



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- tactical and strategic error." On the political aspects of the war, Trapnell feels that "a strictly military solution to the war in Indochina is not possible...It is doubtful if the ordinary people understand the issues at stake between the rebel and Associated States objectives." The solution in Indochina requires a strong French assault on the Viet Minh, training of National armies, a defensive alliance of Asian nations, and a guarantee of the Associated States borders. Trapnell recommends a U.S. training mission for Indochina, and concludes that victory in Indochina is international rather than local and essentially political as well as military. Major General Trapnell Debriefing, 3 May 1954..... 406
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115. The White House views the JCS position on intervention in Indochina as not involving any new policy issue relative to NSC 5405. However, a pencilled Secretary of Defense marginal note indicates that the White House "misses the point" -- the JCS was considering the "regional grouping" and others in the grouping, i.e., U.K. may object to NSC 5405 policy. Hence the JCS is warning "not to get involved in such a grouping" unless all parties accept direct action. White House Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 26 May 1954..... 494
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negotiation or military force as necessary; (4) if Tonkin is lost, France will not fight in the South, (5) nor would Vietnamese fight against other Vietnamese and sooner or later the whole of Vietnam will become communist. TEDUL 171, 7 June 1954.....	535
127. Dulles feels that it is of "overriding importance" to push on with action on Thailand's appeal to the United Nations Security Council, TOSEC 368, 7 June 1954.....	538
128. The U.S. will seek firm views of others once the "French authoritively tell us they want to internationalize the Indochina war." Further, when France decides to request U.S. intervention, the U.S. must have the opportunity to make its own decision based on prevailing circumstances. "We cannot grant the French an indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration." TEDUL 175, 8 June 1954.....	540
129. Because of Thailand's strong feeling the scope of appeal should not be limited to Thailand. The Thai government has a negative attitude on limiting the scope and they object to Czechoslovakia or other Soviet satellite membership on the Peace Observation Commission (POC). United Nations 810 to Dulles, 8 June 1954.....	542
130. Bidault replies to a conversation reported in DULTE 156 (not printed here) in which "agreement in principle" with the U.S. had been reached. No major differences are noted, however, French military believe <u>any</u> JCS war plan would show the necessity of at least one Marine division for the Delta. General Valluy's conversations at the Pentagon are seen as most crucial. "Thus if we want French military assistance...in Southeast Asia...it is vital. JCS...approve a joint war plan justifying the use of Marines." Paris 4766 to Dulles, 9 June 1954.....	544
131. Eden cites three major issues emerging on which "we cannot compromise": (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia problem, (2) status and powers of international supervisory authority and (3) composition of the international supervisory authority. Britain feels negotiations have failed and little can be salvaged in Vietnam. DULTE 164, 9 June 1954.....	547
132. The French are upset because Admiral Radford had said there was "no question of utilization of Marines in Indochina." The U.S. position, according to Dulles,	

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had been clear from the start that "we were not willing to make a commitment ahead of time which the French could use for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at Geneva...." TEDUL 178, 9 June 1954.....	550
133. "General Ely has twice in my presence stated that his keenest desire is for the United States to enter this war." The purpose of General Valluy's statement (war assessment) is either to bring the U.S. and five other powers into the conflict or to prepare an "excuse before history" for an armistice. Saigon 2714 to Dulles, 10 June 1954.....	552
134. The French military feel that a Tonkin decision will rest on U.S. intentions. The French are reluctant to request "internationalization" which would result in new talks and provoke new "hopes." The U.S., on the other hand, does not want to consider a U.S. training mission separate from the "overall operational plan" on the assumption the conditions are fulfilled for U.S. participation in Indochina. Murphy (Acting SecState) 4508 to Paris, 10 June 1954.....	553
135. The French impression is that even after all conditions are met, the chances of U.S. participation are "nil." With this attitude it is only a matter of time until the French come to terms with the Viet Minh. The result would be disastrous to French public opinion and the "U.S. would be blamed" for having failed in the crisis. Therefore, it is recommended that the French be informed that " <u>the President is no longer prepared to request military intervention</u> " even if France fulfills all conditions. France should strive for an armistice and thus avoid a military disaster. A few months delay in communist takeover in Indochina is not commensurate with "possible collapse of the defense of Western Europe." Paris 4841 to Dulles, 14 June 1954.....	555
136. The French want, and "in effect have, an option on our intervention, but they do not want to exercise it and the date of expiry of our option is fast running out." TEDUL 197, 14 June 1954.....	558
137. Secretary Dulles emphasizes that events have shown that predictions he has made all along on the lack of any real French desire for U.S. intervention but "as a card to play at Geneva." The U.S. does not see that France's bitterness is justified considering "prolonged French and U.K. indecision." Dulles 4579 to Paris, 14 June 1954....	559

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138. It is in the best interests of the U.S. that final adjournment of the Conference take place unless France wants to keep it alive. Eden's departure on a recess is seen as evidence of no reason to delay "collective talks on SEA defense." TEDUL 196, 14 June 1954.....	561
139. The CIA estimates communist reactions to the participation of U.S. air and naval forces at various levels of intensity and on various targets in conjunction with French Union forces in Indochina. Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 10-4-54, 15 June 1954.....	563
140. Dulles cites an alternative that "if and when" a French Government which had the confidence of the Assembly should decide to continue the war, as opposed to an unacceptable armistice, the U.S. would be prepared to respond promptly. TEDUL 208, 16 June 1954.....	570
141. Viet Minh demand all of Tonkin area including Hanoi and Haiphong in secret talks with France. The U.S. informs France that "we did not wish to be....abruptly confronted with agreement..." as a result of secret negotiations and suggest a U.S. liaison officer. DULTE 187, 16 June 1954.....	572
142. China and the Soviet Union are "greatly concerned" over any break-up of the Indochina conference. Eden expresses the view that China wants a settlement but doubts their degree of control over the Viet Minh. DULTE 193, 17 June 1954.....	574
143. The "underground military talks" at Geneva are pointing toward a <u>de facto</u> partition of Indochina. "There can of course be no repeat no question of U.S. participation in any attempt to 'sell' a partition to non-communist Vietnamese. TEDUL 212, 17 June 1954.....	576
144. U.S. re-examines possible <u>de facto</u> partition of Vietnam in light of five-power staff report suggesting Thakhek-Donghoi line. TEDUL 222, 18 June 1954.....	577
145. The French feel that partition is the best settlement they could have worked for under the conditions laid down by U.S. for intervention which "no French Parliament would approve." Partition should come as no surprise to the Vietnamese since the Viet Minh had made it clear to them -- "coalition government or partition." DULTE 195, 18 June 1954.....	578

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146. General Smith and Molotov conduct lengthy conversations on "making positions clear." The Soviet tactics were probably to forestall U.S. intervention in the Delta by a compromise formula if intervention appeared imminent. When intervention became improbable, the "ante" in negotiations was raised. DULTE 202, 19 June 1954.....	580
147. In conversations with the French, China recognizes that "two governments" exist in Vietnam and Chou En-lai regards that the final political settlement should be reached by direct negotiations between the two governments. Paris 5035 to Dulles, 24 June 1954.....	589
148. Dulles thinks our present role at Geneva should "soon be restricted to that of observer...." TOSEC 478, 24 June 1954.....	592
149. A French <u>aide-memoire</u> indicates the French objective to seek a <u>de facto</u> division which leaves a solid territory for the State of Vietnam and further requests that the U.S. do nothing to encourage an anticipated "violent and unreasoning" reaction on the part of Vietnamese patriots who object to an indefinite period of division of the country. Dulles 4852 to Paris, 28 June 1954.....	593
150. French negotiations with Viet Minh are stalled and Mendes-France is perplexed by reference to the "Dong Hoi" line since France was holding out for the 18th parallel. Paris 5117 to Dulles, 30 June 1954.....	596
151. Dulles warns that Ngo Dinh Diem has been "kept in the dark" on French negotiations and fears that if revealed as a <u>fait accompli</u> the reaction French wish to avoid will result. Dulles 39 to Paris, 2 July 1954.....	597
152. France apologizes for not keeping the U.S. fully informed of French military withdrawals in the Delta. In addition, while France is holding out for an eighteen-month period before elections, Diem, to the contrary, has suggested elections within a year. Paris 32 to Dulles, 2 July 1954....	598
153. The French speak most firmly to the Viet Minh that the proposal for demarcation along the thirteenth parallel is unacceptable. On Soviet interest in the line, the French threaten that the line they propose is acceptable to the rest of the conference and thus averts the "risk of internationalization of the conflict." SECTO 557, 3 July 1954.....	600

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154. The U.S. does not want to be associated with a settlement which falls short of the seven-point memorandum on which Britain agreed and now appear to be less than firm. "If either or both the French and Communists are operating on the assumption we will adhere to any settlement they agree to, then we may be headed for serious trouble." Dulles 52 to Paris, 3 July 1954.....	603
155. Dillon recommends that if the U.S. attempts to get the best possible settlement, we should (1) maintain a Geneva delegation, (2) have Dulles return to head the delegation, (3) offer French support to sell a settlement to Vietnam if it is satisfactory, and (4) pressure Britain to stick to the seven points of US-UK agreement. Paris 41 to Dulles, 4 July 1954.....	606
156. The French welcome the US-UK 7-point agreement except that clarification was suggested on the conflict between provisions for elections and the position that no political provisions should risk loss of the area to communism. The French felt that the elections could "go wrong." Paris 50 to Dulles, 6 July 1954.....	608
157. The French indicate they attach no great military importance to retention of Haiphong and that they were "avoiding contact" with the Vietnamese in order not to have to answer their questions. SECTO 560, 6 July 1954.....	609
158. Mendes-France will announce to the National Assembly that if a cease-fire is not agreed to prior to 21 July, it will be necessary for the Assembly to approve the sending of conscripts to Indochina. Paris 66 to Dulles, 6 July 1954.....	612
159. Dulles informs Eden that it is "better if neither Bedell nor I went back" to Geneva since the French will probably settle for worse than the 7-point agreement, hence it would be embarrassing to all concerned. Dulles NIACT 101 to London, 7 July 1954.....	614
160. The U.S. feels that elections mean eventual unification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and therefore should be held "as long after a cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation...." Further, the U.S. believes no date should be set now and that no conditions be accepted which would affect international supervision of elections. The U.S. would not oppose a settlement based on the 7-points nor would we seek to upset a settlement by force. Dulles 77 to Paris, 7 July 1954.....	616

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161. Dillon discovers that the U.S. complaints of not being informed are proved unjustified on the French withdrawal in Tonkin. Both State and Defense were notified via Trapnell's hand-carried plans and diplomatic cables. Public statements thus "can only serve to make our position here vis-a-vis Mendes and his government increasingly difficult and undermine the confidence of both the French Government and people in our candor..." Paris 81 to Dulles, 7 July 1954..... 618
162. "I have never harbored any thought of wilful concealment...there is a certain lack of intimacy..." in relations with the present government. The U.S. intends to leave representation at Geneva but not Bedell Smith nor Dulles will return. The U.S. should avoid a "position at Geneva..." Dulles 85 to Paris, 8 July 1954..... 619
163. The Chinese inform Ambassador Johnson that Chou En-lai had a "very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and that "results would be helpful to the French." The French believe that the Sino-Soviet positions have been coordinated with the Chinese views on Asian problems being given major weight. SECTO 578, 9 July 1954..... 622
164. The Defense Department queries the State Department regarding equipping three French light infantry divisions for Indochina in view of (1) the Premier's promise to end the war by 20 July and (2) the considerable impact of equipment removal on NATO. Defense Letter to State, 9 July 1954..... 624
165. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles indicate firmly to President Mendes-France the rationale behind not sending Dulles or General Smith back to Geneva. Essentially, the rationale is based on failure of the U.S., U.K. and France to agree on a joint position at Geneva and lack of agreement on a "united action" proposal if the position is not accepted by the communists. Dulles sees France and U.K. enhancing a communist "whittling-away" process by readily accepting less than the seven points. Dulles 127 to Paris, 10 July 1954..... 625
166. France views the Dulles decision as (1) making the French bargaining position weaker and (2) that Europe would interpret U.S. absence from Geneva as a step in the "return to a policy of isolationism." Paris 134 to Dulles, 11 July 1954..... 631

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167. France indicates the "necessity for a clear-cut U.S. guarantee that would protect the Associated States" if the communists did not honor a Geneva settlement. Mendes-France will resign if no cease-fire is reached. Paris 133 to Dulles, 11 July 1954..... 633
168. Views of the U.K. on collective security of Southeast Asia are summarized: (1) the British prefer a generalized collective arrangement with as many states involved as possible; (2) the preferred organization would have a general council, a political/economic council, and a military organization; (3) in the event of no Indochina agreement, the British would move ahead with a military arrangement to meet the threat. Admiral Davis Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 13 July 1954..... 635
169. Secretary Dulles reports on the Paris meeting: (1) an agreed French-United States position paper on Indochina which has the United States respecting terms conforming to a 7-point agreement; (2) the 7 points along the lines which were agreed during the Churchill-Eisenhower conversations; (3) a Mendes-France to Dulles letter which tells Dulles that his absence from Geneva would produce an effect opposite to his intention; (4) a Dulles to Mendes-France letter which informs him of General Smith's return to Geneva; (5) and a letter from Eden to Mendes-France reassuring him of Britain's support. Paris 179 to Dulles, 14 July 1954..... 638
170. Secretary Dulles reports on his trip to Paris at the NSC meeting. Dulles had told Mendes that France's troubles stemmed from lack of a decision on EDC and the Soviets were successful in splitting France and Germany. If the U.S. cannot guarantee the Geneva Conference results or influence France to reject any settlement, the U.S. will be blamed and put a major strain on Franco-United States relations. NSC Minutes, 15 July 1954..... 644
171. Mendes-France is firm in a cocktail conversation with Molotov on Vietnam election dates. The French, however, conceive the military demarcation line and regroupment of forces to be the major outstanding issues. SECTO 626, 16 July 1954..... 646
172. At a meeting of Mendes, Eden, and Molotov, the outstanding issues are summarized: (1) demarcation line for Vietnam; (2) elections; (3) control arrangements; (4)

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regroupment time; (5) prevention of arms importation, and (6) Laotian regroupment areas. France strongly opposes Molotov on holding elections in 1955 and placing the demarcation line at the 16th parallel. SECTO 632, 17 July 1954.....	648
173. The Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Conference secretly passes the U.S. delegate a note of protest which had been handed to the French. The note complains that the "National Government of Vietnam has been left in complete ignorance" of proposals made by the French to other nations on Vietnam's fate. Vietnam rejects the <u>de facto</u> partition proposal, a cease-fire, and requests that United Nations control be established over all Vietnam territory. SECTO 633, 17 July 1954.....	651
174. The Chinese Communists inform the U.S. of their position via Seymour Topping, Associated Press. The despatch reflects the views of Chou En-lai and demands that the U.S. guarantee a "partition peace plan." Further, China is hopeful of a cease-fire but did not rule out the chance for one even if the U.S. refuses to accept the armistice. SECTO 639, 18 July 1954.....	653
175. The U.S. fears Britain will push France into an agreement short of the 7 points resulting in a situation which had been previously discussed in Paris. TOSEC 565, 18 July 1954.....	656
176. At the 23rd Indochina restricted session, Tran Van Do (Vietnam) states that Vietnam cannot associate itself with the final declaration of the Conference which is to be reviewed. Vietnam does not agree to conditions for cease-fire nor have they as yet advanced proposals for a solution "based on peace, independence, and unity." SECTO 654, 18 July 1954.....	658
177. The Vietnamese delegation requests a plenary session to put forward their position (Document 171, preceding). The U.S. replies that the Vietnamese position is "not practicable" and, in indicating that time is short, suggests that the Vietnamese "speak directly with the French." SECTO 655, 18 July 1954.....	662
178. Seymour Topping again supplies confidential information from a Chinese Communist contact, Huang Hua. "When Huang Hua spoke of the possibility of American bases in Indochina, or anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia; he became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down..." Chinese are convinced that France and the U.S. have made a deal. SECTO 661, 19 July 1954.....	663

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179. International control commission is to be composed of Poland, India, Canada, or Belgium. The U.S. is satisfied that this is better than Korea and is "within the spirit of Point 7." SECTO 666, 19 July 1954.....	664
180. General Smith makes it clear to France that the U.S. could, under no circumstance, associate itself with the conference declaration and recommends authorization to amend the proposed U.S. declaration of position. SECTO 669, 19 July 1954.....	665
181. Dulles has no objection on Smith's proposal to amend the declaration, but is concerned about including part of paragraph 9 of the Conference declaration, which seems to imply a "multilateral engagement with the Communists" which is inconsistent with the U.S. basic approach. TOSEC 576 NIACT, 19 July 1954.....	667
182. The Vietnamese delegation proposes: (1) a cease-fire on present positions; (2) regroupment into two small zones; (3) disarmament of irregular troops; (4) disarmament and withdrawal of foreign troops; and (5) control by the United Nations. It is noted that there is no provision for demarcation line or partition. SECTO 673, 19 July 1954.....	669
183. The United States, not prepared to sign the Accords, makes a unilateral declaration of its position on the Conference conclusions. The United States declares that it will refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements and would view any renewal of the aggression with grave concern and as a threat to international peace and security. Unilateral Declaration of the United States, 21 July 1954.....	671
184. Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, 21 July 1954.....	672

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

15 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Steps Which the United States Might Take
to Assist in Achieving Success of the
Navarre Plan.

1. In response to the action taken by the National Security Council (NSC) on 8 January 1954 on MSC 177, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend for your consideration the actions shown hereafter, Appendix "B" of which was prepared in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to assist in achieving the success of the Navarre Plan.

2. The actions are considered to be feasible within the framework of existing national policies and will not involve the overt use of U.S. forces in combat. However, in view of the continuing changes in the military situation in Indochina, together with their influence on existing national politico-military policies and commitments in other areas, the actions should be reviewed and re-evaluated on a continuing basis.

3. Appropriate agencies of the government should undertake the following actions:

a. Place renewed emphasis upon the attainment and maintenance of the full support by the government of France of the Navarre Plan and United States measures in support of it. This full support by France of the Navarre Plan should include the augmentation of the French Air Force, Indochina, with maintenance and air crew personnel from military and/or civilian resources available in metropolitan France or elsewhere. The U.S. supporting measures should include necessary materiel and financial support but should not include military and/or civilian personnel except in certain highly specialized categories.

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Discussion: The French government is under strong and increasing domestic pressure to reduce the French military commitment in Indochina. French national sensitivity continues--particularly upon points of prestige. Although General Navarre has adopted many of the recommendations of Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, USA, other recommendations pertaining to training, tactics, strategy, and logistics have not yet been fully implemented. In some cases the reasons for this lack of cooperation may be political in nature, and therefore beyond General Navarre's control. In summary, a renewed effort to obtain full support of the Navarre Plan and U.S. measures to support it, including those hereafter recommended, is essential.

b. Approach the French with a proposal to organize a volunteer air group composed of personnel from various anti-communist nations or groups to serve with the French Union forces in Indochina as outlined in Appendix "A."

Discussion: This examination was directed by the President at the NSC meeting of 8 January 1954. While the President emphasized participation by U.S. volunteer personnel he also mentioned the inclusion of other nationals. Since this is a definitive means by which the French can increase the Indochinese air effort as desired by them and thereby increase their over-all air capability this step is militarily desirable. Its feasibility is limited only by the provision of sufficient U.S. funds.

c. Assign additional technical specialists to MAAG, Indochina, in accordance with the recommendations of the November O'Daniel report, so as to maximize technical assistance to the French Union forces.

Discussion: Additional technical advisory personnel are needed for MAAG, Indochina, to provide guidance and training to the French.

d. Convince the French military authorities that it is imperative to increase unconventional warfare activities as suggested in Appendix "B," the substance of which is a broad general concept, for the use of guerrillas and can be used as the basis for discussions between General O'Daniel and authorities in Indochina in order to appropriately influence the French.

Discussion: The present French unconventional warfare effort in Indochina is considered to be relatively ineffective.

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e. Re-examine current national strategy with respect to Indochina, taking advantage of any unifying forces existing in Southeast Asia as a whole in opposition to the spread of Soviet Communism, and treating Southeast Asia as a unit with due regard to the long term objectives of the U.S. and France in the area. For further discussion, see Appendix "C."

Discussion: The Soviet Communist campaign in Southeast Asia is waged on a regional and coordinated scale, rather than separate attacks on individual countries. By forming new coalitions of Western oriented countries, certain opportunities can be expected to open up which will directly support operations in Indochina.

f. Increase the pace and scope of the U.S. information program, and the U.S. advisory activities in furtherance of the French and Associated States military psychological warfare effort in accordance with the recommendations of the senior U.S. officers on the ground. (See Appendix "D"). Consideration should be given to both unilateral action and action in conjunction with colonial French military and civil authorities, as well as indigenous leaders of Southeast Asia. The objectives should be to increase:

- (1) The willingness of the people of France and the U.S. to support the prosecution of the war.
- (2) The anti-Communist attitudes and active participation of the native populations.
- (3) The morale of the French forces in Indochina.

Discussion: To secure the maximum benefits of our program of assistance to Indochina and, simultaneously, Southeast Asia by the cumulative and cooperative efforts of all propaganda media at the disposal of the Allies.

g. To render maximum and expeditious assistance in providing materiel and training to the French and Associated States Forces engaged in the Indochina war, the Services should be directed to accomplish (1) and (4) below and authorized to accomplish (2) and (3) below:

- (1) Expedite shipment of undelivered items on FY 50-54 Programs in accordance with priority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for deliveries of MDAP.

- (2) Make changes in current programs as requested by Chief, MAAG, Indochina, and make deliveries against such changes and, if deemed necessary, without prior reference to or approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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(3) Increase monetary value of FY 54 MDA Programs for Indochina, as may be necessary and feasible to provide additional materiel and/or training requested by Chief, MAAG, Indochina.

(4) Undertake the implementation of these instructions through such organizations and by such procedures as are considered necessary to insure prompt and effective response to valid requests for assistance..

Discussion: To date, restrictive criteria and procedures have seriously handicapped the administration of MDAP assistance in the support of the effort in Indochina. MDAP assistance is normally used to support a training and re-equipment program. In Indochina, however, such equipment is being used to support an active campaign. The purpose of the above is to free the Services of all restrictive criteria other than final legal limitation of available funds in order that prompt and effective response may be achieved in meeting all valid requests received from Chief, MAAG, Indochina.

h. Give consideration to interim revision of French NATO commitments in Europe in order to allow provision of additional French air personnel to Indochina.

Discussion: Shortage of air personnel has been one major factor in prolonging the war. A reappraisal of French NATO commitments should be considered with a view toward releasing additional French air personnel for Indochina.

i. Insure that personnel assigned to MAAG, Indochina, are qualified to advise the French Union forces on U.S. tactics and techniques.

Discussion: This would provide the benefit of U.S. battle experience for use in Indochina.

j. Consideration should be given at Governmental level to the proposition of declarations as follows:

(1) By France: A declaration of intention to prosecute the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion and looking toward the more complete independence of the Associated States of Indochina.

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(2) By the United States: A declaration to the effect that positive action will be taken to prevent the conquest of Indochina by aggression originating outside of Indochina.

Discussion: A declaration of intent, as outlined above, would in general raise the morale of all peoples in Southeast Asia and in particular would increase the determination of the Indochinese to fight the war to a successful conclusion.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

F. F. EVEREST
Lieut. General, USAF,
Director, Joint Staff.

Enclosure

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NSC 5405

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January 16, 1954

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

- References:
- A. NSC 177
 - B. NSC Action Nos. 897, 1005 and 1011
 - C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 12, 1954
 - D. NSC 124/2
 - E. NSC 171/1
 - F. NIE-63/1 and SE-53

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 180th Council meeting on January 14, 1954 adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 177, subject to the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 1-a thereof and to the deletion of paragraph 46 (NSC Action No. 1011-a).

In connection with this action the Council also agreed that the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with other appropriate departments and agencies, should develop plans, as suggested by the Secretary of State, for certain contingencies in Indochina.

The Council at its meeting on January 8, 1954, in connection with its preliminary consideration of NSC 177 also (NSC Action No. 1005-g and d):

- a. Agreed that Lieutenant General John Wilson O'Daniel should be stationed continuously in Indochina, under appropriate liaison arrangements and with sufficient authority to expedite the flexible provision of U. S. assistance to the French Union forces.

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- b. Requested the Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency, urgently to study and report to the Council all feasible further steps, short of the overt use of U. S. forces in combat, which the United States might take to assist in achieving the success of the "Laniel-Navarre" Plan.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 177, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5405; directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. A financial appendix is enclosed for Council information.

Accordingly those portions of NSC 124/2 not previously superseded by NSC 171/1 are superseded by the enclosed statement of policy. The enclosure does not supersede the current NSC policy on Indonesia contained in NSC 171/1.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

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UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

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STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION
WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA*

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.

a. In the conflict in Indochina, the Communist and non-Communist worlds clearly confront one another on the field of battle. The loss of the struggle in Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast Asia and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious repercussions on U. S. and free world interests in Europe and elsewhere.

* Southeast Asia is used herein to mean the area embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina and Malaya. Indonesia is the subject of a separate paper (NSC 171/1.)

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b. Such is the interrelation of the countries of the area that effective counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single country from leading to submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Furthermore, in the event all of Southeast Asia falls under communism, an alignment with communism of India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) could follow progressively. Such widespread alignment would seriously endanger the stability and security of Europe.

c. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would threaten the U. S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U. S. security interests in the Far East.

d. The loss of Southeast Asia would have serious economic consequences for many nations of the free world and conversely would add significant resources to the Soviet bloc. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities. The rice exports of Burma, Indochina and Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and Hong Kong and are of

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considerable significance to Japan and India, all important areas of free Asia. Furthermore, this area has an important potential as a market for the industrialized countries of the free world.

g. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.

2. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China. The use of U. S. forces to oppose such an attack would require diversion of military strength from other areas, thus reducing our military capability in those areas, as well as over-all, with the recognized military risks involved therein, or an increase in our military forces in being, or both. Toward deterring such an attack, the U. S. Government has engaged in consultations with France and the United Kingdom on the desirability of issuing to Communist China a joint warning as to the consequences to Communist China of aggression in Southeast Asia. Although these consultations have not achieved a full measure of agreement a warning to Communist China has in fact been issued, particularly as to Indochina, in a number of public statements. (See Annex A for texts.) The U. S. has also participated with France, the United

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Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in military talks on measures which might be taken in the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression against Indochina.

3. However, overt Chinese Communist attack on any part of Southeast Asia is less probable than continued communist efforts to achieve domination through armed rebellion or subversion. By far the most urgent threat to Southeast Asia arises from the strong possibility that even without overt Chinese Communist intervention the situation in Indochina may deteriorate anew as a result of weakening of the resolve of France and the Associated States of Indochina to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion, the military strength of which is increased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist and Soviet regimes. Barring overt Chinese Communist intervention or further serious deterioration in Indochina, the outlook in Burma, Thailand, and Malaya offers opportunities for some improvement in internal stability and in the control of indigenous communist forces.

4. The successful defense of Tonkin is the keystone of the defense of mainland Southeast Asia except possibly Malaya. In addition to the profound political and psychological factors involved, the retention of Tonkin in friendly hands cuts off the most feasible routes for any massive southward advance towards central and Southern Indochina and Thailand. The execution of U. S. courses of action with respect to individual countries of the area may vary depending upon the

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route of communist advance into Southeast Asia.

5. Since 1951 the United States has greatly increased all forms of assistance to the French in Indochina, particularly military aid, and has consulted continuously with France with a view to assuring effective use of this aid. Partly as a result of these efforts, French resumption of the initiative under the "Laniel-Navarre Plan" has checked at least temporarily deterioration of the French will to continue the struggle. Concurrently the French have moved toward perfecting the independence of the Associated States within the French Union. In September 1953 the United States decided to extend an additional \$385 million in aid, in return for a number of strong French assurances, including a commitment that the French would vigorously carry forward the "Laniel-Navarre Plan", with the object of eliminating regular enemy forces in Indochina, and on the understanding that if the "Laniel-Navarre Plan" were not executed, the United States would retain the right to terminate this additional assistance. (See NSC Action No. 897, Annex B)

6. The French objective in these efforts is to terminate the war as soon as possible so as to reduce the drain of the Indochina war on France and permit the maintenance of a position for France in the Far East. By a combination of military victories and political concessions to the Associated States, France hopes to strengthen these States to the point where they will be able to maintain themselves against

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Communist pressures with greatly reduced French aid. In the absence of a change in basic French attitudes, the Laniel-Navarre Plan may be the last French major offensive effort in Indochina. There is not in sight any desirable alternative to the success of a Franco-Vietnamese effort along the lines of the "Laniel-Navarre" Plan.

7. Notwithstanding the commitment and intent of the Laniel Government to seek destruction of Viet Minh regular forces, a successor French Government might well accept an improvement in the military position short of this as a basis for serious negotiation within the next year. Political pressures in France prevent any French Government from rejecting the concept of negotiations. If the Laniel-Navarre Plan fails or appears doomed to failure, the French might seek to negotiate simply for the best possible terms, irrespective of whether these offered any assurance of preserving a non-Communist Indochina. With continued U. S. economic and material assistance, the Franco-Vietnamese forces are not in danger of being militarily defeated by the Viet Minh unless there is large-scale Chinese Communist intervention. In any event, apart from the possibility of bilateral negotiations with the Communists, the French will almost certainly continue to seek international discussion of the Indochina issue.

8. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly continue their present type of support for Viet Minh. They are

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unlikely to intervene with organized units even if the Viet Minh are threatened with defeat by the Franco-Vietnamese forces. [In the event the United States participates in the fighting, there is a substantial risk that the Chinese Communists would intervene.] The Communists may talk of peace negotiations for propaganda purposes and to divide the anti-Communists believing that any political negotiations and any settlement to which they would agree would increase their chances of eventually gaining control of Indochina.

9. Actions designed to achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia require sensitive selection and application, on the one hand to assure the optimum efficiency through coordination of measures for the general area, and on the other, to accommodate to the greatest practicable extent to the individual sensibilities of the several governments, social classes and minorities of the area.

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II. OBJECTIVE

10. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free governments with the will and ability to resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

III. COURSES OF ACTION

A. SOUTHEAST ASIA IN GENERAL

11. Demonstrate to the indigenous governments that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and closer affiliation with the nations of the free world.

12. Continue present programs of limited economic and technical assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous non-communist governments of the area and expand such programs according to the calculated advantage of such aid to the U. S. world position.

13. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to cooperate with, and restore and expand their commerce with, each other and the rest of the free world, particularly Japan, and stimulate the flow of raw material resources of the area to the free world.

14. Continue to make clear, to the extent possible in agreement with other nations including France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, the grave consequences

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to Communist China of aggression against Southeast Asia and continue current military consultations to determine the military requirements for countering such Chinese Communist aggression.

15. Strengthen, as appropriate, covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

16. Continue activities and operations designed to encourage the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia: (a) to organize and activate anti-communist groups and activities within their own communities; (b) to resist the effects of parallel pro-communist groups and activities; (c) generally, to increase their orientation toward the free world; and, (d) consistent with their obligations and primary allegiance to their local governments, to extend sympathy and support to the Chinese National Government as a symbol of Chinese political resistance and as a link in the defense against communist expansion in Asia.

17. Take measures to promote the coordinated defense of Southeast Asia, recognizing that the initiative in regional defense measures must come from the governments of the area.

18. Encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to Chinese Communist aggression, to indigenous Communist insurrection, subversion, infiltration, political manipulations, and propaganda.

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19. Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as appropriate, in relation to the area to foster increased alignment of the people with the free world.

20. Make clear to the American people the importance of Southeast Asia to the security of the United States so that they may be prepared for any of the courses of action proposed herein.

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B. INDOCHINA

In the Absence of Chinese Communist Aggression

21. Without relieving France of its basic responsibility for the defense of the Associated States, expedite the provision of, and if necessary increase, aid to the French Union forces, under the terms of existing commitments, to assist them in:

a. An aggressive military, political and psychological program, including covert operations, to eliminate organized Viet Minh forces by mid-1955.

b. Developing indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will eventually be capable of maintaining internal security without assistance from French units.

Toward this end, exert all feasible influence to improve the military capabilities of the French Union-Associated States forces, including improved training of local forces, effective command and intelligence arrangements, and the reposing of increased responsibility on local military leaders.

22. Continue to assure France that: (1) the United States is aware that the French effort in Indochina is vital to the preservation of the French Union and of great strategic importance to the security of the free world; (2) the United States is fully aware of the sacrifices France is making; and (3) U. S. support will continue so long as France continues to carry out its primary responsibility in Indochina.

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23. Encourage further steps by both France and the Associated States to produce a working relationship based on equal sovereignty within the general framework of the French Union. These steps should take into account France's primary responsibility for the defense of Indochina.

a. Support the development of more effective and stable governments in the Associated States, thus making possible the reduction of French participation in the affairs of the States.

b. Urge the French to organize their administration and representation in Indochina with a view to increasing the feeling of responsibility on the part of the Associated States.

c. Seek to persuade the Associated States that it is not in their best interest to undermine the French position by making untimely demands.

d. Cooperate with the French and the Associated States in publicizing progress toward achieving the foregoing policies.

24. Continue to promote international recognition and support for the Associated States.

25. Employ every feasible means to influence the French government and people against any conclusion of the struggle on terms inconsistent with basic U.S. objectives. In doing so, the United States should make clear:

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a. The effect on the position of France itself in North Africa, in Europe, and as a world power.

b. The free world stake in Indochina.

c. The impact of the loss of Indochina upon the over-all strategy of France's free world partners.

26. Reiterate to the French:

a. That in the absence of a marked improvement in the military situation there is no basis for negotiation with any prospect for acceptable terms.

b. That a nominally non-Communist coalition regime would eventually turn the country over to Ho Chi Minh with no opportunity for the replacement of the French by the United States or the United Kingdom.

27. Flatly oppose any idea of a cease-fire as a preliminary to negotiations, because such a cease-fire would result in an irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position in Indochina.

28. If it appears necessary, insist that the French consult the Vietnamese and obtain their approval of all actions related to any response to Viet Minh offers to negotiate.

29. If the French actually enter into negotiations with the communists, insist that the United States be consulted and seek to influence the course of the negotiations.

