance that their joy may be full.¹

¹This paraphrase does not cover the concluding lines of the poem, which I shall touch on later (see p. 210).

The general correctness of the interpretation here offered is, I think, proved by the motto—*Nec me mea cura fefellit*—attached to the poem in *Fragments*. This motto is taken from the first words of greeting spoken by Anchises when Aeneas meets him in the Elysian Fields: “Art thou come at last, and has thy love, child of my desire, conquered the difficult road? Is it granted, O my son, to gaze on thy face, to hear and to answer in the speech we know? Thus indeed did I forecast in spirit, counting the days between; nor has my care misled me.”¹

*(Sic equidem ducebam animo rebarque futurum,
Tempora dinumerans, nec me mea cura fefellit.)*²

Moreover, to a MS. copy of the poem which Myers sent to a friend, he had affixed another motto, in place of the Vergilian one, which equally indicates the intention of the poem. This other motto was *Ut non sine nobis consummarentur*, the Vulgate version of the last half of the last verse of the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. I will quote its context in order to make the applicability of the motto plain:

And these all [*i.e.* the fathers of old time], having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise: God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect [*Ut non sine nobis consummarentur*]. Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses. . . .³

¹ Mackail's Translation.

² The first line and half of the second are thus paraphrased in the poem:
“They count thy coming, and thy fates foreknow.”

³ The MS. copy of *Venice* with the motto *Ut non sine nobis consummarentur* is dated March 21, 1900. Since this paper was written Miss Alice Johnson has pointed out to me that the words *Ut non sine nobis consummarentur* occur in Myers's *Presidential Address* which was delivered on May 18, 1900, and occur in a context which gives expression to exactly the same thought as informs *Venice*.

“Perhaps,” writes Myers, “in the spiritual world as well we have strained our gaze too exclusively on luminaries that are beyond the parallaxic limit; and eyes turned steadily on some nearer brightness may teach us at last our kinship and community in the firmament of souls.

“Not, then, with tears and lamentations should we think of the blessed dead. Rather we should rejoice with them in their enfranchisement, and know that

The thought that inspired *Venice*, the thought, that is, of the dependence of the two worlds on each other, of the continued interest of the dead in us, and of their desire for our continued interest in them, how complete a contrast it presents with the thought of the "Archytas" Ode and with the doubts and misgivings of *Immortality*!

But let us go back for a moment to *On a Spring Morning at Sea*. This poem is clearly in harmony with *Venice* on the one hand, and as clearly in disaccord with the "Archytas" Ode and *Immortality* on the other; though both the harmony and the disaccord will be all the more plainly revealed if we read the context in which *On a Spring Morning* appears in Myers's *Fragments of Prose and Poetry* (p. 53). It runs thus:

We need, as I have elsewhere said, a summons "to no houri-haunted paradise, no passionless contemplation, no monotony of prayer and praise; but to endless advance by endless effort, and, if need be, by endless pain." Be it mine, then, to plunge among the unknown Destinies, to dare and still to dare!

Meanwhile the background of Eternity shows steadfast through all the pageants of the shifting world. . . .

And then, except for four lines which I need not quote, comes the poem. For my part I find it impossible to believe that Myers could have written the opening sentence of the above extract without having in his mind the second stanza of his poem *Immortality*.

The image in the last sentence about "the background of Eternity" showing "steadfast through all the pageants of the shifting world" exactly reverses the imagery in *Venice*:

Thro' that clear vision fades, remotely fair,
The Imperial City of all his earthly care,
Whose few last arches glimmer,—and all the rest
Whelmed in that thronging welcome of the Blest.

they are still minded to keep us as sharers in their joy. It is they, not we, who are working now; they are more ready to hear than we to pray; they guide us as with a cloudy pillar, but it is kindling into steadfast fire.

"Nay, it may be that our response, our devotion, is a needful element in their ascending joy; and God may have provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect;—*Ut non sine nobis consummarentur.*" (*Proc.*, Vol. XV., p. 123.)

Here, as also of course in the pictures which inspired the poem, Eternity is in the foreground and the earthly city in the background. But though the imagery differs, the fundamental thought is the same; and I think it not unlikely that Myers had this part of the context of *On a Spring Morning at Sea* in his mind when he wrote the lines in *Venice*.¹

While, then, on the one hand, we have reasons for believing that in Frederic Myers's mind the "Archytas" Ode was associated with *Immortality*, and *Immortality* in turn with the context of *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, and hence with the poem itself, and some grounds for thinking that the context of *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, and accordingly the poem itself, may have been associated in his mind with *Venice*—while, I say, we have reasons for thinking that these associations did exist or may have existed in the mind of Frederic Myers; we have reasons also for believing that Myers_p and Myers_v shared these associations.

"ODE TO NATURE."

Myers_p and Myers_v and Frederic Myers, I have suggested, associated *Immortality*, *On a Spring Morning at Sea* and *Venice* with the "Archytas" Ode, and with each other, because these three poems give utterance to views about man's destiny either accordant, discordant or comparable with the view expressed by Horace on the same subject in the "Archytas" Ode.

But Myers_p, it will be remembered, also associated a fourth poem of Frederic Myers's with the Horace Ode, namely, *Ode to Nature*. It was, indeed, so he said, the first poem that came to his mind in connexion with the question: "Which Ode of Horace had entered deeply into your inner life?"

The only explanation I have hitherto been able to offer (*Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 401-402) of why Myers_p mentioned *Ode to Nature* in connexion with the Horace Ode Question is that it contains echoes of Hor. *C.* iii. 4, an ode entirely distinct from *C.* i. 28, the "Archytas" Ode.

¹ *On a Spring Morning at Sea* and the passages quoted above from *Fragments* were written not later than 1893. *Venice* was composed in 1900.

Although I still think that *Ode to Nature* does contain echoes of Hor. *C.* iii. 4, this explanation no longer appears to me a sufficient one. Miss Johnson has discovered another solution, and, as I think, a much better one, because it explains the reference to *Ode to Nature* on exactly the same lines as I have explained the references to the three other poems of Myers's.

But before stating what Miss Johnson's interpretation is, I had better first quote and discuss the exact words in which the reference to *Ode to Nature* was made by Myers_p. They were as follows: "I had Ode to Nature on my mind, but as I thought I loved another ode better I did not reply until I could say it more clearly. Do you remember immortality [*sic*] . . ." (*Proc.*, Vol. XXII., p. 369).

In my first paper I took "another ode" to mean another Ode of *Horace's*. This interpretation, in the first place, involves the assumption that Myers_p at first hesitated as to which Ode of Horace's was the subject of Mrs. Verrall's question.¹ In the second place it involves taking the actual words of Myers_p in a sense which, though legitimate, is not, I think, on the whole the most obvious one; for while the first "Ode" certainly means *Myers's* Ode, I had to make the word "ode" when it occurred a second time refer to an *Horatian* Ode.

But let us apply the second "ode" as well as the first to *Myers's* poems. Then "another ode" must mean *Immortality*. I need not debate the purely academic question of whether *Immortality* may properly be called an "Ode"; though I am told on good authority that it has at least as good a claim to the designation as many other English poems so entitled. What we need is evidence to show that Myers_p called *Immortality* an Ode. Evidence to this effect is to be found in one of Mr. Dorr's sittings with Mrs. Piper. On March 10, 1908—nearly a year after the Horace Ode Question had been asked and answered—Mr. Dorr, who knew nothing whatever about the

¹In saying this I must not be understood to imply that such hesitation would be prejudicial to the theory that Myers_p has access to the memories of Frederic Myers; for a man with the readiest and best equipped of memories, if challenged to recall a literary judgement that he had passed in years gone by, might surely show some hesitation about his reply, and yet run no risk of the integrity of his personality being called in question.

question or the answers to it, on his own initiative read to Myers_P a passage from *Fragments* in which Frederic Myers describes his early familiarity with various Greek and Latin poets, among them Horace. As the name Horace was read out, Myers_P wrote :

Ode to i motalty imortality
 . . . Ode Horace to Mortality.

Here it seems clear that the poem *Immortality* is called "Ode to Immortality." I do not think that it is an error for "Ode to Mortality" which immediately follows it. On the contrary, I believe that "Ode to Immortality" is meant to refer to Myers's poem, and that "Ode to Mortality" is a title—and not a bad title, either—invented by Myers_P to designate the "Archytas" Ode.

So I now am of opinion that Myers_P did *not* connect *Ode to Nature* with one Horatian Ode and *Immortality* with another, but that he connected both poems with one and the same Ode of Horace, namely, the "Archytas" Ode.

What, then, is the connexion between *Ode to Nature* and the "Archytas" Ode? Miss Johnson's answer to that problem is this: In *Ode to Nature* Myers assigns to the soul after the death of the body only some sort of un-individualised existence. Nature only "endureth to the end": the soul at death is reabsorbed into the blind world of Nature from which it sprang:

Let all in darkness end, as darkly all began!

Hence, hence I too had birth,
 One soul with the ancient Earth,
 Beyond this human ancestry of pain:—
 My soul was even as ye;¹—
 She was,—and she would be;—
 O Earth, and Night, and Nought, enfold her once again!

So *Ode to Nature* strikes as sombre a note as the "Archytas" Ode, for absorption into the physical universe is the annihilation of personality.

¹ "Ye" means the blind forces of nature.

Now contrast the cheerless speculations of *Ode to Nature* with the closing lines of *Venice*:¹

but she [*i.e.* Venice]
 Dreams in her melted Pearl of sky and sea.
 For me too dreaming let the sunset fire
 Shade the dark dome and pierce the pillared spire!
 Let night and peace the cosmic promise pay,
 And even the Soul's self dream into the day!

There is no loss of personality here; the self is no longer to be enfolded into *Night* and Nought, but dreams "into the day."

CONCLUSION.

As I have now done my best to explain why, in answering the Horace Ode Question, Myers_p referred to *Ode to Nature* and *Immortality*, and Myers_v to *Venice* and *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, it only remains for me to state in a few words the upshot of the new evidence.

The five scripts of Mrs. Verrall's, 136, 171, 176, 178 and 180, which constitute the new evidence, tend, I submit, to confirm the interpretation which in 1909 I placed upon her four early scripts of 1901. They likewise tend to confirm the two interpretations, which I arrived at in 1908 and 1909, of the answers given by Myers_p to the Horace Ode Question in 1907 and 1908.

But they do something more.

In my two previous papers I suggested that Myers_v and Myers_p had contrasted the dismal speculations about "the doubtful doom of human kind" in the "Archytas" Ode and *Immortality* (and to these I should now add *Ode to Nature*) with the optimistic forecasts of *Abt Vogler* and *On a Spring Morning at Sea*. If I have interpreted the new evidence

¹For the assistance of readers who may wish to trace the development of Myers's views about a future life, I append the dates of the four poems discussed in this paper:

Immortality was first published in 1870;

Ode to Nature was written between 1869 and 1873;

On a Spring Morning at Sea was written not later than 1893; and

Venice was written in March 1900, some ten months or so before Myers's death.

aright, to these two happier forecasts must now be added the Heavenly Jerusalem of the *Apocalypse*, the Elysian plain of the Fourth Book of the *Odyssey*, the Paradise of Celtic Legend, the Tennysonian Island-Valley of Avilion, and that "Universal Country," depicted for us in *Venice*, which embraces in one common and conscious citizenship both the living and the dead.

NOTE A.

ON THE DISCOVERY OF COINCIDENCES BETWEEN 178 AND
"ON A SPRING MORNING AT SEA."

The verbal coincidences between this poem and 178 I first noticed in 1910, when, some months after the publication of my second paper on the Horace Ode Question, I was engaged in indexing and annotating a large batch of Mrs. Verrall's scripts. In this second paper I had pointed out the verbal resemblances between *On a Spring Morning at Sea* and four early scripts of Mrs. Verrall's written in 1901. But as I did not in 1910 notice the connexion between 178 and 176, and was not then aware of any sort of link between 176 and the "Archytas" Ode, the discovery of verbal coincidences between the poem and 178, while they appeared interesting enough to be worth noting, conveyed nothing further to my mind. The date of the discovery is important, because it shows that in detecting the coincidences I could not have been influenced by the interpretation of 176 and 178 at which I arrived only in January 1912. In other words, after interpreting 176 and 178 as an answer to the Horace Ode Question, I did not say to myself, "Go to! you must now discover in 176 and 178 coincidences with *On a Spring Morning at Sea*." Likewise, after discovering the coincidences with the poem, I did not say to myself, "You must now by hook or crook somehow manage to hitch 178 on to the Horace Ode." The discovery of the coincidences between 178 and the poem, and the discovery of the connexion between 176 and the "Archytas" Ode were independently made.

NOTE B.

MRS. VERRALL'S SCRIPT OF FEB. 20, 1907 (140).

(140) (February 20, 1907. 11.10 a.m.)

Chiaroscuro

non semper possum tibi confidere hortationes
meas. sed ausculta.

[I cannot always confide to you my exhortations, but listen.]

There are messages for you in Monday and Wednesday's words
not on Tuesday. To-day is important. Sit still and help—it will
not come to you but to Piddington.



no the word is very difficult to give

Print it Rector.

Behind the darkening billows there is peace
Peace—and the Light that never was On Land or Sea
No not right but partly. Do not write—sit still and wait.
Behind our darkness there is light.
'High Emprize' adventure forth—a full sail
Argosy 'comes beetling forth'.

"*Chiaroscuro*" occurs in the form "clear-obscure" in F. W. H. Myers's *Renewal of Youth*, p. 223, with reference to Tintoretto's pictures. Tintoretto was one of the Venetian masters who painted those "allegorical compositions intended to express the close alliance between Religion and the State" which are described in Myers's *Venice*. Two examples of this type of picture painted by Tintoretto have been reproduced and discussed above (Plates 1 and 7).

"*The Light that never was On Land or Sea*" occurs again in 178 in the forms "The light that gleamed on sea and shore The light that never was on sea or shore": all three being incorrect versions of Wordsworth's

and add the gleam,
The light that never was, on sea or land.

It is by means of this Wordsworthian reminiscence common to both that 140 is linked on to 178.

But if I am right in seeing in 178 allusions to Myers's *Venice*, there is another link between 140 and 178, for the words "adventure forth—a full sail Argosy" in the former are clearly reminiscent of phrases in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*. Thus:

Salario. There, where your argosies with portly sail,
 Like signiors and rich burghers on the flood,
 Or, as it were, the pageants of the sea,
 Do overpeer the petty traffickers,
 That curtsy to them, do them reverence,
 As they fly by them with their woven wings.

Salanio. Believe me, sir, had I such venture forth. . . .

Act I. Sc. i.

and again:

Shylock. . . . he hath an argosy bound to Tripolis, . . . a fourth
 for England, and other ventures he hath.

NOTE C.

ON THE OCCURRENCES OF "PEARL," "PEARLY," ETC., IN MRS. VERRALL'S SCRIPTS BETWEEN JANUARY 1905 AND MAY 1910.

"Pearl," or a derivative of it, occurs in only seven scripts of Mrs. Verrall's between Jan. 1905 and May 1910.

First in 93 (Sep. 1, 1906): "pearls and a jasper gate";

next, as quoted above, in 176, 178 and 180;

next in 212 (Nov. 26, 1907): "Aurora's faintest light in Eastern skies and then the pearled chariot of the Dawn";

next in 223 (Jan. 18, 1908): "The Orient splendours of the dawn The pearl of sea and sky no not that";

and last in 344 (Dec. 22, 1909): "Soft draperies of pearly grey Have veiled the Emypyreal Blue So rising mists at break of day Obscure the distant view."¹

¹I have purposely omitted from the above list the occurrence of "these pearls" in Mrs. Verrall's script of April 18, 1906; for while writing this script Mrs. Verrall was holding an ornament containing pearls in her hand or lap, for the purpose of an experiment; and to this ornament "these pearls" refers.

In every instance, except perhaps the last (and even there we find combined the ideas of a pearly sky and of early morning), the emergence of the word "pearl" is, I believe, traceable to one and the same group of associated ideas as is exhibited in the scripts connected with the Horace Ode. Thus, "orient pearl" occurs in 178; "pearl" occurs in 180 in connexion with Cleopatra and with a quotation from *Antony and Cleopatra*, in which play Antony makes a gift to Cleopatra of an "orient pearl"; "pearl" and "Eastern" occur in 212, a script containing reminiscences of a passage in *Paradise Lost*, Book V.; and "orient" and "pearl" occur in 223, a script containing reminiscences of the same passage in *Paradise Lost*; and in 176, 178, 212, 223 and 344, "pearl" is combined with "early morning" or "dawn." Moreover, 223 has "the pearl of sky and sea," which looks like an echo of "her melted Pearl of sky and sea" in *Venice*. The fact of this close approximation to the phrase in *Venice* being followed by the words "no not that" goes to support Mrs. Verrall's theory that there are allusions to *Venice* in 176 and 178; for to a student familiar with the scripts "no not that" signifies that the phrase thus negatived has *previously* emerged in some other script. It is true that the phrase "pearl of sky and sea" had not occurred before in Mrs. Verrall's script, but we may legitimately suppose that the scribe thought that either the actual phrase or a sufficiently close approximation to it had been recorded in 176 and 178.

This way of retracting words or phrases written by the automatist by means of some such negatory comment as "no, not that," "no, that is different," is very common, and is usually, I believe, confined to cases where in the course of an attempt to express some new phrase or idea, an old phrase or idea, like—though not the same as—the new one has re-emerged by mistake.

The facts detailed above show that the occurrence of "pearl" in Mrs. Verrall's script is no haphazard affair, and tell in favour of the synthesis of "pearl" scripts propounded in this paper. "Pearls and a jasper gate" in 93 suggests the imagery of the 21st chapter of *Revelation*.

NOTE D.

MRS. VERRALL'S SCRIPT OF OCTOBER 27, 1905 (51), AND ITS
CONNEXION WITH 174, 176 AND 178.

(51) (Oct. 27, 1905)

[About 10 p.m. in train before Hatfield.]

Pathorne evangel S. Marco. Leone canequ dormientibus iuxta ipse sedet biblia sacra studiose legens. Apparet angelus cum magna pennata donaki quam Sancto dedit. quocirca quod nondum scriptum esset post haec aureochalcatis symbolis in papyrum pinxit ille magister.

Historiam bene cognitam dictitas. non facile vel credentibus acceptam. [With a lion and a dog asleep by his side, he himself sits, attentively reading the sacred books. An angel appears with a large winged pen, which he gave to the Saint. Wherefore what had not yet been written, that master thereafter painted upon the parchment in brazen signs. You repeat a story well known but not easily accepted even by believers.] But anyone will show you where the second pen took up S. Mark's narrative—right in the middle of a chapter.¹

There is a picture—is it at Perugia.

[Hatfield.]

It is not the St. Jerome story—quite another S. Marco.

“Evangel” does not occur again in Mrs. Verrall's script till May 1, 1907, the date of the script (174) in which she was instructed to “wait for a message” in connexion with “a special experiment” till May 13, 1907, the date on which 178 was written.

Consequently, by means of the catch-word “Evangel,” 51 is linked with 174 and 178; and, since 178 is a sequel to 176, 51 seems to be one of a series consisting of itself, 174, 176 and 178.

As we know, 176 and 178 present coincidences with Myers's *Venice*. I believe that 51 represents a partially successful, though muddled, attempt to refer to the same poem, and to

¹ On Oct. 29, 1905, Mrs. Verrall made the following note:—“A. W. V. [*i.e.* Dr. Verrall] says the end of St. Mark is lost; he has been reading this term an article on it in the *Hibbert Journal* for July. I find there that St. Mark xvi. 9-20 is, ‘as is well known, an old addition, added presumably by a certain Ariston.’” Mrs. Verrall at the time knew nothing of this.

some of the details found in the type of pictures described in it.

Thus, with *evangel S. Marco. Leone caneque dormientibus juxta ipse sedet biblia sacra studiose legens*, compare the following details in the pictures reproduced above:

- (1) St. Mark with the "sacred books" (Plates 2, 3, 5 and 7);
- (2) St. Mark with a lion at his feet or by his side (Plates 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7);
- (3) Near either St. Mark or his lion the motto of Venice *Pax tibi, Marce Evangelista meus* (Plates 1, 4 and 6), rendered in the poem "My peace be with thee, Mark Evangelist!"

The coincidences with the poem are verbal, and are as follows:

<i>Script.</i>	<i>Poem.</i>
"evangel S. Marco."	"Mark Evangelist."
"ille magister."	"that Venetian master."

If it should seem to the reader absurd to lay any stress on the second of these verbal coincidences, I would ask him to observe that the word *pinxit* ("he painted"), which immediately precedes *ille magister*, adds something to the coincidence, for "that Venetian master" of the poem is, of course, a painter.

That the script is about a picture is shown by the words "There is a picture"; and that the picture is an Italian one is suggested by the query "is it at Perugia?" and by St. Mark's name being twice given in its Italian form. The scribe, it should be noticed, recognises that there has been some confusion between the picture he is trying to describe and a picture connected with St. Jerome; for he remarks: "it is not the St. Jerome story—quite another S. Marco." I should explain the confusion in this way: The scribe wishes to make the automatist describe some of the details commonly found in the type of pictures described in *Venice*. So he begins by thinking of the patron Saint of Venice, St. Mark the Evangelist, book in hand, and his lion couchant at his feet. But once the automatist has got hold of the idea of a picture of a Saint with a book and a lion, it suggests to her pictures of St. Jerome, whose regular emblem is a lion, and who is very frequently represented studying "the sacred books" or trans-

lating them. Frequently, too, an angel is inspiring or dictating to St. Jerome. Hence the angel of the script. And in one picture, at least—and that one very familiar to Mrs. Verrall in a photographic reproduction—Carpaccio's "St. Jerome in his Study" (in the chapel of S. Giorgio dei Schiavoni at Venice), there is, as Ruskin says, a "happy white dog" "watching his master translating the Bible, with highest complacency of approval." And in Dürer's engraving with the same title—also known to Mrs. Verrall—St. Jerome is seated at a desk in the background, while in the foreground a lion and another animal, which some authorities call a dog and others a fox, are asleep. Hence the *leone canque dormientibus* of the script.

The script, then, is the resultant of a struggle between the scribe's thoughts and thoughts aroused thereby in the automatist's mind. On the whole the scribe managed to hold his own fairly well, for he succeeded in negating the allusions to St. Jerome, and in insisting on his original reference to St. Mark.

It may be that the emergence of the automatist's recollections of the St. Jerome picture was facilitated by there being latent in the scribe's consciousness a recollection of the picture by Palma Giovine (Plate 2), in which St. Mark and St. Jerome both appear with their respective lions.

It should be noted that this script (as also the script of August 15, 1906, discussed in Note E), was written after the publication of *Fragments of Prose and Poetry*, and accordingly after Mrs. Verrall was normally acquainted with the poem *Venice*.

NOTE E.

MRS. VERRALL'S SCRIPT OF AUGUST 15, 1906 (88), AND
ITS CONNEXION WITH 176 AND 178.

(88) (Aug. 15, 1906. 10 p.m.)



Mary Tredegan. on a long green slope crowned with

firs against a western sky.

There has been till to-night no trace of connexion but to-night we have made her understand. She has thought of the double thread.

Richard Hodgson is on her paper what's the line about not wanting to be a King in Hades— Achilles I mean, write that line. Phthia and a slave there.

The initial capital *V* with which this script opens is found again in none of Mrs. Verrall's scripts except 178. The *V* in 178, I have suggested, is the initial letter of the word Venice. Here, I fancy, it may have the same significance.

The words in 88 "on a long green slope crowned with firs against a western sky" may be compared with the words in 176: "Spires of flame like the tops of cypress trees, cypress tops against a pearly sky" (see pp. 183 and 193).

The last paragraph of 88 unmistakably refers to the passage in *Odyssey*, XI. 487-491, where Achilles says to Odysseus:

Nay, speak not comfortably to me of death, oh great Odysseus. Rather would I live attached to the soil (or, "above ground") as the serf of another, with a landless man who had no great livelihood, than bear sway among all the dead that be departed.

Now it was to these very words that reference was made in Mrs. Verrall's four early scripts of 1901 by means of the phrase *adscriptus glebæ*, "attached to the soil"¹; and these four early scripts contained reminiscences of the "Archytas" Ode, and also, I have suggested, allusions to Myers's *Immortality* and *On a Spring Morning at Sea*.

But 176 and 178 are connected with the "Archytas" Ode, and present coincidences with *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, and *Venice*. Hence, if I am right in connecting 176 and 178 with the first paragraph of 88, 88 links Achilles' speech to Odysseus with Myers's *Venice*; and so, I would argue, contributes another instance of contrasted forecasts of the future life.

The middle paragraph of 88 I interpret as follows:

"There has been till to-night no trace of connexion' between *Venice* and the words of Achilles to Odysseus. She (*i.e.* Mrs. Verrall) has previously got references to each

¹On a future occasion I hope to show that Dr. Maxwell's criticism of our interpretation of *adscriptus glebæ* as an allusion to *ἐπάρονος* (see pp. 114-115) is beside the mark.

separately, namely to Achilles' words in her early scripts of 1901, and to *Venice* in her script of Oct. 27, 1905 (see note D above); but hitherto she has never connected the two. 'But to-night we have made her understand. She has thought of the double thread.'"

If, then, my interpretation of this script, of Mrs. Verrall's script of October 27, 1905 (see Note D), and of her four early scripts of 1901, is right, Myers_P and Myers_V in 1907 constructed their answers to the Horace Ode Question largely out of old material taken from Mrs. Verrall's scripts. New illustrations were indeed introduced—namely, *Ode to Nature* and the lines from *Abt Vogler* by Myers_P, and the allusions to the Heavenly Jerusalem and so on by Myers_V; but the keynote was the same throughout.

It is by no means rare to find a subject being thus pursued, with what seems almost relentless and tiresome persistence, over a period of several years. It is a feature common to the scripts of Mrs. Verrall, Miss Verrall and Mrs. Holland, both jointly and severally. And one of the most interesting points about it is that only, as a rule, in the most obvious instances is the automatist aware of the reiterations; and, even when she is, she seldom sees the point of them. It has usually been reserved for a student of the scripts to trace the series of allusions—often taking very diverse shape—to a given subject running through a number of widely separated scripts, and to furnish a clue to their meaning. Sometimes, however, light has been thrown on the meaning of such a series occurring in the script of A by a comment or comments in the script of B, who in some cases has, and in others has not, been acquainted with A's scripts. Sometimes, too, Mrs. Verrall has traced such a series of allusions in her own or others' scripts, and worked out the meaning underlying them; but then she is in the exceptional position of playing at one time the *rôle* of automatist, at another that of student. In this case, however, it should be clearly understood that she is not responsible for the interpretation of any of the scripts discussed in this paper. Her only contribution was to point out that 176 and 178 contain verbal coincidences with *Venice*.

The ideas which eventually constituted the answers of

Myers_P and Myers_V to the Horace Ode Question had, then, it would seem, been lying dormant in Mrs. Verrall's script for several years. But they had been so cryptically or imperfectly expressed, had emerged in so disconnected a fashion and at such long intervals, that their meaning had escaped detection.

Then in 1907 the putting of a test-question about an Ode of Horace afforded—though quite undesignedly—an appropriate focus for the scattered fragments of former years. Myers_P and Myers_V seized the chance, and grouped the fragments round the "Archytas" Ode. But the fact of 176 being connected with the "Archytas" Ode was overlooked until 1912, and it was only then, when the connexion was for the first time recognised, that the entire series of fragmentary allusions in Mrs. Verrall's scripts between 1901 and 1907 could be put together so as to yield a coherent meaning.

When indexing and annotating Mrs. Verrall's scripts in 1910 and 1911, I had noted many of the verbal coincidences between 55, 88, 136, 140, 171, 174, 176, 178 and 180, which I have pointed out in the course of this paper. But, though fully alive to the importance of such coincidences as indicating how one script should be dovetailed with another, the unifying thought that explains and justifies the synthesis indicated by the superficial coincidences would have remained unrevealed, had not the connexion of 176 with the "Archytas" Ode supplied the clue.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOREGOING PAPER.

BY THE RIGHT HON. G. W. BALFOUR.

THERE are altogether four sets of scripts which bear on this case. These are:

- (1) Mrs. Verrall's scripts of 1901.
- (2) Mrs. Piper's scripts of 1907.
- (3) Mrs. Verrall's scripts of 1907.
- (4) Mrs. Piper's scripts of 1908.

Let us for the moment dismiss from our minds the first and last of these, and confine our attention entirely to the scripts of 1907. It was in that year that the Horace Ode Question was asked and answered, and it is with this question and the answer to it that we are primarily concerned.

The question was first put to Myers_p on Jan. 23, 1907: "Which Ode of Horace entered deeply into your inner life?". Any answer would be correct which pointed directly or indirectly to the Archytas Ode.

No direct answer was attempted; but if we are to accept Mr. Piddington's views, a satisfactory indirect answer may be elicited (1) from the Piper scripts taken alone, (2) from the Piper scripts and the contemporaneous Verrall scripts when compared together.

The Piper scripts taken alone connect the desired Ode of Horace (*a*) with certain lines in *Abt Vogler*; (*b*) with Myers's poem *Immortality*; (*c*) with the *Odyssey*, and so by implication—though this is conjectural—with the famous declaration of Achilles in the Underworld that a living serf is better off than a king among the dead. These literary references all have a bearing on man's state after death; and as this subject also forms the burden of the "Archytas" Ode, and as, moreover, the poem on *Immortality* seems to show some coincidence of language

as well as of thought with the "Archytas" Ode, an intention to indicate the latter as the Ode in question may be inferred with a great measure of probability.

Mr. Piddington further points out that, whereas in the "Archytas" Ode, in Myers's *Immortality*, and in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*, gloomy views are taken of man's hereafter, a different and happier conception of it inspires *Abt Vogler*. Accordingly he suggests that this also is intentional, and that Myers_p deliberately meant to call attention to the contrast. Here we are clearly on more doubtful ground, since there is no hint of such intention in the script itself.¹

I now pass to the connexion which Mr. Piddington believes he has discovered between the Horace Ode Question and certain of Mrs. Verrall's contemporaneous scripts. If he is right, the answer to the Horace Ode Question given in the Piper scripts is supplemented and confirmed by a cross-correspondence between those scripts and Mrs. Verrall's.

The five Verrall scripts cited by Mr. Piddington contain unmistakable allusions to mystic or legendary descriptions of the Abode of Blest.

The "island valley of Avilion" of the *Morte d'Arthur* and the "Heavenly City" of the *Apocalypse* are quite definitely referred to; and I am disposed to agree with Mr. Piddington that allusions are probably made to Myers's *Venice*, and perhaps also to his *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, both of which poems depict in celestial colours the future in store for those who have "passed through the body and gone."

It is clear, then, that we have here the elements of a cross-correspondence, man's future destiny forming the central topic round which all the scripts turn, and different views, favourable or unfavourable, of that destiny forming the subordinate topics distributed between the two automatists. What is not so clear is that the cross-correspondence is intentional, in other words, that the allusions in the Verrall scripts are meant by

¹ Mr. Piddington now connects the mention of Myers's *Ode to Nature* in the Piper sitting of April 17, 1907, with the "Archytas" Ode, whereas formerly he took it to refer to another Ode of Horace altogether, viz. C. iii. 4, which Myers_p ultimately rejected as not being the Horatian Ode which "entered most deeply into his inner life." For reasons which it is unnecessary to go into now, I believe his original interpretation was right. I have accordingly omitted all mention of the *Ode to Nature* from my remarks on the case.

the communicating intelligence to be taken as part of the answer to the Horace Ode Question.

If we confine our attention to the two sets of scripts produced in 1907, what reasons are there (apart from the general similarity of subject) for thus connecting them together?

Mr. Piddington gives one reason and one reason only. On May 7, the date of Script No. 176, which he interprets as referring to Myers's *Venice*, Mrs. Verrall, before beginning to write, deliberately fixed her attention on the "Archytas" Ode. From this circumstance Mr. Piddington thinks we are entitled to infer that the script which followed was intended by the "communicator" to be taken in connection with the Horace Ode Question. It is certainly noteworthy that a script produced under these conditions should be found capable of being fitted into the answer to that question. But I cannot regard the argument as by any means conclusive. The odds against such a coincidence are surely not so great as Mr. Piddington seems to imply. Mrs. Verrall produced only a limited number of scripts during the time that she had any reason for fixing her mind on the "Archytas" Ode, and of this limited number at least five, according to Mr. Piddington's own showing, are *capable* of being fitted into the answer to the Horace Ode Question.

On the other hand, there are two considerations which, so far as they go, seem to me to tell against Mr. Piddington's contention. The first of these is the complete absence from the Verrall scripts themselves of any hint of a connexion with the Horace Ode Question. The second is the possibility of connecting them with what, *prima facie* at least, must be regarded as a different topic altogether.

Mr. Piddington has not, I think, noticed in his paper that one of the five Verrall scripts which he quotes has been already cited by him (in Vol. XXII. of the *Proc.*) as belonging to the *ἀπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκίμων* series. I refer to Script No. 136, which contains the passage about "the island valley of Avilion where blows not any wind," etc. The date of this script is Feb. 12, 1907, and it was followed on Feb. 25 by another which quotes from the well-known passage in Tennyson's *Lucretius*, describing the abode of the Epicurean gods:

The lucid interspace of world and world
 Where never creeps a cloud, nor moves a wind,
 Nor ever falls the least white star of snow,
 Nor ever lowest roll of thunder moans,
 Nor sound of human sorrow mounts to mar
 Their sacred everlasting calm! and such
 Not all so fine, nor so divine a calm,
 Not such, nor all unlike it, man may gain
 Letting his own life go.

This script, like No. 136, is included by Mr. Piddington in the *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* series, and if it is legitimate to connect No. 136 with the Horace Ode series, I do not understand why the script of Feb. 25 is not entitled to the same distinction.

A "heavenly calm" may indeed be said to be a prominent feature in every one of the visionary Abodes of the Blest alluded to in the five Verrall scripts selected by Mr. Piddington as forming part of the answer to the Horace Ode Question, and all of them, it seems to me, might find an appropriate place in the *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* series. It is no doubt possible that they may have been intended to play a double part. I certainly do not summarily reject such a hypothesis; but I think it is one which should be received with caution.

On the whole, if account is taken of the 1907 scripts only, it does not appear to me that a strong case has been made out for the supposed cross-correspondence. Is any further light thrown upon the question by the Verrall scripts of 1901 or the Piper scripts of 1908?

Of the Piper scripts of 1908 (produced in America in the presence of Mr. Dorr, who was in complete ignorance that any question about an Ode of Horace had been either asked or answered), it may at once be said that, while they confirm in the strongest manner, and indeed in my judgment make practically certain, the general correctness of Mr. Piddington's interpretation of the answer given to it in the Piper scripts of the previous year, they give us no assistance in forming a conclusion on the further issue raised in his latest paper.

It is otherwise with the Verrall scripts of 1901. These scripts, which at first seemed little better than mere gibberish, are now turning out to be of great interest and possibly of

great importance. For they not only seem to associate the "Archytas" Ode with the stanzas on *Immortality* and with the *ἐπιφύρα* passage of the eleventh book of the *Odyssey* (thereby anticipating the Piper scripts of 1907 and 1908), but also—possibly—with Myers's lines *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, a poem which was not published until the year 1904. The elucidation of these early Verrall scripts we owe, like that of so many others, to the ingenuity of Mr. Piddington, and if his interpretation of them is correct, they practically contain, in skeleton, the whole of the answer to the Horace Ode Question which he reads into the subsequent Piper and Verrall scripts of 1907.

I shall probably be doing Mr. Piddington no injustice in surmising that had it not been for the early Verrall scripts of 1901 the idea of connecting the later Verrall scripts of 1907 with the answer to the Horace Ode Question would never have occurred to him. At the same time, I must frankly admit that the fact of the earlier and the later Verrall scripts both lending themselves to his interpretation is, to say the least of it, curious; and whatever the explanation of the fact may be, it does, I think, very materially corroborate his view of the case as a whole. I still cannot regard as definitely proved either the connexion of the Verrall scripts of 1907 with the Horace Ode Question, or the hypothesis of a deliberate cross-correspondence intended to suggest a contrast between the despairing and the hopeful conceptions of man's destiny after death. But the cumulative effect of the evidence does, in my judgment, make Mr. Piddington's interpretation plausible and even probable.

The question still remains, What is the significance of the entire incident, and what light does it throw upon the *source* from which the scripts emanate?

The new matter now brought forward by Mr. Piddington has a bearing on the answer to this question, as will presently be seen. But for the moment let us ignore it.

The outstanding point in the case will still be this: that the materials employed in providing a correct, though indirect, reply to the Horace Ode Question in the Piper scripts of 1907 and 1908 are also found conjoined in the early Verrall scripts of 1901.

Thus we have :

In V. Scripts of 1901.

Two quotations from the "Archytas" Ode.

"Sperne elegos quos audax composui" (probably an allusion to the poem *Immortality*).

Adscripta glebæ = ἐπιόρουπος.

In P. Scripts of 1907-8.

x = the "Archytas" Ode.

Ode to Immortality.

Odyssey—Achilles.

The coincidence can hardly be accidental. Nor can it be ascribed to any normal knowledge acquired by Mrs. Piper before 1907 of the early Verrall scripts, because these scripts, even if she had read them in Mrs. Verrall's volume published in October, 1906, must have been quite unintelligible to her without explanation, and no explanation had at that time been offered.

Nor again can we ascribe it to Mrs. Verrall's supraliminal consciousness, for her *conscious* understanding of the interest taken by Myers in the "Archytas" Ode would have suggested quite a different answer from that which Myers_p actually gives.

It would seem, therefore, that we must attribute the coincidence either to the action of some intelligence external to both automatists, or else to a supernormal communication of ideas between their subconscient selves. This latter is the hypothesis to which the cautious enquirer would naturally have recourse in the first instance, especially in view of the fact that the question started from Mrs. Verrall herself, that she knew the straightforward answer to it, and that the "Archytas" Ode already had associations in her own script, the significance of which might have been comprehended by her subliminal, though hidden from her normal, self.

The weak point in this explanation is that it takes no account of the origin of the early Verrall scripts. Are we to regard these as purely the work of Mrs. Verrall's subliminal imagination?

The references to the "Archytas" Ode might no doubt be due to subliminal memory of Myers's letter to Dr. Verrall, in which he specially emphasises the impression produced on his mind by lines 5 and 6 of the "Archytas" Ode:

"Aerias tentasse domos animoque rotundum
Percurisse polum morituro."

(It is from these very lines that the reminiscent phrases in the Verrall scripts of Mar. 5 and Apr. 27, 1901, are drawn.) Myers's letter was written in 1884, and had not been seen by Mrs. Verrall since the beginning of 1885; but there is nothing unusual in the emergence of a cryptic memory after that interval of time. References, on the other hand, to *Immortality* and to *On a Spring Morning at Sea* cannot be explained in this easy manner. For Mrs. Verrall is confident that she never saw either of these poems until several years later. She *might* be mistaken with respect to *Immortality*, which had been published in 1870 and again in 1875, although it had been long out of print in 1901. But she could hardly be mistaken as regards *On a Spring Morning at Sea*,¹ which did not see the light until it was published in *Fragments of Prose and Poetry* in 1904. *Immortality* also was reprinted in this volume, and was there read by Mrs. Verrall (as she firmly believes) for the first time.

If it be admitted that Mrs. Verrall never saw the two poems until 1904, it is obvious that the question whether her early scripts really do contain references to them becomes the most important of all the questions raised by the entire incident. An affirmative answer clearly carries with it the conclusion that some source of information other than her conscious or subconscious self must have been drawn upon in producing the scripts.

No doubt it might still be argued that the external source of information was the mind of some living person to whom the poems were known, and not the surviving personality of Frederic Myers; and that Mrs. Verrall's subliminal self, having acquired knowledge of the poems in this way, proceeded to weave it, together with other materials, into the texture which Mr. Piddington's ingenuity has at last succeeded in unravelling. While such a view cannot, I think, be definitely refuted, I will only say that it seems to me to throw a burden on Mrs. Verrall's subliminal consciousness which we cannot lightly accept for it.

If we believe that the early Verrall scripts contain allusions to poems by Myers which Mrs. Verrall had never seen or even heard of, and the communicator professes to be Myers

¹See, however, the Note appended to this Paper.

himself, the explanation which consists in accepting his statement is so much simpler than any other, that it is likely to commend itself to all but those who beg the question at issue by declaring survival to be *a priori* an impossibility; and once this was granted it would no longer be worth while to resist the conclusion that the answer given in the Piper scripts of 1907 to the Horace Ode Question had also been inspired from the same source.

But can we be sure that the early Verrall scripts do really allude to *Immortality* and *On a Spring Morning at Sea*? My own position is that I think these poems probably *are* alluded to, but that I could wish the evidence were stronger. Judgment on this point must rest in the main on the considerations set forth in a previous paper published by Mr. Piddington in Vol. XXIV. of the *Proceedings* (pp. 162-169); and to the account there given of the internal evidence to be derived from the scripts themselves I have nothing to add. The case, however, comes so near to affording a crucial test of the truth of survival, that any confirmatory evidence, slight though it may be, is yet of value.

We have seen that a certain group of references in the early Verrall scripts is subsequently utilised in the Piper scripts of 1907 to provide an answer to the Horace Ode Question. Now if to this group, as contained in the early Verrall scripts, we are to add allusions to *On a Spring Morning at Sea*, we should naturally expect that in this answer to the Horace Ode Question a corresponding allusion would appear. In the Piper scripts there is no trace of it; but if Mr. Piddington's latest theory is sound, our expectation would be equally well satisfied by finding the required allusion in one or more of the five Verrall scripts of 1907, which according to him form a cross-correspondence with the Piper answer to the question. Indeed, we should naturally look for it in the Verrall scripts rather than in the Piper scripts; for this cross-correspondence, if it be one, is in so far of the "complementary" type, that all the unfavourable provisions concerning a future life are allotted to Mrs. Piper, and to Mrs. Verrall none but favourable ones.

Mr. Piddington has given his reasons for believing that the Verrall Scripts 176 and 178 do actually contain references

to *On a Spring Morning at Sea*. These reasons may not be conclusive, but neither can they in my opinion be summarily set aside. It is not *certain* that this poem is alluded to in the early Verrall scripts; it is not *certain* that it is alluded to in the later. But the affirmative view can be plausibly maintained in both cases, and on independent grounds; and while two uncertainties do not make a certainty, two "fairly probables" may, and in this instance do, I think, go some way to corroborate each other.

Be that as it may, the case is undeniably one which deserves the serious attention of all who are interested in the evidence for personal survival after bodily dissolution.

NOTE.

Since this paper was sent to the printers Mrs. F. W. H. Myers (to whom a proof was submitted) has called my attention to the possibility, or even, as she thinks, the probability, that the poem *Immortality* and also *On a Spring Morning at Sea* were unconsciously seen by Mrs. Verrall in the early spring of 1901 when helping her to arrange and sort her late husband's papers. Manuscript copies of *On a Spring Morning at Sea* were lying, Mrs. Myers states, in note-books on the table of the study at Leckhampton, a room which Mrs. Verrall was often in at that time, and in the same room were also four copies of the early editions containing *Immortality*.

I sent Mrs. Myers's observations to Mrs. Verrall and have received from her the following reply dated from Switzerland, July 16, 1912:

It is possible that during my visits to Mrs. Myers in the early spring and summer of 1901, I may have seen, without noticing at the time, books or papers that were lying about in the library at Leckhampton House. Such a possibility I recognised in my comments on the allusions in my script to the *Symposium* incident (*Proc.*, Vol. XX., p. 317, footnote); though I feel certain that I took out no books from the shelves, and that I read no papers except such as were shown to me by Mrs. Myers or given to me to sort.

It is thus not impossible, though I think it unlikely, that at that time one or both of the poems, *Immortality* and *On a Spring Morning*

at Sea, came within the range of my normal knowledge, though not within my conscious observation.

Nor can it be actually proved that some knowledge of these poems had not been conveyed to me at an earlier period, before the inception of my automatic writing, at a time when I was not keeping careful record—as I have done since my experiments began—of anything likely to affect the contents of my script. It is, for instance, impossible for me to assert positively that neither the MSS. of the poems nor the printed *Immortality* (in the early volume) fell under my observation during one of my talks with Mr. Myers in his library.

All I can assert is (1) that Mr. Myers never read or quoted to me any unpublished poem of his, and (2) that when, upon its publication in October, 1904, I read with great interest and close attention the volume of *Fragments*, neither of these poems awoke in me the least recollection or suggestion of previous acquaintance. To the best of my belief I came across both poems for the first time in October, 1904.

The footnote to *Proc.*, Vol. XX., p. 317, is as follows:

“The proofs of *Human Personality* were in Mrs. Myers’s house at Cambridge where I was a frequent visitor during the spring and summer of 1901. It is therefore not impossible that I should have seen, without consciously noticing, the direct reference to Diotima in the first volume or the indirect allusion to the Dialogue in the second volume.”

This statement, published in 1906, was overlooked by me in preparing my paper, and the fact that the two poems *may* have come under Mrs. Verrall’s eye, whether they actually did so or not, does undoubtedly weaken the cogency of any inferences based on the contrary assumption.

I freely recognise, therefore, that certain of the expressions in the present paper are stronger than I should now feel justified in using; and I should have introduced some modifications into the text had not the substance of what I have written been already read to a meeting of the S.P.R. In the circumstances it seemed best to allow the text to remain unaltered, and append this Note to correct any mistaken impression which might otherwise be left in the reader’s mind.

A REPLY TO MR. BALFOUR'S OBSERVATIONS.

By J. G. PIDDINGTON.

MR. BALFOUR has laid his finger on a weak spot in my argument: namely, the reason I gave in support of my theory that Myers_v intended 176 to be read in connexion with the Horace Ode Question. I agree that I exaggerated the odds against the chance of this particular script proving relevant as an answer to the Horace Ode Question. I propose accordingly to substitute the following argument for the one offered on pp. 202-203:—

Mrs. Verrall's subconscious thoughts may be presumed to have been occupied with the Horace Ode Question between January 1, 1907, when she first formulated it, and June 2, 1907, when Mrs. Piper's sittings came to an end. During that period Mrs. Verrall wrote 57 scripts. Four of them (140, 171, 176 and 178) I claim as relating exclusively; three of them (136, 141¹ and 174) as relating partly to the Horace Ode Question.² It was apparent to me when indexing and collating Mrs. Verrall's scripts in 1910 and 1911 that these seven scripts are linked together by various devices, such as catch-words, cross-references, similar quotations or phrases. But though these superficial coincidences were then known to me, and though I was fully alive to the fact that coincidences of this kind usually betoken the existence in the scripts so linked of some deeper underlying meaning, I had no inkling of what this deeper meaning might be. To discover it a clue was needed. The clue had been there all the time—by which I

¹I have not hitherto claimed 141 as belonging to the Horace Ode Question group of scripts; but, as will appear later, a suggestion of Mr. Balfour's has now led me to do so.

²I say "partly," because I regard 136, 141 and 174 as relating also to the *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* topic. I make no mention here of 180, because it was not written until June 24, 1907, and so does not fall within the period in question.

mean the connexion established by Mrs. Verrall's experiment between the "Archytas" Ode and 176—but until January 1912 it was overlooked. When once it was perceived, the problem was solved. Now, though it cannot be said that the clue was attached to one of the seven scripts, it can be said that one of the seven scripts was attached to the clue. The odds against this being accidental are not so great as I represented them to be on p. 203, but they are still not negligible.

But even had they been as great as I previously represented them to be, there would still have been something wanting to make the evidence for design completely satisfactory. The want would have been met by a statement or hint in 176 to the effect that this script had reference to the Horace Ode Question; and had there been besides a hint that this script was meant as a counterpart to the answers to the Horace Ode Question given in Mrs. Piper's trance, it would have been better still. But no such statements or hints appear in 176 or in the scripts allied with it; and so we must content ourselves with the presumptive evidence to be derived from the coincidence that 176 was written immediately after Mrs. Verrall had been fixing her thoughts on the "Archytas" Ode. Nevertheless, although 176 contains no statement indicating a connexion between itself and the Horace Ode Question, 174 and 176 do contain statements which indicate that 174, 176 and 178 have to do with a special experiment, and that this experiment involves the answering of some question. The relevant passages are as follows:

I want you to try a special experiment. On May 13 wait for a message, I cannot tell how it will reach you—but there is some special interest in that day. Tell Helen too—she might help. Don't ask more—a veil is best—but in the end you will understand and find the record complete. (174.)

May 13 thirteen has been given you for a date.

Tell Helen to try for the answer then—and after that you shld [*sic*] write no more till we give the word. (176.)

As she wrote no script between March 18 and May 26, 1907, we can leave out of account the references to Miss

Helen Verrall, except in so far as they suggest that "the answer" is to be given partly through one automatist and partly through another: in other words, by means of a cross-correspondence.

Obviously part of "the answer" is to be given in Mrs. Verrall's script on May 13, 1907: the date of 178. But it is not necessary to conclude that 178, the script of May 13, 1907, is to be the only script of Mrs. Verrall's to convey this answer. It seems legitimate to assume that any script of hers between which and 178 a connexion can be clearly established may contribute to it.

Certain facts which I am about to cite create a fairly strong presumption that the "special experiment" requiring an answer had reference either to the *ἄπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* Question or to the Horace Ode Question, and more probably to the latter than to the former.

Two test-questions formed the subject of two experiments during the Piper sittings of 1906-1907. Both had been formulated by Mrs. Verrall, and were put to Myers_P at her instance: the Horace Ode Question on Jan. 23, and the *ἄπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* Question on Jan. 29, 1907. By March 13, 1907, Myers_P had shown knowledge of the associations of *ἄπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* with *In Memoriam* and with Myers's poem *To Tennyson*, and had given a satisfactory paraphrase of the three Greek words. But he had not named the author of them, Plotinus. Accordingly, Mrs. Verrall had sittings with Mrs. Piper on April 29 and 30, 1907, and explained to Myers_P that though, so far as it went, his answer to the *ἄπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* question was clear and satisfactory, he had not given the author's name. She also wished that Myers_P would display knowledge of the fact that a translation of the three Greek words occurs in *Human Personality*; but did not actually express her wish to him. Without going into details—which are fully given in *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 130-136 and 157-168—I may say that by the afternoon of May 6, 1907, Mrs. Verrall knew that Myers_P had satisfied her on both points: he had alluded to *Human Personality* and given the name Plotinus. Now, since these were admittedly the only associations wanting to round off and complete the answer of Myers_P, and as Myers_V had completed his answer as far back as March 11, 1907

(*id. ib.*, p. 116), it seems justifiable to assume that by the afternoon of May 6, 1907, Mrs. Verrall's immediate interest in the *ἀπὸς οὐρανοῦ ἀκύμων* experiment ceased.

But not so her interest in the other test-question, the Horace Ode Question. In this her interest was still alive, for so far (or so, at least, she thought) Myers_P had given no satisfactory answer to it.

The Horace Ode Question was first put to Myers_P on Jan. 23, 1907. Myers_P gave his first answer to it¹ on April 17, 1907; but Mrs. Verrall was told nothing about it, nor had she even been told that the question had ever been asked at all.

When Mrs. Verrall had her sitting with Mrs. Piper on April 29, 1907, Myers_P spontaneously referred to the subject of the Horace Ode Question. So completely, however, had the matter passed out of Mrs. Verrall's mind, that she did not understand the reference.² After the sitting she recalled the matter, and at the sitting next day, April 30, she herself put the Horace Ode Question to Myers_P, and asked for an answer. Then on May 4, she heard from Mrs. Sidgwick about the *Abt Vogler* quotation, and thought it might have been meant to identify the "Archytas" Ode. But in view of the fact that the *Abt Vogler* quotation had been given disconnectedly and without reference to the Horace Ode Question, she decided on May 7, 1907, before trying for script, to fix her mind on the "Archytas" Ode: her idea being that, if Myers_P had really meant the *Abt Vogler* quotation to be connected with the Horace Ode, she might thereby help him to establish the connexion clearly.

So it appears that while Mrs. Verrall's immediate normal interest in the *ἀπὸς οὐρανοῦ ἀκύμων* Question ceased on the afternoon of May 6, her normal interest in the Horace Ode Question continued at least until May 7, 1907, and possibly longer.

¹ Mrs. Sidgwick and myself were the only people who knew of this answer; and to both of us it seemed to be meaningless.

² It is perhaps not without significance that Myers_P spontaneously mentioned the Horace Ode Question to Mrs. Verrall at the sitting of April 29, for, an hour or so before the sitting began, 171—a certain Myers_V script—had been written; and 171 is the first script after 141 (written on Feb. 25, 1907) which, according to my interpretation at least, has any relevance to the Horace Ode Question.

Although it does not, of course, necessarily follow that, because Mrs. Verrall ceased on May 6 to be preoccupied in her normal state with the Plotinian Question, the consciousness concerned in the production of her scripts followed suit; still it does seem likely that the "script" consciousness should, like the normal consciousness, occupy itself with the incomplete rather than with the completed experiment. That in fact it did so, is rendered probable by a comparison of the scripts written while Mrs. Verrall was normally interested in both test-questions with the scripts written while she was interested in the Horace Ode Question only. The former, I hope to show, reflect both interests: the latter make far better sense if interpreted as answers to the Horace Ode Question, than they would, if interpreted as reverberations of the Plotinian topic.

In the course of producing the evidence on which I base these statements, I shall at the same time deal with an objection raised by Mr. Balfour. This objection may be formulated as follows:—There being no hint in those Verrall scripts which I have connected with the Horace Ode Question of such a connexion having been intended, it may be urged that all the scripts really belong to the series of *ἀπὸς οὐρανοῦ ἀκύμων* scripts, with which they show certain analogies and among which they would find an appropriate place. That as a matter of fact I have included one script, 136, in the Horace Ode series, which I had previously included in the *ἀπὸς οὐρανοῦ ἀκύμων* series; and that, to be consistent, I ought to have included another *ἀπὸς οὐρανοῦ ἀκύμων* script, that of Feb. 25, 1907. These two scripts, it is true, may possibly have been intended to belong to both series, but such a hypothesis must be received with caution.

As it may perhaps be a help to the reader, I will state in advance what form my answers to the points raised by Mr. Balfour will take. I shall maintain

- (1) that the script of Feb. 25, 1907 (which I shall in future refer to as 141) does belong, and should therefore be added, to the group of scripts—136, 140, 171, 174, 176, 178 and 180—which I have already connected with the Horace Ode Question;
- (2) that out of this group—as now enlarged by the addition

of 141—136, 141 and 174 relate to the *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* Question as well as to the Horace Ode Question;

- (3) that references to both topics were combined in 136 and 141, because for Myers_v the two topics were closely interwoven, as they had been in the mind of Frederic Myers; and
- (4) that if 140, 171, 176, 178 and 180 are referred, as Mr. Balfour suggests they might be, to the *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* topic, they contribute nothing of any importance; while if they are referred to the Horace Ode Question they contribute an intelligent and appropriate answer thereto.

Let us begin by considering 141, the script which I formerly connected with the Plotinian Question and am now prepared to connect as well with the Horatian Question. The text of it is as follows:

(141) (Feb. 25, 1907. 6.45 p.m.)

Not each but all United stand —a firm knit band —but, single, fall.

Test the weakest link but even that stands firm

I stretch my hand across the vaporous space, the interlunar space—'twixt moon and earth,—where the gods of Lucretius quaff their nectar.

Do you not understand?

The lucid interspace of world and world

Well that is bridged by the thought of a friend, bridged before for your passage, but today for the passage of any that will walk it, not in hope but in faith.

The bridge has been built from our side, it is our thought that builds it—but it rests on a pier of your founding,—not yours—of you only,—of all of yours

Non TUA opera, sed omnibus adiuvantibus qui in ista causa laborant.

[not by THY help, but with the assistance of all who labour in this cause.]

not *tua* but but *vestra* he means

R [*i.e.* Rector]

but he does not talk our language.

The *lucid interspace of world and world* is a quotation from Tennyson's *Lucretius*:

The Gods, who haunt
The lucid interspace of world and world,
Where never creeps a cloud, or moves a wind,
Nor ever falls the least white star of snow, . . .

Tennyson is here paraphrasing ll. 18-22 of the third book of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*.

Exactly the same idea of Elysian calm had already been implicitly expressed in 136 by means of a reference to the following lines from Tennyson's *Morte d'Arthur*:

the island-valley of Avilion;
Where falls not hail, or rain, or any snow,
Nor ever wind blows loudly . . .

which (see p. 188) are a paraphrase of *Odyssey*, IV. 566-568.

They appeared in the script in this form:

the island valley of Avilion where blows not any wind *nor ever falls the least light*—no not that but you have the sense—there falls no rain nor snow nor any breath of wind shakes the least leaf.

The words I have underlined seem clearly to be an attempt at the line—

“*Nor ever falls the least white star of snow*”—which belongs to the passage from Tennyson's *Lucretius* quoted in 141.

The passage from Tennyson's *Lucretius* is, I have said, an imitation of Lucretius, Book III. ll. 18-22, which are themselves in turn an imitation of the following passage in the Sixth Book of the *Odyssey* (ll. 42-45):

Athene . . . departed to Olympus, where, as they say, is the seat of the gods that standeth fast for ever. Not by winds is it shaken, nor ever wet with rain, nor doth the snow come nigh thereto, but most clear air is spread about it cloudless, and the white light floats over it. (Butcher and Lang's translation.)

The resemblance between *Odyssey*, IV. 566-568 (the original of the *Morte d'Arthur* passage) and *Odyssey*, VI. 42-45 (to which the *Lucretius* passage ultimately goes back) is obvious

at a glance, and is a matter of common knowledge to classical scholars.

Hence it is as certain as anything based merely on internal evidence, as apart from direct statements, can be, that the two Tennysonian quotations are meant to stand in close relation to each other, and that the quotation from *Lucretius* in 141 is an intentional reference back to the quotation from *Morte d'Arthur* in 136.

As there were, then, allusions, and closely related allusions, in 136 and 141 to the calm of external nature, I naturally—and, I think, rightly—included both in the series of *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* scripts.¹

While, however, retaining both in the *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* series, I have included 136 (for reasons explained on pp. 186 and 188), and I now include 141, in the series of Horace Ode Question scripts.

I include 141 in this series not simply because it links on to 136—though that is one of my reasons—but also because it links on to 174. The link that unites 141 with 174, as will be seen on reference to the appended copy of the latter, is the same link that unites 141 with 136: namely, the quotation from Tennyson's *Lucretius*.

(174) (May 1, 1907. 10.50 a.m.)

Evangel

then speed the word

Sleep Death's twin brother

I stretch my hand across the gulf of time—that was said before to you. the intervening space twixt world and world, the lucid inter-space. I want you to try a special experiment. On May 13 wait for a message I cannot tell how it will reach you—but there is some special interest in that day. Tell Helen too—she might help. Don't ask more—a veil is best—but in the end you will understand and find the record complete.

Try to say the eagle soaring over Plato's tomb.

(*Drawing of bird with large outspread wings.*)

¹I included them in this series solely because they possessed a certain psychological interest (see *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 112-113), not because I attached any evidential value to them. Lately, for reasons explained in a separate note on pp. 245-250, I have come to attach considerable evidential importance to them.

write slowly for him to repeat again

VAGITUS Wailing

κωκυτος [wailing.]

We cease and may the blessings of the Most High rest on you
all Farewell ($\frac{+}{+}$) R [*i.e.* Rector.]

The sentence beginning "I stretch my hand" and ending "lucid interspace"¹ is an unquestionable, and also a deliberate reference back to the passage in 141 beginning "I stretch my hand" and ending "the lucid interspace of world and world."

But, like 136 and 141, 174 contains matter relating to the *ἀπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* case; for the words "the eagle soaring over Plato's tomb" are a quotation of a quotation applied to Plotinus in *Human Personality* (Vol. II., p. 261).²

We have arrived, then, at this position: 136, 141 and 174 contain matter relevant to the *ἀπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* Question; and 136 and 174 matter relevant to the Horace Ode Question. But I have claimed 141 as belonging to both series. What matter, then, does it contain relevant to the answer to the Horace Ode Question?