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30. In view of the possibility of large-scale Chinese Communist intervention, and in order that the United States may be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in such circumstances, continue to keep current the plans necessary to carry out the courses of action indicated in paragraphs 31 and 32 below. In addition, seek UK and French advance agreement in principle that a naval blockade of Communist China should be included in the courses of military action set forth in paragraph 31 below.

In the Event of Chinese Communist Intervention

31. If the United States, France and the Associated States determine that Chinese Communist forces (including volunteers) have overtly intervened in Indochina, or are covertly participating so as to jeopardize holding the Tonkin delta area, the United States (following consultation with France, the Associated States, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand) should take the following measures to assist French Union forces to repel the aggression, to hold Indochina and to restore its security and peace:

- a. Support a request by France or the Associated States that the United Nations take immediate actions, including a resolution that Communist China had committed an aggression and a recommendation that member states take whatever action may be necessary, without geographic limitation, to assist France and the Associated States to meet such aggression.

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b. Whether or not the United Nations so acts, seek the maximum international support for participation in military courses of action required by the situation.

c. Carry out the following minimum courses of military action, either under UN auspices or as part of a joint effort with France, the UK, and any other friendly governments; *or unilaterally if necessary,*

(1) Provide, as may be practicable, air and naval assistance for a resolute defense of Indochina itself; calling upon France and the Associated States to provide ground forces.

(2) Provide the major forces to interdict Chinese Communist communication lines, including those in China; calling upon the UK and France to provide token forces and such other assistance as is normal among allies.

(3) Provide logistical support to other participating nations as may be necessary.

d. Take the following additional actions, if appropriate to the situation:

(1) If agreed pursuant to paragraph 30 above, establish jointly with the UK and France a naval blockade of Communist China.

(2) Intensify covert operations to aid guerrilla forces against Communist China and to interfere with and disrupt Chinese Communist lines of communication.

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(3) Utilize, as desirable and feasible, Chinese National forces in military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China proper.

(4) Assist the British in Hong Kong, as desirable and feasible.

(5) Evacuate French Union civil and military personnel from the Tonkin delta, if required.

32. a. If, after taking the actions outlined in paragraph 31-c above, the United States, the UK and France determine jointly that expanded military action against Communist China is necessary, the United States, in conjunction with at least France and the UK, should take air and naval action against all suitable military targets in China which directly contribute to the war in Indochina, avoiding insofar as practicable targets near the USSR boundaries.

b. If the UK and France do not agree to such expanded military action, the United States should consider taking such action unilaterally.

33. If action is taken under paragraph 32, the United States should recognize that it may become involved in an all-out war with Communist China, and possibly with the USSR and the rest of the Soviet bloc, and should therefore proceed to take large-scale mobilization measures.

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FINANCIAL APPENDIX

POLICY ALTERNATIVE: NO CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES IN CONNECTION WITH U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Millions of Dollars)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	<u>Total</u>	MDAP and Common-use Programs <u>1/</u>	Financial Support through <u>France</u>	Technical and Economic <u>Assistance</u> <u>Grant</u>	<u>Loan</u>	<u>Information</u> <u>Activities</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>2/</u>
<u>Indochina</u>							
FY 1950-53	969.7	548	375	46	--	.7 <u>3/</u>	--
FY 1954	839.5	304	400-500	25	--	.5	--
FY 1955	1159.5	333	750-800	25	--	1.5	--
FY 1956	713.5	287	400-500	25	--	1.5	--
<u>Burma</u>							
FY 1950-53	18.6	2	--	16	--	.6 <u>3/</u>	--
FY 1954	4.5	*	--	4	--	.5	<u>1/</u>
FY 1955	.5	--	--	--	--	.5	<u>1/</u>
FY 1956	.5	--	--	--	--	.5	--
<u>Thailand</u>							
FY 1950-53	102.7	.88	--	13	1	.7 <u>3/</u>	--
FY 1954	49.5	42.5	--	7	--	.5	--
FY 1955	53.0	46.0	--	7 <u>5/</u>	--	1.0	--
FY 1956	52.0	45.0	--	7 <u>5/</u>	--	1.0	--

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	<u>Total</u>	<u>MDAP and Common-use Programs</u>	<u>Financial Support through France</u>	<u>Technical and Economic Assistance Grant</u>	<u>Loan</u>	<u>Information Activities</u>	<u>Other^{2/}</u>
<u>Malaya</u>							
FY 1950-53	.7	--	--	--	--	.7 ^{3/}	--
FY 1954	.5	--	--	--	--	.5	--
FY 1955	.5	--	--	--	--	.5	--
FY 1956	.5	--	--	--	--	.5	--
<u>Total</u>							
FY 1950-53	1,092.7	639	375	75	1	2.7 ^{3/}	--
FY 1954	894.0	346	400-500	36	--	2.0	--
FY 1955	1,213.5	378	750-800	32	--	3.5	--
FY 1956	766.5	331	400-500	32	--	3.5	--

*Less than \$500 thousand.

- 1/ Represents value of end item shipments plus expenditures for packing, handling, crating and transportation, training and common-use items.
- 2/ Estimated costs of covert operations not available.
- 3/ FY 1953 only
- 4/ Estimated costs to the U. S. of evacuation of Chinese troops from Burma not available.
- 5/ Additional expenditures of approximately \$2.0 million in 1955 and \$3.0 million in 1956 might be generated by a proposed road program currently under consideration.

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PERTINENT ASSUMPTIONS

Indochina

1. MDAP and Common-use Programs (Col. 2) expenditures assume (a) elimination of organized resistance by June 1955; (b) a period of pacification extending for approximately another year; (c) a continuance of U. S. assistance for the duration of the major military operations at approximately the same rate as in FY 1954.
2. Financial Support through France (Col. 3) expenditures for FY 1950-53 reflect staff estimates of amounts of aid to France which is attributable to Indochina.
3. Economic Assistance (Col. 4) includes no specific estimates for rehabilitation on the assumption that such costs could be offset against reduced military expenditures.
4. Informational Activities (Col. 5) are assumed to continue in FY 1956 at a relatively stable rate.
5. Other (see footnotes 27 and 37 to table)

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

January 29, 1954

Honorable Charles E. Wilson
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have been impressed for some time that we have been steadily moving closer and closer to participation in the war in Indo-China. I am not objecting to any announced policy thus far, but a decision must soon be made as to how far we shall go. I feel that you will be highly influential in formulating this important policy.

It seems to me that we should certainly stop short of sending our troops or airmen to this area, either for participation in the conflict or as instructors. As always, when we send one group, we shall have to send another to protect the first and we shall thus be fully involved in a short time.

With consideration of our confirmed promises and assumed obligations in Europe, in the Pacific area, in Korea and elsewhere, and with consideration of our home defenses, I do not think we can at all afford to take chances on becoming participants in Indo-China.

Further, I have understood that the Air Force has a special request to send twenty-five to fifty civilian airplane mechanics to Indo-China. It seems to me that almost the same reasons apply in this instance. France has a great abundance of such mechanics, I am sure, as I saw many French mechanics last September at our military installation at Chateauroux engaged in overhauling jet engines.

I appreciate the fine contribution you are making to our national welfare as Secretary of Defense and as a member of the Security Council. I shall appreciate your consideration of this important, far-reaching question.

With best wishes, I am

Cordially yours,

John C. Stennis
John Stennis
United States Senator



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

30 January 1954

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of President's Special Committee on Indochina,
29 January 1954

1. The Special Committee met in Mr. Kyes' office at 3:30 p.m. 29 January 1954.
2. The first matter discussed was the disposition of urgent French requests for additional U.S. assistance. The Under Secretary of State, General W. B. Smith, mentioned that there has as yet been no reply to Prime Minister Laniel's letter to President Eisenhower on this subject. It was necessary to answer this substantively as soon as possible.
3. Admiral Radford said he had been in touch with General Hly, French Chief of Staff, through General Valluy. Ten B-26 aircraft are on the way to Indochina this week. These would contribute to filling the French request for aircraft to bring two B-26 squadrons up to a strength of 25 operational aircraft each. However, an additional 12 are needed to fill the full requirement because a total of 22 are needed (12 to fill the annual attrition plus 10 to fill the additional French request). There was some discussion on the seeming differences in requests reaching Washington via Paris and those coming through the MAAG. Subsequently in the meeting it was agreed that the French should be informed that the U.S. would act only on requests which had been approved by General O'Daniel after General O'Daniel was set up in Indochina.
4. Admiral Radford indicated that to fill the entire requirement for 22 B-26's on an urgent basis would mean taking some of them from U.S. operational squadrons in the Far East, but this could be done. The aircraft would not all have "zero" maintenance time on them.
5. As to the additional French request for 25 B-26's to equip a third squadron, it was decided that final decision to furnish them should await the return of General O'Daniel. However, the Air Force has been alerted that they may have to be furnished on short notice.
6. As to the provision of a small "dingible", it was decided to inform the French that this could not be furnished.

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7. Regarding the French request for 400 mechanics trained in the maintenance of B-26 and C-47 aircraft, there was considerable discussion. Admiral Radford said he had informed General Ely, through General Valluy, that the U.S. does not believe the French have exhausted all efforts to get French civilian maintenance crews. He suggested the French try to find them through "Air France." Mr. Kyes mentioned the possibility of obtaining French personnel from their eight aircraft factories or from the big Chateauroux maintenance base where the U.S. employed French mechanics. General Smith inquired about the possibility of lowering French NATO commitments to enable transfer of French military mechanics. Admiral Radford said General Valluy had informed him the French Staff have carefully considered the idea but the French Air Force does not have enough military mechanics trained in B-26 or C-47 maintenance to fill the requirement. Therefore, there would be such a delay while their military mechanics were being trained on these aircraft that the urgent requirement could not be met. He had also said that the employment of French civilian mechanics presented a difficult problem in security clearance.

8. General Smith recommended that the U.S. send 200 U.S. Air Force mechanics to MAAG, Indochina, and tell the French to provide the rest. Admiral Radford said this could be done and that the Air Force is, somewhat reluctantly, making plans to this end. He had let the French know that if American mechanics were sent they must be used only on air bases which were entirely secure from capture. General Smith wondered, in light of additional French requests, if the Committee should not consider sending the full 400 mechanics.

9. Mr. Kyes questioned if sending 200 military mechanics would not so commit the U.S. to support the French that we must be prepared eventually for complete intervention, including use of U.S. combat forces. General Smith said he did not think this would result - we were sending maintenance forces not ground forces. He felt, however, that the importance of winning in Indochina was so great that if worst came to the worst he personally would favor intervention with U.S. air and naval forces - not ground forces. Admiral Radford agreed. Mr. Kyes felt this consideration was so important that it should be put to the highest level. The President himself should decide. General Smith agreed. Mr. Allan Dulles wondered if our preoccupation with helping to win the battle at Dien Bien Phu was so great that we were not going to bargain with the French as we supplied their most urgent needs. Mr. Kyes said this was an aspect of the question he was raising. Admiral Radford read from a cable just received from General O'Daniel which indicated General Navarre had been most cordial to General O'Daniel at their meeting and had indicated he was pleased with the concept of U.S. liaison officers being assigned to his general headquarters and to the training command. General Navarre and General O'Daniel agreed to try to work out a maximum of collaboration at the military level.

10. Later in the meeting, Mr. Allan Dulles raised the question as to sending the CAP pilots the French had once requested. It was agreed that

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the French apparently wanted them now, that they should be sent, and CIA should arrange for the necessary negotiations with the French in Indochina to take care of it.

11. Mr. Kyes said that if we meet the French urgent demands they should be tied to two things: first, the achievement of maximum collaboration with the French in training and strategy, and secondly, the strengthening of General O'Daniel's hand in every way possible. General Smith agreed and felt we should reinforce General O'Daniel's position not only with the French in Indochina but also at the highest level in Paris.

12. Summary of Action Agreed Regarding Urgent French Requests

It was agreed:

a. To provide a total of 22 B-26 aircraft as rapidly as practicable.

b. To provide 200 uniformed U.S. Air Force mechanics who would be assigned as an augmentation to MAAG, Indochina. These mechanics to be provided only on the understanding that they would be used at bases where they would be secure from capture and would not be exposed to combat.

c. To send the CAP pilots, with CIA arranging necessary negotiations.

d. Not to provide a "dirigible."

e. To await General O'Daniel's return to Washington before making a decision on the other French requests. Efforts should continue to get the French to contribute a maximum number of mechanics.

It was further agreed that General Smith would clear these recommended actions with the President.

13. The next item discussed was the status of General O'Daniel. Mr. Kyes said General Trapnell, the present Chief of MAAG, is being replaced at the normal expiration of his tour. General Dabney had been chosen to replace General Trapnell and is about to leave for Indochina. Admiral Radford pointed out that General O'Daniel could be made Chief of MAAG without any further clearance with the French Government. General Smith said this would be all right but should not preclude further action to increase the position of General O'Daniel. General Erskine pointed out that the MAAG in Indochina is not a "military mission" but only an administrative group concerned with the provision of MDAP equipment. He thought the MAAG status should be raised to that of a mission which could

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help in training. It was agreed that General O'Daniel should probably be first assigned as Chief of MAAG and that, for this reason, General Dabney's departure for Indochina should be temporarily held up. General Dabney should, however, go to Indochina to assist General O'Daniel by heading up the present MAAG functions. Admiral Davis was requested to assure that General Dabney did not depart until further instructions were given.

14. There was some discussion, initiated by Mr. Kyes, about ways by which the French Foreign Legion in Indochina might be augmented. He felt that if the German and French Governments would facilitate it, considerable numbers of Germans might be enlisted to increase the Legion. Mr. Kyes mentioned several other general courses of action he thought should be further considered by the Special Committee and then suggested that General Erskine read his paper on the subject of Indochina. Mr. Kyes made it plain he considered this paper only a point of departure for further work by the Special Committee. General Erskine then read the paper, copies of which were given to the members of the Special Committee.

15. Admiral Radford said he thought, in general, that the paper covered many important fields but he had one or two reservations. He felt, with regard to the recommendation on regional coordination, that CINCPAC was, and should be, the man to head up regional coordination of the MAAGs. Mr. Kyes reiterated that the paper was only a point of departure and said he felt the basic trouble in trying to help in Indochina was the attitude of the French Government. Mr. Allan Dulles said the French do not want us to become too involved in the conduct of operations in Indochina because they want to keep one foot on the negotiations stool.

16. Admiral Radford said he felt the paper was too restrictive in that it was premised on U.S. action short of the contribution of U.S. combat forces. He said that the U.S. could not afford to let the Viet Minh take the Tonkin Delta. If this were lost, Indochina would be lost and the rest of Southeast Asia would fall. The psychological impact of such a loss would be unacceptable to the U.S. Indochina must have the highest possible priority in U.S. attention. He suggested the paper, when redrafted, should have two parts, one based on no intervention with combat forces and a second part indicating what should be done to prepare against the contingency where U.S. combat forces would be needed. General Smith was generally agreeable to this approach.

17. It was agreed not to use the OCB facilities to support the Special Committee, but instead to set up a working group of representatives of the principals of the Special Committee to revise General Erskine's paper by the middle of the week, 31 January - 6 February.

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18. The working group would comprise:

Admiral Davis (OSD)
Mr. Godel (OSD)
Captain Anderson (JCS)
Mr. Bonsal (State)
Mr. Aurell (CIA)
General Bonesteel (OSD)

General Smith recommended that a representative of the Air Force be included in the working group.

19. At the close of the meeting, General Smith inquired as to what was being done to speed up the delivery of spare parts for B-26's and C-119's. He was informed that necessary action had been taken.

20. Mr. Allan Dulles inquired if an unconventional warfare officer, specifically Colonel Lansdale, could not be added to the group of five liaison officers to which General Mavarre had agreed. Admiral Radford thought this might be done and at any rate Colonel Lansdale could immediately be attached to the MAAG, but he wondered if it would not be best for Colonel Lansdale to await General O'Daniel's return before going to Indochina. In this way, Colonel Lansdale could help the working group in its revision of General Erskine's paper. This was agreeable to Mr. Allan Dulles.

21. Present at the meeting were:

Department of Defense - Mr. Kyes, Admiral Radford, Admiral Davis, General Erskine, Mr. Godel, B/G Bonesteel, Colonel Alden.

Department of State - General Smith, Mr. Robertson.

CIA - Mr. Allan Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Aurell, Colonel Lansdale.


C. H. Bonesteel, III
Brigadier General, USA

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30 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Jean Valluy,
French Military Mission to the United States

Admiral Radford, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has asked me to convey to you the following message which he is certain you would be interested in receiving as soon as possible.

Admiral Radford has received approval from higher authority for the transfer to Indo-China immediately of 10 additional B-26 type aircraft to bring the two existing B-26 squadrons of the French Air Force up to a strength of 25 planes each. This will bring to a total of 22 the airplanes of this type now in process of delivery or to be delivered to Indo-China in the immediate future. Directives for the movement of these aircraft have already been sent to the Commanding General of the U.S. Air Force in the Far East.

The U.S. Air Force is now assembling for immediate transportation to Indo-China 200 uniformed U.S. Air Force mechanics, who will augment the United States Military Assistance Group in Indo-China for the purpose of assisting the French Air Force in the maintenance of C-47 and B-26 aircraft.

The matter of the provision of 25 additional B-26 aircraft for a third squadron is still under consideration. Decision will be made subsequent to the receipt of reports from General O'Daniel upon return to Washington about 7 February from his current mission in Indo-China, and information which Admiral Radford is expecting from General Valluy as to ability of the French Air Force to obtain from France additional maintenance personnel, either civilian or military.


G. W. ANDERSON, Jr.
Captain, USN

cc: Admiral Davis

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REPORT OF U.S.
SPECIAL MISSION
TO
INDOCHINA



5 FEBRUARY 1954

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SUBJECT: Report of U.S. Special Mission to Indochina

TO: The Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Thru Commander-in-Chief, Pacific)

1. The attached report of my visit to Indochina covers the results accomplished, action taken, and recommendations. The outstanding points are covered herein.

2. During this visit I talked with General Navarre and other senior French officials, as well as officials of the Vietnamese government. All conversations were conducted in a spirit of frankness, with a free exchange of views and information.

3. During my stay in Indochina I had two conferences with General Navarre, in which we discussed the purpose of my visit and means and methods by which I could be of assistance to him. Relative to establishing myself in Indochina as a liaison officer to him, he emphasized that he did not desire U.S. overt participation at this level for political reasons but that he would not object to periodic visits by me and my staff. We agreed on my visiting Saigon at about six weeks' intervals. Navarre said we could try this out and discuss the matter further at my next visit.

4. In the field of psychological warfare, he was not particularly interested in U.S. participation. On the other hand, the Vietnamese are amenable to it.

5. General Navarre stated that while he felt some concern over the present situation, he sees no reason for changing his original plans for a fall offensive. The continued development of the Vietnamese forces is making possible the recovery of more units that should give him a preponderance of forces with which to strike the enemy.

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10. The French and Vietnamese Navies are fully employed to the limit of their capabilities in transporting troops and supplies, amphibious operations, mine sweeping, shipping reconnaissance, blockade and patrol, and training. There are insufficient personnel and small craft to permit progressive maintenance, or rotation of crews from hazardous and exacting duties.

11. While approximately three fourths of all naval operations are currently taking place in the Tonkin Delta area, less than half the personnel of the F.U. Navies is assigned there. Eschewing criticism, it still appears that the staffs and easy billets in the Saigon area are overmanned. Requests from the North for personnel and additional ISU's to discharge missions assigned have not been heeded by Admiral Auboyneau, CINC, FE.

SAIGON
overmanned
Request for
personnel

12. There is an obvious lack of coordination in joint operations, and small craft troop convoys in ambush country have not received either observation or air support, either of which would normally ensure a safe journey, barring the ever present threat of mines.

13. Casualties in both ships and personnel continue unabated, testimony to the efficacy of point blank bazooka fire and new mine tactics (See Annex A).

The French Naval Air squadron of Privateers is a first class aggregation of pilots and crews. They provide the only night bombing potential in Indochina, and engage in varied operational tasks suited to the PB4Y.

14. The French light carrier "Arromanche" provides close air support, photo reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance sorties in answer to requests from GATAC.

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15. Naval amphibious assault units (Dinassau) are active in their assigned areas. A review of their small craft requirements is now underway, and will be the subject of another report. Meanwhile, training of new assault units is progressing.

16. Vietnamese personnel are now considered by the French Navy to be capable of handling all small craft and, with some French supervision, larger ones. Accordingly, recruit and NCO training at NHA TRANG has been stepped up, and more Vietnamese officers are being sent to France for technical training.

17. With U.S. programmed support, the F.U. Navy has been fully committed to operations that strain to the utmost their personnel involved. They are employing sound tactics and appear well lead in the field.

18. A requirement for additional maintenance and logistic support exists if the operational capabilities of the FAF in Indochina are to be maintained or increased. The arrival in Indochina on 5 February 1954 of USAF maintenance personnel will largely satisfy the requirement. No recommendation as to additional personnel needs will be made until the work of this group can be evaluated.

19. The training school for Vietnamese airmen at NHA TRANG is well established, and the program is considered adequate for the contemplated employment of personnel.

20. My current arrangements with General Navarre do not include establishment of myself; with a small staff, in Saigon. However, he assented to periodic visits and agreed to my liaison personnel. A small permanent Joint Staff is needed to prepare detailed operations

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and training plans, to develop sound advice, which can be furnished in a coordinated manner through the liaison officers to all levels of the French command. It employs as its field agency the five liaison officers recently approved, and is capable of quick movement to Indochina in echelons or as a group, on either a temporary or permanent basis. The Intelligence Division is a translation, liaison and security agency only, drawing its intelligence material from facilities available to CINCPAC. Since MAAG, Indochina, is a logistic staff in being, the logistic division of the proposed organization is limited to joint planning and coordination. The Plans and Training Division contains representatives from all services and will include the diverse planning skills required. Officer requirements for the activation of this staff have been furnished CINCPAC.

21. General McReynolds, Chief of STEM, reported that the people in areas liberated from the Viet Minh were badly in need of food and other necessities. He believed that additional funds should be allotted STEM or some other U S agency for such use. He stated that food and clothing provided by the U S through local authorities would form a powerful psychological weapon in allied hands.

22. RECOMMENDATIONS.

I recommend:


- a. The organization of the small Joint Staff, set forth in paragraph 20 above, be approved.
- b. The two officers for psychological warfare be attached to an appropriate U S organization in Saigon to assist the Vietnamese Government in psychological warfare training and development.

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c. Additional funds be allotted STEM (or some other U.S. agency) to assist in the rehabilitation of war ravaged areas recovered from the Viet Minh. FOIA

d. The employment of liaison officers, now being assigned, to be my spokesmen to the French be approved as an interim measure.


JOHN W. O'DANIEL
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Chief of Mission

Annexes:

- A. Naval Situation
- B. Training of Kinh Quan Bn
- C. Summary of French Union and Viet Minh Forces Indochina

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14. On February 2 and 3, I went by U.S. aircraft to Hanoi and from there by French C-47, a commercial chartered airlift plane, to Dien Bien Phu, arriving there at 1400. I was met by Colonel de Castres, CO of troops at Dien Bien Phu and was briefed by him and taken on a tour of battle positions. There are twelve French Union Battalions in the area, supported by what I consider sufficient air, armor, and artillery. The defenses lie in a valley and are sitting across the road intersection which joins there. Hills rising as high as 1000 feet or more surround the area at a distance of 3000 to 5000 yards. The defenses are heavily wired-in in with barbed wire, bunkers have been built and a good job of construction of fortifications is being done. Dugouts and bunkers are topped with timber and dirt. I had the impression that wet weather would cause much trouble through crumbling walls and leaking roofs. The defense area is twelve kilometers long and six kilometers wide. I feel that it can withstand any kind of an attack that the Viet Minh are capable of launching. However, a force with two or three battalions of medium artillery with air observation could make the area untenable. The enemy does not seem to have this capability at present. The morale of the troops is high; they are confident that they can stop any attack. I believe that if I were charged with the defense of the area, I would have been tempted to have utilized the high ground surrounding the area, rather than the low ground, and when I asked about this, the commander said that fields of fire were better where they were. I returned to Hanoi arriving there at 1820 after a flight of one hour and twenty minutes.

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15. I called at General Cogy's Headquarters and had a profitable talk with him. He is a fine officer and is sound in his thinking. He is greatly concerned over having to send so much of his mobile reserve from the Delta area. He stated that the enemy has increased infiltration in the southern part of the Delta and that the 320th Viet Minh Division, as well as other units are involved. At the present time, Cogy reports twenty regular Viet Minh battalions in the Delta area, plus several individual companies. I feel that this infiltration will no doubt continue until Navarre has more troops to continue the clearing of the Delta or adopts a plan to wire in the Delta with tactical wire, covering it with fire, and then conducts a deliberate campaign to eliminate all enemy. I expressed these ideas to Cogy. He was non-committal but was interested when I attempted to show him by a sketch how I thought fencing in could be done.

16. I also talked with Cogy's Deputy. He expressed the idea that the political war had to be won before the military. I told him that I did not agree at all with such a concept and that the military had to be won first. I am sure that Cogy is of the same opinion that I am. Cogy is anxious to stay in Indochina until the war is won, although he has been there now for more than thirty months. Navarre has high regard for Cogy and no doubt Cogy will stay. I certainly hope so.

17. The impression I have gained as a result of my visit to Indochina is that the French are anxious to get on with and win the war; that the military definitely want to stay until the war is brought to a successful conclusion. The French are sadly lacking in know-how in many fields,

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including planning and maintenance matters. They are proud and sensitive to criticism. They need help. A step in the right direction has been made in removing obstacles standing in the way of furnishing necessary supplies; in establishing closer liaison with Navarre and in supporting the maintenance effort by sending additional U.S. maintenance personnel to Indochina. I believe that with careful handling, we can implement many of our ideas as to the conduct of the war strategically and in training matters. The machinery is in motion and my desire is to follow through in every way possible. Navarre stated that he intended to follow his plan in the conduct of the war by continuing the recovery of battalions, forming regiments and divisions, and by launching an all-out offensive in the Fall. The Vietnamese army is making progress mainly the sound action of Secretary Defense Quat.

/s/ JOHN W. O'DANIEL
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Mission

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Visit of Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel to Vietnamese Defense Minister, 1 February 1954 at Saigon.

I called on the Minister of National Defense of Vietnam, Dr. Pham Huy Quat, accompanied by the Deputy Chief of Mission who served as interpreter.

Dr. Quat told me that the plan for augmentation of the Vietnamese national forces had been approved by the High Military Committee at its meeting on January 18. This called for an increase of 66 battalions in 1954, plus 16 specialized companies. However, Dr. Quat had proposed a new system of accelerating the increase of the Vietnamese National Army. This consisted in drawing on the local militia as the initial base for recruitment to the light battalions, and the light battalions, in turn, would serve as the base for filling out the regular battalions. Dr. Quat felt that, by the adoption of his system, it would be possible to decrease the present training cycle of four months to only two months. He said that if his system were adopted (and stated that it had already received the approval of Bao Dai) he could raise 130,000 additional troops in the current calendar year.

The Minister of National Defense said that one of his great problems was that of cadres. There simply were not enough officers of field grade to go round. He had an absolute ceiling limitation of 800 French officers for the Vietnamese National Army, and a large proportion of these were employed in training activities. If, by chance, he could secure American officers as instructors, this would liberate an equivalent number of French officers for combat service.

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However, Dr. Quat added in strictest confidence that when last in Paris he had discussed this problem with Marshal Juin. The Marshal asked why the Vietnamese had not found it possible to find officers "elsewhere." Quat at that time had made a request of Defense Minister Pleven for French reserve officers, promising the pay and accoutrement of active officers in the line plus an insurance policy. However, the French replied that their reserves were very scarce in number and that most of the ex-officer personnel were now in civil life.

I inquired whether, if it met with general agreement, it would be possible to pay American reserve officers, should they seek employment in the Vietnamese National forces, at the rate of salary they had received when serving in American uniform. I likewise inquired if retired American colonels who were qualified to serve as Generals of Division could be given division command, rank and pay. The Defense Minister thought that, if the principle were accepted, means of payment and rank could be worked out.

Dr. Quat said, again in terms of strictest confidence, that he had received permission from Bao Dai to elaborate plans for development of a national militia. He said the matter was a delicate one, as it had not met with complete French acquiescence, and he requested that the matter be discussed with the French. However, his studies of how to improve the militia were almost completed, and he thought that soon His Majesty would authorize him to approach the Chief of MAAG, the American Ambassador, or the reporting officer with the request for American aid to arm, train, and equip a Vietnamese National Militia.

I queried the Minister as to what progress had been made in psychological warfare, stressing his belief that competence in this field was "half the battle" in such a war as that which prevails in Indochina.

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Dr. Quat described in detail the present psychological warfare activities undertaken in "Operation Atlanta" in the three provinces extending between Nhatrang and Hue. He said that not only were GAMO teams close behind the expeditionary force, but that a new technique was being tried for the first time in Vietnam. Hitherto the French Union and Vietnamese forces had been content to overwhelm an area and then leave it relatively empty, with the result that the Viet Minh returned to territories officially listed as "pacified." Now, however, two new systems were being tried. The first was in the treatment of villages in the line of allied advance. Instead of following the old system of obliteration, three categories of villages were recognized. The first was the village which offered all-out resistance. This was subject to all-out attack and was wiped out, either by aerial bombardment or land assault. The second class of village was one which showed sporadic resistance, and this was encircled by Vietnamese troops and called upon to surrender. Following capitulation, the inhabitants were divided into three sub-categories: those who were clearly Viet Minh and who were used for battle intelligence before being made prisoners; those who were merely suspect and who were placed in concentration camps where, by means of psychological warfare, they might be induced to come over to the Vietnamese side; and those who were clearly the mass of the people - peasants who were promptly given work, paid in good Vietnamese piasters, and set free, although still kept under surveillance. The third type of village was that which offered no resistance whatever, but on the contrary, welcomed liberation from the advancing French and Vietnamese forces. These people were given immediate assistance and an opportunity to work with prompt payment. The Minister felt that the outcome of this

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experiment in the three provinces which had been entrusted largely to Vietnamese hands would be of utmost importance in developing future guidance in the realm of psychological warfare.

In response to my question, Dr. Quat likewise indicated that his Ministry was preparing plans for training in guerrilla warfare. He was interested in the suggestion, although it did not apply specifically to Vietnam, that in the present conflict in middle Laos prompt action in bringing Laotian guerrillas, backed up by regular battalions, to confront the Viet Minh who had invaded that area might be successful in preventing the Viet Minh from settling down in these remote jungles and mountains and so establishing themselves that their eradication would prove a time-consuming and difficult problem.

The over-all impression given by Minister Quat was one of quiet self-confidence in his ability to get on with the war and to succeed in his program, provided that he had sufficient backing from the French High Command and if an increased amount of American aid, both in officer training instructors and in arms for his proposed militia, were forthcoming.

Acknowledgment for this detailed report of my meeting is made to Mr. McClintock, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Saigon.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. D.

1 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Consideration of the ROK Offer to
Send a Division to Indochina

1. In two messages, C-66980 dated 2 February 1954 (DA IN 36799) and KCG 2-4 dated 5 February 1954 (DA IN 37583), CINCFE has reported President Rhee's proposal, subject to United States concurrence, to offer a Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) division to assist the Government of Laos in resisting the Viet Minh invasion of that country. In discussing this matter with General Hull on 5 February 1954, President Rhee stated that he did not wish to make any move which would be embarrassing to the United States Government and that he would do whatever the United States Government desired him to do in this case. He felt that early action should be taken if any reinforcements are to be sent to Indochina, as the situation there appeared to him to be quite critical. He stated that, in his opinion, whatever decision is taken should be taken quickly.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the implications of this problem, and submit herewith their views in the premises.

3. Provided the withdrawal of a ROKA division from the United Nations forces in Korea for transfer to Indochina did not bring about a general movement on the part of our United Nations Allies to reduce their contingents in Korea, such a withdrawal would be acceptable from the standpoint of the military situation in Korea.

4. The augmentation of the French Union forces in Indochina by one ROKA division would not, of itself, increase their military capability vis-a-vis the Viet Minh to a degree likely to be decisive.

5. In addition to the purely military considerations, there are involved a number of important political and psychological factors having military implications which should be carefully weighed in evaluating the over-all

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effects which the introduction of a ROKA division into Indochina might have. Since the substance of President Rhee's offer has now been publicized, certain psychological benefits have probably already been realized. The political factors involved cannot be finally evaluated unless and until the reactions of our Allies in Korea are determined.

6. President Rhee does not have at his command the resources required to initiate and subsequently to support his proposed project. The French Government has repeatedly indicated that it is unable to increase above the present level its contribution to the Indochina conflict. Therefore, the material support of the project would inevitably devolve upon the United States. It follows that no matter how President Rhee's offer is presented, and no matter what the proclaimed attitude of the United States Government might be, the sponsorship of the project would be generally ascribed to the United States in the eyes of the world.

7. It is not possible to predict with any degree of dependability what the reaction of Communist China would be to the introduction of a ROKA division into Indochina. While a decision on the part of Communist China to intervene overtly in Indochina is more likely to be governed by other considerations, the entry of ROK forces into the Indochinese conflict might precipitate overt intervention by the Chinese Communists. In view of publicly announced United States policy, i.e., that open Red Chinese aggression in Indochina would have ". . . grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina." (See paragraph 4, Annex "A" to NSC 5405), implementation of President Rhee's offer could have grave military implications involving United States armed forces.

8. A direct and exclusive offer of a ROKA division to Laos would probably be regarded by the governments of the other Associated States and of France as an affront, and could cause serious embarrassment in the matter of command relationships. Furthermore, should the forces invading Laos be withdrawn by the Communists as was done in the previous instance, the employment of a ROKA division solely in Laos could develop into unprofitable garrison duty even though it freed other forces for active operations elsewhere in Indochina. Therefore, if President Rhee's offer is to be formally made, it should be addressed individually and simultaneously to the governments of France, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam with the stipulation that the ROKA division would be made available to the Commander of the French Union forces in Indochina for employment subject only to the condition that the integrity of the division be maintained.