In my opinion the whole of 141, including the Lucretian passage, forms part of the answer to the Horace Ode Question given by Myers_v in the following group of Verrall scripts, 140, 171, 174, 176, 178 and 180; into which group 141 is entitled to enter by virtue of its correlation with 174.

The whole of 141 insists on the need of co-operation between incarnate and discarnate spirits; and one passage in it—"The bridge has been built from our side, it is our thought that builds it"—speaks of the preponderant share borne by the

¹Note that this sentence is followed immediately, without the slightest break in the writing, by the reference to the "special experiment" which is to form the subject of a message in the script of May 13 (178).

It may also be noted that both 141 and 174 are signed by Rector on behalf of the communicator (whom the internal evidence shows to be Myers_v): a fact which suggests that both these scripts are intended to form part of a cross-correspondence with Mrs. Piper. Only two other scripts of Mrs. Verrall's during the period contemporaneous with the Piper sittings of 1906-1907 are signed by Rector.

²The significance of the appearance of this quotation in 174 is explained in *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 131-133.

discarnate in that co-operation. But these are the very themes of Myers's *Venice*, and of that passage in his almost contemporaneous *Presidential Address*, which, as I have previously pointed out (see footnote to p. 205), reproduces in prose the thought poetically expressed in *Venice*.

To appreciate the parallelism fully the reader should peruse the whole of the 9th paragraph of Myers's *Address (Proc., Vol. XV., pp. 122-123)*. Meanwhile I will copy here the specially pertinent sentences :

The new conception is neither of benefactors dead and done for, inspiring us automatically from their dates in an almanac . . . ;—but rather of a human unity, . . . wherein every man who hath been or now is makes a living element ;—inalienably incorporate, and imperishably co-operant, and joint-inheritor of one infinite Hope. . . .

It is they [*i.e.* the blessed dead], not we, who are working now ; they are more ready to hear than we to pray. . . .

Nay, it may be that our response, our devotion, is a needful element in their ascending joy ; and God may have provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect ; *ut non sine nobis consummarentur*.¹

So I regard 136 and 141 as double-barrelled scripts, designedly framed in such a manner as to be relevant to both test-questions. To Mrs. Verrall, in her normal state at least, the *ἀπὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* and the Horace Ode Questions were two absolutely distinct things. But to Myers, they were not. To him—or, if you will, to it—they were yoked by a natural association of ideas. For, while one was concerned with the Ode of a pagan poet, who would never have uttered his hopeless “Eat and drink ; for to-morrow we die,” had he

¹ *Ut non sine nobis consummarentur*, it will be remembered (see p. 205), was the motto affixed to *Venice* in a MS. copy of it sent by Myers to a friend. Mrs. Verrall saw a copy of this MS. in 1903. She did not, however, recognise the source of the motto, from which the important word *sine* had been accidentally omitted, until a year or two later, perhaps in 1905. It is conceivable that in 1905, or at some time previous to the dates of 141 and 174, the motto affixed to the poem in the MS. copy reminded her of the passage in Myers's *Presidential Address* into which the same motto is introduced ; and that this may explain the connexion of 141 (which seems to reflect the passage in the *Address*) with 174 and the other “*Venice*” scripts. But if this was so, it at any rate strongly enforces my view that 176, 178 and 180 allude to Myers's *Venice*.

known of man's "kinship and community in the firmament of souls"; the other bore upon the *conditions* under which the realisation of this kinship and community could best be attained.

That it was appropriate for a personality who claims to be Frederic Myers thus to fuse these two distinct subjects, the reader will, I think, agree, if he will study carefully the 8th and 9th paragraphs of Myers's *Presidential Address* (*Proc.*, Vol. XV., pp. 119-123) and sections 1013 and 1014 of *Human Personality* (Vol. II., pp. 290-291).¹

But for the sake of argument let us accept Mr. Balfour's suggestion and assume that 171, 174, 176, 178 and 180 have no reference to the Horace Ode Question and are really *ἄτρός οὐρανός ἀκύμων* scripts;² and consider whether they contribute matter relevant thereto, and, if so, whether this matter is of any interest or of evidential value.

I may say at once that they do contain matter vaguely applicable to the Plotinian topic—as, indeed, on the hypothesis that the answers to the two test-questions were drawn from a common range of ideas, might have been expected; but in my opinion it has neither interest nor evidential value.

The passage of Plotinus, from which the words *ἄτρός οὐρανός ἀκύμων* come, lays down the conditions essential to communion with the Divine Soul; and one of these conditions is the complete tranquillity of external nature: "Calm be the earth, the sea, the air, and let Heaven itself be waveless."

To this condition the reference to "the lucid interspace of world and world" in 174, to "a pearly sky no movement" in 176, to *On a Spring Morning at Sea* and Wordsworth's *Peete Castle* in 178, to "the melted Pearl of sky and sea" in 178 and 180, may be supposed to relate. If the phrases in 171, 176 and 178 reminiscent of the *Apocalypse* are regarded as allusions

¹I would direct his attention especially to the passage about "a Plato and a Newton" in the *Address*, because it exactly reverses what Horace says about Archytas in the first six lines of the "Archytas" Ode; and to "the cloud encompassing of unforgetful souls" in the 1013th section of *Human Personality*, because it seems like a reminiscence of part of the context ("we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses") of *ut non sine nobis consummarentur*.

²It is unnecessary to take 136 and 141 into account here, because I agree that they do in part belong to the *ἄτρός οὐρανός ἀκύμων* group.

to the Heavenly Jerusalem, they might be taken in the same sense; but they might be regarded as allusions to the vision of John ("I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day") suggested by the ecstatic vision of Plotinus. These are the only references which, so far as I can see, could be claimed as having any relevancy to the *ἄνωγος οὐρανόσ ἀκύμων* topic. Let us now compare them with the earlier references to this topic in Mrs. Verrall's script: that is to say, with the references which began on February 12 and ended on March 11, 1907 (see *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 112-118).¹

The script of February 12, 1907 (136) quoted the lines from Tennyson's *Morte d'Arthur* descriptive of the calm of the island-valley of Avilion. This was followed on Feb. 25, 1907 (141) by the quotation from Tennyson's *Lucretius* descriptive of the "sacred everlasting calm" of the gods. This again was followed on March 6, 1907, by a quotation from Section XI. of Tennyson's *In Memoriam*: "Calm is the sea—and in my heart if calm at all, if any calm, a calm despair"; and to it this comment was appended: "That is only part of the answer—just as it is not the final thought. The symphony does not close upon despair but on harmony. So does the poem. Wait for the last word."

But there was no need for "the last word" to be spoken, for sufficient clues had already been afforded to make the purport of these scripts plain. Starting from Tennysonian passages descriptive of nature at peace (the *Morte d'Arthur* and *Lucretius* passages) the scribe had led up to a passage (*In Memoriam* XI. and XII.) where a trance, occurring under some, though not all, of the conditions laid down by Plotinus as essential to communion with the Divine, brings no assurance of reality;² and then had indicated that *In Memoriam* contains another passage which would be found to harmonize more closely with the context of *ἄνωγος οὐρανόσ ἀκύμων*. Following

¹After March 11 there is nothing in Mrs. Verrall's scripts which seems to bear upon the *ἄνωγος οὐρανόσ ἀκύμων* topic until April 29, 1907 (the date of 171), except the following sentence on March 27, 1907: "The *In Memoriam* passage is not the only one I have explained to you—there are others, which perhaps are not clear."

²The earth, sea and air are calm, but the poet's heart is filled with "wild unrest." Hence true ecstatic communion does not ensue. (See *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 19-20.)

the hints thrown out by her script, Mrs. Verrall made the discovery that Sections XCIV. and XCV. of *In Memoriam* describes a trance which took place under all the conditions laid down by Plotinus, and resulted first in communion with a discarnate spirit and at its culmination in communion with the Divine.

The parallelisms between *In Memoriam* XI., XII., XCIV. and XCV. were, to the best of our belief, revealed for the first time by Mrs. Verrall's script; for, so far as we can discover, they had not been observed by any of the commentators, and they were not within Mrs. Verrall's normal knowledge. Additional interest, moreover, was lent to the parallelism with *In Memoriam* XCIV. and XCV. by the discovery that the actual language in which Tennyson there records the conditions antecedent to his trance appears to reflect the language used by Plotinus in the *ἀπὸς οὐρανοῦ ἀκύμων* passage.

Now, whatever view be taken of the source of this answer, its great originality, effectiveness and appropriateness must be admitted. On the other hand, the passages in 171, 174, 176, 178 and 180, which, for argument's sake, we are assuming to be connected with the *ἀπὸς οὐρανοῦ ἀκύμων* topic, either merely reproduce illustrations of nature at peace given in earlier scripts (*e.g.* the quotation from *Lucretius* in 174), or merely accumulate fresh illustrations of the same topic (*e.g.* the "Elysian quiet" of Wordsworth's *Peele Castle*, of the Heavenly Jerusalem, of *On a Spring Morning at Sea* and *Venice*) which, not being associated in any way with ecstasy, have no particular point; or allude to a vision, that of John in *Revelation*, which presents no analogy, as do the trances of *In Memoriam* XII. and XCV., to the Vision of Plotinus. Regarded, then, as contributions to the *ἀπὸς οὐρανοῦ ἀκύμων* topic, I must pronounce these passages to be either vain repetitions, or inappropriate or otiose reverberations, and as falling very far below the standard of the earlier references.

A priori it would not be surprising to find pointless repetitions and stale rehashes in automatic script or speech; and in fact they are not uncommon features of Mrs. Piper's trances. In Mrs. Verrall's case repetitions and reverberations are plentiful enough; but the longer I study her script, the more clearly have I come to realise that they are rarely otiose. As a general rule they either serve the purpose of useful, sometimes of

indispensable, guides through the maze, and indicate how various topics or scripts, apparently disconnected, are to be synthesized; or else they are devices for effecting a transition from one idea to another of similar, though not identical, character.¹

Hence I am not readily disposed to consider the references in 171, 174, 176, 178 and 180 which we have been discussing, as otiose reverberations of the *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* subject. If, however, they really are, then it must not be lost sight of that they possess the remarkable property of being convertible into an appropriate answer to the Horace Ode Question. Whether in so converting them I have gone beyond the intentions of the communicator, is a question that I must leave to the reader to decide.

In conclusion I should like to express my thanks to Mr. Balfour for his comments on my paper. They have proved instructive and suggestive in various ways, and have enabled me to perceive connexions between the answers given by Myers to the two test-questions which otherwise would have escaped my observation.

¹ An example of this can, I think, be seen in the quotation from Tennyson's *Lucretius* common to 141 and 174. In 141 it is used as an illustration of nature at peace; in 174 as an illustration of an Abode of the Blest.

VI.

TWO TENNYSONIAN QUOTATIONS IN
MRS. VERRALL'S SCRIPTSRELATING TO THE *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* CASE.

BY J. G. PIDDINGTON.

In my account of the *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων* case (*Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 107-172) I treated the references in 136 to the island-valley of Avilion,

Where falls not hail, or rain, or any snow,
Nor ever wind blows loudly ;

and the references in 141 to

The lucid interspace of world and world,
Where never creeps a cloud, or moves a wind,
Nor ever falls the least white star of snow,

as possessing only a general relevancy (*id. ib.*, pp. 112-114). I supposed either that their emergence was due to Mrs. Verrall's thoughts having been directed by the Plotinian passage to descriptions of nature at peace; or else that these two Tennysonian passages had served to smooth the way towards the desired goal, namely, other Tennysonian passages (*In Memoriam*, XI, XCIV., and XCV.), where trance occurs during a profound calm.

But I have since noticed a fact which suggests that the references to the *Morte d'Arthur* and *Lucretius* passages may possess a far more pointed significance.

As previously stated (see p. 188), the *Morte d'Arthur* passage is modelled on *Odyssey*, IV. 566-568, and the *Lucretius* passage on *Lucretius*, III. 18-22, which in turn is modelled on *Odyssey*, VI. 42-45. Now, neither Tennyson, *Lucretius*, nor Homer in these passages touches upon trance or ecstasy or the conditions

favourable thereto. There is, however, a passage in the *Dissertationes* of the little-known and less read Platonic philosopher, Maximus of Tyre, where both the *Odyssey* passages (the originals of the Lucretian and Tennysonian imitations) are in the most direct manner connected with the subject of ecstatic intuition.

The soul, according to Maximus, has a higher and a lower reason. While the lower is concerned with the things of sense, with the higher we may see God, even while in the body, if freed for a moment from the tumult of the sensuous world.

If with upright and steadfast soul a man gaze without growing dizzy on that unsullied light, and look not back earthwards; if he stop his ears, and turn his sight and all his other senses inwards upon himself; if, utterly unheeding of earthly cares and afflictions, of pleasures and honours, of glory and infamy, he let himself be led by true reason and steadfast love . . . then, as he goes thitherwards and leaves the world behind him, always that which is in front of him shall grow clear and brilliant, prelude, as it were, the Godhead. So, as he travels on, he shall hear the Godhead, and, the journey done, shall behold it face to face.

Yet his journey's goal is not the firmament of heaven, nor such bodies as are therein, . . . but he must pass beyond these, and overstep the firmament¹ until he reach the real goal and its perfect calm,

“Where neither is great winter-storm, nor is it ever wet with rain; but most clear air is spread about it cloudless,¹ and the white light floats upon it”;

and where no fleshly affection, such as vexes the wretched soul here below, can trouble the vision.²

(*Dissertationes*, XVII. 10-11.)

In this passage Maximus combines *Odyssey*, IV. 566 and VI. 43-45 in a curious and unmetrical manner, quoting neither correctly, as the following comparison will show:

¹ Compare the paraphrase given in Mrs. Piper's trance of the words *αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκίμων*: “Cloudless sky beyond the horizon” (*Proc.*, Vol. XXII., p. 126).

² The above is a close paraphrase, but does not profess to be a literal translation.

HOMER.

οὐ νιφετὸς, οὔτ' ἄρ' χειμὼν πολλὸς, οὔτε
 ποτ' ὄμβρος.
Od., IV. 566.
 . . . οὔτ' ἀνέμοισι τινάσσεται οὔτε
 ποτ' ὄμβρω
 δέεται οὔτε χιῶν ἐπιπίλναται, ἀλλὰ
 μάλ' αἴθρη
 πέπταται ἀνέφελος, λευκὴ δ' ἐπιδέ-
 δρομεν αἴγλη.
Od., VI. 43-45.

MAXIMUS OF TYRE.

ἔνθ' οὐκ ἔστ' οὔτ' ἄρ' χειμὼν πολλὸς,
 οὔδ' ἐ ποτ' ὄμβρω
 δέεται, ἀλλὰ μάλ' αἴθρη
 πέπταται ἀνέφελος, λευκὴ δ' ἐπιδέ-
 δρομεν αἴγλη.

Since the *Morte d'Arthur* passage is an imitation of *Odyssey*, IV. 566-568, and the *Lucretius* passage is an imitation of *Lucretius*, III. 18-22, which is in turn an imitation of *Odyssey*, VI. 43-45, **136** and **141** together may in a sense be said to combine the two passages here combined by Maximus of Tyre. But as a matter of fact **136** alone combines the two Homeric passages, and does so in much the same way as Maximus of Tyre, as the following comparison shows:

“the island valley of Avilion
 where blows not any wind none
nor ever falls the least light—...
 there falls no rain nor snow nor
 any breath of wind shakes the
 least leaf.”

“... the island-valley of Avilion ;
 Where falls not hail, or rain, or
 any snow,
 Nor ever wind blows loudly.”

Tennyson's *Morte d'Arthur*.

“The lucid interspace of world
 and world,
 Where never creeps a cloud, or
 moves a wind,
Nor ever falls the least white star
 of snow.”

Tennyson's *Lucretius*.

In view of these coincidences, I find it difficult to believe that the quotations from Tennyson's *Morte d'Arthur* and *Lucretius* in **136** and **141** were not intended to connect the passage from Maximus of Tyre quoted above with the αἰτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκύμων topic.

I came across the passage from the *Dissertationes* about the

end of October 1910: not, however, in the original, but in Dill's *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*. On pages 421-423 of this book Dill, in the course of giving some account of the philosophy of Maximus, paraphrases concisely various passages in *Dissertationes*, IV., VIII., X., XVI., and XVII. The particular passage in *Dissertationes*, XVII., with which we are concerned, he paraphrases thus:

It is by this higher faculty that God is seen, so far as He may be, in this mixed and imperfect state. For the vision of God can only in any degree be won by abstraction from sense and passion and everything earthly, in a struggle ever upwards, beyond the paths of the heavenly orbs, to the region of eternal calm "where falls not rain or hail or any snow, but a white cloudless radiance spreads over all" (p. 421).

When I read this passage in Dill's book (which was first published in 1904) it reminded me at once of 136 and 141; and I naturally suspected that Mrs. Verrall had read it, and read it before 1907. Accordingly I wrote and asked her—without, however, explaining the reason for my question—whether she had read Dill's *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*.

She wrote in reply on Nov. 5, 1910, as follows:

I have never read Dill's *Roman Society, etc.*, nor seen the book—though of course I know of its existence, and have probably read reviews.

I cannot, of course, pretend to prove that the passage quoted above has not been reproduced in some review of Dill's book; but a passage of this kind, half summary and half paraphrase, is not at all a likely one to be selected by a reviewer for quotation.

I next wrote and asked Mrs. Verrall—again without explaining why I wanted the information—whether she had ever read the *Dissertationes* of Maximus of Tyre. Her reply, dated Nov. 7, 1910, was a large and emphatically underlined "No."

Here again it is impossible, of course, to exclude the possibility of Mrs. Verrall's having come across *Dissertationes*, XVII., in an "Unseen Translation" paper, or in some such way; but to those who know the kind of passages selected for "Unseen

Translation" at the Universities, and who are good enough Grecians to appreciate how crabbed the style of Maximus is in this passage—if, indeed, the text is not corrupt—this possibility will appear to be remote.

Having learnt that Mrs. Verrall had read neither Dill's book nor the *Dissertationes*, it occurred to me to inquire whether Frederic Myers had been acquainted with the writings of Maximus of Tyre. I accordingly searched through Myers's books, and found the following reference to the *Dissertationes* in his Essay on Greek Oracles (*Essays Classical*, p. 60):—

Alexander himself consulted Zeus Ammon not only on his own parentage but as to the sources of the Nile, and an ingenuous author regrets that, instead of seeking information on this purely geographical problem, . . . Alexander did not employ his prestige and his opportunities to get the question of the origin of evil set at rest for ever.

Who the "ingenuous author" is, is explained by a foot-note—"Max. Tyr. *Diss.* 25"—appended to this sentence.¹

This—the only reference that I have traced in Myers's writings to Maximus of Tyre—establishes the fact that Myers had some acquaintance with the *Dissertationes*. And he may well have been familiar with them, for, as is well known and as his writings bear witness, he was deeply read in Neoplatonic literature, and Maximus of Tyre was a 2nd century precursor of the Neoplatonists of the 3rd century.

Moreover, Myers's study of the Daemon of Socrates (see *Proc.*, Vol. V., pp. 538-543, and *Human Personality*, Vol. II., pp. 95-100) is likely to have sent him to the *Dissertationes* of Maximus, since they are one of the sources of information on this subject (see *Dissertationes*, XIV. and XV.).²

In *Proceedings*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 16-19, I have given a list of nine instances of what I have called "literary personation" of Frederic Myers by Myers_V, Myers_{HV}, and Myers_P.

These instances, however, with the probable exception of the eighth, are not on all fours with the apparent knowledge

¹ "*Diss.* 25" = *Diss.* XLI. in Dübner's edition: the edition to which I have given references.

² L. F. Lélut in *Le Démon de Socrate*, which Myers (*loc. cit.*) criticises adversely, thrice at least refers to Maximus and his *Dissertationes*. For this, if for no other reason, Myers's attention is likely to have been drawn to them.

of a passage in the *Dissertationes* shown by Myers_v; for in them the "literary personation" was effected by means of allusions to passages in the writings of Frederic Myers which had been, or may reasonably be supposed to have been, within the cognisance of the automatist in whose script the allusions appeared.

The present case is rather to be compared with those cases where an automatist's script has contained allusions to passages in literature with which she herself to the best of her knowledge and belief has never been acquainted, but which either certainly or probably had once been within the range of Myers's knowledge (see *Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 23-30, 98-120, 128-133, 138-141, 142-144, 144-150; Vol. XXV., pp. 246-250; and above pp. 191-194 and footnotes to p. 194).

SUPPLEMENT.

REVIEW.

Les Hallucinations Télépathiques, by N. VASCHIDE. 100 pp. ("Bibliothèque de Psychologie Expérimentale et de Métapsychie." Librairie Bloud et Cie. Paris, 1908).

It must be by an oversight that this interesting little book, published posthumously, has not yet been reviewed in our *Proceedings*, for it is in effect an attack on an important part of the work of the S.P.R. The author, who was, as he tells us on p. 28, led to the investigation of telepathy by perusal of *Phantasms of the Living*, found that the results of his own observations did not agree with those arrived at in that work. In his opinion this is probably due to want of intimate acquaintance by the authors of *Phantasms of the Living* with the psychological conditions affecting their percipients; but examination seems to us to show that it is chiefly due to the fact that his own observations concern a different order of phenomena from that with which he compares them.

M. Vaschide made his observations on the experiences of thirty-four persons—friends or colleagues of his own, or persons with whom he was intimately associated—twenty-one of whom were Roumanian and thirteen French men or women. During periods varying for different persons from six months to nine years, the average period being between four and five years, he noted down at the time of its occurrence every "telepathic hallucination" experienced by those persons which came to his notice, and compared them with the contemporaneous condition of the supposed agent. He thus noted 1374 experiences! This gives an average of over forty per head. Only one person had as few as two such experiences, and this person was observed for four years. On the other hand, one person had 100 experiences in the two years during which he was observed, or on an average nearly one a week; and another person, a woman, had 172 experiences

noted by M. Vaschide in the course of five years. These figures are certainly startling. It appears, however, that M. Vaschide merely means by "hallucinations télépathiques" an experience having some sort of sensory quality, and suggesting in some way to the percipient a definite person at a distance. He does not regard the term telepathic as implying that any communication otherwise than through the ordinary channels of sense actually occurred between agent and percipient. This is clear, because in only forty-eight of the 1374 cases did he find any real coincidence between the "hallucination" and the condition of the agent, counting as a coincidence a certain amount of agreement between the state of the agent and the impression of the percipient within a period of from six to sixty hours.¹ It is an interesting fact, however, that in 1325 of the 1374 cases the percipients believed, presumably at the time of the experience, that it was veridical; and we are left to infer that for the most part their confidence was not disturbed by subsequent discovery that the coincidence was inadequate. Some explanation could always be found—some adaptation of recollections on comparing notes with the agent. The possibility of such persistent though misplaced confidence is not surprising to the psychical researcher; what is new is the scale on which with M. Vaschide's subjects it actually occurred. This is probably due to an uncritical habit of mind induced by the social *milieu* in which the percipients lived, in which one gathers that belief in the frequency of a kind of second sight was very general.

Quite apart from questions of veridicality, however, M. Vaschide's numbers would be very surprising—indeed almost incredible, as his percipients are apparently ordinary sane and healthy people—if he meant the same thing by "hallucination" as is meant in *Phantasms of the Living* and in the *Proceedings* of the S.P.R. generally. From the specimens he gives us in detail, however, it would appear that his "hallucinations" are not those fully externalised hallucinations—hallucinatory percepts which lack, but can only by distinct reflection be recognised as lacking, the objective basis which they suggest—which have been the subject of statistical investigation by the S.P.R. They seem, on the contrary, to be the phenomena called in our Census of Hallucinations (after Kandinsky) pseudo-hallucinations. These appear to the percipient to be seen with the eye of the mind, not the bodily eye; to be heard with the mental, not the bodily, ear. The degree of externalisation was not apparently a matter of

¹ Apparently none were closer than six hours.

enquiry by M. Vaschide, and it is even possible that he never came across a case of really externalised hallucination, at least of a visual sort.

M. Vaschide gives interesting classifications of the content of the impressions, but describes only four "hallucinations visuelles" specifically—one experienced by a Madame N. and three by himself. Madame N.'s impression, which occurred while she was at supper, was like a clear vision of her daughter dying (*comme la vision claire de sa fille mourante*) wrapped in white sheets and on the point of yielding her last breath. Madame N. was in some anxiety about her daughter, but did not know that she was ill with typhoid fever and that fifteen hours earlier she had gone through the crisis of the illness. The experiences of Monsieur Vaschide himself which he describes were connected with the death of his father, who was seventy-three years of age and ill, and about whom his son was feeling anxious. Coming in with his wife, the latter remarked that she had an impression of the smell of quinces¹—a smell which she recognised as characteristic of his father's house, distant three days' railway journey. Thereupon he saw his father dying (*à ce rappel j'ai vu mon père mourant*). As he learnt afterwards, his father had died seven hours earlier. The day before he had had "une hallucination vague de son regard bleu et doux," and on the evening of his death—perhaps while he was dying—he had had a "hallucination" of his state (*j'avais eu hallucination de son état*). He saw him as he had left him, with his habitual expression and gestures, and he seemed to have greatly changed.

Any one who takes the trouble to compare these experiences, the only visual ones described in detail by M. Vaschide, with Mrs. Bettany's case described in *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I. Chap. v. § 3, or with those given in Chap. vi. § 5 of the same volume, or with Chap. iv. of the "Census of Hallucinations," S.P.R. *Proceedings*, Vol. X., will, we think, agree with us that they should be classified as pseudo-hallucinations. Such experiences may be very impressive, but may easily be the reverse and, like dreams, easily forgotten.²

¹Olfactory impressions were unexpectedly frequent among the "hallucinations télépathiques" noted by M. Vaschide, more so than tactile impressions. He recorded seventy-four, he tells us.

²The distinction between hallucinations and pseudo-hallucinations is not of course in vividness or impressiveness. Some of the pseudo-hallucinations described in the chapters of *Phantasms* and of the "Census" referred to above were very vivid and impressive. On the other hand, the colourless and somewhat formless figures seen by Dr. Henry Head's patients when suffering from

They are not experiences to which we have attempted to apply any statistical method of investigation, and there is, therefore, nothing in the publications of the Society with which M. Vaschide's results are exactly comparable. This is indeed the reason why his results are new and interesting. He has had an opportunity of observing, at the time of their occurrence, evanescent phenomena, the frequency of which in any circle it would be otherwise impossible to ascertain, and of showing how little the impression of the percipients in his circle that they are veridical is warranted. It is only to be regretted that he has not given a fuller account of his observations, and especially particulars of more of the actual experiences.

The 1374 experiences noted by M. Vaschide consisted of 962 visual, 298 auditory, 74 olfactory, and 40 tactile cases.¹ The percentage of what he counts as coincidental cases as defined above was 3.49. He gives rather more particulars about the Roumanian results. The total of these was 1011 with forty coincidences (3.96 per cent.), of which in nineteen cases the percipient's experience preceded and in twenty-one followed the corresponding event in the agent's life. There were 740 visual cases among the Roumanian ones, of which twenty-one (2.84 per cent.) are counted by M. Vaschide as coincidental. M. Vaschide is sceptical about the applicability of a mathematical calculation of chances to any real facts so far as I understand him, and at any rate to psychological facts. And certainly it is difficult to see how it could be applied to his figures in the absence of any definition of the event in the agent's life with which coincidence is to be counted, or knowledge of the frequency of that event. However, without calculation he expresses confidence (p. 81) that the coincidences he has observed exceed what chance alone would give (*la veracité de ces 48 cas de coincidences . . . montre suffisamment qu'elles*

visceral disease (see Mr. Piddington's discussion of Dr. Head's Goulstonian Lectures, *Proceedings*, Vol. XIX., pp. 267-341) must in themselves have been unimpressive. Nevertheless these last were truly externalised hallucinations, as various things indicate. Thus, for instance, some patients before admission to the hospital sprang out of bed to seize the figure standing near their beds, which they supposed to be a person who had entered the room (p. 291). This would not happen with a vision seen with the mind's eye only.

¹ M. Vaschide very rarely found in the cases observed by him that two senses appeared to be concerned simultaneously or nearly so (p. 54). This is probably due to their being pseudo-hallucinations. In the externalised and therefore more realistic experiences dealt with in our "Census of Hallucinations" about 14 per cent. are reported as affecting simultaneously two or more senses.

dépassent la probabilité). He gives us no means of forming an independent judgment on this conclusion, but it is not necessary that we should do so, as he practically withdraws it two pages further on, where he says that he does not regard the proportion of veridical cases as a chance, but as an accidental coincidence easily explicable (*cette proportion des cas veridiques nous ne la considérons pas comme un hasard; c'est une coincidence fortuite facilement interprétable*). The explanation is a little obscure, but seems to be that all "telepathic hallucinations" in M. Vaschide's sense depend on a special mental state of the percipient—chiefly of emotional sympathy with the agent apparently—and that in most veridical cases there is a kind of pre-established intellectual harmony (*harmonie intellectuelle préétablie*) (p. 95; see also p. 73). At any rate the emotional condition of the percipient seems a sufficient explanation of the form of the impression in the cases described by M. Vaschide, and no one we imagine would be inclined to found a theory of telepathy on them.

It would be interesting to know to what extent M. Vaschide has really studied the work of the S.P.R. He claims acquaintance with the French (abbreviated) translation of *Phantasms of the Living*, and has seen summaries of the papers on our "Census of Hallucinations" (*Proceedings*, Vol. X.) read at the Psychological Congress held at Munich in 1896. But his use of the terminology of *Phantasms of the Living* in a new sense and without explanation while criticising that work, his failure to distinguish between hallucinations and pseudo-hallucinations, his impression that information was accepted by the authors of *Phantasms* from anonymous persons (p. 70), and even that the inquiry was carried on through newspapers (p. 71), as well as other errors, suggest a very superficial reading. We cannot regard his book as affording useful criticism either of the methods or the results of the investigations of our Society; but his own investigation is, as already said, interesting and useful, and should not be lost sight of. We only regret that he has not given his results to the world in greater detail.

ELEANOR MILDRED SIDGWICK.

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I.

SOME TYPES OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY.

BY T. W. MITCHELL, M.D.

WELL-MARKED cases of multiple personality are rare, and if we confined ourselves to the study of these cases alone we should make little progress towards an understanding of the strange and seemingly inexplicable phenomena which they present. Fortunately, however, these are not the only ones that occur. When we examine the records we find that a great variety of forms may be observed, and that there are many gradations between the well-marked cases and those which can hardly be looked upon as examples of multiple personality at all. An examination of some of these latter conditions will provide the best introduction to the study of the complex phenomena of double and multiple personality.

It is now very generally admitted by psychologists that in some persons at least consciousness may be split up into two or more parts. The split-off or dissociated portion may be but a fragment of the whole self, or it may be so extensive, so

complex, and so self-sufficient as to be capable of fulfilling all the functions of a personal consciousness. In hysteria we find isolated paralyses or localized anaesthesias which are due to the dissociation of relatively simple ideas, or we may find a splitting so deep, a dissociation of so many kinds of mental activity, that it leads to a complete change of personality.

All ideas, feelings, and actions associated in experience tend to become linked together into systems or groups in such a way that the stimulation of one element of a group excites the activity of all the rest. Such a system or group is commonly referred to as a complex. Now just as dissociation may fall upon a relatively simple idea, such as the use of a limb, so it may fall upon a complex of ideas related to some particular experience. A complex formed in relation to some event accompanied by great emotion may become dissociated from the personal consciousness, so that all recollection of the event and of the feelings and actions connected with it becomes impossible. A complex so dissociated does not cease to be capable of functioning. For the time being it may become latent, but it may occasionally exhibit extremely independent activity. A case recorded by Professor Janet¹ well illustrates the results of the functioning of such dissociated complexes.

A young girl nursed her dying mother. The poor woman, who had reached the last stage of consumption, lived alone with her daughter in a poor garret. Death came slowly with suffocation, blood vomiting, and all its frightful procession of symptoms. The girl struggled hopelessly against the impossible. She watched her mother during sixty nights, working at her sewing-machine to earn a few pennies necessary to sustain their lives. After the mother's death she tried to revive the corpse, to call the breath back again; then as she put the limbs upright the body fell to the floor, and it took infinite exertion to lift it up again into the bed. Some time after the funeral the young girl began to fall into somnambulatory attacks in which she acted again all the events that took place at her mother's death, without forgetting the least detail.

One of the characteristics of these recurrent psychomotor states or somnambulisms, as Janet calls them, is that they repeat themselves indefinitely. Not only are the attacks always

¹ *The Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, p. 29.

exactly alike, repeating the same movements, expressions and words, but in the course of the same attack the same scene may be repeated many times exactly in the same way. The patient acts out some past experience as if in a dream, and during the attack the senses are shut to all impressions not connected with the dream. He perceives nothing except the idea he is possessed of, and he remembers nothing except that one idea. When the attack is over there is a return of all sensations, the lost memories of waking life are restored, and the events of the dream are forgotten. This loss of memory bears not only on the period of the somnambulism; it bears also on the event that has given birth to the somnambulism, on all the facts that are connected with it, and on the feelings that are related to it. Thus the young girl referred to forgot during her waking state all the events connected with her mother's illness and death. She was callous and insensible, and her filial love, the feeling of affection she had felt for her mother, seemed to have quite vanished.

Many separate experiences may have taken part in the formation of a dissociated complex, but they are all bound together by some common element of feeling or emotion. When these experiences are reproduced in somnambulant attacks, the various episodes are enacted in succession, though not always in the same order, and the reproduction may or may not be modified by perception and association of ideas. When the reproduction is not modified by external impressions, the attacks are very similar to those already described. But if ability to perceive surrounding objects be retained, the regular development of the somnambulism may be interfered with and modified by the performance of actions determined by the actual situation. In other cases still further modifications may be introduced by association of ideas. When dissociation bears upon any large section of mental life, the interlinking of the various dissociated complexes may afford material for the determination of a great variety of somnambulant acts. In illustration of this we may refer to the case of the old soldier recorded by Mesnet. This man had received a gunshot wound in the head and was afterwards subject to attacks of somnambulism in which he gave an exact repetition of events of his life when in hospital. But when a pen was put into his hand

during the somnambulant state, he would write letters having reference to other periods of his life. He could hear nothing in this state, but if ideas were suggested to him through the sense of touch, he would perform appropriate actions which were determined by old memories.

In all these cases conduct consists mainly of repetitions of actions appropriate to past events in the patient's history, and it is not relevant to his actual circumstances during the somnambulism. When the dissociation is of such a nature as to permit a just appreciation of the surroundings during the secondary state, and ability to react in an appropriate manner, there is a tendency for the state to be prolonged and to be filled up by a course of conduct in which are displayed the purpose and contingency which we usually regard as characteristic of waking life. Attacks of this kind usually take the form of *fugues* or ambulatory automatisms and are generally described as such; but the change of character which is sometimes exhibited during the secondary state, and the amnesia for the events of the *fugue* which ensues when the normal state is restored, justify us in regarding them as genuine instances of double personality.

Prolonged *fugues* appear to be generally of hysterical origin, but shorter periods of intelligent conduct followed by amnesia are frequently met with as a result of a variety of causes. Head injuries, profound emotional shock, carbon monoxide poisoning, alcoholic intoxication, epileptic attacks, and other conditions, may so affect consciousness that acts performed during hours or days subsequent to the trauma are completely forgotten when recovery of normal health occurs. But the lost memories are not destroyed; they are merely dissociated; and by using various artificial measures, such as hypnotism or hypnoidization, they can be restored, and an account of what happened during the abnormal state may be obtained.

Fugues are of not infrequent occurrence, and many of the cases of loss of memory reported from time to time in the newspapers are undoubtedly of this character. These people have lost for the time being the memory of their real personality. Some system of thoughts which determines their wandering has become dissociated from the personal consciousness. As is the tendency of all dissociated ideas, this system of thoughts takes

on independent functioning, and when it is working itself out in action, the other systems of thoughts relating to the personality, to the former life and its responsibilities, become latent. The whole personality is no longer in control of conduct. When through some chance association or through artificial means the memory of the former existence is restored, the lately active complex becomes latent again, and the events associated with its recent activity are forgotten.

The principal characteristics of a fugue are well brought out in the following case, which I quote from Professor Janet :

The subject is a boy of seventeen, Rou., son of a neuropathic mother, rather nervous himself, who already had, when he was ten years old, tics and contractures in the neck. . . . At thirteen he often went to a small public-house, visited by old sailors. They would urge him to drink, and, when he was somewhat flustered, they would fill his imagination with beautiful tales in which deserts, palm trees, lions, camels, and negroes were pictured in a most wonderful and alluring way. The young boy was very much struck by those pictures, particularly as he was half tipsy. However, when his drunkenness was over, the stories seemed to be quite forgotten ; he never spoke of travels, and on the contrary led a very sedentary life, for he had chosen the placid occupation of a grocer's boy, and he only sought to rise in that honourable career.

Now there came on quite unforeseen accidents, almost always on the occasion of some fatigue or a fit of drunkenness. He then felt transformed, forgot to return home, and thought no more of his family. . . . I will dwell on only one of his fugues, which is particularly amusing, and was of extraordinary duration, for it lasted three months. He had left Paris about the fifteenth of May, and had walked to the neighbourhood of Melun. This time he was thinking about the means of succeeding in his scheme and of getting safely to the Mediterranean. Until then he had failed, owing to fatigue and misery : the question was to find means of living as he went along. A bright idea had occurred to him ; not far from Melun, at Moret, there are canals that go more or less straight to the south of France, and in those canals there are ships laden with goods. He succeeded in being accepted as a servant on a ship laden with coal. His work was terrible ; now he had to shovel the coal, now to haul the rope in company with a donkey called Cadet, his only friend. He was badly fed, often beaten,

exhausted with fatigue, but, though you would scarcely believe it, he was radiant with happiness. He thought only of one thing,—of the joy of drawing nearer to the sea. Unhappily, in Auvergne, the boat stopped, and he was forced to leave it and continue his journey on foot, which was more difficult. In order not to be resourceless, he hired himself as a helper to an old china mender. They went slowly along, working on the road.

Then, one evening, an unlooked-for event took place again. The day's work had been a success; the two companions had earned seven francs. The old china mender stopped and said to R., "My boy, we deserve a good supper: and we will keep to-day's feast; it is the fifteenth of August." On hearing this, the boy heedlessly said: "The fifteenth of August? Why, it is the feast of the Virgin Mary, the anniversary of my mother's name-day." He had scarcely uttered these words when he appeared to be quite changed. He looked all round him with astonishment, and turning to his companion, said, "But who are you, and what am I doing here with you?" The poor man was amazed, and was quite unable to make the boy understand the situation; the latter still believed himself in Paris, and had lost all memory of the preceding months. They had to go to the village mayor's, where, with great difficulty, the matter was made more or less clear. The mayor telegraphed to Paris, and the prodigal child was sent back home.¹

In this case we see something of the way in which fugues may originate. It is exceptional in showing so clearly how the ideas and desires which determined the fugue became implanted in the patient's mind, and how they became dissociated from the waking consciousness under the influence of alcoholic intoxication. As a rule it is not so easy to discover how the determining ideas found an entrance into the mind or how they became dissociated. In some cases they seem to have originated in day-dreaming or in other states of abstraction. Sometimes they appear to be ideas or wishes that have been entertained in the normal state, but have been voluntarily repressed as being incompatible with the general character and purposes of the individual.

The termination of this fugue is also instructive. Just as an attack of hysterical somnambulism may be artificially reproduced by insistently directing the patient's attention towards

¹Janet, *loc. cit.*, p. 51.

the idea which dominates it, so a fugue may be brought to a close by some chance impression which succeeds in arousing emotional complexes related to the normal life.

It seems impossible to draw any hard and fast line between fugues and some of the classical cases of double personality. On the whole it may be said that the fugue is characterized by a tendency to wander, by a certain unity of purpose which links the dissociated ideas together, and by the persistence of this purpose as a directive force in determining conduct while the fugue lasts. It is true that in some fugues the working out of this purpose seems vague and obscure, and the wandering may appear quite purposeless to an observer; but it is probable that in every fugue the conduct of the patient is determined by a subconscious desire for some new experience or by aversion to some experience of his ordinary life. There is something in his life from which he feels he must fly, or some anticipated good towards which he must go.

In conditions which may more strictly be regarded as cases of double personality, conduct in the secondary state seems to have no such continuity of purpose running through it. Dissociation seems to bear upon a larger section of the self, and the mental activity displayed is of a more varied character. In some respects at least it more closely resembles the activity of ordinary life and seems less guided by any fixed idea. But we find transitional forms where any such distinction seems to break down. The well-known case of Ansel Bourne¹ may perhaps come under this category. In the first fortnight of his secondary state, Ansel Bourne's conduct conformed to that of an ordinary fugue. He forgot his personal identity, assumed a new name, and wandered about from city to city. In the remaining six weeks he led a quiet, respectable life as a small shop-keeper. In his second state he had no recollection of his former life, and when he came to himself he had no recollection of his life during the second state. The lost memories were, however, recovered during hypnosis, and the revelation so obtained of his frame of mind at the beginning of his fugue probably indicates the nature of the ideas that determined it. He said "he wanted to get away somewhere—he didn't know where—and have rest." When he opened his

¹ *Proceedings S.P.R.*, Vol. VII., p. 221.

little shop, the fugue proper came to an end. The idea which determined his flight was about to be realized, and while it was working itself out he lived the life of a secondary personality which was conditioned by the breach in the continuity of his memory, rather than by any great change in his character or conduct.

So far we have considered disintegrations of personality in which the dissociated elements comprise only a small portion of the mental life. A single idea, or a group of ideas linked together into a complex by some common underlying feeling, becomes split off more or less completely from the personal consciousness. When it is aroused to function, it displays great independence and takes possession of the whole organism. A new state is entered upon, a new personality appears, whose actions are initiated and guided by the dominating complex.

The section of mental life thus cut off is relatively so small that its disappearance does not appreciably affect the integrity of the personal consciousness, so that both before and after the somnambulistic attack the individual is regarded as being his normal self. But it is possible for the dissociation to bear upon such a large section of consciousness that the curtailment of the self which its withdrawal entails may amount to a change of personality. And the dissociated portions of consciousness may lack the community of feeling or of purpose which would enable them to take possession of the bodily organism on their own account. Dissociation is revealed by gaps or disabilities in the normal self, rather than by the appearance of any new form of activity simulating a second self. But if the dissociated portions of consciousness should suddenly become reinstated so as to lead to the formation once more of the normal personality, and if again they should gradually or suddenly drop out of consciousness so as again to leave the normal self crippled and curtailed by their disappearance, we should have an alternation of two selves whose relation to each other might not readily be recognized.

Some of the best known of the recorded examples of double personality are to be explained in this way, and the misinterpretation of such cases has given unwarrantable support to the view that a secondary self is sometimes an improvement

on the primary personality. Such a view may or may not be true; but these cases cannot be adduced in support of it.

The classical example of this form of double personality is Azam's Félicité X.¹ The condition which Azam described as Félicité's primary state was undoubtedly the crippled or curtailed self produced by hysterical dissociation; and the condition which he described as secondary was really the normal self restored by the synthesis of the dissociated states. But the real secondary personality in this case was, in fact, the hysterical condition (see diagrams on Plate II, p. 285), which had come on so gradually that no distinct gap in the continuity of memory was observed. When the two phases began to alternate, the curtailed self became amnesic for the restored self, while the restored self had no amnesia for the hysterical phase. There is in cases of the Félicité type no reciprocal amnesia such as is observed in the cases we have previously examined.

Félicité's alternations occurred spontaneously and for a long time they were misinterpreted. It was only when it was discovered that similar phenomena could be artificially produced that the status of the two phases and the mechanism of their alternation became apparent. Janet's prolonged researches on Marcelline R.²—an artificial Félicité, as he has termed her—afford us the clearest notion of the way in which double personalities of this kind come into being, but we do not seem justified in adopting Janet's view that this is the type to which all forms of multiple personality must in the last analysis be held to conform.

In cases of the Félicité type I have supposed that the split-off section of consciousness has not the structural unity which would permit it to manifest as a secondary personality, and that the two selves which are exhibited are merely the normal self and the same self shorn of some of its faculties or powers. But it is possible for a split-off section of consciousness, even when dissociation is extensive, to have so much structural unity that it is capable of utilizing the whole bodily organism for its expression, and of showing all the features of a second self. We may thus have the curtailed primary self alternating with a self formed by the split-off portion, and a hypothetical third

¹ Binet, *Les Altérations de la Personnalité*, pp. 6-20.

² *Revue Philosophique*: Avril, 1910, p. 329; Mai, 1910, p. 483.

self, the normal self, which will appear if a synthesis of the dissociated states can be effected.

There are several cases on record in which this interpretation seems legitimate. But before going on to examine some instances in which such a third self has appeared or in which its possible formation could be predicted, we may look for a moment at an intermediate type in which a third personality may arise. These are cases in which the stress causing the dissociation has been so severe that everything that goes to the formation of a personal consciousness disappears, leaving seemingly nothing but a bare consciousness without any content to play the part of a secondary personality. It was to such a condition that Mr. Hanna was reduced as the result of an accident.¹ All knowledge of his former life, all his acquisitions and memories, even his acquaintance with the meaning of the organic sensations of his own body, had completely disappeared. But he was capable of learning, and at the end of a few weeks he had learnt much. In doing so he developed a new personality which had no knowledge of his former self. But the old memories were not destroyed, they were only dissociated; and in the course of the treatment adopted by Dr. Sidis, the old self began to alternate with the new self. The old self when it reappeared was as ignorant of the new self as the new self was of the old self (see diagrams on Plate I, p. 284), therein differing from what happens in alternations of the Félicité type. The only way to ensure the stability and permanence of the old self was to get it to synthesize with the new self, thus producing a third self which knew both the others. This third self was, however, different from the normal self which emerges as a third self in the synthesis of two selves which are each but fragments of an original whole self. For in the Hanna case each self was a whole self, although one had a much fuller content, a much richer store of memories, than the other. And the third self, instead of being the original self restored by the union of two halves, *was* the original self with the memories of the new self superadded.

The third self in the Hanna case must not then be confused with the third self which arises from the reintegration of two selves, each of which is abnormal and fragmentary. The case

¹Sidis and Goodhart, *Multiple Personality* (New York, 1905).

of Mary Reynolds,¹ described by Weir Mitchell, may probably have been of this latter kind, but the restoration of the normal personality seemed to take place gradually late in life, and there is no definite record of the inclusive memory which such a third self should imply. A far more striking instance of the restoration of the normal personality by the synthesis of two dissociated states is to be found in the history of Miss Beauchamp.² Dr. Prince has shown that by a synthesis of B I and B IV the original Miss Beauchamp was reconstructed. B I was the original self curtailed by the dissociation of a portion of consciousness which six years afterwards reappeared as another personality, B IV. B I's memory was continuous for her whole waking life up to the appearance of B IV. B IV's memory was continuous and coextensive with B I's up to the time of the dissociation, but B IV had no knowledge of the six years of B I's existence. When B I and B IV began to alternate, there was reciprocal amnesia. When the real Miss Beauchamp was reconstructed she had memory for the whole lives of B I and B IV. She was a third self formed by the synthesis of two dissociated states, each of which was a portion of the original self (see diagrams on Plate I, p. 284).

The kind of disintegration of personality which leads to the formation of two curtailed selves may in rare instances be carried much farther, and instead of two selves, either of which might be mistaken for a more or less normal self—so many of the characteristics of selfhood do they retain—we may get a large number of incomplete selves, some of which are so abortive as hardly to warrant the designation of selves at all. The multiple personalities of Louis V.³ and of Mary Barnes⁴ seem to belong to this category. But however many of these personalities appear in any particular case, so long as they are but split-off fragments of the original self, restoration of the normal personality by a reintegration and synthesis of all the parts is always hypothetically possible.

We have thus constructed a series of dissociations of consciousness, ranging from the split-off ideas of hysterical somnambulisms to the most extreme forms of multiple personality,

¹ See Myers, *Human Personality*, Vol. I., p. 336.

² Morton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality* (New York, 1906).

³ See Myers, *Human Personality*, Vol. I., p. 338.

⁴ *Proceedings S.P.R.*, Vol. XVIII., p. 352.

and we have found the mechanism of dissociation and the resulting phenomena to be of the same general type throughout the whole of the series. A portion of the self becomes split off and excluded from the experience of the remaining consciousness. The split-off portion remains, for the most part, latent; but when by any means it is aroused, it displays extremely independent functioning. When it is sufficiently unified to be able to take possession of the bodily organism it manifests as a somnambulism, a fugue, or a secondary personality; it alternates with the normal consciousness, or rather with what is left of the normal consciousness; the experience of the two states is discontinuous, and their memories are mutually exclusive. Have we then exhausted the possibilities of dissociations of consciousness? Can we find a place in this series for every form of multiple personality?

In speaking of the Beauchamp case I said that the real Miss Beauchamp was reconstructed by the synthesis of B I and B IV. But what about Sally? There is hardly a vestige of Sally in the restored Miss Beauchamp. When the real Miss Beauchamp was found, Sally went, as she herself said, back to where she came from, and it is there that we must look for her, if we can find out where it is.

I have said nothing of the differences of character which the various selves of multiple personalities may present, and we may disregard the character of Sally and confine our attention to one special feature in which she differs from all the other cases referred to so far. This feature is that Sally not only alternated with B I and B IV, but also existed as a co-conscious personality when B I or B IV was present as an alternating personality. Thus when B I was present as an alternating personality, Sally co-consciously knew B I's experiences—her feelings, thoughts, and actions—and knew them as belonging to B I. But she also claimed to have at the same time concomitant experiences of her own. And when she appeared as an alternating personality, she remembered not only B I's experiences but also her own co-conscious experiences. She claimed to exist continuously as an independent personality throughout all the various phases of Miss Beauchamp's life. A consciousness like this seems something quite different from any of the forms of multiple personality we have examined, and if we find other

examples of a similar kind we must conclude that we have here a new type of secondary self which cannot be fitted into the series of dissociations which we have constructed.

The simplest examples of two separate streams of thought coexisting in the same individual are to be found in certain hypnotic experiments. The only satisfactory explanation of the fulfilment of a post-hypnotic suggestion at a time that the waking consciousness is fully occupied with other matters is to suppose that some sort of co-conscious intelligence is at the same time attending to the fulfilment of the suggestion. When the performance of the suggested act necessitates some definite mental process, such as making an elaborate calculation, the evidence for the existence of two simultaneously acting streams of thought is still better. Although we are not bound to suppose that when waking life is resumed the hypnotic consciousness ordinarily persists as anything worthy of being called a second self, yet the phenomena observable in trained hypnotic subjects do point to something of this kind in these cases. Indeed, it can be shown that a true secondary personality which is demonstrably co-conscious with the waking self, may be artificially produced or may develop spontaneously during hypnosis. A good example of this may be found in Janet's account of his experiments with his subject Lucie, but perhaps the best instances on record are the Léontine and Léonore personalities which he discovered on hypnotizing Léonie (Madame B.).¹ In Janet's description of the origin of Adrienne (Lucie 3) we see the very beginning of such a personality taking form under the hands of the experimenter. In Léontine and Léonore he seemed to encounter two personalities already fully formed, each having definite characteristics and in some respects different memories. Léonie knew nothing of Léontine or of Léonore. Léontine was co-conscious with Léonie and knew her life, but did not know Léonore. Léonore was co-conscious with and knew the lives of both Léonie and Léontine (see diagrams on Plate II, p. 285).

I have been able on several occasions to obtain similar stages of memory in suitable hypnotic subjects, but only very rarely have the different stages displayed any distinct differences in character. My experience is that if the experimenter

¹See Myers, *Human Personality*, Vol. I., pp. 322-330.

maintains the same attitude towards the subject in each stage, if he speaks in the same tone and about the same topics, the stages do not in respect of character show any distinguishing peculiarities. But if the experimenter adopts a more familiar or frivolous attitude towards one stage, and a more reserved or serious attitude towards another, the change of attitude in the experimenter is responded to by the subject, and each stage when it is subsequently induced exhibits respectively the levity or seriousness which was indirectly suggested by the experimenter on their first appearance. And although the characters of Léontine and Léonore seemed to exist ready made when Janet first discovered them, it must be remembered that Léonie had frequently been hypnotized by different physicians many years before she came under Janet's observation. It seems probable that the differences of character exhibited in the three states, although no doubt expressions of tendencies potential in Léonie's original nature, may have had in their development some outside encouragement of the kind I have suggested.

Nevertheless, we do sometimes find secondary personalities of this kind which seem to exist, in an incipient form at least, where no possibility of their artificial origin can be entertained. In my own case of Milly P. (see below, pp. 286 *et seq.*) the patient had not been previously hypnotized by any one, yet I seemed to discover a hypnotic personality, claiming to be co-conscious, whose character differed in some respects from that of the waking personality. But I confess that the extraordinary rapidity with which Amelia developed self-consciousness and initiative after I had given her a name, tends to make me suspect the genuineness of the spontaneous formation of any co-conscious personality that may appear in the course of hypnotic experiment or treatment.

There are, however, several recorded cases which seem to indicate that a co-conscious personality may arise spontaneously, or that it may develop from some split-off fragment of consciousness acting as a nucleus around which subconscious experiences during normal life, or experiences during spontaneous states of mental dissociation, may accrete. The most notorious example of this kind is the B III personality (Sally) of the Beauchamp case.

Whatever our final view of Sally's personality may be, we

must not minimize or forget the resemblances between Sally and the other co-conscious personalities already referred to. One feature in particular which is common to them all is that it seems unnecessary for them to be synthesized with the waking consciousness in order to form a "normal" personality. These co-conscious states do not as a rule seem ever to have participated in the structure of the waking self, and no synthesis of them with the waking self is necessary in the interests of mental health. This is certainly true of the co-conscious personalities developed by hypnotism. And even if the nucleus of Sally Beauchamp's individuality had been derived from split-off elements of the primary personality, her growth and development must have taken place in the subconscious. So that as a fully formed personality Sally was never a part of the original Miss Beauchamp in the same sense that B I or B IV was, and when the reconstruction of the disintegrated self was to be brought about, there was no room for Sally except "where she came from."

Are we to conceive of her as being still there as an imprisoned and impotent co-consciousness, or may we suppose that in Miss Beauchamp's reconstruction those very elements from which Sally evolved have become reintegrated in the complete Miss Beauchamp, and that by the withdrawal of these elements from the subconscious, Sally's personality has become for the time being totally disintegrated? There is not much evidence in Dr. Prince's book that anything of this kind took place, but writing at a later date he says:¹ "In Miss Beauchamp as a whole, normal, without disintegration, it was easy to recognize all three dispositions as 'sides of her character,' though each was kept ordinarily within proper bounds by the correcting influence of the others. It was only necessary to put her in an environment which encouraged one or the other side, to associate her with people who strongly suggested one or the other of her own characteristics, whether religious, social, pleasure-loving, or intellectual, to see the characteristics of B I, Sally, or B IV stand out in relief as the predominant personality."

It is hard to say just how much or how little, if any, of the original self may be necessary to form a nucleus around which a co-conscious personality may grow, or what kind and extent

¹*Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. III., No. 4, p. 287.

of dissociation may be sufficient to afford the requisite mental material. Every normal self is an ideal construction, and in its formation much has to be cast aside as being useless or unsuitable. A secondary self that arises as a parasitic growth around a nucleus of cast-off mental dispositions may be more excellent in some respects than the primary self. Yet it may be not only unsuited for the practical purposes of life, but even positively detrimental to their realization. It may, indeed, be so incompatible with the practical self which has to adjust itself to its environment at all costs, that any real synthesis of the two selves is impossible. We need not be surprised that in the reconstruction of the real Miss Beauchamp there was no room for Sally. Sally may, indeed, appear to be a stronger and more interesting personality than either B I or B IV, but her status is different. She is no integral part of the Miss Beauchamp who, for years before the final disintegrating shock, had been endeavouring to construct a self that would be best suited to the practical purposes of life. She represents rather a phase of Miss Beauchamp's nature that had long been subject to repression as being incompatible with the system of purposes on which the construction of her true self essentially depended.

In tracing the development of co-conscious processes from the doubling of the stream of thought in hypnotic experiments up to the co-conscious life of such a personality as Sally Beauchamp, we seem to have constructed another series of dissociations whose differentia is this very fact of co-conscious activity. I do not wish to suggest that in practice we can draw a sharp line between these two kinds of dissociation or that mixed forms may not be met with, but there are certain features peculiar to each which seem to justify us in regarding them as separate types. In the first series the split-off portions of the self seem to remain latent until the attack or alternation occurs. During their periods of latency they seem cut off from all experience, and do not grow or develop in any way. There is a division of the self without any true doubling of consciousness. In the second series the dissociated portion of consciousness may never have formed a part of the waking self, and consequently cannot properly be described as a split-off part of the mind. When it is not in evidence as an alternating

personality, it is not latent. It is co-conscious, and may have experience and grow and develop in the subconscious. There is a doubling of consciousness without any true division of the normal self.

A co-consciousness, whether associated with hysteria or not, usually, if not always, manifests only in cases that have been subjected to hypnotic or other artificial procedures, and we may regard it as being essentially of the same nature as other hypnotic phenomena, without thereby implying that these procedures have produced it. Split-off portions of the self may indeed sometimes exhibit proof of their co-conscious existence, but it is very rare to have any manifestation of such co-consciousness unless some artificial means are taken to elicit it. It may seem unjustifiable to class Sally Beauchamp with ordinary hypnotic phenomena. And so it may be, for Sally has been a puzzle to many of her commentators. But one cannot help feeling that if B I had never been hypnotized, Sally would never have been "born."

Were it not for our knowledge of the possibility of the coexistence in one individual of two independent streams of thought as revealed by hypnotic experiments, we might be inclined to think that the claim of a secondary personality to continuous co-conscious activity is an illusion. But when we survey all the evidence for the existence of co-conscious states there seems no good reason why we should deny the claim of such a personality as Sally Beauchamp. There is, however, one case on record which seems greatly to increase the difficulty of forming any conception of the relations which obtain between the various personalities when co-consciousness is claimed by one or more of them. Dr. Prince has published the autobiography of a personality who describes with great fullness and care her own origin by dissociation from an originally integrated personality C., and her development into a secondary personality B. who claimed to be co-conscious with another personality A., formed by the secession of B. from C.¹ The original healthy person C. broke up into A. and B., who alternated one with another. B. claimed to be co-conscious when A. was present as an alternating personality, but A. was

¹"My Life as a Dissociated Personality," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. III., Nos. 4 and 5.

latent when B. was present. Consequently A. was amnesic for B., but B. was not amnesic for A. Under Dr. Prince's treatment the original C. was obtained by the synthesis of A. and B., and the most puzzling feature of the case is the claim of B. to persist as a co-consciousness after the normal C. had been thus reconstructed. Dr. Prince, in a prefatory note to B.'s account of her life, after referring to the co-consciousness when A. was present, says: "The writer, B., claims to have the same co-conscious life with this apparently normal stable personality." Now it is very difficult to understand how B. could participate in the synthesis by which C. was obtained, and at the same time persist as a personality distinct from and co-conscious with the personality thus reconstructed.

It is in our second series, I think, that we must find a place for many of those more or less fully formed personalities which are met with in connexion with "mediumship" and are usually referred to as "trance personalities." It is true that trance personalities do not, as a rule, alternate with the waking consciousness to the extent of taking possession of the whole bodily organism, and in many instances they afford no definite evidence of their existence as co-conscious activities. Yet in so far as their origin cannot be traced to any large splitting off or secession from the waking self, they seem to conform to the type of secondary personality whose growth and development take place entirely in the subconscious.

I have assumed that the evolution of these personalities must be dependent on subconscious experiences in relation to the ordinary environment. But if, as some people think, man has an environment which transcends sense, it may be that this environment can affect the subconscious without having any noticeable influence on the waking self. It would then be legitimate to suppose that experiences related to such an environment might sometimes take part in the formation of secondary personalities.

It would be out of place here to enter into any consideration of the supernormal phenomena which have been claimed to be sometimes associated with trance or other dissociated states. These are commonly lightly dismissed by medical men as being merely products of hysteria and mal-observation. But even

if every state of dissociation be labelled hysterical, we gain nothing by claiming this, and we lose nothing by admitting it. If there is any transcendental world, and if it is possible for us to get into relation with it, it may very well be that such intercommunication is only possible during states of mental dissociation. And in regard to supernormal phenomena it does not matter in the least what the term hysteria may connote. The supernormality of an automatic script has to be determined by other considerations than the psychological state of the automatist. If it can be shown that any hysteric really has the gift of clairvoyance or any other supernormal power, it will be just as good evidence as if he were a normal person. If physical objects do move without contact in the presence of any one who is said to be hysterical, it is just as wonderful as if they so move in the presence of some one who is not.

In all these conditions which we have examined there is a division or a doubling of personality. Normally, we know all our thoughts, our feelings, and our actions, as cohering together in our one personal consciousness, but in cases of multiple personality the self may become divided or curtailed, and the stream of consciousness may become discontinuous or doubled or multiplied. The unity of the self is broken, the parts may function alternately or concomitantly, and one part may not know the other.

If we try to put forward any hypothesis that will be explanatory of the various forms of multiple personality, we are immediately confronted by a problem which is in itself so difficult of solution that no satisfactory answer to it has yet been found. In order to explain how consciousness can be split into two, we must first be able to explain how it ever comes to be one. If we try to understand how a dissociation of personality can occur, we must first understand how a unitary personality ever comes into existence.

There are two main views as to what constitutes the ground or basis of the unity of consciousness. All who accept the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism or any other monistic view of mind and body maintain that this ground must be sought in the structural and functional continuity of the nervous system. The whole neuronic substratum of mental life is

functionally continuous, and the unity of the conscious stream which is correlated with its activity depends upon this continuity. If the total aggregate of inter-related neurones becomes functionally discontinuous, there will be a splitting or dissociation of consciousness. As happens in our first series of dissociations, one part of the disaggregated mass of neurones may continue to function and to be accompanied by a stream of consciousness, while the other becomes for a time latent. This latent portion may afterwards become functionally active while the other becomes latent. Or, as in Dr. Prince's case of B. C. A. (if we can trust the introspection of the personality B.), both portions of the disaggregated mass may continue to function so as to give rise to two coexisting streams of consciousness in one individual. A somewhat similar explanation may with some difficulty be given of the co-conscious streams of thought manifested in hypnotic experiments and by hypnotic personalities. The chief difficulty consists in providing for a duplicating of neural structures corresponding to the duplicating of the content of the mind which these personalities show.

The other main view of the unity of consciousness is that it must have as its ground some psychological subject or being, the ego, soul, or spirit, which alone can account for the fusion of the physical manifold of experience into one psychological unitary whole. Those who adopt this dualistic hypothesis find it difficult to reconcile cases of double personality with that view of the soul which regards it as being in itself the full personality independently of the nervous system. If we ascribe to the soul only the forms of mental activity, and to the nervous system the content of the mind, we may suppose that in the cases of divided personality described in our first series of dissociations the soul interacts alternately with two or more functionally discontinuous systems of neurones. Or we may suppose that when the split-off part functions as a secondary personality, a second psychic being or soul enters into relation with this portion of the nervous system, while the original soul retains its relations with the other portion. This latter supposition seems to be unnecessary, for if these phases of the empirical self have their original ground of unity in the soul, they may still be so unified during their phenomenally separate existence. However diverse or opposed

these phases may appear when exhibiting as alternating personalities, the fact that they have formed part of the originally unitary self seems to get over the difficulty of regarding them as manifestations of the activity of one and the same soul.

But if such diversity of character and of conduct as may occur in secondary personalities which are alternately but not simultaneously conscious can be unified in one and the same psychical subject or soul, there would seem to be no need to postulate any second soul in cases of secondary personality which show co-conscious activity. Yet we know that some modern defenders of the soul have felt bound to suggest something of this kind in order to explain the occurrence of such a personality as Sally Beauchamp. Dr. M'Dougall thinks that the facts of this case can best be explained "by assuming that a normally subordinate psychic being obtains, through the weakening of the control of the normally dominant soul, an opportunity for exercising and developing its potentialities in an unusual degree."¹

In view of the gradations that may be observed between the simpler forms of co-conscious activity and fully developed co-conscious personalities, the acceptance of this hypothesis is only compatible with belief in a plurality of psychical beings or souls in every bodily organism. And if belief in a plurality of psychical existents associated with one bodily organism be accepted on general metaphysical grounds, we must apply it consistently wherever such application is logically demanded. There seem no good grounds for Dr. M'Dougall's contention that "abnormal conditions of two distinct types are commonly confused together under the head of co-conscious or subconscious activity,"² and that a second soul or psyche is necessary in the one type and not in the other. At the extremes of the series of co-conscious phenomena the conditions do indeed seem to be very different, but it is impossible to say at what point secondary psychical beings or souls must be assumed.

If we must postulate a soul as the necessary ground of unity of the normal consciousness, it is perhaps more probable that in even the most pronounced cases of multiple personality there is some underlying unity, rather than that secondary

¹ *Body and Mind*, p. 368, foot-note.

² *Ibid.*, p. 368.

personalities are manifestations of the activity of secondary and independent souls. One possible ground of such underlying unity is indeed self-evident in the fact that all the different personalities make use of one and the same bodily organism, and it does not seem impossible to believe that they are all manifestations of one and the same psychical organism.

This possibility will seem the more easily conceivable if we adopt the view of the relation between mind and body outlined by M. Bergson in his philosophical writings. His conception of "pure memory" as being entirely a spiritual manifestation and totally unconnected with any brain traces, has the same practical consequences as the conception of the soul as bearing both the form and the content of the mind. But his view of the "bodily memory," made up of the sum of the sensori-motor systems organized by habit, as being a necessary factor in the reappearance of any recollection in consciousness, helps us to understand how secondary personalities, even when exhibiting co-consciousness, may be manifestations of the activity of a single soul. On this view the soul may be regarded as the ground of the unity of consciousness, but the structural and functional continuity of the higher nervous system is a necessary factor in the phenomenal manifestation of this unity. Although consciousness may not have its true ground of unity in the functional or structural continuity of the nervous system, its manifestation as a unity is conditioned by such continuity, and any breach of continuity in the nervous system will lead to a disruption of the unity of the personal consciousness. We may, therefore, suppose that all the cases included in our first series of dissociations may be accounted for by a breach in the functional continuity of the systems of neurones through which the soul habitually manifests.

Can the same principles be applied to explain cases of multiple personality of the co-conscious or hypnotic type? Can these be accounted for by any disruption of the systems of neurones, whose functioning is correlated with the normal waking consciousness? I do not think they can. Divisions of the self dependent on a dissociation of neurones do not know each other. They manifest as personalities alternately,

and the one does not remember the other. But in personalities of the co-conscious type—in the hypnotic consciousness and in hypnotic personalities—one of the phases or personalities does know the other. It may know it as part of itself, or it may know it as something so different from itself that it will not admit any identity or recognize any community of interest with it.

The knowledge of the primary personality by the secondary seems totally opposed to the view that these personalities are produced by a breach in the continuity of the systems of neurones subserving waking consciousness. To say that such knowledge is telepathically acquired, is to invoke a precision and fullness of thought-transference of which we have no experimental evidence and to which all the evidence we have is directly opposed. A co-conscious personality's experience, in so far as it is experience of the same things as that of the primary personality, must be obtained through the same sensory channels and must be subserved by the same neuronic systems. In so far as the co-conscious experience is a different experience, or an experience of different things, it must be due to the inclusion in the functioning aggregate of a wider system of neural elements. The hypnotic consciousness, and the consciousness of hypnotic personalities, is invariably wider and more inclusive than that of the waking person, and it cannot be correlated with the functioning of a split-off portion or of a curtailed remnant of the total neural substratum of consciousness.

In view of the occurrence of co-conscious personalities, we seem bound to look for some other ground of the felt unity of consciousness besides the spatial continuity of a nervous system through which a unitary soul may manifest. Such a ground may, perhaps, be found in the conception of a psycho-physical threshold which delimits, though it does not constitute, personality. Fechner introduced the conception of a psycho-physical threshold in order to account for the discontinuity of consciousness in nature as a whole, but it may also be applied to the discontinuity which is sometimes met with in the consciousness associated with one nervous system.

If we adopt Fechner's symbolic representation of a human consciousness as a wave with its crest rising over a certain

threshold above which only waking consciousness occur,¹ we may regard this threshold as the normal threshold determined in the course of evolution by its being that at which consciousness is most useful for life. But the height of the threshold may vary under different circumstances. If it is considerably raised, the activity of large systems of neurones ceases to have any conscious accompaniment of which the individual is aware, and the extent of the field of consciousness is proportionately curtailed. A permanently raised threshold will produce a curtailed personality. On the other hand, if the threshold is lowered, we get an expansion of the normal consciousness. Neurone aggregates, whose activity is not intense enough to manifest in waking consciousness, become functionally continuous with the general mass of neurones now functioning at a lower threshold level. This low threshold activity is accompanied by a form of consciousness which is not the normal waking consciousness, although it may appear to be like it. It may be called the hypnotic consciousness, and is a result of a general lowering of the threshold. Any considerable lowering of the threshold will produce hypnosis, and a permanently lowered threshold will lead to the formation of a hypnotic personality.

Now it would seem that functional activity at the lower level may go on concomitantly with activity at the normal threshold, and that each form of activity may be accompanied by consciousness. But the only consciousness of which there is awareness in the waking state is that which occurs at or above the normal threshold. Yet we know that a concomitant awareness at a lower level occurs in hypnotic subjects and is claimed by hypnotic or co-conscious personalities. This secondary consciousness includes all that belongs to the primary consciousness, but it also includes much of which the primary consciousness knows nothing. And so extensive may the additional mental material be that it may greatly modify or totally alter the character pertaining to the primary personality. We may thus have two coexisting streams of consciousness manifesting as two distinct personalities through one bodily organism.

It seems impossible to account for the inclusive knowledge

¹The diagrams given below are constructed on the basis of this conception.

of hypnotic personalities on any hypothesis which regards them as being split-off portions of the waking self. This knowledge seems more consistent with the view that these personalities are expansions rather than curtailments of the waking self. The form that the expansion takes will depend on the nature of the complexes that are available for incorporation with those of the normal personality at the hypnotic level, for these complexes may dominate the whole aggregate of complexes thus formed and stamp the resulting personality with their own peculiarities.

On this view co-conscious personalities would be due to a doubling of the threshold at which consciousness can appear. The intensity of neural activity which is necessary for the appearance of *a consciousness* is not sufficient for the appearance of *the waking consciousness*. The threshold of waking consciousness has been determined and fixed by natural selection. A rise in the organic scale is accompanied, and to some extent conditioned, by a rise in the threshold of waking consciousness; but consciousness which is not immediately useful for life may still occur at the older and lower thresholds. It is at the level of these lower thresholds that co-conscious personalities appear.

In attempting to construct two series of separate types of multiple personality I described in each series a form of dissociation which seemed to be out of place there. Félicité X., although in one of her states she had knowledge of the other state, was ranged along with those splittings of the self which show reciprocal amnesia. And, again, among co-conscious personalities which were shown to be not due to splittings of the self I placed Dr. Prince's case of B. C. A., although the co-conscious personality B. describes her own formation as being due to a splitting off of the B. complex from the original whole personality C. Both of these cases seem to be mixed types, and we may, perhaps, regard them as being partly the result of dissociation of neurone aggregates and partly of changes of psycho-physical thresholds.

In Félicité's case we may suppose that the dissociation was brought about by a gradual rise of the threshold of consciousness. As the threshold rose, groups of neurones would split off, one after another, from the main mass, and a gradual

curtailment of the personality would result. When the threshold fell suddenly to the normal level, the dissociated neurones became re-synthesized and the normal personality reappeared. This normal personality had no amnesia for the curtailed self, but when the threshold again became raised, the resulting curtailed self had amnesia for the normal personality. Now it is instructive to compare the memory relations of these two phases with what occurs in hypnotic personalities. Here also the consciousness at the lower threshold has no amnesia for the consciousness at the higher threshold, while that at the higher has amnesia for that at the lower. In cases of the Félicité type, the normal self has exactly the same relation to the curtailed self as the hypnotic self has to the normal self in other cases (see diagrams on Plate II). In fact, the normal self *is* a hypnotic phase of the curtailed self; it is a self resulting from a lowering of the threshold. This is well seen in some other cases of this type. When Blanche Wittmann,¹ in her curtailed phase, was hypnotized by Jules Janet she became her normal self. And this normal self—a hypnotic phase of the curtailed self—had, like all hypnotic phases of consciousness, knowledge of the self that had been hypnotized. But when Blanche was “awakened” into her former curtailed phase she had no knowledge of her normal state, just as a person awakened from deep hypnosis has no knowledge of the events of the hypnotic state. It was also shown that the normal self of Blanche persisted as a co-consciousness when the curtailed self was present as an alternating personality.

It would seem then that cases of the Félicité type ought properly to be included in our second series of dissociations. A co-conscious personality, as a rule, is a hypnotic self which knows, but is not known by, the normal self. Here, however, we have a normal self which knows, but is not known by, a curtailed self. But in each case we have two selves functioning concomitantly at different threshold levels, and in each case the lower knows the higher and the higher does not know the lower.

The case of B. C. A. was included in the second series of dissociations because the personality B. claimed to be co-

¹ See Myers's *Human Personality*, Vol. I., p. 447.

conscious, although the way in which the two personalities are said to have been formed allies this case to those of the B I-B IV type described in the first series. In the Beauchamp case B I and B IV had amnesia for each other, as they might be expected to have if they resulted from a splitting of two systems of neurones, but B. of the B. C. A. case had no amnesia for A. and claimed co-consciousness. We can only suppose that here in addition to the neurone dissociation there was also some dislocation of thresholds. But as I have already said, it is difficult to bring this case into line with any of the forms of multiple personality hitherto recorded.

Although these two types of multiple personality may be difficult to classify, they raise no new problems in regard to the ground of the unity of consciousness or in regard to the hypotheses that may be put forward in explanation of dissociation of various kinds. If we have to postulate a soul as the ground of the unity of any consciousness, we must postulate a soul as the ground of the unity of each of the consciousnesses met with in personalities of the co-conscious or hypnotic type. But there seems no reason why we should not regard one and the same soul as the effective ground in each and all of the phases of consciousness occurring in one individual.

The personality formed at the lowest threshold is the most inclusive and has the fullest content. The soul as bearing this content can project the "pure" memories of this personality into consciousness at this level only, because only here are the appropriate sensori-motor memories to be found. The waking consciousness cannot know these pure memories, because the necessary sensori-motor memories cannot rise above the normal threshold. The soul as pure memory can manifest in consciousness only when it finds the appropriate sensori-motor memories ready to hand. As M. Bergson says,¹ "l'esprit humain presse sans cesse avec la totalité de sa mémoire contre la porte que le corps va lui entr'ouvrir," and where there is more than one threshold, there is more than one door.

We may, therefore, regard the unity of consciousness revealed on introspection as being conditioned by the spatial continuity of neural elements and by a psycho-physical threshold above which only is the functional activity of these

¹ Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire*, p. 198.

elements effective in this respect. Multiple personalities of the simply alternating type are due to a structural or functional discontinuity or dissociation of neurone systems. Those of the co-conscious type are due to the existence of different threshold levels at which conscious processes may arise. One unitary soul may persist behind all dissociations of consciousness, but it will be unable to appear as a unity, and its manifestations will be fragmentary and discordant. Its unity will be masked by the imperfections of its instrument.

EXPLANATION OF THE PLATES.

THE horizontal straight line passing continuously through the diagrams represents the level of the normal threshold of consciousness in each case; the shaded part below this line represents the subliminal, the unshaded part above represents the supraliminal.

In the case of the alternating types shown in Plate I, different parts of the threshold have risen, making various portions of the self subliminal at various times, and so leading to the formation of alternating personalities.

In the case of the co-conscious types shown in Plate II, the threshold rises or falls as a whole, so that some of the personalities include the others.

PLATE I.


Alternating Types.

- (1) ROU: a case of simple alternation.
- (2) HANNA: immediately after the accident his consciousness is almost completely submerged; later the "new self" and the "old self" alternate.
- (3) MISS BEAUCHAMP: BI and BIV are alternating personalities, the synthesis of whom forms Miss B. Sally is a co-conscious personality, analogous to those represented in Plate II.

PLATE I.


ALTERNATING TYPES.

Rou.



(2: fugue state)

HANNA.




The "old self" as an alternating personality.

The "new self."

Just after accident.

MISS BEAUCHAMP.



B I.

B I V.

Sally as an alternating personality.


Miss B.

* * * Sally's threshold.

PLATE II.

CO-CONSCIOUS TYPES.

MME B.



Léonie.


* Léontine's threshold,
 † Léonore's threshold.

Léontine.

†† Léonore's threshold.

Léonore.

FÉLIDA.



I. Normal =
 Azam's Félicia II.

II. Hysterical =
 Azam's Félicia I.

Ordinary Hypnosis.




PLATE II.

Co-conscious Types.

- (1) MADAME B.: below the threshold of the normal personality, Léonie, are the two thresholds of the two hypnotic personalities, Léontine and Léonore.
- (2) FÉLIDA: Azam's "secondary state" is really the normal, his "primary state" being the constricted hysterical personality.
- (3) ORDINARY HYPNOSIS: here the normal threshold is lowered, so that sensations and memories, etc., which are ordinarily subliminal become supraliminal.

II.

A STUDY IN HYSTERIA AND MULTIPLE PERSONALITY,
WITH REPORT OF A CASE.

BY T. W. MITCHELL, M.D.

IT is with considerable hesitation that I venture to give to the Society some account of a case of hysteria which I have had under observation for the past ten years. The facts which I am about to record may seem to have little bearing on Psychological Research. It may be said that these are pathological phenomena, and that our Society is not concerned with disease. To this I would answer in the words of Mr. Myers, "These are not pathological phenomena, but pathological revelations of normal phenomena, which is a very different thing. The gearing of the hysteric's inward factory is disconnected; the couplings are shifted in all sorts of injurious ways; some of the wheels are standing still, and some are whizzing uselessly round and round. But the wheelwork is still all there; and by observing the various hitches and stoppages which are now taking place, we can get a better notion of the way the power is applied than the smoothly working, carefully-boxed machinery of the healthy subject is likely to give us."¹ If Mr. Myers's defence of hysteria as a fit subject of study for our Society is accepted, I need make no apology for recording this case here, for it abounds in hitches and stoppages in the working of the mental machinery which are of a very peculiar character.

Amelia Geraldine P. . . . was 29 years of age when I first attended her professionally in 1901. She is unmarried, and lives at home with her father and two sisters. Her father is

¹ *Proceedings S.P.R.*, Vol. VI., p. 200.

a retired tradesman, and she has had an education suitable to her station in life. Her family history is good, there is no discoverable neurotic taint, and she enjoyed good health up to the beginning of 1901. There is an indefinite history of some slight affection of a choreic nature when she was about eleven years old.

On Feb. 3rd, 1901, a very cold day, whilst out walking, she was suddenly seized with a paroxysm of coughing. She went home, and as the cough persisted, I was sent for. I found her temperature just over 100° F. and sent her to bed. The cough was of hysterical type, and lasted for twenty-four hours with very little intermission.

Two days afterwards, the patient still being in bed, a twitching of her left hand was observed. I was called in as soon as it was noticed, and I found the movements limited to a rhythmic extension of the left wrist. This soon came to be combined with supination of the hand. If opposed, the movements became more violent and irregular. In the course of the evening, the left elbow joint was included in the movements, and next day the whole of the left arm was affected. The temperature ranged from 99° F. to 101° F. The movements ceased during sleep. The deep reflexes were much exaggerated, especially on the left side. The patient was dull and apathetic, and complained of pain in the head. On Feb. 7th the left arm was still jerking vigorously, and the left leg became affected in a similar manner. The leg movements began with rhythmic contractions of the muscles which produce inversion of the foot. Next day the whole of the left leg was included in the movements, and the arm was still in the same condition. On Feb. 10th the right foot began to be affected in the same way as the left had begun, namely by rhythmic inversion of the foot, and on Feb. 11th the whole of the right leg was included in the movements, and the right hand had begun to be extended at the wrist and supinated. On Feb. 12th the whole of the right arm was affected, while the movements of the left hand had somewhat abated. The patient's speech became affected in a peculiar manner. There was ptosis and photophobia of the left eye. Pain in the head was severe. The temperature was 100.6° F.

The speech defect was not investigated at this time as the

patient was too ill, but the general impression it gave was that there was a great preponderance of sibilants. She seemed to have no difficulty in saying what she wanted to say, but merely a faulty pronunciation, such as "ses" for "yes," "sad" for "bad," and so on.

From this date, Feb. 12th, 1901, the movements began to abate, and in their disappearance they followed the exact order in which they had come on. First the left hand and arm became quiescent, then the left foot and leg, then the right foot and leg, and lastly the right hand and arm. The pain in the head got better and the temperature went down. By March 5th, 1901, all the movements had ceased. The deep reflexes were still exaggerated, and testing them tended to produce a temporary return of the contractions.

There was now found to be complete anaesthesia with loss of muscular sense of the whole of the right arm with the exception of the thumb and index finger. This had been preceded for some time by a loss of accuracy in localising impressions. Some time later it was discovered that the whole of the right half of the body had become totally anaesthetic and analgesic with the exception of the thumb and index finger. There was paresis, more or less pronounced, of all the limbs, and for many weeks there was almost total inability to walk. The left arm and leg were at first more paralysed than the right, but they recovered more quickly. There was very marked concentric reduction of both visual fields.

At various times during her convalescence there was some recurrence of the muscular spasms, but as time went on, the rhythm of the movements became quicker and their extent more restricted, so that they had in the end rather the character of a coarse tremor than of clonic contractions. Sometimes they lasted for days in one limb without any intermission except during sleep. All her limbs were affected in this way at some period of her convalescence, but in no definite order. At various times there was a return of coarser movements of the limbs, but they had to a great extent lost their rhythmic character and were of a more choreic type. The left arm and shoulder were affected for a long time in this way, but by July 20th, 1901, both the choreic movements and the coarse tremor had quite disappeared. There was, however, still

great loss of power in the limbs. In the beginning of August I sent her to Folkestone for a change. At the end of a fortnight she returned very much improved in every way. She afterwards made a more or less uninterrupted recovery, and in the course of some months became practically well. By the end of July, 1902, the only trace of her illness was a total hemianalgesia of the right side of the body with the exception of the thumb and index finger. This condition seemed to cause no inconvenience whatsoever, and it remained unaltered until Nov. 9th, 1906, when it suddenly completely disappeared.

The patient's condition with regard to motor power, sensation, kinaesthesia, and the reception and production of spoken and written language was tested many times during the course of her illness. I will only refer to some of the most striking peculiarities observed in regard to kinaesthesia and speech.

It must be remembered that the index finger and thumb of the right hand were at no period of her illness involved in the hemianaesthesia which for so long affected her, nor was she ever deprived of the knowledge to be gained by kinaesthetic impressions from these two members, even when the loss of muscular sense was complete in the rest of the arm. If passive movements of the right arm were made, the patient being blindfolded, she had no knowledge of the position of the limb, except when the forefinger and thumb came in contact with something that she recognised, such as her dress or her hair. When she was blindfolded, active movements of the right arm were very imperfectly performed. If asked to raise her hand on to her knees she felt with her forefinger and thumb as she slowly slid her hand along her dress. When the arm was kept away from her side she was unable to perform the action, but she kept moving the forefinger and thumb as if trying to come in contact with something that she might recognise.

One day in July, 1901, she was lying on a sofa when I called to see her. I asked her which leg she could move best. Her answer was, "The right one, if I can see it." I asked her to bend the leg at the knee without looking at it. She said she could not, but on being urged to try she made the limb move slightly, and the foot slipped off the sofa on to the floor. On asking her where her foot was now, she said she did not know. I told her to look. She did so, and said it had slipped

down. "Now," I said, "lift it up and lay it beside the other one." In order to do so she sat upright, so that she could see exactly where her foot was, and then quite easily and rapidly she replaced it on the sofa.

The type of paralysis here disclosed is of very rare occurrence, and is met with only, I think, in cases of most profound anaesthesia. Very few instances of the kind have been recorded.

The earliest indication of any disturbance of speech was the sibilant lalling which came on at the end of the first week of her illness. On analysing at a later date the defects in her speech production it was found that all the vowels were given their proper value when used in words. If the vowels were pronounced by themselves they were always prefixed by a *y* sound, thus, *ya*, *ye*, *yi*, *yo*. Of the voiceless oral consonants *p* was always given as *s*, and the voiceless *w* as *y*. Of the voiced oral consonants *w*, *l*, and *r* were always pronounced as *y*, while *g* was given as *d* in the earlier part of her illness and later as *g*. *B* was at first given as *s*, but later as *b*. Of the voiced nasal resonants *n* was the only sound which gave any trouble. For example, she always referred to the letter *m* as "am m." It may be noticed that the difficulties were confined to the labials and the linguo-palatals.

Although for more than a year her speech was characterised by these peculiarities, her sisters assured me that on several occasions during that period they had heard her saying her prayers with a faultless pronunciation.

When the acute phase of her illness was over it was found that she could not read. She could still write, but her writing reproduced all the peculiarities of her speech, the substitution of the letters *y* and *s* for other letters corresponding to the substitution of these sounds in her spoken language. She was unable to read what she wrote, so the peculiarities which rendered her writing rather difficult to understand were not noticed by her. The handwriting was good when the tremor and paresis of the right arm had passed off. The following is a good example of the sort of letters she wrote at this period:

My dea Hayy

I was veyy seaseg to hea you ayyieg home safey
You will be sussised to hea E... yode down on Sungay. O...

& I went to meet him & as usuay he dave us a yost joyney tooc the yond tunind & came though —. he is yoocind vey well & is comind adain nex Sattye weec. Well I cant yite any mo e I am tyied Love fom everyone.

S.S. Do you yice you Sotos.

The translation is:

My dear Harry,

I was very pleased to hear you arrived home safely. You will be surprised to hear E... rode down on Sunday. Ro... and I went to meet him and as usual he gave us a lost journey—took the wrong turning and came through —. He is looking very well and is coming again next Saturday week. Well I can't write any more. I am tired. Love from everyone.

P.S. Do you like your photos.

It may be seen that the substitution of letters is very similar to that which was noticeable in her speech. There are, however, some differences. The only constant similarity in her speech and writing was the use of *y* and *s* for other letters. Yet it may be noticed that the letter *r* is sometimes written *y* and sometimes omitted altogether. The letter *l* is generally written as *y*, but in short words like "well" and "will" it is often written correctly. The phrase "love to all" is in some of her letters written correctly, in others as "yove to ayy."

In writing to dictation the same mistakes were made as in spontaneous writing. Thus the phrase "Let us go out" was written "Yet us do out." She could not do transfer copying—that is, copying from printed into written characters. In copying from writing she copied only such letters as she recognised; the others she "drew" very badly.

For many months she was almost totally word-blind and to a great extent letter-blind. On testing her with large printed capitals it was found that she could seldom recognise at sight the letters *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *g*, *k*, *l*, *n*, *p*, *q*, *r*, *x*, *y*, *z*. *D* was always called *g* without any hesitation, while *g* was not recognised at all or was mistaken for *c*. *K*, *l*, and *r* were always called *y*. *P* was always called *s*. *S* was recognised and named correctly, but she could not distinguish it from *p*. She had the same

difficulties with written letters as with printed ones, but when she was allowed to trace over the written letters with the tip of her index finger she could name many of them correctly. This held good of all the letters which she made use of in spontaneous writing.

There were, however, certain letters of which she seemed to have lost all knowledge. For many months the letters *k*, *l*, *p*, and *r* were not recognised by sight, by sound, or by kinaesthetic impressions. They were not used in writing, nor were their sounds used in speech. One day after much trouble I taught her to pronounce the letter *p*, and the curious fact was observed that from that day she could use the *p* sound in speech, could read the letter in print and in writing, and could use it in writing spontaneously or from dictation.

She could name the numerals correctly up to 20, after which she said 30, 40, 50, etc. She could also write them, but was unable to read them after she had written. Even when allowed to trace over the figures with her forefinger, she rarely was able to name them correctly. In consequence of her difficulty in reading figures she was incapable of doing the simplest addition sums on paper. Yet she was still good at mental arithmetic. She was especially quick at the multiplication table, and never made a mistake.

The word-blindness was almost total for some months, but she was able to read with understanding long before she could recognise all the letters. Her power of reading, like her recognition of letters, came back gradually, and so far as could be judged, re-education had little to do with her recovery, although she had lessons every day. This was especially noticeable with regard to those letters which she had most completely forgotten. Prolonged efforts to teach her to recognise the letters *k*, *r*, and *l*, having resulted in complete failure, the attempt was given up. Yet in the course of time these letters came back to her. One day she discovered she could recognise *k*; some weeks later the same thing was observed with regard to *l*; and in the end she once more knew all the letters of the alphabet. The most striking instance of a good result from trying to teach her was the effect of showing her how to pronounce the letter *p*, or rather the *p* sound in words. Why regaining the power to produce the sound should

have enabled her to recognise the letter may be difficult to explain, but there is no doubt as to the fact that the one followed the other almost immediately.

Since we may get word-blindness without letter-blindness, and letter-blindness without word-blindness, it is probable that her recovery of the power of reading words was not dependent on her recovery of the power of recognising letters; but it was observed that improvement in both respects took place at about the same rate. The same holds good in regard to her speech, and the recovery of ability to recognise a letter was generally accompanied by the reinstatement of its sound in her speech. Whether one invariably preceded the other, and if so which returned first, I cannot say, as by the time such recovery took place her general health had so much improved that I had stopped seeing her regularly. Eighteen months after the onset of her illness she had quite recovered in every respect, with the exception of right hemianalgesia, which persisted for nearly six years.

During the whole course of this illness of eighteen months, and after recovery had taken place, the interpretation of the case was exceedingly difficult. The symptoms pointed to serious organic disturbance of the brain, combined, however, with a large functional element whose extent it was impossible to determine. The acute condition at the beginning corresponded to no known affection, and the long duration of the word-blindness was opposed to the view that it was of a purely functional nature. Yet it was almost impossible to understand how the various peculiarities of the case could be accounted for by any definite organic lesion. The fact that the patient could write, although she could not read, except by kinaesthetic impressions, showed that her word-blindness conformed to the type of "pure" word-blindness first described by Déjerine in 1892, but with regard to certain letters of the alphabet there was not only "blindness" but agraphia.

Except for the hemianalgesia, which caused her no inconvenience, the patient remained very well until December, 1904. On Dec. 3rd I was called to see her on account of a twitching of the mouth which had been present for a few days. I found her lying on a sofa asleep. Her face was in repose until she

awoke. As soon as she awoke, choreic movements of the mouth began. The mouth twitched first to one side, then to the other, and continued to do so without ceasing. Next day, while the movements of the mouth continued, the tongue became affected in a similar manner. She was drowsy and disinclined to talk. The temperature was 101° F.

On Dec. 8th she became very deaf, especially in the right ear, and her speech became affected in the old way. Asked to spell "lazy," she said "y, a, z, y," and pronounced it "yazy." On Dec. 19th the movements of the mouth suddenly stopped, but the tongue-movements continued. On Dec. 20th severe headache came on suddenly. Complaint of headache continued for a month. On Dec. 22nd the tongue-movements stopped. On this date I found that the right leg was paralysed. She was also anaesthetic and analgesic on the right half of the body. She was apparently very deaf, and did not understand what was said to her unless it was shouted into her left ear. Yet I sometimes got her to answer questions spoken in a low voice close to her right ear, and on several occasions she seemed to know what I was saying to her sisters. At all events she frequently made remarks very relevant to what we were talking about. Her sister told me that the patient had written some letters, and that her writing showed all the peculiarities which characterised it during her former illness. On Jan. 19th, 1905, rhythmic movements of the right hand, like those which occurred at the beginning of her former illness, began. They lasted for eight days and then suddenly stopped. She became duller and less inclined to talk, and still complained of headache, earache, and deafness.

Her condition remained more or less unaltered for many weeks. Some of her symptoms passed off and new ones took their place. The following note was written by me on March 25th, 1905:

Some days ago the paralysis of the right leg suddenly passed away. She said she heard a voice within her saying, "You can walk." She immediately got out of bed and walked without difficulty. There has been a serous discharge from the left ear for about a week, and now hearing in this ear is very much better. The right ear is still very deaf. For three months the middle, ring, and little fingers of the right hand have been closed in contracture on the

palm. It was found necessary to place a pad of cotton wool in the palm to prevent the finger nails from cutting into the flesh. By using some force I can open the hand, but she complains that doing so hurts her. She can open the fingers quite easily by using the other hand to force them open. She really uses no force at all, but the fingers open at once when she uses the other hand to open them.

She is now totally word-blind and letter-blind except for the letter *o*. She seems to have lost all knowledge of written and printed words. She cannot remember that she has ever known anything about them. She is absolutely agraphic and cannot even write her own name. She cannot read any words or letters by kinaesthetic impressions. Speech is very imperfect. There is lalling on many consonants. There does not seem to be any real word-deafness, although there seem to be some words which she does not understand. She does not know the multiplication table. She cannot count up to ten. After a little teaching she tries to do so, but always leaves out 2 and 8. She does not recognise any written figures. Although she has forgotten the multiplication table, she has a good memory for certain money tables learnt at school. She never makes a mistake in turning pence into shillings. I ask her what thirty-two pence make, and she answers immediately "two and eight pence."

Throughout April, May, and June, 1905, her condition did not vary much. The discharge from the left ear became tinged with blood. The left eye became affected in the same way, and every day some blood oozed from the lower eyelid, although no abrasion or solution of continuity of the skin or mucous membrane could be detected. This condition lasted until the end of July, 1905.

In the beginning of July, 1905, she went to Folkestone for a fortnight. She came back improved in health, and was now able to open and close all the fingers of her right hand. Her eye and ear still bled almost every morning, and she complained of great difficulty in seeing. On Aug. 16th she consulted an eye specialist, who found an enormous amount of hypermetropia and prescribed Sph. + 3.75 glasses for both eyes. She could not see at all with these glasses, but on the other hand she could see much better than formerly without them. On Aug. 19th, the day before she got her glasses, her

eye did not bleed. On Aug. 20th her ear did not bleed, and she told her father that her eye and her ear would not bleed any more. She had frequently made such announcements with regard to the disappearance of other symptoms, and on this as on former occasions her prognostication was correct. With the cessation of the bleeding from the ear, the deafness, which had lasted for seven months, entirely disappeared.

She still remained totally word- and letter-blind, she was also still completely agraphic, and she lalled in her speech almost as badly as ever. Yet her sisters informed me that they had occasionally heard her pronounce all her words perfectly when talking to children or strangers.

On Oct. 28th, 1905, the total agraphia stopped, and she wrote me a letter in the style of the letters she used to write during her illness in 1901. The spelling in this letter corresponded to that which was observed in the latter part of her former illness, namely, the period during which her main trouble was with the letters *k*, *l*, *r*, and *p*.

On Dec. 1st, 1905, there was sudden and complete recovery of sight, speech, and ability to read and write in a normal manner. The hemianaesthesia which had persisted since December, 1904, disappeared, but the hemianalgesia remained. I now stopped seeing her, but I learnt some months later that her sight became troublesome again, and that on the advice of a friend she consulted another eye-specialist. He prescribed Sph. + 1 glasses, and with these she was able to see much better than with her former ones.

On Nov. 7th, 1906, the right hemianalgesia which had existed uninterruptedly since June, 1901, suddenly and completely disappeared.

During the course of this second illness, which lasted from the beginning of December, 1904, to Dec. 1st, 1905, there was hardly any doubt as to the nature of the troubles from which the patient was suffering. Every fresh symptom helped to strengthen the conviction that all the peculiar phenomena which I have described were of functional or hysterical origin, and were not dependent on any organic lesion whatsoever.

I did not see the patient again until Nov. 5th, 1908. She was then in bed complaining of headache and general *malaise*,

and had a temperature of 100° F. She had kept well for nearly three years until a few weeks prior to the date of my visit. She had then begun to complain of her head, and had been much troubled by obsessional thoughts. These still continued to trouble her, and when I saw her on Nov. 5th, 1908, they were her chief complaint. She said she constantly heard voices telling her to run away from home, or to throw herself into the water, and she was greatly distressed in consequence.

I tried to hypnotise her, but with little apparent success. Every day for a week I went through some brief hypnotic process, but thinking there was little probability of inducing a true hypnosis, I confined my attention almost entirely to making suggestions with regard to the headache and obsessions. During this treatment the headache got well and the obsessions became much less troublesome; but she developed many of her old hysterical symptoms. The old tremor appeared in both legs with occasional choreic jerks of the arms. Her walking powers were very defective, and she twice fell and hurt herself. Her old lalling speech returned. She became quite word-blind and letter-blind except for the letter *o*, and totally agraphic. I persevered with suggestions of her speedy recovery from all these symptoms, but with no effect.

On Nov. 24th, 1908, I discovered that she now went into what seemed to be a genuine hypnosis with amnesia on waking, and I was disappointed that her speech affection, which I was now convinced had no organic basis, did not respond to my suggestions of recovery.

On Nov. 25th, 1908, she developed her old contracture of the middle, ring, and index fingers of the right hand. She had no recollection of having suffered from this condition before, and its occurrence alarmed and worried her. She told her sisters that she was sure I could put it all right, and when I called next day she asked me to make her hand open. I hypnotised her, and told her that she could now open her hand quite easily, and that it would never again become closed against her will. She immediately opened her hand, and from that moment had complete use of all her fingers. Suggestions during this hypnosis as to cessation of the coarse tremors in the legs had no effect. Later in the day she complained of pain in the left ear, and feared that she was going deaf.

There was also some blood-stained discharge from the right eye. Her sisters, remembering the trouble her eyes and ears had been in her illness in 1906, were uneasy about this symptom. The patient told them that she was sure I could cure the pain in the ear, and next morning she asked me to do so. This was easily effected, but suggestions as to cessation of the tremor in the legs and ability to walk and speak properly were of no avail.

On Nov. 29th, 1908, what troubled her most was complete colour-blindness. She asked me to cure this. I hypnotised her and gave appropriate suggestions. At the same time I made a whispered suggestion to the effect that at 12 o'clock she would suddenly be able to read. Before waking her I said, "You feel now that you can see colours properly, don't you?" "Yes," she answered with great assurance. "And what did I say about 12 o'clock?" "That I should be able to read." "And you feel you will?" She assented, but not with the same assurance as she had shown with regard to the colour-blindness. I then woke her, and showed her various pieces of coloured material. She at once named the colour of each of them correctly. Her sisters afterwards told me that at or about 12 o'clock the patient said she felt as if she could read a little. She tried to do so, and could understand most of the words, but long words still troubled her. In the course of the day this partial recovery regressed, and she could read only small words. Two days afterwards I succeeded in restoring her power of reading completely, and there has been no return of the word-blindness.

In the course of my attempts to dissipate some of her disabilities by suggestion, I was struck by the unequal success which attended my efforts. Some symptoms, like the contraction of the fingers, which in her former illnesses had remained unaltered for months, disappeared instantly at the first suggestion. Others, like the speech troubles and the difficulty in walking, seemed to be quite unaffected, no matter how often or how impressively appropriate suggestions were given. It soon became evident that the symptoms which were easily relieved were those which in her waking state she *asked* me to relieve, or those to the relief of which I had gained her free and unqualified assent during hypnosis. Without stopping

here to inquire into the meaning of this peculiarity, I may say that, rightly or wrongly, I tried to make use of it for therapeutic purposes, and I endeavoured to induce her to ask me definitely to relieve those symptoms which most seriously impaired her bodily and mental health.

The condition I was most anxious to alleviate was the paresis and tremor of the legs, for, as she was practically unable to walk, she was kept a prisoner in the house, and her general health was suffering in consequence. Every day for a week I predicted to her that on Wednesday, Dec. 2nd, 1908, all her trembling would cease, and that she would be able to walk as well as ever she did. On Dec. 1st I told her in hypnosis to ask me to cure her legs when I saw her next day. This she promised to do, but there was a lack of assurance in her reply when I asked her if she felt sure that I could make her walk properly.

On several occasions when I had desired her to ask me to relieve some particular symptom, I had found on visiting her that some fresh trouble had arisen, which seemed to her more urgent than that which I was anxious to relieve. I was not surprised then to find on the Wednesday morning that she had fallen downstairs and hurt her back. When I asked her what she wanted me to do for her, she said I must take away the pain in her back; but she made no reference to the trembling of the legs, or the inability to walk. I led her up to this by saying that, besides taking away the pain in her back, which I said would be quite easy, I wanted her to ask me to do something more for her. She then said that she wished me to keep her from falling and hurting herself any more. This gave me the opportunity to remark that the best way to do this would be to stop the trembling in her legs and to make her walk properly. To this she half reluctantly assented. I then hypnotised her, and made suggestions that her legs would stop trembling. These suggestions I continued for about fifteen minutes, but, although the tremor seemed to subside a little, there was no sign of its stopping. On being asked if she did not feel that her legs were going to become still in a very short time, she said she was trying to make them stop, but could not. "Oh," I said, "you need not try. All you have to do is to sleep a little more deeply, and they

will stop of their own accord. Now, I am going to stroke your face, and at each stroke you will go more and more deeply asleep." I then began to stroke her face slowly from above downwards, and at the fourth stroke the legs suddenly became quite still. I told her that the trembling had stopped and would never return, and that now she could walk perfectly well. That evening she walked to my house, a distance of a mile.

I would like to dwell for a moment on the nature of these tremors, which thus suddenly stopped after existing unchanged for over three weeks. A similar trembling could possibly have been produced by voluntary muscular efforts, but this trembling was, as a matter of fact, occasioned by a series of inco-ordinate muscular contractions, which can by no possibility be produced by the waking will. All over both limbs could be seen groups of muscles and even individual muscles, momentarily standing out as if stimulated by a Faradic current. Each contraction was a violent twitch, which immediately passed off, or was repeated once or twice in rapid succession. At the same time other muscles in other parts of the limb were similarly affected, and a constant succession of such isolated and widely separated twitchings went on uninterruptedly.

Why those twitchings stopped in response to suggestion I do not know. I do not think any one knows why such a result should occur, and it seems to me to be folly or dishonesty to pretend that we do. I have seen many strange things happen in response to suggestion during hypnosis, but I have not, I think, ever seen anything which more profoundly impressed me than the sudden cessation of those muscular contractions.

Encouraged by the complete restoration of her walking powers, I lost no time in trying to get an equally good result with regard to her speech and writing. During hypnosis on the evening of Dec. 2nd, I told her to ask me next morning to make her talk properly and write correctly. This she said she would like, but she seemed a little doubtful as to the result. On Dec. 3rd she asked me to make her talk properly and to be able to write, but the request did not come without some prompting from me. During hypnosis I made her pro-

Letter of Dec. 3rd, 1908.

My dear Dr. Mitchell

I am writing
to tell you I no
l. I remember it
after you had left
will you come
to mygo at 6 and
help me to sea

possibly and get
nicely nice you
made me gave and
on the other days
helps me get my
faggots and the
monies tell time
and to pick up
fings I dont get
fast long time and
the other fings I dont
no. Good bye

Letter of Dec. 4th, 1908.

My dear Dr. Mitchell

I am writing
to thank you very
much for helping me
to walk, and speak
properly, and write
nicely. Am I writing
as you would like
me to? I hope I am
but I am not quite
sure as I feel so
dreadfully sleepy today
I have been asleep

all the morning &
and this afternoon
until ~~R~~ woke me
and would not let
me sleep any longer.
My eye has been bleeding
again very much and
aches rather. My ear is
better. Will you come
and see us tomorrow
at 6 and help us to
tell the time & figures

Good Bye

mise to write me a letter in the course of the day, and to bring it to me. After hypnosis her speech was better, but by no means perfect, and I told her that it did not yet satisfy me. I said I still had difficulty in understanding her, and that I wanted her to talk *properly* and to write *nicely*. Both in the waking state and in hypnosis I made her promise to ask me next morning to complete the cure. The effect of the suggestions given on Dec. 3rd with regard to writing may be seen in the letter of this date, which is reproduced above. It is very difficult to read, and her sister, who saw her writing it, told me that each individual letter in its composition was written backwards.

On Dec. 4th she asked me quite spontaneously to make her talk *properly* and write *nicely*. She promised in hypnosis to write me another letter during the day. Immediately after this hypnosis her speech was practically normal, and the letter written in the afternoon was well written and free from mistake. This letter of Dec. 4th, 1908, is also reproduced for comparison with the other.

Her chief disabilities having been removed, she very soon recovered her health, and although for many weeks she provided me with a variety of hysterical symptoms on which to exercise my therapeutic ingenuity, she was during this time a very different person from the helpless invalid of the years 1902 and 1904.

As I have already said, I was very much struck by the unequal results produced by suggestion in this case. Hypnosis was apparently profound; post-hypnotic amnesia was complete; the disabilities I was anxious to remove were obviously of a functional nature; all the conditions favourable to the speedy removal of any particular symptom seemed to be present; yet it was clear that to most of my suggestions there was some resistance of a kind quite different from the mere failure of response to suggestion that may be met with in ordinary psycho-therapeutic work. It is difficult to account for such resistance to therapeutic suggestion as was met with in this case. Obstinacy was certainly a very marked characteristic of the hypnotised patient, but we feel that there must be some good reason for unwillingness to accept curative suggestions.

It seems to me probable that the resistance to which I have referred may be related to the resistance met with by Freud in the practice of psycho-analysis in cases of hysteria.

In Freud's opinion, hysterical symptoms are due to the repression of painful ideas, so that they no longer occupy a part of the conscious field, and cannot be recalled voluntarily or by association. Relief from the psychical pain caused by an unbearable idea is obtained by a conversion of the repressed feeling into physical manifestations. This transformation is described by Freud as a defence reaction of the ego against unbearable ideas, and the "repugnance of the ego" is the psychic force which determines the repression. The aim of psycho-analysis is to recover the repressed ideas in their entirety, to bring them back into consciousness, and to let the feelings connected with them have their proper emotional expression. According to Freud, "a patient can rid himself of a hysterical symptom only after reproducing and uttering under emotion its causal pathogenic impressions."¹

In the process of psycho-analysis, as practised by Freud, great resistance is sometimes encountered in trying to recover forgotten memories connected with the original psychic trauma, and Freud concludes that the resistance is due to the same psychic force which led to the repression, namely, "repugnance of the ego." When we try to drag these painful memories back into consciousness, some part of the patient's mind seems to know that the restoration of these lost memories will be accompanied by feelings that are unbearable.

Now if Freud's views on the causation of hysterical symptoms are correct, it would seem that when a hysterical symptom is removed *by suggestion*, the disappearance of the symptom must be accompanied by its re-conversion into some other symptom or into the original unbearable idea. And just as the "repugnance of the ego" to the unbearable idea may lead to resistance in psycho-analysis undertaken to disclose it, so the same psychic force may lead to the rejection of suggestions directed towards the removal of the hysterical symptom.

The mutual interchangeableness of somatic and mental affections in hysteria was strikingly shown on several occasions in the course of the treatment of A. G. P. by suggestion.

¹Freud, *Selected Papers on Hysteria* (English Trans.), p. 100.

When the obsessions of the early stage of the last illness disappeared, the physical manifestations began. When cessation of the muscular twitching and ability to walk were obtained, there occurred a series of dreadful dreams, which affected the patient very strongly (see p. 304). When the most persistent of all the bodily symptoms—the right hemianalgesia—was removed by suggestion, she passed almost immediately from a state of comparatively normal mental health into a state of profound depression, accompanied by phobias and obsessions. In the middle of the night, some hours after the disappearance of the hemianalgesia, she wrote a most pitiful letter to her sister, in which she expressed the fear that she was going out of her mind, and begged her sister not to send her to an asylum. I received a letter from her next day, in which she said that “the awful thing in her head” kept shouting at her and telling her to do dreadful things. So great was her distress, and so evident seemed the connection between the disappearance of the hemianalgesia and the appearance of the morbid mental symptoms, that I decided to bring back the bodily defect by suggestion, in the hope that by so doing the mental troubles might be ameliorated. I was careful not to give any indication to the patient why I wished the loss of sensibility to return, yet with the recurrence of the hemianalgesia she soon returned to her ordinary state and became free from all mental distress. Now if we can suppose that somewhere in her mind there was some sort of prevision that the removal of the hemianalgesia would be accompanied by such mental distress, there would be good reason for her prolonged rejection of my curative suggestions in regard to this symptom, and this rejection may be regarded as being due to the same cause as that which leads to resistance in psycho-analysis.

But although the relations between the resistance met with in psycho-analysis and the rejection of therapeutic suggestions are interesting, and may be worthy of further consideration, I wish here rather to describe how the resistance to suggestion met with in this case appeared to me at the time. In the course of treatment it seemed to become more and more apparent that there was a wilful rejection of certain therapeutic suggestions and an exercise of choice and discrimination as to what suggestions were to be allowed to be effective. Here was

no passive state in which every suggestion is readily accepted, but rather a very obstinate and capricious person, who seemed to have some unusual kind of control over her own bodily organism. The rejection of therapeutic suggestions appeared to be the deliberate act of a second personality brought to light by the induction of hypnosis. In order to estimate the nature of this personality, there is one circumstance connected with the patient's history to which some reference must be made.

Soon after I began to attend A. G. P. in 1908, it became a common occurrence for her to talk in her sleep to her sisters before she awoke in the mornings. If one of them happened to be passing her door, she would call her by name, and she was never known to be in error as to which of her sisters it was. Indeed, they found it difficult to explain how she acquired the knowledge she sometimes showed in regard to their actions in various parts of the house. She was never known to speak in her sleep unless she had something definite to say and some one to say it to. There was no aimless or incoherent sleep-talking, as in dream or delirium. What she said was always the definite expression of a person who knew what she wanted to say and said it. The subject-matter of these conversations was as a rule confined to the symptoms or events of her illness, and her purpose in speaking apparently was that I should be informed of certain matters which she thought it important for me to know.

In the morning of Dec. 4th, 1908, her father heard her crying out, and went into her bedroom. He found her asleep and evidently dreaming, as she was struggling and crying as if in terror. Later she called her sister to her room, because her right eye was streaming with blood and blood was oozing from her right ear. When I heard this story next day, I asked her if she had dreamt in the night. She said she did not think so. In hypnosis she told me that in the night a nasty man had attacked her, and hit her on the head with a hammer. When I referred to this episode as a dream, she insisted very firmly that it was a real experience, not a dream. In the waking state she had no knowledge of the matter at all.

Soon after this various articles of value belonging to her disappeared—her watch, some money, and her keys, for example, were lost, and could not be found. In the waking state she

did not know where these things were, and she sought for them in vain. In hypnosis she confessed that she herself had hidden them, and told me where they might be found. She said she had hidden them because a nasty man had come to her in the night and wanted to steal them. This man who wanted to steal her watch and money was the same man who had attacked her with the hammer.

The whole of this dream life, and all the actions associated with it, belonged to the stratum of consciousness revealed in hypnosis. The waking consciousness had no knowledge of any of the events of this phase of the patient's life. But although in the primary state there was no knowledge of the events of the second state, there was in the second state full knowledge of all the events of waking life. This is, of course, the ordinary type of amnesia observed in all cases of deep hypnosis. But in this case there were many indications that the personality of the second state was different from that of a mere state of hypnosis, and it seemed to persist throughout waking life as a co-conscious personality capable of acting on its own initiative, and also capable of taking possession of the bodily organism at will.

Very soon after the sleep-talking in bed began, it was noticed that the patient often dropped into the second state in the day-time, and always on these occasions she spoke to her sisters of events connected with this phase of her existence, or made remarks in regard to events of her waking life which she would not have made if she had been awake. For example, in talking to her father, a querulous old man who was sometimes very trying, she would often make cutting or sarcastic remarks, which she would not have made in her ordinary state. He was often surprised at the things she said, but excused her on account of her ill-health. Her sisters, however, knew that when she said those things she had dropped into the second state, and they found that shortly afterwards she knew nothing of having said them. They said they never had any doubt as to which state she was in. In the second state her voice was different, her manner of speaking was more vivacious, she was more determined and assertive. She was exceedingly obstinate, very petulant, and rather childish. Her eyes were closed or half-closed.

For a long time I was scrupulously careful to avoid any suggestion that might increase the separateness of the two personalities. One day, however, when trying to discover their points of resemblance and difference, I proposed to the hypnotised patient to speak of her in the hypnotic state as Amelia and in the waking state as Milly—the name ordinarily used by her friends. Amelia, on being asked what was the difference, if any, between herself and Milly, said she was not very sure, but that she knew more than Milly did, and remembered many things that Milly had forgotten. This seemed especially true of many of the events of her illnesses. Milly, when in good health, had no recollection of her three illnesses. She knew she had been ill, but she did not remember much about it. During the course of these illnesses her memory was of course very defective in many ways, and in each attack one curious loss, which proved very persistent, was observed. She forgot that her second name was Geraldine. Each time when she got well, although she forgot the events of the illness, most of her old memories came back to her; but she still denied for many months that Geraldine was part of her name. Now I found that Amelia knew no more than Milly about Geraldine being her second name.

When I first tried to get Amelia to write automatically through Milly's hand she refused, giving as a reason that she did not wish Milly to see what she wrote. I therefore asked her to write me a letter some time when Milly was asleep. Next day her sister brought me a letter which the patient, when in the second state, had asked her to give to me. It is interesting to notice how readily Amelia adopted the style of an orthodox second personality. The letter begins: "My dear Doctor, She does not know I am writing this"—"she" being, of course, Milly.

Amelia denied all responsibility for most of the morbid symptoms from which Milly suffered, but she confessed to having caused some of them. She said in a letter to me, "I made her hands shake and her legs as well, and I scratched her and made all those nasty places on her hands and legs, and made her fingers close down and her thumbs so that she could not move them. . . . I made her fall downstairs and hurt herself." She said, however, that she had nothing to do with

causing the difficulties of speech, reading, and writing, or the bleeding from the eyes and ears, or the hemianaesthesia. Although we must be cautious in accepting these statements, there are some grounds for thinking that they have some foundation in fact. During the course of the patient's illness it seemed evident to me that those more serious disturbances, for the production of which Amelia denied all responsibility, were connected with the functioning of dissociated states of consciousness which were not synthesised within the hypnotic personality; and when I succeeded in removing any of the more obstinate symptoms by suggestion, I generally found it necessary to try to render hypnosis as deep as possible. The nature, or even the existence, of such deeper hypnotic states was not experimentally tested at the time for fear of compromising the therapeutic results, but when the patient was practically well I was able to hypnotise Amelia and so to obtain a new state which assumed the name of Amelia Geraldine—from the fact that in it Amelia remembered her second name. Amelia Geraldine seemed to present a more normal character than Amelia. The childishness of Amelia seemed to disappear and to give place to a more serious and womanly personality.

Both Amelia and Milly claimed to be amnesic of all that transpired when Amelia Geraldine was present; but although this was no doubt true in regard to Milly, it sometimes appeared as if Amelia had some sort of knowledge of Amelia Geraldine. Both Amelia and Amelia Geraldine ascribed the more serious functional disabilities to something beyond or within them. There seemed indeed to be in this case some dissociated states which could not be recovered in hypnosis, dissociated ideas which were outside the mental content of any discoverable personality, dissociated emotions deeply buried in the subconscious which revealed their presence by these bizarre defects of the psycho-physical organism. Amelia, in trying to excuse herself for her participation in the production of Milly's troubles, says, "it is *that awful thing in my head* that makes me do those things to her; it is dreadful and makes me feel bad, and I must do something to hurt her."

Notwithstanding the beneficial results that had been obtained in this case by the use of suggestion, a stage was reached where it became evident that something more was necessary

to restore the patient to normal health. Every attempt at producing complete freedom from all physical manifestations of hysteria was followed by an increase of mental pain and depression. Although it is no uncommon experience to be able by suggestion to remove completely and permanently the disabilities met with in mild cases of hysteria, it is the general opinion of those who have had much to do with graver cases that complete restoration to health is difficult to obtain. Janet, in accordance with his view that hysterical symptoms are the result of a narrowing of the field of consciousness, says that, so long as the field of consciousness remains contracted, we can never add one phenomenon on one side without taking one away from another side. Janet's hysterical has been well compared by Freud to a weak woman who has been shopping, and is now on her way home laden with packages and bundles of every description. She cannot manage the whole lot with her two arms and her ten fingers, and soon she drops one. When she stoops to pick this up, another breaks loose, and so it goes on. This view of the nature of hysteria is hardly in keeping with the observation commonly made that in hysteria exaltation of faculty in some directions is to be found along with diminished power in others. More in accord, on the whole, with clinical facts is Freud's view that the somatic symptoms of hysteria are due to the conversion of repressed emotions into physical disabilities, and that where adaptation for such conversion does not exist, purely mental symptoms such as phobias and obsessions may appear.

In view of the remarkable findings of Freud and his pupils in regard to the pathogenesis of hysteria, I decided to undertake a psycho-analysis of A. G. P. in the hope that I might be able to achieve the complete restoration to health which suggestion alone seemed unable to effect. For various reasons I adopted, to begin with, the technique used by Freud in his earlier work, making use of the hypnotic state as a means of facilitating the analysis. At a later period this was supplemented by word-association tests in the waking state and other measures.

It soon became evident that the memory of incidents forgotten in the waking state was most readily resuscitated in the state known as Amelia Geraldine (AG). Her memory of such in-

eidents of a pathogenic kind seemed much wider and more accessible than that of Amelia (A). But it was soon found that a still better state for psycho-analysis was one which may be called AG_2 , produced by hypnotising AG. When AG first appeared I suggested to her that she should open her eyes, and that she should always "come" with her eyes open. AG_2 had her eyes closed and said she was AG asleep. Thus when Milly (M) was hypnotised, A came with eyes closed. When A was told to sleep, AG appeared after a little time with eyes open. On continuing the hypnotising process—verbal suggestions of sleep combined with light passes with contact on the face—AG closed her eyes and claimed to be AG_2 . On telling AG_2 to awake, she opened her eyes and was AG. On telling AG to awake, she closed her eyes and A appeared. When A was told to awake, she opened her eyes and M appeared. M was amnesic for all the stages. A was amnesic for AG and AG_2 . AG remembered what I said to A, but "lost herself" when AG_2 appeared.

From the very beginning A had persistently asserted that she was not responsible for all the things that Milly said and did when asleep. I had assumed that it was A who spoke to her sisters and father in what I have described as the second state; but in her first letter to me A had said, "I do not make her talk." For a long time I took no notice of this denial, accounting it merely a ruse on A's part by which she might escape a scolding from me. A, however, maintained very persistently that Milly in her sleep often said and did things for which she (A) was not responsible. These things were ascribed by A to "Milly asleep" (Ma). But Ma was a phase of consciousness with which I had no personal dealings, and in which I did not believe until A came to my assistance. She told me that the way to find Ma was "to put her to sleep—very sound sleep—ever so much deeper than you put me, and then make her open her eyes." The process here described amounted to producing AG_2 , or some deeper state, and then getting her to open her eyes. After Ma was discovered, AG_2 appeared only as a transition stage between AG and Ma , and this latter stage was used in the remaining stages of the psycho-analysis.

I find it very difficult to come to any conclusion regarding

the interpretation which should be put upon these various phases of the hypnotic state in this case. I believe they were to a large extent artificial products, partly due to direct or indirect suggestion from me, but to a still greater degree to self-suggestion on the part of the patient. It seems to me impossible to disentangle from the whole series of phenomena that which might be due to self-suggestion and that which occurred apparently spontaneously. The different personalities exhibited no very striking differences of character, but, such as they were, these differences were fairly consistently maintained throughout the whole period of investigation. I charged both A and AG to take care of Milly, and to keep her well and free from accidents or injuries. A became rather a fussy guardian of Milly's welfare, and reported her various misdeeds to me with an exaggerated sense of her own importance and rectitude. She was rather proud of her disciplinary methods, which consisted in biting and scratching Milly when the latter did not act in accordance with A's ideas of what was conducive to health. AG, on the other hand, generally spoke "more in sorrow than in anger" of Milly's delinquencies. *Ma* was very like Milly awake, but with a greatly extended memory as regards certain experiences which were of hysterogenic significance.