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9. In addition to the foregoing, it is considered that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina would be attended by the following advantages and disadvantages having military implications:

Advantages

a. It would augment the present "foreign forces" of 192,000 French metropolitan and colonial troops by about 15,000 men. This would enhance the capability of the French to implement the Navarre Plan for offensive operations designed eventually to achieve a military victory, and could furnish to the French Union forces the new impetus required to accomplish this objective;

b. It could create a situation that would make it more difficult for the French to withdraw from Indochina or to negotiate a settlement with the Viet Minh of a nature prejudicial to the future freedom of the Associated States. A rejection of the offer by the French would tend to place increased onus on them to bring the Indochinese conflict to a successful military conclusion with the forces now available or planned;

c. It would represent a concrete step in fostering unity of action by anti-Communist Asiatic forces in countering Communist aggression in Asia, with immense psychological gain to the Free World;

d. It would open the way for a well-trained, battle-experienced ROKA division, by exhibiting a high standard of performance in combat, to inspire and stimulate the Vietnamese forces to greater efforts;

e. If a ROKA division performed well in Indochina, it would serve as a demonstration of the effectiveness of United States training methods in Korea, and might speed the adoption of comparable training methods in Indochina;

Disadvantages

f. It would provide President Rhee with an opportunity to exploit the situation to his own ulterior purposes. It might be his hope that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina would lead to a renewal of hostilities in Korea;

g. The burden of moving and providing logistic support for the ROKA division would most certainly devolve, directly or indirectly, on the United States. This would impose additional responsibilities, commitments, and costs on the United States Government and on the United States military

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departments. The arrangements for furnishing logistic support to the ROKA division would undoubtedly involve numerous difficulties;

h. It would add to the complications and difficulties of French command relations in Indochina.

i. It would be difficult to explain and justify to the American public the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina while still requiring the retention of United States ground forces in Korea. In all probability, serious criticism by the American public would ensue;

j. The governments allied with us in Korea would experience similar difficulties, and this would impose additional strains upon our relations with our Allies in Korea;

k. The situation would, in all likelihood, be widely exploited by Soviet bloc propaganda as a case of United States employment of hapless oriental puppets for the benefit of the white imperialists;

l. A ROKA division committed in Indochina would be fighting a type of warfare entirely new to it, under conditions of climate and terrain completely foreign to its previous experience, and without the accustomed United States advisors at hand. It would lack the incentive of fighting in the defense of its homeland. If under these conditions the performance of the division were poor or indifferent, the reputation of United States training methods would suffer accordingly;

m. The language barrier would be a considerable obstacle.

10. In the light of all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, from a military point of view and having due regard for the principal political and psychological factors having military implications, the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina at this time would not be in the best interests of the United States. Therefore the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that while President Rhee should be commended by our Government for his determination to combat communist aggression in Asia even outside the borders of Korea, he should be told that we do not consider that the transfer of a ROKA division to Indochina at this time would be in the best interests of the Free World and therefore that we request he not make a formal offer to the Laotian Government.

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11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, subject to your concurrence, the foregoing views be presented by the Department of Defense for consideration in the formulation of the United States position on this subject and in the preparation of a formal reply to President Rhee.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ Arthur Radford

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

5 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Reappraisal of General O'Daniel's
Status with Respect to Indochina

1. Subsequent to decisions made at levels above the Department of Defense concerning enlargement of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina, and appointment of a new chief thereof, information has been received which points to the need for a reappraisal of the matters involved.
2. A recent message from the United States Ambassador to Indochina, states that General Navarre informed the Ambassador that Navarre's "very willing acceptance of General O'Daniel [USA] was predicated on the understanding that the latter's functions were limited to military assistance," that "any good ideas the General or any [U.S.] officers might produce would be put into effect wherever practicable [but that] it should be clearly understood that neither O'Daniel nor MAAG was to have any powers, advisory or otherwise, in the conduct and planning of operations, or in the training of national armies and cadres."
3. Information available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to plans of the United States Government indicates that a very considerable increase in MAAG, Indochina, personnel and in the scope of its training responsibilities is contemplated. Recent messages from the U.S. Ambassador to Indochina and the U.S. Embassy, Paris, make it apparent that General Navarre would be strongly opposed to granting increased training responsibility and authority. From this it appears that the Chief, MAAG, Indochina, will not have authority, primarily the authority of command supervision, to accompany the proposed greatly increased responsibility of the MAAG. Without this capability to exercise command supervision, no training program can be assured of success. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this places a completely different complexion on the entire matter of General O'Daniel's appointment as Chief, MAAG, Indochina.

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4. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it is more essential than ever, in the interests of the United States, that this basic issue of authority commensurate with responsibility be satisfactorily resolved in advance on a governmental level and in a manner acceptable to the United States.

5. Inasmuch as this basic matter requires reconsideration, we believe that the question of the rank proposed for Lieutenant General O'Daniel, USA, as Chief, MAAG, Indochina, should be reconsidered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hold it to be distinctly detrimental to the prestige of the United States Military Services in general, and to the United States Army in particular to demote a distinguished senior United States Army officer already well and widely known in that region. The repercussions of such action in the Orient are well known.

6. In light of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The basic issue of increased responsibility of MAAG, Indochina, with respect to training be satisfactorily resolved on a governmental level, and in a manner acceptable to the United States.

b. The despatch of General O'Daniel to Indochina, and his demotion both be held in abeyance until the training issue is satisfactorily settled.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Preparation of Department of Defense
Views Regarding Negotiations on
Indochina for the Forthcoming
Geneva Conference

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum dated 5 March 1954, subject as above.

2. In their consideration of this problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA (NSC 5405), in the light of developments since that policy was approved on 16 January 1954, and they are of the opinion that, from the military point of view, the statement of policy set forth therein remains entirely valid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views concerning the strategic importance of Indochina to the security interests of the United States and the Free World in general, as reflected in NSC 5405. They are firmly of the belief that the loss of Indochina to the Communists would constitute a political and military setback of the most serious consequences.

3. With respect to the possible course of action enumerated in paragraph 2 of your memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following views:

a. Maintenance of the status quo. In the absence of a very substantial improvement in the French Union military situation, which could best be accomplished by the aggressive prosecution of military operations, it is highly improbable that Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia. Therefore, continuation of the fighting with the objective of seeking a military victory appears as the only alternative to acceptance of a

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compromise settlement based upon one or more of the possible other courses of action upon which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been specifically requested in your memorandum.

b. Imposition of a cease-fire. The acceptance of a cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory settlement would, in all probability, lead to a political stalemate attended by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position. (See paragraph 27 of NSC 5405.)

c. Establishment of a coalition government. The acceptance of a settlement based upon the establishment of a coalition government in one or more of the Associated States would open the way for the ultimate seizure of control by the Communists under conditions which might preclude timely and effective external assistance in the prevention of such seizure. (See subparagraph 26b of NSC 5405.)

d. Partition of the country. The acceptance of a partitioning of one or more of the Associated States would represent at least a partial victory for the Viet Minh, and would constitute recognition of a Communist territorial expansion achieved through force of arms. Any partition acceptable to the Communists would in all likelihood include the Tonkin Delta area which is acknowledged to be the keystone of the defense of mainland Southeast Asia, since in friendly hands it cuts off the most favorable routes for any massive southward advance towards central and southern Indochina and Thailand. (See paragraph 4 of NSC 5405.) A partitioning involving Vietnam and Laos in the vicinity of the 16th Parallel, as has been suggested (See State cable from London, No. 3802, dated 4 March 1954), would cede to Communist control approximately half of Indochina, its people and its resources, for exploitation in the interests of further Communist aggression; specifically, it would extend the Communist dominated area to the borders of Thailand, thereby enhancing the opportunities for Communist infiltration and eventual subversion of that country. Any cession of Indochinese territory to the Communists would constitute a retrogressive step in the Containment Policy, and would invite similar Communist tactics against other countries of Southeast Asia.

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e. Self-determination through free elections. Such factors as the prevalence of illiteracy, the lack of suitable educational media, and the absence of adequate communications in the outlying areas would render the holding of a truly representative plebiscite of doubtful feasibility. The Communists, by virtue of their superior capability in the field of propaganda, could readily pervert the issue as being a choice between national independence and French Colonial rule. Furthermore, it would be militarily infeasible to prevent widespread intimidation of voters by Communist partisans. While it is obviously impossible to make a dependable forecast as to the outcome of a free election, current intelligence leads the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the belief that a settlement based upon free elections would be attended by almost certain loss of the Associated States to Communist control.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any negotiated settlement which would involve substantial concessions to the Communists on the part of the Governments of France and the Associated States, such as in c and d above, would be generally regarded by Asian peoples as a Communist victory, and would cast widespread doubt on the ability of anti-Communist forces ultimately to stem the tide of Communist control in the Far East. Any such settlement would, in all probability, lead to the loss of Indochina to the Communists and deal a damaging blow to the national will of other countries of the Far East to oppose Communism.

5. Should Indochina be lost to the Communists, and in the absence of immediate and effective counteraction on the part of the Western Powers which would of necessity be on a much greater scale than that which could be decisive in Indochina, the conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer term results involving the gravest threats to fundamental United States security interests in the Far East and even to the stability and security of Europe could be expected to ensue. (See paragraph 1 of NSC 5405.)

6. Orientation of Japan toward the West is the keystone of United States policy in the Far East. In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism would, through economic and political pressures, drive Japan into an accommodation with the Communist Bloc. The communization of Japan would be the probable ultimate result.

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7. The rice, tin, rubber, and oil of Southeast Asia and the industrial capacity of Japan are the essential elements which Red China needs to build a monolithic military structure far more formidable than that of Japan prior to World War II. If this complex of military power is permitted to develop to its full potential, it would ultimately control the entire Western and South-western Pacific region and would threaten South Asia and the Middle East.

8. Both the United States and France have invested heavily of their resources toward the winning of the struggle in Indochina. Since 1950 the United States has contributed in excess of 1.6 billion dollars in providing logistic support. France is reported to have expanded, during the period 1946-1953, the equivalent of some 4.2 billion dollars. This investment, in addition to the heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese, will have been fruitless for the anti-Communist cause, and indeed may redound in part to the immediate benefit of the enemy, if control of a portion of Indochina should now be ceded to the Communists. While the additional commitment of resources required to achieve decisive results in Indochina might be considerable, nevertheless this additional effort would be far less than that which would be required to stem the tide of Communist advance once it had gained momentum in its progress into Southeast Asia.

9. If, despite all United States efforts to the contrary, the French Government elects to accept a negotiated settlement which, in the opinion of the United States, would fail to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the future political and territorial integrity of Indochina, it is considered that the United States should decline to associate itself with such a settlement, thereby preserving freedom of action to pursue directly with the governments of the Associated States and with other allies (notably the United Kingdom) ways and means of continuing the struggle against the Viet Minh in Indochina without participation of the French. The advantages of so doing would, from the military point of view, outweigh the advantage of maintaining political unity of action with the French in regard to Indochina.

10. It is recommended that the foregoing views be conveyed to the Department of State for consideration in connection with the formulation of a United States position on the Indochina problem for the forthcoming Conference and for any

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conversation with the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and, if deemed advisable, with the governments of the Associated States preliminary to the conference. In this connection, attention is particularly requested to paragraphs 25 and 26 of NSC 5405; it is considered to be of the utmost importance that the French Government be urged not to abandon the aggressive prosecution of military operations until a satisfactory settlement has been achieved.

11. It is further recommended that, in order to be prepared for possible contingencies which might arise incident to the Geneva Conference, the National Security Council considers now the extent to which the United States would be willing to commit its resources in support of the Associated States in the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists either:

- a. In concert with the French; or

b. In the event the French elect to withdraw, in concert with other allies or, if necessary, unilaterally.

12. In order to assure ample opportunity for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their views on these matters, it is requested that the Military Services be represented on the Department of Defense working team which, in coordination with the Department of State, will consider all U.S. position papers pertaining to the Geneva discussions on Indochina.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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March 17, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, NSC

SUBJECT: Military Implications of the U. S. Position on
Indochina in Geneva

1. The attached analysis and recommendations concerning the U. S. position in Geneva have been developed by a Sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Department of Defense, JCS, State, and CIA.

2. This paper reflects the conclusions of the Department of Defense and the JCS and has been collaborated with the State Department representatives who have reserved their position thereon.

3. In brief, this paper concludes that from the point of view of the U. S. strategic position in Asia, and indeed throughout the world, no solution to the Indochina problem short of victory is acceptable. It recommends that this be the basis for the U. S. negotiating position prior to and at the Geneva Conference.

4. It also notes that, aside from the improvement of the present military situation in Indochina, none of the courses of action considered provide a satisfactory solution to the Indochina war.

5. The paper notes that the implications of this position are such as to merit consideration by the NSC and the President.

6. I recommend that the Special Committee note and approve this report and forward it with the official Department of State views to the NSC.

/s/ G.B. ERSKINE

G.B. Erskine
General, USMC (Ret)
Chairman, Sub-committee
President's Special Committee

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Military Implication of U. S. Negotiations on Indochina at Geneva

I. PROBLEM

To develop a U. S. position with reference to the Geneva Conference as it relates to Indochina, encompassing the military implications of certain alternatives which might arise in connection with that conference.

II. MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Department of Defense and the JCS have reviewed NSC 5405 in the light of developments since that policy was approved from a military point of view and in the light of certain possible courses of action as they affect the Geneva Conference. These are:

1. Maintenance of the status quo in Indochina.
2. Imposition of a cease-fire in Indochina.
3. Establishment of a coalition government.
4. Partition of the country.
5. Self-determination through free elections.

B. The Department of Defense and the JCS have also considered the impact of the possible future status of Indochina on the remainder of Southeast Asia and Japan and have considered the effect which any substantial concessions to the Communists on the part of France and the Associated States would have with respect to Asian peoples as a whole and U. S. objectives in Europe.

C. Indochina is the area in which the Communist and non-Communist worlds confront one another actively on the field of battle. The loss of this battle by whatever means would have the most serious repercussions on U. S. and free world interests, not only in Asia but in Europe and elsewhere.

D. French withdrawal or defeat in Indochina would have most serious consequences on the French position in the world; the free world position in Asia; and in the U. S. on the domestic attitude vis-a-vis the French. It would, furthermore, constitute a de facto failure on the part of France to abide by its commitment in U. N. to repel aggression.

E. Unless the free world maintains its position in Indochina, the Communists will be in a position to exploit

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what will be widely regarded in Asia as a Communist victory. Should Indochina be lost to the Communists, and in the absence of immediate and effective counteraction by the free world (which would of necessity be on a much greater scale than that required to be decisive in Indochina), the conquest of the remainder of Southeast Asia would inevitably follow. Thereafter, longer term results, probably forcing Japan into an accommodation with the Communist bloc, and threatening the stability and security of Europe, could be expected to ensue.

F. As a measure of U. S. participation in the Indochinese war it is noted that the U. S. has since 1950 programmed in excess of \$2.4 billion dollars in support of the French-Associated States operations in Indochina. France is estimated to have expended during the period 1946-1953 the equivalent of some \$5.4 billion. This investment, in addition to the heavy casualties sustained by the French and Vietnamese, to say nothing of the great moral and political involvement of the U. S. and French, will have been fruitless for the anti-Communist cause if control of all or a portion of Indochina should now be ceded to the Communists.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. NSC 5405, approved January 16, 1954, states U. S. policy with respect to Indochina.

B. The French desire for peace in Indochina almost at any cost represents our greatest vulnerability in the Geneva talks.

IV. DISCUSSION

For the views of the JCS see Tab A.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. Loss of Indochina to the Communists would constitute a political and military setback of the most serious consequences and would almost certainly lead to the ultimate Communist domination of all of Southeast Asia.

B. The U. S. policy and objectives with respect to Southeast Asia as reflected in NSC 5405 remain entirely valid in the light of developments since that policy was approved.

C. With respect to possible alternative courses of action enumerated in paragraph IIA above, the Department of Defense has reached the following conclusions:

1. Maintenance of status quo in Indochina. It is highly improbable that a Communist agreement could be obtained to any negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia in the absence of a very substantial improvement in the French Union military situation. This could best be accomplished by the aggressive prosecution of military operations.

2. Imposition of a cease-fire. The acceptance of a cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory settlement would in all probability lead to a political stalemate attended by a concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position.

3. Establishment of a coalition government. The acceptance of a settlement based upon this course of action would open the way for the ultimate seizure of control by the Communists under conditions which would almost certainly preclude timely and effective external assistance designed to prevent such seizure.

4. Partition of the country. The acceptance of this course of action would represent at the least a partial victory for the Viet Minh and would constitute a retrogressive step in the attainment of U. S. policy and would compromise the achievement of that policy in Southeast Asia.

5. Self-determination through free elections. Many factors render the holding of a truly representative plebiscite infeasible and such a course of action would, in any case, lead to the loss of the Associated States to Communist control.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That the U. S. and U. K. and France reach an agreement with respect to Indochina which rejects all of the courses enumerated above (except No. 1 on the assumption that the status quo can be altered to result in a military victory) prior to the initiation of discussions on Indochina at Geneva. Failing this, the U. S. should actively oppose each of these solutions, should not entertain discussion of Indochina at Geneva, or having entertained it, should ensure that no agreements are reached.

B. If, despite all U. S. efforts to the contrary, the French Government elects to accept a negotiated settlement which fails to provide reasonably adequate assurance of the future political and territorial integrity of Indochina, the U. S. should decline to associate itself with such a

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settlement and should pursue, directly with the governments of the Associated States and with other Allies (notably the U. K.), ways and means of continuing the struggle against the Viet Minh in Indochina without participation of the French.

C. The Special Committee has reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Department of Defense and considers that the implications of this position are such as to warrant their review at the highest levels and by the National Security Council, after which they should become the basis of the U. S. position with respect to Indochina at Geneva. The Special Committee recognizes moreover that certain supplementary and alternative courses of action designed to ensure a favorable resolution of the situation in Indochina merit consideration by the NSC. These, and the Special Committee recommendations with respect thereto, are:

1. The political steps to be taken to ensure an agreed U. S.-U. K.-French position concerning Indochina at Geneva. That the NSC review the proposed political action designed to achieve this objective with particular attention to possible pressure against the French position in North Africa, and in NATO, and to the fact that discussions concerning implementation of course 2 and 3 hereunder will be contingent upon the success or failure of this course of action.

2. Overt U. S. involvement in Indochina. That the NSC determine the extent of U. S. willingness, over and above the contingencies listed in NSC 5405, to commit U. S. air, naval and ultimately ground forces to the direct resolution of the war in Indochina with or without French support and in the event of failure in course 1 above. That in this connection the NSC take cognizance of present domestic and international climate of opinion with respect to U. S. involvement and consider the initiation of such steps as may be necessary to ensure world-wide recognition of the significance of such steps in Indochina as a part of the struggle against communist aggression.

3. The development of a substitute base of operations. That the NSC consider whether this course of action is acceptable as a substitute for 1 and 2 above and recognizing that the hope of implementation thereof would be one of major expenditure and long-term potential only.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

March 23, 1954

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to a recommendation of the Under Secretary of State, the Department of Defense has considered the military implications of a negotiated settlement to terminate the hostilities in Indochina. The views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter were submitted to me in a memorandum dated March 12, 1954. These views, together with the views of General G. B. Erskine, USMC (Ret), Chairman of the Subcommittee of the President's Special Committee, were submitted to the Special Committee in a memorandum dated March 17, 1954. It is understood that the Department of State is presently considering General Erskine's report.

I am fully in accord with General Erskine's recommendations and the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this matter. Accordingly, there is forwarded herewith for your information a copy of the aforementioned documents which represent the views of the Department of Defense. It is recommended that these views be carefully considered in preparation of the United States position on Indochina for the forthcoming conference at Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ C.E. WILSON

C. E. Wilson

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COPY NO. 16

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington, D.C.

CM-74-54
29 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
INDO-CHINA;

SUBJECT: Discussions with General Paul Ely.

1. During the period 20-24 March I conducted a series of discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the situation in Indo-China. I am setting forth herein a summary report of these discussions with particular relation to those items which were included in Phase A report submitted by the Special Committee.

2. General Ely requested urgent action for the United States to effect early delivery of various items of material that had previously been requested through the MAAG-Indo-China. These requests were all met to the satisfaction of General Ely with exception of:

a. 14 C-47 aircraft which are in critical supply and were not in the urgent category.

b. 20 helicopters and 80 additional U.S. maintenance personnel. An alternative solution is now being worked out through routine channels.

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3. In connection with the foregoing is the solution that was evolved to meet the French request for 25 additional B-26 aircraft for a third squadron. There is no doubt that French capabilities for maintenance and aircraft utilization fall far short of acceptable standards and that the supply of additional aircraft alone is not the remedy to inadequate air power in Indo-China. However, in view of the importance of the morale factor at the present time in relation to the struggle for Dien Bien Phu, it was agreed, and the President has approved, to lend the French these aircraft. Certain conditions were imposed which General Ely accepted:

a. A special inspection team headed by an Air Force General Officer would proceed to Indo-China immediately to examine French maintenance, supply problems, and utilization of U.S. aircraft furnished the French. A report will be made to the Secretary of Defense with a copy being given to General Navarre.

b. The aircraft will be returned to the U.S. Air Force at the end of the current fighting season about the end of May, or earlier if required for service in Korea. Decision as to permanent acceptance and support of the third B-26 squadron will be made after the report of the special examination (para 3 a above) has been analyzed.

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4. General Ely informed me that steps had been taken by the French Air Force to supply additional aviation mechanics to Indo-China and to replace our 200 U.S. Air Force mechanics along the following lines:

a. The tour of duty of 200 French mechanics due for early return to France is being extended two months. This will permit the operation of the 25 additional B-26s without need for more U.S. personnel. 15 Air crews now in training in France and North Africa are being sent by air to Indo-China.

b. Fifty mechanics are being sent from France within the next month and beginning 1 June, one hundred additional per month will be sent to a total of 450.

c. The 200 U.S. Air Force mechanics can be released "within 8 days of 15 June".

5. General Ely raised the question of obtaining authorization to use the C-119 transports to drop napalm at Dien Bien Phu. Although the U.S. does not expect spectacular results, this was approved on condition:

a. No U.S. crews were involved.

b. The French high command requested the diversion of this air lift capability to meet the emergency situation at Dien Bien Phu.

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6. I presented to General Ely our views in regard to expanding the MAAG to assist the French in training the Vietnamese, indicating to him the importance which we attach to this action, first, to obtain better results, secondly to release French officers for combat service. General Ely was most unsympathetic to any encroachment on French responsibilities or significant expansion of the MAAG. The reasons given related to French "prestige", possible lack of confidence in French leadership by the Vietnamese, "the political situation in France" etc. The only commitments I was able to get from General Ely were;

a. He would urge General Navarre to be most sympathetic to the advice given by the officers recently assigned to MAAG (such as Colonel Rosson).

b. He would request General Navarre to discuss the utilization of U.S. staff officers with General O'Daniel "on the spot in a broad, understanding and comprehensive manner". I would make a similar request of General O'Daniel.

c. He would make some informal soundings in Paris on the subject of increased U.S. participation in training and would communicate further with me - informally - through General Valluy.

I conclude that the French are disposed firmly to resist any delegation of training responsibilities to the U.S. MAAG.

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7. Much the same attitude was manifested by General Ely in regard to U.S. operations in the fields of psychological, clandestine and guerrilla warfare. No commitment was obtained except that General Ely would discuss the matter with Mr. Allen Dulles (which he did).

8. General Ely submitted a request in writing, copy attached as Enclosure "A", as to what action the U.S. would take if aircraft based in China intervened in Indo-China. I exchanged the following agreed minute with him on this matter:

"In respect to General Ely's memorandum of 23 March 1954, it was decided that it was advisable that military authorities push their planning work as far as possible so that there would be no time wasted when and if our governments decided to oppose enemy air intervention over Indo-China if it took place; and to check all planning arrangements already made under previous agreements between CINCPAC and the CINC Indo-China and send instructions to those authorities to this effect."

9. The particular situation at Dien Bien Phu was discussed in detail. General Ely indicated that the chance for success was, in his estimate, "50-50". He discounted any possibility of sending forces overland to relieve the French Garrison. He recognized the great political and psychological importance of the outcome both in Indo-China and in France but considered that Dien Bien Phu, even if lost, would be a military victory

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for the French because of the cost to the Viet Minh and the relatively greater loss to the Viet Minh combat forces. Politically and psychologically the loss of Dien Bien Phu would be a very serious setback to the French Union cause, and might cause unpredictable repercussions both in France and Indo-China.

10. In regard to the general situation in Indo-China General Ely's views were essentially as follows. The loss of Indo-China would open up all of South East Asia to ultimate Communist domination. Victory in Indo-China is as much a political as a military matter. The French hope to get agreement with the Viet Nam in current discussions in Paris which will implement the July 3rd declaration and lead to more enthusiastic cooperation and participation in the war by the Vietnamese. They hope also to get more positive leadership from Bao Dai who, at this time, is the only potential native leader. From the more optimistic point of view, assuming that Dien Bien Phu was held and native support assured, he expected that military successes but not total military victory would be achieved in 1954-1955, following the broad concept of the Navarre Plan and within presently programmed resources. Ultimate victory will require the creation of a strong indigenous army, extending operations to the north and west, manning and defending the Chinese frontier and the commitment of resources greatly in excess of those which France alone can supply. He envisages some sort of a coalition or regional security arrangement by the nations of South East Asia.

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11. I raised with General Ely the question of promoting General Navarre in order that General O'Daniel might retain his rank of Lt. General without embarrassment to Navarre. General Ely made no commitment, pointing out that rank in the French Army resulted from a Cabinet action depending upon seniority. He indicated that the Cabinet might possibly consider a promotion for General Navarre if Dien Bien Phu was held.

12. General Ely made quite a point of explaining in "great frankness" actions on the part of the United States which were causes of friction. Those mentioned specifically were:

a. Americans acted as if the United States sought to control and operate everything of importance; that this was particularly true at lower levels and in connection with FCA operations.

b. The United States appears to have an invading nature as they undertake everything in such great numbers of people.

c. French think that McCarthyism is prevalent in the U.S. and actually is akin to Hitlerism.

d. Americans do not appreciate the difficulties under which the French must operate as a result of two devastating wars.

e. Many Americans appear to favor Germany over France.

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f. U.S. administrative procedures are enormously wasteful, irritating and paper heavy.

g. In Germany the U.S. forces have the benefit of better weapons and most modern techniques, whereas the French forces do not.

h. In connection with offshore procurement, the U.S. appeared to lack confidence in the French in the manufacture of most modern weapons and equipment.

I endeavored to set the record straight on each of these particulars and stressed the fact that Americans were growing very impatient with France over its lack of action on the EDC and German rearmament and French tendencies to overemphasize their prestige and sensitivities.

13. General Ely indicated that the leaders of the present French Government were fully aware of the importance of denying Indo-China to the Communists and the prevention of Communist domination of South East Asia. He stated that they would take a strong position at the Geneva Conference but, inasmuch as France could make no concessions to Communist China, they looked to the United States for assistance as the United States could contribute action that the Communist Chinese sought, i. e., recognition and relaxation of trade controls.

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14. During the course of the discussions General Ely stressed that, from the military standpoint, one of the major deficiencies in Indo-China was offensive air power. I took this opportunity to pose the proposition of incorporating an air component within the framework of the Foreign Legion or alternatively forming an International Volunteer Air Group for operations in Indo-China. General Ely manifested casual interest but made no commitment to do more than consider the matter further on his return to Paris.

15. As I stated in a brief memorandum to the President, copy attached as Enclosure "B", I am gravely fearful that the measures being undertaken by the French will prove to be inadequate and initiated too late to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation in Indo-China. If Dien Bien Phu is lost, this deterioration may occur very rapidly due to the loss of morale among the mass of the native population. In such a situation only prompt and forceful intervention by the United States could avert the loss of all of South East Asia to Communist domination. I am convinced that the United States must be prepared to take such action

/s/ ARTHUR RADFORD

ARTHUR RADFORD
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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ENCLOSURE "A"

Washington, 23 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL ARTHUR W. RADFORD
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

FROM: GENERAL PAUL ELY

The absence of enemy air has been a characteristic of the military situation in Indochina since the beginning of operations. Therefore, an enemy air intervention would carry grave consequences.

On the other hand, the lack of jettable airfields in Vietminh controlled areas leads to the conclusion that any intervention by modern aircrafts would start from Chinese territory.

Without prejudging decisions of a general nature which our governments could take in the event of an air aggression starting from China, it seems to me it will be of some use to study the best way of limiting the effects that such an attack might have on the French Air Force units and on the Corps Expeditionnaire even if it were carried out by aircraft of a doubtful nationality; this last assumption has not been made so far.

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Can direct intervention by U.S. aircraft be envisaged and, if such is the case, how would it take place?

Contacts have already been made in the past by CINCPAC and the French CinC Indochina on this problem. I feel they ought to be renewed and pave the way for more precise studies and more detailed staff agreements with a view to limiting the air risk which characterizes the present situation.

/s/ P. ELY

Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington, D. C.

24 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Discussions with General Ely relative to the situation in Indo-China.

1. During the period 20-24 March I conducted a series of discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the situation in Indo-China. In addition, General Ely conferred with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA and the U.S. Military Representative to NATO.

2. General Ely requested urgent action to make early delivery of various items of material that had previously been requested through the MAAG Indo-China. These were all arranged to the satisfaction of General Ely except for 14 C-47 transport aircraft which are in critical supply and did not come in the urgent category. Noteworthy is the supply of 25 additional B-26s for a third squadron which will be furnished immediately on a temporary loan basis. A recent request for 20 helicopters and 80 additional U.S. maintenance personnel was discussed and he was informed that it was not possible to grant the request at this time.

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3. General Ely made no significant concessions in response to suggestions which would improve the situation in Indo-China. He explained French difficulties involving domestic problems and maintenance of prestige as basic reasons for his non-concurrence. He agreed to explore informally the possibility of accepting limited U.S. assistance in training the Vietnamese, but is generally in opposition.

4. General Ely submitted a request in writing as to what action the U.S. would take if aircraft based in China intervened in Indo-China. No commitment was made. The matter is being referred to the Secretary of State.

5. General Ely affirmed the gravity of the situation at Dien Bien Phu stating the outcome as 50-50, and emphasized the great importance of that battle from the political and psychological standpoint. In this I am in full accord but share the doubts of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the adequacy of the measures being taken by General Navarre. He was given approval to use C-119 transport aircraft to drop Napalm provided no U.S. crews were involved.

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6. General Ely expressed the view that military successes but not total military victory were to be expected in 1954-1955, with the presently programmed resources in pursuance of the Navarre Plan. He considers the problem in Indo-China to be political as well as military. Ultimate victory will require the independence of the Associated States, development of a strong indigenous army, manning and defending the Chinese frontier and commitment of resources greatly in excess of those which France can supply. He envisages some sort of coalition by the nations of S. E. Asia.

7. As a result of the foregoing conferences I am gravely fearful that the measures being taken by the French will prove to be inadequate and initiated too late to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation. The consequences can well lead to the loss of all of S. E. Asia to Communist domination. If this is to be avoided, I consider that the U.S. must be prepared to act promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated request by the French for U.S. intervention.

/s/ ARTHUR RADFORD

Enclosure "B"

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Department of State

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FYI We were disturbed at Berlin by Eden's position on Indochina which was in effect that this was problem between US and France, with the UK standing on sidelines as an uninterested party, situation which actually encouraged French seek negotiated settlement. This was not only unhelpful but unrealistic, since if Indochina goes, Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand will be directly threatened (areas where UK has definite responsibilities), as will be Burma, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and over period of time Japan and whole off-shore island chain.

It seems to us one of best ways keep French from taking any steps which might prove disastrous re Indochina is for US and UK have solid alignment and let French know we will not only not be party to but will actively oppose any solution of any kind which directly or indirectly in near future or over period of time could lead to loss Indochina to Communists. To bring UK to greater recognition its own responsibilities, we are talking very frankly to Australians and New Zealanders here regarding problem (which involves their vital security) in hope they will press British stand firmly with us on above fundamental principles. Secretary also is calling in Makins (who is absent from town) April 2 and will impress upon him forcefully our

Dist. Desired

(Offices Only)

Drafted by:

C: D MacArthur
EUR: R: RMCBride: em 3/31/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

Douglas MacArthur
Douglas MacArthur

Clearance:

Cleared in substance with Secretary
EUR - Mr. Merchant
FE - Mr. Robertson
BNA - Mr. Raynor

S/S - CR

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Page 2 of telegram to Ambassy LONDON

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views. End FYI

With above in mind and following Secretary's talk with Makins which will be reported to you, you should see Eden and reiterate to him our position along following lines:

1. We clearly understood from Bidault at Berlin that our agreement to discuss Indochina at Geneva was on condition France would not agree to any arrangement which would directly or indirectly result turnover area to Communists. We presume British because of vital security interests in area as well as their role in free world would solidly support this position.
2. Our views on any special position for Communist China at Geneva have already been made clear (DEPTEL 4982 repeated Paris as 3340).
3. Our basic position on Communist China is contained in Secretary's March 29 speech of which you should give copy to Eden if you have not already, particularly emphasizing eighth paragraph from end in which is contained following sentence: "We shall not however be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us merely to buy its promises of future good behavior."
4. Insofar as development US position is concerned, our preliminary views on substance and procedure contained numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 DEPTEL 3401 to Paris (repeated London 5067, Saigon 1814) and these views should also be conveyed Eden.
5. We believe it essential at this time have understanding above basic points on which we would hope for strong British support with French.
6. Re foregoing DEPTEL 3353 to Paris repeated London as 5079 also provides further guidance.

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OUTGOING
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Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
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SENT TO: AMEMBASSY PARIS 3476
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5175

Origin

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EYES ONLY DILLON AND ALDRICH

FYI Following are main points made by Secretary in long conversation with Bonnet this morning.

1) We see no prospect of negotiated settlement at Geneva which does not boil down to one of following alternatives: (a) Face-saving formula to cover surrender of French Union forces, or (b) Face-saving formula to cover surrender of Viet Minh.

2) Division of Indochina impractical. QUOTE Mixed UNQUOTE government would be beginning of disaster. Both would lead to (a).

3) In addition to consequences in Southeast Asia solution (a) would create gravest difficulties for France in Europe and North Africa. Future of France as great power is at stake.

4) If we are strong and resolute enough to make Chinese Communists see clearly that their conquest of

Southeast

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REV

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Drafted by:

4/3/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

EJR:JCHBonbright:mls

James C. H. Bonbright

SS - Mr. Van Hollen

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Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassy Paris; AmEmbassy London

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Southeast Asia will not be permitted without danger of extending war they may desist and accept (b).

5) This requires strong coalition of nations (U.S., France, Associated States, U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines) who will recognize threat to their vital interests in area and will be prepared to fight if necessary. This presupposes continuation of French military effort in Indochina.

6) If coalition established U.S. would play its full part.

7) Establishment and announcement of coalition should precede Geneva in order permit us to go there with position of strength.

8) Although UN action not excluded and UN would in any event need to be notified in some formal way, we probably could not count on it. (Soviet veto in SC and long drawn debate in Assembly.)

9) Formal approach to other governments will depend on French desires.

10) Bonnet said he would report immediately to his Government and seek their views.

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Department of State

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RPTD INFO Amembassy PARIS 3478

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EYES ONLY ALDRICH AND DILLON

790.5/4154 ^{RS}

Secretary saw Makins late April 2 and discussed Indochina

problem along same general lines his talk April 3 with Bonnet
5090 to London rptd Paris 3418 and DEPTTEL 3476 to Paris,
(see Department's /). Makins indicated our thinking
5175 to London).
considerably more advanced than British which had apparently
not yet gone beyond examination of possible political solutions
Indochina under existing conditions.

Partition seemed to London least undesirable settlement
according Makins but it was clear UK had not yet developed thoughts
for dealing positively and constructively with situation which would
confront us if French determined to sell out.

Secretary emphasized to Makins essentiality of UK and US before
and at Geneva maintaining solid front to stiffen French attitude.

Makins agreed latter point and promised report entire talk fully
and urgently. He suggested desirability British military
representative here talking promptly to our Chiefs which Secretary
said had best wait till later next week.

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-2- 3710, April 5, 1 a.m., from Paris.

Second. Special telephone lines installed maintained and operated by Chinese personnel.

Third. Forty 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns radar-controlled at Dien Bien Phu. These guns operated by Chinese and evidently are from Korea. These AA guns are now shooting through clouds, to bring down French aircraft.

Fourth. One thousand supply trucks of which 500 have arrived since 1 March, all driven by Chinese army personnel.

Fifth. Substantial material help in guns, shells, etc., as is well known.

Bidault said that French Chief of Air Staff wished US be informed that US air intervention at Dien Bien Phu could lead to Chinese Communist air attack on delta airfields. Nevertheless, government was making request for aid.

Bidault closed by saying that for good or evil the fate of Southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu. He said that Geneva would be won or lost depending on outcome at Dien Bien Phu. this was reason for French request for this very serious action on our part.

He then emphasized necessity for speed in view of renewed attack which is expected before end of week. He thanked US for prompt action on airlift for French paratroops. He then said that he had received Dulles' proposal for Southeast Asian coalition, and that he would answer as soon as possible later in week as restricted Cabinet session not competent to make this decision.

New Subject. I passed on Norstad's concern that news of airlift (DEPTEL 3470, April 3) might leak as planes assembled, Plevin was called into room. He expressed extreme concern as any leak would lead to earlier Viet Minh attack. He said at all costs operation must be camouflaged as training exercise until troops have arrived. He is preparing them as rapidly as possible and they will be ready to leave in a week. Bidault and Laniel pressed him to hurry up departure date of troops and he said he would do his utmost.

DILLON

AB:MRS/12

NOTE: This message was read by Mr. MacArthur (C) at 10:15 p.m. and he informed the Secretary, Under Secretary Smith, Mr. Merchant (EUR) and Admiral Radford at 10:30 p.m.
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COPY NO. 17

SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

April 5, 1954

NSC ACTION NO. 1074-a
(Revision of Report distributed April 3)

Problem

1. To analyze the extent to which, and the circumstances and conditions under which, the United States would be willing to commit its resources in support of the effort to prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists, in concert with the French or in concert with others or, if necessary, unilaterally.

Issues Involved

2. The answer to this problem involves four issues:

a. Will Indochina be lost to the Communists unless the United States commits combat resources in some form?

b. What are the risks, requirements and consequences of alternative forms of U. S. military intervention?

c. Should the United States adopt one of these forms of intervention rather than allow Indochina to be lost to the Communists and if so which alternative should it choose?

d. When and under what circumstances should this decision be taken and carried into effect?

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Prospect of Loss of Indochina

3. The first issue turns on whether the French Union can and will prevent the loss of Indochina and what further actions, if any, the United States can take to bolster or assist the French effort. Some of these questions were covered by the Report of the Special Committee of March 17, 1954. Others are matters of continuous intelligence estimates. At the present time there is clearly a possibility that a trend in the direction of the loss of Indochina to Communist control may become irreversible over the next year in the absence of greater U.S. participation. There is not, however, any certainty that the French have as yet reached the point of being willing to accept a settlement which is unacceptable to U.S. interests or to cease their military efforts. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of the fight at Dienbienphu, there is no indication that a military decision in Indochina is imminent. It is clear that the United States should undertake a maximum diplomatic effort to cause the French and Associated States to continue the fight to a successful conclusion.

Risks, Requirements, and Consequences of U.S. Intervention

4. The attached Annex addresses itself to the second issue: The risks, requirements and consequences of certain alternative forms of U.S. military intervention. In order to permit analysis of military requirements and allied and hostile

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reactions, this annex assumes that there will be either:

(1) a French and Associated States invitation to the United States to participate militarily; or (2) an Associated States invitation to the United States after a French decision to withdraw, and French willingness to cooperate in phasing out French forces as U. S. forces are phased in. If neither of these assumptions proved valid the feasibility of U. S. intervention would be vitiated. If the French, having decided on withdrawal and a negotiated settlement, should oppose U. S. intervention and should carry the Associated States with them in such opposition, U. S. intervention in Indochina would in effect be precluded. If, after a French decision to withdraw, the Associated States should appeal for U. S. military assistance but the French decided not to cooperate in the phasing in of U. S. forces, a successful U. S. intervention would be very difficult.

Desirability and Form of U. S. Intervention

5. The third issue is whether the United States should intervene with combat forces rather than allow Indochina to be lost to the Communists, and which alternative it should select?

a. U. S. commitment of combat forces would involve strain on the basic western coalition, increased risk of war with China and of general war, high costs in U. S.

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manpower and money, and possible adverse domestic political repercussions. Moreover, the United States would be undertaking a commitment which it would have to carry through to victory. In whatever form it might intervene, the U.S. would have to take steps at the outset to guard against the risks inherent in intervention. On the other hand, under the principles laid down in NSC 5405, it is essential to U.S. security that Indochina should not fall under Communist control.

b. Of the alternative courses of action described in the Annex, Course A or B has these advantages over Course C. Neither Course A or B depends on the initial use of U.S. ground forces. For this reason alone, they obviously would be much more acceptable to the American public. For the same reason, they would initially create a less serious drain on existing U.S. military forces. But either Course A or B may turn out to be ineffective without the eventual commitment of U.S. ground force.

c. A political obstacle to Course A or Course B lies in the fact that the present French effort is considered by many in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world as essentially colonial or imperialist in character. If the United States joined its combat forces in the Indochina conflict, it would be most important to attempt

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to counteract or modify the present view of this struggle. This would also be essential in order to mobilize maximum support for the war within Indochina.

d. An advantage of Course B over Course A lies in the association of the Asian States in the enterprise which would help to counteract the tendency to view Indochina as a colonial action. There would be advantages in Course B also in that U.S. opinion would be more favorable if the other free nations and the Asian nations were also taking part and bearing their fair share of the burden.

e. As between UN and regional support it appears that regional grouping would be preferable to UN action, on the ground that UN support would be far more difficult to get and less likely to remain solid until the desired objective was reached.

6. In order to make feasible any regional grouping, it will be essential for the United States to define more clearly its own objectives with respect to any such action. In particular, it would be important to make perfectly clear that this action is not intended as a first step of action to destroy or overthrow Communist China. If the other members of a potential regional grouping thought that we had such a broad objective, they would doubtless be hesitant to join in it. The Western powers would not want to increase the risks of

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general war which would, in their opinion, flow from any such broad purpose. The Asian countries would be equally reluctant to engage in any such broad activity. Both groups would doubtless want to make very clear that we object essentially to the expansionist tendencies of Communist China and that, if those ceased, we would not go further in attempting to carry on military activities in the Far East. Furthermore, to attract the participation of Asian States in a regional grouping, the United States would undoubtedly have to undertake lasting commitments for their defense.

Timing and Circumstances of Decision to Intervene with U.S. Combat Forces

7. The timing of the disclosure or implementation of any U.S. decision to intervene in Indochina would be of particular importance.

a. In the absence of serious military deterioration in Indochina, it is unlikely that France will agree to the arrangements envisaged in Alternatives A, B, or C in light of the hopes widely held in France and elsewhere than an acceptable settlement can be achieved.

b. On the other hand, inaction until after exhaustive discussions at Geneva, without any indication of U.S. intentions, would tend to increase the chance of the French government and people settling, or accepting the

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inevitability of settling, on unacceptable terms. Hints of possible U.S. participation would tend to fortify French firmness, but might also tend to induce the Communists to put forward more acceptable terms.

c. On balance, it appears that the United States should now reach a decision whether or not to intervene with combat forces, if that is necessary to save Indochina from Communist control, and, tentatively, the form and conditions of any such intervention. The timing for communication to the French of such decision, or for its implementation, should be decided in the light of future developments.

8. If the United States should now decide to intervene at some stage, the United States should now take these steps:

a. Obtain Congressional approval of intervention.

b. Initiate planning of the military and mobilization measures to enable intervention.

c. Make publicized U.S. military moves designed to make the necessary U.S. air and naval forces readily available for use on short notice.

d. Make maximum diplomatic efforts to make it clear, as rapidly as possible, that no acceptable settlement can be reached in the absence of far greater Communist concessions than are now envisaged.

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g. Explore with major U.S. allies --- notably the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, and with as many Asian nations as possible, such as Thailand and the Philippines, and possibly Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, and Burma --- the formation of a regional grouping.

1. Exert maximum diplomatic efforts with France and the Associated States designed to (1) bring about full agreement between them, if possible prior to Geneva, on the future status of the Associated States; (2) prepare them to invite U.S. and if possible group participation in Indochina, if necessary.

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ANNEX

I. GENERAL

Scope of This Annex

1. This Annex seeks to assess the risks, requirements, and consequences of alternative forms of U. S. military intervention in Indochina.

Objective of U. S. Intervention in Indochina

2. The immediate objective of U. S. military intervention in any form would be the destruction of organized Vietminh forces by military action limited to the area of Indochina, in the absence of overt Chinese Communist intervention. However, whether or not the action can be limited to Indochina once U. S. forces and prestige have been committed, disengagement will not be possible short of victory.

Risk of Expanding the War

3. The increased risk of such Chinese Communist intervention is assessed under each alternative form of U. S. military intervention. U. S. action in the event that the Chinese Communists overtly intervene in Indochina is covered by existing policy (NSC 5405).

4. The implications of U. S. intervention go far beyond the commitment and support of the military requirements identified below under the several alternative courses. To meet the increased risk of Chinese Communist intervention and possibly of general war, measures must be taken inside

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the United States and in areas other than Indochina to improve the defense posture of the United States. Military measures would include the increased readiness of the existing forces and the re-positioning of U. S. forces outside the United States. Domestic measures would include those outlined below under "Mobilization Implications." A re-examination and possibly complete revision of U. S. budgetary and fiscal policies would be required.

Availability of Military Forces

5. The military forces required to implement the various courses of action described in this paper are presently assigned missions in support of other U. S. objectives. A decision to implement any of these courses would necessitate a diversion of forces from present missions. It would also require the mobilization of additional forces to assume the functions of the diverted forces and to meet the increased risk of general war. The foregoing is particularly true with respect to U. S. ground forces.

Mobilization Implications

6. All the domestic consequences of U. S. intervention cannot be forecast, being dependent on such factors as the degree of opposition encountered, the duration of the conflict and the extent to which other countries may participate, but in varying degree some or all of the following steps may become necessary:

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- a. Increase in force levels and draft quotas.
- b. Increase and acceleration of military production.
- c. Acceleration of stockpile programs.
- d. Reimposition of materials and stabilization controls.
- e. Speed-up of readiness measures for all continental defense programs.

Whether or not general mobilization should be initiated, either at the outset or in the course of U. S. intervention, is a major question for determination.

Use of Nuclear Weapons

7. Nuclear weapons will be available for use as required by the tactical situation and as approved by the President. The estimated forces initially to be supplied by the United States under the alternatives in this paper are based on the assumption of availability. If such weapons are not available, the force requirements may have to be modified. The political factors involved in the use of nuclear weapons are assessed under the various alternatives*.

Political Conditions

8. U. S. military intervention in concert with the French should be conditioned upon satisfactory political

* State considers the military effect of use or non-use of nuclear weapons should be made clear in the estimates of military requirements to assist in making a decision.

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grant independence
cooperation from the French and French agreement to grant independence to the Associated States in a form that will contribute to their maximum participation in the war. The Associated States undoubtedly would not invite U. S. or allied intervention without lasting guarantees of territorial integrity. U. S. contribution to a full-scale reconstruction and development program in Indochina must also be anticipated.

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II. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF COMMITMENT OF U. S.
COMBAT FORCES FOR OPERATION IN INDOCHINA

A. In Concert with the French

Assumptions

11. The Associated States and France invite the military participation of the United States.

12. It is impracticable to organize a UN or regional military effort.

13. The military situation in Indochina is approximately as at present, i.e., stalemate with elements of deterioration.

14. France and the Associated States will carry forward the scale of military effort envisaged in the Laniel-Navarre Plan.

Military Requirements

15. Estimated forces to be supplied by U. S. initially.

a. Ground forces - (None, provided French Union forces afford adequate security for local defense of U. S. forces in Indochina.)

b. Naval forces - (Total personnel strength of 35,000)

(1) 1 carrier task group plus additional units consisting of:

Amphibious lift for 1 RCT

Minecraft

Underway replenishment group

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c. Air Force forces - (Total personnel strength of 8,600)

(1) 1 fighter wing (3 sqdns with integral air defense capability)

(2) 1 light bomber wing

(3) 1 troop carrier wing

(4) 1 tactical control sqdn.

(5) 1 tactical recon. sqdn.

16. Command Arrangements: Theater Command

a. This should be U. S., since this command must be a combined as well as a joint command and U. S. commanders have had considerably more experience in commanding combined and joint commands. Further, should it become necessary to introduce U. S. ground forces, it would be much better to have a U. S. commander already operating as theater commander rather than effect a change at the time U. S. ground forces become involved. All services of the United States, France, and the Associated States will have representatives at the combined headquarters. Similar representation will be necessary at the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to be established.

b. Political considerations and the preponderance of French Union forces may dictate the assignment of theater command to the French, at least during the early

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phase of U. S. participation.

17. Logistic Requirements: This course of action can be logistically supported with the following effects:

a. No delay to NATO deliveries.

b. No drain on Army logistic reserves, negligible drain on Air Force logistic reserves, a partial drain on certain logistic reserves of the Navy, particularly aircraft and ammunition.

c. Some Navy production schedule increases in aircraft and ammunition (depending on extent of operations), some increases in Air Force production schedule with emphasis on ammunition, no effect on Army production schedules.

d. No additional facilities at bases in Indochina required.

18. The training of indigenous forces is crucial to the success of the operation. The United States should therefore insist on an understanding with the French which will insure the effective training of the necessary indigenous forces required including commanders and staff personnel at all levels. The United States must be prepared to make contributions of funds, materials, instructors and training devices as agreed with the French. A United States program for the development of indigenous forces would stress the organization of divisional size units. The battalion organization does not particularly well fit the approved

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concept for operations formulated by General Navarre, nor does it represent the best return in striking power for the manpower investment made. A reasonable, attainable goal in Associated States forces which the United States might develop and train is on the order of 330,000 (an increase of 100,000 over the present forces.) This would be accomplished by a re-organization of the presently formed battalions into divisions followed by further training stressing regimental and divisional exercises. New units would be developed as necessary to complete the program.

Political Aspects

19. French Reaction: The French would expect U. S. military participation in Indochina:

a. To relieve them from the prospect of defeat or failure in Indochina and to this extent they would welcome U. S. intervention.

b. To highlight the inability of the French to handle the situation alone, with resultant weakening of the general international position of France.

c. To lead to a strengthening of the position of the Associated States as against the French, and a weakening of the French Union concept.

d. To tend to result in channeling U. S. support for the Indochina war directly to the theater of operations, thus reducing the financial benefits to metropolitan France.

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e. To increase the risk of Chinese Communist intervention and, through a series of actions and counteractions, to increase the risk of general war with the USSR.

On balance, the French would prefer to find a solution of the Indochina problem which did not involve U. S. military participation, although such solution might in our opinion risk the ultimate loss of Indochina. In the event of U. S. military participation the French could be expected to attempt progressively to shift the military burden of the war to the United States, either by withdrawing their forces or failing to make good attrition.

20. Associated States Reaction: The Associated States would not be interested in U. S. intervention unless they were satisfied (1) such intervention would be on a scale which seemed adequate to assure defeat of the Vietminh organized military forces and to deter Chinese Communist aggression, and (2) the United States would assume lasting responsibility for their political independence and territorial integrity. On these terms non-Communist Indochinese leaders would welcome U. S. intervention, and would be unlikely to succumb to Communist peace proposals. The war-weary Indochinese people, however, might be less favorable, particularly if U. S. intervention came at a time when an end to the fighting seemed otherwise in sight. The Associated States would expect to profit from U. S. intervention in terms of

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increased independence from the French, and would constantly seek to enlist U. S. influence in bolstering their position vis-a-vis France. The Indochinese, however, would be worried over the possibility that U. S. intervention might invite Chinese Communist reaction and make Indochina a battleground of destruction on the Korean scale. Accordingly, they would be expected to oppose the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina.

21. Free World Reaction: The U.K., apprehensive of the possibility of war with Communist China, would approve a U. S. intervention in Indochina only if convinced that it was necessary for the prevention of further expansion of Communist power in Asia. Australia and New Zealand would fully support such a U. S. action, and Canada to a lesser extent. Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea would welcome U. S. intervention in Indochina, since both would hope that this would lead to general war between the United States and Communist China. President Rhee, in particular, might be tempted to believe that his chances of involving the United States in a renewal of Korean hostilities were greatly enhanced. Thailand, if assured of U. S. guarantees of adequate permanence would probably permit the use of Thai territory and facilities. The Philippines would support U. S. intervention. Japan would lend unenthusiastic diplomatic support. India and Indonesia strongly, and Ceylon and Burma to a lesser extent, would disapprove U. S. intervention. Other members of the Arab-Asian bloc would be unsympathetic

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especially because of seeming U. S. support for French colonialism. The NATO countries, other than those mentioned above, would generally support U. S. military action, but their support would be tempered by fear of expansion of the hostilities and the effect on the NATO build-up. The attitude of most of the Latin American countries would tend to be non-committal.

22. Free World Reaction in the Event of U. S. Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons: U. S. allies would almost certainly consider that use by the U. S. of nuclear weapons in Indochina (a) would remove the last hope that these weapons would not be used again in war, and (b) would substantially increase the risk of general war. Our allies would, therefore, doubt the wisdom of the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and this doubt would develop into strong disapproval if nuclear weapons were used without their being consulted or against their wishes. On the other hand, France and, if consulted, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly the Netherlands, might support such action but only if convinced by the U. S. that such action was essential to keep Southeast Asia from falling under Communist control and to preserve the principle of collective security. Other NATO governments, if similarly consulted would probably not publicly disapprove of such U. S. action, if they were persuaded during consultation that such action was essential to prevent collapse of the collective security system. Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea would probably approve such action in the hope that this would

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result in general war between the U. S. and Communist China. Japan would almost certainly publicly disapprove. Most Asian states and those of the Arab Bloc would probably object strongly to such U. S. action. Certain of these nations led by India, would almost certainly seek to have the UN censure the U. S.

23. Soviet Bloc Reaction:

a. The Communist Bloc would almost certainly seek to create differences between the United States and the French, and for this purpose would probably put forward "plausible" peace offers to the greatest extent possible in the light of the Geneva Conference. It is unlikely, in the first instance, that the USSR would take any direct military action in response to U. S. participation in the Indochina war. The Soviet Union would, however, continue to furnish to the Chinese Communists military assistance for Viet-minh utilization in Indochina.

b. The Chinese Communists probably would not immediately intervene openly, either with regular or "volunteer" forces, but would substantially increase all other kinds of support. However, if confronted by impending Vietminh defeat, Communist China would tend toward intervention because of the prospect that Communist prestige throughout the world would suffer a severe blow, and that the area of U. S. military influence would be brought to the southern border of China. On the other

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hand, Communist China's desire to concentrate on domestic problems, plus fear of what must appear to Peiping as the virtual certainty of U. S. counteraction against Communist China itself, would tend to deter overt intervention. The chances are about even that in this situation Communist China would decide upon overt intervention rather than accept the defeat of the Vietminh.*

c. Soviet Bloc Reaction in the Event of U. S. Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons. Initial Communist military reactions would probably be substantially the same as in the case of no nuclear weapons. Politically, the Communists would intensify their world-wide campaign to brand the U. S. as an aggressor, with the expectation that considerable political capital could be realized out of the adverse world reactions to U. S. use of nuclear weapons. If U. S. use of nuclear weapons should lead to impending Vietminh defeat, there is a split of opinion within the Intelligence Advisory Committee as to whether the Chinese Communists would accept the risk involved and intervene overtly to save the Communist position in Indo China: three members believe the chances they would not openly intervene are greater than assessed

* For fuller discussion of the split of opinion within the IAC on this question, see SE-53, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible U. S. Courses of Action in Indo-China through 1954" (published December 18, 1953)

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in par. 23-b above; three members believe the chances are better than even they would openly intervene.

24. Foreign Aid Considerations: Military assistance to finance the French and Associated States military effort and to supply military hardware would continue at approximately current rates (FY 1954 = \$800 million; FY 1955 = \$1130 million). Expenditures for economic assistance in Indochina would be substantially increased over the present rate of expenditure (\$25 million). These figures do not take into account the cost of U. S. military participation or the possible cost of post-war rehabilitation in Indochina.

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B. In Concert with the French and Others

Assumptions

25. The Associated States and France invite the military participation of the United States and other nations.

26. It is practicable to organize a UN or regional military effort.

27. The military situation in Indochina is approximately as at present, i.e., stalemate with elements of deterioration.

28. France and the Associated States will carry forward the scale of military effort envisaged in the Laniel-Havarré Plan.

Military Requirements

29. Same as II-A (pars. 15-18 above). Ground forces contributed by other nations will supplement French Union ground forces, air or naval forces contributed by other nations might substitute for U. S. air and naval forces.

Political Aspects

30. a. UN Action. An appeal to the UN for assistance against Communist aggression, in order to secure the requisite two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, would necessarily have to come from the Associated States, acting as independent states, and be supported by the French. A request for assistance by France alone would probably fail of passage as being merely a request for assistance in a colonial war. Even with an appeal from

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the Associated States, it is probable that, though a two-thirds majority might be secured, there would be not more than 36 affirmative votes, and many abstentions. During the course of the debate, there would be major efforts to incorporate in the resolution a call for a cease-fire and negotiated settlement, or provisions for limiting the conflict to Indochina. U. S. control of the character of the resolution would be extremely difficult, although not necessarily impossible. In sum, it might be possible to secure UN action for armed assistance to the Associated States, but the difficulties in staving off UN pressure for a negotiated settlement or UN mediation would be considerable. The majority for a satisfactory UN resolution would, at best, be slim and conceivably might take more time to achieve than is available. Failure to obtain UN action, if attempted, would seriously prejudice the prospects of any effective intervention.

b. Regional Grouping. Any regional grouping should enlist maximum Asian participation. It would be possible to develop a regional grouping which would lend moral and some military support to a U. S. intervention in Indochina if it were clear that the United States had decided (1) to undertake the commitment of U. S. forces to the Indochina area, and (2) to assume commitments of a lasting character for the defense of the

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Associated States, Thailand and Malaya. Australia and New Zealand, while concerned about the effect on the ANZUS organization, would probably be willing to participate in a broader organization for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia. The U. K., already disturbed at its exclusion from ANZUS, and in general ready to support U. S. intervention in Indochina, would be prepared to enter a South East Asian regional grouping which carried with it U. S. guarantees for Malaya. Thailand, if given lasting U. S. defense commitments, would also participate in such an organization and would probably provide bases and facilities for support of military operations in Indochina and possibly modest military forces. The Philippines would also support a regional organization and might provide modest military forces. The Nationalist Government of China and the ROK would seek inclusion in any regional organization which sponsored military action in Indochina, in the hope of an extension of hostilities to Communist China. For this reason, their inclusion would probably be opposed by at least the UK and French governments. Such a regional grouping would almost certainly be less inclined than the UN to respond to plausible Communist peace offers, and more likely to persevere to an acceptable solution in Indochina.

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31. French Reaction: The French would prefer a regional grouping to UN sponsored assistance. They might consider such a grouping as less desirable than U. S. intervention alone. The French would probably feel, however, that they would have to go along with the formation of such a regional grouping if they could see no other way out of their difficulties in Indochina. After active multilateral armed intervention in Indochina, France would probably seek progressively to reduce its share of the military burden.

32. Associated States Reaction: The Associated States would probably prefer UN sponsored military assistance to any other form of outside intervention. They would, however, be more than willing to accept such assistance from a regional grouping, and would be eager to participate in such a grouping if it included effective U. S. military participation.

33. Free World Reaction:

a. In general. The reaction to U. S. military intervention in Indochina under the aegis of a regional grouping would be somewhat more favorable than the reaction to U. S. military intervention alone. UN sponsorship of U. S. military participation would materially decrease the hostility of the Arab-Asian bloc to U. S. intervention, and might also strengthen somewhat the support for such action in Latin America and Western Europe.

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b. To U. S. Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons. Reactions of other nations, including the participating nations, would be substantially the same as in par. 22 above.

34. Soviet Bloc Reaction: The fact that the United States was initially only one of a group would probably not appreciably reduce Peiping's apprehension at the presence of U. S. power on the southern borders of China. Peiping might well believe that in the end, as in the case of Korea, the situation would evolve into a continuing and largely U. S. unilateral commitment. Thus, the chances of overt Chinese Communist intervention would remain substantial.

35. Soviet Bloc Reaction in the Event of U. S. Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons: Whether or not the other participating powers concurred in U. S. use of nuclear weapons, the chances of Chinese Communist overt intervention would be the same as stated in paragraph 23-c above.

36. Foreign Aid Considerations: In addition to the increased program under A above (par. 24) the United States would probably have to provide additional expenditures for provision of military equipment and supplies to the forces of some of the participating states.

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C. In the Event of a Proposed French Withdrawal, the United States Acting in Concert with Others, or Alone

Assumptions

37. France refuses to continue participation in the war in Indochina.

38. The Associated States invite the military participation of the United States with others or alone.

39. There has been no serious deterioration in the French Union military situation prior to U. S. take-over.

40. The French will so phase their withdrawal as to permit orderly replacement of their forces.

41. The Associated States will cooperate fully with the United States in developing indigenous forces.

42. It may be practicable to organize a UN or regional military effort.

Military Requirements

43. a. Ground forces. (Total personnel strength of 605,000)

(1) Indigenous forces of 330,000.

(2) U. S. or allied forces of six infantry and one airborne division (each the equivalent of a U. S. division in strength and composition) plus necessary support personnel totaling 275,000.

b. Air Force forces. (Total personnel strength of 12,000)

1 air defense fighter wing

1 light bomb wing

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- 1 troop carrier wing
- 2 tactical recon. sqdns.
- 1 fighter bomber wing
- 1 tactical control sqdn.
- c. Naval forces. (Total personnel strength of 35,000)
 - 1 Carrier Task Group plus additional units consisting of:
 - Minecraft
 - VPRONS
 - Amphibious lift for 1 RCT
 - Underway replenishment group
 - d. Training forces. (included in above)
 - e. Logistic implications. This course of action can be logistically supported with the following effects:
 - (1) Effect on NATO deliveries:
 - Army and Navy -- No adverse impact.
 - Air Force -- No effect until second quarter of FY 1955, when certain units scheduled for withdrawal from CINCPAC are retained in that area, due to the Indochina commitment and are not available to fulfill the NATO commitment.

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(2) Drain on logistic reserves:

Army -- Negligible on all items that are in production, assuming necessary adjustments in production schedules (par. 43-g(3) below).

Navy -- Partial drain on certain logistic reserves, principally aircraft.

Air Force -- Negligible in all instances.

(3) Effect on production schedules:

Army -- Require revision of ammunition schedules for 105 and 155mm howitzers and for 4.2, 60mm and 81mm mortars which are currently being cut back.

Navy -- Increased production schedules for aircraft and ammunition may be required, depending upon the extent of operations.

Air Force -- Some increases in certain production schedules with emphasis on ammunition depending on the extent of operations.

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(4) Additional facilities required at bases
in Indochina:

Army

- A logistic support base similar to but on a smaller scale to that established at Pusan, Korea.

Navy

- Base requirements can be met with existing mobile logistic support units now in FECOM and by expansion of bases in the Philippines.

Air Force

- Light and fighter bomber and interceptor wings will operate from existing facilities in Indochina. This operation may require two wings to operate from one airbase. POL can be supplied.

The majority of FEAF's airlift capability must be made available to insure effective operation if units are required to move in on short notice.

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f. Material Requirements: The major share of the burden for provision of replacement equipment, ammunition and over-all logistic support for all forces involved will have to be undertaken by the United States. The equipment and materials relinquished by the French forces should assist in meeting the initial materiel requirements.

g. Impact on U. S. Military Programs: This course would undoubtedly have the following effects: an increased calculated risk of war with Communist China or of general war, adversely affecting war plans; alterations in fiscal and budgetary policies and programs dependent on the scale and duration of operations; and a reversal of policy planning to reduce the size of the U. S. armed forces.

Political Aspects

44. U. N. Action: French disassociation would largely remove Asian suspicions that the actions of the United States and the West were directed toward perpetuating French colonialism in the area and thereby enhance support for UN action. However, there might be increased pressure for a negotiated settlement and UN mediation, and equally strong pressure for limiting any hostilities to Indochina.

45. Regional Action: It would be feasible to secure support of a regional grouping for U. S. replacement of French forces in Indochina. In the contingency of French withdrawal Thailand, in particular, and the other states in general,

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would wish to assure themselves that the United States was really committed to fully replacing French strength in the area. If they were convinced this was the case, and if the nature of French withdrawal made replacement by U. S. troops practicable, they would support a U. S. effort.

46. Effect on France: A French decision actually to withdraw would signal a major change in the French position in the world. France might be expected to lose interest in the Far East, to resign itself to a diminution of U. S. assistance and support, and to an abrupt loss of its role as a major power. The French political position in North Africa would be seriously prejudiced. The effect on French policy toward NATO and EDC or in Europe has not been estimated.

47. Associated States Reaction: The Associated States would be concerned by a French withdrawal largely by reason of the practical obstacles which they would believe would have to be overcome in any replacement of French forces. If convinced, however, that these obstacles could be overcome, they would continue to fight in support of U. S., regional, or UN military efforts in Indochina; but the war-weary Indochinese people would be less willing to fight, particularly if intervention comes at a time when the end of the fighting is otherwise in prospect.

48. Free World Reaction:

a. In general. Free world reaction would vary. If the French withdraw the rest of the free world would probably prefer UN action to U. S. intervention alone. But,

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if convinced that the only alternative to Communist domination was unilateral U. S. action, most of the free world would support such action. The NATO countries would be concerned with U. S. diversion of resources to the Far East and the increased risk of general war.

b. To U. S. Use of Nuclear Weapons. Reactions of other nations, including any participating nations, would be substantially the same as in par. 22.

49. Soviet Bloc Reaction: (Same as in paragraph 23 above.)

50. Soviet Bloc Reaction in the Event of U. S. Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. (Same as in paragraph 23-c above.)

Foreign Aid Considerations

51. In addition to the increased economic aid set forth in previous contingencies (pars. 24 and 36 above), the United States would be required to replace key French advisors to governments of the Associated States with U. S. personnel and greatly increase expenditures for relief and rehabilitation. In addition, the requirement for military aid for indigenous forces would be at least as great as under present plans. The savings in the U. S. contribution for the support of French forces in Indochina would partly serve to offset the greatly increased costs of U. S. forces taking their place.

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ARMY POSITION ON NSC ACTION NO. 1074-A

1. There are important military disadvantages to intervention in Indochina under the assumptions set forth in NSC Action No. 1074-a.
2. A military victory in Indochina cannot be assured by U.S. intervention with air and naval forces alone.
3. The use of atomic weapons in Indochina would not reduce the number of ground forces required to achieve a military victory in Indochina.
4. It is estimated that seven U.S. divisions or their equivalent, with appropriate naval and air support, would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists do not intervene. However, U.S. military intervention must take into consideration the capability of the Chinese Communists to intervene.
5. It is estimated that the equivalent of 12 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina, if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communist intervene.
6. The equivalent of 7 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French remain and the Chinese Communists intervene.
7. Requirements for air and naval support for ground force operations are:
 - a. Five hundred fighter-bomber sorties per day exclusive of interdiction and counter-air operations.
 - b. An airlift capability of a one division drop.
 - c. A division amphibious lift.
8. One U.S. airborne regimental combat team can be placed in Indochina in 5 days, one additional division in 24 days, and the remaining divisions in the following 120 days. This could be accomplished partially by reducing U.S. ground strength in the Far East with the remaining units coming from the general reserve in the United States. Consequently, the U.S. ability to meet its NATO commitment would be seriously effected for a considerable period. The time required to place a total of 12 divisions in Indochina would depend upon the industrial and personnel mobilization measures taken by the government.

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PART I

INDO-CHINA

I - THE PROBLEM

To set forth a program of action without resort to overt combat operations by U.S. forces, designed to: (a) secure the military defeat of Communist forces in Indo-China, and (b) establish a western oriented complex in Southeast Asia incorporating Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

II - MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS

(A) Indo-China is considered the keystone of the arch of Southeast Asia, and the Indo-Chinese peninsula must not be permitted to fall under Communist domination. This requires the defeat in Indo-China of military and quasi-military Communist forces and the development of conditions conducive to successful resistance to any Communist actions to dominate the area. Measures taken in Indo-China, however, must be in consonance with U.S. and allied action taken in the Far East and Southeast Asia to defeat Communist efforts to extend their control of the area.