According to Freud, the pathogenic psychic material which has been crowded out of the ordinary consciousness in hysteria may be shown still to exist in an orderly form; and again and again in the course of psycho-analysis undertaken in the waking state, Freud seems struck by the appearance of its being in the possession of a second intelligence. He says: "One receives a delusive impression of a superior intelligence, external to the patient's consciousness, which systematically holds a large psychic material for definite purposes. . . . I presume, however, that this unconscious second intelligence is only apparent."¹ In another place he says: "The pathogenic psychic material appears as the property of an intelligence which is not necessarily inferior to the normal ego. The semblance of a second personality is often most delusively produced."²

There are some grounds, I think, for demurring to Freud's

¹Freud, *loc. cit.*, p. 90.

²*Ibid.*, p. 104.

view that this semblance is necessarily delusive. It seemed to me that in the case of A. G. P. the induction of hypnosis brought me into touch with a series of personalities who held in their possession a vast amount of psychic material of which the waking consciousness had lost all knowledge, and of a kind which, on Freud's own showing, must be regarded as hysterogenic.

On trying to recover some of the incidents of Milly's past from A, AG, or AG₂, great resistance was very often encountered, and little progress was sometimes made for weeks at a time. It was apparently in order to help me over these difficulties that A voluntarily offered to tell me how to find "Milly asleep." "She knows everything," A said, "and she will tell you everything, if you do as I say." And A's prognostication was on the whole correct. Resistances were still met with, but in the end all the episodes of which AG₂ could only recover fragments were filled out in detail by Ma.

Concurrently with the revelation of the emotional shocks which had led to disintegration of personality, Milly's health recovered. But I must add that, all through the later period of treatment, as at the beginning, suggestion was employed. After the psycho-analysis had reached a certain point the hemianalgesia was again made to disappear by suggestion and no untoward results followed. Very likely from the Freudian point of view the analysis was incomplete, but I had attained my end, and Milly became to all appearance a normal healthy woman. And so she remains. The phases A, AG, and Ma can still be obtained, but their spontaneous manifestations have, so far as I know, ceased.

III.

A NOTE ON THE UNCONSCIOUS IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.

BY PROFESSOR SIGM. FREUD, M.D., LL.D. (VIENNA).

I WISH to expound in a few words and as plainly as possible what the term "unconscious" has come to mean in Psycho-analysis and in Psycho-analysis alone.

A conception—or any other psychical element—which is now *present* to my consciousness may become *absent* the next moment, and may become *present again*, after an interval, unchanged, and, as we say, from memory, not as a result of a fresh perception by our senses. It is this fact which we are accustomed to account for by the supposition that during the interval the conception has been present in our mind, although *latent* in consciousness. In what shape it may have existed while present in the mind and latent in consciousness we have no means of guessing.

At this very point we may be prepared to meet with the philosophical objection that the latent conception did not exist as an object of psychology, but as a physical disposition for the recurrence of the same psychical phenomenon, *i.e.* of the said conception. But we may reply that this is a theory far overstepping the domain of psychology proper; that it simply begs the question by asserting "conscious" to be an identical term with "psychical," and that it is clearly at fault in denying psychology the right to account for its most common facts, such as memory, by its own means.

Now let us call "conscious" the conception which is present to our consciousness and of which we are aware, and let this be the only meaning of the term "conscious." As for latent

conceptions, if we have any reason to suppose that they exist in the mind—as we had in the case of memory,—let them be denoted by the term “unconscious.”

Thus an unconscious conception is one of which we are not aware, but the existence of which we are nevertheless ready to admit on account of other proofs or signs.

This might be considered an uninteresting piece of descriptive or classificatory work if no experience appealed to our judgment other than the facts of memory, or the cases of association by unconscious links. The well-known experiment, however, of “the post-hypnotic suggestion” teaches us to insist upon the importance of the distinction between *conscious* and *unconscious*, and seems to increase its value.

In this experiment, as performed by Bernheim, a person is put into a hypnotic state and is subsequently aroused. While he was in the hypnotic state, under the influence of the physician, he was ordered to execute a certain action at a certain fixed moment after his awakening, say half-an-hour later. He awakes, and seems fully conscious and in his ordinary condition; he has no recollection of his hypnotic state, and yet at the pre-arranged moment there rushes into his mind the impulse to do such and such a thing, and he does it consciously, though not knowing why. It seems impossible to give any other description of the phenomenon than to say that the order had been present in the mind of the person in a condition of latency, or had been present unconsciously, until the given moment came, and then had become conscious. But not the whole of it emerged into consciousness: only the conception of the act to be executed. All the other ideas associated with this conception,—the order, the influence of the physician, the recollection of the hypnotic state, remained unconscious even then.

But we have more to learn from such an experiment. We are led from the purely descriptive to a *dynamic* view of the phenomenon. The idea of the action ordered in hypnosis not only became an object of consciousness at a certain moment, but the more striking aspect of the fact is that this idea grew *active*: it was translated into action as soon as consciousness became aware of its presence. The real stimulus to the action being the order of the physician, it is hard not to concede

that the idea of the physician's order became active too. Yet this last idea did not reveal itself to consciousness, as did its outcome, the idea of the action; it remained unconscious, and so it was *active and unconscious* at the same time.

A post-hypnotic suggestion is a laboratory production, an artificial fact. But if we adopt the theory of hysterical phenomena first put forward by P. Janet and elaborated by Breuer and myself, we shall not be at a loss for plenty of natural facts showing the psychological character of the post-hypnotic suggestion even more clearly and distinctly.

The mind of the hysterical patient is full of active yet unconscious ideas; all her symptoms proceed from such ideas. It is in fact the most striking character of the hysterical mind to be ruled by them. If the hysterical woman vomits, she may do so from the idea of being pregnant. She has, however, no knowledge of this idea, although it can easily be detected in her mind, and made conscious to her, by one of the technical procedures of Psycho-analysis. If she is executing the jerks and movements constituting her "fit," she does not even consciously represent to herself the intended actions, and she may perceive those actions with the detached feelings of an onlooker. Nevertheless analysis will show that she was acting her part in the dramatic reproduction of some incident in her life, the memory of which was unconsciously active during the attack. The same preponderance of active unconscious ideas is revealed by analysis as the essential fact in the psychology of all other forms of neurosis.

We learn therefore by the analysis of neurotic phenomena that a latent or unconscious idea is not necessarily a weak one, and that the presence of such an idea in the mind admits of indirect proofs of the most cogent kind, which are equivalent to the direct proof furnished by consciousness. We feel justified in making our classification agree with this addition to our knowledge by introducing a fundamental distinction between different kinds of latent or unconscious ideas. We were accustomed to think that every latent idea was so because it was weak and that it grew conscious as soon as it became strong. We have now gained the conviction that there are some latent ideas which do not penetrate into consciousness, however strong they may have become. Therefore we may

call the latent ideas of the first type *foreconscious*, while we reserve the term *unconscious* (proper) for the latter type which we came to study in the neuroses. The term *unconscious*, which was used in the purely descriptive sense before, now comes to imply something more. It designates not only latent ideas in general, but especially ideas with a certain dynamic character, ideas keeping apart from consciousness in spite of their intensity and activity.

Before continuing my exposition I will refer to two objections which are likely to be raised at this point. The first of these may be stated thus: instead of subscribing to the hypothesis of unconscious ideas of which we know nothing, we had better assume that consciousness can be split up, so that certain ideas or other psychological acts may constitute a consciousness apart, which has become detached and estranged from the bulk of conscious psychological activity. Well-known pathological cases like that of Dr. Azam seem to go far to show that the splitting up of consciousness is no fanciful imagination.

I venture to urge against this theory that it is a gratuitous assumption, based on the abuse of the word "conscious." We have no right to extend the meaning of this word so far as to make it include a consciousness of which its owner himself is not aware. If philosophers find difficulty in accepting the existence of unconscious ideas, the existence of an unconscious consciousness seems to me even more objectionable. The cases described as splitting of consciousness, like Dr. Azam's, might better be denoted as shifting of consciousness,—that function—or whatever it be—oscillating between two different psychological complexes which become conscious and unconscious in alternation.

The other objection that may probably be raised would be that we apply to normal psychology conclusions which are drawn chiefly from the study of pathological conditions. We are enabled to answer it by another fact, the knowledge of which we owe to psycho-analysis. Certain deficiencies of function of most frequent occurrence among healthy people, e.g. *lapsus linguæ*, errors in memory and speech, forgetting of names, etc., may easily be shown to depend on the action of strong unconscious ideas in the same way as neurotic symptoms. We shall meet with another still more convincing argument at a later stage of this discussion.

By the differentiation of foreconscious and unconscious ideas, we are led on to leave the field of classification and to form an opinion about functional and dynamical relations in psychical action. We have found a *foreconscious activity* passing into consciousness with no difficulty, and an *unconscious activity* which remains so and seems to be cut off from consciousness.

Now we do not know whether these two modes of psychical activity are identical or essentially divergent from their beginning, but we may ask why they should become different in the course of psychical action. To this last question psychoanalysis gives a clear and unhesitating answer. It is by no means impossible for the product of unconscious activity to pierce into consciousness, but a certain amount of exertion is needed for this task. When we try to do it in ourselves, we become aware of a distinct feeling of *repulsion* which must be overcome, and when we produce it in a patient we get the most unquestionable signs of what we call his *resistance* to it. So we learn that the unconscious idea is excluded from consciousness by living forces which oppose themselves to its reception, while they do not object to other ideas, the foreconscious ones. Psychoanalysis leaves no room for doubt that the repulsion from unconscious ideas is only provoked by the tendencies embodied in their contents. The next and most probable theory which can be formulated at this stage of our knowledge is the following. Unconsciousness is a regular and inevitable phase in the processes constituting our psychical activity; every psychical act begins as an unconscious one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into consciousness, according as it meets with resistance or not. The distinction between foreconscious and unconscious activity is not a primary one, but comes to be established after repulsion has sprung up. Only then the difference between fore-conscious ideas, which can appear in consciousness and reappear at any moment, and unconscious ideas which cannot do so gains a theoretical as well as a practical value. A rough but not inadequate analogy to this supposed relation of conscious to unconscious activity might be drawn from the field of ordinary photography. The first stage of the photograph is the "negative"; every photographic picture has to pass through

the "negative process," and some of these negatives which have held good in examination are admitted to the "positive process" ending in the picture.

But the distinction between foreconscious and unconscious activity, and the recognition of the barrier which keeps them asunder, is not the last or the most important result of the psycho-analytic investigation of psychical life. There is one psychical product to be met with in the most normal persons, which yet presents a very striking analogy to the wildest productions of insanity, and was no more intelligible to philosophers than insanity itself. I refer to dreams. Psycho-analysis is founded upon the analysis of dreams; the interpretation of dreams is the most complete piece of work the young science has done up to the present. One of the most common types of dream-formation may be described as follows: a train of thoughts has been aroused by the working of the mind in the daytime, and retained some of its activity, escaping from the general inhibition of interests which introduces sleep and constitutes the psychical preparation for sleeping. During the night this train of thoughts succeeds in finding connections with one of the unconscious tendencies present ever since his childhood in the mind of the dreamer, but ordinarily *repressed* and excluded from his conscious life. By the borrowed force of this unconscious help, the thoughts, the residue of the day's work, now become active again, and emerge into consciousness in the shape of the dream. Now three things have happened:

- (1) The thoughts have undergone a change, a disguise and a distortion, which represents the part of the unconscious helpmate.
- (2) The thoughts have occupied consciousness at a time when they ought not.
- (3) Some part of the unconscious, which could not otherwise have done so, has emerged into consciousness.

We have learnt the art of finding out the "residual thoughts," the *latent thoughts of the dream*, and, by comparing them with the *apparent dream*, we are able to form a judgment on the changes they underwent and the manner in which these were brought about.

The latent thoughts of the dream differ in no respect from the products of our regular conscious activity; they deserve

the name of foreconscious thoughts, and may indeed have been conscious at some moment of waking life. But, by entering into connection with the unconscious tendencies during the night, they have become assimilated to the latter, degraded as it were to the condition of unconscious thoughts, and subjected to the laws by which unconscious activity is governed. And here is the opportunity to learn what we could not have guessed from speculation, or from another source of empirical information,—that the laws of unconscious activity differ widely from those of the conscious. We gather in detail what the peculiarities of the *Unconscious* are, and we may hope to learn still more about them by a profounder investigation of the processes of dream-formation.

This enquiry is not yet half finished, and an exposition of the results obtained hitherto is scarcely possible without entering into the most intricate problems of dream-analysis. But I would not break off this discussion without indicating the change and progress in our comprehension of the Unconscious which are due to our psycho-analytic study of dreams.

Unconsciousness seemed to us at first only an enigmatical characteristic of a definite psychical act. Now it means more for us. It is a sign that this act partakes of the nature of a certain psychical category known to us by other and more important characters, and that it belongs to a system of psychical activity which is deserving of our fullest attention. The index-value of the unconscious has far outgrown its importance as a property. The system revealed by the sign that the single acts forming parts of it are unconscious we designate by the name "The Unconscious," for want of a better and less ambiguous term. In German, I propose to denote this system by the letters *Ubw*, an abbreviation of the German word "Unbewusst." And this is the third and most significant sense which the term "unconscious" has acquired in psycho-analysis.

IV.

THE THEORY OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS.

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CHAPTER I.

THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRATION.

PLATO put on the portals of his academy the inscription, "No one can enter here without a knowledge of geometry." Similarly no one can gain access to the facts of abnormal psychology without a thorough understanding of the subconscious. The subconscious may be briefly defined as mental processes of which the individual is not directly conscious. The general drift of my *Psychology of Suggestion* is the description of the subconscious as a diffused consciousness below the margin of personal consciousness. I sometimes use the term subconscious self. I designate by "self" not personal consciousness, but mere consciousness. In *Multiple Personality*, in which I develop the theory of thresholds in regard to the phenomena of normal and abnormal mental life, I define the subconscious as consciousness below the threshold of attentive personal consciousness. I find that my clinical and psychological investigations more and more confirm me in the view of the subconscious advanced by me in *The Psychology of Suggestion*. I am pleased to find that Prof. James, in a recent article, accepts the same view, and advances the same theory of threshold in regard to the subconscious. "Nobody knows," he writes, "how far we are 'marginally' conscious of these memories, concepts and conational states at ordinary times, or how far beyond the 'margin'

of our present thought trans-marginal consciousness of them may exist."

In my *Psychology of Suggestion* I pointed out the difficulties of the purely physiological interpretation of the subconscious. Since this view still lingers among some psychologists, I cannot do better than reproduce the passage verbatim (pp. 118 *et seq.*):

The facts of hypnotic memory alone strongly indicate the intelligent nature of the subconscious. Can the theory of unconscious cerebration explain, for instance, the fact of suggested amnesia during hypnosis? I hypnotize Mr. V. F. and make him pass through many lively scenes and actions. I give him hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestions. The subject is awakened and hypnotized time and again. At last he is put into a hypnotic state, and it is suggested that on awakening he shall not remember anything of what had happened in the state of hypnosis. The subject, on emerging from his trance, remembers nothing of what he has passed through. I then put my hand on his forehead and tell him in a commanding voice, "You remember now everything." As if touched by the wand of a magician, the suppressed memories become endowed with life and movement, and invade the consciousness of the subject. Everything is now clearly remembered, and the subject is able to relate the tale of his adventures without the omission of the least incident. So detailed is the account that one cannot help wondering at the extraordinary memory displayed by the subject. How is the theory of unconscious cerebration to account for this strange fact? Prof. Ziehen, in his *Physiological Psychology*, tells us that "it is still a matter of doubt whether, despite their complicatedness, all the facts of the hypnotized individual are not motions accomplished without any concomitant psychical processes," and that "even the recollection of the hypnotic psychical processes do not necessarily argue *in favour* of their existence during the hypnotic trance." This extreme view is certainly wrong, for the subject during hypnosis not only acts, moves, but he also speaks, answers questions intelligently, reasons, discusses; and if such an individual may be regarded as a mere machine, on the same grounds we may consider any rational man as a mere unconscious automaton.

The advocates of unconscious cerebration must admit at least this much, that hypnosis is a conscious state. Now, on the theory

of unconscious cerebration, it is truly inconceivable how psychological states can be suppressed, the accompanying physiological processes alone being left, and all that done by a mere word of the experimenter. The restoration of memory is still more incomprehensible than the suggested amnesia. A command by the experimenter, "Now you can remember," brings into consciousness a flood of ideas and images. It is not that the experimenter gives the subject a clue which starts the train of particular images and ideas; but the mere general, abstract suggestion, "You can remember," is sufficient to restore memories which to all appearances have completely vanished from the mind of the subject. Are the unconscious physiological nervous modifications so intelligent as to understand suggestions and follow them? Does unconscious cerebration understand the command of the experimenter, and does it oblige him to become conscious? On closer examination, we find the term unconscious cerebration to be of so loose a nature that under its head are often recorded facts that clearly indicate the working of an intelligence. Thus, Mr. Charles M. Child brings the following fact as a specimen of unconscious cerebration: "I had earnestly been trying," a gentleman writes to Mr. Child, "to make a trial balance, and at last left off working, the summary of the Dr. and Cr. sides of the account showing a difference of £2 10s., the Dr. side being so much smaller. The error I had not found on Saturday night when I left the counting-house. On this same Saturday night I retired feeling nervous and angry with myself. Some time in the night I dreamed thus: I was seated at my desk in the counting-house and in a good light; everything was orderly and natural, the ledger lying before me. I was looking over the balance of the accounts and comparing them with the sums in the trial-balance sheet. Soon I came to a debit balance of £2 10s. I looked at it, called myself sundry names, spoke to myself in a deprecating manner of my own eyes, and at last put the £2 10s. to its proper side of the trial-balance sheet and went home. I arose at the usual Sunday time, dressed carefully, breakfasted, went to call on some . . . friends to go to church. Suddenly the dream flashed on my memory. I went for the keys, opened the office, also the safe, got the ledger, and turned to the folio my dream had indicated. There was the account whose balance was the sum wanted which I had omitted to put in the balance-sheet, where it was put now, and my year's posting proved correct."

The adherents of unconscious cerebration tacitly include under

this term not only unconscious physiological processes, or nerve modifications, but also psychical states. Keeping clearly in mind the real meaning of unconscious cerebration as referring to physiological processes, or nerve modifications with no psychical accompaniment, the difficulties of unconscious cerebration to account for the phenomena of hypnotic memory become truly insurmountable. For if the physiological processes subsumed under the category of unconscious cerebration are completely lacking in all psychical elements whatever, how can a general abstract negative phrase, "You cannot remember," suppress particular psychical states, and how can a similar positive phrase, "You can remember," bring the forgotten memories back to consciousness? It is simply incomprehensible.

Furthermore, while the subject is in a hypnotic condition, we can suggest to him that on awakening he shall not remember anything, but when put to the automatic recorder he shall be able to write everything that has taken place in the state of hypnosis. The subject is then awakened: he remembers nothing at all of what he has passed through while in the state of hypnotic trance. As soon, however, as he is put to the automatic recorder the hand gives a full rational account of all the events. If now you ask the subject what it is he has written, he stares at you in confusion; he knows nothing at all of the writing. How shall we account for this fact on the theory of unconscious cerebration? Can unconscious physiological processes write rational discourses? It is simply wonderful, incomprehensible.

These, however, are not the only difficulties which the theory of unconscious cerebration has to encounter. Take the following experiment: I gave Mr. V. F. the suggestion that on awakening he should put my coat on three times, take it off, and put it on again; that he should do it when he heard a signal which should be a knock; amnesia was suggested and also the possibility of writing the suggestion. The subject was then roused from his trance. There was not the slightest recollection of what had been suggested, but when he was put to the automatic recorder the hand at once proceeded to write everything. In the middle of the writing, "when a signal will be given . . .," I stopped the subject and asked him what he was writing about. "I do not know," he answered. "How is it," I asked again, "you write and do not know what you write?" "I do not know, I think it was something about a coat." "What was it you were writing about a coat?" "I do not know, maybe it was about the make of a coat." Then when the signal

came, he rose and put on the coat three times. To take another experiment of the same kind: I give the subject the suggestion that he should bow to the gas whenever the door should be opened; again amnesia is suggested, with the possibility of writing. The subject is stopped when he finished his account. "What was it you wrote?" I asked. The subject looked surprised. I repeated my question. "I do not know, I think something about a door." "What was it about a door?" "I do not know." I have made many similar experiments, and all of them with the same results. It is evident that the writing is not an unconscious automatic process, for the subject possesses a general knowledge of what he has written, or even of what he is going to write. Now, on the theory of unconscious cerebration this general knowledge ought to be entirely lacking, since the physiological processes of the suppressed memory have no psychical accompaniment. It would not do to say that the subject knows each word as he writes it, but becomes unconscious of it, forgets it as soon as it is written down, because the subject is able to tell the central idea; that is, he has a general knowledge of it, and, what is more, he is able to tell us this general central idea even before he finishes the writing,—in fact, he can do it when stopped in the middle of the phrase. On the theory of secondary consciousness, however, the experiments could not possibly give other results. The secondary consciousness understands the suggestions given by the experimenter, accepts them, obeys the commands, keeps the suppressed memories, and sends up a general knowledge of them to the upper consciousness, and if commanded, communicates the suppressed particular suggestions in all their details.

The advocates of unconscious cerebration assume too much: they assume that normal memory, or recollection in the normal state, can be fully accounted for by unconscious physiological processes, and the only thing required is to apply this theory to the phenomena of hypnotic memory. It would be well to examine this theory and see how strong its claims are in the case of normal memory.

Many a modern psycho-physiologist no doubt smiles at the crude, ancient psycho-physiological theory of perception. Images or copies of objects emanate from objects, get deposited in the mind, hence perception, cognition, memory. The modern psycho-physiological speculations, however, the speculations of Maudsley, Carpenter, Ziehen, Ribot, etc., are no less crude. Thus, Ziehen, for instance, conceives that each sensation deposits a copy of itself,—an image,

an idea, in some one of the memory ganglion cells, and memory consists in the reproduction of this copy,—the hen lays an egg from which another hen may come out. Maudsley expresses the same thing in slightly different terms; instead of “deposits of images in memory ganglion cells,” he uses “modifications of nerve elements.” “It may be supposed,” says Maudsley, “that the first activity did leave behind it, when it subsided, some after-effect, some modification of the nerve element, whereby the nerve circuit was disposed to fall again readily into the same action, such disposition (unconscious) appearing in consciousness as recognition or memory.” Ribot and many other psychologists, with slight variations in minor points, follow the same beaten track. All of them agree that it is the nerve modifications produced by the physiological processes of sensations, emotions, etc., that constitute the basis, nay, the very essence, of memory itself. It does not require a close examination to find the deficiencies of this theory. A mere modification left behind as a trace cannot possibly explain memory, recollection, the fact of referring a particular bit of experience to an experience felt before. The retention of a trace or of a nervous modification, and the reproduction of that trace or modification, cannot in the least account for the fact that a series of sensations, ideas, images, emotions felt at different times, should become combined, brought into a unity, felt like being similar, like being repetitions, copies of an original experience. *It is not retention or reproduction, but it is the recognition element that constitutes the essentia of memory.* The rose of to-day reminds me of the rose of yesterday, of the same rose seen the day before yesterday. Now the image of the rose may be retained, may even be reproduced, but if it is not recognized as having happened in the past, there can be no recollection: in short, without recognition there is no memory. As Prof. James strongly puts it, “the gutter is worn deeper by each successive shower, but not for that reason brought into contact with previous showers.” Does the theory of unconscious physiological processes, of material brain traces, of nerve modifications, does the theory take into account this element of recognition? Can the theory of unconscious cerebration offer the faintest suggestion as to how that element of recognition is brought about? What is that something added to the unconscious physiological trace or nerve modification that effects a conscious recognition?

Furthermore, first impressions can be localized in the past, but so can also each subsequent revival. How shall we explain on the theory of unconscious physiological nerve registration that the original,

the primitive sense experience, as well as each subsequent revival, can be referred to as distinct psychical facts. For if the structural nerve elements are slightly modified with each revival, how shall we account for this psychical distinction of the original sense experience as well as of the modified revivals? The remembered experience leaves its own individual trace, then a trace of its being a copy of a former original impression, and also a trace of its being a member in a series of similar traces, each trace being both a copy of another and a copy of the original impression. How all that is done is a mystery.

These objections advanced by me many years ago hold true of recent theories which fall back on the old views of Mill and Carpenter, namely, unconscious cerebration. The modern upholders of unconscious cerebration think that they have discovered new facts and arguments in favour of unconscious mental activity, and are thus justified in denying subconscious mental life. The arguments, as we have pointed out, are not new, nor are the facts advanced in support of these arguments true. The same objections hold true in the case of the theory of unconscious cerebration offered us in the garb of nerve currents and nerve paths, well worn nerve tracks, opening and closing of nerve currents and tracks, and formation of all shapes and forms of neurograms. Why be misled by figments and by sounds? The subconscious stands for a number of facts, reactions, and behaviour which are accompanied by psychic life, by mental activities, by *consciousness*.

The physiological unconscious registration theories of nerve currents, nerve-paths and neurograms are not only figments, arbitrary fanciful weavings of the imagination, they cannot even hypothetically explain the simplest act of memory and especially of recognitive memory.

Since the theories of unconscious registration fail us in the most elementary mental processes, how can we possibly rely on cerebration-fancies in the case of such complex phenomena as hypnotic conditions and various mental states of trance and dissociation? The physiological theories such as unconscious cerebration and their modifications failing, we must use for all those phenomena the psychological interpretation. The subconscious must be taken as a necessary theory in Psychopathology, as atoms, molecules, electrons and ether are in

Chemistry and Physics. The subconscious is not an "unconscious," it is not a physiological automatism. The subconscious is a consciousness, a secondary consciousness, a sort of secondary self, the self being understood by me as a *diffused consciousness*.

CHAPTER II.

THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND AUTOMATISM.

THE theory of unconscious cerebration dies hard. Recently a few psychologists made an attempt to revive it. The arguments advanced are rather philosophical than psychological. It may be well to test the validity of these arguments. If we clear the ground of all superfluous speculations, we find two main contentions. In the first place, it is assumed that many hypnotic and hysterical manifestations are solely the result of physiological activities. It is claimed by some, such as Münsterberg, that physiological processes without any psychic accompaniments, may reach such a high state of complexity as to account fully for all the observed manifestations in the different forms of mental dissociations. In the second place, it is claimed, from a purely philosophical standpoint, that even in the case of dissociation when consciousness may be granted to be present, there is no dissociation in consciousness itself, since consciousness is but a passive onlooker while the active changes go on in the content of consciousness; in other words, in states of dissociation it is not consciousness that is changed, but only the content of consciousness.

Let us examine these contentions and see whether they can stand the test of critical analysis. The view of regarding mental activity from a purely physiological standpoint is not new, it dates as far back as Descartes, who regards all the animals, with the exception of man, as mechanical automata.¹

¹The philosopher, Maiman, in his "Autobiography" tells an anecdote of himself. In his youth Maiman was an ardent adherent of Cartesian automatism. During one of his strolls with a friend Maiman struck a goat. The animal bleated. The friend rebuked Maiman for his cruelty. Maiman laughed at the simplicity of his friend.—"The goat is like a drum which sounds when it is beaten."

Huxley carried the view further, regarding consciousness as an epiphenomenon. The physiological mechanism is the engine, consciousness is but the whistle accompanying it. Of course, it goes without saying that all psychologists and physiologists at present take for granted that all states of consciousness are accompanied by physiological processes. Every thought, every feeling, even the most complicated poetical inspirations, or the most abstruse mathematical, logical and metaphysical speculations, have physiological processes as their accompaniments. We are, however, hardly justified in carrying this postulate to the absurdity of the total denial of consciousness, and regarding all adjustments and adaptations as so many chemical and mechanical reactions—"tropisms," as some modern biologists, such as Loeb and others, are apt to put it in the case of many animals, a reversion to the Cartesian hypothesis of mechanical automatism. Motor reactions can be regarded solely from the physiological standpoint, but consciousness cannot be entirely ruled out. What probability is there that a play of atoms and electrons would produce the *Iliad*, *Hamlet*, the *Principia* of Newton, the *Celestial Mechanics* of Laplace, or Darwin's *Origin of Species*?

Even if we descend to such motor reactions as are expressed in the compositions of a schoolboy, we still unhesitatingly assume a conscious activity. We cannot refute the philosopher who would regard all such manifestations as so many physiological processes without any conscious accompaniment. For though every one is directly conscious of his own mental life, no one can experience directly the mental life of another. We cannot inspect directly the psychic processes that go on in other living beings, or in our fellow men. Mind is inferred from action, from behaviour. Reactions, adjustments to environment, accompanied by consciousness, by intelligence in us, are rightly judged to have the same accompaniment in other beings, in our neighbours. To deny consciousness to our neighbour, and to regard him as a physiological automaton, is to put oneself in the absurd position of denying the existence of states which are observed in ourselves under similar conditions. In fact the burden of proof falls on those who make such a denial.

Now, in the case of hypnosis or various states of dissociation, we meet with intelligent adjustments often expressed in gestures, writing and speech. We can, by means of various methods, enter

into active relationship with those dissociated activities unknown to the individual himself. We can obtain intelligent replies to our questions either by writing or by speaking or by other arranged means of communication. What right have we to deny consciousness in one case while we affirm it in another case under similar circumstances? When I receive a letter from my friend I regard the letter as having been written by a being who possesses consciousness, but when a similar letter is written by a friend in a hypnotic or post-hypnotic state, we regard it as the result of physiological automatism, with no conscious accompaniment. It is clear that the denial of consciousness to the hypnotic individuality is purely arbitrary. It is certainly arbitrary in the case of double or multiple personality to regard one personality as conscious and the other personalities as purely automatic, with no consciousness in them. It would have been more consistent if the psychologist were to take the solipsistic point of view and deny consciousness to all else except himself.

The arbitrary standpoint of the psychologist who denies secondary and multiple consciousness can be still further made clear in the case of coexistent, dissociated mental activity. Thus one hand of the subject or of the patient may write a letter, while the other hand may be engaged in drawing or writing a composition, of which the individual is not cognizant. Both hands enter independently of each other into communication with the external observer. The communications are independent and equally intelligent. In each case we get intelligent replies and reactions to our questions and stimulations. Which of the two is supposed to be conscious? To take a concrete experiment. Mr. M. presents phenomena of dissociation. When in one of those states of dissociation Mr. M. is made to write a letter with one hand, while the other hand, being anaesthetic, is put under a screen and made to carry out a calculation. One hand replies to questions, while the other solves problems. Both hands give intelligent replies. To which of them is consciousness to be ascribed? If we deny it in one case, we should also deny it in the other. But, then, why not be consistent and deny it in every case of intelligent adjustment? We realize how arbitrary and illogical is the position of those psychologists

who coquet with physiology under the delusion that they are more scientific. They are led to take arbitrary positions which lead into the pitfalls of solipsism, with all its contradictions and absurdities.

Besides, physiological processes are, after all, but hypothetical concepts; physiological currents are conceived after the model of electrical currents, and are by no means theoretically proven. While they should be used for the sake of a better elucidation of the facts, it is not good scientific sense to sacrifice to them the very material of the science of psychology. Sensations, ideas, feelings, emotions, are after all the direct data of the psychologist, while physiological processes and currents are purely hypothetical. When, therefore, these hypothetical existences lead not to a better understanding of the facts of mental life, but to their denial, the very purpose of the hypothetical creations is completely defeated.

Physiological processes are framed to explain states of consciousness with their motor reactions. When, therefore, these hypothetical creations threaten to sweep away the actual living facts, it is time to halt and examine closely the sterile character of the hypothesis. The central fallacy lies in the tacit assumption that unknown and possibly unknowable, highly problematical brain currents, with their "opening and closing valves," with "well worn or blocked paths," all of a purely conjectural character, have, by their ingenious complexity, become, like marionettes, so marvellously endowed with sense-like activities as to dispense completely with the mental states which these conceptional entities were called in to explain.

Clinical cases and experimental facts go further to invalidate the theory of the purely physical interpretation of the subconscious, or what may be described as automatism-psychology. If anything is of the utmost importance in mental life, it is surely memory. Memory forms a unity of our life, brings, so to speak, to a focus our life-experiences, which would have otherwise been disconnected, confused, and chaotic. I remember just now what I did an hour ago, a day ago, what I lived through many years ago. I remember the experiences of my childhood, boyhood, and youth. I remember my struggles and disappointments, my loves, my friendships, my enmities, my feelings, sentiments, emotions, ideas,

and sensations. All these inter-connected, interlocked links of memories form the solid chain of my conscious personality. In my memory of the past experiences there is the present consciousness that all that I had gone through at the time of the experience—any change, any modification, that had taken place—occurred in *my* mind, in *my* consciousness. Unless under delusion or illusion of memory we cannot remember what did not occur in consciousness. *We cannot remember what we were not conscious of.* The past mental state which the present memory refers to is a state of consciousness; otherwise memory is impossible and meaningless. Memory, recollection, reminiscence, can only refer to *a previous state of consciousness.* Surely no one else can have a better and more direct knowledge than I myself have of the ideas, emotions, and moods that I remember, as experienced by me.

The memory factor is all the more important in psychology, since we have to take account of the subject's inner experiences. In each case of memory the burden of proof falls on those who deny the validity of that memory, as referring to a past state of consciousness. Suppose I have a memory in a full state of consciousness that I lighted a lamp an hour ago, the burden of proof would fall on those who deny the existence of such a state. It would be an arbitrary, if not preposterous, position for an outside observer to claim that the lighting of the lamp was carried out mechanically, by a physiological automatism, and that the subsequent memory was but an illusion. The onus of proof that the original act had no conscious accompaniment is entirely on those who take such a position in opposition to the direct introspective account. Where such a proof is not forthcoming, the position taken is arbitrary. Were we to take such a preposterous position, the very science of psychology would become an impossibility, since all memory would have to be declared a snare and a delusion. All psychological studies based on introspection and memory would have to be abandoned, and we should have to follow Comte, and declare psychology an impossibility. A psychologist maintaining such a point of view is, from the very nature of his position, disqualified to give his opinion; he must fall back on physiology, and rule out all psychology.

If, however, memory and introspection are not rejected, then the recollection of a conscious state should not be arbitrarily dismissed, unless there are good reasons for such a dismissal. Now, the hypnotic subject, or the patient, in the case of functional psychosis, undergoes an experience of which he is apparently unconscious. In a subsequent state, in a hypnotic or trance state, he actually recollects that the experience was a conscious one; we cannot possibly reject this recollection as an illusion of memory. The burden of proof that the former state was not a conscious one falls on him who denies the person's mental experience. Such a proof is all the more requisite since it can be demonstrated that in subconscious states there is really present a subconscious consciousness.

CHAPTER III.

THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND THE PASSIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.

DRIVEN out of the psychological fortress, some psychologists of the philosophical type (Münsterberg) still take refuge in the metaphysical citadel. It is claimed that psychologically mental life is analyzed into consciousness and its content. Now, it is further assumed that all mental modifications occur in mental contents, but not in consciousness. Consciousness, itself, is supposed to be a passive, immutable looker-on, a sort of psychic deity. We thus have a mental content which is not conscious and a consciousness which has no content, a sort of vacant entity resembling the blessed Buddha in his blissful state of Nirvana. Consciousness is regarded in the light of a substance which contains the mental content somewhat after the fashion of a material substance underlying physical qualities. This view of an underlying, immutable substance, with a changing qualitative content, was long ago criticized by Hume, both in the case of mind and body. The assumption of an entity underlying observed phenomena, whether physical or mental, has since become so weakened that it is no longer regarded as a living hypothesis among thinking men of science.

We can see at a glance that the substance-consciousness with its changing qualitative content is but a piece of metaphysical speculation, it is a revival of the old soul-hypothesis, long ago buried by analytic and experimental psychologists. The soul-consciousness hypothesis must be rejected, for the simple reason that it complicates matters and explains nothing. In fact, the hypothesis of an imperturbable soul-consciousness, from the very nature of its hypothetical being, itself requires an explanation, while it does not in the least explain the mental content, which is the material of the psychologist. Such a passive, changeless soul-consciousness is a sort of box in which the content of soul-consciousness resides and has its being. This soul-consciousness is but a survival from a past metaphysical period.

In the case of double and multiple personalities it is claimed that, while the personalities are different, their consciousness is not different, but one and the same. In the different personalities found in the case of multiple personality, there is among them but one consciousness, somewhat like the Greek myth of the three old women with one eye among them. By a parity of reasoning we may say that the minds of different individuals, such as John's and Peter's, are really identical. John and Peter are different personalities with different contents, but with the same consciousness. In fact, we may generalize further and say that the whole human race and the beasts of the field and the birds of the air share in one and the same indivisible, passive, immutable consciousness, a sort of world-soul. This may be a grand metaphysical speculation, but it is neither psychological nor scientific.

There is another objection to the subconscious, an objection based on an artificial fast and hard line drawn between the purpose of science on the one hand, and that of will on the other. Science, it is claimed, deals with artificial concepts, while personal will is concerned with the real values of life. It is claimed that the concept of the subconscious is illegitimate, because it involves a confusion of this metaphysical double bookkeeping.

The world of description and the world of appreciation were brought out and contrasted by Professor Royce in his early works, and afterwards elaborated by a few psychologists

of the Schopenhauerian tinge. The division is not new, and dates back to the Middle Ages, with its split of science and philosophy on the one hand, and religion on the other. It is the doctrine of the two-fold truth (*Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit*). According to mediaeval thought, there are two realms, the realm of knowledge and the realm of faith; the realm of intellect and the realm of will. What is true in the one may not be true in the other. From Maimonides, Ibn Gabirol, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus and Occam the same doctrine of the two-fold truth and the two realms prevailed. The scholastic could say anything he wished provided he was cautious to claim that what was true *secundum rationem* was not true *secundum fidem*.

This double view still survives in some philosophical quarters. Instead of finding fault with the subconscious for ignoring this time-honoured double truth, it should rather be regarded as a special merit. As a matter of fact, the subconscious, unless interpreted in metaphysical terms of a cosmic self, has nothing to do with the heirloom of metaphysical mediaeval thought. The subconscious is based on experience and facts to which philosophical and metaphysical distinctions should adapt themselves.

We thus find that the objections to the subconscious are based on insufficient grounds. We also find that the abandonment of the subconscious leads to a tangle of difficulties and to the quagmire of mediaeval metaphysics. If the metaphysical interpretation of the subconscious in the sense of a cosmic self lands one in the misty regions of religious mysticism, the opposite view of the total negation of the subconscious, apparently in the interests of science, lands one in regions no less shadowy, regions of naturalistic mysticism.

So fundamental, however, is the concept of the subconscious that even its opponents have to admit it under different names. They admit the fact of dissociation, of dissociated mental systems, and of dissociated personalities. But they put forth the hypothetical claim that it is one and the same consciousness present in all the different forms of dissociation. Now, if we omit that speculative metaphysical consciousness which, being inactive and unchangeable, is of no use in scientific

work, we are really left with the mutations and permutations of mental systems which, from their very nature, must be *conscious*. The psychopathologist must postulate the subconscious just as the geometrician postulates space and position, or as the physicist postulates matter and force.

CHAPTER IV.

SUBCONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS IDEAS.

THERE is a school which regards the subconscious as formed of "suppressed mental complexes." The views of this school are not psychologically clear. It seems, however, that the subconscious is viewed in the light of "unconscious ideas." "Unconscious Ideas" were discussed by me in my *Psychology of Suggestion*, and I cannot do better than to quote from that volume, "For the mechanism of consciousness is hidden deep down in the depths of the subconscious, and it is thither we have to descend in order to get a clear understanding of the phenomena that appear in the broad daylight of consciousness."

The German school, with Wundt at its head, at first started out on similar lines, but they could not make any use of the subconscious, and their speculations ran wild in the fancies of Hartmann. The reason of this failure is due to the fact that the concept of the subconscious as conceived by the German school was extremely vague, and had rather the character of a mechanical than that of a psychical process. An unconscious consciousness—that was their concept of the subconscious. In such a form as this the subconscious was certainly meaningless—mere nonsense—and had to be given up. The German psychological investigations are now confined to the content of consciousness in so far as the individual is immediately conscious of it. But as this form of consciousness is extremely narrow and circumscribed, the results arrived at, though remarkable for their thoroughness, are, after all, of a rather trivial nature. It is what Prof. James aptly characterizes as "the elaboration of the obvious."

This criticism applies well to Freud and his adherents.

Das Unbewusste is conceived as "Suppressed unconscious idea-complexes." Of course, the claims of that school to originality and to the apparent unveiling of the causation of psychoneurosis are entirely unjustified. A "suppressed complex" is but another term for a dissociated system, commonly accepted in Psychopathology. The special theories developed by that school in regard to desire, to sexuality and to voluntary suppression of unpleasant or painful ideas are highly questionable in the light of psychology and clinical experience.

This German school of Psychopathology has unfortunately fallen back on the Herbartian psychology with its metaphysical Reals or ideas which by their mutual tension keep suppressing one another, thus determining the display of the contents of consciousness. As Herbart tells us: "Concepts become forces when they resist one another. This resistance occurs when two or more opposed concepts encounter one another." This proposition or principle proclaimed by Herbart is at the basis of Freud's psychology. "A concept is in consciousness in so far as it is not suppressed," Herbart tells us, "but is in actual representation. When it rises out of complete suppression, it enters into consciousness." According to Herbart and his modern followers, suppressed ideas become forces and impulses. Concepts which are not opposed or contrasted with one another, so far as they meet unhindered, form a "complex," a favourite term used by the German school and their followers.

It may possibly be of interest to remark that Herbart is closely followed by the German school of Psychopathology in regard to the doctrine of desire. Desire with Herbart is fundamental. "The faculty of desire must include wishes, instincts, and every species of longing." "The expression 'desire' must not be so limited as to exclude those wishes which remain, though they may be vain, or so-called pious wishes, and which, for the very reason that they do remain, constantly incite men to new efforts, because through them the thought of a possibility is ever anew suggested, in spite of all reasons which appear to prove the impossibility of attainment. It is very important to give the concept of the unattainability of the wished-for object strength enough so that a peaceful renunciation may take place of the desire. A man dreams of a desirable future for himself, even when

he knows it will never come." These Herbartian doctrines, long ago abandoned by psychology, are now being revived by the German school of Psychopathology as a new discovery in the science of normal and abnormal psychology. No better criticism can be passed on this revival of Herbartian psychology in the domain of Psychopathology than the one made by Prof. James: "I must confess that to my mind there is something almost hideous in the glib Herbartian jargon about *Vorstellungsmassen* and their *Hemmungen* (suppressions) and *sinken* and *erheben* and *schweben* and *Verschmelzungen* and *Complexionen* (complexes)."

It is claimed by some of Freud's younger adherents that the mechanism of "unconscious ideas," though a contradiction, is nevertheless justified, because of its being a conceptual construct, as Karl Pearson puts it, in order to aid the explanation of mental phenomena. This is a new epistemological argument in defence of a tottering system. It is truly amazing that science has nowadays become so philosophical that when a theory is unstable, it is unhesitatingly supported by epistemological considerations.

Perhaps it may be well to point out that self-contradictory hypotheses are not quite acceptable in science. A scientific hypothesis should at least have the merit of being rational, logical, and not conceived in a wild harum-scarum fashion. A good scientific hypothesis must have restrictions and definite conditions. I think it is Huxley who says that in the case of stolen goods two hypotheses are at hand: one hypothesis is that an angel is responsible for it, and the other that a thief has carried off the goods. The angel-hypothesis is hardly considered by science. In other words, the hypothetical causative agency must be conceived in terms of experience.

The hypothetical agency must either be a fact directly observed in nature or a fact which can be verified later on. Thus the theory of gravitation is based on the facts of falling bodies; the theory of natural selection is based on the facts of the struggle for existence observed in the organic world. In short, a good scientific hypothesis must take as its causative agency a *vera causa*, a fact observable in experience or a fact which can be verified by further experience. Atoms, electrons,

ether, are not haphazard constructs ; they are not regarded by the physicist as unreal fancies, unreal abstract notions to explain the real facts ; but each of these hypothetical agents is regarded as real, as a *vera causa*. We cannot help agreeing with J. S. Mill on the subject of hypothesis : " I conceive it to be necessary, when the hypothesis relates to causation, that the supposed cause should not only be a real phenomenon, something actually existing in nature, but should be already known to exercise, or at least to be capable of exercising, an influence of some sort over the effect. In any other case it is no sufficient evidence of the truth of the hypothesis that we are able to deduce the real phenomenon from it." Again, " What is true in [Newton's] maxim is that the cause, though not known previously, should be capable of being known thereafter ; that its existence should be capable of being detected, and its connection with the effect ascribed to it should be susceptible of being proved by independent evidence " (*Logic*, p. 53).

If we apply this very simple rule of logic to the theory of " unconscious ideas," we at once realize the illegitimate character of such a hypothesis. An idea is essentially of a conscious nature. To speak, therefore, of unconscious ideas, is to introduce into psychology the self-contradictory impossible concept of unconscious conscious ideas. This is equivalent to the assumption of an unconscious consciousness. An unconscious idea is neither a *vera causa* nor a fact ultimately to be verified. The conception of an unconscious idea is like the conception of a round square.

Moreover it is not true, psychologically, that ideas can be " suppressed " so that they become dissociated or " unconscious." It is not true that we suppress painful ideas into the " *unconscious*." *We do not forget our painful ideas.* On the contrary, painful ideas stand out all the more prominent in our consciousness. *Pain hammers experience into the mind.* In fact we may say with more right that *it is the pleasurable ideas that are forgotten, while the painful ideas are remembered.* An experience associated with pain is never forgotten. Like a splinter in the flesh, it remains in consciousness to trouble us all our life long. It is due to other causes that a painful experience becomes subconscious. Teleologically, we can well see the importance of this fact.

It would have been suicidal to the individual and ultimately to the species, if painful experience were forgotten. The individual must learn to avoid harmful objects and hurtful stimuli. This can only be accomplished by actually *remembering* painful experiences. That individual would survive who remembered best his painful experiences. Were it otherwise, the individual would be very much in the condition of the proverbial silly bird that hides its head at the sight of the hunter. The subjective painful experiences must be remembered; a painful experience fixes the attention. On this fact was based the once universally recognized method of training and education. What is fixed by pain is never forgotten. What may bring about forgetfulness is either a constitutionally bad memory or a state of indifference, or an intense, paralyzing emotion of fear, especially in early childhood. *The whole theory of "suppression" of painful "complexes" is based on false clinical and psychological assumptions.* Neither is there such a process as "suppression of complexes," nor is there such a mental state as an "unconscious idea."

An "unconscious idea" in the sense that the idea has no consciousness can have no meaning. If, however, by an "unconscious idea" is understood a *consciousness* of which the individual or personal self is not conscious, then we come around to a *subconscious consciousness*, as developed by me in my various works. A quotation from Höfdding may bring out my point in a clearer and stronger light:

The question before us is, whether the unconscious can be other than a purely negative concept. In daily speech (and more than is proper even in the scientific use of the language) we use such expressions as unconscious sensations, unconscious ideas, unconscious feeling. As, however, sensations, ideas and feelings are elements, the expression is in reality absurd. If by an unconscious idea is meant the idea which I *have*, then the predicate "unconscious" signifies only that I do not think of or pay heed to the fact that I have it. This use of the word unconsciousness is connected with a twofold use of the word consciousness. It is used to denote not only the inner presentation of our sensations, ideas and feelings, but also self-consciousness, the attention especially directed to our sensations, ideas and feelings. We have, of course, many sensations and ideas without being conscious that we have them, that is, without self-consciousness: many feelings and impulses stir within

us, without our clearly apprehending their nature and direction. In this sense we speak, for example, of unconscious love. A man who has this feeling does not know what is astir in him; perhaps others see it, or he himself gradually discovers it; but he *has* the feeling his conscious life is determined in a particular way.

In other words, what Höffding practically claims here is that there is no such mental state, no idea that is "unconscious," but that there are mental states, ideas, feelings, which, though conscious, do not reach self-consciousness. In other words, there are in us mental processes which have consciousness, but no self-consciousness. This is precisely what I mean by the subconscious,—mental states which have consciousness, but do not reach the personal consciousness. In short, the only possible psychological assumption is a *subconscious consciousness*.

CHAPTER V.

THE SUBCONSCIOUS, CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS.

THOSE who accept the division of the subconscious into co-existing consciousness or the co-conscious and the unconscious really assume the doctrine of the subconscious. They claim that it would be better and more precise to indicate whenever possible the conscious or unconscious, that is, the strictly physiological character of the observed manifestations. This, however, is more easily said than done. We know next to nothing of the physiological brain processes, which are mainly hypothetical, and we do not know the limits of the subconscious consciousness. In many cases it is not easy to determine what the exact character of the subconscious manifestation is, how far it is conscious, dimly conscious, how far it has gone toward the development of an independent personality, and how far it shades in the direction of the purely physiological. In the absence of any exact determination, the term subconscious indicates the character of the mental state without any definite committal to any of the possible hypotheses.

The term "unconscious" is all the more objectionable, as Höffding has already pointed out, as it is essentially an

ambiguous, negative concept. The "unconscious" may mean absence of self-consciousness, or lack of consciousness, that is, purely physiological processes with no conscious concomitant. He who uses the term "unconscious" must in each case indicate in what sense he uses the term. Is the manifestation entirely physiological, or is it conscious in the sense of consciousness with no self-consciousness? The two meanings are diametrically opposed to each other. The unconscious in the sense of the purely physiological assumes the theory of unconscious cerebration; the other use of the unconscious in the sense of mere consciousness with no self-consciousness recognizes the view of the subconsciousness as advanced in my works.

It is claimed again that in many cases of psychopathic maladies there is no need to have recourse to subconscious systems. It is quite probable that the association between the stimulus and the emotion called forth is a direct one. The patient who is afraid of dogs has the fear called forth by the sight of a dog. There is no need to assume that there are here any intermediate links in the chain of association. Even physiological links may be totally absent here. It may be that by investigation it can be shown that this association has a history based on some former experience. There is no reason to assume that the experience is functioning subconsciously, whether consciously or "unconsciously," that is, physiologically. The dog and the fear have formed an indissoluble association, so that, as soon as the dog is perceived the fear is awakened.

This, however, is rather a debatable subject, since it is impossible to tell in the case of purely physiological links, whether such are present or not. Thus, Höffding says, "Not only may conscious results come from unconscious (subconscious) working up, but there may also be unconscious intermediate links in the midst of conscious work. Supposing the idea *a* to be linked with the idea *b*, and *b* again with *c*, then *a* will finally produce *c* directly without the intervention of *b*. The intermediate links are often so numerous that they cannot be recovered at all or with great difficulty. Many psychological paradoxes and sudden suggestions have their explanation in this unconscious determining of conscious ideas."

Wundt seems to maintain the same view: "The memory-process is especially predominant in those cases where the element of the new impression that gave rise to the assimilation is entirely suppressed by the other components of the image, so that the associative relation between the memory-idea and the impression may remain completely unnoticed. Such cases have been spoken of as 'mediate memories' or 'mediate associations.' Still, just as with 'mediate recognitions,' we are here, too, dealing with processes that are fundamentally the same as ordinary associations. Take, for example, the case of a person who, sitting in his room at evening, suddenly remembers, without any apparent reason, a landscape that he passed through many years before; examination shows that there happened to be in the room a fragrant flower which he saw for the first time in the landscape. The difference between this and an ordinary memory-process in which the connection of the new impression with an earlier experience is clearly recognized, obviously consisted in the fact that here the elements which recall the idea are pushed into the obscure background of consciousness. The not infrequent experience, commonly known as the 'spontaneous rise' of ideas, in which a memory-image suddenly appears in our mind without any assignable cause, is in all probability reducible in every case to such latent association." It appears, then, that both Höffding and Wundt acknowledge the presence of intermediate links in what appears to be a case of purely "mediate" or direct association.

In cases where the intermediate links are "unconscious," in the sense of a purely physiological process, there is no criterion to prove the presence of such intermediate physiological links, and one may as well, from a purely psychological introspective standpoint, deny their very existence. On the other hand, if with Wundt, Höffding and others we assume the presence of intermediate psychic links, there is no way of disproving them. It is quite probable that such intermediate links are present in every single case. The very fact that "unconscious" systems can be revived as memories or hallucinatory hypnoidic states would indicate their functioning when one of their components becomes awakened to activity.

As an objection to the presence of intermediate psychic links,

Pavlov's experiments are brought forward to show that associations can be formed between remote stimuli and glandular secretions, for instance. Thus, a dog with a fistula in the parotid gland can be made to react with secretions to light or sound stimuli.

This objection may be easily obviated by the consideration that we do not know whether there are or are not intermediate mental links between the artificial stimuli and the discharge of the glandular secretion. This consideration is all the more cogent as the remote stimuli can only give results, if persistently associated with food stimuli. If such association with food stimuli is absent, and new stimuli are associated with remote stimuli which give reactions through their associations with food stimuli, the result is *inhibition* of secretion. In other words, each new stimulus must be directly associated with the original food stimulus.

To quote from Savadsky's work carried out in Pavlov's laboratory: "Wasiliev and Mishtovt were the first to investigate conditions of inhibitions. At first the authors had in mind to develop conditional reflexes, not on the basis of the unconditional reflex (*i.e.* food) but on the basis of another conditional reflex (such as a sound or light stimulus giving secretion). Their experiments were as follows: from time to time they associated with the usual conditional stimulus another stimulus which had no relation whatever to salivary secretion, and this combination was not accompanied by the presence of the unconditional stimulus (food). By means of a great number of repetitions of such a combination, it was supposed to associate with the quality of the extraneous stimulus the quality of bringing about salivary secretion. It turned out, however, that such an arrangement of experimentation could by no means transform the extraneous agent into a conditional stimulus. In that way it became clear that the conditional stimulus, contrary to the unconditional, is not capable of communicating its property of bringing about salivary secretion. The fact is that the associative external stimulus, when accompanied by the unconditional stimulus alone, becomes after a few repetitions a powerful inhibiting agent."

This clearly shows that the conditional reflex in the

dog can bring about salivary secretions only when associated with the unconditional reflex. What it means is, that the dog on seeing a light or hearing the sound *expects* food, and hence the psychic stimulation of his salivary glands resulting in secretion. Pavlov's experiments and also the experiments carried out under his directions by his pupils clearly prove that there is no direct association between secretion and an external stimulus, such as light or sound, but that the secretion is brought about by an intermediate psychic link, namely *the expectation of food*. Thus we find that the work of Pavlov and his pupils, far from showing the possibility of formation of direct associations, really goes to substantiate the view of the presence of intermediate mental links in cases of mediate associations.

As a matter of fact there is no need for us to establish hypothetical, intermediate, unconscious or physiological links. The "unconscious" brain-processes are problematic entities and there is no way of getting at them. What we need to discover in cases of mediate association, and especially in cases of psychopathic diseases, is whether the intermediate links, or the original experience that brought about the trauma, or the state of dissociation is present, consciously or subconsciously or co-consciously. This is possible to test by hypnosis or by means of the hypnoidal state. In many such cases we actually find that the patient lives through the original experience either *consciously* in a hypnoidal state, or in a hypnoidic state, thus undergoing a mental experience which is immediately forgotten or dissociated; or what is more commonly the case, the patient lives through the original experience *subconsciously*. But, whether conscious or subconscious, the mental state is not "unconscious," but is essentially of a conscious character. In short, we deal here either with the personal consciousness or with the subconscious consciousness. Thus, all the facts of mental life, normal or abnormal, substantiate the presence of a *subconscious consciousness*.

SUPPLEMENT.

REVIEWS.

Body and Mind: a History and a Defence of Animism. By WILLIAM M'DOUGALL, M.B. (Methuen & Co., Ltd. London, 1911. 384 pp. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

THE scope and purpose of this important contribution to modern Psychology are concisely described in its second title—a history and a defence of Animism.

The term “Animism” as defined by Mr. M'Dougall covers a very wide range of meaning. “The essential notion,” he says, “which forms the common foundation of all varieties of Animism, is that all, or some, of those manifestations of life and mind which distinguish the living man from the corpse, and from inorganic bodies, are due to the operation within him of something which is of a nature different from that of the body, an animating principle generally, but not necessarily or always, conceived as an immaterial and individual being or soul.”¹

In order to make this definition still clearer, Mr. M'Dougall examines a variety of other terms which might have seemed to serve his purpose equally well or better, and gives his reasons for rejecting them either as being too narrow or as otherwise open to objection. “No other term,” he considers, “indicates precisely all those theories of human personality which have in common the notion which, as I believe, provides the only alternative to Materialism. The word ‘Spiritualism’ as used in philosophy is ambiguous, and it has been spoilt for scientific purposes by its current usage to denote that popular belief which is more properly called Spiritism. Nor is all Animism spiritualistic; during long ages the dominant form of it was a materialistic Dualism. The term ‘psycho-physical dualism’ accurately expresses the essential animistic notion; but it is cumbrous, and the word dualism is apt

¹ Preface, p. viii.

to be taken to imply metaphysical Dualism, an implication I am anxious to avoid; for Animism does not necessarily imply metaphysical Dualism, or indeed any metaphysical or ontological doctrine, Solipsism alone excepted. The expression 'psycho-physical interactionism' will not serve my purpose, because (as we see in the philosophy of Leibnitz, and in that modification of the Cartesian system known as Occasionalism), Animism may be combined with the denial of psycho-physical interaction. Again, the term 'soul-theory' does not cover all varieties of Animism, in illustration of which statement I may remind the reader that the late Prof. James advocated a distinctly animistic view of human personality, which he called the 'transmission theory,' but explicitly rejected the conception of the soul as a unitary and individual being."

The very wide extension thus given to the term Animism, and particularly the inclusion in it of what Mr. M'Dougall calls "materialistic dualism," make it difficult to say definitely concerning some of the earlier phases of philosophic thought whether they should be classed as animistic or non-animistic. The difficulty is no doubt largely due to the vagueness of the doctrines themselves. As Mr. M'Dougall points out, "The doctrine of the Ionian philosopher was not properly Materialism, for the distinction between matter and spirit had not yet been clearly drawn. It is impossible to say that their universal principles (*e.g.* the air of Diogenes or the fire of Heraclitus) were more nearly allied to the spiritual or to the physical, as conceived by later thought. Nor did the conception of the soul entertained by animistic philosophers imply any clear distinction between the material or physical and the spiritual or mental, such as has commonly been maintained in later ages." Mr. M'Dougall, however, treats the Hylozoism of the Ionians as non-animistic, and no doubt rightly, if regard is had to the general tendency of their speculations. Yet it must be remembered that their fundamental Monism did not prevent the Ionian philosophers from regarding soul as a special kind or mode of matter, and in this sense distinguishing it from the body; and that even Democritus, whose system Mr. M'Dougall describes as a thorough-going Materialism, held that the soul-atoms were distinct in kind from the atoms constituting the body, and were that which gave the body life and consciousness. To that extent Democritus might be counted as a "materialistic dualist," and come within Mr. M'Dougall's definition of Animism. The difficulty is well illustrated in the case of the Stoic philosophy. The Stoics held that whatever is real is material, and that the soul is the warm breath within the

body. But this did not prevent some of them at least from also holding that the soul outlives the body.

Of Aristotle Mr. M'Dougall says that his doctrine of the soul has more affinity with the Hylozoism of the Ionian philosophers and the Materialism of Democritus than with the materialistic Animism of popular thought or the spiritualistic Animism of Plato. Apparently he classes him among the non-Animistic thinkers. No doubt there is much ambiguity in Aristotle's teaching concerning the soul, but even if we interpret his doctrine of the *νοῦς ποιητικός* in the sense most unfavourable to the survival of the individual, a definition of Animism which includes the "transmission theory" of William James can hardly exclude the Aristotelian conception of the psycho-physical relation.

In reality it is of comparatively small importance how we classify particular thinkers of early and medieval times in relation to terms which are more applicable to modern than to ancient thought. The chief legacy bequeathed by Greek philosophy and by Scholasticism was a clearly drawn distinction between matter and spirit; and when to this distinction was added the conception of the entire material universe as subject to laws capable of definite mathematical expression, modern philosophy may be said to have begun.

Chapters IV. and V. of Mr. M'Dougall's book, which gives an account of the progress of psycho-physical speculation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are a good example of skilful condensation. The essential points are sufficiently brought out, while at the same time the danger of "losing sight of the wood for the trees" is successfully avoided.

As a specimen of terse and striking historical characterisation we may quote the following passage from the end of the chapter on "Animism in the Seventeenth Century":

"Descartes had taught that man is composed of soul and body acting and reacting upon one another; Leibnitz that, though he is compounded of soul and body, these do not influence one another; Spinoza that mind and body are equally real or unreal, because but two aspects of one reality; Hobbes that man consists of body alone, the soul being a mere figment of his imagination.

"Two possibilities only remained, namely, first that the soul alone is real, the body being fictitious or appearance only; secondly that both body and soul are fictitious. And the ingenuity of the eighteenth century proved equal to the task of propounding and maintaining these doctrines also; before the century passed away these two were

added to the list of rival doctrines by philosophers, namely Bishop Berkeley and David Hume, whose penetration and high reputation secured for their views a respectful hearing and a career whose end no man can yet foresee."

The immediate developments of the Cartesian philosophy turned on the definition of *substance*. Although Descartes held that in man the spiritual substance, or soul, and the material substance, or body, mutually interacted, his definition of substance made interaction impossible. The doctrines of the Occasionalists, of Leibnitz, and of Spinoza, were so many attempts to overcome the logical difficulty without surrendering the conception of substance. It was the conception itself which was made the subject of enquiry and question, first by Locke, who held that spiritual and material substances were alike only useful hypotheses inferred from the facts of immediate experience; next by Berkeley, for whom spiritual substances alone were real, and material substance a fiction; and finally by Hume, who attacked the whole idea of substance, whether spiritual or material, and declared it to be a figment of the imagination without any counterpart in real experience.

Both these lines of speculation were in some sort united, although with much inconsistency alike of statement and of thought, in the philosophy of Kant; and it has been in the main through the medium of that philosophy that they have affected later psychophysical theories. It is interesting, however, to note that the leading ideas which distinguish the two parallelistic doctrines most in vogue to-day are to be found, in the one case, in the doctrine of Leibnitz that material extension is only the appearance to us of an aggregation of psychical existents, and, in the other case, in the "double aspect" theory of Spinoza. Both the modern forms of parallelism, moreover, accept the notion of "psychology without a soul," of which Hume must be regarded as the originator.

In the nineteenth century, and especially in the last half of the century, Animism suffered a rapid decline. It can hardly be doubted that Mr. M'Dougall is right in assigning as the chief cause of this decline "the astonishing and splendid development of the natural sciences, based in the main upon the strictly mechanistic view of nature." As contributing causes, but of less importance, he mentions Kant's destructive attack on the dogmatic Metaphysic of his predecessor, and the reaction produced by the attempt of his immediate successors to convert the Kantian epistemology without more ado into an Absolute Idealism.

That the whole material universe constituted a system mechanically ordered was already common ground with Descartes and his successors. Descartes, indeed, taught that in the case of man the soul or spiritual substance interacted with the body: but this he held to be the solitary exception to the universal sway of mechanism in the material sphere; all other animals were automatons. Even this exception was swept away by Spinoza. But, as Mr. M'Dougall observes, the conclusion that the actions of men are capable of being fully explained in terms of mechanism was rather a corollary from his philosophical system than a doctrine based on empirical observation. "Spinoza . . . could appeal only to men's profound *ignorance* of the body and its processes; whereas those who make the same assumption in the present age appeal with confidence and good show of reason to our *knowledge* of the body and its processes, claiming that the knowledge which we now have amply justifies the assumption, and allows us to understand in a general way the mechanics of human conduct."

In three interesting chapters Mr M'Dougall traces the special modern developments of physical science, of physiology, and of biology, to which he considers the anti-animistic tendency of recent speculation is due. Chief among them are, in physics, the triumphant establishment of the law of conservation of energy; in physiology and biology the discovery of the localisation of cerebral functions; the development of the doctrine of reflex action, and the apparent continuity of chains of physical causation even in the brain; the seemingly unconscious performance (*e.g.* in trance) of actions which are ordinarily taken to imply perception, feeling, reasoning and volition; the explanation of the association of ideas by the analogy of habitual actions mechanically performed; and the experience, generally, of a parallelism of mental and cerebral development, decay, affection by injuries, drugs, etc.

The influence of the Darwinian theory must also be counted among the causes which have contributed to the decline of Animism, by removing (in the opinion of many) any necessity for the recognition of a teleological element in the organic world. The conception of a continuity in evolution likewise raises difficulties, whether it be of man from animals, or of organic from inorganic nature.

This formidable array of anti-animistic considerations drawn from empirical science is set forth by Mr. M'Dougall with commendable frankness and candour. Nor does he shrink from stating in the most emphatic terms the effect they have produced in the minds

of the majority of thinkers during the last sixty years who have concerned themselves with the psycho-physical problem. "Modern science and philosophy," he tells us, "have turned their backs on Animism of every kind with constantly increasing decision." "Its few exponents," he says in another place, have been "generally regarded as survivors from an earlier age, actuated by some theological bias to offer a futile opposition to the conquering march of science."

These are strong expressions, but probably they are no inaccurate representation of the mental attitude of most of those who approach the subject primarily from the study of physiology. The very respectable list of names which Mr. M'Dougall gives on p. 204 of writers whom he reckons on the side of Animism shows that there is by no means the same degree of unanimity among philosophers. His own book may be counted as one among several indications that the tide of opinion is perhaps once more beginning to turn.

Having stated the principal scientific objections to Animism, and added a brief account of current philosophical arguments against it, Mr. M'Dougall does not proceed at once to answer them, but interposes instead a survey and general examination of the modern psycho-physical doctrines proposed as substitutes for Animism. Such an arrangement of topics seems at first sight to interrupt and confuse the argument; and it might perhaps have been better to have included his statement of these doctrines in the historical sketch which occupies the earlier chapters of the book. This the author might have done without serious inconsistency; for though he describes the historical part of his work as a "history of Animism," it is in reality, down to the end of the eighteenth century, a history of anti-animistic theories as well, and only ceases to be so when the nineteenth century is reached.

On the other hand, when we come down to our own times, there are undoubted advantages in a systematic rather than a historical exposition; and the statement of the chief objections to Animism leads up naturally to an account of the systems which claim to avoid those objections.

There may be also another reason for the procedure which Mr. M'Dougall has adopted. It enables him, almost at the outset of the discussion, to carry the war into the enemy's country; and so difficult is the psycho-physical problem that the advantage is in general apt to be, or to appear to be, with the assailants rather than with the defenders of any particular doctrine. Moreover, Mr. M'Dougall

believes that the overthrow of Parallelism is equivalent to the establishment of Animism. "The main body of this volume," he tells us in the preface, "is occupied with the presentation and examination of the reasonings which have led the great majority of philosophers and men of science to reject Animism, and of the modern attempts to render an intelligible account of the nature of man which, in spite of the rejection of Animism, shall escape Materialism. This survey leads to the conclusion that these reasonings are inconclusive and these attempts unsuccessful, and that we are therefore compelled to choose between Animism and Materialism; and since the logical necessity of preferring the animistic horn of this dilemma cannot be in doubt, my survey constitutes a defence and justification of Animism."

In the body of the work the argument is presented somewhat differently, though the difference is unimportant. Materialism is curtly dismissed as obviously untenable; its modern representative, Epiphenomenalism, is demolished in the course of a few pages; and the final dilemma presented to us is that of Animism or Parallelism. From this dilemma Mr. M'Dougall holds that no escape is possible: "We must accept Animism if we find the difficulties involved in Parallelism to be fatal to it."

In developing his argument, Mr. M'Dougall enumerates four principal type-formulations of the modern psycho-physical doctrines that reject Animism:

(1) *Epiphenomenalism*, which confines causality to the physical series, and regards consciousness as the incidental accompaniment of the brain process, produced by that process, but itself empty of all causal efficacy whatsoever.

(2) *Psycho-physical Parallelism* (or, as I should prefer to call it, *Dualistic Parallelism*¹), which holds the physical and the mental series

¹ It is only as implying an ultimate metaphysical dualism that "Psycho-physical Parallelism" in M'Dougall's sense can be properly ranked as co-ordinate with the doctrines which he calls "Phenomenalistic Parallelism" and "Psychical Monism." In this form (which seems further to imply a "pre-established harmony" between the two series) I should doubt whether it is dogmatically maintained by any one whose opinion is worth counting. Mr. M'Dougall observes that it is generally held merely as a working hypothesis; but as such it can hardly be said to carry with it any ontological implication concerning the ultimate nature of reality; and it would seem better to apply the term *Psycho-physical Parallelism* not to one among a number of co-ordinate varieties of Parallelism, but rather to the undifferentiated generic form of which these varieties are specific developments.

to be equally real, but the relation between them to be one of simple concomitance without interaction. The law of Causation holds good only within each series.

(3) *Phenomenalistic Parallelism*, which holds that mind and body are but two aspects of one reality, whose true nature is hidden from us. The physical and the psychical series are alike appearances: there is no causal action between them. There is an appearance of causal connection within each series; but this too is, strictly speaking, only the phenomenal manifestation of one underlying reality.

(4) *Psychical Monism*. The physical series is the appearance of the psychical series to another consciousness. Consciousness is the only reality, and true causal efficiency is confined to the psychical series: within the physical series the chain of causation is appearance only.

If to these four formulations of anti-animistic views we add *Crude Materialism*, "which asserts that consciousness is matter or the movement of matter," and *Solipsism*, which "denies the existence of the physical world and of other minds than my own (except as ideas of my own)," Mr. M'Dougall holds, if I understand him rightly, that we have a complete classification of all anti-animistic doctrines: and as all of these save the varieties of parallelism may be more or less summarily rejected, we are left with the alternative already indicated of Parallelism or Animism.

Some objection may perhaps be taken to this general line of argument. To overthrow a rival doctrine does of course go some way to establish one's own; but such reasoning must remain inconclusive unless it can be shown that the classification of the various doctrines concerned is sound, and that it covers the entire field not only of actual but of possible speculation on the subject. Now this is a very difficult thing to prove; and though Mr. M'Dougall devotes a whole chapter to the defence of his "dilemma," his admission that Berkeley's subjective Idealism, and Professor Ward's "Trans-subjectivism" do in a sense "transcend" the psycho-physical problem, and his practically complete ignoring of the Post-Kantian Idealism, cannot fail to suggest doubts even to those who are far from accepting these theories.

It must be remembered, too, that even if Mr. M'Dougall's reasoning is sound, the value of the conclusion to be drawn from it must be measured with due regard to the very wide extension which it necessarily leaves to the term Animism. The essential features

which all modern anti-animistic solutions of the psycho-physical problem exhibit, are, according to him, the following :

- (1) Denial of all psycho-physical interaction.
- (2) Insistence that all the processes of the organic world (including all the behaviour of men and animals) are capable in principle of being fully explained in mechanical terms.

So far as Animism is established by the rejection of anti-animistic doctrines, Animism must be held to include any view of the psycho-physical relation from which these features, or either of them, are excluded. Incidentally, it may be noted, we are thus provided with a negative definition of Animism that may profitably be compared with the positive definition already quoted at the beginning of this review.

Arguments for or against any solution of the psycho-physical problem fall broadly into two classes, the first consisting of arguments drawn from empirical science, the second of arguments of a metaphysical or epistemological character.

Mr. M'Dougall is very anxious to impress upon his readers that Animism does not involve any metaphysical doctrine save the rejection of Solipsism, and that in this respect it has a great advantage over Parallelism. At the end of the Preface he writes :

“I wish to state emphatically that my enquiry is not conceived as a search for metaphysical truth, but that it is rather conducted by the methods and with the aims of all empirical science; that is to say, it aims at discovering the hypotheses which will enable us best to co-ordinate the chaotic data of immediate experience by means of a conceptual system as consistent as may be, while recognising that such conceptions must always be subject to revision with the progress of science. Of course if the term metaphysic be taken in the older sense as implying an enquiry into that which is not physical, the theme of this work is metaphysical; but that is a usage which is no longer accepted; metaphysic is now distinguished from empirical science by its aims and methods rather than by its subject matter. I claim, then, for the conception of soul, advocated in the last chapter of this book, no more than that it is a hypothesis which is indispensable to science at the present time.”

Again, on page 192, he says :

“It is, in fact, one of the great advantages of psycho-physical Dualism that, whereas each of the rival monistic doctrines necessarily commits those who accept it to some particular ontological doctrine (Materialism, Spinozistic Agnostic Monism, or Psychical Monism),

we are committed by Animism to no metaphysical doctrine. We may accept it while remaining wholly on the plane of empirical science; and in view of the strong dislike of metaphysic expressed by so many workers in the natural sciences, this fact should be for them a strong recommendation of Animism. It is true that Descartes' psycho-physical Dualism was made by him a metaphysical Dualism; for he taught that matter and soul are two ultimately different kinds of reality. But scientific Animism is under no obligation to accept Descartes' ontological dogma; it leaves open the ultimate questions, about which it is a mere piece of presumption for any man to express a decided opinion in the present state of human knowledge. For the real natures both of body and soul remain open questions, the answers to which, we may hope, will be gradually brought nearer to the truth by the labours of after-coming generations. For the present the Animist may, if he likes, suppose body to consist of matter such as is described by physical science, or, with Kant, he may regard it as the phenomenon of an unknowable thing-for-itself; or, with Leibnitz and Lotze, as a system of real being of like nature with the Soul; or, with Berkeley, as nothing but the perpetually renewed acts of God upon our souls. In any case his ontological view, whatever it may be, so long as it is not solipsistic, need not affect, and is perfectly compatible with, his belief in psycho-physical interaction."

Once more, on p. 356:

"Though the acceptance of either horn of the dilemma [Parallelism or Animism] involves the acceptance of a number of strange consequences and leaves on our hands a number of questions to which we can return no answer, Animism has this great advantage over its rival, namely, that it remains on the plane of empirical science, and, while leaving the metaphysical question open for independent treatment, can look forward to obtaining further light on its problems through further scientific research. It is thus a doctrine that stimulates our curiosity and stirs us to further efforts, whereas Parallelism necessarily involves the acceptance of metaphysical doctrines which claim to embody ultimate truth, and which set rigid limits to the possibilities of further insight into the nature of the world, and it finds itself forced to regard certain of its problems as ultimately inexplicable."

These are interesting passages; and the stress laid upon the profoundly metaphysical character which the Parallelistic doctrines have assumed in the hands of those who have most carefully worked out

their implications, is certainly in a measure justified. At the same time, although my own sympathies are entirely on Mr. M'Dougall's side in the controversy between Animism and Parallelism, I cannot but think that he has somewhat exaggerated the advantage which in this matter he represents Animism as possessing in comparison with its rival.

The term "metaphysical" is not very easy to define; but surely every hypothesis which deals with fundamental concepts like Body and Mind must ultimately be prepared to submit its claim to philosophical and even metaphysical examination: and this is as true of Animism as of Parallelism. Mr. M'Dougall himself practically admits that Animism cannot be held in complete independence of metaphysical considerations. He tells us in one place that, while (p. 355) "the belief in the adequacy and the exclusive sway of mechanical principles in both the inorganic and organic realms has been and remains the principal ground of the rejection of Animism by the modern world," yet, on the other hand, "the more enlightened of the opponents of Animism, recognising the uncertain nature of this ground, have rested their case mainly upon certain metaphysical arguments that make against the acceptance of the notion of psychophysical interaction." A whole chapter, though a short one, of his book is devoted mainly to a statement of these and other metaphysical objections to Animism, and another and much longer chapter to a refutation of them. It may be urged that in these chapters the author is only engaged in securing a standing-ground for a defence of Animism on Empirical lines, and that it is possible to clear away the imaginary obstructions raised by an unsound metaphysic without laying down any positive metaphysical doctrine. But the negative here implies a positive. The metaphysical questions involved are those which concern the nature of causality and substantiality, and the legitimacy of treating the soul as a substance or even as a "thing" transcending in some sense the consciousness in which its essence is manifested. Let the reader consider for a moment the main propositions in which Mr. M'Dougall sums up the conception of soul which he would himself commend to our acceptance. The soul, according to this view,¹ is (1) immaterial; (2) a thing or being "that possesses, or is, the sum of definite capacities for psychical activity and psycho-physical interaction;" (3) "a unitary being or entity distinct from all others." The metaphysical implications in these propositions and the meta-

¹ Pp. 364-366.

physical questions suggested by them lie on the surface; and the more strenuous the attempt to give precision to the Animistic theory, the more loudly do such implications and questions clamour for examination. There could hardly be a more striking illustration of this than the divergence of view between Professor James and Mr. M'Dougall (both of them Animists in Mr. M'Dougall's sense) respecting the existence of the Soul. "Souls have outworn both themselves and their welcome, that is the plain truth," says Professor James. To which Mr. M'Dougall replies (and I think he has the best of the argument) that, according to James's own admission, "the only alternatives to the acceptance of the soul-theory are either to give up our belief in logic or to declare that life is logically irrational"; and in this dilemma or trilemma he holds it best to "retain a modest confidence in human reason, and accept the hypothesis of the soul!"

The claim which Mr. M'Dougall sets up on behalf of Animism, that it can be held without metaphysical implications, seems to me to depend very largely upon the extremely wide limits which he gives to the definition of Animism. Animism, according to him, includes any psycho-physical theory which is not Epiphenomenalism or Parallelism. But it is impossible to rest in this vague and quasi-negative view of Animism. As we proceed, the need for greater particularity becomes apparent, though not until the last chapter do the wide distinctions which separate the various formulations of modern Animism stand fairly revealed. In his final chapter Mr. M'Dougall enumerates four principal varieties of Animism: the "animistic Actuelle-Seele"; the "transmission-theory" of James and Bergson: the "contentless" soul; and the soul conceived as "a developing system of psychical dispositions." Mr. M'Dougall's own view is a sub-variety of the last of the four; and in defending one view and rejecting others the metaphysical character of much of the reasoning is patent. The plain fact is that the moment any attempt is made to give precision to a psycho-physical theory, metaphysical considerations force themselves into prominence. The metaphysical conceptions involved have been lurking there all the time in the form of unquestioned presuppositions, and the further thinking out of the theory brings them inevitably to the surface.

I suspect that a large number of scientific men who would describe themselves as opponents of Animism, or even as Parallelists, feel quite as unencumbered by metaphysical difficulties, and quite as completely "on the plane of empirical science" as the Animist, in

Mr. M'Dougall's view, is entitled to do. No less a writer than Wundt, for instance, treats Parallelism as "a heuristic principle or a necessary working hypothesis for psychology," and is attacked by Mr. M'Dougall for doing so. "The culminating absurdity of Wundt's position," he says, "is that after arguing at great length to show that psychology must accept psycho-physical Parallelism as a 'heuristic principle' empirically based, he turns round and tells us that in considering voluntary movements of the body we must treat them as being psychically originated, because we cannot ascertain the nature of the physiological process which initiates them, and that we must make use of the conception of psycho-physical interaction, so long as we cannot complete our account of the brain processes."¹ I am far from wishing to defend Wundt's consistency; but the position he takes up is at least evidence of his determination to "remain on the plane of empirical science" in spite of his Parallelism. And this attitude really is possible so long as Parallelism is genuinely treated as a merely heuristic principle. Of course, even as a heuristic principle it contains latent metaphysical implications, just as Animism does. These implications may be more apparent and more difficult to overlook in the case of Parallelism than in that of Animism; but if this be so, I think the reasons are, first, that more attempts have been made in recent years to work out the Parallelistic hypothesis into a philosophical system, and, secondly, that the metaphysic of the ordinary forms of Animism is more in accordance with the unconscious metaphysic of popular thought, and, therefore, challenges examination in a less degree.

There is, perhaps, a tendency among writers on this subject to use metaphysical arguments much more freely in attacking an opponent's solution of the psycho-physical problem than in establishing their own. Mr. M'Dougall's examination of the Anti-animistic (or Automaton) theories is an excellent specimen of vigorous and acute criticism. But of the four principal formulations of Anti-animistic views, Epiphenomenalism, Dualistic Parallelism, the double aspect theory, and Psychological Monism, the first three are demolished and eliminated by arguments which in the main must certainly be regarded as metaphysical, and we practically hear little more of them throughout the book. It is in this way that Mr. M'Dougall arrives at his final dilemma—Psychical Monism or else Animism. But in the end Psychological Monism itself fares no better. It has been preferred on metaphysical grounds to every other form of Anti-

¹ P. 155.

animistic doctrine ; but no sooner have its rivals been driven from the field than the metaphysical battery is directed in turn against it.

The fundamental propositions of Psychological Monism are formulated by Mr. M'Dougall as follows (p. 160):—“(1) Consciousness or conscious-process (or something of the same nature, but so very much simpler as to require a different name, such as mind-stuff or infra-consciousness) is the only reality, the only mode of existence or of real being. (2) By each one of us only one tiny fragment of reality is directly known, namely, the stream of his own consciousness ; although all the rest of the universe consists of other conscious processes, it can be apprehended by him only under the form of material or physical phenomena. (3) The appearances to us of other real or conscious processes under the forms of physical objects and processes bear some constant and orderly relation to those real processes, so that the descriptions and explanations of the universe given by physical science are valid, though they are symbolic only ; that is to say, all the processes which constitute the universe proceed according to, or can be fully explained in terms of, the laws of mechanical causation.”

These propositions are all metaphysical, and they are met in the chapter we are now considering by counter-arguments which are themselves either purely metaphysical, or partly metaphysical and partly drawn from that region of introspective psychology which is often hard to distinguish from metaphysic, and at least cannot be described as belonging to empirical science. It is the first of them, however, which is specially characteristic of Psychological Monism. As against the rejection by Psychological Monism of the notion of substance or thing and its replacement by that of activity or process, Mr. M'Dougall insists that these notions are essential to our thought, that they are necessary alike to physical science and to psychology, and that the denial of existence to the soul, and the assertion that the self consists in the stream of consciousness alone, involve the consistent psychological monist in the strange conclusion that my self is not my own consciousness but “the streams of consciousness of other selves” (p. 167). The unity and individuality of consciousness as we know it is, says Mr. M'Dougall, “a fundamental fact which raises insuperable difficulties for Psychological Monism.” The philosophical expounders of the doctrine either make no attempt to explain it, or else they fall back on a conception of a compounding, or flowing together into a unity, of consciousnesses each of which nevertheless continues to exist in and for itself—a conception which, it is argued,

not only re-admits surreptitiously the rejected notion of substance, but is in itself logically and metaphysically untenable.

"We find then," writes Mr. M'Dougall in conclusion, "that the fundamental assumption of Psychological Monism, namely that consciousness is the reality and the only reality, and its attempt to abolish as illegitimate the conception of any mode of being other than consciousness, involve it in very great difficulties, not to say absurdities." I agree: but holding, as he does, that each and every form of Anti-animistic doctrine is open to "insuperable" objections from the philosophical standpoint, and, further, that all forms of Parallelism (but particularly Psychological Monism)¹ involve the self-contradictory idea of "unconscious consciousness," and can only achieve the seemingly impossible task of making mechanical determination the counterpart of teleological determination by lapsing into Solipsism—holding these views, as he does, we may be pardoned some mild surprise at finding him affirming in a later chapter (p. 223) that "the issue between Animism and Parallelism is one that must be settled by the methods of empirical science, *i.e.* by an appeal to observation and experiment and the weighing of the claims of rival hypotheses." Surely in so difficult an enquiry as that into the relation of Mind with Body there is not only room but a pressing necessity for both philosophic and scientific methods. The two should be used to supplement each other. And in spite of Mr. M'Dougall's anxiety to claim for Animism the right to remain on the plane of empirical science, this is, I venture to think, the procedure which he has himself followed.

The author's defence of Animism on the Empirical side opens with Chapter XVI,² and occupies practically the whole of the remaining portion of the book.

First comes a very interesting general reply to the objections drawn from Physiology and General Biology, and already set forth in

¹ I understand Mr. M'Dougall's argument to be that an unconscious soul is a legitimate and (for Animism) even perhaps necessary conception, but that unconscious consciousness is a contradiction in terms. It is interesting to note that Lotze, perhaps the greatest champion of Animism in recent times, leaned, in his latest work (*Metaphysic*, p. 534 in the translation), to the view that in becoming unconscious the soul ceased to exist—an admission which William James (wrongly, I think) treated as an abandonment of the "Soul-Theory."

² The argument against Animism drawn from the so-called Law of the Conservation of Energy would seem to belong naturally to this section of the work, but Mr. M'Dougall has preferred to deal with it in the previous chapter, in which the philosophical arguments against Animism are examined.

Chapters VIII. and IX. Mr. M'Dougall contends (successfully, I think) that neither the localisation of cerebral functions, nor the absence of any discoverable gap in the sequence of material causation which connects sense-impression with muscular reaction upon it, nor the apparently automatic performance of highly complex actions of which no normal memory afterwards remains, nor the dependence of our mental life upon brain-conditions, nor the multiplicity of conscious individualities within a single organism, nor the assumption of continuity of evolution from the inorganic to the organic, nor the acceptance of Darwinian views, justifies any final conclusion against the Animistic hypothesis. Even where the facts are admitted an explanation consistent with Animism is always possible.

In the succeeding chapters the argument passes from defence pure and simple to the "defensive-offensive." Parallelism holds (1) that the universe in all its features is susceptible of explanation in mechanical terms; (2) that every psychical process has its exact physical counterpart. Against the first of these dogmas Mr. M'Dougall argues that, on the contrary, mechanical conceptions are inadequate even in physiology and morphology, and that mechanism is wholly insufficient to explain either organic evolution or animal and human behaviour. Against the second he contends that the unity of consciousness has no physical unity corresponding to it, and that this can be shown to be true even if we confine our attention to sensation. Still more demonstrable is it that consciousness of *meaning*, to which sensations are only the cues, as well as the "feeling-tone" of pleasure and displeasure which attend the whole content of consciousness, and the "conative processes" which are so intimately connected with pleasure and displeasure, are purely psychical and have no correlative analogue on the physical side. "True" memory, again (as opposed to habit), involves *meaning* as an essential element, and cannot be explained in terms of brain-structure. Finally, an examination of the results of "Psychical Research" leads to the conclusion that telepathy must be accepted as a fact empirically proved; and telepathy is wholly inconsistent with Parallelism.

Without detracting in any way from the merits of the earlier portion of the book, the chapters of which a brief summary has just been given may fairly be regarded as the most important and original part of Mr. M'Dougall's work. It is, however, impossible to do justice

to them within the narrow compass of a review, and I must content myself by calling attention to a few points of special interest.

The centre of the psycho-physical controversy is undoubtedly to be found in the problem of the unity of consciousness. That consciousness, as we know it, is in some sense unitary, and runs in personal streams, is admitted by both sides; but the significance of the fact thus admitted is very diversely regarded. For the majority of Animists it is the chief ground for conceiving the soul as an entity which, by whatever name it may be called, is at least a real being, relatively independent, capable of acting and being acted on, and not to be identified with its fleeting states.

The soul-theory is generally sought to be established by reasoning of a metaphysical character, of which Lotze has been in modern times the principal exponent. Mr. M'Dougall does not disdain the metaphysical argument. On the contrary, he quotes Lotze's presentation of it at considerable length, and declares that it cannot be refuted. But it is by appealing to the facts of cerebral physiology, he thinks, that the argument from the unity of consciousness to the real being of the soul can be presented in the most cogent form. Do these facts justify us in treating either the brain as a whole or any portion of it as the physical counterpart of that unity of consciousness which is admitted by Parallelists themselves? If not, then Parallelism stands condemned by empirical science.

The question is one that cannot be avoided; but only in the region of simple sensation have physiologists made any serious attempt to answer it in the affirmative. And even in this region no affirmative answer can be given which is compatible with observed facts. When the effects of more than one sensory stimulus are combined in the unity of a single consciousness, the very least that can be demanded of Parallelism is to show reason for believing that there exists in the brain a physical "medium of composition" in which the physical effects of the stimuli are combined in a physical unity just as the psychical effects are combined in the unity of consciousness. But this cannot be done. The search for a *sensorium commune* has proved as futile as the search for a punctual seat of the soul.¹ "The knowledge we now have of the nervous system and its functions," says Mr. M'Dougall, "enables us to assert confidently that there exists

¹ As Mr. M'Dougall points out, the physiological considerations so often relied upon for the rejection of Animism, such as the localisation of brain functions and the failure to find a punctual seat for the soul, tell in reality less against Animism than against Parallelism.

in the brain no such physical medium of composition, and that the processes of the several sensory nerves simultaneously excited do not affect any common material medium to produce in it a complex physical resultant." Nor is he content to rest this statement upon any general principles of cerebral physiology, however well established: on the contrary, he appeals in support of it to the very case in which the physical compounding of simultaneous sense-stimuli has been most confidently assumed, namely, the case of binocular vision. When we look at any object with both eyes, both retinae and both optic nerves are stimulated, but only one object is seen. Similarly, if we look at a spot of light with both eyes, interposing a red glass before one eye and a blue glass before the other, we experience a colour-sensation neither of red nor of blue, but of purple. Where in either case does the compounding take place?

Mr. M'Dougall's answer to this question is clear: "The fusion of effects of simultaneous sensory stimuli to a unitary resultant is not a physiological or physical fusion or composition, but a purely psychical fusion; the unitary resultant exists only in the psychical sphere." In other words, the fusion is a psychical process to which no physical process runs parallel. This conclusion he supports by a formidable array of arguments, which cannot be reproduced here, but which appear to constitute a strong *prima facie* case, and certainly deserve the careful attention of all students of the subject.

The difficulties created for Parallelism by the unity of consciousness are of course far greater in the case of more complex sensations, and still more so when the higher mental functions are involved. The whole position seems to be given away by Fechner when he writes (in a sentence quoted by Mr. M'Dougall), "The psychically unitary and simple are resultants of a physical manifold: the physical multiplicity gives unity or simple resultants." For this amounts to saying (in Parallelistic language) that psychical unity has for its counterpart physical multiplicity. Even if an attempt is made to render this statement a little more plausible by representing the counterpart of psychical unity to be physical multiplicity *plus* material continuity, and further to supplement this view, as Fechner does, by his ingenious theory of the varying threshold of consciousness, we are still entitled to insist that multiplicity cannot in any true sense be the counterpart of unity.

Mr. M'Dougall's chapters on "Memory" and on "the Bearing of the Results of Psychological Research on the Psycho-physical Problem,"

will be read with special interest by the members of our Society—the latter for obvious reasons, the former because the author's theory of memory has profoundly influenced his views on the nature of the soul and the question of its possible survival after the death of the body.

I will conclude this review by briefly referring to each of these topics.

Mr. M'Dougall is among the very few psychologists of high rank who have had the courage to declare not only that telepathy has been established, but also that it cannot be explained on mechanistic principles. When we consider that it is only three or four years ago since even William James, in his lectures on "A Pluralistic Universe," described the field of enquiry with which *Psychical Research* is occupied as "perhaps too spook-haunted to interest an academic audience," this bold recognition comes as a very welcome sign of the increasing value which is being attached to the Society's work.

In Mr. M'Dougall's opinion the evidence collected by the Society, while not sufficient to produce conviction of survival, is sufficient to force upon us the alternative of accepting the fact of telepathic communication of a kind and at a distance that puts the supposition of mechanical transmission entirely out of court. "So long," he says, "as we consider only the evidence of telepathy between persons at no great distance from one another, it is possible to make the facts appear compatible with the mechanistic assumption by uttering the 'blessed' word 'brain-waves.' But the strain upon the mechanistic assumption becomes insupportable by it when we consider the following facts: Minute studies of automatic writings, and especially those recently reported under the head of 'Cross-correspondence,' have shown that such writings frequently reveal knowledge of facts which could not have been acquired by the writer by normal means, and could not have been telepathically communicated by any living person in the neighbourhood of the writer. In short, the evidence is such that the keenest adverse critics of the view which sees in these writings the expression of the surviving personalities of deceased persons, are driven to postulate as the only possible alternative explanation of some of them the direct communication of complex and subtle thoughts between persons separated by hundreds and even thousands of miles. . . . Unless, then, we are prepared to adopt the supposition of a senseless and motiveless conspiracy of fraud among a number of persons who have shown themselves to be perfectly upright and earnest in every other relation, we must recognise that

we stand before the dilemma—survival or telepathy of this far-reaching kind. The acceptance of either horn of the dilemma is fatal to the mechanistic scheme of things.”

I do not think much exception will be taken to this reasoning by those who have devoted most time and attention to the subject. Two observations, however, may perhaps usefully be made.

First, telepathy and survival, although presented in the argument as alternatives, do not really exclude each other. On the contrary, to establish either is to render the other more probable: and it is plausible to assume that *if* spirits exist and can communicate with human beings, the process by which they do so is of like nature with telepathy between embodied minds.

Secondly, I do not think the facts can be said to show that distance is an entirely negligible factor in telepathy, though there is not a shred of evidence that anything resembling the law of inverse squares is applicable to it. That being the case, the admission that “the explanation of telepathy at close quarters by the hypothesis of ‘brain-waves’ transmitted through the ether cannot be absolutely rejected,” does in some degree weaken the case for assigning to it a purely psychical nature; and undoubtedly the analogy of wireless telegraphy seems plausible to many people. It may be as well to point out, therefore, that wireless telegraphy depends for its effectiveness entirely on the use of *symbols*, whereas there is good reason to believe that in telepathy there is in many cases a direct communication of *meanings*. The analogy with wireless telegraphy would be more to the point if it could be shown that telepathic communication always takes the form of language, or, on the other hand, that wireless telegraphy could directly convey a complex picture or an abstract idea.

The analogy with wireless telegraphy fails also, I believe, in another respect of capital importance. There appears to be something in telepathy which I may describe as *selective action*, and which cannot be explained on mechanistic principles. By the selective action of telepathy I do not mean that some individuals seem to be capable of being acted upon telepathically, and others not, or not to any noticeable extent. This might be paralleled in wireless telegraphy by appropriate “tuning” of the receiving instruments. The brain, it might be said, requires to be “tuned” to the proper pitch in order to respond. The selective action I have in mind is something different, and seems rather to consist in a power on the part of the agent so to direct the telepathic communication that it reaches some particular person for whom it is intended and no other. I believe there

is evidence for selective action in this sense, but no doubt more evidence is required before it can be considered as firmly established.

In dealing with the psycho-physics of memory, Mr. M'Dougall follows Professor Bergson in distinguishing sharply between *habit* and *true memory*. Habit, it is admitted, has neural association for its basis; but true memory cannot be identified with habit. The essential element in true memory is meaning; and meaning, Mr. M'Dougall holds, as we have seen, to be a purely psychical product of psychical activity, and to be without any correlate in the brain-process. Nevertheless, even in true memory, as we know it, habit always enters as a co-operating factor; and accordingly, the view of mental retention put forward by the author is "intermediate between the two extreme views that have long been opposed to one another, the view that it is wholly conditioned by neural structure and the view that it is conditioned wholly in some immaterial fashion."

Mr. M'Dougall proceeds to give what he calls a "suggestion towards a theory of memory." It is too long to be quoted *verbatim* here, and not easy to summarise: indeed, I am not sure that I can fully grasp his thought. If I understand him rightly, the theory requires that we should conceive of the soul as having a "psychical structure" consisting in persistent "psychical dispositions," which are not themselves meanings, but only persistent conditions of meanings. From this point of view the soul may be regarded as a kind of repository of potential meanings, which may be added to by experience. But in order to be *actualised*, the potential meanings require a sensory content, and a sensory content is essentially the expression of psycho-physical interaction. Consciousness, therefore, as we know it, is impossible without the interaction of soul and body. This interaction, however, "can be initiated either from the neural side (in accordance with the conjunction of sense stimuli and pre-formed habits or neural associations), when it brings meanings to consciousness; or from the psychical side, by meanings which demand specific sensory complexes for the completion of ideas, and which thus in turn, through the medium of sensation, bring neural dispositions into play."

Mr. M'Dougall claims for his theory of memory that it is one "which is consistent with all the empirical data, especially all those which show the dependence of sensation and imagery upon the integrity of the brain, and which yet relieves us of the impossible task of conceiving a physical basis for all memory, and allows us to

believe that true memory is conditioned by the persistence of modification of psychical structure or capacities."

I forbear to express any opinion on this theory here. It obviously presents some considerable difficulties. The conception of the soul as a being with "psychic dispositions" seems to take us straight into metaphysics, and is not likely to pass unchallenged; and if meanings cannot exist in consciousness without a sensory context, it is not easy to see how the *initiation* of ideas can come from the psychical side at all. But accepting the theory as it stands, readers will not fail to perceive its possible bearing on the question of survival, and if they turn to the last chapter of the book they will see how frankly the conclusions to which it seems to lead are accepted by the author.

Mr. M'Dougall criticises the Cartesian description of the soul as a "thinking being," on the ground that it goes beyond the evidence at present available. "Our evidence at present allows us to say only that the soul thinks or is conscious (realises its capacities or potentialities) when interacting with some bodily organism; psychophysical interaction may be, for all we know, a necessary condition of all consciousness. For all the thinking or consciousness of which we have positive knowledge is of embodied minds or souls. . . . Rather than say that the soul is a thinking being, we must then say that it is a being capable of being stimulated to conscious activities through the agency of the body or brain with which it stands in relations of reciprocal influence."

So long as we confine ourselves to empirical data, and so long as no convincing empirical evidence of survival is produced, this criticism is justified. Indeed, it hardly goes far enough. For instead of saying "Our evidence at present allows us to say only that the soul *is conscious* when interacting with some bodily organism," we ought rather to put it, "Our evidence at present allows us to say only that the soul *exists* when interacting with a bodily organism." For on the supposition mentioned there would clearly be no empirical evidence for the continued existence of a disembodied soul. But if, notwithstanding this, we assume the truth of survival as being, though not supported by empirical data, yet not actually inconsistent with them, what kind of continued existence would be left to the soul by Mr. M'Dougall's theory of memory?

I am afraid the answer to this question will be profoundly unsatisfactory to those to whom the conception of a survival of the personality is dear. It is true that the theory bids us regard the

soul as a sum of psychical capacities which can be built up during bodily life, and which it may be permissible to conceive as continuing to exist in their more developed form after bodily death; and this is one degree better than the view which treats the soul as a system of unchanging potentialities, actualised by interaction with the body, but carrying none of its developed powers into another state of existence, if there be such a state. But the crucial question still remains: Is it consistent with Mr. M'Dougall's theory to suppose that the surviving soul carries with it into the other state of existence such memories as would enable it to be conscious of itself as the same enduring personality notwithstanding the transition? If I understand him rightly, his answer would be in the negative. This is an essential element in the popular view, and he expressly rejects the popular view. "The popular view," he tells us, "though it has been maintained in modern times by Lotze, a philosopher of the first rank, cannot be reconciled with the fact that the make up of human personality includes many habits that are unquestionably rooted in the structure of the nervous system. It conflicts also with all the large mass of evidence which indicates the dependence of all the sensory content of consciousness, all sensation and all imagery, on the integrity of the brain."

Concerning these speculations, all I would say is that we really have no evidence to go upon that can afford any ground for definite conclusions. As I have already pointed out, if we rest upon empirical data only, and exclude or reject the evidence for survival collected by the Society for Psychical Research, there is no reason why we should assume that the soul exists at all after the death of the body. If, on the other hand, we *do* assume this, then we ought to recognise that it is very unsafe to infer the capacities or incapacities of the disembodied soul (of which, *ex hypothesi*, we have no experience) from those which belong to, or which we attribute to, the embodied soul. For aught we know, the body may inhibit as well as stimulate the capacities of the soul; and in the region of memory in particular, which would seem to be of the essence of consciousness, a very wide field of conjecture lies open.

Mr. M'Dougall himself, I may note in conclusion, by no means treats with contempt the endeavour of psychical researchers to obtain empirical evidence on the question of survival. On the contrary, he admits that "a considerable mass of evidence pointing in the direction of survival has been accumulated," and although hitherto,

in his opinion, the character of the evidence has "fallen just short" of the perfection required to "produce conviction in the mind of an impartial observer," he clearly contemplates the possibility that more conclusive results may be attained in the future. Now such results must from the nature of the case include proof that the supposed surviving personality retains some of the memories of its earthly life. Let us imagine for a moment that convincing evidence of survival were to be actually obtained. It is quite certain that in such an event all preconceptions as to the capacity for memory in disembodied souls based upon observation of life in the body would be swept away like cobwebs. Probably, in the new light thus cast back upon psychological problems, Mr. McDougall might have to revise his theory of memory: but we may be sure, from the candour and openness of mind shown in every page of the work now under review, that no man would be more willing to modify even his most cherished views the moment the facts appeared to require it.

GERALD W. BALFOUR.

Die Psychanalyse Freuds. Verteidigung und kritische Bemerkungen.

Von PROF. DR. E. BLEULER. (Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, Band II. Franz Deuticke. Leipzig and Vienna, 1911.)

THIS article, which is published as a separate pamphlet, consists largely of a temperate and effective reply to the impassioned attacks which have been made upon Freud and his methods of psychoanalysis in German scientific and theological publications. These attacks are so fierce, and in many cases so devoid of the calm reasoning which should accompany a scientific controversy, that in themselves they furnish a valuable illustration of the power of a pre-existing complex to determine an attitude of mind and a high degree of emotional feeling in subjects who believe that their conceptions are based solely upon facts and logic. The same phenomenon is probably familiar to all those who have at any time discussed the problems of *Psychical Research* with persons who are insufficiently acquainted with its aims and methods, but who "feel strongly" that such investigations are a waste of time.

But, besides these attacks, there are a few criticisms which are put forward on more logical grounds. These are directed chiefly against the therapeutic application of Freud's psychology, and, though

it is generally admitted that a number of neuroses have been cured through psycho-analysis, the critics would contend that the cure might have been as well produced by other psycho-therapeutic methods, and especially by suggestion, to the operation of which any psycho-analytic cure is ascribed.¹ Professor Bleuler's reply is that even if the effects are due to suggestion, certain cases have been cured which have not proved amenable to suggestion in any other form, and that the discovery of a new method of suggestion is of great therapeutic value. He considers, however, that the process is essentially different from and superior to suggestion directed against what he considers to be merely symptoms. Though the beneficial effects of facing boldly any disagreeable emotion or memory are known to all, without analysis the most important factor may remain hidden from consciousness and so be unknown to both patient and physician. Finally, the suggestions of the psycho-analyst are often directly antagonistic to the patient's own wishes instead of coinciding with them as in the usual forms of suggestion.

In the field of psycho-therapy it is clear that there are two almost diametrically opposed methods of treatment, and this particular portion of Bleuler's defence may well be emphasized as shewing the contrast between them. On the one hand is the older suggestion, whether conveyed during hypnosis or waking or in some intermediate condition. On the other is the psycho-analytic method. The former seeks to aid the patient to dismiss altogether from his mind the disturbing element which both schools alike recognize as the cause of his trouble. If he succeeds in banishing it completely, so completely that it is no longer able to affect his mental being at all, clearly he will be cured. But according to the psycho-analyst that is impossible. Nothing can be forgotten or put away so completely. By mere suggestion the unwelcome complex is but driven deeper into the unconscious, where it can work perhaps more effectively than before. Thus the psycho-analyst tries to bring it up into the fullest consciousness so that it may be faced, and thus lose its power to produce those psycho-physical results which he has learnt to look upon as the expression in consciousness of a desire which is not allowed to be present there in a recognizable form. Here surely is the crux of the whole dispute: is it or is it not a good thing to bring into consciousness ideas which each individual for himself endeavours, consciously or unconsciously, to maintain below the threshold? The final answer must depend on the results

¹ Cf. Dr. T. W. Mitchell, *Proceedings S.P.R.*, Vol. XXIV., p. 68.

obtained by the two methods, and both claim startling successes. Does it not seem probable that for the less serious conditions suggestion may suffice, while there are more obstinate neuroses which will not yield to a conservative treatment? Metaphors are dangerous and generally unsound, but the present writer would suggest that if a bacterial infection is of slight virulence and is taken early it may yield to a treatment of hot fomentations, while under different conditions the surgeon's knife provides the only possible cure.

The critical notes mentioned in the title of the paper are directed chiefly against some of the generalisations put forward by Freud's followers, and only to a very slight extent against Freud's own conclusions. The author expresses some doubts as to the invariably sexual basis of neuroses, and as to the analyses which have been put forward of various historical personages, the latter on the ground that a process which is difficult enough in a living patient becomes unreliable when it can only rest on the scanty material of biographies. He also mistrusts the sharp delimitations which some of the psycho-analytic school consider themselves justified in making between various functional disorders.

The article concludes with a demonstration that in his chief conclusions Freud has not advanced anything which is contrary to or subversive of the whole fabric of psychology as it has been built up by previous investigators. On the other hand, many of his fundamental propositions were known long before his time. Freud has only developed them into a somewhat unfamiliar shape and united them into a system. As instances may be taken the transference of psychical energy from a repressed idea to another which is allowed to come to the surface, and the connection of the sexual instinct with hysteria and with "Angst."

The points raised are illustrated by numerous instances from Professor Bleuler's own experience, both among his patients and in himself, and the article will be very acceptable to those who wish to read a whole-hearted defence of the psycho-analytic method, but who are repelled by what seems to them the premature dogmatism of the more advanced members of the Vienna school.

V. J. WOOLLEY, M.D.

Faith and Suggestion. By EDWIN ASH. (Herbert & Daniel, London, 1912. Pp. 153. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

DR. EDWIN ASH gives us in *Faith and Suggestion* a full and interesting account of the case of Dorothy Kerin, and he has made it the centre from which to develop his theories on psycho-therapy.

This case, it will be remembered, created some sensation last spring from the notices about it in the newspapers under the title of "The Herne Hill Miracle," and Dr. Ash went down to investigate it.

He found the girl fairly well and strong after having been bed-ridden for years and finally apparently moribund.

Eye-witnesses of the last scene gave their testimony; the patient herself described her experiences; doctors and nurses who had been in attendance over a period of years gave accounts of her various illnesses; and, finally, Dr. Ash got hospital physicians and Röntgen-ray specialists to examine the girl and give their reports of her present condition.

So we have one of the most complete histories which has been published of these puzzling cases, and the author is justified in hoping that it will prove not only of present interest but of value for future reference.

Briefly, the history is as follows. The girl, aged 24, was supposed to be dying of phthisis, with kidney and other complications, and her family and friends were collected round her bedside to witness the end, which was momentarily expected. After lying in a semi-comatose state for some hours she suddenly murmured "I am listening. Who is it? Yes, yes!" Then she sat up in bed, assured her friends she was cured and quite well, and insisted on getting out of bed and walking into the next room. From that time she got stronger every day, her natural functions became re-established, and she is now quite strong and well.

She herself says she heard a voice say distinctly three times "Dorothy!" then a light came over the bed, and behind it a beautiful angel appeared, who said "Your sufferings are over! Get up and walk."

We frequently hear of such cures, and it is easy to dismiss them as cases of hysteria. Dr. Ash discusses the subject very fairly, and points out that, even if by hysterical we mean imaginary illness, this case would be remarkable; but he says the testimony of an experienced local doctor who attended her for the last two years is that the girl was really suffering from tuberculosis, and had the

typical signs, not only subjective but objective, of that disease. It was not, however, a case of advanced phthisis, as the lay papers affirmed, and subsequent examination by experts show no loss of tissue or extensive structural changes.

Dr. Ash points out that the disease was undoubtedly serious, and that but for the intervention of a psychic agency death would probably have occurred in a few hours. Her sudden recovery of walking power after being bedridden for five years is sufficiently remarkable, for one would expect great atrophy and weakness of the muscles; but Charcot and others give numerous instances of sudden accessions of strength from emotional causes apart from religious influences.

The analogy of such cases to that of Bernadotte of Lourdes is of course obvious, and is dwelt upon by Dr. Ash. He discusses at length the action of hypnotism and suggestion, and as he objects to the mere classification of a disease as hysteria being considered sufficient definition of a morbid state, so he objects to the term suggestion alone being considered sufficient explanation of the mode of cure. He argues that suggestion may act on the body through the mind in several different ways and on different planes, *e.g.* on a low mental plane, as when the patient is cured through appealing to his imagination by a bread pill which he takes for a powerful drug; by hypnotic suggestion, which enables the physician to act on the subliminal consciousness; by appeal to a spiritual force outside ourselves, as in the pilgrimages to Lourdes and by healers of the Salvation Army type. Dr. Ash thinks the efficacy of the particular method of suggestion depends upon the temperament of the patient, and he tells us that Dorothy Kerin is a young woman of strong religious feelings, and much given to praying for the relief of her friends' illnesses and troubles. She was therefore accessible to the highest and most spiritual form of influence, and he is inclined to believe her cure was brought about by an agency or force outside herself. In support of this view he quotes largely from Myers, William James, Sir Oliver Lodge, and other distinguished members of the S.P.R., as well as from the writings of Drs. McComb and Worcester, Mr. Percy Dearmer, and other clergymen who have taken up the subject of spiritual healing.

It appears that Dorothy Kerin was once subjected to some hypnotic experiments, but she believed they were wrong and successfully resisted hypnosis. Charcot has told us how he occasionally sent hysterical patients to Lourdes, thinking they would benefit more

from religious than from hypnotic suggestion as practised at the Salpêtrière.

This history presents many features in common with the Gillingham case reported in the *Journal* for October, 1912, and investigated by Miss Verrall. In each case, for instance, there are the appearance of a bright light and the suggestions of a hallucinatory voice. It will be interesting to note the future of these girls.

Dorothy Kerin thinks she has been restored to health in order to carry on good works, and Dr. Ash argues that her unselfish and spiritual character justifies her being selected for cure by the Higher Powers when so many invalids are allowed to suffer and die unaided. Whatever view may be taken, Dr. Ash has put the subject before the reader in a very impartial and readable form.

CHAS. LLOYD TUCKEY, M.D.

THE LIVERPOOL PSYCHO-THERAPEUTIC CLINIC.

SINCE the foundation of the Psycho-Medical Society of Great Britain at London in 1905, medical men have been, and are still being, enrolled as members from all parts of the Kingdom, and in no city has Psycho-Therapy made more progress, and attracted the attention of the medical profession to a greater extent, than in Liverpool, where quite a number have joined the Society and formed themselves into a branch, which has received official recognition by the parent organisation. This branch has been meeting from time to time for discussion, and the reading of papers bearing upon the subject. Although there is still much prejudice and not a little ignorance to combat, the efficacy of treatment by hypnotic suggestion in suitable cases has become so widely known and appreciated that many physicians now send their patients for treatment, and large numbers of the public seek it themselves. This being the case, the need of a Clinic, where the poorer classes can receive treatment, has become an urgent necessity. This matter has been under the consideration of the Liverpool branch of the Society for some time, and after much effort among patients' friends and sympathisers, a sufficient sum has been collected to enable us to make the venture. The ground floor of a Nursing Home has been rented at 8 Maryland Street in the neighbourhood of Rodney Street. It consists of three rooms: a small one which will be used as a consulting room for the visiting physician of the day, another larger room, which will be used as a waiting-room, and a third, still larger room, which will be used for treating patients, three or four at a time. All these are already furnished, and will only require the addition of a few easy chairs, etc., some needful stationery, and other details, which will be supplied by the Society in good time for the opening. Patients will be expected to pay 1s. for the first sitting, and

3d. for each subsequent one found necessary; absolutely destitute patients, who have been certified as such, will, of course, receive free treatment; and those able to pay more, but not enough for private treatment, will be encouraged to do so, and all money so received will be utilised for the support of the Clinic. A managing committee consisting of the three medical officers and the medical Hon. Treasurer, together with three laymen and the lay Hon. Secretary, will be selected to supervise the affairs of the Institution.

Thus, then, on Monday, November 11th, 1912, Liverpool will have the honour of founding the first Clinic of this kind in Great Britain under the direction of medical men for the treatment of the sick poor.

A. BETTS TAPLIN, L.R.C.P.

76 RODNEY STREET, LIVERPOOL.

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

Society for Psychical Research.

PART LXVII.

JULY, 1913.

I.

A REPLY TO DR. JOSEPH MAXWELL'S PAPER ON
"CROSS-CORRESPONDENCES AND THE EXPERI-
MENTAL METHOD."¹

By MRS. HENRY SIDGWICK.

DR. MAXWELL'S paper, as its title indicates, is partly occupied with criticising the general methods of those who in our *Proceedings* have written about the automatic scripts of Mrs. and Miss Verrall, Mrs. Holland, Mrs. Willett, and Mrs. Piper, and partly with detailed comments on particular cases. In my reply I shall concern myself chiefly with the question of the general methods, only going into particular cases so far as may be needed to illustrate my points. Incidentally, a reply on general methods meets a good deal of what M. Maxwell has to say about particular cases, because much of this depends, I think, on misunderstanding of the general methods; and some further reply dealing with particular cases is given in

¹ *Proceedings*, Part LXV., pp. 57-145.

appendices to this paper by Mrs. Verrall, Miss Johnson and Mr. Piddington. But in fact the general methods are much more important than the particular cases. The value of most of what has been written in the *Proceedings* of late years by Mrs. Verrall, Miss Johnson, Mr. Piddington, Sir Oliver Lodge, and to a minor extent myself, depends on these methods. If our meaning and aim, our assumptions and what we think is proved, can be so much misunderstood as they seem to have been by an able and industrious critic of M. Maxwell's eminence, it is to be feared that others also may have failed to grasp the points, and it may well be worth while to go over them again in the light of M. Maxwell's criticisms.

Before doing so, I should like to thank M. Maxwell for taking so much trouble to put before us the impression the work on cross-correspondences has made on him. It is only when those who study the subject will express their views that we can have the kind of discussion which may help towards the solution of the very complicated and difficult problems raised on any hypothesis by these automatic scripts. We are the more indebted to him—and though I am not going to speak of the "Latin Message," I should like to say this also of Mrs. Hude¹—because, not being an Englishman, he has had the additional trouble of dealing with a language not his own. His knowledge of English, indeed, is almost perfect; still, here and there he is led into mistakes which, I think, an Englishman would not have made. For instance, I doubt whether an English-speaking person would have thought the sarcasm which M. Maxwell applies on his first page to Dr. Hodgson fair comment. Dr. Hodgson thinks Mrs. Piper's trance personalities communicate by writing without being conscious of the process of writing,² but this is very different from not being conscious of what they say, which is how M. Maxwell interprets "not conscious of writing." Again, no English-speaking person would, I think, interpret "papers" as newspapers ("*gazettes*") in the particular connexion in which the word occurs in the incident referred to on p. 73

¹Mrs. Hude's article on this subject appeared in *Proceedings*, Part LXV., pp. 147-170.

²Whether we agree with Dr. Hodgson's view or not is another question. I am myself disposed to think it at any rate far too sweeping.

of M. Maxwell's paper (where it obviously means documents). Nor to an Englishman would "the Lawns of Lea" (p. 99) suggest the idea of Leah, Rachel's sister, because he would perceive that Lea rhymes with Sea. It actually does so in the script in question, which is partly in verse. (Oddly enough, M. Maxwell attributes to Mrs. Verrall this association of Lea and Leah, though without the slightest justification that I can perceive.) Such linguistic errors as I have been speaking of are, however, very few.

Let me, before I proceed to my reply to M. Maxwell, add that there are interesting points in his paper. For instance, the purely accidental coincidence which he has discovered between certain scripts and the poems of Lamartine—though it can only be made to fit by ignoring the reference of the scripts to Gautier and Hugo—is striking, and might well have figured in Miss Johnson's paper on "Chance Coincidences" (*Proceedings*, Vol. XIV., pp. 158-330). It is a useful warning, if one were needed, against attaching too much importance to a single coincidence, even of a striking kind.

Then again, he refers (pp. 142, 143), though with too little detail and too little confirmation, to what appear to be interesting telepathic incidents observed by himself. The cases of "Clémentine" and of the butterflies are full of suggestion as to the working of telepathy, and may be usefully compared with some of our experiments with percipients hypnotised by Mr. G. A. Smith (*Proceedings*, Vol. VIII., pp. 536-596).

Again, certain criticisms made by M. Maxwell are just. Probably all readers agree with him that scripts should, if possible, be exhibited in a less scrappy manner, in a manner showing better the connexion of different parts of a script, than was done in Mrs. Verrall's first paper. It makes it more difficult for the would-be critical reader, though often casier for the more general reader, to have the script cut up into snippets. It was natural, in an analytical description of her script, such as Mrs. Verrall's is, to illustrate the different points by the appropriate fragments, or the mere statement that some topic occurred in the script at such a date, other portions of the same script illustrating other points being sometimes discussed in other parts of the paper. With further experience those who have discussed the scripts have

learnt that there is apt to be something confusing in this way of treating them, and that it may tend to the obscuring of interesting points, evidential and other. Accordingly, in more recent papers, scripts have been given in a more complete form.

The mention of Mrs. Verrall's original paper on her own script (*Proceedings*, Vol. XX.) leads me from details to the fundamental points which, as I have said, I propose mainly to discuss in this paper. M. Maxwell's first criticism on our methods (p. 130) is that on our plan "we must admit the automatists' good faith"; "The medium's good faith must be implicitly admitted as an element in the experiment"; and that as a matter of method this is wrong; the need for her good faith should be eliminated.

It is of course quite true that the value of our evidence depends very largely on the good faith of the automatists; but I should put the matter somewhat differently myself, and say that the automatic writers, when the writing is not produced in trance, are inevitably themselves investigators, usually fellow-investigators with others, but investigators. And no scientific observations or experiments are independent of the good faith of the investigators. An investigator may sometimes produce objective evidence that he is not self-deceived, but his good faith has to be taken on trust. I believe that in orthodox science—biology, physics, etc.—bogus experiments have been put forward on one or two occasions, though extremely rarely. As a rule, however, the known character of the observers or experimenters concerned renders deception so improbable that the danger need hardly be taken into account; and the improbability is in most cases rendered enormously greater by the fact that deception would involve collusion, as is also of course the case with cross-correspondences. We must admit, however, that in the orthodox sciences few important facts are fully accepted until the experiments or observations on which they rest have been repeated by others, and that here psychical research is at a disadvantage in being limited so much as it is to observation. Progress is always slow when knowledge depends on observation of phenomena occurring spontaneously, and neither on lines nor at times selected by the observer; and it is partly because in psychical research

we can as yet seldom repeat experiments at will that we advance only slowly in our interpretation.

M. Maxwell tries to support his view that automatic writers ought not to be co-investigators, by referring to some remarks by the late Henry Sidgwick in a Presidential address delivered in 1889. There is confusion here. Those who will take the trouble to turn to the passage referred to (*Proceedings*, Vol. V., pp. 401-2)—and may I say here that any one reading M. Maxwell's paper should in all cases go back to the original accounts to avoid misunderstanding—will see that Mr. Sidgwick was speaking only of the physical phenomena of spiritualism. His point was that if any one, one's best friend or indeed oneself, professes, *e.g.*, to move an object supernormally—say raise a table without touching it—it is necessary, before accepting the phenomenon, not only to feel confident that there has been no conscious deception, but that there has been no unconscious deception—no action of the subliminal self tending to move the table unknown to the supraliminal self. In cases like this the medium may no doubt help the investigator, but ought to be relieved of all responsibility as an investigator himself.

Quite apart from cryptomnesia, with which I shall deal presently, a similar difficulty may occur in the case of automatic writing. I think it does occur in some of Mr. Stainton Moses' experiences; those for instance in which, he being alone, his script by request quotes passages verbatim from books in the room.¹ In such cases very careful precautions would be needed to make it quite certain that the automatist had not, unknown to his normal consciousness, looked into the book.

I should like to know how M. Maxwell would propose to investigate automatic script, produced otherwise than in trance, without letting the automatists share in the responsibility. Would he keep them in solitary confinement? Or does he, perhaps, think that automatic script is not a proper subject for scientific investigation at all? But that would seem rather arbitrary. And would he equally exclude from investigation all introspective psychology, all analysis of subjective sensations,

¹See *Proceedings*, Vol. XI., pp. 106-7, and *Human Personality*, Vol. II., pp. 591-2.

all accounts of dreams, visions, hallucinations, which from the nature of the case must be given by the percipients themselves?