(B) Feasible actions to provide for the immediate U.S. assistance requested by the French for operations in the Dien Bien Phu-Central Laos sector have been taken. The measures recommended herein will hardly affect the immediate tactical situation in those areas (which, while serious, is not as critical as public pronouncements suggest). They are designed to effect a general improvement in the over-all situation in Indo-China, which is such that all actions

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must be considered a matter of urgency to be implemented without delay. They are also designed to achieve the desired results in Indo-China without overt involvement by U.S. combat forces.

(C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency have developed a program of support for the Navarre Plan in Indo-China. This plan considers certain basic immediate requirements for continued U.S. support for Franco-Vietnamese operations and some of these recommendations have been implemented. The remaining actions have been incorporated hereunder in paragraph III (A). However, there is implicit in many of these proposals a requirement for a stronger French political and military effort as well as more effective support for Vietnamese participation. The alternative to more precise and extensive action by the French and Vietnamese, as proposed by the U.S., appears to be a continued stalemate or debacle in Indo-China.

(D) It would appear that France cannot withdraw her forces from Indo-China without serious deterioration of her position as a world power.

(E) The key to the success of military operations continues to be the generation of well-trained, properly led indigenous forces effectively employed in combat operations against the Communist forces in Viet Minh. The eventual goal must be the development of homogeneous indigenous units with a native officer corps. In this the French have had, for whatever reason, insufficient success. Such success will ultimately be dependent upon the inspiration of the local population to fight for their own freedom from Communist domination and the willingness of the French both to take the measures to stimulate that inspiration and to more fully utilize the native potential. At the same time, French sensitivities with respect to their sacrifices, responsibilities, and capabilities must be respected, as we persuade and assist them to correct existing deficiencies.

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(F) The U.S. objective in Indo-China should be centralized U.S. control and coordination of all U.S. military, military aid, and "unconventional warfare" (which includes psychological warfare, guerrilla warfare, and certain aspects of pacification operations) mechanisms in Indo-China.

(G) There is in Indo-China, or programmed for Indo-China (and anticipating continued U.S. assistance) a sufficient amount of equipment and supplies and a potential manpower pool sufficient eventually to defeat the Communists decisively if properly utilized and maintained and if the situation continues to permit this manpower to be converted into military effectiveness. In their own report the French have acknowledged that U.S. aid in many areas has exceeded French capacity to absorb it.

(H) Measures advocated by the U.S. must be so characterized by determination, strength, confidence, and justice that they serve to enhance the support of all Asians who seek freedom, both from Communist domination and western colonization. Asians must be convinced that they will have a far better future with the Free World than under Communism and that there is not to be reinstitution of colonialism.

(I) The Communists in Indo-China, Southeast Asia, China, and Moscow must be made aware that the United States, France, and the free governments of the Far East are united, steadfast, and capable of accomplishing their aims.

(J) The U.S. must take the initiative in persuading the French and Vietnamese to overcome these deficiencies. Such initiative must, however, avoid French exploitation in its unilateral interest and must avoid actions which will lead to involuntary U.S. combat participation.

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III -- ACTIONS REQUIRED

(A) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, have recommended certain courses of action which are susceptible of immediate implementation. Of those not already undertaken, the following should be completed as a matter of urgency:

1. The French air forces in Indo-China should be augmented, particularly with respect to air and ground-crew personnel from military and/or civilian resources within the framework of the French-Vietnamese armed forces. Steps should be taken through existing contacts with the French Government to satisfy those requirements; to explore the possibilities of establishing a volunteer air group; and to make the necessary arrangements to replace the uniformed U.S. military personnel being temporarily assigned to assist the French in maintenance functions.

Action: Defense

2. The present arrangements for the assignment of U.S. officials to Indo-China should be altered to include the assignment of an additional representative of the Central Intelligence Agency to an appropriate U.S. activity in the area.

Action: Defense, CIA

3. A source of funds in the amount of \$124 millions to meet additional urgent requirements for Indo-China for all services must be determined. Currently for FY 1954 there has been provided to the French effort in Indo-China a total of \$1,115 millions in military assistance, defense support, and military support projects. Unless a source of funds other than MDAP is made available to meet

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these additional requirements, the materiel action and training support for Indo-China will have to come at the expense of the world-wide FY 1954 MDA program.

Action: Defense

(B) The present situation in Indo-China, however, indicates that in addition to the immediate actions outlined above, the following steps must be taken as a matter of priority:

Politically

1. As a result of events which have occurred during recent weeks, and particularly in the light of the forthcoming Geneva convention, certain actions which might have been susceptible of direct negotiation with the French Government now require more circumspect negotiation. None the less, it should remain the U.S. objective to obtain French active acceptance formally or informally of the following:

- a. Modification of the mission of the U.S. MAAG, Indo-China, to provide for expanded strength, including a planning staff (composed initially of up to 10 highly selected officer personnel); authority to conduct liaison with senior training and planning staff sections; and authority to make recommendations concerning the conduct of operations. This relationship may be justified entirely within the framework of the present agreement with the French Government that "the French Government will continue to facilitate exchanges of information and views on a continuing basis between French and U.S. military authorities and will take into account the views expressed by the latter with respect to the development and carrying out of the French

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strategic plans without in any way, of course, detracting from exclusive French responsibility for adoption and execution thereof." It should be presented that the U.S. has complete confidence that France can win the struggle against the Communists in Indo-China and that expanded U.S. representation at the French Headquarters is designed to provide the maximum and most effective assistance in aiding the French to achieve common free world objectives in Indo-China

b. Gradual assignment of additional U.S. personnel up to a level of 50 specially qualified personnel in Indo-China as such assignments become feasible. These individuals should have the mission of acting as instructors, principally with the Vietnamese forces and in non-combat areas as recommended by the Chief, MAAG, and concurred in by the local Commander,

c. Expanded utilization of U.S. covert assets, particularly in the unconventional warfare field and particularly in bilateral US-Associated States unconventional warfare operations.

Action: State, Defense, CIA

2. It should also be a U.S. objective to seek (both with the active French and other appropriate governments as well as with the necessary U.S. authorities) the methods of attaining the following:

a. Modification of present Foreign Legion enlistment requirements with reduced enlistment period for service in Indo-China and expansion of the Foreign Legion to include the formation of air units.

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b. Recruitment in certain foreign countries, especially Germany, Italy, and possibly Asia, of non-French personnel with appropriate technical qualifications for service in Indo-China with the Foreign Legion.

c. Provision of certain U.S. personnel, on a voluntary basis, for service in the French forces without sacrifice of their U.S. citizenship.

Action: Defense, State

3. In addition to the urgent actions outlined above, the following additional actions are suggested as contributing to the advancement of U.S. interests with respect to Indo-China:

a. The U.S. should continue to stress and emphasize in every way our purpose in helping the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos through the French is to maintain their independence, and should reiterate our position regarding that independence.

Action: Operations Coordinating Board

b. A vigorous U.S. effort might be made to restore Bao Dai's health and to persuade him and possibly the King of Cambodia to take a more active part in the struggle against the Viet Minh. This effort should include action designed to encourage Bao Dai to withdraw from his semi-isolation to visit his troops, to reside in his capital and otherwise to comport himself like a dynamic Chief of State. This effort might be correlated with measures designed to have some U.S. military assistance delivered

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directly to the Associated States instead of through the French. Such action might appropriately be taken upon the conclusion of or during the latter phases of the Geneva conference.

Action: Operations Coordinating Board

Militarily

1. A general officer of two-star rank, as designated by the Department of Defense, should be appointed Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, upon relief of the present Chief in February 1954. He will be subject to the coordination of the U.S. Ambassador to Indo-China, but will be under the military command of U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. He will command all U.S. military personnel and covert assets in Indo-China relative to his mission and will be personally responsible for preventing the involvement of uniformed U.S. personnel in combat.

2. Subsequent to the receipt of French governmental approval (and desirably at their invitation), but at the earliest possible time, the Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, should be provided with necessary staff sections, and assigned additional duties involving expanded liaison with the French and Vietnam forces. He should be directed and authorized to advise and assist the Franco-Vietnamese command in training and planning, and to make recommendations concerning the conduct of operations. In this connection he should urgently seek the following:

a. Development and implementation of a sound concept and operational plan for the conduct of operations in Indo-China.

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b. Intensive and aggressive operations with a view to winning a victory of consequence at the earliest time, and exploitation of this success politically and psychologically.

c. Effective pacification of French-Vietnamese held areas, emphasizing security of individuals and property through proper utilization of defense groups and guards and institution of adequate local civil administration.

d. Training and properly equipping Vietnam units with emphasis upon the institution of adequate officer, NCO, and technical training courses.

e. Improvement in intelligence and security agencies.

f. Expansion of unconventional warfare operations.

Action: Defense, CIA

3. Concurrently with the tasks assigned above, arrangements should be made to develop an over-all concept designed to achieve the subjugation of Communist forces in Indo-China and the pacification of the area. This concept should be provided the Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, as guidance in seeking the accomplishment of the task assigned in paragraph 2 above.

Action: Defense, CIA

Information and Psychological

1. Concurrently with the political and military actions outlined above, and under the coordination of the Operations Coordinating Board, a specific domestic and foreign information campaign should be developed and maintained, particularly for the period

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leading up to the Geneva conference, to de-emphasize "hysteria" publicity, and to bring about widespread recognition of and appropriate attention to the following themes:

a. France, in supporting the fight of the Associated States of Indo-China against Communist domination, is the principal nation now shedding its blood for the freedom of others.

b. The French Government has made major sacrifices in terms of its young military manpower, its economic resources, and its political position in order to defend the cause of liberty and freedom from Communism in Indo-China.

c. The French Government has accepted the principle of self government and sovereignty for the Associated States of Indo-China and has in fact more than satisfied the initial demands of Ho Chi Minh, thus providing evidence that the Viet Minh are fighting not for freedom but for the Communist cause.

d. The cause of the Associated States of Indo-China is the cause of all countries in South Asia who desire freedom from Communist domination and self determination with respect to their political and economic objectives.

e. The cause of Viet Minh as with all Communists is the cause of colonization and subservience to Kremlin rule as was the cause in China, in North Korea and in the European satellites.

Action: State, Defense, CIA, USIA

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2. A specific U.S. psychological warfare program for Indo-China should be developed immediately, including overt and covert projects, under Operations Coordinating Board coordination, with paramount emphasis on the establishment of a climate of opinion which associates all outside support with the achievement of Indo-Chinese national aspirations. Benefit will accrue from U.S. courses of action in direct proportion to the degree they are implemented through indigenous peoples rather than through direct support of the French. The U.S. psychological warfare program should therefore provide for the following:

a. The establishment under the U.S. Ambassador to Indo-China of an operations advisory group, including representatives of the U.S. Military Mission in Indo-China, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency as appropriate to coordinate the non-military aspects of U.S. psychological operations within Indo-China. The Chief, MAAG, Indo-China, should be responsible for coordinating all psychological warfare activities directly relative to his expanded mission with this group.

Action: State, Defense, CIA, FOA, USIA

b. Appropriate psychological warfare equipment and supplies should be assigned to the French and Vietnam forces, and key technical personnel should be assigned to the MAAG for such use as the Chief, MAAG, may desire.

Action: Defense, CIA, FOA

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c. A specific mechanism should be established within the U.S. to provide for the orientation of all official U.S. personnel assigned to duty or visiting Indo-China so that maximum favorable psychological effect is derived from all their activities and contacts.

Action: Operations Coordinating Board

d. Development of indigenous leadership which will be truly representative and symbolic of Indo-Chinese national aspirations and win the loyalty and support of the people.

Action: State, Defense, CIA

e. Subsidization of indigenous newspapers and public information media, including provision of equipment and supplies as well as air transport to remote population centers.

Action: CIA, USIA

f. Upon establishment of necessary agreements with the French Government as prescribed above, augmentation of the US-Vietnam guerrilla warfare potential in Indo-China.

Action: Defense, CIA

IV -- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(A) If the above actions can be completed at an early date with full French support (and on the assumption that the Chinese Communists do not intervene overtly in Indo-China), it is considered that this program will have the effect of reversing the present situation and give promise of leading to an ultimate victory in Indo-China without overt use of U.S. military forces.

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(B) However, should the immediate situation in Indo-China deteriorate drastically or should French intransigence make the substantial accomplishment of the program outlined herein impossible, the U.S. may wish to consider direct military action in Southeast Asia to ensure the maintenance of our vital interests in the area. Under such circumstances, an area concept including Malaya, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, as well as Indo-China, would appear essential. These ramifications are to be considered in Part II of this study as assigned to the Special Committee.

(C) It is recommended that this program be approved by the Operations Coordinating Board and submitted to the President for immediate implementation.

(D) It is also recommended that the Department of Defense develop, for the immediate attention of the Special Committee, a concept of operations and considerations involved in the use of U.S. armed forces in Indo-China, should such involvement be determined upon.

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Special Committee Report On

SOUTHEAST ASIA PART II

I - THE PROBLEM

To set forth recommendations concerning longer range policy and courses of action for possible future contingencies in Southeast Asia not covered by NSC 5405.

II - MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Special Committee has reviewed NSC 5405, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia", dated 16 January 1954, and considers that this statement of policy remains valid and should be continued in effect insofar as it concerns the specific contingencies enumerated therein.

B. NSC 5405 covers the contingency of possible Chinese Communist intervention in Indo-China and along with Part I of the Special Committee Report establishes U.S. courses of action designed to secure the military defeat of Communist forces in Indo-China in the absence of Chinese Communist intervention.

C. There are, however, at least two additional factors not covered by NSC 5405 which merit additional policy consideration of the U.S. Government. These are:

(1) The fact that the Communist threat to Southeast Asia will continue to be a major obstacle to U.S. policy and objectives in Southeast Asia even though a solution to the Indo-Chinese war which is satisfactory to the U.S. may be obtained.

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(2) The fact that the threat of Communist domination in Southeast Asia will be infinitely increased in the event that Indo-China should fall under Communist domination despite the present efforts of the U.S. to the contrary.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. Southeast Asia comprises some 170 million people in an area just emerging from the colonial era. Standards of living and of literacy are very low. With the exception of Viet Nam, military forces are inconsiderable. The number and quality of leaders, administrators, and technicians is far below minimum requirements. The prospects of political or economic stability during this generation are dim, except in the Philippines and perhaps in Thailand.

B. The peoples of Southeast Asia are accustomed to the rule of the many by the very few at the level of their central government. Their principal national political vitality expresses itself as "anti-colonialism" and the termination of all foreign domination rather than in a desire for political democracy or for the political liberties upon which the Western concept of the world ideological struggle is based.

C. Southeast Asia is a part of and ethnically associated with the Asian continent, principally China. China today is the base of international Communism in the Far East. With the exception of Australia, to which Southeast Asian states are not ideologically oriented, anti-Communist bases are very distant. Certain of them are associated with colonialism in the minds of the people of Southeast Asia. Western influence, both in Southeast Asia and in Korea, has not been effective in preventing the spread of Communism. This results in increased vulnerability of some Southeast Asian countries to Communist influences.

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D. Nationalism that expresses itself in Asia as anti-colonialism, if properly guided, is also a potential weapon against Communist imperialism. At the present time, however, some Asians tend to regard "Western colonialism" as more evil and pressing than the possible future threat of Communist imperialism.

E. Economically, the countries of Southeast Asia vary in their products and markets. Many major export products of the area (rubber, tin, copra, etc.) are absorbed by the West. However, rice production is a matter of pan-Asian concern as is oil production.

F. Southeast Asia as a region is less homogeneous than the Atlantic Community or the American Republics in the factors making for real regional consistency and strength. There are major ethnic and religious differences as well as traditional enmities. There is no sense of a common danger as regards Communist imperialism.

G. Current developments, including military operations in the Associated States and the forthcoming Geneva Conference, will have a major influence on future U.S. policy throughout Southeast Asia.

H. U.S. position and policy in the area are most effectively represented in the Philippines and in Thailand, from which countries -- outside of Indo-China -- any expanded program of Western influence may best be launched.

IV .. CONCLUSIONS

A. The Special Committee considers that these factors reinforce the necessity of assuring that Indo-China remain in the non-Communist bloc, and believes that defeat of the Viet Minh in Indo-China is essential if the spread of Communist influence in Southeast Asia is to be halted.

B. Regardless of the outcome of military operations in Indo-China and without compromising in any way the overwhelming strategic importance of the Associated States to the Western position in the area, the U.S. should take

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all affirmative and practical steps, with ~~or without~~ its European allies, to provide tangible evidence of Western strength and determination to defeat Communism; to demonstrate that ultimate victory will be won by the free world; and to secure the affirmative association of Southeast Asian states with these purposes.

C. That for these purposes the Western position in Indo-China must be maintained and improved by a military victory.

D. That without compromise to C. above, the U.S. should in all prudence reinforce the remainder of Southeast Asia, including the land areas of Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

V. RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION *

A. The Special Committee wishes to reaffirm the following recommendations which are made in NSC 5405, the Special Committee Report concerning military operations in Indo-China, and the position paper of the Special Committee, concurred in by the Department of Defense, concerning U.S. courses of action and policies with respect to the Geneva Conference:

(1) It be U.S. policy to accept nothing short of a military victory in Indo-China.

(2) It be the U.S. position to obtain French support of this position; and that failing this, the U.S. actively oppose any negotiated settlement in Indo-China at Geneva.

*The Department of State representative recommends the deletion of paragraphs A and B hereunder as being redundant and included in other documents.

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(3) It be the U.S. position in event of failure of (2) above to initiate immediate steps with the governments of the Associated States aimed toward the continuation of the war in Indo-China, to include active U.S. participation and without French support should that be necessary.

(4) Regardless of whether or not the U.S. is successful in obtaining French support for the active U.S. participation called for in (3) above, every effort should be made to undertake this active participation in concert with other interested nations.

B. The Special Committee also considers that all possible political and economic pressure on France must be exerted as the obvious initial course of action to reinforce the French will to continue operations in Indo-China. The Special Committee recognizes that this course of action will jeopardize the existing French Cabinet, may be unpopular among the French public, and may be considered as endangering present U.S. policy with respect to EDC. The Committee nevertheless considers that the free world strategic position, not only in Southeast Asia but in Europe and the Middle East as well, is such as to require the most extraordinary efforts to prevent Communist domination of Southeast Asia. The Committee considers that firm and resolute action now in this regard may well be the key to a solution of the entire problem posed by France in the free world community of nations.

C. In order to make the maximum contribution to free world strength in Southeast Asia, and regardless of the outcome of military operations currently in progress in Indo-China, the U.S. should, in all prudence, take the following courses of action in addition to those set forth in NSC 5405 and in Part I of the Special Committee report:

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Political and Military:

(1) Ensure that there be initiated no cease-fire in Indo-China prior to victory whether that be by successful military action or clear concession of defeat by the Communists.

Action: State, CIA

(2) Extraordinary and unilateral, as well as multi-national, efforts should be undertaken to give vitality in Southeast Asia to the concept that Communist imperialism is a transcending threat to each of the Southeast Asian states. These efforts should be so undertaken as to appear through local initiative rather than as a result of U.S. or UK, or French instigation.

Action: USIA, State, CIA

(3) It should be U.S. policy to develop within the UN charter a Far Eastern regional arrangement subscribed and underwritten by the major European powers with interests in the Pacific.

a. Full accomplishment of such an arrangement can only be developed in the long term and should therefore be preceded by the development, through indigenous sources, of regional economic and cultural agreements between the several Southeast Asian countries and later with Japan. Such agreements might take a form similar to that of the OEEC in Europe.

Action: State, CIA, FOA

b. Upon the basis of such agreements, the U.S. should actively but unobtrusively seek their expansion into mutual defense agreements and should for this purpose be prepared to underwrite such agreements with military and economic aid and should

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be willing to become a signatory to such agreements upon invitation, as in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Formosa.

Action: State, Defense, CIA

c. As an immediate move in this direction, the U.S. - working through indigenous channels - should sponsor the negotiation of a mutual defense treaty directed against Communist aggression between the several states of Indo-China and Thailand, and particularly between Cambodia and Thailand.

Action: CIA, Defense, State

(4) The U.S. should undertake the immediate organization within the several states of Southeast Asia of an increased number of military units, including guerrilla and para-military organizations, as well as anti-subversion police forces. In particular, this should be accomplished in Thailand and if possible in Indonesia and Burma. This should include the establishment of U.S. military missions through the assignment of U.S. officers who might, where necessary, serve on a contract basis with local military forces. In addition, the U.S. should stand ready to offer such assistance in Malaya as the UK may require.

Action: State, Defense, CIA

(5) The U.S. should take the initiative in establishing an International Volunteer Air Group to be used in Indo-China and elsewhere as required. In addition, the U.S. should consider the advisability of establishing an International Volunteer Corps of ground forces for use in Southeast Asia. So long as the French retain the major responsibility for military operations, such

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forces should only be utilized with French consent.

Action: Defense, CIA

(6) The U.S. should support when appropriate any Asian-inspired development of regional or area organizations, conferences, and agreements and should seek unobtrusively to promote such inter-Asian rapport.

Action: State, USIA, CIA, FOA, Defense

(7) With respect to Malaya, Burma, and Thailand, the U.S. should seek UK agreement to measures designed to ensure the retention of these areas in the free world. A statement that any change in the present security status of these areas would be considered a fundamental threat to US-UK interests in the area might be appropriate.

Action: Defense, State, CIA, USIA

(8) The U.S. should, largely through covert means, take steps:

a. To promote and support energetic, able and honest indigenous anti-Communist leaders in Southeast Asia in order to provide more effective government in the area.

b. To exploit opportunities to strengthen western-oriented anti-Communist political parties and other influential indigenous groups in Southeast Asia.

Action: CIA

Economic

(1) The U.S. should be prepared, as in Korea, to underwrite the economic potential of the Associated States in the event of a satisfactory solution in that area. A statement to this effect at the present time might have a favorable effect on the Geneva Conference.

Action: State, FOA

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(2) The U.S. should affirmatively attack the economic problems that grow out of the instability of demand for primary products (such as rice, tin, oil, etc.) in the area, and should give major attention to the development of mutually desirable economic programs and assistance as between the U.S. and Southeast Asia:

Action: FOA, State, Commerce

(3) Technical programs, particularly those designed to achieve improvement in agricultural skilled and semi-skilled labor, should be stepped up. Leadership programs, however useful, cannot alone overcome the deficiencies in these areas.

Action: State, FOA

(4) Capital investment associated with indigenous interests in the area should be encouraged. This includes the establishment of:

a. A climate of opinion in the countries concerned favorable to foreign investment.

b. The establishment by treaty of the rights and obligations of U.S. investors in the countries.

c. The creation in the U.S. through a system of guarantees of adequate and attractive investment opportunities.

Action: State, Commerce, FOA, Treasury.

(5) The Export-Import Bank and the International Bank should be encouraged to extend loans to Southeast Asia for economic development.

Action: State, FOA

(6) The U.S. should discreetly promote reasonable reparations settlements between Japan and Southeast Asian countries.

Action: State

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D. The courses of action outlined above are considered as mandatory regardless of the outcome of military operations in Indo-China.

(1) If Indo-China is held they are needed to build up strength and resistance to Communism in the entire area.

(2) If Indo-China is lost they are essential as partial steps:

a. To delay as long as possible the extension of Communist domination throughout the Far East, or

b. In conjunction with offensive operations to retake Indo-China from the Communists.

(3) Should Indo-China be lost, it is clear to the Special Committee that the involvement of U.S. resources either in an attempt to stop the further spread of Communism in the Far East, (which is bound, except in terms of the most extensive military and political effort, to be futile) or to initiate offensive operations to retake and reorient Indo-China, (which would involve a major military campaign), will greatly exceed those needed to hold Indo-China before it falls.

(4) Furthermore, either of these undertakings (in the light of the major setback to U.S. national policy involved in the loss of Indo-China) would entail as an urgent prerequisite the restoration of Asian morale and confidence in U.S. policy which will have reached an unprecedentedly low level in the area.

(5) Each of these courses of action would involve greater risk of war with Communist China, and possibly the Soviet Union, than timely preventive action taken under more favorable circumstances before Indo-China is lost.

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5 April 1954

Proposed Implementing Procedures for the Establishment
of a Southeast Asian Regional Concept

1. In considering various methods by which a project to develop regional arrangement a reasonable understanding in Southeast Asia might be undertaken, it appears that, in any case, considerable time may elapse before an effective organization may be developed. However, it does appear that a preliminary survey should be made by the individual appointed by the President for the development of this project. For initiation of this preliminary phase it is believed that the procedure outlined in the following paragraphs should be undertaken.

2. The President should appoint an individual of international standing as a special and personal representative of the President. Such an appointment, during the preliminary phase, should not be limited to any specific assignment. This individual should not be classified as a "roving Ambassador" but he should have ambassadoral rank.

3. Having appointed this individual, the President should immediately and publicly request this special representative to undertake a survey of Southeast Asia for the purpose of making a detailed report on conditions and problems directly to the President. This report to form the basis for further development of the regional arrangement among Southeast Asian States.

4. The special representative should have no other official assignment and should be relieved of any duties which would tend to restrict his interests to any one country or particular area.

5. The President's special representative should be empowered to enter into discussions with all U.S. military and civilian officials in ~~pages~~.

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the area and with the chiefs of state of the several Southeast Asian countries. He should go to Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, the Associated States, Malaya, and Indonesia. Thereafter, he should probably also go to Korea and Japan. It is not thought that the special representative should go to Burma except upon receipt of a specific invitation from the Burmese government.

6. The special representative should enter into any discussions with the governments of Southeast Asia through the respective Ambassadors and any arrangements made with those governments should be consummated by the Ambassadors or by the government itself.

7. It should be the publicly announced mission of the special representative to undertake a fact-finding mission. He should not himself publicly interfere or intercede in the continuing relations by the U.S. and the Southeast Asian countries or among the several Southeast Asian states themselves.

8. On the contrary, the special representative should act only as a catalytic agent and should offer to assist in the solution of problem areas by appropriate intercession in the U.S. For this purpose, the special representative should initially be based in the U.S. although for his initial survey he may wish to establish an advance headquarters with a small staff in some appropriate Southeast Asian country.

9. It should also be the mission of the special representative to seek an expansion of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the several Southeast Asian states such as those already established between Cambodia and Laos and between Thailand and Viet Nam.

10. Initial agreements may probably best be obtained in the field of economic or cultural agreements; defense arrangements should initially be secondary.

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11. The special representative should, of course, report through the Department of State but should specifically have access to all departments of government for the purpose of expediting the solution of any problems in which the U.S. may contribute to the achievement of better regional understanding and association among the Southeast Asian countries.

12. Upon the completion of his initial survey, the special representative should return to the U.S. for the purpose of making recommendations to the President and to secure the implementation of recommendations developed during the survey.

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Info:

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

As I personally explained to Ely in presence of Radford, it is not (rpt not) possible for US to commit belligerent acts in Indochina without full political understanding with France and the other countries. In addition, Congressional action would be required. After conference at highest level, I must confirm this position. US is doing everything possible as indicated my 5175 to prepare public, Congressional and Constitutional basis for united action in Indochina. However, such action is impossible except on coalition basis with active British Commonwealth participation. Meanwhile US prepared, as has been demonstrated, to do ~~xxx~~ everything short of belligerency.

FYI US cannot and will not be put in position of alone salvaging British Commonwealth interests in Malaya, Australia and New Zealand. This matter now under discussion with UK at highest level.

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STATE DEPARTMENT
APR 5 1954
751 G. S/4-554

JAS

Dulles DULLES

Drafted by: S:JFDulles:cjp

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S:JFDulles

FE - Robertson
EUR - Merchant
C - MacArthur
U - Smith

359

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Classification

APR 5 1954
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ROUTING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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I
Action
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Info

Control: 2055
Rec'd: April 5, 1954
2:26 p.m.

FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 3729, April 5, 8 p.m.

NIACT

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

I delivered message DEPTTEL 3482 to Bidault Monday evening. He asked me to tell Secretary that he personally could well understand position US Government and would pass on your answer to Laniel.

He asked me to say once more that unfortunately the time for formulating coalitions has passed as the fate of Indochina will be decided in the next ten days at Dien-Bien-Phu. As I left he said that even though French must fight alone they would continue fighting and he prayed God they would be successful.

DILLON

MEJ/8

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JES 4/10/54
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6 April 1954

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ITEM 1 (For Consideration)

POSSIBLE U. S. INTERVENTION IN INDO-CHINA
(NSC Action 1074-a)

PROBLEM

1. To consider and make recommendations to the President on appropriate action regarding Indo-China and on the need for U.S. military intervention.

SUMMARY

2. The paper consists of a brief report from the Planning Board and an annex which analyzes alternative forms of U.S. intervention. The annex is summarized in TAB A:

3. The report states there are four issues to be decided by the Council. These are:

a. Will Indo-China be lost unless the U.S. commits combat forces?

This involves several specific questions:

(1) Is the military situation critical? (The report says not yet but that it is deteriorating.)

(2) Are the French likely to negotiate an unsatisfactory settlement at Geneva unless the U.S. is prepared to intervene? (The report says this is uncertain.)

(3) Have we exhausted all practicable political and diplomatic measures to encourage the French to live up to their commitments? (The report says the U.S. should make a maximum diplomatic effort to cause the French and Associated States to continue to fight to a successful conclusion.)

b. What are the risks, requirements, and consequences of alternative forms of U.S. military intervention?

(See the annex or TAB A - The alternatives, to be valid, involve assumptions: either the French and Associated States both will invite U.S. military intervention or the Associated States will issue the invitation alone if the French intend to withdraw. The annex also discusses the question of use of nuclear weapons.)

c. Should the U.S. intervene rather than lose Indo-China and if so on which alternative?

(The risks of intervention are high, but the loss of Indo-China would result probably in, at least, the loss of South East Asia. A regional grouping (Altern. B) would bring Asian allies to help fight and thus be good, although it would require time and a need to give defense commitments and assurances that intervention is not intended to overthrow

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Communist China. A UN action is not desirable. Unilateral intervention (Alterns. A or C) might be politically difficult at home and abroad.)

d. When and under what circumstances should the decision to intervene be taken and carried into effect?

(The report says - par. 7-c, page 7 - "on balance, it appears that the U.S. should now reach a decision whether or not to intervene with combat forces, if that is necessary to save Indo-China from Communist control and, tentatively, the form and condition of such intervention." The real issue, however, in light of the French request for urgent help at Dien Bien Phu, is that the Council must decide whether it is essential to intervene now with little or no time to (1) work out arrangements with the French (including acceptance of conditions, command arrangements, etc.), (2) condition public and Congressional opinion - intervention may involve our drafting men for Indo-China where the French have never yet sent a conscript - and (3) try to prepare a regional type arrangement. Decision to act later may take care of these difficulties but might come too late to save Dien Bien Phu.)

COMMENTS

4. In reaching any decision the Council should affirmatively decide that regardless of the numbers or types of U.S. military forces initially involved once the U.S. physically intervenes we must be prepared to expend whatever resources are necessary to secure victory. Involved are increased risks of Chinese Communist intervention or general war, steps to prepare the U.S. to meet these increased risks, and reversal of plans to reduce the size of U.S. armed forces.

5. The views of the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be available at the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting at 11:30 a.m., 6 April.

6. [An associated problem is that the U.S. has accepted an invitation to meet with the French on 12 April 1954 to exchange views on Indo-China, preparatory to the Geneva Conference. It is important that the U.S. representation at this meeting be at a high level (at least Mr. Robertson), with Department of Defense representation.]

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that you:

a. Agree that the U.S. must intervene if necessary to avoid the loss of Indo-China, but advocate that no steps be left untaken to get the French to achieve a successful conclusion of the war on their own.

b. Support Alternative B (regional grouping with maximum Asian participation) as the best of the alternatives for intervention, subject to discussion in the AFPC.

c. Base your decision as to whether immediate intervention at Dien Bien Phu should be approved on the results of discussion in the AFPC.

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SUMMARY OF PLANNING BOARD ANNEX TO ITS REPORT ENTITLED, "NSC ACTION NO. 1074-a"

1. Problem: To assess risks, requirements, and consequences of alternate forms of US military intervention in Indochina. The objective of intervention is, in the absence of overt Chinese Communist intervention, destruction of organized Viet Minh forces by military action.

2. Nuclear weapons: Nuclear weapons will be available for use as required by the tactical situation and as approved by the President. Estimated force requirements contained in this paper are based on assumption of such availability.

3. Alternative A: Commitment of US forces in concert with the French.

a. Military requirements: Assuming military situation is approximately as at present, US military requirements would be:

(1) Ground Forces: None, provided that French Union forces afford adequate security for the forces in Indochina.

(2) Naval Forces: 1 Carrier Task Group, plus additional supporting units.

(3) Air Forces: 1 fighter wing, 1 light bomber wing, 1 troop carrier, 1 tactical control squadron, 1 tactical reconnaissance squadron.

b. Logistic requirements: Case I can be logistically supported without particular difficulty. As the training of Indigenous forces is crucial to the success of this operation, the US must be prepared to support a training program for 330,000 Indigenous troops, an increase of 100,000 over present forces.

c. Political aspects: The French would prefer a solution which did not involve US military participation, but would not seriously oppose same. The Associated States would welcome US intervention if given appropriate security guarantees. The Free World would generally support this action.

d. Free World reaction to US tactical use of nuclear weapons: Our Allies would probably disapprove if nuclear weapons were used without their being consulted, but if consulted would generally approve their use tactically.

e. Soviet bloc reaction: Generally Soviet reaction would be the same as though the US were assuming unilateral responsibility. The chances are about even that in this situation Communist China would decide upon overt intervention rather than accept the defeat of Viet Minh. If US use of nuclear weapons should lead to impending Viet Minh defeat, chances are better than even that the Chinese Communist would not openly intervene.

f. Foreign aid considerations: Military assistance would continue at approximately current rates: i.e., FY-54, \$800 million; FY-55, \$1130 million. Economic assistance would be substantially increased over present rate of \$25 million per year.

4. Alternative B: In concert with the French and others.

a. Military requirements: Same as in Case 1, although allied air or naval forces might substitute for US forces.

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b. Political aspects: While it might be possible to secure UN action for armed assistance to the Associated States, it would be difficult to stave off pressure for a negotiated settlement or UN mediation. It would be possible to develop a regional grouping with maximum Asian participation if it were clear that the US had decided to commit forces to the area. France would prefer a regional grouping to UN sponsored assistance. The Associated States would prefer UN sponsored assistance. The Free World reaction would be somewhat more favorable to action as a part of a regional grouping than to US unilateral action.

c. Reaction to US use of nuclear weapons: Same as Case I.

d. Soviet bloc reaction: Even though the US was participating as one of a regional group, the chances of overt Chinese Communist aggression would remain substantial.

e. Foreign aid considerations: Expenditures would probably be greater than in Case I because the US would be called upon to support the forces of the additional participating states.

5. Alternative C: US acting in concert with others or alone.

a. Military requirements: Assuming no serious deterioration in the military situation prior to US take-over from the French of responsibility for military operations:

(1) Ground Forces: Indigenous forces of 330,000; 6 Infantry and 1 Airborne Division of US or Allied troops, plus 275,000 support personnel.

(2) Air Forces: 1 Fighter Wing, 1 Light Bomber Wing, 1 Troop Carrier (Wing), 2 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, 1 Fighter Bomber Wing and 1 Tactical Control Squadron.

(3) Naval Forces: 1 Carrier Task Group, plus additional mining and support units.

b. Logistic implications: Case III can be supported without major logistical implications provided production schedules are maintained at approximately Korean War levels.

c. Impact on US military programs: As this course would involve accepting an increased calculated risk of war with Communist China or of general war, it would require a reversal of present policy planning to reduce the size of the US armed forces.

d. Political aspects: French disassociation would enhance support for UN action or for a regional grouping. It would also end France's role as a major power. Most of the Free World would support US intervention.

e. Soviet bloc reaction: Same as in Case II.

f. Foreign aid considerations: Same as in Case II, although savings in the US contribution for the support of French forces in Indochina would partially offset the greatly increased cost of US forces taking their place.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA - ALTERNATE POLICIES

1. General. The basic decision confronting the United States in Southeast Asia is whether to cut our losses in that area and to gradually withdraw our commitments with the least possible loss of prestige or to implement fully the provisions of a policy calculated to guarantee the retention of the area in the free world provided the U.S. is willing to take the full range of measures which are necessary to make its stated policy effective. If the U.S. is not willing to do the latter it may consider two possible alternatives to Communist control.

2. Japanese Alternative. Recognizing the lack of decisive U.S. military objectives in Southeast Asia, the apathy of the indigenous people toward Communist encroachment, the improbability of any realistic Indian reaction to responsibility for Southeast Asia, to this end:

a. assure the Japanese Government of U.S. willingness to acquiesce in a Japanese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia provided they will cooperate in preventing Communist control of the remainder of Southeast Asia by accelerating their rearmament program sufficiently to assume responsibilities there;

b. divert a considerable proportion of MDAP funds programmed for Indochina to an offshore procurement program for Japan for the production of ground force weapons for Japanese and other free Asian forces;

c. encourage maximum Japanese participation in organizations and programs designed to stimulate the economic growth of Southeast Asia.

3. Indian Alternative. Recognizing the proximity of the Colombo powers in this region, stimulate, with U.S. support, Indian interest in and responsibility toward Southeast Asia, to this end:

a. assure the Indian Government of U.S. willingness to support an Indian area of moral influence in Southeast Asia, provided they will act to prevent Communist control of the remainder of Indochina;

b. utilize the Colombo economic development organization to stimulate the economic growth of Southeast Asia;

c. utilize to the maximum Indian officials in assisting and advising the indigenous governments.

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Control: 2512
Post'd: April 6, 1954
11:04 a.m.

FROM: London

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4382 April 6, 3 p.m.

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY.

yes
799.5/4-154 T.S.

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7519.5/4-654

In compliance with DEPTTEL 5090, I saw Eden this morning and made points referred to therein and embodied those in an informal memorandum which I left with him, a copy of which is going forward to you by pouch.

7519.5/4-454 T.S.

Eden had already seen President's letter to Prime Minister (DEPTTEL 5179). Eden stated questions covered would be considered at highest level as soon as possible and that in meantime he wished to say that he felt seriousness of military situation in Indochina had been exaggerated saying, "French cannot lose the war between now and the coming of the rainy season however badly they may conduct it." He will consult with Prime Minister, Cabinet and Joint Chiefs of Staff and will let us know soonest whether it is thought that you or Bedell Smith might profitably come here prior to meeting in Paris.

ALDRICH

ROW/1

JAN 5 1955
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Origin

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EYES ONLY AMBASSADORS PEASLEE AND SCOTTEN

REF. Following are main points made by Secretary in conversation with Ambassadors Spender and Munro April 4.

(1) Situation in France is deteriorating and there is very real possibility that unless new element interjected into Indo-China situation French will seek settlement at Geneva which will amount to a sell-out.

(2) We see no prospect of negotiated settlement at Geneva which does not boil down to one of following alternatives: (a) a disguised surrender of the French or ~~retirement~~ retreat (b) a disguised/~~arrangement~~ of the Communists. We have carefully studied other possibilities including division of Indo-China and consider them impracticable.

(3) In our view required new element in situation should be creation before Geneva of an ad hoc coalition of states directly interested in area who had pledged themselves to work together and, if necessary, to contribute forces. Nations we have in mind are US, France, Associated States

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Drafted by:

EUR:JCHBonbright:bsm

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

L. T. Merchant

Clearances:

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Page 2 of telegram to Canberra and Wellington

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United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines, ^{effort}
Proposal presupposes continuation of French military/in
Indo-China. US is prepared to contribute and play its
~~full~~ part in such a common effort.

(4) Secretary stressed attitude of UK, Australia, and New Zealand, particularly former, was key to problem. With passage of time danger would increase ^{and} ~~their~~ capacity for united action would be reduced. It would be difficult to hold unity of free world ~~until~~ ^{if} we waited until danger was at our very doorstep. If danger not recognized by United Kingdom and Commonwealth, which ~~is~~ ^{is} much closer to it than we are, we cannot move.

(5) Matter would at some time be laid before UN with view to broadening support as much as possible. However, coalition we had in mind was indispensable and we could not count on UN for effective action.

((6) (3) We believe action by coalition would not lead to Chinese intervention. However, if this happened we would all consult.

Spender referred to Australian election May 29 and obviously feared interjection of issue in campaign. However, he personally felt action should be taken if we believed French situation would deteriorate irretrievably in next two months.

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Page: 3 of telegram to Canberra and Wellington

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Munro referred to New Zealand commitments in Middle East which would need to be changed and said attitude of United Kingdom would be of greatest significance to his government.

In reply to inquiry concerning expected Australian and New Zealand contribution Admiral Radford indicated Australian carrier and New Zealand naval effort comparable to what it had contributed in Korea would be satisfactory.

Ambassadors indicated they would consult their governments immediately.

For Peaslee: As Spender raised Australian election as possible difficulty, Merchant at Secretary's direction today had supplemental talk with Spender suggesting matter might be manageable politically if Australians took initiative and thereby gained credit as they had on creation of Anzus. You may have opportunity plant same seed with Menzies or Casey.

For Peaslee and Scotten: Please follow up urgently with Australian and New Zealand governments at highest levels with view to early favorable response.

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STANDARD FORM NO 64

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. John L. Holcomb
Deputy Defense Comptroller, Europe
FROM : G.G. Maloney *GM*
SUBJECT : Preliminary Summary Report, MAAG, Saigon

DATE : April 7, 1954

*Embassy
concern*
in
concern
28/4/54 (MAAG)
concern
file

The following is a preliminary report on the mission to Saigon:

PURPOSE: The purpose of this mission was to completely review with the US Country Team in Saigon, Indochina, the cost study for Indochina performed by the Deputy Defense Comptroller Europe in Paris. The review was to consist of checking force basis utilized, initial requirements for supplies and equipment for the approved forces, consumption rates, stock level and operational reserve requirements and all other pertinent information in relation to the report in order to develop a reasonably sound basis for projecting future requirements and funds to support the accepted plan for ultimate victory in Indochina.

It is not possible within the present logistical and operational arrangement in Indochina to arrive at any reasonable estimate of cost to the United States of material requirements for the war in Indochina. With changing force goals, crash requirements for current military operations, lack of knowledge of French operational plans, and serious gaps in logistical data, the costs for FY 1954 are in a constant state of flux. The Air Force MDAP program, for example, which was originally estimated to cost approximately \$55 million dollars in FY 1954 is now over \$100 million with no end in sight as to final costs for this fiscal year. The Army MDAP program is in the same position with a program of \$251 million with now requests providing for sizeable increases. For FY 1955, no MDAP cost estimates have been developed or can be developed until force goals are firmer, requirements and assets of military end items established, and basic personnel cost data determined. These basic facts must be obtained from the French to become a basis for the MAAG to perform its major function of reviewing and screening requirements to develop a firm program necessary for determining US logistical and funding requirements.

After review of the information available to the Country Team in Saigon, it is recommended that the cost study prepared by the Deputy Defense Comptroller Europe be accepted with such modifications as can be determined as a result of the Saigon visit by the cost study team. Since the cost study was prepared, developments have occurred which will affect the cost study. Specifically these developments are: (1) the pending 500 million piaster (\$8.5 million) increase in the cost of the Cambodia military program, (2) the pending gift of the Viet Nam TFR advance (or probable other pay increase) estimated to cost 500 to 600 million piasters (\$14 - \$17 million), (3) the more rapid activation of certain Laotian and Vietnamese armed forces by the French High Command (rough estimate \$20-\$40 million), (4) the possible inclusion of / personnel cost CY54 CY55

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costs of certain regional militia units in Associated States military budgets of which the first installment is estimated at \$8 million and (5) the additional costs of pacification of areas liberated by operation "Atlante" estimated at 200 million piasters (\$5.7 million). These developments plus adjustments such as changes in force goals and consumption and initial provisioning requirements where known should be incorporated in the cost study. However, it should be made clear that in revising the cost study based on the known factors these areas more or less tend to increase the estimate. It is estimated that there are many unknown areas that would, if known, in all probability reduce the estimate considerably. With these revisions, the report of DC/E should be accepted as the best possible estimate of cost of the Indochina military operations until such time as the French and MAAG Saigon can provide improved experience factors and costs. From an overall standpoint, it should be noted that MAAG Saigon has no basis for determining the costs of the FY 1954 and FY 1955 MDA Program at this time. The MAAG feels that until such time as the French inform them of future plans it is impossible to develop a costing of the FY 1954 and FY 1955 Indochina operations. Thus, any estimates contained in the FY 1955 Budget and Congressional presentations are illustrative only and in no way reflect what the costs for FY 1955 will be.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS: The MAAG must be given authority to review requisitions along the line indicated in this report in order that they may no longer merely act as a transmission agency for French requisitions.

When and if the French provide the required logistical data, the MAAG must make some fundamental changes internally, designed to establish a system of supply control which will be geared toward the screening of requirements. This will necessitate a proper integration of the present record system with the needs of the screening and review process.

There is no question that requirements of the French and Associated States must be met, but the problem is one of providing sufficient equipment of the right type needed to support the military mission. Otherwise, both funds and effort will be dissipated and the military mission weakened by providing equipment in excess of requirements or not of a type that can be utilized. For example, 2094 rocket launchers 3.5" have been delivered along with 66,000 rounds of ammunition, and an additional 190,000 rounds programmed, which the French do not want or use. Without close liaison with the French in the planning and logistical phases, which will enable the MAAG to have an understanding of future operations, assets, and requirements, there will be continuous problems of an unbalanced supply situation and inadequate data for US logistical and funding planning.

An improved system of inspection of end use of MDAP equipment must be developed. At present the MAAG is permitted 30 inspections of units a month. The MAAG must give 60 days notice of proposed units to be inspected, which necessitates assuming that specific units will be non-operational and at a given location 60 days in advance. Even when the schedule is approved by the French, units to be inspected are made operational without notifications to the MAAG, who, upon arriving at the site find that inspections cannot be accomplished because the unit was made operational. More freedom of choice of units to be inspected.

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must be worked out with the French. Because the \$385 million dollar program includes pay and subsistence of forces of the Associated States, this problem of inspection becomes an even more acute area, since it is proposed that those units will be visited by the MAAG at least once a year to follow up on its implementation.

The major reasons for the lack of program information and logistical back up material within the MAAG are more or less a direct result of the following:

The MAAG members have, in the past, been expected to be experts in relation to requirements for supplies and equipment to logistically support a war for which they have no part in the planning or execution. Not only do they have no part in the planning but the plans, if any, which are prepared by the French are not made known to the MAAG for the most part until after execution or on a crash basis. It is believed that the MAAG has made a valiant attempt based on the limited information provided them to screen and evaluate the requests for supplies and materiel in order to provide the necessary requirements to support the war. Due to the very limited justification presented with requisitions, it has in the past been incumbent upon the MAAG to ask the French for additional information prior to recommending approval to Washington. An example of a reply from the French is shown in (Tabs A and A1). The Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces, General Navarre, forwarded a letter (Tab B) to General Trapnell, Chief of the MAAG, which resulted in a cable being forwarded from OSD Nash to the MAAG (Tab C). As a result of the above correspondence and General Navarre's discussion of the situation here with visiting US officials who have given him the impression that all his requests will be granted, this attitude has filtered down through General Navarre's staff to the point that they feel that an official request for equipment or assistance from the French High Command is sufficient justification, and that their needs should not be put to question. The MAAG, as a net result, has become to a great extent a transmission agency for requisitions for supplies and equipment except in those limited areas where MAAG personnel are able to extract reasonable justification from the French. In many cases the MAAG has recommended disapproval of requests and the French have gone to higher authority and gained approval. A recent dispatch from the MAAG to Headquarters USAF in connection with French requests for aircraft support is attached (Tab D) as an illustration of the difficulties under which MAAG action is taken.

The following is a brief analysis of the problem areas and recommendations. It is believed that the following recommendations are essentials if the US is to furnish logistically support for the war in Indochina in a reasonably efficient and economical manner.

FORCE BASIS: Since the completion of the 6 February 1954 DCE cost study there have been a number of changes in Force Plan objectives of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Some of the changes were under advisement at the time of the 6 February report and in those cases where considered

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firm were included in the study. There are indications that further changes are being considered by the French and/or Vietnamese which have not yet been officially communicated to the MAAG. For the most part changes as of this date will increase the cost estimates over those included in the original study although they are relatively minor when compared to the overall force levels.

The logistical implications of these frequent changes are important. For example, since mid-January 1954 the Country Team has become aware of three different plans for the build-up of Standard Infantry Battalions and Light (Khin Quan) Battalions in the Vietnamese Army. These plans are summarized as follows:

Time Periods	Infantry Battalion (Standard)(T/O Personnel:829)			Light Battalion (K.Q.) (T/O Personnel: 640)		
	Plan A	Plan B	Plan C	Plan A	Plan B	Plan C
In being Dec'53	86	86	86	54	54	54
Planned Dec'54	86	97	87	84	103	129
Planned Dec'54	86	97	NA	120	120	NA

Plan A: Officially submitted to MAAG on 25 January 1954 as basis for logistical planning. MAAG has submitted to JCS for approval. Probably in costing study base.

Plan B: Unofficially submitted to MAAG in support of request for change in equipment programming on 2 March 1954. MAAG has requested official submission; request as yet unanswered.

Plan C: Learned of through informal sources on 2 April 1954.

The equipment required by a light battalion is significantly different from that required by a standard infantry battalion. Shifts in planning of this magnitude over such short periods of time could easily result in US furnishing equipment of the wrong type for the missions of forces that will actually be activated.

Attached is table F which illustrates the utilization of assigned aircraft. As you will note in the table of the total F-8-F aircraft assigned, only 65% are operational or projected to be operational at any one time. Likewise, for the B-26, only 55% of the total assigned aircraft are operational or projected to be operational at any one time.

RECOMMENDATION: While it is recognized that a fluid situation requires changes in planning, the necessity of keeping MAAG fully and promptly informed of changes in thinking should be stressed to the French. Further, force plans and T/O's should be stabilized to the maximum extent permitted by the military situation as soon as possible in order to permit orderly and effective logistical support.

REQUIREMENTS: The MAAG has available for the most part, tables of organization and equipment for major Army tactical units but they are not available for most sector or static units. Where T/O's are

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available initial requirements have been computed by the cost study team. The Air Force and the Navy have T/O&Es for a limited number of units, but the MAAG does not accept them as firm enough to be a basis for requirements computations. The T/O&Es available represent a small segment of the total materiel requirements. Therefore, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been accepting requirements as stated by the French except in those cases where sufficient information is available to modify the requests.

Table (1) attached is a comparison of requirements and assets indicating the incomplete nature of the requirements data available to the MAAG. For some items such as rifles, heavy machine gun, 57mm recoilless rifle, 60mm mortar, all trucks, armored cars M-8, personnel carriers half track, and most signal equipment, the requirements are less than assets, as much as 50% in some cases. No data is available as to the basis for the requirements for the difference between the T/O&Es and the stated assets. Similarly, it is impossible to determine whether there are additional requirements for those end items where requirements exceed assets. Would all the requirements be met if the apparent deficiency were funded? The MAAG is in no position to answer that question or to provide an answer as to the definitive requirements which must still be met.

RECOMMENDATIONS: United States military experienced logistic and planning officers be assigned to General Navarre's staff in an advisory capacity in order to determine logistic requirements for projected programmed operations. If it is not possible to assign US personnel to the French Staff then it is imperative that the US logistic officers be kept informed of the planned operations in order to effectively and efficiently support those operations. Furthermore, the French and the MAAG should meet and agree on approved T/O&Es for all units including tactical, sector and static units, and the MAAG must be advised immediately of changes or revisions to the approved T/O&Es.

INVENTORIES: No firm information is available on actual inventory positions as of any given date and actual deliveries from MDAP are not known in many areas. The Air Force, for example, does not have actual delivery information on MDAP ammunition. This is due to such things as: (1) No manifest being forwarded with shipments; (2) shipments arriving and unloading without knowledge of MAAG, etc. No information is available as to French contributions of end items or deliveries from off-shore procurement. The inventories as submitted by the French for the cost study vary as much as 50% plus or minus from the inventories contained in the MAAG records.

As illustrated in Table 1, the status of inventories is not firm. The table compares asset data as of 31 December 1953 available at the MAAG with that presented by the French in their Paris report to DCE. There is no consistent pattern or explanation as to the variation existing between the two sets of stated assets, since for some items such as the carbine and 81mm mortar the MAAG assets are double those stated by the French, while for the rifle and light machine gun, for example, the French indicate assets double those stated by the MAAG. It should be recognized that the MAAG does not provide for combat losses or for OSP and indigenous financed shipments of end items to Indochina. This table indicates that without the complete knowledge

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of assets, the MAAG may approve end item requests based on their limited asset data when in reality they may be in long supply, or vice versa.

A further complication to the end item inventory problem is contained in the Memorandum of Understanding between the US and the French with relation to the \$385 million aid program to the Associated States. The Memorandum permits expenditures for ammunition, motorized equipment, communications equipment, and engineering equipment for the Associated States out of the \$385 million. It is estimated that \$70 million will be for materiel, which will not be controlled by the MAAG. Thus, if the MAAG rejects a request for HDAP end item aid, there is nothing to prevent the ASSOCIATED States from procuring that item out of the \$385 million program. FURTHERMORE, the MAAG would have, if the present state of logistical confusion continues, no information as to the materiel on order from the \$385 million or that which is stocked as a result of the \$385 million.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The MAAG immediately bring their records up to date in relation to what equipment and supplies have actually been shipped to Indochina under all programs and what is planned to be shipped by date. This will necessitate complete cooperation of all Department of Defense agencies in the US and France with MAAG Saigon.

A request be made to the French to furnish to the MAAG all known assets, including materiel from France, off-shore procurement and materiel to be procured from the \$385 million Associated States aid program. Those stated assets, in turn, must be reconciled with the MAAG records in order to provide a firm basis for computing future requirements.

CONSUMPTION: The latest information available to the MAAG on actual Army consumption is contained in a French report dated April 1953 for the calendar year 1952 which does not take account of the major increased effort since that period. When consumption information is furnished to the MAAG it is usually on a crash basis for the purpose of justifying air lift of additional supplies. Experience has shown that the French are requesting materiel on a crash basis when they actually have sufficient quantities in their own depots but say it is much easier to have the US air lift additional quantities than to redistribute the materiel within Indochina. This is particularly true in the case of ammunition. Sometime during the month of April, the French will submit another list of consumption factors, but these will be based on CY 1953 and will not reflect the full impact of the Navarro Plan or the present fighting at Dien Bien Phu.

RECOMMENDATION: That the French be requested to provide experienced consumption rates on all types of equipment and supplies on a monthly recurring basis, or whatever basis is reasonable within their capability.

STOCK LEVELS - OPERATIONAL RESERVE: Inasmuch as the assets, consumption and receipts are more or less unknown, it is not possible for the MAAG to determine what stock levels or operational reserves are being maintained in depots, nor the amount of serviceable and repairable equipment in depots, or the amount of equipment in the hands of troops. There are

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a few exceptions to this, such as army ammunition, where monthly reports are submitted by the French on stock levels and consumption. However, the stock levels for the bulk of the supplies and equipment cannot be determined or reconciled to any specific level. The MAAG in their comment on the cost study stated that the French must have at least a six-month stock level of supplies in the theater. However, the MAAG was unable to state in specific terms what actually constituted a six-month level or what constitutes any militarily satisfactory level for Indochina.

In the army ammunition area, as noted in Table II, if the current high consumption rates continue, a shortage of 60 mm mortar shells and 105 mm howitzer shells will occur, while present MDAP programming will result in an oversupply of 30 caliber carbine cartridges, 57 mm rifle shells, and 155mm howitzer shells. With available consumption data, rough requirements can be developed to serve as a basis for logistical planning to prevent the crash approach that has been necessary recently. While some consideration must be given to the MAAG position that lacking data on the operational plans of the French, it is impossible to state what constitutes a definitive operational level, estimates for planning purposes are still necessary and can be made based on the available consumption data.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The French should be requested to furnish the MAAG the quantity and location of stock levels and operational reserves currently maintained by type of equipment and supply and what is projected.

The levels of supply required in Indochina are dependent on the extent of logistical back-up outside the theater, the capabilities of the logistical organization in Indochina and such other factors as transportation and communication facilities within the theater. It is recommended that qualified logistical personnel be assigned to make a study of the logistical support situation in Indochina in order to determine what levels are required in the theater to support the operation.

MILITARY PERSONNEL COSTS: There is insufficient information available from American sources in Saigon to validate either the French or DC/E estimates of pay and allowances, nor is there a revised personnel plan available to show the effect of recent changes in force goals on the personnel build-up. Embassy and STEI sources consider a pay increase for Associated States military personnel a distinct probability most likely taking the form of non-repayment of the annual New Year's (TET) advance of one month's pay. Average pay data submitted to DC/E in Paris indicates French expectation of a 20% pay increase for these Associated States personnel as well as indigenous personnel with French Forces by end of calendar 1955, although this was not included in the budget. Such information as is available on food and clothing points to some upward revision of the DC/E estimate.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the French be requested to furnish revised personnel plans showing the phased build-up as it relates to latest force objectives.
2. That in order to validate estimates of food costs, the French be requested to provide:

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- (a) Most recent data on average cost of food per man for both French and Associated States Forces, by service.
- (b) Lists of the quantities and kinds of food in the authorized ration for (1) French Forces (2) A.S. Forces and (3) any major feeding groups (such as supplatives) which are furnished a separate ration. The lists should indicate those items procured locally and those in metropolitan France, and the current prices being paid for each.
- (c) Latest available inventory position and explanation of basis for stock levels maintained.
- (d) Data on unit cost, consumption rates and inventory status of any special or operational rations used.

3. For estimates of clothing costs, the French should be requested to provide:

- (a) A general explanation of the system or systems used by each service in providing clothing to (1) French Forces and (2) Associated States Forces, including the significance, if any, of deployment on clothing requirements.
- (b) A list of the items and quantities of clothing furnished individuals upon entry into the service, and the value of this initial outfit (by service).
- (c) Latest available data as to annual clothing replacement costs per man, (i.e. consumption factors).
- (d) Current inventory position and explanation of basis for stock levels maintained.

4. Inasmuch as the US combined Group Saigon will have definite responsibilities in the administration of the \$385 million aid program for the support of military personnel of the Associated States, procedures should be set up to keep currently advised of (a) changes in personnel plans as changes are made in force plans, (b) progress made toward meeting goals (or slippages) in force plans and personnel plans, (c) experience data on food and clothing consumption, prices, and stock levels as well as (d) experienced expenditure rates for pay and allowances.

LOSSES THROUGH TRANSFERS FROM DOLLARS TO PIASTERS: The official rate of exchange is 35 piasters to the dollar, while the present purchasing power parity in Indochina is about 72 piasters to the dollar. It is apparent that for those items purchased locally, there is an average 50% loss of dollars as a result of the differences between the exchange rate and the dollar piaster purchasing power parity.

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4. Should the Communists operate an air force from South China in sufficient strength to jeopardize French retention of the Tonkin delta, the resulting situation would warrant active consideration of implementation of appropriate actions as outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405. If and when the introduction of Communist aircraft into the Indochina War appears imminent, the U.S. should initiate talks at a political level as set forth in NSC 5405 to provide for the implementation of the military actions outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405.

5. Although there is no reliable evidence to indicate that Communist combat air units, POL, or other aviation supplies have been moved in strength to South China, this could be accomplished without too much difficulty. However, until there is some indication of such an enemy development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any commitment which restricts or limits freedom of action by the United States would be premature and unwarranted. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the reply to Mr. Plevin indicate that United States action in such a development would depend upon the circumstances.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will acquaint Department of State Representatives with the substance of their views as expressed in this memorandum when the subject of Indochina is again discussed at a State-JCS meeting.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject; U.S. Reaction to Chinese Communist
Introduction of Air Power in Indochina

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed a memorandum by Department of State Representatives, dated 12 March 1954, subject as above, tabled at the 12 March 1954 State-JCS meeting. In substance, this memorandum requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their views on the military significance and implications of the following:

a. The appearance of, and Communist capability of maintaining and supplying, an air force using only airfields in Viet Nam or Laos in the face of French opposition.

b. The appearance of, and Communist capability of mounting, an air force based principally on airfields in Communist China, and how large a force would be required to counter French defense capabilities.

2. In regard to subparagraph 1 a, above, there are no indications that the Viet Minh currently possess an air force. Therefore, the appearance of combat aircraft in Minh would warrant the assumption that they were supplied by and operated from Communist China. It is estimated that the Communists, in the face of current French capabilities, could not maintain and supply an air force operating exclusively from airfields in Viet Nam or Laos.

3. In regard to subparagraph 1 b, above, the Communists have the capability of mounting a serious air threat to the French with an airforce based principally in South Cina. The French air defense of the Indochina area is inadequate. Consequently, a Communist air force of from 100-200 aircraft (including jet bombers) could readily overcome French air strength in the Tonkin delta and severely affect other French strengths in Indochina.

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4. Should the Communists operate an air force from South China in sufficient strength to jeopardize French retention of the Tonkin delta, the resulting situation would warrant active consideration of implementation of appropriate actions as outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405. If and when the introduction of Communist aircraft into the Indochina War appears imminent, the U.S. should initiate talks at a political level as set forth in NSC 5405 to provide for the implementation of the military actions outlined in paragraph 31 of NSC 5405.

5. Although there is no reliable evidence to indicate that Communist combat air units, POL, or other aviation supplies have been moved in strength to South China, this could be accomplished without too much difficulty. However, until there is some indication of such an enemy development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any commitment which restricts or limits freedom of action by the United States would be premature and unwarranted. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the reply to Mr. Plevin indicate that United States action in such a development would depend upon the circumstances.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will acquaint Department of State Representatives with the substance of their views as expressed in this memorandum when the subject of Indochina is again discussed at a State-JCS meeting.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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In reply refer to I 11594

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT CUTLER

SUBJECT: The Aircraft Carrier "Belleau Wood"

1. On the 23rd of May, 1953, France requested the loan of an additional aircraft carrier for use in the Indochina theatre. They asked that the ship be turned over to them on 1 October. Accordingly, the President on 26 August, 1953, under the terms of P.L.188, 83d Congress, approved the loan of the "Belleau Wood" to France effective on or about 5 September, 1953.
2. The US Navy actually transferred the ship to the French on 5 September, 1953, but, owing to France's delay in supplying a full crew, she did not arrive in France until about 24 December, approximately two and one-half months later than originally scheduled.
3. Latest reports indicate that the "Belleau Wood" was scheduled to sail from Toulon on 7 April, 1954, to begin her first tour in the Indochina theatre. Enroute she will deliver 32 French-built "Ouragon" jet aircraft to the Indian Air Force at Bombay. It is estimated that it will take her approximately one month to make the voyage from France to Indochina with a stop at Bombay to unload the jets. Furthermore, when she arrives in the Gulf of Tonkin she will relieve the carrier "Arromanche" which will return to France. MAAG Paris points out that if the Ouragon's were unloaded and replaced by one and possibly two available Corsair squadrons it would be possible to keep both the "Belleau Wood" and the "Arromanche" in the Indochina combat. There is no indication, however, that the French Navy is considering such action.
4. The French government's sale of French-built jets to India is particularly interesting. At the same time these jets were being built, we have been delivering, as a part of our military assistance program for France which at the end of FY 1953 had exceeded a total of 3.8 billion dollars, US jets to France in order to help them meet their NATO force goals. (We have already given them more than 700 jets.)
5. In view of the current crisis in Indochina, the repeated frantic French requests for additional US aircraft, and the recent proposal by Pleven

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that the US provide a large carrier and aircraft of types familiar to French pilots for French air strikes in support of the Dien Bien Phu battle (see attached cable) it would appear that:

a. The French will have had the "Belleau Wood" a whole year without making use of her in the fight for Indochina.

b. She is currently being used as a delivery wagon rather than as a combat vessel.

c. Despite France's urgent need for additional fighter aircraft in NATO and in Indochina the French will manage to find time to build, sell and deliver 32 jets to India.

C. H. Bonesteel, III
Brigadier General, USA
Defense Member
NSC Planning Board

Enclosures

1. Cable D/State to Paris, 3541
dtd 8Apr54, sgnd Dulles, Secret
2. Naval Mes 7048 dtd 061330s, Secret
3. Cable DA IN 49168 frm Paris
dtd 3 Apr 54, Top Secret
4. Cpy Memo to Sec/Navy frm ASNA
dtd 16Mar54, Secret
5. Cpy Memo to Sec/Navy frm AS0Air
dtd 3Sept53, Restr. w/incl. cpy
memo for Sec/Navy frm Sen. Buffner,
dtd 1Sept53, Conf.

Prep: Col Black/isc/10Apr54/OASD (ISA)
NSC/2E853/79349

Cpy #1-Mr. Cutler
2-R&C Files
3 & 4-OSD Files
5-SWO Lewis, Comeback, 2B853

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

April 15, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: NSC Action No. 1086-a, b and c

REFERENCE: Planning Board Report on NSC Action No. 1074-a,
dated 5 April 1954

1. At its meeting on 6 April 1954, the National Security Council agreed on the following, which has been subsequently approved by the President (NSC Action No. 1086-a, b and c):

a. Noted and discussed the reference report and postponed decision on the recommendation in paragraph 7-c thereof, but agreed that military and mobilization planning to be prepared for this contingency should be promptly initiated.

b. Agreed that the United States should direct its efforts prior to the Geneva Conference toward:

- (1) Organizing a regional grouping, including initially the U.S., the U.K., France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist efforts by any means to gain control of the countries in this area.
- (2) Gaining British support for U.S. objectives in the Far East, in order to strengthen U.S. policies in the area.
- (3) Pressing the French to accelerate the program for the independence of the Associated States.

c. Noted the President's view that, if agreement for the organization of the above-mentioned regional grouping could be achieved, Congressional authorization for U.S. participation therein should then be requested.

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2. The action set forth in paragraph 1-a above has been referred to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization for appropriate implementation and was discussed at the Armed Forces Policy Council on 15 April 1954. The action in paragraph 1-b was referred to the Secretary of State.

3. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly prepare the military plans involved under paragraph 1-a above. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in close collaboration, under existing arrangements, with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Supply and Logistics), (Manpower and Personnel) and (Comptroller), promptly develop the supply, manpower and other requirements arising from these military plans which might affect production, manpower and budgetary planning by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization. This military planning and the development of requirements should cover not only specific intervention in Indochina, but also any augmentations in forces or supplies required to permit the United States to maintain at present levels its present defense commitments and to be prudently prepared to face possible increased risks of (1) Chinese Communist intervention and (2) general war.

4. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff report to my office on the above by 10 May 1954. If it has not been possible to complete the planning by that date, a progress report on 10 May 1954 is requested.

5. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Supply and Logistics) and (Manpower and Personnel) will collaborate with the Office of Defense Mobilization, as appropriate, in the preparation of production and manpower plans based upon and required to implement the military plans.

5. Because of the security sensitivity of this planning, appropriate security precautions will be taken by all concerned.

/s/

C. E. WILSON

cc: ASD (Comptroller)
ASD (Manpower & Personnel).
ASD (Supply & Logistics)
ASD (ISA)
Office of Special Operations

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April 15, 1954

Dear Alex:

This Department is becoming increasingly concerned regarding the lack of a U.S. position in preparation for the Indochina phase of the Conference to be held at Geneva. I fully appreciate the difficulties which, up until this time, have made it very difficult to draft a position on Indochina. However, in view of the short time remaining until the Conference convenes at Geneva, it is essential that consideration be given to the U.S. position.

It appears to me that ample guidance is available to provide the basis for an initial draft of a U.S. Government position on Indochina for Geneva. NSC 5405 as well as reports of the Special Committee set forth, in positive terms, U.S. policy with respect to Indochina and Southeast Asia. At the meetings of the Indochina Working Group the need for a U.S. position on Indochina has been discussed at considerable length, but to date no progress has been made. In order to initiate action on a draft position, the Defense representatives at the working level submitted an outline of views to the State members of the Indochina Working Group. A copy of this paper is attached for your information.