There is one thing perhaps worth noting at this point concerning evidence in automatic writing for supernormally acquired knowledge—cross-correspondences and the like. It is that, from a purely evidential point of view, it does not matter whether the writing is automatic or not. Of course I do not mean that the fact that it is automatic is not important. The study of automatism is of great psychological interest, and I think it will be admitted that in the various studies on it that have appeared in our *Proceedings*, especially of recent years, we have given to the world much material for such psychological study. Automatism may, too, in time, not only give us evidence for, *e.g.*, telepathy, but give us clues to the processes involved. A cross-correspondence, however, might be just as good evidentially without any automatic writing at all. For instance, if an idea came into Mrs. Verrall's head accompanied by an impression that Mrs. Holland had the same idea, and she recorded this idea and this impression in ordinary writing, and if on the same day Mrs. Holland independently recorded the same idea, we should have *prima facie* evidence for telepathy between them, though no automatic writing had been produced at all. For this reason contemporaneous impressions of the automatists about the meaning of their scripts may have evidential value. For instance, if Mrs. Verrall records, before she knows that any cross-correspondence is involved, that the "storied mount" of her script can only be Dante's Mount of Purgatory, then this interpretation must be taken as an integral part of the evidence to be considered. It does not matter that to M. Maxwell, or to any one else, it may seem an absurd way of describing that mount.¹

I suppose it is partly at least because of his view that automatic writers should not be investigators of their own writing that M. Maxwell objects (p. 58) to Mrs. Verrall's discussion of her writing in Vol. XX. Mrs. Verrall, he says,

¹Mrs. Verrall understood by "storied mount" the mount of which Dante told the story: "storied" in this sense being equivalent to the Latin "fabulosus." I, like M. Maxwell, read it as "la montagne étagée," although in the latter sense the usual spelling would be "storeyed" mount. The point is of course quite unimportant.

could not with the utmost goodwill be impartial; one cannot be judge in one's own case. But what is Mrs. Verrall's case? What is her side and what is the other side? In what way do her interests come in? What is the thesis she supports, and disagreement with which would disappoint her? M. Maxwell apparently assumes (p. 61) very gratuitously that she starts with a conviction of the supernormal value of her scripts. I believe the truth is that we have here in the background an assumption which M. Maxwell makes about all the investigators—one which he has not, I think, fully expressed anywhere, unless it be *à propos* of Dr. Hodgson (on p. 58), because it has not occurred to him to doubt its validity, but which nevertheless is always in his mind, and explains criticisms which otherwise seem scarcely intelligible. I take him to assume that all the writers whom he criticises, with whom I should like to associate myself and whom I may therefore for shortness call we, have adopted and are defending the hypothesis that the intelligences directing the automatic script are in all cases, or at least in all where there is any evidence in the writing of supernormally acquired knowledge, spirits of the dead; and further that those spirits are responsible for the wording of the script. In other words he takes us to assume that the scripts are verbally inspired by spirits. Regarding this as our view,¹ he then proceeds to argue, like the critics described by Miss Johnson in her last report on the Holland script (*Proceedings*, Vol. XXV., p. 292), that the scripts are either produced by the influence, say, of Mr. Myers, or they are not; but there are passages in them unlike Mr. Myers; therefore Mr. Myers cannot have produced them, and therefore our supposed contention falls to the ground.

But this would be beginning at the wrong end. The problem does not present itself to us in this way at all; and after all we have written, it is disappointing that any of our readers should imagine that it does. What we do is to start with the undeniable fact that in automatic writing the intelligence directing the writing is not the normal waking intelligence of the automatist. It is an intelligence working simultaneously with, and to a considerable extent independently of,

¹ Cf. p. 58, 2nd and 3rd paragraphs; p. 60, 2nd paragraph; p. 125, 3rd and 4th paragraphs; p. 139, 3rd paragraph.

the normal waking intelligence. It presents in its workings obvious resemblances to the intelligence manifested in our dreams, and whatever other elements it may possess, it is to a large extent, as we all agree, a dissociated phase or portion of the automatist's own personality.

From the fact that its thoughts are recorded in writing we have, however, permanent and stable data for studying it, absent in the case of rapidly fading dreams. Automatic writing, in fact, at least affords material for studying dissociated personality if it does nothing more. And a large part of Mrs. Verrall's analysis of her own script in Vol. XX. is a study of this kind; and so is a great deal of Miss Johnson's account of Mrs. Holland's script. So far the matter might have been left to orthodox psychology, though indirectly it has, of course, an important bearing on the problems of psychical research. The questions with which we are more immediately concerned begin when we find that the writing intelligence somehow appears to have access to information to which the normal self of the automatist has not got access. We have then first to make up our minds whether this really is so, and secondly, if it is, to discover (*a*) what light, if any, is thereby thrown on the nature of the intelligence directing the writing; (*b*) the mode in which the information reaches this intelligence; and (*c*) the source of the information.

The first question of course is,—Are the coincidences between the scripts under consideration, and either other scripts or external facts, beyond what we can reasonably attribute to chance? The answer which we each of us make to this question will depend on individual judgment. I confess to feeling no doubt whatever myself that they are too numerous, and many of them too striking, to be attributed to chance. M. Maxwell apparently decides otherwise, but, if I may say so, I think he hardly gives himself a fair chance of judging, because he so often confuses the issue. Take for instance the case he begins with, the "sphere-spear" case (p. 59 and cf. *Proceedings*, Vol. XX., pp. 213-217). In America on January 28, 1902, Dr. Hodgson suggests to the Piper communicator (Myers_p at the moment) to appear to Miss Verrall with a spear in his hand. Spear was at first misheard as "sphere," but finally the experiment with "spear" was agreed on. On January 31,

as the result of a strong impulse to write, Mrs. Verrall produces a script in which occurs sphere in Greek and an expression in Latin (*volatile ferrum*) which she translates "spear." Miss Verrall is left out, but otherwise the coincidence will seem to most people striking. M. Maxwell objects to it chiefly because, in his opinion, *volatile ferrum*, which is an expression of Virgil's, means "arrow," and not "spear." Mrs. Verrall can give scholarly reasons for attributing to Virgil the meaning "spear." But what Virgil meant is really entirely irrelevant from the evidential point of view, for Mrs. Verrall removed all ambiguity from her script by recording before she heard anything about the experiment in America that in her opinion her script meant "spear."

A rather curious indication of the way in which M. Maxwell's estimate of coincidences differs from ours may be found on p. 86, where, in criticising Mr. Piddington's paper on "Concordant Automatism" in *Proceedings*, Vol. XXII., he says that, in order to make the most favourable case for the experimenters, he will analyse only their best cases, and proceeds to discuss as one of these "Celestial Halcyon Days," about which Mr. Piddington says (Vol. XXII., p. 103) that it is one of a number of "rather vague coincidences," and that he discusses it "chiefly, if not entirely, on account of its association with the important group of phenomena . . . to be dealt with in the next section."

A large proportion of the coincidences which impress us are rejected by M. Maxwell on the ground that they are concerned with such common words that their occurrence in the scripts of several automatists, even at approximately the same time, signifies nothing. He gives on p. 86 a list of such words, namely, Steeple, Hope, Star, Arrow, Giant and Dwarf, Laurel wreath, Violets, Cup, Spirit and Angel, Mountains Seas Lakes and Rivers, Music, Azure, Horizon. Another list of very common words (*mots très communs*), given on p. 101, is Spirit, Shadow, Umbrae, East, West, Daffodils. To these he adds a list of commonplace ones (*banals*,—the word *banal* occurs very frequently in his paper as a criticism); these are: Euripides, Orion, Hercules, Cytherea, Aphrodite, etc. The question of commonness, from the point of view that now concerns us, is, of course, relative to the scripts. A rare word

in ordinary letter writing might be common in the scripts, and *vice versa*. Some of the above words occur relatively often and some rarely in the scripts. To aid the reader's judgment as to their commonness, Mr. Piddington generally indicates the occasions on which they have appeared in the scripts written during the period covered by the experiments. But unless a word is very rare indeed in ordinary usage, and the time coincidence is very exact, we want more than the mere occurrence of the word in two scripts. We want it to be ear-marked in one or both scripts as intended for a cross-correspondence, or in some way strongly emphasized.¹ Or we want it combined in both scripts with some other word or words. M. Maxwell seems to ignore this ear-marking of words altogether. Does he, I wonder, object to experiments in thought-transference with cards or numbers, because of the undeniable *banalité* of the ideas transferred?

One is sometimes almost tempted to think that M. Maxwell describes a case as *banal* when he does not want to take further trouble in examining it. For instance, he disposes of the *Sesame and Lilies* case in the single sentence: "La correspondance sur *Sesame and Lilies* est d'une grande banalité" (p. 122). I suppose he means that *Sesame and Lilies* is the title of a well-known book of Ruskin's. But if that is all he has observed in the cross-correspondence in question, he has indeed read it hastily. It is in fact, whatever interpretation we put on it, a most curious case, which no student of automatic writing can afford to neglect. The reader will remember that in broad outline the facts we have to deal with (see *Proceedings*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 264-318) are that automatists, quite unknown to and unconnected with Mrs. Verrall or any of us, called by us Mr. and Miss Mac, produce script at the end of July, 1908, containing the words "Sesame and Lilies," and other seeming references to the topic. In August, 1908, Mrs. and Miss Verrall's scripts produce what, on comparing them, they take to be an attempt at a cross-correspondence on "Sesame and Lilies." In September, 1908, in consequence of repeated urging through the writing itself to send to Mrs. Verrall certain of their scripts—the particular

¹See the list of cross-correspondences during the experiments of 1906-1907 hus "ear-marked" in the *Journal* for Jan., 1909 (Vol. XIV.) pp. 24-25.

scripts meant being defined—the Macs write to her, then a total stranger, about their experiments, and so the coincidence of topic is discovered. Readers of the *Proceedings* will remember that there are further curious details about this cross-correspondence, and that there are other cross-correspondences involved; but the points I have mentioned are enough to raise interesting questions, and to relieve the case—as I should have thought every one must agree—from the charge of *banalité*. Indeed, it seems to me that *banal* is the last epithet that should be applied to it.

But I must go on to other matters. When we conclude that the correspondence with the script or with external facts appears to be beyond what mere chance will account for, we have next to examine whether it can be accounted for by knowledge unconsciously acquired from normal sources or unconsciously remembered. Both these possibilities may for evidential purposes be described as *cryptomnesia*—hidden memory—memory available to the subliminal self, but not to the supraliminal. It is an advantage possessed by good cross-correspondences, whether of the simple or complex kind, that they are, from the nature of the case, free from this particular danger. An automatist cannot have learnt normally and forgotten what exists only in another automatist's mind, or in her locked-up script; the two automatists having neither conversed nor corresponded in the interval, if any, between the production of the two scripts. I do not know, by the way, what M. Maxwell means (p. 139) by saying that cross-correspondences depend on negative facts, such as, that the mediums have no knowledge of antecedent publications. What antecedent publications can there be? Nor can cryptomnesia account for such curious coincidences as either that between Mrs. Verrall's script and the reading of Marmontel under special circumstances by a man who knew nothing of the script; or that about the bird and the chalk; because in both these cases the events apparently described took place subsequently to the scripts.

The possibility of cryptomnesia must, however, be allowed for in cases like that of Abraham Florentine, to which M. Maxwell refers with approval (p. 139). Mr. Stainton Moses by table-tilting described with some correct details the recent

death of an American named Abraham Florentine, who had fought in the war of 1812, of whom he believed he had never heard. It is, however, impossible to feel sure that no obituary notice had fallen under his eye—perhaps unnoticed even at the time by his normal consciousness; especially as in certain other cases it seems almost certain that such obituary notices were the source of the information given in Mr. Moses' script.¹

Cryptomnesia is a possibility with which long experience in Psychical Research has made us familiar. We have given crucial instances of its occurrence from the scripts under discussion themselves (see, *e.g.*, *Proceedings*, Vol. XXI., pp. 287-9). We have stated more than once in general terms that its possibility must be allowed for even when all we know goes against the supposition that some normal source of information has been open to the automatists. Thus Miss Johnson even goes so far as to say (Vol. XXI., p. 368) that "no statement in automatic script that has ever been in print, or is of such a nature as to be known to a good many people, can be regarded as really good evidence of supernormal knowledge." Mrs. Verrall says, speaking of a particular case (Vol. XXIV., p. 267), "It may therefore be taken as certain that no knowledge of *Proceedings*, Vol. XX., was consciously possessed by the Mac family. At the same time it cannot be proved that at some time the Report, or a notice of it, may not have been within reach of one or other of the automatists. The point is of importance in connexion with some allusions in the Mac script, but does not affect the value of the greater part of its contents." Mr. Piddington takes great pains to examine and to lay before the reader all the information he can collect as to Mrs. Piper's possible sources of information about Lethe (*Proc.*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 102-104, etc.) and so forth. We have, moreover, to the best of my belief, never attributed evidential importance to cases where cryptomnesia is a possible explanation, without giving the reader all the information available to enable him to judge how much it should be allowed for.

Why, then, does M. Maxwell constantly attribute to us

¹ *Proceedings*, Vol. XI., pp. 82-85. Cf. Mrs. Thompson's "Susanna Parkes" case, *Proceedings*, Vol. XVIII., pp. 267-271.

ignorance and neglect of cryptomnesia? To say the truth, I think it is extremely difficult to explain how a careful reader comes to do so. But one thing is plain: the mistake is connected with a fundamental misunderstanding which pervades his paper. He apparently supposes that we regard the frequent quotations or reminiscences of passages in the poets which occur in the script as of supernormal origin. Now in certain cases, as in the answers to the "Lethe" question, the literary sources drawn on seem so surprisingly out of the automatist's range, that it is worth while putting before the reader all the material we can collect bearing on the question of what literary sources of information she may have had access to. These cases remain remarkable, in my opinion, even if we decide on the whole that cryptomnesia played a part in the phenomenon. That is to say, the form of, *e.g.*, the answer given by Mrs. Piper to the Lethe question is very curious, is probably instructive, and is certainly suggestive of a supernormal element, even if we conclude, as M. Maxwell does, that she had at some time read a translation of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.

But for the most part there is no reason whatever for attributing anything supernormal to the literary references in the scripts, and it never occurred to us that any one could suppose there was, till M. Maxwell sent us his paper. The automatic scripts—especially those produced without trance and therefore in the presence, as it were, of the waking intelligence—are often obscure, allusive, symbolic, and expressed by means of literary quotations. (I will deal presently with M. Maxwell's objections to symbolism.) Unless we can find the source of these literary quotations, and thus their context, we may often lose a valuable aid to interpreting the scripts—and to interpret them is important, if only with a view to "the study of the psychological processes of automatic messages," which M. Maxwell, as well as ourselves, has so much at heart (p. 141). We have a good instance in the interpretation of the phrase, "a knot of blue ribbon," which seems to M. Maxwell so preposterous (p. 137). The phrase occurs at the beginning of a script of Mrs. Verrall's. Has it a meaning or is it pure irrelevant nonsense? From the evidential point of view this question is entirely unimportant; its only interest so far as we can see is from the point

of view of the psychological processes of automatic writing. The name "John" occurs very shortly afterwards in the script, and this suggests to Mr. Piddington a probable explanation for the knot of blue ribbon, namely, that it emerged on account of its association with the name John in a verse with part at least of which M. Maxwell might have been familiar had he been brought up in an English nursery—the verse:

"Oh dear, what can the matter be?
 Johnny's so long at the fair;
 He promised to buy me a bunch of blue ribbon
 To tie up my bonny brown hair."

Notwithstanding M. Maxwell's scorn, Mr. Piddington's suggestion will, I think, seem to most English people plausible, if not convincing. Comparing this case with others we may suppose the phrase, "a knot of blue ribbon," to be symbolic of the name John, though in this particular case the symbol is superseded by the plain writing of the name immediately afterwards.

Some quotations of course every one recognises at once. For instance, *Crossing the Bar*, of which M. Maxwell thinks the newspaper *Light* may be the source in the scripts, is, at least so far as the title of the poem is concerned, almost as familiar to Englishmen as *God save the King*. But there are other quotations less easy to recognise, for Mrs. and Miss Verrall and Mrs. Holland are widely read in literature, and their minds appear to be veritable storehouses of literary phrases remembered or half remembered. If therefore the source of a phrase is not at once obvious, what seems to us the first course to adopt is to ask the automatist, or for the automatist to ask herself, whether she knows where it comes from. If she remembers it supraliminally, then the question is settled, for there can be no reasonable doubt that the subliminal self must be assumed to have access to supraliminal information.¹ This plan of asking the automatist

¹ Whether this is always completely true as regards all supraliminal knowledge it is difficult to say. Our dream selves do not seem to be always fully aware of our actual surroundings, but in this case it may be argued that the supraliminal consciousness is in abeyance and itself also unaware of impressions it might receive through the senses. Dr. Hodgson thought there was some evidence that Mrs. Piper's trance personality was not always aware of recent experiences of her normal

seems simple, and why M. Maxwell should object to it I cannot imagine. Why should we try to find out by laborious and devious methods what we can so easily learn from the automatist?

But the automatist cannot by any means always tell us where a quotation comes from. She often does not supra-liminally know. When this is the case it has to be searched for, and if found the next point is to ascertain whether at some time it has or may have been in the mind or under the eye of the automatist. So far, hardly any approximately exact quotation has been discovered in the scripts which there is any serious difficulty in supposing to have been at one time or other seen by the automatist. A very curious exception is the Latin quotation from Ovid's *Fasti* given by Mrs. Holland on March 2, 1910 (see *Proceedings*, Vol. XXV., p. 246), and a few more cases of the kind would give cause for reflection: but one swallow does not make a summer.¹ It is not, then, in the mere use of quotations that we have hitherto found evidence of supernormal knowledge. Quotations seem as a rule to be merely furniture of the mind which the intelligence responsible for the script finds ready to hand.

Of course, when a phrase in the script resembles one occurring in more than one author, especially if the author actually quoted is comparatively obscure, we may sometimes ascribe an allusion to the wrong source. One or two instances of this have been discovered or suggested, and lead M. Maxwell to accuse us of superficiality in our investigations. In some cases such a mistake may lead to misinterpretation of the script. It possibly does so as regards a subordinate point—the association with Persephone of Nightingale—in the case referred to by M. Maxwell (on p. 136), when what is subsequently found to be a quotation from Oscar Wilde had been taken as an allusion to a verse of Tennyson's. In

consciousness. But certainly for evidential purposes it would be very unsafe to suppose that the subliminal self had not access to all supraliminal knowledge.

¹There are of course other cases where literary sources apparently unknown to the automatist seem to have been drawn upon. For these see Mr. Piddington's paper in *Proceedings*, Part LXV. (p. 245) on "Two Tennysonian Quotations" and the passages he refers to at the end of that paper. But, except in Mrs. Holland's quotation from Ovid, these cases relate to reminiscences of literary passages rather than to quotations.

other cases it may be of no importance at all. For instance, when Mrs. Piper said "Clock! Tick, Tick, Tick, Stairs" (which is not a quotation, by the way), she may have had in mind Longfellow's poem, *The Old Clock on the Stairs*; or she may, as M. Maxwell thinks, following Professor Hyslop's suggestion, have been alluding to the clock on the stairs at the Tavern Club. It really does not matter which, as the whole point is in the words she actually uses. As the simplest theory of their source I myself prefer Longfellow's poem; for I think it practically certain that at school or since Mrs. Piper has met with so well known a poem of the famous American poet; and it is not equally probable that she ever saw the clock in Mr. Hodgson's club or heard of the ceremonies connected with it. Indeed, Prof. Hyslop regards the phrase, if it refers to the club, of which he does not feel sure, as an indication that we have to do with a persistent memory of Hodgson's rather than with Mrs. Piper's mind.¹

M. Maxwell, I note, prefers spiritualistic literature, especially the newspaper *Light*, as a source of phrases used, to the sources suggested by us, and refers to *Light* phrases which hardly seem to require a literary source at all. For example, "seven times seven," uttered by Mrs. Home, is a phrase too undistinctive to be regarded as a quotation (unless it be from the multiplication table); and I do not know that her actual words, "seven times seven and seventy-seven" occur in that combination anywhere else. But if Mrs. Home was led to the phrase by any literary reminiscence, it was probably the well-known text in the New Testament (*Matt.* xviii. 22), "I say not unto thee, until seven times: but, until seventy times seven," that she had in mind rather than references in *Light* to Mr. Stainton Moses' seven circles of seven spirits, though she has very likely seen these references. This is again a case where the source is unimportant, because all that is of interest is the emphasis on the idea seven. M. Maxwell, I may remark, is a little rash in his assumption that all automatists read *Light*, as indeed he is in some other assump-

¹ This is perhaps more clearly seen in Prof. Hyslop's article in the *Journal of the American Society of Psychological Research* (March, 1911) than in the paragraph based on it in our *Proceedings*, Vol. XXV., p. 298.

tions about their habits and opportunities. Probably Mrs. Holland and Mrs. Willett never see *Light*, and Mrs. Piper very rarely, if at all. Mrs. and Miss Verrall no doubt look into it occasionally, and Mrs. Home, I should imagine, reads it regularly. These estimates, I ought to say, are based on my knowledge of the ladies, not on special inquiries. If, therefore, *e.g.* Mrs. Holland quotes from an English poet a passage also at some time or other quoted in *Light*, it is much more likely that the source in her case is the poet's works than that it is *Light*. If, again, Mrs. Piper talks about "Pharaoh's daughter," it is much more likely that it is because she has in her mind the Bible story of Moses saved by Pharaoh's daughter than that she has a reminiscence of the words as used in *Light* some years before (p. 120).

But I have said enough about quotations. They lead on naturally to another characteristic of the scripts, with which indeed they are closely connected—I mean the symbolic character of the language used, much of which depends on meanings being expressed by means of quotations and allusions. M. Maxwell objects strongly to this, but whether he thinks the symbolism exists only in our imagination, or whether he thinks that automatic script in which symbolic language is used is too obscure to be worth studying, I am not quite sure. I think, however, that a little further examination would convince him that the symbolism is really there if he has any doubt about it. For instance, is there any possible doubt that Mrs. Holland's script of March 14, 1906 (Vol. XXI, p. 320) is symbolic? That is the script where she gives a string of numbers which, when interpreted as letters of the alphabet expressed in their numerical order, gives the name, Roden Noel. These numbers are followed by the words, "Not to be taken as they stand," and by a reference to a portion of a verse in *Revelation*, which when looked up is found to be "for it is the number of a man." In this case the symbolic script itself gives the clue to the symbolism, besides telling us in the phrase, "not to be taken as they stand," that it is symbolic. Similarly in Mrs. Verrall's script of February 18, 1907 (Vol. XXII, p. 82) occur the words, "The white hill and les neiges d'antan Blanche de Lys or some such name—but it is all only symlobic [*sic*]."

Instances where the symbolism is unmistakable and where the script itself says it is symbolic, or uses such expressions as "so and so is a clue," implying that a clue is wanted to find the meaning, might be multiplied indefinitely. There is no doubt that the symbolism is there and that the meaning of the scripts is constantly wrapped up in a way that prevents its being at once obvious, and though it would often be more convenient to have the meaning stated more plainly and would prevent some ambiguities—and ambiguities in the case of cross-correspondences may sometimes give a double chance—we must, if we wish to study the scripts at all, accept them as they are. Of course, however, we must all admit that great care should be exercised not to let our imaginations run away with us, and not to assume doubtful interpretations to be certain.

The question naturally arises—why this symbolism and obscurity? I think we shall have to wait till we know more to answer fully, but some reasons may be suggested. Part of the obscurity may be due to dream-like sequences of associated ideas unregulated by a controlling intelligence—like the conversation of some chattering people who flow on from one thing to another till you do not know what they are talking about. This would account for the introduction of irrelevant ideas, and it is a possibility which the script itself takes note of. For instance, a script of Mrs. Verrall's, on Feb. 15, 1910 (*Proceedings*, Vol. XXV., p. 214), cuts short some rhyming verses with the words:

no don't say obvious nonsense—the rhyme hinders—but you now have the general sense. I can't think why you will not just put down the words without making up bad verses to disguise from yourself what you are doing. Now write FOUNT no more than that—and off you go to Fountains Abbey.¹

But we cannot thus explain conundrums which are evidently deliberate, like the one about the name Roden Noel, referred to above. Here another explanation suggests itself, namely, that obscurity may sometimes be necessary to prevent inhibition by the supraliminal self. The writing intelligence is writing, on sufferance, as it were, the normal intelligence agreeing to

¹Cf. also *Proc.*, Vol. XXII., pp. 191 and 228.

stand aside for the moment. But—at any rate where there is no trance, and to some extent, probably, where there is—the normal intelligence is there in the background all the time. Its attention may be arrested at any moment by what is being written, and if its interest is aroused it may interfere either by inhibiting or by directing the script. The intelligence directing the automatic writing may therefore find itself less obstructed if it expresses itself so that its meaning is not immediately obvious. It says so itself—*e.g.*, Mrs. Holland, Feb. 23, 1905 (Vol. XXI., p. 247):

Names. Names and proofs are the very things we must withhold [*sic*] from you because your brain which you cannot or will not will to a proper state of passivity—will spin its own web round whatever is presented to you—For truth's sake we must be veiled and ambiguous. [Then comes what is evidently a punning allusion to the names of Gurney, Sidgwick, and Myers:] A gurnet among the sedge which grew in the mires. [And the script goes on] We want to withhold [*sic*] riddles from you—your usefulness would depart.

Neither of the explanations suggested so far involves anything supernormal. They would be equally applicable and equally needed if the writing contained no supernormal element at all. For though in the quotations I have given there is an assumption that a personality outside the automatist is concerned, we cannot of course take it at its own valuation—especially as we have evidence in automatic states of what Prof. William James calls a “will to personate.”

But now we come back to the evidence for knowledge supernormally acquired—ideas entering from outside the automatist, and not by the ordinary channels of sense. Here we have a new source of obscurity and complexity, because, as we have every reason to think, ideas conveyed telepathically are apt to come in a fragmentary and imperfect way, and both to be imperfectly apprehended, and to be dressed up by the percipient. Experiments in thought-transference help us here. For instance, when Mr. G. A. Smith tried telepathically to make the hypnotised P. see a picture on a blank card of a choir boy dressed in a surplice, P. said :

Edge of card's going a dark colour. Somebody dressed up in white, eh? Can see something all white; edge all black and like

a figure in the middle. There's his hands up (making a gesture to show the attitude) like a ghost or something—you couldn't mistake it for anything but a ghost. . . . It might frighten any one.

(*Proc.*, Vol. VIII., p. 565. *Human Personality*, Vol. I., p. 552.)

The same thing may happen in the case of a split personality with ideas from outside brought in normally through the senses. For instance, Mr. Myers on another occasion told the same subject P. while in hypnotic trance, the story of Robinson Crusoe finding the footprint and fearing savages:

Awakened and set before the glass of water [which was being used as a crystal], P. at once exclaimed, "Why, there's Buffalo Bill! he's dressed in feathers, and skins round him, almost like a savage. He's walking about in a waste place. . . . I can see something else coming from another part—it's a blackie . . . look at them now, how they're arguing, Buffalo Bill and his black man."¹

(*Proc.*, Vol. VIII., p. 461. *Human Personality*, Vol. I., p. 580.)

In this case it was not in the communication from Mr. Myers to P.'s hypnotic consciousness that the failure took place—it was rather between two phases of the subliminal consciousness, or else in the transmission of the picture to the supraliminal consciousness. We can imagine how meaningless the occurrence of these visions would have seemed without the clue, though with it—with the knowledge of what it was intended the percipient should perceive—the connexion with this of what he did perceive is perfectly obvious.

And this brings us to what may, I think, be an even more important cause of the complexity of the scripts if we suppose that an outside intelligence is influencing them. That outside intelligence—let us call it the communicator—if it is actively trying to convey a definite idea, may well have difficulty, if it works telepathically, in getting the intelligence directing the script either to grasp the idea or to write down the words in which the communicator would naturally express it. The communicator may therefore be reduced to selecting such phrases and ideas already in the automatist's mind as will come nearest to what it wishes to say, with the further hampering condition that they must be phrases and ideas which the intelligence

¹ Buffalo Bill was the name of the hero in a show going on in England at that time and representing life in the Wild West.

directing the writing can be induced to write down. Under conditions such as these we must suppose that the communicator will have constant difficulty in getting its message through at all, that when it succeeds, the success will often be very partial, and that an occasion on which it is at all adequately successful in getting the message expressed will be something of a red-letter day with it.

But the reader will say I am going too fast and assuming all sorts of things about the intelligences concerned without discussing them. Let us go back then to the questions I raised earlier in this paper: (*a*) What light, if any, is thrown by the script on the nature of the intelligence directing the writing; (*b*) what is the mode in which supernormally acquired information reaches this intelligence; and (*c*) what is the source of this information? These are difficult questions, and can at present only be answered incompletely. Nor, though I believe the writers of the papers criticised by M. Maxwell to be in substantial agreement with me, do I wish in what I am about to say to be held to express the opinions of any one but myself, nor even any final opinion of my own. The whole subject is very difficult, evidence is accumulating, and further light may be thrown on our problems at any moment. And, in fact, what we have all been trying to do in the papers concerning automatic scripts, is to set before readers of the *Proceedings* what material is available for answering these questions without attempting to force any particular answer upon them.

Let us begin with the question—What light is thrown by the scripts, and especially by the supernormal elements in them, on the nature of the intelligence directing the script? The reader will be prepared from what I have already said to hear that in my view this intelligence, whether prompted or inspired from outside or not, is a phase—a subliminal self—of the automatist. Several reasons may be urged for this view. One is that some scripts are almost provably purely subliminal. I will give a hitherto unpublished instance—a script of Mrs. Verrall's, written on Nov. 19, 1906. She was trying an experiment with Mr. J. A. Hill (a member of the Society known to her by correspondence only), he being in another place and she writing with attention directed to

him to see if anything connected with him would come. This is the script:

Wilberforce. The lamplight shines on the wet streets, and the turning is to the left—the house is on the right hand side—two windows on the street.

But it seems a long time back, not the dress of to-day.

And then Jamaica seems written—and I think of a place with black people. Apocryphal.

This had no significance for Mr. Hill, and remained unexplained for more than five years. A few months ago Mrs. Verrall discovered its meaning. She had occasion to read a paper of mine on "Phantasms of the Dead," including haunted houses, published in Vol. III. of the *Proceedings*. On pp. 137-141 of this paper is a story of a haunted house in Spanishtown, Jamaica, occupied by a Mr. Hill, who himself, among others, saw the ghost. When she came to this story she had no recollection of having read it before, but was at once reminded of the above script, and I think the correspondences are too close for any one to doubt the connexion. "Wilberforce" is an approach to Emancipation of Slaves, "half-emancipated negroes" (p. 139) being referred to in the story. "House" and "street" come in naturally, for the haunting of the house is the point of the story, and the ghost "sometimes appeared to come from the street" (pp. 140-141). "It seems a long time back, not the dress of to-day," corresponds with the statement that the haunting was traced back from 1848 to 1806, and believed to have existed before, and that Mr. Hill "came to the conclusion that the ghost wore the garb which was in use in the colony in the reign of George the First." "Jamaica" is where the house was, and "black people" figure largely in the story as percipients. The only inappropriate remark is that about lamplight shining on the wet streets. The word "apocryphal," Mrs. Verrall suggests, may represent the opinion of the ghost story held by her subliminal self. Though Mrs. Verrall had no conscious recollection of the story, she is certain that she read the article containing it a long time ago—probably in 1887, soon after she became a member of the Society. She remembered supraliminally the general conclusions arrived at in it, but

hardly any of the particular stories. No doubt, however, some recollection of the story in question was retained by her subliminal self and was brought out by association of ideas—the name of Mr. Hill with whom Mrs. Verrall was experimenting, recalling another Mr. Hill connected with Psychical Research. The case seems to me a clear instance of purely subliminal origin, altogether uninfluenced from outside. But if some automatic scripts are purely subliminal with no external agency at all, is it not gratuitous to suppose that in other cases which seem to have nothing to distinguish them from the first, except that part of the contents of the script appears to come from some other mind, the scribe is different? Is it not like supposing that it is a different “I” who writes when I write a letter out of my own head, and when some one else suggests to me what to say?

Another reason for believing the intelligence directing the writing to be a subliminal self of the automatist is that there is in my view hardly any evidence for what I may call the general construction or machinery of the scripts, *e.g.*, the language in which they are written, being beyond the possible range of the automatist's own power. Mrs. Holland does not, for instance, write Greek, nor Mrs. Piper Latin, and so forth.

A third reason is that the style of the scripts of each automatist is individual and differs from that of others. With a little practice one can generally tell from the script itself—or at any rate form a very good guess—which automatist is responsible for it. This would not happen, I think, if it were not the work of some phase of the automatist's subliminal self.

If it be granted that the intelligence directing the writing is a subliminal self of the automatist, it almost follows that the answer to our second question is that the mode in which supernormally acquired knowledge reaches that intelligence is telepathic—telepathy either from other embodied human minds or from minds not in the body. Unless indeed it be clairvoyant; but evidence for clairvoyance in the sense of the perception otherwise than through the senses of things not in other minds, is at present almost non-existent. Telepathy merely means communication between mind and mind otherwise than through the senses, and we know of course very little about it. We do not, for instance, know whether when an idea

reaches B telepathically from A it is because A has actively tried to impress it on B, who receives it passively; or whether, on the other hand, it is B who actively fetches it out of the mind of the passive A; or whether active co-operation is wanted on both sides; or even whether telepathy may come about without the active co-operation of either mind. Thought-transference experiments do not help us much in deciding any such question, because we do not know whether the supraliminal efforts of which we are cognisant have or have not any effect on the phenomenon. It may be a purely subliminal affair. This is one of the things we must look for light on from the evidence which is accumulating, noting that if we find purposive intention in the idea telepathically conveyed we have to assume an intelligent agent.

Well then we come to the third question, and it is of course by far the most crucial and important of all—What is the source from which this information comes telepathically? In simple cross-correspondences like the “sphere-spear” case we may suppose Mrs. Piper’s and Mrs. Verrall’s minds alone to be concerned. Telepathy between them would, so far as we know, sufficiently account for what occurred, though it may not be the true explanation. But when we come to complex cross-correspondences, simple telepathy will not serve—at least I think not. M. Maxwell thinks it will; he thinks Mr. Pigou has clearly shown that even cross-correspondences of the “mosaic type”—the complex kind, that is—may be due to fragmentary telepathic thought-transference (p. 139). He does not tell us whether he has read Mr. Balfour’s reply to Mr. Pigou (*Proc.* Vol. XXV., pp. 38-56), and, if so, how he would meet it. To me the reply seems conclusive, and until it is met we must, in my opinion, assume that a purposive element in the distribution among different automatists of the fragments of a complex cross-correspondence does show the operation of intelligence, and cannot be due to the mere accidental fragmentariness of telepathically conveyed ideas. A purposive element may be shown either by the selection and distribution of the fragments, or by statements in the script showing that there is intention, or by both. I do not propose to go over all this much discussed ground again. What we have each to decide for ourselves is whether in the cross-correspondences of

which we know, there is evidence of purposive design in the distribution of the parts. If we think there is, the next point is to discover whose design it is. Is it that of the subliminal self of one or more of the automatists? This hypothesis should be strained to the utmost, but if any one will honestly try to apply it in all cases, he will, I think, find it very difficult.

But if it is not the subliminal selves of the automatists that work the cross-correspondences, what hypothesis remains except that they are the work of external intelligences? This is a very far-reaching hypothesis, and one which requires much evidence very carefully scrutinised to establish it.¹ Further, if we have to do with external intelligences, we must ask what external intelligences they are. Are they, what they claim to be, our former fellow-workers in psychical research, Gurney, Sidgwick, and Myers? It must be admitted in favour of this that the idea of proving external agency by giving evidence of purposive design is an ingenious one, and one which it is natural to suppose might occur to these former investigators, anxious to prove survival, and well aware of the difficulties of doing so, and of the need of new methods. Moreover, the claim of identity is to some considerable extent supported—even after full allowance for the share in the script of the automatist's own mind—by the characteristic nature of some communications, and by the greater apparent appropriateness to the supposed communicators than to the automatists of certain ideas and arrangements of ideas—*e.g.* in the answers to the Lethe question. But more evidence is wanted before we form a definite conclusion.

I hope, therefore, that readers of the *Proceedings* are not getting tired of cross-correspondences. Regarded merely as proof of telepathy, their importance can hardly be overrated, and much more may ultimately be proved by them. As, by degrees, more publishable evidence comes in, or fresh light is thrown on what we have already, we shall have to trouble

¹ I should like here to refer the reader who is not already familiar with it to the very interesting final section of Miss Johnson's "Third Report on Mrs. Holland's Script" (*Proceedings*, Vol. XXV., pp. 282-293). It covers more fully some of the ground gone over in the later paragraphs of the present paper.

members of the Society with it, hoping that as members of a scientific society they will give it dispassionate consideration in the light of experience already accumulated. The investigation is difficult; it is comparatively new; it is not likely that those engaged in it, however careful, will avoid all errors of method or interpretation. We therefore greatly desire from readers of the *Proceedings* co-operation and criticism, in considering both evidence already published and any new evidence that may be brought forward.

In the meanwhile I should like to conclude by saying that though we are not yet justified in feeling any certainty, I myself think the evidence is pointing towards the conclusion that our former fellow-workers are still working with us.

APPENDIX I.

BY MRS. A. W. VERRALL.

I DO not propose to reply *seriatim* or in detail to the criticism in *Proceedings*, Part LXV., by M. Joseph Maxwell on my report upon my own automatic writing (Vol. XX.). To do so could serve no useful purpose. It would weary the reader to be taken again over twice-trod ground, and since in M. Maxwell's opinion no medium should estimate the value of her own phenomena, he can take no interest in any conclusions of mine. But some points in his article call for more detailed treatment than they could receive in Mrs. Sidgwick's foregoing paper. Where M. Maxwell's inferences from the recorded facts differ from mine, readers must judge for themselves whether either of us, and if so which, is right. M. Maxwell has reminded them that I am not an impartial judge, and for my part I would refer them for the facts to my first-hand and full report, and not to his abbreviated summary.

I confine my observations to the two first and the two last of the incidents commented on by M. Maxwell. There is no special reason for this selection; in every case M. Maxwell's methods will be found to be the same.

I.

The first case with which he deals (p. 59) is the supposed correspondence between Mrs. Piper's script and mine in January, 1902, the "sphere-spear" incident. To what Mrs. Sidgwick has said above (p. 382) I add the following observations:

(1) I myself pointed out (Vol. XX., p. 215) that the

commentators were not agreed as to what precise implement is described as a "flying weapon" or "flying iron";

(2) My contemporary interpretation—or misinterpretation, if M. Maxwell prefers—was based upon the view that (a) the words of the script indicated that in the phrase *volatile ferrum*—a Virgilian phrase—*ferrum* had been substituted for *telum*; that (b) *volatile telum*, in a familiar passage of Lucretius (I. 970), is translated by Munro, "winged javelin";¹ (c) that in Virgil, *Æn.*, VIII., 694 (a passage referred to but not quoted by M. Maxwell), the *volatile ferrum*, the "flying iron," whatever it may be—and of the commentators one may say *quot homines tot sententiae*—is not a *sagitta*;

(3) I did not claim that "Panopticon" meant "*la vue*" or that *συνδεργμα* was an extant Greek word;

(4) It is true, and I drew attention to the fact, that there was for me an anterior subliminal association between the words "Panopticon" and "sphere," but it is not true that the script in which these words first occurred (March 14, 1901, quoted in Vol. XX., p. 342) also contained three crosses; the first piece of script written on that day terminated with the letter *x* repeated three times. This letter has doubtless been mistaken by M. Maxwell for a cross, but there is no confusion possible between the small *x* in the original script and the transverse or St. Andrew's Cross. As to the words "Panopticon sphaerae," to my earlier statements I add the following:

(a) The word "Panopticon" was used by Bentham to describe the circular Penitentiary which he was anxious to induce the Government of his day to adopt.² This use had probably been known to me, but, if so, I had forgotten it till, after the issue of my report, I was reminded of it by a correspondent. The shape of Bentham's Panopticon may account for the original conjunction in the script of Panopticon and sphere, and subliminal memory may have conduced to its recurrence

¹ My note of Feb. 7, 1902, refers to the two passages, Virg., *Æn.*, VIII., 694, and Lucretius, I., 970, and Munro's translation of the Lucretian *volatile* by the picturesque "winged" is reflected in my use of the phrase "the winged iron," in the second paragraph on p. 215 of Vol. XX.

² See Prof. Sidgwick's *Miscellaneous Essays*, p. 145.

on January 31, 1902, but does not account for its combination on that occasion with other phrases or symbols (*volatile ferrum* and Rector's Greek cross) which appear to make a cross-correspondence with Mrs. Piper's trance-writing;

(b) I wrote in 1906 (Vol. XX., p. 216) that "it is perhaps worth noting that the suggestion of a *sphere* as the object to be shown came not from Dr. Hodgson, but from the 'control.'" I now add, what I then intentionally omitted, that the "control," or rather the "communicator," for whom Rector was ostensibly acting as amanuensis, was Myers_P, and that the letter which I was holding in my left hand (Vol. XX., p. 342)—one of several experiments tried in the early days of the script—when, on March 14, 1901, the script contained the words, "Panopticon sphaerae," was a letter from Mr. Myers. The anterior emergence in my script of the phrase thus seems to me to strengthen rather than to weaken the evidence for supernatural connexion between the later script and Mrs. Piper's trance-writing in January, 1902.

(5) I am disposed to assent to M. Maxwell's ingenious suggestion that phonetic association between *ἐπίδωρος* and Dido is, at least in part, responsible for the actual phrasing of my script. The point is one of psychological interest, in so far as it throws light on the mental process of an automatist, and may be compared with Mr. Piddington's note on "a knot of blue ribbon" as likely to be associated in the automatist's mind with "John" (Vol. XXII., p. 182). But to explain the mental process of one automatist does not account for coincidences in the ideas expressed, in their several ways, by both.

(6) So again M. Maxwell's objection that my script is in Latin and that Rector_P knows no Latin goes to prove, if proof were wanted, that Rector_P is not the writer of my script, but does not help to decide whether the connexion between the ideas represented in Mrs. Piper's script and mine, and expressed in languages familiar respectively to each of us, is closer than would be produced by accident.

II.

In the next case discussed, M. Maxwell (p. 60) thinks that my interpretations are coloured by my conviction of the supernatural character and value of my script, which leads me into mistranslations, unconscious emphasis of points of agreement with Mrs. Forbes, and omission of points of difference. In particular, he complains that the words, "a statement was made in my script about fir trees planted in a garden," are not a fair representation of the actual words of the script, "*conifera arbor in horto iam insita*," because *conifera arbor* does not mean fir-trees (*sapins*), but a coniferous or cone-bearing tree (*un arbre conifère*). That is so, but neither were the trees in Mrs. Forbes's garden fir-trees, "des sapins," if that word is used in a specific sense. I do not know, nor does Mrs. Forbes, what the exact species is of the trees grown from seed sent to her by her son. They are, however, conifers. M. Maxwell writes as though "des sapins" (*fir-trees*) were a specific and not a generic botanical term. What is the case with *sapin* I cannot say, but in English the expression "fir-trees" certainly covers several species (Scotch, Spruce, Silver, etc.). So also does the term "conifer," and no English reader would, I think, feel M. Maxwell's objection to the use of the word "fir-tree" to translate *conifera arbor*. Nor does the fact that there are four or five of them in Mrs. Forbes's garden make the use in the script of the singular *conifera arbor* an inaccuracy. The English equivalents for *conifera arbor* are more than one; the words may mean "a fir-tree," "the fir-tree," or "fir-trees"; what they do not mean is "one fir-tree." How, for instance, would M. Maxwell translate the singular nouns in Pliny's list of mountain-loving trees:¹ *montes amant cedrus, larix, teda, et cæterae, et quibus resina gignitur*? In English we should write indifferently: "cedars, larches, etc., are mountain-lovers," or "the cedar, etc., is a mountain-lover."

M. Maxwell may be right in interpreting as a cross what I

¹ Pliny, *N.H.*, XVI., 30. Singular and plural are combined in Pliny's lists with complete indifference: "Non temere in montibus visæ sunt prunus, Puniceæ, oleastri, iuglans, morus, sambuci."

took for a sword, and, if he is, the allusion to Talbot Forbes is less definite than I had supposed. There are, however, other representations in the script of a similar object, which on the first occasion of its appearance (Aug. 6, 1901) is labelled a "sword." The modern sword is no doubt not cross-hilted, but the script may here as elsewhere prefer symbolism to realism.¹

M. Maxwell points out that the greater part of my script of August 28, 1901, is inapplicable to Talbot Forbes, and sees no "*continuité de conscience*" between my script and that of Mrs. Forbes. I have never claimed for any individual portion of my script that it proceeded as a whole from some single source, and was uninfluenced by my own subliminal or supra-liminal knowledge or association of ideas. In this case I called the attention of the reader to a certain reciprocity in the scripts produced by Mrs. Forbes and myself on August 28, 1901; the contents of her script, considered in connexion with the conifers and the suspended bugle of mine, suggest that some other than accidental connexion exists between our automatic phenomena. This question cannot be decided by the examination of one in the long series of similar incidents related in my paper. Readers who wish to form a judgement on the point must, I fear, read the whole sixty-eight incidents (Vol. XX., Chap. XI.).

It is true, as M. Maxwell points out, that my translation of "*omina sibi met ostendit*" does not give the reflexive sense of *sibi met*; a closer rendering would be "gives a portent to itself." In neither case do the words appear applicable to the facts. I placed no reliance on them, and did not mention them in my comment on the incident. I draw attention to this point because from M. Maxwell's correction, followed as it is by an encomium on my Latin scholarship and a complaint

¹I do not understand what M. Maxwell means by saying that "the word *fir-tree* is unmistakably associated with a cross in the scripts of Aug. 25 and 26, 1902." The actual word *fir-tree* occurs in neither script. On Aug. 25, 1902 (quoted in Vol. XX., p. 355), occur the words "Forest and firs—and a moss grown tree trunk" apparently "in a German speaking country," and this script is signed with an attempt at the word Cross and a drawing of a Latin cross. The script of Aug. 26, 1902 (which is briefly referred to, p. 77, but not quoted) contains the word Cross, but has nothing in it suggesting a tree of any kind.

of my errors in translation, the reader would be led to believe that this mistake of mine was an illustration of his point and that my loose translation helped to establish my "case."

I pass from the first two cases selected for comment by M. Maxwell to the last two, the "*Daily Mail* ghost" and "Marmontel."

III.

The "*Daily Mail* Ghost" is treated by M. Maxwell (p. 71) with more respect than usual, perhaps because he has himself observed cases of the same type. He does not define the type otherwise than by comparison with another case in my report (Vol. XX., p. 324). If, however,—a point on which judgment may be reserved—reliance is to be placed on the statement of the writer in the *Daily Mail* (Vol. XX., p. 329), the cases differ in one important respect, namely, that one can and the other cannot be accounted for by telepathy with the newspaper writer. The *Daily Mail* writer and his friend, when they planned their investigation in the haunted room, did not anticipate that the marks, which they hoped to obtain upon their scattered chalk, would represent the footprints of a bird, and the bird is one of the identifying points in the script. In the other case, as the journalist's account was apparently imaginary, there is no external subsequent event corresponding with anything in the script.

It is true, and was stated by me, that *calx* is ambiguous, meaning as it does both "heel" and "chalk." But its meaning seems to be defined by the context, for "chalk" is more suited than is a "heel" to "stick to the feet." M. Maxwell further objects that the bird of the script is a "caricature." I fail to see why this is an objection. However ill drawn, it is a bird.

IV.

The last case considered by M. Maxwell—the Marmontel incident—specially illustrates in his view the method employed in my report, and to the question of the method used here as well as in other recent publications of the Society he attaches, so he tells us (p. 71), great importance. Of no less importance is the method employed by our critics, and M. Maxwell's

examination of this incident may serve as an illustration of the method which he employs. On that method I offer the following comments:

(1) M. Maxwell counts the details in the script and classifies them as five correct, eight incorrect, and one doubtful. He makes no distinction among these details, treating them as though they were all equally important. It is true that he subsequently applies to two of those classed as correct the epithet "*banal*." But if reading in bed ("correct") is *banal*, is not the substitution of two chairs for a sofa ("incorrect") also *banal*? Triviality or non-triviality is a matter of opinion, but in an analysis by enumeration, which suggests that the items are of equal importance, the question of triviality, if introduced at all, should be indiscriminately applied throughout.

(2) A classified list of this sort presented to the reader should be complete. M. Maxwell omits an item which, had it not been omitted, must have been classed as "correct," namely that the reading was done with "only a candle's light." This detail, though trivial, appears to me distinctive: it is not common nowadays—not even, I should think, in *La Ville Lumière*—to read by candle light.

(3) The precision of coincidence between the words of the script and the passage which Mr. Marsh read on February 21, is not brought out in M. Maxwell's abbreviated version of the facts. He says that the volume which Mr. Marsh was reading contained the story of the discovery of a panel, etc.¹ As a fact, Mr. Marsh read "with only a candle's light" the very chapter in which Marmontel tells that story among other recollections of Passy.

The inferences to be drawn from the considerations put forward by me in this case, as in others, are, as I have said, matters of opinion, and I shall not discuss them here. But I hope that if the reader has any desire to know what my inferences are, he will take them first-hand from me and not second-hand from M. Maxwell. In his necessarily condensed account M. Maxwell has left out most, if not all, of my frequent remarks directing the reader's attention to the obscurities, the ambiguities, and the errors which are present even

¹ "Dans le volume il était question de la découverte, etc."

in the best cases. Readers of M. Maxwell's description of my report as "not an analysis but a piece of special pleading" (p. 58) will be surprised to find for how large a part of the script I make no claim to the possession of evidential value.

APPENDIX II.

BY ALICE JOHNSON.

REFERENCE has been made above by Mrs. Sidgwick to the confusion inherent in Dr. Maxwell's discussion between matters which in the nature of the case must depend on the automatist's good faith and those for which objective evidence is obtainable.

Whether or not the writing is produced without the voluntary and conscious participation of the supraliminal self, and whether or not the facts stated in it are consciously known to the writer, are matters belonging to the former category. In regard to them we might conceivably find evidence of fraud through statements made at different times being inconsistent with one another; but we could never find evidence of genuineness; that must always be a matter of opinion based on general considerations.

Now, Mrs. Holland—to whom in particular I refer, because most of my own reports have been on her script—has in a great many instances told me that facts mentioned or alluded to in her script were known to her; while, during a long and intimate acquaintance with her and her script, I have never found any inconsistencies in the information she has given me about it. For these reasons, I personally accept whatever she tells me as to her conscious knowledge or recollection,—*e.g.* her statement that she had not interpreted the script in which she gave the name "Roden Noel" by means of numbers and the reference to a text. Of this statement Dr. Maxwell remarks (p. 75): "Cela est bien invraisemblable." The insinuation seems to me uncalled for. Mrs. Holland, even before I knew her, had been well aware

of the large subjective element in her script, and she knew that the question in this case was of psychological interest only. She had answered many similar questions, sometimes in the affirmative and sometimes in the negative.

The incident was given in my first Report as an illustration of her subliminal ingenuity; for it is very important that we should know the extent to which subliminal ingenuity may go and how far it may account for the complexities of the cross-correspondences and various features in them that suggest a supernormal origin. Dr. Maxwell thinks that the publication of such incidents suggests that we are not familiar with recent researches into the psychology of the subconscious. Our view is that individual instances may often be more instructive than general dissertations on this subject—which dissertations are not infrequently based on the study of morbid cases only.

It is curious to see how Dr. Maxwell's preconceptions lead him to distort the simplest incidents: an instance is to be found on p. 136 of his paper:

Mrs. Holland's script had given a description of Mr. Roden Noel's personal appearance which agreed with a portrait prefixed to his *Collected Poems* and also with my own recollection of the one occasion on which I saw him. Miss Noel later sent me various notes in confirmation of small details in Mrs. Holland's script, but added that she thought the description of him not very accurate, for "his hair was very thin latterly." I printed her notes, partly to confirm and partly to correct my earlier statements, though, as I implied, there was nothing incompatible in my recollection of his hair being decidedly thick when I saw him some years before his death and Miss Noel's statement that it was very thin latterly. Dr. Maxwell's "unconscious tendency to adapt the facts to [his] opinions" (if I may apply to him a phrase which he uses of us) suggests to him that this only shows that I had more faith in my recollection than in Miss Noel's!

More serious misrepresentations arise from his habit of generalising from single instances. Thus, on p. 82, he remarks: "Mmes. Verrall et Holland étaient en correspondance." The reader would infer from this that at least several letters had passed between them, from which they might have learnt of

each other's affairs. As a matter of fact, each had written one letter and one only to the other, and these letters are given in my first Report on Mrs. Holland (Vol. XXI, pp. 328-329). There is nothing changed or omitted except that in Mrs. Holland's letter (which is before me as I write) some passages are left out which refer merely to the exchange of rings between the automatists, for the purpose of the experiments described.

Dr. Maxwell disposes of the "Ave Roma immortalis" cross-correspondence by asserting (p. 79) that it is a mere coincidence, since Mr. Myers died at Rome. This is one of several cases in which—no doubt unintentionally—he writes as if he had discovered some flaw in the evidence which we had not noticed. I had, however, pointed out in my Report that the mention of Rome in Mrs. Holland's script probably led her to refer to the (well-known) fact of Mr. Myers's death there. But this had happened more than five years before, and therefore seems hardly sufficient to account for allusions to Rome occurring in both Mrs. Holland's and Mrs. Verrall's scripts within five days of one another.

Dr. Maxwell adds: "on trouve de nombreuses références à Rome dans les textes publiés de Mme. Holland." I do not know what he means by "nombreuses"; but as a fact, the words "Roma," "Rome," or "Roman" occur in only 6 out of 218 scripts by Mrs. Holland, namely, all those produced by her from July 1903 to the end of 1908, and only 3 of these 6 scripts have been published up to the present time. There are further in the 218 scripts 7 references to places in Rome, of which only one (relating to the Janiculum) has been published.

Dr. Maxwell minimises the significance of the cross-correspondence by ignoring the historical circumstances and intention of the picture to which Mrs. Verrall's scripts were supposed by us to refer. Since he wrote his criticism, I have discovered certain clues to a number of hitherto obscure points in the scripts, which show that almost every phrase has a definite and coherent meaning, adding to the force of the whole case. To explain this would take too long here, but I propose to include an account of it in a paper which I am preparing for publication.

Another statement, correct in itself, but misleading in its context, is the following: In trying to explain away the cross-correspondence "Not in the Electra," Dr. Maxwell says (p. 85): "Les textes de Mme. Verrall contiennent souvent des citations grecques." They do, but this was not known to Mrs. Holland, as none of them had then been published. Mrs. Holland had at that time seen copies of only eight of Mrs. Verrall's scripts; these were all in English, except one, which contained two sentences of Latin. The first time that any Greek had appeared in any of the scripts written by Mrs. Verrall for purposes of experiment with Mrs. Holland was on Feb. 28, 1906; and it was on that day that Mrs. Holland's script contained (among other evidential statements) the phrase, "No, not in the Electra—M. will know better," which was appropriate to the Greek in Mrs. Verrall's script.

Again, Dr. Maxwell says (p. 77): "Pourquoi insister constamment sur l'impossibilité où est le sensitif d'avoir normalement connaissance des faits indiqués par lui . . . comme dans la correspondance Roden Noel?" My statement on this case is (*Proc.* Vol. XXI, p. 326): "It will be seen that in neither of the scripts does a single statement occur that is *provably unknown* to the writers," and it will be seen that this is just the opposite of what Dr. Maxwell attributes to me.

The possibility of Mrs. Holland's having seen any published book is fully admitted in my reports, but it is surprising to see what evidence Dr. Maxwell thinks conclusive on this question. Evidence of her having read any given book may be furnished by finding coincidences between her scripts and the book, in the same way that evidence for telepathy between her and Mrs. Verrall is furnished by coincidences between their scripts. But in both cases, of course, the coincidences must be a good deal beyond what can be attributed to chance before any deduction can be drawn from them.

The following are two examples of Dr. Maxwell's arguments: (1) He tries to prove that Mrs. Holland had read an article by me on "Coincidences" in the *Proceedings*, Vol. XIV., pp. 158 *et seq.* This article (I regret to say) extends to the length of 173 pp. It contains more than 300 names of persons (not including persons who are designated by initials only) and a good many of these names occur more than once. Dr. Maxwell

does not find that a single one of these names appears in Mrs. Holland's script; but he finds *two* on one page, *Brett* and *Shuttleworth*, which, put together, have, I admit, a strong resemblance to *one* name, *Brittleworth*, in Mrs. Holland's script. He also observes that Mrs. Holland particularly noticed the name Dr. *Hermann Lorberg*, Professor of Physics, in a newspaper (seen by her on March 8, 1906), whereas my paper (published in 1899) contains the name *G. Lorberg*, cutler. On the strength of these coincidences, Dr. Maxwell remarks (p. 76): "Mme. Holland, dans la mesure où les preuves humaines ont quelque valeur, a certainement parcouru [l'article] de Mlle. Johnson . . . ou en a lu des comptes-rendus et l'a oublié." (To the best of my belief, no *comptes-rendus* of this article have ever been published.) He adds later another coincidence. In the same article, the letter K is used, in a mathematical diagram, to denote the greatest deviation from the average in a long series. Mrs. Holland also uses the letter K in her script, followed by a number and a Christian name!

(2) For evidence that Mrs. Holland had read a certain article in *Light*: Her script of Feb. 6, 1906, contained these words: "This scribe . . . this scribe—Medium is not the best word in this connection." In *Light* of Oct. 17, 1896, there is an article on "Automatic Writing," by a writer signing himself *Scriba*. This article criticises the S.P.R. use of the word "automatic," and proposes instead the word "allomatic." The word "medium" does not occur at all in the article. Mrs. Holland, on the other hand, uses the words "scribe" and "medium," and does not use either of the words "automatic" or "allomatic." Now the latter is a very unusual word; it is one not likely to be used by persons of education, and in all probability this is its sole appearance in print. If, therefore, it had occurred in Mrs. Holland's script, the fact might well be held to point to her having read *Light*. As things are, the script seems to point rather to her having, in common with most English people, read the Bible, in which the word scribe occurs quite often.

The whole point of the incident, however, which Dr. Maxwell seems to have overlooked, lies in the fact that Mrs. Holland used a common word in a very uncommon sense, within less than a month of Mr. Piddington's having, unknown to her,

used it in a similar very uncommon sense, and dwelt on the desirability of our adopting that sense of it in our reports.

Similarly, as mentioned above, in a script referring to Dr. Hodgson Mrs. Holland used "K 57" followed by the Christian name of an intimate friend of his, which emphasised the connection with him; and it was found that he had used K followed by numerals, apparently as reference marks to his private papers (see *Proc.* Vol. XXI., p. 307).

It seems to me that in both these cases Mrs. Holland's scripts coincide far more closely with the events with which I connected them than with the sources to which Dr. Maxwell attributes them.

In some other cases, I venture to think that Dr. Maxwell is not quite familiar enough with English words and traditions to appreciate the point of the cross-correspondences. Thus in his analysis (p. 80) of "Eheu fugaces," there are several misapprehensions. He demurs to my saying that Mrs. Verrall's script repeated several times the idea of flight. But the English word *flight* includes all the senses in which I used it. It means running away, or fleeing, and also the flying of birds, etc., or any swift motion; and it is also applied to the flight, or swift passage, of time. It is in fact equivalent to the Latin *fuga* (adj. *fugax*), which covers the same meanings. In saying that one passage in the script "seems an imaginary description of an elopement," I was referring to elopements to Gretna Green, as they used to occur in the days when marriages could be more easily effected in Scotland than in England, as described, *e.g.*, in the entertaining "Adventure of the Runaway Couple" in R. L. Stevenson's *St. Ives*: "I was at the same time approaching a place of some fame in Britain—Gretna Green. Over those same leagues of road . . . how many pairs of lovers had gone bowling northwards to the music of sixteen scampering horse-shoes; and how many irate persons, parents, uncles, guardians, evicted rivals, had come tearing after."