In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that immediate action be taken to draft a U.S. position paper on Indochina for the Conference at Geneva. I would be glad to discuss this matter further at your convenience or at a meeting of the Assistant Secretaries.

Sincerely yours,

For the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA):

SIGNED

A. C. DAVIS
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Office of
Foreign Military Affairs

1 Attachment
Draft U.S. Position
on Indochina for Geneva

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
Coordinator, U.S. Delegation to Geneva Conference
Department of State

CASullivan/jg/14 Apr 54
OASD(ISA) 2E832 79271
I-11,691

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UNITED STATES POSITION ON INDOCHINA TO BE TAKEN AT GENEVA

Assumptions

1. NSC 5405, approved 16 January 1954, continues to be the policy of the United States with respect to Southeast Asia.
2. It is highly improbable that Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia. (JCS memorandum, 12 March 1954).
3. At Geneva, the French Government under continued domestic pressure will favor a negotiated settlement of the fighting in Indochina at almost any price.

Discussion

The French Government has been under considerable domestic pressure to terminate the hostilities in Indochina. In order to forestall a showdown prior to Geneva, M. Laniel, in a public statement, proposed six points as conditions for a cease-fire in Indochina. These six points would unquestionably be unacceptable to the Communists, particularly if reinforced by additional conditions to assure enforcement of the armistice terms. However, domestic pressure on the French Government to terminate hostilities is expected to increase during the course of the Geneva Conference, rather than decrease. In view of this, it would be extremely difficult for the French Government not to accept an agreement which would be less than the conditions of the Laniel proposal. It should be noted that although the above factors make it almost certain that the French Government will seek agreement at Geneva at practically any price, there has been no indication that this "price" has been considered realistically by the French Government or public.

Communist tactics at Geneva are likely to follow closely those tactics employed by Communist negotiators at Panmunjom. Communist intransigence and other tactics, short of actually breaking off negotiations, led to prolonged discussions which worked to the disadvantage of our side. As a result, the Korean Agreement in its final form produced an armistice bringing about a cease-fire but with which it has been impossible to assure Communist compliance. On the other hand, in Korea the United Nations command is required to live up faithfully to the terms of the armistice. It should be noted that this problem would be considerably more complex and disadvantageous to the French in Indochina.

The Department of Defense has considered the military implications of terminating the fighting in Indochina under conditions less than a military defeat of organized Viet Minh forces. It was the conclusion of the Department of Defense, as indicated in Assumption No. 2 above, that inasmuch as it is highly improbable that Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement which would be consistent with basic

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United States objectives in Southeast Asia, a continuation of fighting with the objective of seeking a military victory appears as the only alternative in Indochina. (JCS memorandum, TAB A).

Conclusions

If the Communists follow the same tactics they employed at Panmunjom, they will be prepared for a long and difficult negotiation. The French will find it almost impossible to withstand pressures for a weakening of their position (the Laniel proposal) and will most likely give way under these pressures. Further, the French, once engaged in a negotiation, will of necessity be required to seek every possible means of settlement.

The United States should not join with the French in any Indochina negotiations at Geneva unless there is prior French commitment not to accept terms leading directly or indirectly to the loss of Indochina. This commitment should be positive and definite, for it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to disassociate itself from the negotiations once they had begun. Thus, if the negotiations result in a settlement leading to the ultimate loss of Indochina, the United States would have participated in this loss.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a. The United States adopt the position that it is highly improbable that the Communist agreement could be obtained to a negotiated settlement at Geneva which would be consistent with basic United States objectives in Southeast Asia;

b. The United States position for Geneva be positive and definite that we will agree to no settlement which would in any way compromise our objectives with respect to Southeast Asia;

c. The French Government be informed of the United States position (a and b above) at the earliest possible date;

d. Concurrently with informing the French of the United States position, consideration should also be given to the following pressures to be brought on the French if circumstances dictate:

(1) If France through one means or another countenances a Communist takeover in Indochina, it will mean far more than the end of France's position in the Far East. Rather it will be a public exhibition of France's inability to carry on any longer as an equal member with the United States and the United Kingdom of the Big Three;

(2) The effect of abandonment would be so severe in North Africa as to have serious repercussions not only on the French position there, but also on the nature of the relationship between France and the United States in that area;

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(3) If the Indochina war ends on terms considered unsatisfactory by the United States, our dollar aid to France would, of course, automatically cease.

(4) Beyond these points, conclusion of negotiations by France resulting in Communist domination of Indochina, an area of extreme strategic interest to the free world, would result in consequences in Europe as well as elsewhere whose seriousness would have no apparent limitation.

e. If the French Government refuses to agree to the United States position, the United States Government should not participate in the Indochina discussions at Geneva;

f. The United States immediately determine whether in the event of (e) above, we should approach the Governments of the Associated States and our allies with a view to continuing the struggle in Indochina either jointly with the French, in concert with our allies, or, if necessary, unilaterally.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action
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Info

FROM: Geneva
TO: Secretary of State
NO: DULTE 5, April 25, midnight

Control: 10479
Rec'd: April 25, 1954
11:18 p.m.

cc:
Gen Smith
J. Murphy
E. R. Radford
F. E. Drumright
White House
adm. Radford
Secy's Office

NIACT

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY

(R. B. Davis III)
(Special Liaison)

I met with Eden this evening at 10:15 p.m., following his arrival from London. He had consulted Churchill, the Cabinet and British chiefs. He said that the United Kingdom is strongly opposed to any intervention at Dien Bien Phu because it does not think it will have decisive effect and will not be understood by United Kingdom or free world opinion. He indicated that the views of the British chiefs differ with ours and that British chiefs look forward to a discussion and estimate with Radford in London. In summary the British position is as follows: (1) The United Kingdom is prepared now to join with the United States in a secret study of measures which might be taken to defend Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia if the French capitulate.

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4-25-54

Eden saw Bidault at Orly tonight on his way through Paris (where he stopped to pick up Mrs. Eden) and outlined to him the British position as follows: (1) The United Kingdom will give the French all possible diplomatic support in Geneva to reach a satisfactory settlement on Indochina. (2) If such a settlement is reached the United Kingdom will be willing to join with United States and others in guaranteeing that settlement. (3) If Geneva fails the United Kingdom will be prepared to join the others to examine the situation urgently to see what should be done.

I said to Eden that while I had reservations myself about air intervention at Dien Bien Phu at this moment without an adequate political basis for such action, his reply was most discouraging in that it seemed to leave the French nothing to fall back on. If French are to stand loss of Dien Bien Phu they must be strengthened and a declaration of common intent would do this. In essence the United Kingdom was asking the French to negotiate and at the same time telling them that if the negotiation failed that they would be glad to examine what could be done. Given the present French situation with which Eden is fully familiar, I said to Eden that I doubted that there would be French will to stand up to their adversaries at Geneva.

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Eden made quite clear that the United Kingdom is opposed to air

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intervention

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intervention at Dien Bien Phu and also opposed to becoming directly involved in any way with the Indochinese war.

Referring to the rest of Southeast Asia, he said the British were confident that they had the situation in Malaya in hand and mentioned that they had 22 battalions there and 100,000 native police. He said that there was no parallel between Indochina and Malaya.

Eden also showed me a map of Indochina prepared by Alexander and the British chiefs. The map indicates that virtually all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is under or subject to imminent control by the Viet Minh. The British believe that the only way to cope with the situation is to commit a strong force to the Hanoi delta and generally work outward concentrically consolidating their position as they go with loyal natives. This they believe is a "tremendous project involving lots of time and considerable forces."

I said to Eden I felt the position which his Government had taken would have so little in it in way of comfort to the French that the prospect of the latter standing firm here was very slight. It would be a tragedy not to take steps now which would prevent Indochina from being written off.

Eden said that there was obviously a difference in the United States and the United Kingdom estimates and thinking but the United Kingdom proposals which he had outlined above were as far as the British Government could go.

DULLES

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Control: 10861
Rec'd: April 26, 1954
6:09 p.m.

Info

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DULTE 9, April 26, 9 p.m.

Discussed with Mr. Murphy 4/27/54 who agreed no action we could safely take at this end now. JWB.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 9; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 73, PARIS 122.

DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY

PARIS AND LONDON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

I met for about an hour this afternoon with Eden and Bidault at latter's villa. Meeting was called at latter's request with no (repeat no) indication its purpose.

After some discussion procedural problems Indochina conference (reported separately) discussion turned to Bao Dai's declaration in Paris and current attitude. Bidault told us that he understands Bao Dai named as his personal representative and observer a former member Ho Chi Minh's cabinet but that Bidault has not (repeat not) been able to confirm observer's arrival at his station in Evian.

Bidault then launched into rather confused discussion of problem his government faces with regard to establishing position for Indochina negotiation which he said was extremely difficult during progress of Dien Bien Phu battle. He touched lightly on whole range of possibilities including collective defense, cease-fire and partition. He mentioned further deterioration in political situation in Associated States.

Eden picked up the question of cease-fire and encouraged further discussion by Bidault this subject with cryptic remark that a month ago British had felt cease-fire due to general infiltration was dangerous but that now without having any clear view they were not (repeat not) so sure. I pointed out that cease-fire at Dien Bien Phu locally would be in fact surrender and that cease-fire generally would involve serious risk of native peoples' rising with resultant massacre of French. Side conversations later made it clear French believe with support of their military authorities in Indochina that

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-2- DULTE 9, April 26, 9 p.m., from Geneva.

general cease-fire lacking any control or safeguards would make it impossible for French Union forces to resume fighting once cease-fire established. Bidault said that the French Government had queried French High Command in Indochina and had received a reply that there would either have to be a final cease-fire or further reinforcements would have to be sent to Indochina during the conference.

As indicative of Bidault's continuing courage, he said that when he saw Molotov tomorrow he intended to stand on Laniel's statement of March 5 and attempt to draw Molotov out without ceding ground himself and without getting involved in detailed discussions of substance on an Indochina settlement.

In my judgment, Eden has arrived with instructions actively to encourage French into almost any settlement which will result in cessation hostilities in Indochina. My guess is that behind this lies British fear that if fighting continues, we will in one way or another become involved, thereby enhancing risk Chinese intervention and possibility further expansion of war. This estimate of mine is confirmed by fact that Chauvel told MacArthur that French believe Eden's instructions are to press actively for a cease-fire.

I made clear to Bidault privately that we would have no (repeat no) part in settlement at Geneva of Indochina war which constituted surrender of Indochina to Communists, and that France has better chance by fighting on rather than by attempted withdrawal which would be under most difficult conditions. I intend to see Eden alone tomorrow morning to talk with extreme bluntness to him expressing my dismay that British are apparently encouraging French in direction surrender which is in conflict not (repeat not) only with our interest but what I conceive theirs to be.

DULLES

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

27 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: French Request for Additional Aid

References: a. NIACT 4085
b. SECTO 14

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff lack verified logistical information, including the comments of the Chief, MAAG, Indochina in regard to feasibility of the aid requested by the French. This information has been requested as soon as possible.

2. Pending receipt of such data and comments from Chief, MAAG, Indochina, which may materially alter the observations on feasibility which follow, the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the French request are indicated below:

a. From the viewpoint of military effectiveness the proposal offers little insofar as relief of Dien Bien Phu is concerned.

b. It would appear that the psychological aspect could be satisfied by confining the operation to one field only-- that at Seno.

c. The Seno airfield appears also to be the only one in which rehabilitation and preparation are feasible within anything like the timing proposed. Preparation of the two other fields included in the French request would require from 2 to 4 weeks and greatly increased supply, logistic and construction effort.

d. It should be pointed out that the proposal is by no means a "one shot" affair but represents a continuing logistic supply requirement of no small proportions with a corresponding reduction of the airlift capabilities of CINCFE.

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of 3 pages series "A"

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e. The matter of local defense of the fields, when operational, adds to the continuing logistic supply effort.

f. The project, even reduced to consideration of the one field at Seno, unquestionably involves continuing participation of U.S. military forces in active operations. The prospects of disengaging them appear remote if the fields are to remain in active operation, as the capabilities of the French to take on the continuing supply effort are questionable. In fact, the probability of continuing and expanded participation by U.S. military personnel is high. Increased risk of U.S. personnel casualties is also involved.

g. The question resolves itself really to whether or not we are, under the guise of a last minute effort to relieve Dien Bien Phu to commence active participation by U.S. forces in the Indochina war.

h. With regard to the furnishing of privateer aircraft this request can be handled through regular MDAP channels, but expedited. The first ten airplanes are now being assembled and prepared, and air delivery to Saigon will be expedited. The additional ten can be provided at a later date.

3. In summary:

a. Employment of U.S. planes and crews, and GOA and supervisory construction personnel, on missions stated, would have the following major military consequences:

(1) Involve U.S. Armed Forces in direct participation in military operations in Indochina.

(2) Mounting scale of U.S. Armed Forces participation due to requirements for local security, and increasing demands for combat and service support for both U.S. and French forces.

(3) Greatly increased risk of U.S. personnel casualties due to enemy action, including capture.

(4) Some increased risk of armed intervention by Communist Chinese forces.

b. Within the approximate time limits suggested, the rehabilitation and extension of the field at Seno appears to be feasible.

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c. From the military viewpoint, insofar as relief of Dien Bien Phu is concerned, the project is of little value.

d. Psychological aspects might well be satisfied by confining projects to the field at Seno only.

e. Maintaining Seno field operational would require a continuing supply effort of considerable proportions.

f. Local defense of field and any ground line of communications would have to be increased to counter Viet Minh guerrilla operations which would increase with the added importance of the airfield.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider* that:

a. From a military viewpoint, the proposal of the French, except for supply of naval aircraft, should be rejected.

b. If, for other than military reasons, the proposal is approved, the U.S. commitment should be limited to rehabilitation and extension of the Seno airfield.

* The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army invites attention to his additional views expressed at the 6 April 1954 meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council and submitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for his information by a covering memorandum, dated 22 April 1954, subject: "Indochina."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

for ARTHUR RADFORD,
 Chairman,
 Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Department of State

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Action

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Info

To - S/S

Control: 11465
Esp'd: April 27, 1954
9:25 p.m.

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DULTE 13, April 27, midnight

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 13 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 77 PARIS 127.

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY.

EYES ONLY AMBASSADORS.

I saw Eden and his immediate advisors for a few minutes before his luncheon April 27. I opened by saying that I wanted to speak frankly concerning our own immediate affairs. I said I considered it great mistake to push French in direction cease-fire which I believed would be a disaster. I said I considered it of utmost importance that we both keep French in mood to fight on in Indochina. If that mood is lost surely disaster would follow with little chance of limiting its scope and indeed little chance of French extricating themselves.

Eden replied with some heat that he was not advocating a cease-fire though he admitted that he had told Bidault that he was less sure today than a month ago that a cease-fire was out of the question. He insisted that all he had been thinking of had been a cease-fire with adequate safeguards and controls. His purpose he said had been to concentrate French thinking on latter points.

I interjected that I did not think three of us were presenting a very impressive or cohesive position. I reminded him that I wanted immediate ad hoc plans covering Southeast Asia including Indochina if Geneva failed but that British were against this. French I said had in effect no government and were at a loss as to what to do. They were drifting toward disaster. I was concerned that we were not doing all possible between us to shore up French resolution. I said there was a basic difference between us in that British seemed to think that plans for a joint defense were more apt to spread conflict than absence of any plans.

Eden said that what worried them in London apart from political aspects was that they felt military intervention would be "terrific business", a bigger affair than Korea, which could get us nowhere. They

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where. They just did not believe that it was a realizable military exercise considering the military means available. Moreover Eden said it would be most unpopular in Asia let alone with British home opinion.

Eden then asked if our tripartite position was really as bad as I had pointed it. He said he felt that other side was properly worried.

I agreed but said in all frankness they were more worried about United States than British.

Eden did not deny this, and said that we must see how things go here in next few days and do what we can to buck French up particularly if Dien Bien Phu falls.

I said I was deeply worried over French situation not alone in its relation with Indochina. NATO was directly affected. The fall of Laniel might result in a left-of-center government coming to power which would exist by Communist sufferance, thereby increasing Communist influence domestically in France and by contagion in Italy which country was also a source of serious concern. I said EDC would be affected, and our entire defense structure in Europe. At this point Bidault arrived and we broke off our conversation.

DULLES

JEF:11

NOTE: Mr. Gilman (S/S) notified 4/27/54 11 p.m., EH.

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Control: 12206

SS

Rec'd: April 29, 1954
6:10 a.m.

Info

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DULTE 21, April 29, 10 a.m.

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY.

Developments have been so rapid and almost every hour so filled with high-level talks that evaluation has been difficult. My present estimates follow:

(1) Indochina. Delay in fall of Dien Bien Phu has resulted in some French discounting of this development. Nevertheless, it must be assumed the French will not continue in any long-range operation unless it will definitely relieve the strain on French manpower in Indochina. Present French Government holding on because their Parliament in recess and probably no one eager to take over at this juncture. Bidault given considerable discretion because present Cabinet cannot make up its mind on any course. Therefore, we do not have anyone on French side with whom we can make any dependable agreements. After deputies return and Dien Bien Phu falls, there may well be a change of government, probably to the left, committed to liquidate Indochina. However, this is more easily said than done and it is possible that as this fact develops a French Government might be prepared to sit down with us seriously and consider some joint program which is something that so far they have evaded.

I do not know whether from military standpoint it would be deemed feasible to end the scattering and exposure of military forces for local political reasons and withdraw present forces to defensible enclaves in deltas where they would have US sea and air protection meanwhile retain enough territory and enough prestige to develop really effective indigenous army along lines suggested by O'Daniel. This might, I suppose, take two years and would require in large part taking over training responsibility by US. Also full independence and increased economic aid would probably be required to help maintain friendly governments in areas chosen for recruitment.

I do not have any idea as to whether this is militarily feasible and Admiral Davis inclines to view that it is not. However,

from political

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from political standpoint this type of program appears to offer best hope of France staying in war. If France and US agree on such a plan, there would be fair chance of Australia and New Zealand coming along. However, this estimate can be improved in next day or two after I have conferred further with Foreign Minister Casey and Prime Minister Webb. It is unlikely that the UK would initially participate and would probably use its influence to prevent participation by Australia and New Zealand. The UK situation would be difficult internally and externally, and there would probably be undesirable repercussions upon other NATO partners. Thailand could be expected to cooperate if we act promptly. Foreign Minister Wan gave further assurance today and urges quick military conversations.

The attitude here of Molotov and Chou En-lai's statement yesterday lead me to rate more highly than heretofore the probability that any open US intervention would be answered by open Chinese intervention with consequence of general war in Asia.

(2) UK attitude is one of increasing weakness. British seem to feel that we are disposed to accept present risks of a Chinese war and this, coupled also with their fear that we would start using atomic weapons, has badly frightened them. I have just received a note from Eden referring to my paper read before NATO restricted council where Eden again urges necessity of consultation before any use. He says, "You know our strongly-held views on the need for consultation before any decision is taken."

(3) General: The decline of France, the great weakness of Italy, and the considerable weakness in England create a situation where I think that if we ourselves are clear as to what should be done, we must be prepared to take the leadership in what we think is the right course, having regard to long-range US interest which includes importance of Allies. I believe that our Allies will be inclined to follow, if not immediately, then ultimately, strong and sound leadership. In saying this, I do not underestimate the immense difficulty of our finding the right course in this troubled situation. Nor do I mean to imply that I think that this is the moment for a bold or war-like course. I lack here the US political and NSC judgments needed for overall evaluation.

DULLES

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

30 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Suspension of U.S. Military Aid to
Indochina in Event of a Cease Fire.

1. The possibility exists that a cease fire in Indochina may be agreed upon either at Geneva or unilaterally between the French and the Viet Minh. In that event, the Viet Minh would likely covertly extend their control over large areas currently held by French Union Forces and cause major defections of these forces. This would result in a quick deterioration of the entire French Union position and enable the Viet Minh to seize large amounts of U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) materiel and supplies.

2. In light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that the United States adopt the following position reference future MDAP assistance to Indochina:

In the event of a cease fire in Indochina, the shipment of military end items under U.S. MDAP provided under the "Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina between the United States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Vietnam," will immediately be suspended, except for such spares and associated maintenance items necessary to the maintenance of equipment in operations. The entire question of U.S. aid to Indochina will be re-examined in the light of circumstances then existing.

3. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the "Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina between the United States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Vietnam," of 23 December 1950, provides adequate legal basis for subject suspension.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you secure governmental acceptance of the position proposed in paragraph 2 above.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR
OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. AIR FORCE

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES WITHIN INDOCHINA OF THE
FALL OF DIEN BIEN PHU



NIE 63-54

Approved 28 April 1954

Published 30 April 1954

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HQ USAF AIR FORCE

The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 28 April 1954. The AEC and FBI abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

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CONSEQUENCES WITHIN INDOCHINA OF THE FALL
OF DIEN BIEN PHU

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable consequences within Indochina during the next two or three months of the fall of Dien Bien Phu within the near future.

SCOPE

The consequences of the fall of Dien Bien Phu on the political situation in France, and the repercussions of major decisions in France or Geneva on the situation in Indochina, are excluded from the scope of this estimate.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would have far-reaching and adverse repercussions, but it would not signal the immediate collapse of the French Union political and military situation in Indochina. As a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the morale of French Union forces would receive a severe blow. A crucial factor in the military situation thereafter would be the reliability of native units, particularly the Vietnamese. There would almost certainly be increased desertions, and the possibility cannot be excluded that the native components of French Union forces might disintegrate. However, we believe that such disintegration would be unlikely during the ensuing two or three months, and that for at least this period the major part of the native troops would probably remain loyal.
2. Assuming no such disintegration, the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself substantially alter the relative military capabilities of French Union and Viet Minh forces in Indochina during the next two or three months. The French stand at Dien Bien Phu has produced certain compensatory military results. It has prevented an overrunning of Laos and has resulted in the inflicting of casualties upon the Viet Minh comparable in number to the total French force committed at Dien Bien Phu. The bulk of Viet Minh forces released by the fall of Dien Bien Phu would probably not be able to move, regroup, and re-equip in time to be employed in new major operations during the next two or three months, although some lightly equipped infantry battalions might be made available more rapidly for operations in the Delta region.

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3. Although the Viet Minh have a substantial capability to organize demonstrations and carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in the major cities of Indochina, we believe that French Union forces could maintain control in those cities.

4. The political consequences in Indochina of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be considerably more adverse than the strictly military consequences and would increase the tempo of deterioration in the over-all French Union position in Indochina, particularly in Vietnam. There would probably be a serious decline in the Vietnamese will to continue the war and to support the Vietnamese military programs. However, we believe that general collapse of French and native governmental authority during the next two

or three months would be prevented by the continued existence of organized French Union forces and the hope among Indochinese that the US might intervene in Indochina.

5. We believe that although the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not immediately lead to collapse of the French Union position in Indochina, it would accelerate the deterioration already evident in the French Union military and political position there. If this trend were not checked, it could bring about a collapse of the French Union position during the latter half of 1954. It should be emphasized that this estimate does not consider the repercussion of major decisions in France or Geneva and elsewhere, which could have a decisive effect on the situation in Indochina.

DISCUSSION

6. We believe that the fall of Dien Bien Phu, if it occurred as assumed in the problem, would result from: (a) French capitulation; or (b) an overwhelming of the French either by assault or by gradual constriction of the French position.

7. If the French were to capitulate without further heavy fighting, the adverse military and political consequences would be essentially similar in kind, though possibly of greater intensity, to those accompanying the fall of the fortress through heavy fighting. Viet Minh losses in the event of capitulation would be less than those which would be incurred during further heavy fighting.

8. In any event, the Viet Minh would have suffered heavy losses in the prolonged fighting at Dien Bien Phu. Estimated Viet Minh casualties in the fighting there to date are approximately 13,000; roughly 50 percent of this number have been killed or rendered perma-

nently ineffective. Although a few experienced units have been sent as reinforcements, individual replacements for the most part have consisted of partially trained personnel. As a result of the Dien Bien Phu operation, the effectiveness of the Viet Minh offensive striking force will be greatly reduced during the next two or three months.

9. French Union casualties at Dien Bien Phu to date have been approximately 5,500. The defeat of the force now at Dien Bien Phu would add another 11,000, thus bringing the total French Union losses to roughly 17,000. At least two-thirds of these troops are experienced, professional units from Algerian, colonial and foreign legion forces. Moreover, six of the thirteen parachute battalions in the French Union forces in Indochina are at Dien Bien Phu. The loss of these elite French Union troops would reduce the French Union offensive striking force by approximately one-

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quarter, thus markedly reducing over-all French Union capabilities for offensive operations in Indochina.

10. As a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the morale of the French Union forces would receive a severe blow. Their will to win would be diminished, largely because of a widespread belief that military victory was no longer possible. The loss of morale would probably not be sufficient to reduce the effectiveness of the professional soldiers of the French Expeditionary force. However, a crucial factor in the military situation thereafter would be the reliability of native units, particularly the Vietnamese. There would almost certainly be an increase in Vietnam desertions, and the possibility cannot be excluded that the native components of French Union forces might disintegrate. However, we believe that such disintegration would be unlikely during the ensuing two or three months, and that for at least this period the major part of the native troops would probably remain loyal. Therefore, we estimate that the impact upon the morale of the French Union forces would be severe, but not of such severity as to preclude their employment as an effective military force during the next two or three months.

11. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself substantially alter the relative military capabilities of French Union and Viet Minh forces in Indochina during the next two or three months unless there were large-scale desertions from the French Union forces. The victorious Viet Minh troops at Dien Bien Phu would have suffered heavy casualties and their efficiency would be reduced. In order to bring these forces up to full strength, the Viet Minh would probably move them from Dien Bien Phu to their main supply and training areas adjacent to the Red River delta. Prior to the rainy season, this redeployment would require at least three to four weeks. After the full onset of the rainy season, which is unlikely before mid-May, the movement would take between two and three months to complete. We therefore estimate that the bulk of the Viet Minh troops at Dien Bien Phu would not be available for major operations elsewhere in

Indochina during the next two or three months, although some lightly-equipped infantry battalions might be made available more rapidly for operations in the Delta region.

12. Although the over-all capabilities of the Viet Minh would be reduced as a consequence of the losses inflicted upon their main striking force, Viet Minh forces elsewhere in Indochina would have the capability during the rainy season to maintain and in some instances increase military pressure against French Union forces. In the Red River delta, they could intensify efforts to sever land communications between Hanoi and Haiphong, ambush French detachments, attack villages, air bases, and other installations, and lay siege to isolated French delta strong points. The scale of Viet Minh operations in the Delta, however, would be restricted by the adverse effects of heavy rains on maneuverability. The Viet Minh could use their force concentrated in the Pleiku region in southern Annam to launch fairly large-scale attacks against French forces engaged in the "Atlante" operation. They could also use units from this force for raiding operations in the Mekong River area or to reinforce the Viet Minh battalions now in Cambodia. Combat operations in southern Annam, the Mekong valley, and in Cambodia would be restricted by the tenuous nature of resupply of ammunition and other military equipment for these units. The Viet Minh could at the same time organize demonstrations and carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in the major cities of Indochina. The Viet Minh capability in this regard is probably substantial.

13. French Union forces, assuming no major Vietnamese defections, would have the capability to maintain their present major fortified positions in the Delta, and elsewhere, maintain control in the major cities, prevent the permanent severing of land communications between Hanoi and Haiphong, repulse Viet Minh attacks in southern Annam and the Mekong River area, and retain the area liberated in the "Atlante" operation. If the Viet Minh were to undertake a major military

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TROOP STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS

FRENCH UNION		VIET MINH	
Regular and Light Bns	274 402,000	Regular and Regional Bns	155 185,000
Semi-Military 203,500	Semi-Military 106,000
Total 605,500	Total 291,000

MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS ¹

DELTA

65 Regular Bns (35 Fr. Ex. Force)
19 Light Bns
83,000 semi-military

22 Regular Bns
10 Regional Bns
35,000 semi-military

DIEN BIEN PHU

16 Regular Bns (15 Fr. Ex. Force)

28 Regular Bns
2 Regional Bns

NORTHERN TONKIN (Less DB Phu Area)

13 Regional Bns

NORTHERN LAOS

14 Regular Bns (10 Fr. Ex. Force)
2 Light Bns

3 Regular Bns
2 Regional Bns

THAKHEK-SAVANNAKHET

17 Regular Bns (13 Fr. Ex. Force)
3 Light Bns

8 Regular Bns
4 Regional Bns

CENTRAL VIETNAM

35 Regular Bns (10 Fr. Ex. Force)
16 Light Bns

14 Regular Bns
7 Regional Bns

COCHIN CHINA

17 Regular Bns (3 Fr. Ex. Force)
20 Light Bns

10 Regular Bns
2 Regional Bns

SOUTHERN LAOS and NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA

8 Regular Bns (3 Fr. Ex. Force)

4 Regular Bns

WESTERN CAMBODIA

11 Regular Bns (0 Fr. Ex. Force)
3 Light Bns

Elements

¹These dispositions cover only infantry units. The regional breakdown does not include the total number of Viet Minh and French bns.

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operation against Cambodia, the defense of Cambodia would require troops from other areas. French Union forces would retain the capability to launch limited offensive operations before the full onset of the rainy season, either in the Red River delta region or on the coast of Annam.

14. The political consequences in Indochina of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be considerably more adverse than the strictly military consequences, although the two are interrelated. The defeat would increase the tempo of deterioration in the over-all French Union position in Indochina, particularly in Vietnam. The principal political consequences would be: (a) a major blow to French prestige among the Indochinese, and an increased conviction on their part that the French were unable to protect them against the Viet Minh; (b) a serious decline in French and Indochinese will to continue the war, and in particular a further decline in popular support in Vietnam for Vietnamese military programs; (c) exacerbation of French-Indochinese relations, partly as a result of increased Indochinese suspicions that the French will "sell out" to the Viet Minh; (d) a sharp increase of "fense sitting" among politically conscious groups previously disposed to support the Vietnam Government; and (e) a sharp increase, particularly among Vietnamese, of covert support of the Viet Minh. However, we believe that a general collapse of French and native governmental authority during the next two or three months would be prevented by the continued existence of organized French Union forces and

the hope that the US might intervene in Indochina.

15. The political effect in Laos would probably be similar to that of Vietnam. However, the Laotians would probably display a greater disposition than the Vietnamese to stand by the French and to continue the war effort.

16. The political effect on Cambodia would be extremely uncertain. The internal security of Cambodia and a certain minimum stability might be maintained, but Cambodia's vulnerability to future Viet Minh pressure would increase.

17. The Viet Minh would make every effort to make political capital of their victory at Dien Bien Phu. They would concentrate on increasing the sense of hopelessness in the Associated States, and would seek to convince the Indochinese that the triumph at Dien Bien Phu signalled their imminent "deliverance" from colonial rule by fellow countrymen. They would intensify current efforts to enhance the status of the so-called "People's Governments" of Laos and Cambodia.

18. We believe that although the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not immediately lead to collapse of the French Union position in Indochina, it would accelerate the deterioration already evident in the French Union military and political position there. If this trend were not checked, it could bring about a collapse of the French Union position during the latter half of 1954. It should be emphasized that this estimate does not consider the repercussion of major decisions in France or Geneva and elsewhere which are likely to have a decisive effect on the situation in Indochina.

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I N D O C H I N A

The following are comments made by Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnall, Junior, former Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina, at his debriefing, 3 May 1954.

GENERAL

The battle of Indochina is an armed revolution which is now in its eighth year. It is a savage conflict fought in a fantastic country in which the battle may be waged one day in waist-deep muddy rice paddies or later in an impenetrable mountainous jungle. The sun saps the vitality of friend and foe alike, but particularly the European soldier. Torrential monsoon rains turn the delta battleground into a vast swamp which no conventional vehicle can successfully negotiate. It is a war of many paradoxes -

Where there is no popular will to win on the part of the Vietnamese.

Where the leader of the Rebels is more popular than the Vietnamese Chief of State.

Where a sizeable French army is composed of relatively few Frenchmen.

Where the partners of the Associated States regard each other as more dangerous than the enemy.

Where a large segment of the population seeks to expel the French at any price, possibly at the cost of extinction as a new nation.

This is a war which has no easy and immediate solution, a politico-military chess game in which the players sit thousands of miles distant -- in Paris, Washington, Peiping, and Moscow.

STRATEGIC POSITION OF INDOCHINA

The autonomous Associated States of Indochina consist of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. They occupy a blocking position against the expansion of Chinese Communist influence along the principal routes of communication in Southeast Asia. If this area, approximately the size of the state of Texas, defects or is neutralized the frontiers of Burma, Thailand and Malaya would immediately be exposed and eventually the positions of Australia, New Zealand, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines would be weakened. A state of Civil War presently exists in Indochina, which pits the Communist Viet Minh against French Union forces essentially devoted to the ideals of freedom. Other issues, such as varieties of Nationalism, are involved as well. Moreover, a state of transition is concurrently underway in which a formerly strong Colonial power is crumbling. France is giving way to a self-determination movement by the indigenous peoples, who, while numbering more than 30 million, lack stability and security. The population of the three states is not completely compatible in matters of economics.

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culture, religion, ethnic origins, philosophy or political goals. Therefore, a compromise position has been reached in which the principal state of Viet Nam, combining the former protectorates of Annam and Tonkin with the ex-colony of Cochin China, has entered into a loose state of alliance with the lesser states of Laos and Cambodia, and with France. This federation is called the French Union. The exact relationship of each autonomous state to France has as yet not been completely determined. This indecision is, moreover, complicated by natural rivalries existing among the states, even extending to political tribal groups within the states.

The topography of Indochina is varied and consists of extensive mountains, jungles, rivers, canals and major deltas. A remarkable compartmentation results. Military operations in a given area may be conducted with almost complete disregard of the situation in the adjacent compartment. While essentially the ground war presently is the dominant military activity, great potentials in amphibious, naval and air warfare by French Union Forces exist which should be exploited increasingly. Poor internal communications and 1,599 miles of coastline are factors dictating the advisability of utilizing more effectively the combat power of the combined arms.