Whether the episode of the script is an elopement or not, it is a flight in one sense of the word, *i.e.* a rapid motion. And the phrase "Eheu fugaces" (with which, of course, I assumed Mrs. Holland to be familiar), refers to another kind of flight—the rapid motion of time.

APPENDIX III.

BY J. G. PIDDINGTON.

MRS. SIDGWICK'S reply in general terms to M. Maxwell is so conclusive that I feel it would be a work of supererogation were I to attempt a detailed answer to most or even to many of the criticisms that he has directed against me. I shall, therefore, refer to only one case which seems to me a typical sample of M. Maxwell's method of dealing with our presentment of the evidence.

In my second and third papers on the Horace Ode Question (*Proc.* Vol. XXIV., pp. 150-169, and Vol. XXVI., pp. 174-220) I took the words "glebis adscripta" and "ascripta glebae" in Mrs. Verrall's scripts of March 12 and April 27, 1901, to represent the word *ἐπάρουρος*, and to involve a reference to a passage in the *Odyssey* (XI. 489-491) where alone this word occurs.

M. Maxwell (Vol. XXVI., pp. 114-115) thinks we ought not to accept *adscriptus glebae* as what he once calls a "translation" and once a "paraphrase" of *ἐπάρουρος*. He says:—

[Le mot grec *ἐπάρουρος*] est placé dans la bouche d'Achille, qui aimerait mieux être paysan travaillant pour un modique salaire chez un homme pauvre, que de régner sur les ombres. Or le commentateur applique une phrase latine employée pour définir un état social du moyen âge, à un état social antérieur de vingt-cinq siècles, dans lequel le serf inscrit à la glèbe n'existait pas, au moins à ma connaissance. Il n'y avait pas de registres fonciers et les droits immobiliers s'établissaient par témoignage (voy. par exemple la loi de Gortyne 1, 2, 14, 17, 18). L'idée d' "adscriptus" n'est pas impliquée dans *ἐπάρουρος* que les dictionnaires traduisent par *rusticus*. L'esclavage d'ailleurs, au temps d'Ulysse, n'était pas

compatible avec le salaire dont parle Achille. Si je ne me trompe, le commentateur dont Mme Verrall accepte la paraphrase commet une erreur juridique et étymologique. M. Myers n'aurait pas commis cette dernière, car il connaissait bien la langue grecque.

Now that sounds very learned; but as a criticism of our interpretation of "ascripta glebae" in Mrs. Verrall's script it is entirely beside the mark. So far as that interpretation is concerned, it is quite immaterial whether "adscriptus glebae" is or is not a correct rendering or paraphrase of ἐπάρουπος. From our point of view the only thing to be considered is this:—Is *adscriptus glebae* a rendering of ἐπάρουπος so familiar to English scholars that an automatist like Mrs. Verrall (who is an English classical scholar) might light on it in the process of groping after the passage in the Eleventh Book of the *Odyssey*?

That this rendering is extremely likely to be so familiar is hardly open to question. In England 19 Greek scholars out of 20, perhaps 99 out of 100, use the *Greek-English Lexicon* of Liddell and Scott. This Lexicon (which Mrs. Verrall uses) s.v. ἐπάρουπος has the following:—

ἐπάρουπος, ov, (ἄρουρα) attached to the soil as a serf, *ascriptus glebae*;

and then quotes *Odyssey*, XI. 489. It does not give the alternative meaning "above ground," but "attached to the soil" only.

Next, Dr. Merry, whose annotated edition of the *Odyssey* is largely used in England, and has been used by Mrs. Verrall, says: "ἐπάρουπος, lit. 'on the soil,' used of a serf, who is *adscriptus glebae*."

Lastly, Butcher and Lang, whose prose-translation of the *Odyssey* is the most popular one in England, while themselves preferring the rendering "on ground," append the following footnote to their rendering of *Od.* XI. 489-491:

ἐπάρουπος seems to mean 'upon the earth,' 'above ground,' as opposed to the dead who are below, rather than 'bound to the soil,' in which sense most commentators take it.¹

In view of these facts I maintain that our interpretation of "ascripta glebae" as a reference to ἐπάρουπος and its context

¹The italics are mine.

is both legitimate and probable: and I cannot help suspecting that M. Maxwell would never have demurred to it had I expressed the opinion in my paper that the appearance of "ascripta glebae" in Mrs. Verrall's script "*s'explique par une association onirique.*" I suspect, too, that M. Maxwell would find "great support in that comfortable word *Mesopotamia.*"

But M. Maxwell is not content to expose the "erreur juridique et étymologique" of those who accept *adscriptus glebae* as a paraphrase of *ἐπάρουπος*, but goes further still and expresses the opinion that Frederic Myers was too good a Greek scholar to have made the same mistake. It is clear that M. Maxwell in expressing this opinion assumes that I have treated, or at least that I regard, the occurrence of "ascripta glebae" in Mrs. Verrall's script as a case of syllabic inspiration on the part of Frederic Myers. How he acquired this erroneous notion I do not know, for nothing I have written on the subject affords any warrant for it. My own conception of the phenomenon was, and is, that the surviving personality of Myers was thinking of the passage in the *Odyssey* in which the word *ἐπάρουπος* occurs, and seeking to impress the idea contained in it on Mrs. Verrall's mind by hook or by crook. But I did not, and do not, suggest that Myers was responsible for the actual phrase "ascripta glebae." He may have been, for all I know, but all that I have assumed is that behind the script was Myers thinking of the *Odyssey* passage and endeavouring to transmit a reference to it in some way or other. The form in which the script actually gave expression to Myers's thought may have been (I don't say, was) entirely determined by the automatist's own associations of ideas; and so far as my interpretation of the script and the arguments I found on that interpretation are concerned, it is quite immaterial how the form was determined, provided that the idea did obtain expression in some form or other.

But even if I had suggested that "ascripta glebae" and "glebis adscripta" were the very words of Myers, then, though so gratuitous a conjecture would have been open to many objections, I do not think it would have been open to the objection raised by M. Maxwell: viz. that Myers was too good a scholar to have accepted *adscriptus glebae* as a paraphrase of *ἐπάρουπος*.

Myers was a fine scholar, but he was not a pedant or a

German commentator. In fact he had quite a lot of imagination. I take the first book of Myers's that comes to my hand, his *Essays Classical*, open it at random, turn a couple of pages and pitch upon Myers's version of *Aen.* VI. 719-721 (p. 172):—

“O father, must I deem that souls can pray
Hence to turn backward to the worldly day?
Change for that weight of flesh these forms more fair,
For that sun's sheen this paradisal air?”

“Paradisal air”! A word significant of a Christian conception used to denote a Pagan conception! Why, this is every bit as bad as any “*erreur juridique et étymologique*.” Nor can we plead in Myers's defence that he was driven to write “paradisal” instead of “Elysian” by the exigencies of metre, for he commits the same unpardonable blunder in prose (see *Essays Classical*, p. 141).

As regards M. Maxwell's criticism generally, it seems to me that much of it would have been valuable, had we really said the things that he represents us as having said; and that much of it may prove effective, because few people take the trouble to verify references.

II.

ANDREW LANG AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

BY THE REV. M. A. BAYFIELD.

“Who loves not knowledge? Who shall rail
 Against her beauty? May she mix
 With men, and prosper! Who shall fix
 Her pillars? Let her work prevail!”

In Memoriam.

“OF making many books there is no end,” wrote a dispirited man more than two thousand years ago, adding that “much study is a weariness of the flesh”—perhaps an indiscreet remark to make to the young man whom he was addressing. If any have since repeated the first words with positive delight, Andrew Lang must be one of them; for a man does not write over threescore volumes, big and little, unless he enjoys the doing of it, and such is Mr. Lang’s remarkable literary output. But not only did he write many books; his ingenious and versatile spirit found interest in an extraordinary variety of subjects, and it would be difficult to name a writer whose flying pen has ranged over a wider field. Anthropology, mythology, psychology, ghosts and the ghostly, literature ancient and modern (even *How to fail in Literature!*), history, biography, charming poetry—works on all these he gave us, with something on angling and golf, all sorts of charming stories, and fairy-tales in a series which apparently would only end when no new colour could be found in which to bind another volume. One unacquainted with his books might perhaps expect to find them, from their number and variety, superficial; but a brief examination would show the opposite to be the truth;

all his serious work, all that was not of the spontaneous exuberance of his natural genius, bears abundant evidence of solid study, and one may judge that much of it will be of lasting value. Indeed, his insatiability as a reader would seem to be partly the key to his productiveness as a writer. He may have found, and no doubt did, that "much study is a weariness of the flesh," but for him at least it was no less an invigoration of the spirit; each new acquisition of knowledge was an inspiration,—he had climbed a fresh "peak in Darien."

It is beyond the scope of the present article to attempt any general review of Mr. Lang's works, which would indeed require a volume; but one feature of his style is so all-pervading and characteristic that it demands at least a passing mention. I mean that buoyant and piquant liveliness which gives his work its unique flavour. He was never dull; and if ever he felt inclined to dullness, one may be sure he laid down his pen, with a smile at the humorousness of expecting to interest a reader in what is not interesting. He brought to everything he handled an elastic freshness of thought and fancy which is delightfully stimulating, and with which he would, I believe, have made a treatise on drains attractive. The diction is of course that of a scholar, choice and polished; the thoughts are presented with instinctive gracefulness; and much even of his most serious work (too much, as some unappreciative critics have thought) is strewn with epigrams, sudden turns of humour, and sallies of delicious wit. In this kind he was an unrivalled master. Who but he would have enforced a deprecation of the employment of paid mediums by declaring that "even the most honourable amateur must make to her commercial sister this sad confession:

"Said Fanny, tho' tears it may cost,
I think we must part, my dear Sue,
For *your* character's totally lost,
And *I've* not sufficient for two."

This prevailing gaiety of manner was not a symptom of inability to feel seriously about serious things; to suppose this would be to mistake him,—a thing which, as Mr. J. M. Barrie recently said, the sober Sassenach has sometimes done. The spiritual in man, the evolution and limits of his psychological equipment,

and all the importunate puzzle of human life, are no trivial problems, and no man who did not feel deeply about them would devote to such subjects, as Mr. Lang did, a life-long study; but profoundly serious as was his interest, he could not as a rule speak or write on them for long without something stirring his irrepressible sense of humour. There was indeed a vein of (Scottish?) whimsicality running through his nature; but it was not levity, it was not base metal,—only just a streak of silver making a foil to the gold. The habitual lightness of a man's literary touch is not to be taken as a criterion of the whole nature. Should we have known one side of Tom Hood if he had not given us *One more Unfortunate* and *The Song of the Shirt*? And after all, as was asked long ago, *videntem dicere verum quid vetat?*—why should not truth wear a smile?

Mr. Lang, who was President of our Society for 1911, became a member only some seven years ago; but his interest in the Society's work is of long standing. A paper by him on the Cock Lane Ghost was read at one of our meetings in 1894, and from that date he made frequent and valuable contributions to the *Journal* and *Proceedings*. One of the earliest of these, *Queen Mary's Diamonds* (*Journal*, Vol. VII., p. 116), tells a story which strongly piques one's curiosity, and which would be, as he says, a convincing case of "retro-cognition," if only it were just a little better! Earlier still, *Custom and Myth*, published in 1884, contains a chapter on the Divining Rod. In those benighted days he regarded the rod as a mildly mischievous instrument of superstition, but Professor Barrett's laborious investigations converted him to a whole-hearted belief in the dowser's faculty as "a fact, and a serviceable fact" (*Presidential Address*, 1911). The article on Psychological Research in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1902) was contributed by him, and is a well-considered *résumé* of the results achieved up to that date.

The general result (he writes) is a normal explanation, not yet complete, of the phenomena hitherto attributed to witch-craft, inspiration, possession, and so forth. Probably the devils, saints, angels, and spirits who have communicated with witches, living saints, demoniacs, and visionaries are mere hallucinatory reflections from the subconscious self, endowed with its stores of latent memories

and strangely acute percipient faculties. . . . But it would not be candid to say that the explanation is complete or nearly complete. The nature of the hypnotic trance itself remains matter of dispute. The knowledge automatically revealed can by no means always be accounted for, either by latent memory or by the sharpening of the normal powers of perception, while the limits of telepathy (if it be accepted) are vaguely conjectured. Even the simple results of "crystal-gazing" are often very perplexing. . . . When the visions are not mere fancy pictures, but correctly represent remote persons and events, unknown to the gazer, and perhaps unknown to all present, but later (in the case of the events) verified, the explanation is rather to seek.

It is not, I think, an unfair inference from some of his later utterances, that he found the exclusion of an external agency from some of the phenomena increasingly difficult.

The Making of Religion, Magic and Religion, Cock Lane and Common Sense, and *The Book of Dreams and Ghosts* are all stores of material interesting and valuable to students in psychical research. All these volumes have, I believe, been noticed in our *Proceedings*; but there is yet another, of no less interest and value in this connexion, which I find has not been reviewed in the Society's publications, and of this something may appropriately be said here. I refer to *The Maid of France*. This work was published in 1908, but the subject had interested Mr. Lang for many years before. Vol. XI. of *Proceedings* (1895) contains an article on *The Voices of Jeanne d'Arc* which shows a thorough acquaintance with the materials for her history, and from which it appears that he had then formed the opinion on it which thirteen years of further study only served to confirm.

It would be impossible for Jeanne, as it was for Socrates, to regard these experiences as other than objective and caused by external influences. Thus I should have no hesitation about considering her experiences mere constitutional externalisations of her ideas. But the evidence showing that the contents of the messages received by her were such as she could not have learned in any normal way is so strong, that I am compelled to believe in some abnormal extension of faculty, corresponding to her native and unparalleled genius. To a certain extent, she was admitted within the arcana and sanctuary of the universe.

“Come to the Salpêtrière,” said a man of science to an Abbé, “and I will show you twenty Jeannes d’Arc.” “Has one of them given us back Alsace and Lorraine?” said the Abbé.

There is the *crux*.

The Maid of France is in form historical, tracing the whole of Jeanne’s too brief life, from the happy childhood days at Domrémy to her shameful martyrdom, but of course the whole revolves around her extraordinary psychic powers. It is a book not to be read, and I venture to think, from the tenderness with which the Maid’s story is touched, not written, without inclination to tears; the severe reserve of the narrative, even in the closing scenes, betrays an emotion that needed to be kept in check. Of all his works it is perhaps the only one throughout the writing of which the author felt not even a passing impulse to be gay. The hideous tragedy of the end seems to have cast its shadow forward over every page, and not once is the gravity of the recital broken even by a smile. It is plain to see that he gave his heart to the task, all his skill in arrangement and presentation, and an enormous amount of loving labour: every previous writer on the subject was studied, every available document examined. The result might have been predicted: the book is so absorbing that one is loth to put it down till it is finished.

Of the simple purity of Jeanne’s character, her absolute sanity and sincerity, and the genuineness of her Voices and visions, Mr. Lang has, as we have already seen, no least doubt:

Here we may cast a backward glance of wonder at the many-faceted character of the Maid. The most notable features are her perfect faith in her mission and in her revelations, and her constant tenacity of purpose. Rebuffs and ridicule could not shake her for a moment, though her normal common sense was in perfect agreement with the general opinion. An ignorant girl, who could not ride or fight, her mission, if deprived of its inspiration, was ridiculous. Nobody knew it better than she; but often she met her heavenly visitors, courteous, encouraging, consoling. She wept when they departed, she kissed the ground where they had stood; she desired that they should take her with them. She was sane, yet she had these ineffable experiences. In them, and in her faith in them, was her strength (p. 105).

I now proceed to extract some evidences of her extraordinary psychical powers.

The history shows that she had *vue à distance*. While waiting at Vaucouleurs, she said to Baudricourt, whom she had been imploring to send her to the Dauphin, and who had summoned her to his presence, "In God's name, you are too slow in sending me: for this day, near Orleans, a great disaster has befallen the gentle Dauphin, and worse fortune he will have unless you send me to him." This was on February 12, 1429, the day of the English victory in the "Battle of the Herrings" at Rouvray, near Orleans, from which she was distant some six days' journey.

As to the famous mystic sword of the Maid, we really know no more than she told her judges in 1431. "While I was at Tours or Chinon I sent to seek for a sword in the church of St. Catherine of Fierbois, behind the altar; and presently it was found all rusty." Asked how she knew that the sword was there, she said "It was a rusty sword in the earth, with five crosses on it, and I knew of it through my Voices. I had never seen the man who went to look for it. I wrote to the churchmen of Fierbois, and asked them to let me have it, and they sent it. . . . When it was found, the elergy rubbed it, and the rust readily fell off" (p. 108).

Of her prophetic power also there seems to be no room for doubt: the evidence is indisputable.

Jeanne . . . was advancing towards the castle, when (as her confessor, Pasquerel, declares that she herself informed him) she was insulted and sworn at by a man on horseback. She answered, "In God's name, do you swear, and you so near your death?" Within the hour the man fell into the water (the moat?) and was drowned. The story is alluded to by a contemporary Italian letter-writer (p. 86).

And again:

As, when at Vaucouleurs, she had "longed, as a woman with child longs for her delivery," to go to Chinon, so now she prayed and wept, desiring sorely to succour the people of Orleans. "You hold so many and such long councils," she said to the Dauphin later. Her heart was on fire to be at work, not to waste that "one year and little more" during which she was to endure, as she kept

telling the Dauphin. It is d'Alençon who vouches for this sad and absolutely accurate repeated prophecy. Jeanne must have made it from the first, for in a letter dated "Bruges, May 10, 1429," the writer remarks, "It is said that the maid is to achieve two more great feats" (in addition to the relief of Orleans), "and then to die." We must think of her as always foreknowing, and always disregarding, her swiftly approaching end (p. 91).

Next we have a prophecy of her wounding at Orleans, recorded before the event:

At this time, at least before April 22 [1429], when the fact was recorded in a letter by de Rotselaer, a Flemish diplomatist at Lyons, Jeanne told the King that she would be wounded at Orleans by an arrow or cross-bow bolt, but not mortally. The prediction was fulfilled; it is more singular that it was recorded in writing a fortnight before the event (p. 109).

She prophesied her capture:

And now her Voices abandoned her: not that they were silent, but they gave no warlike counsel. She told her judges the heart-breaking story. It was in Easter week (April 17-23 [1430]), and it seems to have been in a moment of triumph, that, "as I was on the ramparts of Melun, St. Catherine and St. Margaret warned me that I should be captured before Midsummer day; that so it must needs be: nor must I be afraid and astounded; but take all things well, for God would help me. So they spoke, almost every day. And I prayed that when I was taken I might die in that hour, without wretchedness of long captivity; but the Voices said that so it must be. Often I asked the hour, which they told me not; had I known the hour, I would not have gone into battle."

Her allotted year, she knew, was almost ended, but the prophecy of the Voices came with the shock of certainty,—the Voices that spoke not of instant death, but a myriad times worse, of capture. Would not the bravest man, with the prospect of the death by fire in case of his capture, would not Ney or Skobéleff, Wallace or Gordon, have blenched? But the Maid rode on, first in the charge, last in the retreat. There is no other such tale in history. She was the bravest of the brave (p. 228).

Two other prophecies will be found on pp. 265 and 272; and I should have liked to recall the story of her knowledge of the Dauphin's secret, but must forbear. The extracts already

given will suffice to show with what a sympathetic touch the author has handled one of the most piteous tales in all history.

As is well known, Mr. Lang preferred to study the 'field of psychical phenomena, with one exception, from the historical and anthropological point of view, rather than as an experimenter. The exception was crystal-gazing; although no "sryer" himself, he assisted at a very large number of experiments, and it is through him that we have some of our most valuable evidence on the subject. But while in his own chief work in these matters he took the wider range, he was an untiring advocate of research into the phenomena themselves, and for their own sake. He held that certain beliefs and practices found all over the world in all ages probably rest on some undiscovered basis of psychic truth and fact; he refused to take them as the mere outcome of savage man's playful fancy and fraudulent proclivities, or to accept the "survival and revival" theory as a sufficient account of modern instances. He maintained—and in this he was at one with the founders of our Society—that since there is so much smoke, there must be some fire; and he never wearied of pouring his genial mockery on the "scientific" temper which protests it can see no smoke and that there is nothing to investigate. The slipshod reasoning and language of his opponents, and their frequent inability to see the real issue, made them an easy prey to his acute dialectic; and he came at last to hold so cheap the logic and verbal currency of scientific obscurantism, with its ever-recurring "presumably" this and "doubtless" that, that he calls this "doubtless" "the 'doubtless' of science," which merely marks what the writer "prefers to think"! I quote from *Magic and Religion* his impression of the scientific method in connexion with the subjects of which he treats:

In the long run magic and religion are to die out, perhaps, and science is to have the whole field for herself.

This may be a glorious though a remote prospect. But surely it is above all things needful that our science should be scientific. She must not blink facts, merely because they do not fit into her scheme or hypothesis of the nature of things, or of religion. She really must give as much prominence to the evidence which contradicts as to that which supports her theory in each instance. Not

only must she not shut her eyes to this evidence, but she must diligently search for it, must seek for what Bacon calls *instantiæ contradictoriæ*, since, if these exist, the theory which ignores them is useless. If she advances a hypothesis, it must not be contrary to the whole mass of human experience. . . . Again science must not pile one unverified hypothesis upon another unverified hypothesis till her edifice rivals the Tower of Babel. She must not make a conjecture on p. 35, and on p. 210 treat the conjecture as a fact. . . . It seems hardly necessary, but it is not superfluous, to add that in her castle of hypotheses, one must not contradict, and therefore destroy, another.

This kind of reasoning, with its inferring of inferences from other inferences, themselves inferred from conjectures as to the existence of facts of which no proof is adduced, must be called superstitious rather than scientific. The results may be interesting, but they are the reverse of science (p. 4).

It would indeed seem to be no easy matter to

“hold the eel of science by the tail,”

if I may change Mr. Lang’s metaphor and slightly alter the application of Pope’s. Yet to one scientific eel after another did he address himself, with well-sanded hands. In controversy, which he dearly loved, as every man loves what he can engage in with success, he was always a courteous fighter, but he was a dangerous one to meet. If the enemy had weak places in his harness, let him beware, for not one would escape a thrust from this practised fencing-master of debate, who knew every trick of the game. In *Cock Lane and Common Sense* many pages are devoted to the logical vagaries of the famous “Dr. Carpenter, C.B., M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., F.G.S., V.P.L.S., Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, *tout ce qu’il y a de plus officiel, de plus décoré*,” who more than once in the “seventies” charged at the windmill of psychical phenomena (and other windmills) with more zeal than discretion. Here is a specimen of Andrew Lang in his lighter manner:

In three pages Dr. Carpenter has shown that “early scientific training” in physiology and pathology does not necessarily enable its professor to state a case fully. Nor does it prompt him to discriminate between rumours coming, a hundred and fifty years after the

date of the alleged occurrences, from a remote, credulous, and unscientific age [the reference is to the alleged levitation of Simon Magus]: and the statements of witnesses all living, all honourable, and, in one case, of "high scientific attainments."

It is this solemn belief in his own infallibility as a judge of evidence, combined with his almost inevitable ignorance of what evidence is, that makes Dr. Carpenter such an amusing controversialist. . . . In matters wholly marvellous, like Home's flight in the air, the evidence of three living and honourable men need not, of course, convince us of the fact. But this evidence is in itself a fact to be considered—"Why do these three gentlemen tell this tale?" we ask; but Dr. Carpenter puts the evidence on the level of patristic tattle many centuries old, written down, on no authority, long after the event. Yet the worthy doctor calmly talks about "want of scientific culture preventing people from appreciating the force of scientific reasoning," and that after giving such examples of "scientific reasoning" as we have examined. It is in this way that Science makes herself disliked. (*Ibid.*, p. 327.)

After reading all, or nearly all, that Mr. Lang has written about levitation, poltergeisty, and telekinesis in general, I confess to feeling a quite masculine curiosity as to whether he was himself finally convinced by the evidence he had so laboriously collected. He confessed to us in his Presidential Address that he was "not certain this kind of thing never occurs"; which sounds as though he were giving that little *coup de pouce* against inclination which he wisely recommended to us all, and that, in his heart of hearts, he believed "this kind of thing" does occur. Miss Johnson has shown (*Proceedings*, Vol. XXI, pp. 490-496) that there are serious gaps in the evidence for D. D. Home's levitation, but the evidence for the phenomena as a whole is irritatingly strong, despite its variations in quality; it seems to leave one in the mental condition of Tom Hood's Footman on Mount Blank, who said of the ehamois, "its Springs in the middle of Winter I believe as incredible."

Equally characteristic and equally good in the controversial line is *The Nineteenth Century and Mr. Myers* (*Proceedings*, Vol. XVIII., p. 62). This was an answer to two essays on *Human Personality*, the one by Mr. Frederic Harrison and the other by Mr. W. H. Mallock, published in *The Nineteenth Century*

and After. The essay by the former called for no serious reply, and its "pomptious" frivolity (if I may borrow a word from the English vocabulary of a foreign acquaintance), is dismissed with little more than the following:

The essay of Mr. Harrison was a sportive apologue. Free, as he is, from degrading superstition, Mr. Harrison playfully informed the town that, after "dipping into" Mr. Myers's book for about ninety minutes, he dreamed that he died, after an apoplectic seizure. *Absit omen!* Mr. Harrison must be cautious as to what he reads, avoiding what he disagrees with.

The essay by "one of our most eminent scientific men, theologians, and investigators of Mrs. Gallup, Mr W. H. Mallock" (to quote Mr. Lang's description), was a quite grotesque misrepresentation, based on an almost incredible misconception, of Myers's theory of the subliminal consciousness. The exposure is formal and complete, and adds one more to the many demonstrations the Society has had to give of the inaccuracy which seizes the "scientific" like a cramp when they wander out of their depth. The concluding paragraph is delicious:

For the rest, I am not defending Mr. Myers's hypotheses—that of "possession" I reject—I am only anxious that they should be understood before they are rejected. In history it is well to quote the exact words of a document: in science it appears to be enough to write that "Mr. Myers says" this or that, in the terms of the scientist himself, and without references to the text of the author. Daily experience proves that profitable criticisms cannot be produced in this way. I need hardly add that, though I think Mr. Mallock misunderstood, I am sure he never dreamed of misrepresenting Mr. Myers.

How delicate is the *coup de grace* in the transparent sincerity of the last sentence! Not dishonest, but—*what?* One is reminded of the "soft answer" in *Punch*: *He.* "Wot d'yer mean, keepin' me waitin' 'ere arf an hour, standin' about like a fool?" *She.* "I carn't 'elp 'ow you stand, 'Energ." Mr. Lang's essay was offered to the editor of the magazine, but, for reasons not disclosed to us, was rejected! On which Mr. Lang remarks, "The S.P.R. will observe that the labour

of half the lifetime of a learned and industrious man appears to be less worthy of discussion than the cypher of Mrs. Gallup.”

One needs not to have known Andrew Lang to realise what a genial, tender, and richly-gifted spirit has passed away from among us, for few men's writings are stamped so unmistakably with the marks of their personality. Nor will he be missed only by those who knew him. All lovers of graceful literature and the many children whom his stories delighted, and for whom he wrote because he loved them, have lost a friend whom they would fain have kept. Our own smaller circle, bound together by the interest of a common study, has lost an inspiring fellow-worker and a valuable champion. By books, essays, and short papers, and by articles contributed to the daily journals, he not only increased our store of knowledge with the fruits of his own labour, but also did much to commend our undertaking to the public at large. And in doing all this he was, like the Society itself (as I believe), inevitably doing yet more, assisting to spread the light of a great and priceless faith:

“Contemplate all this work of Time,
The giant labouring in his youth;
Nor dream of human love and truth,
As dying Nature's earth and lime;
But trust that those we call the dead
Are breathers of an ampler day
For ever nobler ends.”

III.

A STUDY OF DREAMS.

BY DR. FREDERIK VAN EEDEN.

I THINK it will be hardly necessary in this company¹ to refer explicitly to the difficulties of treating my present subject.

The most important is the subtle and highly spiritual order of the phenomena. Their investigation leads us to the boundary of what is called exact Science, and brings us into the dangerous vicinity of metaphysical speculative systems and religious beliefs. It is well-nigh impossible to discuss these ultimate psychical phenomena without touching on different primary scientific or philosophical dogmas, and in no branch of science, I think, is the inadequacy and confusion of our only instrument of orderly thought—language—more painfully brought before our mind.

All this, I believe, tends to justify my conviction, that for the exploration of this mysterious world of dreams we want not only the purely scientific, but also the poetical function. In this field the pioneers have to be either poetical men of science or scientific poets; since it is the poet—at least when we attach to this word its highest and deepest meaning—whose natural passion it is to explore the ultimate regions of the human soul and whose constant occupation is to create new spiritual values and give them accurate expression.

Since 1896 I have studied my own dreams, writing down the most interesting in my diary. In 1898 I began to keep a separate account for a particular kind of dream which seemed to me the most important, and I have continued it up to this

¹This paper was read at a meeting of the Society on April 22, 1913.

day. Altogether I collected about 500 dreams, of which 352 are of the particular kind just mentioned. This material may form the basis of what I hope may become a scientific structure of some value, if leisure and strength to build it up carefully do not fail me.

In the meantime, with a pardonable anxiety lest the ideas should not find expression in time, I condensed them into a work of art—a novel called *The Bride of Dreams*, published a few years ago in Holland and Germany, and an English edition of which will shortly be issued in New York. The fictitious form enabled me to deal freely with delicate matters, and had also the advantage that it expressed rather unusual ideas in a less aggressive way—esoterically, so to speak. Yet I want to express these ideas also in a form that will appeal more directly to the scientific mind, and I know I cannot find a better audience for this purpose than the members of the S.P.R., who are accustomed to treat investigations and ideas of an unusual sort in a broad-minded and yet critical spirit.

It may be said that the poet is sometimes carried away by his fancy; on the other hand, the purely scientific mind is sometimes handicapped by a tendency to disbelieve, and I do not see why the poet, enamoured of truth and reality as he is, should be less severely critical than the man of science.

I may take it then to be clearly understood that this paper is only a preliminary sketch, a short announcement of a greater work, which I hope to be able to complete in later years.

I will as much as possible avoid speculation, and limit myself to facts; yet these facts, as I have observed them, bring me in a general way to the firm conviction that the theories on dream-life, as brought forward up to to-day, within my knowledge, are unable to account for all the phenomena.

Selecting among the most prominent and most up-to-date authors, I may mention Prof. Sigmund Freud, who is now considered by many as the highest authority on dreams, and whose key to the mysteries of dream-life may be formulated in these words:

The Dream is the symbolically expressed wish or desire of the subconscious part of a human being, and generally of an erotic character. This view has been amply criticised, among others by Mr. Havelock Ellis in his recent book, *The World of*

Dreams, which I regard as one of the best handbooks of recent years.

Havelock Ellis, fully acknowledging the boldness and ingenuity of Freud's theory, endorses the comment of many of Freud's critics, that this key, however fitting in many cases, does not open all doors, and still leaves many mysteries.

According to Havelock Ellis the principal characteristic of the dream is *psychical dissociation*, and all dreams may be accounted for by the natural and unceasing tendency of the human mind to reason and to explain, even in a condition of dissociation. He supposes that the brain in sleep continues to receive impressions from different internal organs, from the involuntary muscles, from the beating heart and the breathing lungs, and in its dissociated state tries to bring some reasonable order into these sensations by inventing all sorts of curious, and more or less absurd, facts, which it regards as real and as accounting for the confused impressions it perceives.

My objection to this theory, in spite of the author's ingenious and plausible defence of it, is the same as his objection to the theory of Freud. It does not by any means cover all the facts. I would even go so far as to say that it holds good in only a few exceptional cases. I hope to make it clear to you that it is utterly inadequate to account in particular for those cases which I recorded as being the most important and interesting.

I wish to mention here the name of a great Englishwoman, who died last year, and whom I consider one of the deepest thinkers of our age.

Victoria Lady Welby is the mother of that new branch of science, now officially acknowledged by the *Britannica Encyclopaedia* under the name of *Significs*, corresponding to Bréal's term *Semantics*. Her contention was that at the bottom of all our disputes, and even of all our misery, is the careless and inadequate use of language. According to my own experience, this want of "significs"—Lady Welby's new science—is felt in every discussion, and I rarely begin a lecture without a warning about it.

In the present case we find a good illustration of Lady Welby's contention. Havelock Ellis, in his explanation of dream-phenomena, says, quoting Vaschide and Piéron, that "the

internal sensations develop at the expense of the *peripheral* sensations. That indeed seems to be the secret of the immense emotional turmoil of our dreams."

Now it seems to me that the word *internal*, by the authors just mentioned and by many others, is used in a deceptive way, without recognition of its shifting value, its significant quality. It stands for the contrary of *peripheral*, yet when the word is used its significance imperceptibly becomes *metaphorical*.

In opposition to sensations derived from the skin, the visceral sensations might be called internal. But from the psychical point of view, any bodily sensation, whether it be from the skin, from the heart, or from the kidneys, is *external* in a metaphorical sense.

For students of natural science, brought up in the nineteenth century, this confusion is very difficult to avoid. The ruling opinion of that time looked upon the physical body as the whole of a human being. A human being, it was thought, consisted entirely of things that could be perceived in three-dimensional space. The simple fact, now beginning to be dimly realised by men of science, that psychical facts are non-spatial, and therefore cannot be expressed otherwise than by *metaphor*, was utterly disregarded.

For instance, Maury, for long the great authority on dreams, speaks repeatedly of "impressions *internes*, *intercérébrales*," as continuing during dream-life, while the *outer* impressions, that is, the *peripheral*, are benumbed.

Now dreams are purely psychical phenomena. They have, of course, connections and associations with the physical body. Yet their most characteristic feature is that they are non-spatial, that is to say, *inner* in a metaphorical sense. Havelock Ellis agrees that even the visceral sensations are not perceived as such, but are transformed into symbols, *i.e.* into purely psychical phenomena.

According to my experience, not only the *peripheral* but also the *internal* sensations, in so far as they are spatial, are inhibited in dream-life. Not only are the senses of hearing, smelling, seeing, tasting, touching, etc., cut off from the mind of the sleeper, but also the more vague and ill-defined bodily sensations,—muscle-sensations, visceral sensations, sensations of bodily well-being or of pain or discomfort.

In a word, the physical body, though it continues to live and to act in certain ways, does not convey its sensations directly to the mind in complete sleep and dream. All immediate connection between the mind, with its non-spatial facts, and the body, with its facts that can be expressed in spatial terms, stops during sleep and dream.

I would even go so far as to draw the line at this point between dream and waking life. So long as a bodily sensation, be it internal or peripheral, is perceived, there is not yet complete sleep or dream, and any abnormal perception that occurs must be called a waking hallucination. When sleep and dream set in, all direct bodily *rapport* is cut off. This is its essential and characteristic feature.

Let me now give you an attempt at classification of the different forms of dreams, which I myself personally experienced and observed during a period of sixteen years. I have been able to distinguish nine different kinds of dreams, each of which presents a well-defined type. There are of course intermediate forms and combinations, but the separate types can still be recognised in their intermingling.

In this scheme I wish to draw attention to the type indicated by the letter (H), which I call *initial dreams*. This kind of dream is very rare; I know of only half-a-dozen instances occurring to myself, and have found no clear indication of them in other authors. Yet it is very characteristic and easily distinguishable. It occurs only in the very beginning of sleep, when the body is in a normal healthy condition, but very tired. Then the transition from waking to sleep takes place with hardly a moment of what is generally called unconsciousness, but what I would prefer to call discontinuity of memory. It is *not* what Maury calls a hypnagogic hallucination, which phenomenon I know well from my own experience, but which I do not consider to belong to the world of dreams. In hypnagogic hallucinations we have visions, but we have full bodily perception. In the initial dream type (H), I see and feel as in any other dream. I have a nearly complete recollection of day-life, I know that I am asleep and where I am sleeping, but all perceptions of the physical body, inner and outer, visceral or peripheral, are entirely absent. Usually I have the sensation of floating or flying, and I observe with

CLASSIFICATION OF

		GENERAL CHARACTER.	TIME OF OCCURRENCE.	CONDITION OF BODY.
A.	Ordinary dreams.	Indifferent or varying.	Probably all the time of sleep.	Normal.
B.	Very vivid dreams.	Unpleasant.	Any time of sleep.	Nervously disturbed.
C.	Symbolic or mocking dreams.	Unpleasant, demoniacal, mostly erotic or obscene.	Idem.	Sometimes disturbed.
D.	General dream-sensations.	Indifferent or varying, not unpleasant.	Middle of night, deep sleep.	Slightly nervously disturbed.
E.	Lucid dreams.	Highly pleasant, generally floating or flying.	Always between 5 and 8 a.m.	Excellent.
F.	Demon-dreams.	Not unpleasant, though demoniacal.	Generally after or before E.	Good.
G.	Wrong waking up (phantasm).	Demoniacal.	Near waking up.	Good.
H.	Initial dreams.	Pleasant.	Immediately after going to sleep.	Very tired.
I.	Pathological dreams. (Fever, poison, indigestion.)	Generally unpleasant.	Any time of sleep.	Bad.

DREAMS.

RECOLLECTION OF DAY-LIFE IN DREAM.	RECOLLECTION OF DREAM AFTER WAKING UP.	FREQUENCY.	EFFECT.
Defective, generally wrong.	Generally faint.	Very frequent, probably in all sleep.	Indifferent.
Very defective, or entirely wrong.	Clear.	Rather rare.	Mostly unpleasant, sometimes premonitory.
Defective.	Not very clear.	Frequent.	Unpleasant, with feeling of shame.
Not clear.	Rather clear.	Rare.	Varying, premonitory.
Nearly complete.	Clear.	Rather frequent.	Very beneficial, sometimes premonitory.
Not quite complete.	Clear.	Rather frequent.	Beneficial, refreshing.
Fairly complete.	Very clear.	Rare.	Indifferent.
Fairly complete.	Clear.	Very rare.	Indifferent.
Entirely wrong.	Confused.	In abnormal condition, nearly always.	Indifferent or unpleasant.

perfect clearness that the feeling of fatigue, the discomfort of bodily overstrain, has vanished. I feel fresh and vigorous; I can move and float in all directions; yet I know that my body is at the same time dead tired and fast asleep.

One experience of this remarkable form of dream seems to me sufficient for the careful observer to undo all current theories. I know quite well, by my own experience, that certain bodily conditions and sensory sensations have influence on dreams. I can give instances of dreams in which sounds from the waking world, the ticking of a clock, the noise of wind, or my own difficult breathing, or snoring, have penetrated into the dream-world and caused some dream-fancy. In one dream, when near waking up, I found myself sitting in company with others, and I heard the sound of snoring. I looked round at the other people, asking, "Who is it that snores?" and then, on waking up, I found that I myself was the only culprit.

But I consider that cases in which the sounds or impressions of day-life—bodily sensations—penetrate into the dream-life, are *exceptional*, whereas nearly all scientific observers of dreams up to the present day start from the supposition that these bodily sensations account for all dreams. And I think you will agree that the direction in which the observer is looking must make a great difference in the outcome of any investigation.

Most students of dream-life begin with the supposition that dreams are more or less abnormal phenomena caused by some abnormal condition of the body, and their experiments are mostly directed towards trying to provoke dreams by artificial bodily conditions.

As the outcome of careful observations, I maintain my conviction that the bodily conditions of the sleeper have, as a rule, no influence on the character of dreams, with the exception of a few rare and abnormal cases, near the moment of waking up, or in those dreams which I have classified as *pathological*, under letter (I), in which fever, indigestion, or some poison, plays a rôle, and which form a small minority. For myself as the observer, I may state that I have been in good health all the time of observation. I had no important complaints of any nervous or visceral kind. My sleep and digestion both

are usually good. Yet I have had the most terrible nightmares, while my body was as fresh and healthy as usual, and I have had delicious peaceful dreams on board ship in a heavy storm, or in a sleeping-car on the railway.

In April, 1906, I was suffering from violent tooth-ache. I was in Italy and did not wish to go to a foreign dentist. I succeeded, however, in falling asleep, and entered at once on a dream of type (F), which I call *demon-dreams*. I had a perfect recollection of my waking life; I knew that I was sleeping and that my tooth was still aching. *Yet I did not feel it.* I realised that I was in the demoniacal sphere, which I recognise by the weird uncanny effect produced by apparently harmless objects, which are seen very sharply and vividly. I could shut my eyes, as it seemed to me, and when I opened them again, the same objects—a tea-pot, a clothes-brush, a triangle, and so on—were still there, and still uncanny and threatening. Then came what I shall have to call *demon-personalities*, who do not seem human, and yet seem to act and speak like independent beings. Usually I am able to drive them away by a voluntary act, *e.g.* by shouting and threatening. But this time I felt powerless, and I debated in my dream whether the tooth-ache could be the cause of this weakness. Then I asked one of the demons what was the reason of my unusual weakness. He answered: “Probably the heat,” and at this answer I considered whether I had left the radiator of the hotel-room open. But soon I understood that the answer was a senseless mockery, irony or stupidity. And I slept the whole night without feeling any pain. Next morning the pain was felt again and I had the tooth extracted.

Now it must be clear that the theory which explains the fancies of dreams by an attempt of the mind to reconstruct a false reality in order to account for subconscious sensations, will never do in such cases. For my mind was perfectly aware of the state of things; it knew about the tooth-ache, it knew that I was sleeping in a hotel-room with a radiator. Yet I felt no bodily sensation at all, not even such a penetrating one as a violent tooth-ache.

I wish, therefore, to define the true dream as *that state wherein bodily sensations, be they visceral, internal or peripheral,*

cannot penetrate to the mind directly, but only in the psychical, non-spatial form of a symbol or an image.

I purposely avoid as much as possible the words "consciousness" and "unconsciousness." They may be convenient in colloquial language, but I am not able to attach any clear meaning to them. I have no idea what "unconsciousness," as a substantive, may stand for. And I found that I could do with the words memory and recollection and the word personality or person, in the primitive sense of *persona* (a mask, *i.e.* the mask worn by players). I do not think it accurate to call the body of a sleeper or a narcotised man unconscious. During my career as a psycho-therapist, having by suggestion produced sleep in many people, I learnt that the human body may act like a self-conscious person, without any participation of the recollecting mind. We know nowadays that a splitting-up of human personality is possible, not only into two, but into three or more. During my sittings with Mrs. Thompson¹ we observed that after a trance, in which Mrs. Thompson had been speaking as "Nelly," or as some other control, she herself remembered dreams, which had nothing whatever to do with the things of which she had been speaking to us. Her being could then be said to have been divided into three entities,—the body in trance, apparently asleep; the "control," who spoke through her mouth; and Mrs. Thompson, who was dreaming in quite different spheres. All these persons or personalities were of course "conscious" in some way, as everything is probably conscious. The question is, where do the threads of recollection run that enable us to identify the persons.

I know that Mr. Havelock Ellis and many other authors will not accept my definition, because they deny the possibility of complete recollection and free volition in a dream. They would say that what I call a dream is no dream, but a sort of trance, or hallucination, or ecstasy. The observations of the Marquis d'Hervé, which were very much like mine, as related in his book, *Les Rêves et les moyens de les diriger*, were discarded in the same way. These dreams could not be dreams, said Maury.

Now this is simply a question of nomenclature. I can only

¹ See *Proceedings*, Vol. XVII., pp. 75-115.

say that I made my observations during normal deep and healthy sleep, and that in 352 cases I had a full recollection of my day-life, and could act voluntarily, though I was so fast asleep that no bodily sensations penetrated into my perception. If anybody refuses to call that state of mind a dream, he may suggest some other name. For my part, it was just this form of dream, which I call "lucid dreams" (see E in the table), which aroused my keenest interest and which I noted down most carefully.

I quite agree with Mr. Havelock Ellis, that during sleep the psychical functions enter into a condition of *dissociation*. My contention, however, is that it is not dissociation, but, on the contrary, *reintegration*, after the dissociation of sleep, that is the essential feature of dreams. *The dream is a more or less complete reintegration of the psyche, a reintegration in a different sphere, in a psychical, non-spatial mode of existence. This reintegration may go so far as to effect full recollection of day-life, reflection, and voluntary action on reflection.*

I will now make a short survey of the nine modes of dreaming, as indicated in my Table, giving an instance of each of them, and will then give further details of the more important and interesting types.

Type (A) is the usual well-known type to which the large majority of dreams conform; probably it is the only kind that occurs to many people. It is not particularly pleasant or unpleasant, though it may vary according to its contents. It may occur in any moment of sleep, in daytime or in the night, and it does not need any bodily disturbance to produce it. Most people, however healthy, dream; and if they say they do not, it must be uncertain whether there is really an absence of dreams or only a lack of remembrance of them. The same doubt may be applied to the view that there is a perfectly dreamless sleep. According to my view the attempts of the *psyche* at reintegration begin almost immediately after sleep has set in and continue during the whole time of sleeping. When aroused by an alarm-clock at different hours of the night, unexpectedly, I was always able to remember some fragments of a dream. I admit, however, that this is no absolute proof, because it is possible that the dream was inserted, so to speak, into the space of time between the bodily sensation caused by

the alarm, and the transmission of this sensation to the dreaming mind. This space of time may be rather considerable. It may be compared to the space of time required by an "absent-minded" person before he realises the import of a question put to him; it may be not only seconds but even minutes before he hears the question psychically, though he heard it bodily quite distinctly, and remembers it in full. This space of time is still longer at the moment of awakening, and in my opinion accounts very easily for the often reported and apparently miraculous phenomenon of a sleeper being awakened by a sound that fits in exactly with the end of a long dream. The classic instance of this is Maury's dream, in which a piece of the bed-cornice fell on his neck when he was dreaming that he was lying on a scaffold-block to be beheaded. Most likely the bodily shock came first; the sleeper's mind was then called, but could not be reached directly; the bodily sensation had first to be translated, so to speak, psychically, into the form of a story, finishing with his waking up.

These dreams of type (A) show dissociation, with very imperfect reintegration, and, as several authors have pointed out, they have in many respects a close likeness to insanity. The true conditions of day-life are not remembered; false remembrance—paramnesia—is very common in them; they are absurd and confused, and leave very faint traces after waking up.

Type (B) differs from (A) principally in its vividness and the strong impression it makes, which lasts sometimes for hours and days after waking up, with a painfully clear remembrance of every detail. These dreams are generally considered to be the effect of some abnormal bodily condition. Yet I think they must undoubtedly be distinguished from the pathological dreams. I have had them during perfectly normal bodily conditions. I do not mean to say, however, that some nervous disturbance, some psychical unrest, or some unknown influence from the waking world, may not have been present. It may have been, but it escaped my observation in most cases. Dreams of type (B) are generally extremely absurd, or untrue, though explicit and well remembered. The mind is entirely dissociated, and reintegration is very defective. A fine instance of this sort of dream is described by Dostojefski in *Crime and Punishment*, when Raskolnikoff sleeps before he commits the murder.

Curiously enough I had a dream of the same type the night after reading that book. In that dream I had committed a murder myself—a dream-feeling well known to dream-students. I thought it remarkable because the psychological cause of it was clear in this case and my bodily condition was entirely normal.

As a rule I find dreams of this kind unpleasant, because of their absurdity, their insane character, and the strong lasting impression they make. Happily they are rare, at least with me. Sometimes they leave a strong conviction that they “mean something,” that they have a premonitory, a prophetic character, and when we read of instances of prophetic dreams we find generally that they belong to the type (B). In my case I often found that they really could “mean” nothing; sometimes, however, I was not so certain. It depends in what direction we are looking for causes. One night, when I was on a lecturing tour, I was the guest of a family in a provincial town, and slept in what I supposed to be the guest-room. I had a night full of the most horrid dreams, one long confused nightmare, with a strong sentiment that it “meant something.” Yet I felt in perfect health, cheerful and comfortable. I could not refrain from saying next morning at the breakfast table what an unpleasant night I had had. Then the family told me I had slept in the room of a daughter who was now in a sanatorium with a severe nervous disease, and who used to call that room her “den of torture.”

Another dream of the most awful description occurred to me in Berlin in 1906. In a dark night, dead tired and forlorn, I was plodding through an endless black, stinking marsh; being old, poor, miserable, full of remorse, all night long. Yet I was in perfect health, and even in a hopeful and cheerful state of mind. The impression was so strong that I packed my trunk next morning and escaped from my hosts without explanation. I could not help thinking that the room must be haunted by the remembrance of some dreadful crime. I could never verify this suspicion. A month later I received tidings of my only brother in the East Indies—that he died that very night in very painful circumstances. Whether there was any connection between this and my dream I will not decide.

It will be remarked that such vivid dreams are sometimes of a very pleasant character, filling whole days with

an indescribable joy. This is true, but, according to my experience, my vividly pleasant dreams are now always of another and higher type. As a child I had these delicious dreams of the type (B). Now they have changed their character altogether and are of type (E).

In type (C), the symbolic or mocking dreams, the characteristic element is one which I call *demoniacal*. I am afraid this word will arouse some murmurs of disapproval, or at least some smiles or sneers. Yet I think I can successfully defend the use of the term. I will readily concede at once that the real existence of beings whom we may call "demons" is problematic. But the real existence of the interstellar aether is also problematic, and yet men of science find the conception very useful and convenient.

I hope to satisfy even the most sceptical of my audience by defining the expression "demoniacal" thus:

I call demoniacal those phenomena which produce on us the impression of being invented or arranged by intelligent beings of a very low moral order.

To me it seems that the great majority of dreams reported by Freud and his adherents, and used for the building up of his elaborate theory, belong to type (C).

It may indeed be called a bold deed to introduce the *symbolism* of dreams into the scientific world. This is Freud's great achievement.

But now let us consider what the word "symbol" implies. A symbol is an image or an imaginary event, standing for a real object or event whereto it has some distant resemblance. Now the invention of a symbol can only be an act of *thought*,—the work of some intelligence. Symbols cannot invent themselves; they must be thought out. And the question arises: who performs this intelligent act; who thinks out the symbol? The answer given by the Freud school is: the subconscious. But here we have one of those words which come in "wo die Begriffe fehlen." To me the word "subconscious," indicating a thinking entity, is just as mysterious, just as unscientific, just as "occult" as the word "demon." In my view it is accurate to say only that in our dreams we see images and experience events, for which our own mind,—our "person" as we remember it,—cannot be held responsible, and which must

therefore come from some unknown source. About the general character of these sources, however, we may form some judgment and I feel justified in calling them in the dreams of type (C) "demoniacal,"—that is of a low moral order.

It is in class (C) also, that the erotic element, or rather the obscene element, plays such an important part. And it is no wonder that some adherents of Freud's school, studying only this kind of dream, come to the conclusion that all dreams have a sexual origin.

Mocking dreams can be very amusing, as many instances in dream-literature show. The day before my fiftieth anniversary I was made the victim of a funny dream-joke. There was to be a pageant in my honour, and the town was all full of flags. When the pageant came, it consisted first of a cow, then a horse, then a gentleman on foot, who fired blank shots from a revolver, then a carriage with four gentlemen, and, to wind up with, an old, rickety, wobbling automobile that advanced very slowly.¹

Type (D), which I call general dream-sensations, is very remarkable but not easy to describe. It is not an ordinary dream; there is no vision, no image, no event, not even a word or a name. But during a long time of deep sleep, the mind is continually occupied with one person, one place, one remarkable event, or even one abstract thought. At least that is the recollection on waking up. One night I was constantly occupied by the personality of an American gentleman, in whom I am not particularly interested. I did not see him, nor hear his name, but on waking up I felt as if he had been there the whole night. In another instance it was a rather deep thought, occupying me in the deepest sleep, with a clear recollection of it after waking up. The question was: Why can a period of our life be felt as very sad, and yet be sweet and beautiful in remembrance? And the answer was: Because a human being knows only a very small part of what he is. Question and answer never left me; yet my sleep was very deep and unbroken. These dream-sensations are not unpleasant and not absurd, so long as the body is in good health.

They often have an elevating or consoling effect. In patho-

¹ Professor Freud will see here a fine instance of a subconscious wish, expressed by inversion.

logical dreams, however, type (I), they may be extremely strange and harassing. The sleeper may have a feeling as if he were a square or a circle, or other sensations of an utterly indescribable character.

Class (E), the type of dreams which I called "lucid dreams," seems to me the most interesting and worthy of the most careful observation and study. Of this type I experienced and wrote down 352 cases in the period between January 20, 1898, and December 26, 1912.

In these dreams the reintegration of the psychic functions is so complete that the sleeper remembers day-life and his own condition, reaches a state of perfect awareness, and is able to direct his attention, and to attempt different acts of free volition. Yet the sleep, as I am able confidently to state, is undisturbed, deep and refreshing. I obtained my first glimpse of this lucidity during sleep in June, 1897, in the following way. I dreamt that I was floating through a landscape with bare trees, knowing that it was April, and I remarked that the perspective of the branches and twigs changed quite naturally. Then I made the reflection, during sleep, that my fancy would never be able to invent or to make an image as intricate as the perspective movement of little twigs seen in floating by.

Many years later, in 1907, I found a passage in a work by Prof. Ernst Mach, *Analyse der Empfindungen*, p. 164, in which the same observation is made with a little difference. Like me, Mach came to the conclusion that he was dreaming, but it was because he saw the movement of the twigs to be *defective*, while I had wondered at the naturalness which my fancy could never invent. Professor Mach has not pursued his observations in this direction, probably because he did not believe in their importance. I made up my mind to look out carefully for another opportunity. I prepared myself for careful observation, hoping to prolong and to intensify the lucidity.

In January, 1898, I was able to repeat the observation. In the night of January 19-20, I dreamt that I was lying in the garden before the windows of my study, and saw the eyes of my dog through the glass pane. I was lying on my chest and observing the dog very keenly. At the same time,

however, I knew with perfect certainty that I was dreaming and lying on my back in my bed. And then I resolved to wake up slowly and carefully and observe how my sensation of lying on my chest would change into the sensation of lying on my back. And so I did, slowly and deliberately, and the transition—which I have since undergone many times—is most wonderful. It is like the feeling of slipping from one body into another, and there is distinctly a *double* recollection of the two bodies. I remembered what I felt in my dream, lying on my chest; but returning into the day-life, I remembered also that my physical body had been quietly lying on its back all the while. This observation of a double memory I have had many times since. It is so indubitable that it leads almost unavoidably to the conception of a *dream-body*.

Mr. Havelock Ellis says with something of a sneer that some people “who dabble in the occult” speak of an astral body. Yet if he had had only one of these experiences, he would feel that we can escape neither the dabbling nor the dream-body. In a lucid dream the sensation of having a body,—having eyes, hands, a mouth that speaks, and so on,—is perfectly distinct; yet I know at the same time that the physical body is sleeping and has quite a different position. In waking up the two sensations blend together, so to speak, and I remember as clearly the action of the dream-body as the restfulness of the physical body.

In February, 1899, I had a lucid dream, in which I made the following experiment. I drew with my finger, moistened by saliva, a wet cross on the palm of my left hand, with the intention of seeing whether it would be still there after waking up. Then I *dreamt* that I woke up and felt the wet cross on my left hand by applying the palm to my cheek. And then a long time afterwards I woke up *really* and knew at once that the hand of my physical body had been lying in a closed position undisturbed on my chest all the while.

The sensation of the *voice* during a lucid dream is most marvellous, and after many repetitions still a source of amazement. I use my voice as loudly as I can, and though I know quite well that my physical body is lying in profound sleep, I can hardly believe that this loud voice is inaudible in the waking world. Yet, though I have sung, shouted, and

spoken loudly in hundreds of dreams, my wife has never heard my voice, and in several cases was able to assure me that I had slept quite peacefully.

I cannot in this paper give even a short and superficial account of the many interesting details of these dreams. I must reserve that for my larger work. And I fear that only a repeated personal acquaintance with the facts can convince one of their significance. I will relate a few more instances in order to give some idea of their character.

On Sept. 9, 1904, I dreamt that I stood at a table before a window. On the table were different objects. I was perfectly well aware that I was dreaming and I considered what sorts of experiments I could make. I began by trying to break glass, by beating it with a stone. I put a small tablet of glass on two stones and struck it with another stone. Yet it would not break. Then I took a fine claret-glass from the table and struck it with my fist, with all my might, at the same time reflecting how dangerous it would be to do this in waking life; yet the glass remained whole. But lo! when I looked at it again after some time, it was broken.¹

It broke all right, but a little too late, like an actor who misses his cue. This gave me a very curious impression of being in a *fake-world*, cleverly imitated, but with small failures. I took the broken glass and threw it out of the window, in order to observe whether I could hear the *tinkling*. I heard the noise all right and I even saw two dogs run away from it quite naturally. I thought what a good imitation this comedy-world was. Then I saw a decanter with claret and tasted it, and noted with perfect clearness of mind: "Well, we can also have voluntary impressions of taste in this dream-world; this has quite the taste of wine."

There is a saying by the German poet, Novalis, that when we dream that we dream, we are near waking up. This view, shared as it is by the majority of observers, I must decidedly reject. Lucid dreams occur in deep sleep and do not as a rule end in waking up, unless I wish it and do it by an act of volition. I prefer, however, in most cases to continue dreaming as long as possible, and then the lucidity vanishes

¹This corresponds with Mach's observation about the perspective of the twigs.

and gives place to other forms of dream, and—what seems remarkable—the form that follows is often the “demon-dream,” type (F) of which I will speak presently.

Then it often happens that I dream that I wake up and tell my lucid dream to some other person. This latter is then a dream of the common form (A). From this dream I wake up in the real waking world, very much amazed at the curious wanderings of my mind. The impression is as if I had been rising through spheres of different depths, of which the lucid dream was the deepest.

I may state that without exception all my lucid dreams occurred in the hours between five and eight in the morning. The particular significance of these hours for our dreams has often been brought forward,—among others by Dante, *Purg.* IX., where he speaks of the hour when the swallows begin to warble and our mind is least clogged by the material body.

Lucid dreams are also symbolic,—yet in quite a different way. I never remarked anything sexual or erotic in them. Their symbolism takes the form of beautiful landscapes,—different luminous phenomena, sunlight, clouds, and especially a deep blue sky. In a perfect instance of the lucid dream I float through immensely wide landscapes, with a clear blue, sunny sky, and a feeling of deep bliss and gratitude, which I feel impelled to express by eloquent words of thankfulness and piety. Sometimes these words seem to me a little rhetorical, but I cannot help it, as it is very difficult in dreams to control emotional impulses. Sometimes I conceive of what appears as a symbol, warning, consoling, approving. A cloud gathers or the light brightens. Only once could I see the disc of the sun.

Flying or floating may be observed in all forms of dreams, except perhaps class (D); yet it is generally an indication that lucid dreams are coming.

When I have been flying in my dreams for two or three nights, then I know that a lucid dream is at hand. And the lucid dream itself is often initiated and accompanied all the time by the sensation of flying. Sometimes I feel myself floating swiftly through wide spaces; once I flew backwards, and once, dreaming that I was inside a cathedral, I flew upwards, with the immense building and all in it, at great

speed. I cannot believe that the rhythm of our breath has anything to do with this sensation, as Havelock Ellis supposes, because it is generally continuous and very swift.

Difficult, spasmodic floating belongs to dreaming of a lower class, and this may depend on morbid conditions of the body; but it may also be symbolic of some moral difficulty or distress.

On Christmas-day, 1911, I had the following dream. It began with flying and floating. I felt wonderfully light and strong. I saw immense and beautiful prospects,—first a town, then country-landscapes, fantastic and brightly coloured. Then I saw my brother sitting—the same who died in 1906—and I went up to him saying: “Now we are dreaming, both of us.” He answered: “No, I am not!” And then I remembered that he was dead. We had a long conversation about the conditions of existence after death, and I inquired especially after the aware-ness, the clear, bright insight. But that he could not answer; he seemed to lack it.

Then the lucid dream was interrupted by a common dream of type (A) in which I saw a lady standing on a bridge, who told me she had heard me talk in my sleep. And I supposed that my voice had been audible during the lucid dream.

Then a second period of lucidity followed in which I saw Prof. van't Hoff, the famous Dutch chemist, whom I had known as a student, standing in a sort of college-room, surrounded by a number of learned people. I went up to him, knowing very well that he was dead, and continued my inquiry about our condition after death. It was a long, quiet conversation, in which I was perfectly aware of the situation.

I asked first why we, lacking our organs of sense, could arrive at any certainty that the person to whom we were talking was really that person and not a subjective illusion. Then van't Hoff said: “Just as in common life; by a general impression.”

“Yet,” I said, “in common life there is stability of observation and there is consolidation by repeated observation.”

“Here also,” said van't Hoff, “And the sensation of *certainty* is the same.” Then I had indeed a very strong feeling of certitude that it was really van't Hoff with whom I talked and no subjective illusion. Then I began to inquire again about the clearness, the lucidity, the stability of this life

of shades, and then I got the same hesitating, dubious, unsatisfactory answer as from my brother. The whole atmosphere of the dream was happy, bright, elevated, and the persons around van't Hoff seemed sympathetic, though I did not know them.

"It will be some time probably before I join you," I said. But I took myself then for younger than I was.

After that I had several common dreams of type (A), and I awoke quite refreshed, knowing my voice had not been audible in the waking world.

In May, 1903, I dreamed that I was in a little provincial Dutch town and at once encountered my brother-in-law, who had died some time before. I was absolutely sure that it was he, and I knew that he was dead. He told me that he had much intercourse with my "controller," as he expressed it,—my guiding spirit. I was glad, and our conversation was very cordial, more intimate than ever in common life. He told me that a financial catastrophe was impending for me. Somebody was going to rob me of a sum of 10,000 guilders. I said that I understood him, though after waking up I was utterly puzzled by it and could make nothing of it. My brother-in-law said that my guiding spirit had told it to him. I told the story to somebody else in my dream. Then I asked my brother-in-law to tell me more of the after-life, and just as he was going to answer me I woke up,—as if somebody cut off the communication. I was not then as much used to prolonging my dreams as I am now.

I wish to point out that this was the *only* prediction I ever received in a lucid dream in such an impressive way. And it came only too true, with this difference, that the sum I lost was twenty times greater. At the time of the dream there seemed not to be the slightest probability of such a catastrophe. I was not even in possession of the money I lost afterwards. Yet it was just the time when the first events took place—the railway strikes of 1903—that led up to my financial ruin.

Perhaps some of my audience will remember that I mentioned in a paper read to the S.P.R. on April 19, 1901, my dream experiment with "Nelly," the control of Mrs. Thompson.¹ Being able to act voluntarily in my dreams, I had made up

my mind to call people while dreaming. And I had succeeded sometimes in seeing my call answered and a figure appear, corresponding to the person whom I had called. I had arranged with Mr. Piddington that he should independently of me make notes during his sittings with Mrs. Thompson, and inform me of it when my name was mentioned. In January, 1900, my call was twice answered, as I learnt by a letter from London, telling me that the "control" had heard it. And once when I called "Elsie" instead of "Nelly," as I thought by mistake,—the name "Elsie" being without meaning for me, this mistake was heard and explained by Nelly. Later experiments with Mrs. Thompson had no success. The next year, however, I came into contact, through the introduction of W. T. Stead, with a very interesting medium, who, though quite ignorant of psychical matters, had suddenly obtained communications through automatic script from a son who had died not long before as a boy of ten years, and whom she had loved passionately.

This boy, whose name was Gordon, I called several times in my dreams, and I saw him and described him to his mother, and I was able to explain to her several particulars which puzzled her very much. For instance, he told her that he took part in her own suppers; which did not at all correspond to her idea of the after-life. To me he appeared on a bicycle, and when his mother asked him about that he answered: "Oh yes, I have got a byke now." To me, knowing how the mind may experience all sorts of subjective sensations and illusions, this was not so improbable as to her.

Of course I was constantly seeking for what psychical researchers call "evidence," objective evidence. Therefore I asked the boy in my dream on August 13, 1901, for a password. He complied with my wish and pronounced a word that I understood as "Sin-ga-poor." I supposed he meant the Asiatic town. His mother, however, got the explanation of the word through automatic writing, a little later, though I cannot tell exactly at what date, but certainly *after* she was informed of my dream. The boy told his mother that he had said to me, "Pick-a-boo," which was the word used by him and his friends when they were hiding. This word and

¹See *Proceedings*, Vol. XVII., pp. 112-115.

its use were utterly unknown to me, and I think the correspondence of the two words is remarkable. Yet I admit that we want more evidence, and several other experiments, *e.g.* with Frederic Myers and with W. T. Stead, were not successful.

Mr. Stead himself once gave me a little ring, telling me to call the owner of it, whose name he gave me. I did so in dream and saw the person and got a message which I wrote to Stead. As I never received any answer I suppose it was a failure.¹

I have called and seen several deceased persons in lucid dreams. I called and saw Myers very shortly after his death, but it was not convincing and the atmosphere was a little dismal. He seemed disappointed and sad. In July, 1908, I called and saw him again, very distinctly and certainly this time. I asked him to tell Piddington that he had seen me. He tried to give me a pass-word, but he could not, as if he were too weak. I have successfully called my father and different deceased friends and relations. William Stead I have so far called in vain. Twice I saw, without having called for him, a deceased man, for whom hitherto I had had very little sympathy: King Leopold of Belgium. He seemed to take great interest in me and my work, which seems to me still very improbable.

I hope it will be clearly understood that I do not at all presume to pronounce with any certainty as to the genuine character of these apparitions. I myself felt certainty in my dream; yet I cannot expect others to accept it on my word, and doubt comes to myself often enough.

This sensation of certainty that it is the real person is indescribable and of course not communicable. Once I saw the face of my father, exactly as I had known him, and yet I knew it was a deceit by a demon. I had not for one moment the feeling that it was the real person. He asked me: "Am I not exactly like myself?" and I had to confess that the likeness was perfect; yet I denied positively that it was my father. This was a demon-dream of type (F).

In two cases, when I was calling a deceased friend in vain, I saw the apparition of a *postman* coming,—a letter-carrier,

¹ Recent information seems to show that it was *not* a failure. I hope to give more particulars of this case later.

who walked round me. As this occurred twice in different years, it might have some symbolic meaning, though I cannot make out what.

Now, whether these apparitions are genuine or not, I think I am scientifically justified in making experiments *as if* they were so, accepting it for the moment as a working hypothesis. Only hundreds of observations will bring an approach to certainty.

Just as there was deceit in the apparition of my father, so there may be deceit in the lucid dream itself. In March, 1912, I had a very complicated dream, in which I dreamt that Theodore Roosevelt was dead, then that I woke up and told the dream, saying: "I was not sure in my dream whether he was really dead or still alive; now I know that he is really dead; but I was so struck by the news that I lost my memory." And then came a *false lucidity* in which I said: "Now I know that I dream and where I am." But this was all wrong; I had no idea of my real condition, and only slowly, after waking up, I realised that it was all nonsense.

This sort of mockery I call demoniacal. And there is a connection, which I observed so frequently that it must have some significance,—namely, that a lucid dream is immediately followed by a demon-dream, of type (F).

I hope you allow me, if only for convenience' sake, to speak as if these intelligences of a low moral order exist. Let me call it also a working hypothesis. Then I wish to point out to you the difference between the symbolic or mocking dreams, of type (C), and the demon-dreams of type (F).

In type (C) the sleeper is teased or puzzled or harassed by various more or less weird, uncanny, obscene, lugubrious or diabolical inventions. He has to walk in slaughter-houses or among corpses; he finds everything besmeared with blood or excrement; he is drawn into obscene, erotic or horrible scenes, in which he even takes an active part. His moral condition is utterly depraved; he is a murderer, an adulterer, etc.; in a word, nothing is too low or too horrible for such dreams.

After waking up the effect is, of course, unpleasant; he

is more or less ashamed and shocked; he tries to shake off the memory as soon as possible.

Now in type (F)—the demon-dreams—which are always very near, before or after, the lucid dreams, type (E)—I undergo similar attacks; but I *see* the forms, the figures, the personalities of strange non-human beings, who are doing it. One night, for instance, I saw such a being, going before me and soiling everything he touched, such as door-handles and chairs. These beings are always obscene and lascivious, and try to draw me into their acts and doings. They have no sex and appear alternately as a man, or a woman. Their aspect is very various and variable, changing every moment, taking all the fantastic forms that the old painters of the Middle Ages tried to reproduce, but with a certain weird plasticity and variability, that no painting can express.

I will describe one instance of these dreams (March 30, 1907, in Berlin), following immediately after a lucid dream. The lucidity had not been very intense, and I had some doubts about my real condition. Then all at once I was in the middle of demons. Never before had I seen them so distinct, so impertinent, so aggressive. One was slippery, shining, limp and cold, like a living corpse. Another changed its face repeatedly and made the most incredible grimaces. One flew underneath me shouting an obscenity with a curious slang-word. I defended myself energetically, but principally with invectives, which I felt to be a weakness. I saw the words written.

The circle of demons was close to me and grinning like a mob of brutal street-boys. I was not afraid, however, and said: "Even if you conquer me, if God wills it I do not fear." Then they all cried together like a rabble, and one said: "Let God then speak first!" Then I thundered with all my might: "*He* HAS spoken long since!" And then I pointed at one of them, saying: "You I know for a long time!" and then pointing to another: "And you!"

Then I awoke at once, and I believe I made some audible sound in waking up in the middle of my apostrophe.

And then—this will astonish you most—after this dispute I felt thoroughly refreshed, cheered up and entirely serene and calm.

This is the principal difference from type (C), that in

type (F), when I see the demons and fight them, the effect is thoroughly pleasing, refreshing and uplifting.

I may take it for granted that the majority of psychologists, reading the description of such a vivid dream, would feel absolutely sure that there was something the matter with my body,—some indigestion, some oppression or the like. As a matter of fact my physical health was perfect, my doubts were only moral, and the effect of this nightmare, which had none of the real anguish of a nightmare, was pleasant, beneficial and refreshing.

This is the principal point in these demon-dreams,—that, whether these beings have a real existence or whether they are only creations of my fancy, to see them and to fight them takes away all their terror, all the uneasiness, the weirdness, of their tricks and pranks.

I have not yet spoken about type (G), which I call “wrong waking up,” occurring always near awakening. Of this sort of dream I found an excellent instance described by Mach, in his *Analyse der Empfindungen*, p. 130. He calls it “Phantasma.” We have the sensation of waking up in our ordinary sleeping-room and then we begin to realise that there is something uncanny around us; we see inexplicable movements or hear strange noises, and then we know that we are still asleep. In my first experience of this dream I was rather afraid and wanted nervously to wake up really. I think this is the case with most people who have it. They become frightened and nervous, and at last wake up with palpitations, a sweating brow and so on.

To me now these wrong-waking-up-dreams have lost their terror. I consider them as demon-pranks, and they amuse me; they do not tell on my nerves any more.

In July, 1906, sleeping at Langen Schwalbaeh, a deep sleep after a laborious day, I had two or three dreams of the type (G). I seemed to wake up and heard a big luggage-box being *blown* along the landing, with a tremendous bumping. Then I realised that I had awakened in the demon-sphere. The second time I saw that my sleeping-room had three windows, though I knew there were only two. Wishing to make sure, I woke up for a moment voluntarily and realised that my room had two windows and that stillness had reigned in the house all night.

After that I had a succession of lucid dreams, very beautiful. At the end of them, while I was still singing loudly, I was suddenly surrounded by many demons, who joined in my singing, like a mob of vicious semi-savage creatures. Then I felt that I was losing my self-control. I began to act more and more extravagantly, to throw my bedclothes and my pillows about, and so on. I drew myself up and saw one demon who had a less vicious look than the others and he looked as if he were saying "You are going wrong." "Yes," I said, "but what shall I do?" Then he said, "Give them the whip, on their naked backs." And I thought of Dante's shades, who also feared the whip. I at once made—created—a whip of leathern strings, with leaden balls at the end. And I threatened them with it and also struck at them a few times. Then suddenly all grew perfectly quiet around me, and I saw the creatures sneaking away with hypocritical faces, as if they knew nothing about it at all.

I had many more adventures that night, lucid and common dreams, and I awoke fresh and cheerful, better in spirits than I had been for a long time.

This wrong-waking-up, type (G), is not to be confused with the dreams related on p. 449, in which I dreamt that I woke after a lucid dream and told that dream to some listener. Those dreams were of the common sort (A). There was nothing uncanny about them. Dreams of Class (G) are undoubtedly demoniacal, uncanny, and very vivid and bright, with a sort of ominous sharpness and clearness, a strong diabolical light. Moreover the mind of the sleeper is aware that it is a dream, and a bad one, and he struggles to wake up. As I said just now, however, the terror ends as soon as the demons are *seen*,—as soon as the sleeper realises that he must be the dupe of intelligences of a low moral order. I am prepared to hear myself accused of superstition, of reviving the dark errors of the Middle Ages. Well, I only try to tell the facts as clearly as possible and I cannot do it without using these terms and ideas. If anybody will replace them by others, I am open to any suggestion. Only I would maintain that it is not *my* mind that is responsible for all the horrors and errors of dream-life. To say that *nobody* is responsible for them will not do, for there is absolute evidence in them of

some thought and intention, however depraved and low. A trick, a deceit, a symbol, cannot be without some sort of thought and intention. To put it all down to "unconsciousness" is very convenient; but then I say that it is just as scientific to use the names Beelzebub, or Belial. I, for one, do not believe in "unconsciousness" any more than in Santa Claus.

Finally, I must say a few words about class (I), what I call pathological dreams. I know that psychologists of a certain class will call all dreams more or less pathological, and those that I have described most emphatically so. And I should not wonder, knowing some of their ways of argumentation, if they were to bring forward those very dreams as evidence that my health is by no means so good as I maintain it to be.

I can only say that I believe, on the contrary, that this dream-life has saved me from loss of nervous or mental equilibrium in periods of terrible strain. Those who know what I have gone through often wonder that I did not become a neurasthenic. I ascribe my freshness after severe labour and difficulties to a great extent to the relaxing and refreshing effect of these lucid dreams. As to true pathological dreams under the influence of fever, indigestion, morphia, or other drugs, I have very little experience. I remember, however, quite well that they show a strongly demoniacal character. They may be similar to several other forms described in my Table, except type (E). But all of them are more confused, weird, vivid and vicious.

The remark may be made that in introducing intelligent beings of a low order to explain these phenomena, an element of arbitrariness is brought in, which excludes the possibility of finding a scientific order. It is, for instance, convenient to ascribe all the phenomena of insanity and of pathological dreams to demons, who make use of the weakness of the body to play their tricks. This is, in fact, the opinion of no less a man than Alfred Russel Wallace, as he freely confessed to me in a personal conversation.

I do not think, however, that even this idea, taken as a working hypothesis, will prevent us from trying to find a scientific order even in these apparently demoniacal tricks; the fact, for instance, that certain drugs bring about halluci-

nations of a well-defined kind; that cocaine produces delicious expectations and pleasant dreams, and alcohol causes visions of small white animals. This suggests that there must be some order behind it, which is not purely arbitrary.

We are here, however, on the borders of a realm of mystery where we have to advance very carefully. To deny may be just as dangerous and misleading as to accept.

I should like to close this all too brief and imperfect sketch with a few reflections—a few philosophical remarks.

When we see certain objects, say the blue sky, we have learned to explain this phenomenon by an infinitely complicated process. To bring about this simple fact, the perception of a blue sky, we require not less than trillions of vibrations of the most subtle kind, coming from the sun, and striking an instrument so wonderfully elaborate and fine as our retinas and the optic nerves.

And now, during sleep, the same phenomenon is repeated,—exactly repeated. When I see the blue sky in a lucid dream, I see it as clearly, as brightly, as consciously as I now see this paper. Pray, what is the difference? Are these trillions of vibrations and the wonderful machinery of the retinas not wanted? How is this second image then created?

Psychologists speak of “hallucinations,” of “*cliché-souvenirs*,” of “imaginary objects,” and so on. But these are all empty words. We have two phenomena exactly alike. For one we accept causes endlessly subtle, elaborate and complicated. For the other we simply use a word: “Hallucination.” The retina is not functioning, the light does not penetrate to it; yet the phenomenon is repeated in a perfectly complete manner. Who performs this miracle? It seems to me a mockery of our physical science. After years of painful study the laws of light and colour, and the mechanics of the nervous system were discovered to account for the phenomenon: the sight of a blue sky. And yet there it is again without aether-vibrations, without ocular action; there it is, perfect, vivid, clear, well-observed. Unstable, you will say, and vanishing. But so are all phenomena. Only the *order* of changing is different; the momentary fact is the same. I will not here attempt to deduce any conclusion from this; I simply wish to point out what so many men of science seem to forget. We

hear Freud's triumphant assertion that *all* dream-life is now explained. Maeh says: "Die Sonderbarkeiten des Traums lassen sich *alle* darauf zurückführen, dass manche Empfindungen und Vorstellungen gar nicht, andere zu schwer und zu spät ins Bewusstsein treten."

You hear it;—*all* mystery is now explained by these few empty words. Did you ever see such things as "sensations" or "representations" "walking into consciousness" as if they were tourists and "consciousness" a hotel? These are all words, words, words,—bare verbiage; no concrete reality can be attached to such an explanation. It is against this scientific arrogance that I utter a warning. No theory has as yet explained *all* about dreams; no! not even more than the tiniest part. We have not yet crossed the threshold of that world, which for us is still "occult."

And yet we desire to know. We are thinking beings; we are proud of doing nothing without forethought. We wish to look before us. And what is the only absolute certainty before us? Bodily death; complete material destruction. And if I had to believe that this meant destruction of my mind; if to-morrow should mean annihilation of myself,—that is, everything of which I have knowledge;—well, what would to-morrow be for me? Why should I, as a reasonable being, toil and work and suffer any longer? It would be absurd, a foolishness!

The twentieth century has begun with many an enlightenment, "aufklärung" in all directions. Men of science have been severely reminded that they had been creating illusions instead of following truth; that they had been indulging in verbiage and rhetoric, where they were pretending to build up eternal systems.

The ideas of a clever thinker like Bergson are not so very wonderful in themselves; but the way he expresses them and the fact that he is gaining wide authority is remarkable and wonderful. He reminded psychologists that memory could not be matter, and that the brain could not be a store-house of "cliché-souvenirs." Psychologists could not contradict this; they know the fact now; but do they grasp its significance?

If memory is not brain, then brain can be destroyed without destroying memory. If psychical facts and not material facts are

the primary facts, then the psyche is more persistent than matter. And if matter is indestructible, then mind and memory are still more so. That is to say, *my* memory and *yours*,—not somebody else's memory. *I, myself*, must persist. But how?

I have a rational certainty of immortality; I know that I, my own self, my memory, is indestructible; but the tremendous question is, what am I to expect? How will it be?

No existing religion can give a satisfactory answer, no philosophy even. For I know, as a psychologist, that there is no religion that has not been the dupe of illusions, and no philosophy that has not been the dupe of language, and of want of signifi-
cant insight.

We want facts, certitude, investigation along lines of experience, of real concrete things. No premature theories, no verbal structures, no amount of scholarly learning without deep insight will satisfy us.

And once more it must be repeated that facts are not the less concrete and real because they are purely psychical facts, and cannot yet be made to fit into any existing orderly system.

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BY PROFESSOR HENRI BERGSON.

MESDAMES, MESSIEURS,

Laissez-moi d'abord vous dire combien je vous suis reconnaissant du grand honneur que vous m'avez fait en m'appelant à la présidence de votre Société. Cet honneur, j'ai conscience de n'avoir rien fait pour le mériter. Je ne connais que par des lectures les phénomènes dont la Société s'occupe ; je n'ai rien vu, rien observé moi-même. Comment alors avez-vous pu venir me prendre, pour me faire succéder aux grands savants, aux penseurs éminents qui ont occupé tour à tour le fauteuil présidentiel et dont la plupart étaient, en même temps que des hommes auxquels leur science et leur talent avaient valu une notoriété universelle, des esprits particulièrement préoccupés de l'étude de ces phénomènes mystérieux ? Si j'osais plaisanter sur un pareil sujet, je dirais qu'il y a eu ici un effet de télépathie ou de clairvoyance, que vous avez senti de loin l'intérêt que je prenais à vos recherches, et que vous m'avez aperçu, à travers les quatre cents kilomètres qui nous séparaient, lisant attentivement vos comptes-rendus, suivant vos travaux avec une ardente curiosité. Ce que vous avez dépensé d'ingéniosité, de pénétration, de patience, de ténacité, à l'exploration de la *terra incognita* des phénomènes psychiques me paraît en effet admirable. Mais, plus encore que cette ingéniosité et plus que cette pénétration, plus que l'inlassable persévérance avec laquelle vous avez poursuivi votre route, j'admire le courage qu'il vous a fallu pendant les premières années surtout,

pour lutter contre les préventions d'une bonne partie du monde savant et pour braver la raillerie, qui fait peur aux plus intrépides. C'est pourquoi je suis fier — plus fier que je ne saurais le dire — d'avoir été élu président de la Société de recherche psychique. J'ai lu quelque part l'histoire d'un officier subalterne que les hasards de la bataille, la disparition de ses chefs tués ou blessés, avaient appelé à l'honneur de commander le régiment : toute sa vie il y pensa, toute sa vie il en parla, et du souvenir de ces quelques heures son existence entière restait imprégnée. Je suis cet officier subalterne, et toujours je me féliciterai de la chance inattendue qui m'aura mis — non pas pour quelques heures, mais pour quelques mois — à la tête d'un régiment de braves.

D'où viennent les préventions qu'on a eues pendant longtemps, et que quelques-uns conservent encore, à l'égard des études psychiques ? Comment expliquer que des savants, qui trouvent tout naturel qu'on poursuive sous leur direction des travaux de laboratoire en apparence insignifiants, qui pensent, non sans raison, qu'il n'y a rien d'insignifiant pour la science, témoignent une telle répugnance pour des recherches comme les vôtres, hésitent même à y voir des recherches scientifiques ? C'est le point dont je voudrais dire un mot d'abord. Loin de moi la pensée de critiquer leur critique pour le plaisir de faire de la critique à mon tour. J'estime que le temps consacré à la réfutation, en philosophie, est généralement du temps perdu. De tant d'attaques dirigées par tant de penseurs les uns contre les autres, que reste-t-il ? rien, ou peu de chose. Ce qui compte et ce qui demeure, c'est ce qu'on a apporté de vérité positive : l'affirmation vraie se substitue d'elle-même à l'idée fautive et se trouve être, sans qu'on ait pris la peine de réfuter personne, la meilleure des réfutations. Mais il s'agit de bien autre chose ici que de réfuter ou de critiquer. Je voudrais montrer que derrière les préventions des uns, les railleries des autres, il y a, invisible et présente, une certaine métaphysique inconsciente d'elle-même, — inconsciente et par conséquent inconsistante, inconsciente et par conséquent incapable de se remodeler sans cesse, comme doit le faire une philosophie digne de ce nom, sur l'observation et l'expérience, — que d'ailleurs cette métaphysique est naturelle, qu'elle tient à un pli contracté depuis longtemps par l'esprit humain, et que dès lors nous avons tout

intérêt à aller la chercher derrière les critiques ou les railleries qui la cachent, afin de nous mettre en garde contre elle : nous éviterons ainsi qu'elle agisse sur nous à notre tour et qu'elle dresse sur notre route des obstacles artificiels. Mais, avant d'aborder cette question, qui concerne l'objet même de vos études, je voudrais dire un mot de la méthode que vous suivez, méthode dont je comprends très bien qu'elle déroute un certain nombre de savants.

Rien n'est plus désagréable au savant de profession que de voir appliquer à une science de même ordre que la sienne une méthode réservée d'ordinaire à des objets tout différents. Il tient à ses procédés comme l'ouvrier à ses outils : c'est William James, je crois, qui a défini la différence entre le professionnel et l'amateur en disant que celui-ci s'intéresse surtout au résultat obtenu, et celui-là à la manière dont on l'obtient. Or, les phénomènes dont vous vous occupez sont incontestablement du même genre que ceux qui font l'objet de la science naturelle, tandis que la méthode que vous suivez, et que vous êtes obligés de suivre, n'a souvent aucun rapport avec celle des sciences de la nature.

Je dis que ce sont des faits *du même genre*. J'entends par là qu'ils manifestent sûrement des lois, et qu'ils sont susceptibles, eux aussi, de se répéter indéfiniment dans le temps et dans l'espace. Ce ne sont pas des faits comme ceux dont s'occupe l'historien, par exemple. L'histoire, elle, ne se recommence pas ; la bataille d'Austerlitz s'est livrée une fois, et ne se livrera jamais plus. Les mêmes conditions historiques ne pouvant se reproduire, le même fait historique ne saurait se répéter ; et comme une loi exprime nécessairement qu'à certaines causes, toujours les mêmes, correspondra un effet toujours le même aussi, l'histoire proprement dite ne porte pas sur des lois, mais sur des faits particuliers et sur les circonstances, non moins particulières, où ils se sont accomplis. L'unique question, ici, est de savoir si l'événement a bien eu lieu à tel moment déterminé du temps, en tel point déterminé de l'espace, et comment il s'est produit. Au contraire, une hallucination véridique, — l'apparition, par exemple, d'un homme qui meurt à un parent ou à un ami qui peut être séparé de lui par des centaines de kilomètres, — est un fait qui, s'il est réel, est sans doute la manifestation d'une loi analogue

aux lois physiques, chimiques, biologiques. Je suppose, un instant, que ce phénomène soit dû à une influence exercée, à travers l'espace, par la conscience de l'une des deux personnes sur la conscience de l'autre ; je suppose, en d'autres termes, que deux consciences humaines puissent communiquer ensemble sans intermédiaire visible et qu'il y ait, comme vous dites, "télépathie." Si la télépathie est un fait réel, c'est un fait susceptible de se répéter indéfiniment. Je vais plus loin : si la télépathie est un fait réel, il est fort possible qu'elle opère à chaque instant et chez tout le monde, mais avec trop peu d'intensité pour se faire remarquer, ou en présence d'obstacles qui neutralisent l'effet au moment même où il va se manifester. Nous produisons de l'électricité à tout moment, l'atmosphère est constamment électrisée, nous circulons parmi des courants magnétiques ; et pourtant des millions d'hommes ont vécu pendant des milliers d'années sans soupçonner l'existence de l'électricité. Il pourrait en être de même de la télépathie. Mais peu importe. Un point est en tous cas incontestable, c'est que, si la télépathie est réelle, elle est naturelle, et que, le jour où nous en connaîtrions les conditions, il ne nous serait pas plus nécessaire, pour obtenir un effet télépathique, d'attendre une hallucination vraie, que nous n'avons besoin aujourd'hui, quand nous voulons voir l'étincelle électrique, d'attendre que le ciel veuille bien nous en donner le spectacle pendant une scène d'orage.

Voilà donc un phénomène qui semblerait, en raison de sa nature, devoir être étudié à la manière du fait physique, chimique, ou biologique. Mais pas du tout : vous êtes obligés de l'aborder avec une méthode toute différente, qui tient le milieu entre celle de l'historien et celle du juge d'instruction. L'hallucination véridique remonte-t-elle au passé ? vous étudiez les documents, vous les critiquez, vous écrivez une page d'histoire. Le fait est-il d'hier ? vous procédez à une espèce d'enquête judiciaire ; vous vous mettez en rapport avec les témoins, vous les confrontez entre eux et vous contrôlez la valeur de leur témoignage. Pour ma part, quand je repasse dans ma mémoire les résultats de l'admirable enquête poursuivie continuellement par vous pendant plus de trente ans, quand je pense à toutes les précautions que vous avez prises pour éviter l'erreur, quand je vois comment, dans la

plupart des cas que vous avez retenus, le récit de l'hallucination avait été fait à une ou plusieurs personnes, souvent même noté par écrit, avant que l'hallucination eût été reconnue véridique, quand je tiens compte du nombre énorme des faits et surtout de leur ressemblance entre eux, de leur air de famille, de la concordance de tant de témoignages indépendants les uns des autres, tous examinés, contrôlés, soumis à la critique, — je suis porté à croire à la télépathie de même que je crois, par exemple, à la défaite de l'Invincible Armada. Ce n'est pas la certitude mathématique que me donne la démonstration du théorème de Pythagore ; ce n'est pas la certitude physique où je suis de la vérité de la loi de la chute des corps ; c'est du moins toute la certitude qu'on obtient en matière historique ou judiciaire.

Mais voilà justement ce qui déconcerte un assez grand nombre d'esprits. Ils trouvent étrange qu'on ait à traiter historiquement ou judiciairement des faits qui, s'ils sont réels, obéissent sûrement à des lois et devraient alors, semble-t-il, se prêter aux méthodes d'observation et d'expérimentation usitées dans les sciences de la nature. Dressez le fait à se produire dans un laboratoire, on l'accueillera volontiers ; jusque-là, on le tiendra pour suspect. De ce que la "recherche psychique" ne peut pas, pour le moment, procéder comme la physique et la chimie, on conclut qu'elle n'est pas scientifique ; et comme le "fait psychique" n'a pas encore pris cette forme simple et *abstraite* qui ouvre à un fait l'accès du laboratoire, volontiers on le déclarerait irréel. Tel est, je crois, le raisonnement "subconscient" d'un certain nombre de savants.

Je retrouve le même sentiment, le même dédain du *concret*, au fond des objections qu'on élève contre telle ou telle de vos conclusions. Je n'en citerai qu'un exemple. Il y a quelque temps, dans une réunion mondaine à laquelle j'assistais, la conversation tomba sur les phénomènes dont votre Société s'occupe, et plus particulièrement sur les faits de télépathie. Un de nos grands médecins était là, qui est aussi un de nos grands savants. Après avoir écouté attentivement pendant quelques minutes, il prit la parole, et s'exprima à peu près en ces termes : "Tout ce que vous dites là m'intéresse beaucoup, mais je vous demande de réfléchir avant de tirer une conclusion. Je connais, moi aussi, un fait extraordinaire.

Et ce fait, j'en garantis l'authenticité, car il m'a été raconté par une dame fort intelligente, dont la parole m'inspire une confiance absolue. Le mari de cette dame était officier. Il fut tué au cours d'un engagement. Or, au moment même où le mari tombait, la femme eut la vision de la scène, vision précise, de tous points conforme à la réalité. Vous conclurez peut-être de là, comme cette dame, qu'il y avait eu clairvoyance ou télépathie ? . . . Vous n'oublierez qu'une chose : c'est qu'il est arrivé bien des fois qu'une femme rêvât que son mari était mort ou mourant, alors qu'il se portait fort bien. On remarque les cas où la vision tombe juste, on ne tient pas compte des autres. Si l'on faisait le relevé, on verrait que la coïncidence est l'œuvre du simple hasard."

La conversation dévia dans je ne sais plus quelle direction ; il ne pouvait d'ailleurs être question d'entamer une discussion sérieuse ; ce n'était ni le lieu ni le moment. Mais, en sortant de table, une très jeune fille, qui avait bien écouté, vint me dire : " Il me semble que le docteur X . . . raisonnait mal tout-à-l'heure. Je ne vois pas où est le vice de son raisonnement ; mais il doit y avoir un vice." Eh oui, il y avait un vice ! C'est la petite jeune fille qui avait raison, et c'est le grand savant qui avait tort. Il fermait les yeux à ce que le phénomène avait de *concret*. Il raisonnait ainsi : " Quand on rêve qu'un parent est mort ou mourant, ou c'est vrai ou c'est faux, ou la personne meurt effectivement ou elle ne meurt pas. Et par conséquent, si le rêve tombe juste, il faudrait, pour être sûr qu'il n'y a pas là un effet du hasard, avoir comparé le nombre des cas où l'on s'est trouvé dans le vrai au nombre des cas où l'on a été dans le faux." Il ne voyait pas que la force apparente de son argumentation tenait à ce qu'il avait remplacé la description de la scène concrète et vivante, — de l'officier tombant à un moment déterminé, en un lieu déterminé, avec tels ou tels soldats autour de lui, — par cette formule abstraite et morte : " La dame, en rêvant, était dans le vrai, et non pas dans le faux." Ah, si nous acceptons cette transposition dans l'abstrait, il faudra en effet que nous comparions *in abstracto* le nombre des cas vrais au nombre des cas faux ; et nous trouverons peut-être qu'il y en a plus de faux que de vrais, et notre docteur aura eu raison. Mais cette abstraction consiste à négliger ce qu'il y a d'essentiel —

le *tableau* aperçu par la dame, et qui se trouve être identique à une scène très éloignée d'elle. Concevez-vous qu'un peintre, dessinant sur sa toile un coin de bataille, et se fiant pour cela à sa fantaisie, puisse être si bien servi par le hasard qu'il se trouve avoir fait le portrait de soldats réels, réellement présents ce jour-là à une bataille où ils prenaient les attitudes que le peintre leur prête? Evidemment non. La supputation des probabilités, à laquelle on fait appel ici, nous montrerait que c'est impossible, parce qu'une scène où des personnes déterminées prennent des attitudes déterminées est chose unique en son genre, parce qu'un visage humain, même isolé, est déjà unique en son genre, et que par conséquent chaque personnage — à plus forte raison la scène qui les réunit — est décomposable en une infinité de détails indépendants les uns des autres: de sorte qu'il faudrait un nombre de coïncidences infini pour que le hasard fût de la scène de fantaisie la reproduction exacte d'une scène réelle: en d'autres termes, il est mathématiquement impossible qu'un tableau sorti de l'imagination du peintre dessine exactement un coin de bataille tel qu'il est. Or, la dame qui avait la vision d'un coin de bataille était dans la situation de ce peintre; son imagination exécutait un tableau. Si le tableau était la reproduction d'une scène réelle, il fallait, de toute nécessité, qu'elle fût en communication avec cette scène ou avec une conscience qui en avait la perception. Je n'ai que faire de la comparaison du nombre des "cas vrais" à celui des "cas faux"; la statistique n'a rien à voir ici; le cas unique qu'on me présente me suffit, du moment que je le retiens avec ce qu'il a de concret. C'est pourquoi, si c'eût été le moment de discuter avec le docteur, je lui aurais dit: "Je ne sais si le récit qu'on vous a fait était fidèle; j'ignore si la dame dont vous parlez a eu la vision exacte de la scène qui se déroulait loin d'elle; mais si ce point m'était démontré, si je pouvais seulement être sûr que la physionomie d'un soldat inconnu d'elle, présent à la scène, lui est apparue telle qu'elle était en réalité, — eh bien alors, quand même il me serait prouvé qu'il y a eu des milliers de visions fausses et quand même il n'y aurait jamais eu d'autre hallucination véridique que celle-ci, je tiendrais pour rigoureusement et définitivement établie l'existence de la télépathie ou d'une cause, quelle qu'elle soit, pouvant nous faire percevoir des objets et

des événements situés hors de la portée normale de nos sens.”

Mais en voilà assez sur ce point. J'arrive à la cause profonde qui a retardé jusqu'ici le progrès de la “recherche psychique” en dirigeant exclusivement d'un autre côté l'activité des savants.

J'ai entendu des personnes intéressées à vos travaux s'étonner que la science moderne ait si longtemps négligé les faits dont vous vous occupez, alors qu'elle devrait, en vertu de son caractère expérimental, s'intéresser à des recherches qui pourraient susciter plus tard une foule d'expériences nouvelles. Mais il faudrait s'entendre sur ce qu'on appelle le caractère expérimental de la science moderne. Que la science moderne ait créé la méthode expérimentale, c'est certain; mais cela ne veut pas dire qu'elle ait élargi le champ d'expériences qui existait avant elle. Bien au contraire, elle l'a souvent rétréci; et c'est là, d'ailleurs, ce qui a fait sa force. Quand nous lisons les écrits des anciens, nous sommes frappés de voir combien ils avaient observé et même expérimenté. Mais ils observaient au hasard, dans n'importe quelle direction. En quoi consista la création de la “méthode expérimentale”? Simplement à prendre des procédés d'observation et d'expérimentation qui existaient déjà, et, plutôt que de les appliquer dans toutes les directions possibles, à les faire converger sur un seul point, la *mesure*, — la mesure de telle ou telle grandeur variable dont on soupçonnait qu'elle pouvait être fonction de telles ou telles autres grandeurs variables, également à mesurer. La “loi,” au sens moderne du mot, est justement l'expression d'une relation constante entre des grandeurs qui varient. La science moderne est donc fille des mathématiques; elle est née le jour où l'algèbre eut acquis assez de force et de souplesse pour pouvoir enlacer la réalité, la prendre dans le filet de ses calculs. D'abord parurent l'astronomie et la mécanique, sous la forme essentiellement mathématique que les modernes leur ont donnée. Puis se développa la physique, — une physique également mathématique. La physique suscita la chimie, elle aussi fondée sur des mesures, sur des comparaisons de poids et de volumes. Après la chimie vint la biologie, qui, sans doute, n'a pas encore pris la forme mathématique et n'est pas près de la prendre, mais qui n'en cherche pas moins, par l'intermédiaire de la physiologie, à ramener les lois de la vie à celles de la chimie et de la physique, c'est-à-dire, indirectement,

de la mécanique. De sorte qu'en définitive notre science tend toujours à la forme mathématique comme à un idéal : elle vise essentiellement à mesurer, et là où le calcul n'est pas encore applicable, là où elle doit se borner à une description ou à une analyse de son objet, elle s'arrange pour n'envisager de cet objet que le côté capable de devenir un jour accessible à la mesure.

Or, il est de l'essence des choses de l'esprit de ne pas se prêter à la mesure. Le premier mouvement de la science moderne devait donc être de chercher si l'on ne pourrait pas substituer aux phénomènes de l'esprit des phénomènes qui en fussent les équivalents et qui seraient, eux, mesurables. De fait, nous voyons que la conscience est liée, d'une manière ou d'une autre, à un cerveau. On s'empara donc du cerveau, on s'attacha au fait cérébral, — dont on ne connaît certes pas la nature, mais dont on sait qu'il doit pouvoir se résoudre finalement en mouvements de molécules et d'atomes, c'est-à-dire en faits relevant de la mécanique, — et l'on euvint de considérer le cérébral comme l'équivalent du mental. Toute notre science de l'esprit, toute notre métaphysique, depuis le XVII^e siècle jusqu'à nos jours, est pénétrée de l'idée de cette équivalence. On parle indifféremment de la pensée ou du cerveau, soit qu'on fasse du mental un simple "épiphénomène" du cérébral, comme le veut le matérialisme, soit qu'on mette le mental et le cérébral sur la même ligne en les considérant comme deux traductions, en langues différentes, du même original. Bref, l'hypothèse d'un *parallélisme* rigoureux entre le cérébral et le mental paraît éminemment scientifique. D'instinct, la philosophie et la science tendent à écarter ce qui contredirait cette hypothèse ou ce qui serait mal compatible avec elle. Et tel paraît être, à première vue, le cas des faits qui relèvent de la "recherche psychique," — ou tout au moins le cas de bon nombre d'entre eux.

Eh bien, le moment est venu de considérer de près cette hypothèse, et de voir ce qu'elle vaut. Je n'insisterai pas sur les difficultés, sur les absurdités théoriques qu'elle soulève. J'ai montré ailleurs que, prise à la lettre, elle est contradictoire avec elle-même. J'ajoute que, *prima facie*, il est contraire à toute vraisemblance que la nature se donne le luxe de répéter purement et simplement en langage de conscience ce

que l'écorce cérébrale accomplit sous forme de mouvement atomique ou moléculaire. Une conscience qui ne serait qu'un duplicatum, qui n'interviendrait pas activement, aurait sans doute disparu depuis longtemps de l'univers, à supposer qu'elle se fût jamais produite : ne voyons-nous pas que nos actions tendent à devenir inconscientes au fur et à mesure que l'habitude les rend machinales ? Mais je ne veux pas insister sur ces considérations théoriques. Ce que je prétends, c'est que les faits, consultés sans parti pris, ne confirment ni même ne suggèrent l'hypothèse du parallélisme.

Pour une seule fonction de la pensée, en effet, l'expérience a pu faire croire qu'elle était localisée en un certain point du cerveau : je veux parler de la mémoire, et plus particulièrement de la mémoire des mots. Ni pour le jugement, ni pour le raisonnement, ni pour aucune autre faculté de la pensée proprement dite nous n'avons la moindre raison de supposer qu'elle soit attachée à tels ou tels processus cérébraux déterminés. Au contraire, les maladies de la mémoire des mots — ou, comme on dit, les aphasies — correspondent à des lésions déterminées de certaines circonvolutions cérébrales : de sorte qu'on a pu considérer la mémoire comme localisée dans le cerveau, et les souvenirs visuels, auditifs, moteurs des mots comme déposés à l'intérieur de l'écorce, — véritables clichés photographiques qui conserveraient d'anciennes impressions lumineuses, véritables disques phonographiques qui enregistreraient des vibrations sonores. En somme, si l'on examine de près tous les faits allégués en faveur d'une exacte correspondance et d'une espèce *d'adhérence* de la vie mentale à la vie cérébrale (je laisse de côté, cela va sans dire, les sensations et les mouvements, car le cerveau est certainement un organe sensori-moteur), on voit que ces faits se réduisent aux phénomènes de mémoire, et que c'est la localisation des aphasies, et cette localisation seule, qui semble apporter à la doctrine paralléliste un commencement de preuve expérimentale.

Or, une étude plus approfondie des diverses aphasies montrerait précisément, à mon avis, l'impossibilité de considérer les souvenirs comme des clichés ou des phonogrammes déposés dans le cerveau, l'impossibilité d'admettre que ce soit réellement dans le cerveau que les souvenirs se conservent. Je ne puis entrer ici dans les détails de la critique que j'ai faite

autrefois de l'interprétation courante des aphasies, critique qui a pu paraître paradoxale à l'époque où une certaine conception de l'aphasie était acceptée comme un dogme, mais à laquelle l'anatomie pathologique elle-même est venue, dans ces dernières années, apporter son concours (je fais allusion aux travaux du professeur Pierre Marie et de ses élèves). Je me bornerai donc à vous rappeler mes conclusions. Ce qui me paraît se dégager de l'étude attentive des faits, c'est que les lésions cérébrales caractéristiques des diverses aphasies n'atteignent pas les souvenirs eux-mêmes, et que par conséquent il n'y a pas, emmagasinés en tels ou tels points de l'écorce cérébrale, des souvenirs que la maladie détruirait. Ces lésions rendent, en réalité, impossible ou difficile *l'évocation* des souvenirs; elles portent sur le mécanisme du rappel, et sur ce mécanisme seulement. Plus précisément, le rôle du cerveau est ici de faire que l'esprit, quand il a besoin de tel ou tel souvenir, puisse obtenir du corps une certaine attitude ou certains mouvements naissants, qui présentent au souvenir cherché un cadre approprié. Si le cadre est là, le souvenir viendra, de lui-même, s'y insérer. L'organe cérébral prépare le cadre, il ne fournit pas le souvenir. Voilà, à mon sens, ce que montre une étude attentive des maladies de la mémoire des mots, et ce que fait d'ailleurs pressentir l'analyse psychologique de la mémoire en général.

Mais, si nous examinons maintenant les autres fonctions de la pensée, l'hypothèse que les faits nous suggèrent le plus naturellement n'est pas du tout celle d'un parallélisme rigoureux entre la vie mentale et la vie cérébrale. Bien au contraire, dans le travail de la pensée en général, comme dans l'opération de la mémoire, le cerveau nous apparaît comme chargé d'imprimer au corps les mouvements et les attitudes qui *jouent* ce que l'esprit *pense* ou ce que les circonstances l'invitent à penser. C'est ce que j'ai exprimé ailleurs en disant que le cerveau est un "organe de pantomime." Et c'est pourquoi, comme je l'ai dit ailleurs aussi, "celui qui pourrait regarder à l'intérieur d'un cerveau en pleine activité, suivre le va-et-vient des atomes et interpréter tout ce qu'ils font, celui-là saurait sans doute quelque chose de ce qui se passe dans l'esprit, mais il n'en saurait que peu de chose. Il en connaîtrait tout juste ce qui est exprimable en gestes, attitudes et mouvements du corps, ce que l'état d'âme contient d'action en voie d'accom-

plissement, ou simplement naissante : le reste lui échapperait. Il serait, vis-à-vis des pensées et des sentiments qui se déroulent à l'intérieur de la conscience, dans la situation du spectateur qui voit distinctement tout ce que les acteurs font sur la scène, mais n'entend pas un mot ce qu'ils disent." Ou bien encore il serait dans l'état d'une personne qui ne connaîtrait, d'une symphonie, que les mouvements du bâton du chef d'orchestre qui la dirige. Les phénomènes cérébraux sont en effet à la vie mentale ce que les gestes du chef d'orchestre sont à la symphonie : ils en dessinent les articulations motrices, ils ne font pas autre chose. On ne trouverait donc rien des opérations de l'esprit proprement dit à l'intérieur du cerveau. Le cerveau, en dehors de ses fonctions sensorielles, n'a d'autre rôle que de mimer la vie mentale.

Je reconnais d'ailleurs que cette mimique est d'une importance capitale. C'est par elle que nous nous insérons dans la réalité, que nous nous y adaptons, que nous répondons aux sollicitations des circonstances par des actions appropriées. Si la conscience n'est pas une fonction du cerveau, du moins le cerveau maintient-il la conscience fixé sur le monde où nous vivons ; c'est l'organe de l'attention à la vie. Aussi une modification cérébrale même légère, une d'intoxication passagère par l'alcool ou l'opium par exemple, — à plus forte raison une intoxication durable comme celles qui causent sans doute le plus souvent l'aliénation, — peuvent-elles entraîner une perturbation complète de la vie mentale. Ce n'est pas que l'esprit soit atteint alors directement. Il ne faut pas croire, comme on le fait souvent, que le poison soit allé chercher dans l'écorce cérébrale tel ou tel mécanisme qui serait l'aspect matériel du raisonnement, qu'il ait dérangé ce mécanisme et que ce soit pour cela que le malade divague. Mais l'effet de la lésion est de fausser l'engrenage et de faire que la pensée ne s'insère plus exactement dans les choses. Un fou, atteint du délire de la persécution, pourra encore raisonner très logiquement : mais il raisonne à côté de la réalité, en dehors de la réalité, comme nous raisonnons en rêve. Orienter notre pensée vers l'action, l'amener à préparer l'acte que les circonstances réclament, voilà ce pour quoi notre cerveau est fait.

Mais par là il canalise, et par là aussi il limite, la vie de l'esprit. Il nous empêche de jeter les yeux à droite et à

gauche et même, autant que possible, en arrière; il veut que nous regardions droit devant nous, dans la direction où nous avons à marcher. N'est-ce pas déjà visible dans l'opération de la mémoire, dont nous parlions tout-à-l'heure? Bien des faits semblent indiquer que le passé se conserve jusque dans ses moindres détails et qu'il n'y a pas d'oubli réel. Vous vous rappelez ce qu'on raconte des noyés et des pendus qui, revenus à la vie, déclarent avoir eu, en quelques secondes, la vision panoramique de la totalité de leur vie passée. Je pourrais citer d'autres exemples, car l'asphyxie n'est pour rien dans le phénomène, quoi qu'on en ait dit. Un alpiniste glissant au fond d'un précipice, un soldat autour duquel s'abat tout à coup une grêle de balles, auront parfois la même vision. La vérité est que notre passé tout entier est là, continuellement, et que nous n'aurions qu'à nous retourner pour l'apercevoir; seulement, nous ne pouvons ni ne devons nous retourner. Nous ne le devons pas, parce que notre destination est de vivre, d'agir, et que la vie et l'action regardent en avant. Nous ne le pouvons pas, parce que le mécanisme cérébral a précisément pour rôle ici de nous masquer le passé, de n'en laisser transparaître, à chaque instant, que ce qui peut éclairer la situation présente et favoriser notre action: c'est même en obscurcissant la totalité de nos souvenirs — sauf celui qui nous intéresse et que notre corps esquisse déjà par sa mimique — qu'il *rappelle* ce souvenir utile. Maintenant, que l'attention à la vie vienne à faiblir un instant, — je ne parle pas de l'attention volontaire, de celle qui dépend de l'individu, mais d'une attention qui s'impose à l'homme normal et qu'on pourrait appeler "l'attention de l'espèce," — alors l'esprit, dont le regard était maintenu de force en avant, se détend et par là même se retourne en arrière; la totalité de son passé lui apparaît. La vision panoramique du passé est donc due à un brusque *désintéressement de la vie*, produit dans certains cas par la menace d'une mort subite. Et c'était à maintenir l'attention fixée sur la vie, à rétrécir utilement le champ de la vision mentale, qu'était occupé jusque-là le cerveau en tant qu'organe de mémoire.

Mais ce que je dis de la mémoire serait aussi vrai de la perception. Je ne puis entrer ici dans le détail d'une démonstration que j'ai faite autrefois: qu'il me suffise de

rappeler que tout devient obscur, et même incompréhensible, si l'on considère les centres cérébraux comme des organes capables de transformer en états conscients des ébranlements matériels, que tout s'éclaircit au contraire si l'on voit simplement dans ces centres (et dans les dispositifs sensoriels auxquels ils sont liés) des instruments de sélection chargés de choisir, dans le champ immense de nos perceptions virtuelles, celles qui devront s'actualiser. Leibniz disait que chaque monade, et par conséquent, *a fortiori*, chacune de ces monades qu'il appelle des esprits, porte en elle la représentation consciente ou inconsciente de la totalité des choses. Je n'irais pas aussi loin; mais j'estime que nous percevons virtuellement beaucoup plus de choses que nous n'en percevons actuellement, et qu'ici encore le rôle de notre corps est d'écarter du champ de notre conscience tout ce qui ne nous serait d'aucun intérêt pratique, tout ce qui ne se prête pas à notre action. Les organes des sens, les nerfs sensitifs, les centres cérébraux canalisent donc les influences du dehors, et marquent ainsi les diverses directions où notre propre influence pourra s'exercer. Mais, par là, ils rétrécissent le champ de notre vision du présent, de même que les mécanismes cérébraux de la mémoire limitent notre vision du passé. Or, de même que certains souvenirs inutiles, ou souvenirs "de rêve," arrivent à se glisser dans le champ de la conscience, profitant d'un moment d'inattention à la vie, ne pourrait-il pas y avoir, autour de notre perception normale, une frange de perceptions le plus souvent inconscientes, mais toutes prêtes à entrer dans la conscience, et s'y introduisant en effet dans certains cas exceptionnels ou chez certains sujets prédisposés? S'il y a des perceptions de ce genre, elles ne relèvent pas seulement de la psychologie proprement dite; elles sont de celles sur lesquelles la "recherche psychique" pourrait et devrait s'exercer.

N'oublions pas, d'ailleurs, que l'espace est ce qui crée les divisions nettes, les distinctions précises. Nos corps sont extérieurs les uns aux autres dans l'espace; et nos consciences, en tant qu'attachées à ces corps, sont extérieures les unes aux autres aussi. Mais si elles ne tiennent au corps que par une partie d'elles-mêmes, on peut conjecturer que, pour le reste, elles ne sont pas aussi nettement séparées. Loin de moi la pensée de considérer la personnalité comme une simple

apparence, ou comme une réalité éphémère, ou comme une dépendance de l'activité cérébrale ! Mais il est fort possible qu'entre les diverses personnalités s'accomplissent sans cesse des échanges comparables aux phénomènes d'endosmose. Si cette endosmose existe, on peut prévoir que la nature aura pris toutes ses précautions pour en neutraliser l'effet, et que certains mécanismes devront être spécialement chargés de rejeter dans l'inconscient les représentations ainsi provoquées, car elles seraient fort embarrassantes dans la vie de tous les jours. Telle ou telle de ces représentations pourrait cependant, ici encore, passer en contrebande, surtout quand les mécanismes inhibitifs fonctionnent mal ; et sur elles encore s'exercerait la "recherche psychique."

Plus nous nous accoutumerons à cette idée d'une conscience qui déborde l'organisme, plus nous trouverons naturelle et vraisemblable l'hypothèse de la survivance de l'âme au corps. Certes, si le mental était rigoureusement calqué sur le cérébral, s'il n'y avait rien de plus dans une conscience humaine que ce qu'il serait possible de lire dans son cerveau, nous pourrions admettre que la conscience suit les destinées du corps et meurt avec lui. Mais si les faits, étudiés sans parti pris, nous amènent au contraire à considérer la vie mentale comme beaucoup plus vaste que la vie cérébrale, le survivance devient si probable que l'obligation de la preuve incombera à celui qui la nie, bien plutôt qu'à celui qui l'affirme ; car, ainsi que je le disais ailleurs, "l'unique raison que nous puissions avoir de croire à une extinction de la conscience après la mort est que nous voyons le corps se désorganiser, et cette raison n'a plus de valeur si l'indépendance au moins partielle de la conscience à l'égard du corps est, elle aussi, un fait d'expérience."

Telles sont, brièvement résumées, les conclusions auxquelles me conduit un examen impartial des faits connus. C'est dire que je considère comme très vaste, et même comme indéfini, le champ ouvert à la recherche psychique. Cette nouvelle science aura vite fait de rattraper le temps perdu. Les mathématiques remontent à l'antiquité grecque ; la physique a déjà trois ou quatre cents ans d'existence ; la chimie date du XVIII^e siècle ; la biologie est presque aussi vieille ; mais la psychologie date d'hier, et la "recherche psychique" en est à peu près contemporaine. Faut-il regretter ce retard ?

Je me suis demandé quelquefois ce qui se serait passé si la science moderne, au lieu de partir des mathématiques pour s'orienter dans la direction de la mécanique, de l'astronomie, de la physique et de la chimie, au lieu de faire converger toutes ses forces sur l'étude de la matière, avait débuté par la considération de l'esprit, — si Kepler, Galilée, Newton, par exemple, avaient été des psychologues. Nous aurions certainement eu une psychologie dont nous ne pouvons nous faire aucune idée aujourd'hui, pas plus qu'on n'eût pu, avant Galilée, imaginer ce que serait notre physique : cette psychologie eût probablement été à notre psychologie actuelle ce que notre physique est à celle d'Aristote. Étrangère à toute idée mécanistique, ne concevant même pas la possibilité d'une parcellaire explication, la science eût recherché alors, au lieu de les écarter *a priori*, des faits comme ceux que vous étudiez : peut-être même la "recherche psychique" eût-elle figuré parmi ses principales préoccupations. Une fois découvertes les lois les plus générales de l'activité spirituelle (comme le furent, en fait, les lois fondamentales de la mécanique), on aurait passé de l'esprit proprement dit à la vie : la biologie se serait constituée, mais une biologie vitaliste, toute différente de la nôtre, qui serait allée chercher, derrière les formes sensibles des êtres vivants, la force intérieure, invisible, dont elles sont les manifestations. Sur cette force nous n'avons aucune prise aujourd'hui, justement parce que notre science de l'esprit est encore dans l'enfance ; et c'est pourquoi les savants n'ont pas tort quand ils reprochent au vitalisme d'être une doctrine stérile : il est stérile aujourd'hui, il ne le sera peut-être pas toujours, et il ne l'eût pas été, probablement, si la science moderne, à l'origine, avait pris les choses par un autre bout. En même temps que cette biologie vitaliste aurait surgi une médecine qui eût remédié *directement* aux insuffisances de la force vitale, qui eût visé la cause et non pas les effets, le centre au lieu de la périphérie : la thérapeutique par suggestion eût pu prendre des formes et des proportions dont il nous est impossible de nous faire la moindre idée. Ainsi se serait fondée, ainsi se serait développée la science de l'activité spirituelle. Mais lorsque, suivant de haut en bas les manifestations de l'esprit, traversant la vie et la matière vivante, elle fût arrivée, de degré en degré, à la matière inerte, la science se serait arrêtée brusquement, surprise

et désorientée. Elle aurait essayé d'appliquer à ce nouvel objet ses méthodes habituelles, et elle n'aurait eu aucune prise sur lui, pas plus que les procédés de calcul et de mesure n'ont de prise aujourd'hui sur les choses de l'esprit. C'est la matière, et non plus l'esprit, qui eût été le royaume du mystère. Je suppose alors que dans un pays inconnu,—en Amérique par exemple, mais dans une Amérique non encore découverte par l'Europe,—se fût développée une science identique à notre science actuelle, avec toutes ses applications mécaniques. Il aurait pu arriver de temps en temps à des pêcheurs, s'aventurant au large de côtes d'Irlande ou de Bretagne, d'apercevoir au loin, à l'horizon, un navire américain filant à toute vitesse contre le vent,—ce que nous appelons un bateau à vapeur. Ils seraient venus raconter ce qu'ils avaient vu. Les aurait-on crus? Probablement non. On se serait d'autant plus méfié d'eux qu'on eût été plus savant, plus pénétré d'une science qui, par ses tendances purement psychologiques, aurait été orientée en sens inverse de la physique et de la mécanique. Et il aurait fallu alors que se constituât une société comme la vôtre, — mais cette fois une Société de recherche *physique*, — laquelle eût fait comparaître devant elle les témoins, contrôlé et critiqué leurs récits, établi l'authenticité des "*apparitions*" de bateaux à vapeur. Toutefois, ne disposant pour le moment que de cette méthode historique ou critique, elle n'aurait pas pu vaincre le scepticisme de ceux qui l'auraient mise en demeure — puisqu'elle croyait à l'existence de ces bateaux miraculeux — d'en construire un et de le faire marcher.

Voilà ce que je m'amuse quelquefois à rêver. Mais quand je fais ce rêve, bien vite je l'interromps et je me dis: Non! il n'était ni possible ni désirable que l'esprit humain suivît cette marche. Cela n'était pas possible, parce que, à l'aube des temps modernes, la science mathématique existait déjà, et qu'il fallait nécessairement commencer par tirer d'elle tout ce qu'elle pouvait donner pour la connaissance du monde où nous vivons: on ne lâche pas le proie pour ce qui n'est peut-être qu'une ombre. Mais, à supposer que c'eût été possible, il n'était pas désirable, pour la science psychologique elle-même, que l'esprit humain s'appliquât d'abord à elle. Car, sans doute, si l'on eût dépensé de ce côté la somme de travail, de talent et de génie qui a été consacrée aux sciences de la matière, la connaissance de l'esprit

eût pu être poussée très loin ; mais quelque chose lui eût toujours manqué, qui est d'un prix inestimable et sans quoi tout le reste perd beaucoup de sa valeur : la précision, la rigueur, le souci de la preuve, l'habitude de distinguer entre ce qui est simplement possible ou probable et ce qui est certain. Ne croyez pas que ce soient là des qualités naturelles à l'intelligence. L'humanité s'est passée d'elles pendant fort longtemps ; et elles n'auraient peut-être jamais paru dans le monde s'il ne s'était rencontré jadis, en un coin de la Grèce, un petit peuple auquel l'à peu près ne suffisait pas, et qui inventa la précision. Les mathématiques — cette création du génie grec — furent-elles ici l'effet ou la cause ? je ne sais ; mais incontestablement c'est par les mathématiques que le besoin de la preuve s'est propagé d'intelligence à intelligence, prenant d'autant plus de place dans l'esprit humain que la science mathématique, par l'intermédiaire de la mécanique, embrassait un plus grand nombre de phénomènes de la matière. L'habitude d'apporter à l'étude de la réalité concrète les mêmes exigences de précision, de rigueur, de certitude, qui sont caractéristiques de l'esprit mathématique, est donc une habitude que nous devons aux sciences de la matière, et que nous n'aurions jamais eue sans elles. C'est pourquoi une science qui se fût appliquée tout de suite aux choses de l'esprit serait probablement restée incertaine et vague, si loin qu'elle se fût avancée : elle n'aurait peut-être jamais distingué entre ce qui est simplement plausible et ce qui doit être accepté définitivement. Mais aujourd'hui que, grâce aux sciences de la matière, nous savons faire cette distinction et possédons toutes les qualités d'esprit qu'elle implique, nous pouvons nous aventurer sans crainte dans le domaine à peine exploré des réalités psychologiques. Avançons-y avec une hardiesse prudente, débarrassons-nous de la mauvaise métaphysique qui gêne nos mouvements, et la science de l'esprit pourra donner des résultats qui dépasseront toutes nos espérances.

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