The political situation in France and Indochina requires a complicated system of military administration. Four national armies comprise the French Union Ground Forces. The French Far East Territorial Force, numbering roughly $\frac{1}{4}$ million troops, equals the combined totals of the three indigenous armies, of which only that of Viet Nam may be considered as significant. Military responsibility is being delegated to the Associated States to the degree that their state of military development and capabilities so warrant. The pentilateral agreement of 23 December 1950 is the authority for existing relationships. The United States is a signatory to this document which extends MDAP into Indochina. Significantly, the conflict in Indochina has not been "internationalized" such as in Korea. Of the French Union partners, only France is a member of the United Nations. France has specifically opposed UN intervention on the presumption that its control of the Union would eventually be weakened by UN participation. On the enemy-side, the rebel army of 300,000 troops could not be supported without the substantial aid presently provided by Red China.

GOVERNMENT OF INDOCHINA

The prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh in Indochina is a joint responsibility of the sovereign governments of Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos and France, under the leadership and direction of the latter. The local representative of the French Government is the Commissioner General, M. De Jean. He represents M. Marc Jacquet, French Minister of State, in charge of relations with the Associated States. The Ministers of the Associated States, the French Commissioner General and the military Commander in Chief, Lt General Henri Navarre, prescribe the conduct of the war. Existing protocols define the degree of military control enjoyed by the Commander in Chief over the armed forces of the individual Associated States. Essentially, the French exercise operational control over all forces in strategy and tactics. Each of the Associated States maintains a Chief of Staff and a General Staff who are primarily concerned with recruiting, training, personnel actions and limited logistical activities. The long range program envisages a progressive turnover of responsibilities to the Associated States, although a requirement exists that adequate coordinating powers be vested in the hands of the French for many years to come.

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Political decisions affecting military operations are reached in sessions of the high committee by representatives of the States, France, and the Commander in Chief. Essentially military problems are resolved in a permanent military committee in which the military chiefs of the Associated States together with the Commanding General of Headquarters, Joint and Ground Forces, Far East, participate.

Although a quadruplication of facilities exist in the form of several national general staffs and territorial organizations, actually a reasonably efficient channel of command is maintained by the French. Diplomatic liaison with the States counterpart organizations is exercised wherever coordination is required. This highly complex arrangement of joint and combined staffs and pooling of national forces may be likened to a miniature NATO at war, except that by necessity, the senior and more professionally qualified partner, France, exercises the dominant role. The governmental structure of each state is more or less oriented toward support of the war against Communism and the principal portion of each State's budget is devoted to defense expenditures. Viet Nam is the most vigorous state in this regard. Laos is cooperative to the French, but without sizeable resources of men or money. Cambodia views the entire struggle as secondary to what it considers more important, the determination of future relationships among the States themselves. In consideration of the fact that hostilities are more or less normal in the life of the Indochinese, the States may be considered as mobilized for war, although with less dislocation to private enterprise and fewer restrictions and austerity measures than would be expected by Western nations in a counterpart situation.

Both Laos and Cambodia are constitutional monarchies, while the Vietnamese respond with less solidarity to the government indirectly controlled by the Chief of State, Bao Dai, nominal descendant of the Emperors of Annam. He is potentially a capable leader but unfortunately out of favor with many extreme Nationalists and non-Communist dissidents.

The overall attitude of the population borders on indifference. The failure of friendly propaganda toward both development of a National attitude and the fostering of patriotism is an important deficiency. The uneducated native is inclined toward himself, his family and his tribe, or stock, in that order. The Japanese-inoculated spirit of Asia for the Asiatics has been adopted by Nationalistic leaders and the intelligentsia. The peasant, whose way of life has not been changed for centuries, is mostly apathetic.

The principal targets for Communism are among the educated classes, whose immediate resentment is the domination of the French through force of arms and political and economic controls. These people, when converted to Communism, muster more effective support from the peasantry and city workers than do the French and the educated Loyalists. Communist influence is strong and its organization very complete, particularly within the large cities. The contending leaders compete with each other for recruits -- the Communists holding forth idealistic rewards reinforced by threats, and the Loyalists stressing fear of the enemy as well as other inducements, some of which approach impressment.

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The effect of the Ho Chi Minh bid for a negotiated peace and the French inclination to seek a settlement has had strong repercussions among the people, particularly those who pay double taxes, and whose villages are invaded, fought over and destroyed periodically by the opposing forces.

It is natural that the Communists will support the line of negotiation since implementation of any such peace will set the stage for Communist absorption of the entire area, without fail and immediately. The Ho Demarche, and the proven ability of his field forces to threaten seriously the French Union Forces, has had a profound affect on metropolitan France as well, where a considerable portion of the population is in favor of terminating an expensive and seemingly futile war.

PERFORMANCE OF MDAP -- SUPPORTED FORCES

French and Associated States Forces have received MDAP equipment in increasing amounts since 1950. French Union Forces conduct modern joint military operations according to professionally accepted tactics and techniques, and in accordance with doctrines approved by the U.S. Armed Services. Applications vary in consonance with difficulties imposed by terrain and the climatic environment. It has been noted that this is a war which pits a modern mechanized army against a large and well-led guerrilla force. However, the character of the Viet Minh forces has been changing during the past year. Therefore, many inefficiencies must be charged against the mechanized army since it lacks complete opportunity to utilize its capabilities fully. Since it is neither practicable nor completely desirable to meet the enemy on the basis of guerrilla versus guerrilla, the ultimate solution will require the isolation of the Viet Minh from his base of supply in Red China and then overwhelming him by materiel superiority. In any instance, a requirement for provision of quantities of MDAP equipment exists and will continue to exist for an indeterminate period. Generally, maintenance standards of MDAP equipment are below those of the U.S. Armed Services, although within well-trained units employing equipment in the intended manner, favorable comparisons may be reached. Since many of the personnel of the French Union Army begin their careers as illiterate peasants, completely unskilled, the training and indoctrination task toward better maintenance is evident. MAAG visiting teams proffer such guidance as is feasible. Specific notification of superior, as well as unsatisfactory units, are made officially to the French military authorities. Under the existing terms of reference, MAAG has no authorized direct contact with armed forces of the Associated States. A significant weakness on the part of the French is their failure to project the r system of field operations and staff planning beyond their experience in Indochina. Imagination is frequently lacking. Also evident is the fact that their limited experience in World War II has stunted their overall development in modern warfare. This is basically the reason underlying their poor staff work, logistic and operational plans. In addition, the French are sensitive and touchy and loath to accept advice. We frequently encounter outdated techniques dating back to Colonial campaigns and World War I.

Another weakness of the French Union Force is the diversity of troops employed. The French Expeditionary Corps is composed of Foreign Legion, Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, Songaless and a small percentage of metropolitan French

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volunteers. These units are diluted nearly 59 percent by native Indochinese. The Associated States Forces are composed of varieties of native Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians. The whole effect is that of a heterogeneous force among whom even basic communication is difficult. Troops require a variety of clothe sizes and diets. They have different religious customs, folkways and mores. They vary in their capacity for different tasks and terrain. Logistically, a great problem exists in the support of such troops.

On the other hand, the Rebels are mostly Vietnamese recruited largely from the hardy stocks of Tonkin and Annam. They are a truly homogenous army whose capabilities and requirements remain more or less consistent.

The MDAP equipment furnished the French Air Force of Indochina has converted it into a modern air arm capable of performing its combat mission in a highly satisfactory manner. It is an effective offensive or defensive combat weapon, the full potential of which has not been realized.

NATIONAL MILITARY SERVICE

a. French Forces: All French Army personnel in Indochina are serving in the Regular Army. The draftee in France is not required by law to serve in Indochina. However, he may volunteer for such duty. The period of service in Indochina was formerly 24 months, but due to a shortage of replacements, the period currently is extended to 27 months. French personnel receive substantial increases in pay for service in Indochina.

b. Vietnamese Forces: The original law which drafted man for military service required all physically fit males to undergo a period of service for 60 days. Until April 1953, this law was not strictly enforced. In April, it became, with minor changes, the basis for the ordinance drafting 40,000 men for duty with Kinh Quan battalions. Personnel are inducted into the army for the duration. They are selected on the basis of their family situation. Single men are taken first. A man enlisting for the Regular Army is taken on a trial basis for one year. At the end of one year, and if his service has proven satisfactory, he can reenlist for a period of one, two, three or four years. Recently, the draft laws have been more vigorously enforced to eliminate draft dodging.

INTER-SERVICE BALANCE OF FORCES IN INDOCHINA

While the majority of resources are devoted to ground operations, the following factors must be considered:

- a. The enemy has no air forces or naval forces other than junks and sampans.
- b. Friendly ground forces maintain a large proportion of river squadrons and light aviation units

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- c. Opportunities for employment of large tactical air forces and seagoing naval and amphibious forces are limited.
- d. Strategic targets are limited. Terrain and enemy skill in camouflage reduce number of tactical targets.
- e. A shortage of trained air personnel exists, with limited prospects for augmentation from metropolitan France resources.
- f. Commercial resources satisfy a considerable portion of naval and air logistical requirements.
- g. Airfield construction limits composition of air traffic to light and medium transports and propeller-driven fighters and bombers. The balance of forces is considered adequate, although recently the French Air Force, motivated by unanticipated operational requirements in Laos and Dien Bien Phu, has requested additional B-26 light bombers, an additional C-47 transport squadron, and the loan of U.S. C-119 heavy transports and maintenance personnel. Civilian CAT pilots are presently on contract to the French Air Force for logistical missions. The Army likewise has requested increased air strength in the form of helicopter companies and liaison aircraft.

OBJECTIVES

The missions of the opposing forces may be considered as follows:

VIET MINH - To achieve, by attritive military and political action, a negotiated settlement of the war in Indochina upon such terms as will permit either.

- a. Absolute control of a portion of Viet Nam and Laos - generally considered to be north of the 18th Parallel, or
- b. Eventual control of the majority portion, or the complete entity, of Indochina as a result of a favorable political position achieved at the peace table.

FRENCH UNION - To achieve, by overwhelming military pressure and political action, a cessation of hostilities upon terms favorable to the French Union which will

- a. Restrict the influence of the League of Independent Viet Nam Party-Viet Minh, to that of a controllable minority.
- b. Permit the establishment of sound, stable, solvent and harmonious governments within the Associated States.
- c. Enable France to maintain its position as the dominant member of the French Union - of the Far East - with extra territorial privileges and commercial benefits.

Naturally, the results of the Geneva Conference may be expected to have a strong influence on future political and military objectives in Indochina for both sides.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH UNION GROUND FORCES

By the end of 1954, French Union ground forces will consist of four French and one Vietnamese infantry division and one French airborne division. The ground divisions will be formed from 13 French RCTs and 9 Vietnamese RCTs. The airborne division will be formed from 2 French ARCTs and one Vietnamese ARCT. This force, known as the Battle Corps, will be supported by 5 armored battalions, 5 reconnaissance battalions, 5 amphibious battalions and 3 medium and 1 heavy artillery battalion. This represents the striking force of the French Union Forces, not much larger than a single U.S. type Army Corps. To free this force for independent action against the Rebel strongholds, the French consider that a force of twice that size is necessary for static defense and pacification purposes. By the end of 1955, this surface defense force will reach a total of 86 standard infantry battalions, 132 light infantry battalions, 1100 suppletive companies, the equivalent of 70 artillery batteries and 36 armored car companies. All units of the French Union Army are equipped with a percentage of MDAP material. Amounts vary according to date of activation, depot stocks, mission and replacement factors. A certain percentage of hard items, estimated at 30 percent of gross requirements, is provided by French procurement agencies and may consist of identical items to those of MDAP, having been acquired during World War II, or through other channels by which U.S. surplus stocks were distributed after 1946. Indigenous production is practically negligible, since local industry is not developed and barely sufficient to provide maintenance for civilian requirements. A certain number of paramilitary agencies exist in this theater of operations which are not MDAP supported. These include militia, national police, plantation guards and others. Obviously, MDAP items, mostly small arms and ammunition will find their way by devious channels into unauthorized hands.

Due to the stress of constant warfare, circumstances are such that strict control is impossible. For example, an MDAP rifle, abandoned in battle may be acquired by a Viet Minh soldier, who will forfeit the same weapon upon his death or capture by paramilitary forces.

LOGISTICS OF THE GROUND FORCES

In general terms the organization and operation of the technical services which furnish logistical support to the combat arms is similar to that in the United States Army. The French Forces are handicapped by a insufficient number of units and trained specialists and consequently are unable to furnish the amount and quality of support given by comparable US units. For all technical services MDA Programs have furnished the spare parts and small items necessary to carry out adequate maintenance and repair programs.

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French Forces: French Forces are, for the most part, trained prior to shipment to Indochina. Training of individual replacements is done in the units to which they are assigned. French Far East ground forces operate schools for artillery, armor, engineer and transportation for their own forces and additionally provide generous quotas for Associated States personnel. Recently, four tactical training centers have been activated for use as maneuver areas for large tactical formations and battalions rotated out of static positions.

Vietnamese Forces: There are eight training centers for recruits of the Vietnamese Army. Four are for recruits for the Regular Army and four are for personnel to be activated into Kinh Quan (light infantry) battalions and companies. On-the-job training is conducted in technical fields for selected individuals upon assignment to a unit. In addition to this training, a limited number of specialists, technical, non-commissioned and officer schools exist. A considerable number of indigenous officers and men attend French schools both in France and Indochina. Training is not up to American standards.

The Associated States training plan has an annual capacity of about 65,000. It is considered adequate to meet phased build-up requirements. By American criteria, certain training deficiencies are conspicuous, particularly in such areas as standardization of training aids, programs of instruction, troop training programs and training literature. Utilization of plant facilities with greater efficiency is a further requirement. It is apparent that the Associated States forces are developing with more stress on quantity than quality. It is hoped that American guidance will prove acceptable and valuable to the French. The use of MDAP equipment has not generated any critical training problems, however a need exists for management training to encompass stock control; organization of depots and other procedural-type activities.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH NAVAL FORCES, FAR EAST

French naval strength is approximately 10,000. The only Associated States navy is a 1,000 man Vietnamese force. Naval forces are light units composed of approximately 250 light vessels and 100 small craft. These are supported by an aircraft carrier on loan from NATO and a squadron of privateer aircraft. Command of river operations as well as overall logistic support is the responsibility of the Commander, French Naval Forces ashore. Direct coordination of naval river forces with the respective Army area commands is executed at the Naval area level. Commander, French Naval Forces, afloat, controls coastal operations including surveillance, blockade, and amphibious operations. Naval Aviation, Indochina, supports the Naval mission as directed. The aircraft carrier force is under Naval administrative command although embarked aircraft operate as directed by the French Air Force area tactical commands.

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SUMMARY OF THE NAVAL SITUATION

The French Union naval forces in Indochina are reasonably effective on rivers and inshore areas. They have had much experience in river landings, combating, river ambushes and intercepting junk and small boat traffic on both the ocean and inland waterways. Also, logistic support by water to all services is a constant and heavy undertaking. For guerrilla warfare along the waterways in the Red River and Mekong River deltas, they are uniquely qualified and equipped. In other more orthodox forms of naval warfare such as large amphibious operations, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft warfare, they are neither trained nor equipped. With the establishment of the Joint Amphibious Staff and the formation of an Amphibious Corps, part of this deficiency should be eliminated. Although enemy submarines and aircraft have not been a factor in this war, the possibility does exist. There is little in Indochina to combat the potential menace. Limitations and restrictions for the conduct of the war at present are basically caused by a shortage of personnel rather than a lack of equipment. In addition, concrete and positive steps have been taken in the establishing of a Vietnamese National Navy. This will perform a two-fold purpose - that of easing the serious shortage of personnel and engendering a spirit of pride in the Vietnamese people through increased responsibility and participation in the conduct of the war in their homeland.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE

As of 10 April 1954, the French Air Force consisted of 98 Bearcats, organized into 4 squadrons, 16 Bearcat Photo Recon Aircraft organized as a flight, 84 B-26 light bombers, expanding to 3 squadrons, a light tactical reconnaissance flight of modified B-26 bombers, 4 transport squadrons of 114 C-47s -- 65 MDAP -- and liaison aircraft squadrons consisting of 8 C-45s, 12 L-20 Beavers and 8 H-19 helicopters. Additionally, 85 Army liaison aircraft - L-19s - will be delivered by 31 August. 22 C-119 packets with supporting (200) mechanics are on loan during the present emergency.

SUMMARY OF THE AIR FORCE SITUATION

The general MAAG opinion is that the individual flight and ground crews are very well qualified in operating and maintaining their equipment. However, there is not enough of them. Shortages of MDAP supplied equipment of the major categories has not restricted or hampered the operational ability of the FAF combat squadrons and support agencies. Some of the changes in methods and procedures which MAAG believed should be placed in effect are actually beyond the capability of the FAF due primarily to the shortage of personnel and overall restrictions imposed on the FAF by the political and economic situation both in Indochina and in Metropolitan France.

The French are highly operationally minded, however, they do not put proper emphasis on their logistics support requirements to support their operations. In spite of the MDAP equipment and machinery received, the development of this country's self-sufficiency has been abnormally slow.

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ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS OF THE REBEL ARMY

The Viet Minh is a well-led, veteran guerrilla army of approximately 300,000 troops organized into 6 infantry divisions, a heavy division of artillery and engineers and numerous regiments, battalions and companies. It has a regional militia component as well as its regular troops. Its equipment and tactics are those of light infantry with a tremendous capability of cross country mobility and endurance. A high command is reputed to contain Red Chinese advisors. Until the pitched battle at Dien Bion Phu, the rebels followed the strategy of hit and run with much of its maneuver dictated by political objectives. The manner in which this force deployed its battle corps into assault infantry, and, with effective artillery support, captured several highly organized and well-defended strong points, indicates a versatility not fully appreciated prior to this campaign season. Additionally, the Viet Minh are skilled in psychological and political indoctrination and have been able to establish bases of operations behind French fortified lines, particularly in the delta. The recent capability of the Viet Minh to seize territory throughout Indochina, albeit temporarily, will have a profound effect upon the conferences at Geneva.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR -- MILITARY ASPECTS

In June 1953, General Navarre formulated a set of principles for the conduct of the war in Indochina. This was described in the O'Daniel report as the Navarre concept for successful conclusion of the war in Indochina, but it is less a formula for successfully concluding the war than a statement of short term aims, to wit:

- a. To retake the initiative immediately through the carrying out, beginning this summer, of local offensives and by pushing to the utmost commando and guerrilla actions.
- b. To take the offensive in the north beginning September 15, in order to forestall the enemy attack. To conduct the battle which will take place during the fall and winter of 1953-54 in an offensive manner by attacking the flanks and rear of the enemy.
- c. To recover from areas not directly involved in the battle a maximum number of units. To pacify these regions progressively.
- d. To build up progressively a battle corps by grouping battalions into regiments and regiments into divisions and by giving to the units thus created

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the necessary support - artillery, engineers, armor, communications - taking into account the very special character of the war in Indochina, the terrain--the enemy. To bring about a maximum of cooperation with the Air Force and the Navy.

e. To maintain a reserve of special type units -- armor, commando, light battalion, etc., for attachment to groups and divisions in accordance with terrain and mission.

f. To continue the effort of instructing and organizing the army of the Associated States so as to give them more and more participation as well as more and more autonomy in the conduct of operations.

Note: The above was given to General O'Daniel in writing by General Navarre on 29 June 1953 and was thereafter referred to as the Navarre concept for the successful conclusion of war in Indochina.

Few of these aims are progressing satisfactorily. The training of the National armies is woefully inefficient and the series of tactical offensive operations engaged in during 1953-54 fighting season, instead of retaking the initiative has lost it to the Viet Minh. After a rather encouraging beginning with the Lang Son operation, Navarre's later operations reveal that he is following the same conservative defensive tactics as his predecessor, General Salan. Although Mouette was highly publicized as a successful offensive, it in fact was nothing but a reconnaissance in force with the objective of occupying a strong position and awaiting attack by the enemy in the hope of dealing him a crippling blow. The enemy refused to be taken in. The current campaign season has been dominated by the Viet Minh, and the present position of the French Union Forces is no improvement over that of last year. Dien Bien Phu is not only another Na San but a grave tactical and strategic error. The only hope for gain from the battle now raging is that the French can survive. The French have consistently postponed seizure of the initiative through failure to select and pursue vital military objectives such as the obvious enemy troop concentration depot and communications area in the foothills north of the Tonkin delta. Viet Minh leadership, on the other hand, has capitalized on this vacated opportunity by seizing and holding the initiative. The French battle corps, which was built up hopefully by energetic withdrawal of implanted units, has now been dissipated into four sizeable components: (1) Dien Bien Phu -- 12 battalions -- an expensive-supplied airhead, is encircled and under heavy attack. (2) Seno-Savannakhet-Thakhek-Pakse area -- 15 battalions -- partially supported by air with its overland communications threatened. (3) Operation Atlanta -- 25 battalions -- a coastline sweep north from Nha Trang, which has uncovered no appreciable enemy, and (4) the Tonkin delta -- 18 battalions -- where the enemy is increasing his attacks on rear installations and lines of communications. The lack of initiative which the French have is emphasized by the day-to-day reaction of the French to enemy moves and activity as expressed in recent requests for emergency assistance in the way of U.S. equipment and maintenance personnel.

French tactics are based primarily on defense, even though French Union Forces outnumber Viet Minh forces by almost 2 to 1, have overwhelming fire power, and opposed air force, a balanced naval force and strategic transport capability. The barbed wire concept is exemplified by the fact that the French have established a requirement of 4000 tons of this item per month over and above that furnished by France. The bulk of the C-119 airlift for Dien Bien Phu supply was utilized in dropping barbed wire.

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French Union forces do not as a general rule attempt to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, but rather, they wait for the Viet Minh to attack. Patrolling is the exception rather than the rule. Viet Minh regular battle corps troops have been avoided unless the French troops are well dug in behind barbed wire or have astronomical odds in their favor.

Night operations are never employed by French Union forces although the Viet Minh use such operations most successfully. French forces retire to their fortified and secured areas at nightfall, and control only the areas of their fields of fire. Night operations training should be instituted and emphasized in their training programs, and French Union forces should be as adopt and successful in such operations as the enemy.

At present there is no evidence that the French staff is working off-detailed plans for the final offensive which General Navarre has indicated to me as Chief MAAG will occur during the next dry season, 1954-55.

Although Navarre demands that his requirement for U.S. equipment should not be challenged by this MAAG, the fact is that the small inadequate French staff handling this function is not capable of accurately presenting requirements for Indochina. Were it not for the screening which these requests undergo by MAAG, material would be wastefully supplied, and many critical and sudden shortages would occur. Many examples of this lack of planning foresight can be found in the files of this MAAG, such as requests for specialized equipment requiring specially trained operators with no companion plan to provide such operators -- request for a specific amount of ammunition in January is constitute a year, supply only to double the request in April - not because of an oversight or error but because of poor planning for the operations to occur during the intervening months.

This lack of French staff capability and to a great extent the conservative and defensive attitude of the entire theater of operations, is due in large measure to the fact that many of the officers on duty in this theater are over age in grade according to U.S. standards, and are lacking in drive and imagination. Lack of command supervision is obvious in all echelons, the best evidence of which is the absence of command inspections and maintenance inspections of equipment of commanders. End-use inspections by members of this MAAG frequently reveal that higher commanders have never made an inspection of equipment in their subordinate units. Shortage of personnel is another contributing factor which cannot be overcome except through more extensive support from metropolitan France.

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POLITICAL ASPECTS

A strictly military solution to the war in Indochina is not possible. Military operations are too closely bound to concurrent political problems, and most of the military decisions concerning tactics and strategy have their origin in the politics of the situation here. The governments of the three Associated States are comparatively weak, and are almost as insistent upon complete autonomy from France as they are on liberation from the Communists. It is doubtful if the ordinary people understand the issues at stake between the rebel and Associated States objectives. It probably appears to them that they are being ground between the two political groups, one of which seeks to achieve autonomy by Communist methods. The other by political evolution. They are not aware of the dangers of domination by Communism nor of the difference between democracy and the Communist People's Government as we understand it.

The French have a tremendous investment in Indochina and have made great strides in bringing the advantages of Western civilization to the people. yet the French are not wanted. Colonialism is still the chief argument against the French and with some substance. The natives are still considered as second-rate people and the French have only made concessions reluctantly and when forced to do so. There is a lack of camaraderie between the native soldier and officer and the French. Separate messes are maintained, due in some measure to the difference in dietary preference, but also due to this lack of friendly association in a common cause.

The Viet Minh, on the other hand, are fighting a clever war of attrition, without chance of a major military victory, but apparently feeling that time is working in their favor and that French and U.S. public opinion will force eventual favorable negotiation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

In 1949 the French, in a search for Nationalist support against Ho Chi Minh, recognized Bao Dai, playboy scion of the ancient Annamite emperors as Chief of State of Viet Nam which was given its independence within the framework of the French Union. Bao Dai is popularly believed to be very pro-French, and most of the people have a luke-warm feeling toward the Government which they feel is not earnestly working for their complete independence from France. The French promise independence, but only reluctantly give concessions.

The key to this problem is a strong and effective Nationalist army with the support of the Populist behind it. When the people have confidence in their government and in its ability, through the Nationalist army, to give them the protection from Communist terrorism which is necessary for business and commerce, then complete victory will be in sight.

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THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

The U.S. has greatly contributed to the success of the French in holding Indochina from the beginning. In January 1951, material was rushed from the docks of Haiphong to the battlefield of Vinh Yen, then being fought under the personal direction of Marshall De Lattre himself. Since then, delivery of aid has kept pace with changing French needs, often on a crash basis, down to the present heroic defense of Dien Bien Phu. U.S. aid has consisted of budgetary support, furnishing of end items, military hardware, and of technical training teams. The magnitude and range of this contribution is shown by the following very few examples. All of these figures are as of 31 March this year.

- a. 785 million dollars has been allocated for the budgetary support of the French Expeditionary Force and the Vietnamese Army. This will assist in meeting budgetary requirements for pay, food, and allowances for these troops.
- b. Under MDA Programs, a total of more than 784 millions of dollars has been programmed for the years 1950-54. Of this, more than 440 million dollars worth of military end items have been received.
- c. To date, 31 March 1954, 441 ships have delivered a total of 478 thousands of long tons of MDA equipment to Indochina.

S O L U T I O N

As in Korea, Iran, Malaya, and Burma, the war in Indochina is not a separate entity. It is another tentacle of the octopus, another brush fire on the periphery of the iron and bamboo curtains. The problem can only be solved completely if the masters of the Kremlin decide that Indochina should be abandoned in favor of more profitable enterprises elsewhere. However, ways and means exist to achieve a degree of success with respect to Indochina, beginning at the political level -- specifically at the level of Chiefs of State. What is then necessary is as follows:

- a. An agreement must be reached with the French to deliver their strongest possible assault upon the Viet Minh as soon as possible to reduce the efficiency of that force to its lowest potential.
- b. Concurrently, the Associated States armies must be put through a training cycle designed to produce leaders and units and to develop confidence through skill and achievement. Such forces must be developed to the level of the ROK or Greek armies under American tutelage and material support for these forces must be in being and capable of replacing the French when they retire.
- c. A defensive alliance of democratic nations of the Orient must be developed to provide future stability for the Associated States. The U.S. must establish leadership in this area by relieving the French in a similar manner as was followed in relieving the British for the responsibility of Greece.
- d. The sovereignty and territorial borders of the Associated States must be guaranteed - under no circumstances should the country be allowed to divide on an arbitrary parallel such as in Korea.

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C O N C L U S I O N

I recommend that the Department of Defense urge that negotiations for agreements to be initiated at the earliest time to achieve the foregoing objectives and that upon reaching an understanding with France and the Associated States, a full-scale U.S. training mission be established with the Associated States forces to achieve an effective training base by Spring of 1956. That the French overwhelm the enemy in the interim is a vital concurrent requirement, and, again, this objective must be achieved by governmental agreement, with the U.S. insisting that the French Government establish military victory as a primary objective and so instruct the field commander, who may then be relieved of his anxieties regarding casualties and indifferent political and moral support from France.

In conclusion, I reaffirm my opinion that victory in Indochina is an international rather than a local matter, and essentially political as well as military.

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WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JOINT SUBSIDIARY PLANS DIVISION

SPDM-173-54
5 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. COL. J. D. SITTERSON, USA, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE MEMBER, OCB WORKING GROUP ON NSC 5405
(SOUTHEAST ASIA):

Subject: U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action
with Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 5405)

Reference: Secretary of Defense memorandum,
4 March 1954, subject as above

In accordance with the above request from the
Secretary of Defense, the following informal comments are
submitted:

a. Reference paragraph 21.

(1) On 14 December 1953, the Secretary of Defense informed the Chief, MAAG, Indochina, that Indochina has the highest MDAP priority. It is the only nation with this priority classification and, as such, has precedence over every other allied nation and the U.S. armed forces for the allocation of equipment in short supply. Generally, military assistance equipment is being delivered at the scheduled rates, which are up to the capability of Indochinese forces to utilize effectively. Thailand is being furnished MDA equipment under a limited program. This material is generally being delivered at the rate at which the Thailand forces can most effectively utilize it. Burma is not a recipient nation for MDAP grant aid. Initial arrangements have been made to provide Burma on a reimbursable basis, but no actual deliveries under this program have yet been made.

(2) Major General O'Daniel has been appointed Chief, MAAG, Indochina. This was as a result of an NSC action designed to increase the influence of the United States in the prosecution of the war in Indochina, particularly training of local forces, effective command and intelligence arrangements, and operational planning.

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b. Reference paragraph 31.

(1) A military plan for U.S. intervention in Indochina has been completed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan has been forwarded to appropriate commanders of airfield commands for the preparation of detailed plans.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff currently have under preparation an outline plan based upon concurrent renewal of hostilities in Korea and intervention in Indochina by the Chinese Communists.

(3) CINCPAC has been directed to prepare plans as follows:

(a) Blockade of China coast.

(b) Assistance to the British in HongKong, as desirable and feasible.

(c) Evacuation of French Union forces from the Tonkin Delta.

(d) Participation defensively or offensively of Chinese National forces.

(4) CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 44-53 is a plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a naval blockade of Communist China.

(5) Other CINCPAC Operation Plans have been prepared to cover the contingencies in paragraph (3) above, but have not yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Although not directly part of the implementation of NSC 5405, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have under preparation the military plans directed in NSC Action No. 1086 a. These plans cover not only U.S. intervention in Indochina but also augmentations in forces and supplies required to permit the United States to maintain at present levels its present defense commitments and to be prudently prepared to face possible increased risks of (1) Chinese Communist intervention, and (2) general war.

(Signed)

M. O. DONOHOO
Colonel, USMC
Deputy Chief.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Control: 1756
Rec'd: May 5, 1954
1:09 p.m.

FROM: Geneva
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 106, May 5, 2 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 106, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY
PARIS 201, PRIORITY LONDON 121, SAIGON 33.

Re SECTO 89, repeated Paris 186.

Following is outline given this morning by Chauvel to
Dennis, Allen and Achilles of proposal which Bidault
last night sent to French Cabinet for authorization to
make when substantive discussion of Indochina starts:

1. Vietnam problem is purely Vietnamese with no question
of partition, only military struggle for control of govern-
ment.
2. Situation different in Laos and Cambodia which are
victims of external aggression.
3. Under Berlin agreement, purpose of Geneva conference
is to establish peace in all three countries. To this end
there should be a cease-fire guaranteed by adequate military
and administrative controls under supervision. Cease-fire
would take effect only when such guarantees had been embodied
in armistic conventions, which might be different for each
three states, and when control machinery had been established
and was in place. Controls would be based upon Laniel's
March 5 conditions. When cease-fire occurred, regular troops
would be regrouped into delimited areas and all other forces
disarmed. The control machinery would be "international"
and would require considerable body of personnel.
4. After peace had been re-established by the cease-fire,
political and economic problems could be examined.

In discussing this draft proposal Chauvel said French
assumed Russians would propose immediate cease-fire followed
by political settlement based on coalition and immediate
elections, which would force West into position of opposing

cease-fire

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-2- SECTO 106, May 5, 2 p.m., from Geneva

cease-fire. French public desire for cease-fire was emotional and French Government could defend its proposal, even though it would in effect delay any cease-fire for long time if not indefinitely, on grounds that conditions demanded were essential for safety of troops themselves. The continued resistance at Bien Bien Phu long after public opinion had discounted its fall had conditioned French opinion to believe its loss would not mean loss of war. He did not exclude possibility of conference calling on opposing forces not to undertake new military operations during negotiations. He assumed very lengthy negotiations would be necessary to reach any armistice agreement and felt that during this period Communist uncertainty as to united action of US intervention might be increased.

Allen inquired whether at some stage in proceedings working out of armistice details might be left to combatants themselves as suggested in Colombo communique. Chauvel did not like this idea but said it might be considered. In response to question as to whether he envisaged conference turning into indefinite Panmunjom Chauvel said it might turn armistice negotiations over to working group and adjourn to reconvene when warranted.

In response to Achilles inquiry as to whether "international" meant "UN" supervision, Chauvel stated French had no firm position on this but subsequent discussion indicated French continue to oppose use of UN machinery as establishing precedent which would be used against them in North Africa and elsewhere and that British definitely share their point of view. Allen suggested something like peace observation commission would be preferable to UN auspices. Achilles stressed importance of insisting on UN auspices.

Chauvel said studies by French military had confirmed their impression that withdrawal of French Union Forces from Cambodia and Laos except for two bases in latter would be of definite military advantage rather than disadvantage.

SMITH

JAK:MEJ/14

NOTE: Mr. Hoey's office (PSA) informed 3:15 p.m. 5-5-54 JDP

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NSC 195th Meeting
6 May 1954

ITEM 1 (For Discussion)

REPORT BY MR. DULLES ON GENEVA AND INDO-CHINA

1. Secretary Dulles, who was rather pessimistic, in reporting to the President yesterday morning on the Geneva Conference, made the following points: (a) there is no responsible French Government with which to deal; (b) the British have declined to take a position regarding a Southeast Asia regional grouping until after the Geneva Conference; (c) the British however are willing to proceed with secret talks with us regarding the political and military scope of our plans for SEA; (d) the expected Communist proposal re Indo-China will call for evacuation of all foreign troops and elections to be supervised by a joint Vietminh-Vietnam Commission; (e) French have no particular form of settlement in mind; UK is still thinking in terms of partition.

2. It is not clear how the NSC discussion will develop, but it seems desirable that certain questions be clarified at the meeting. They are along this line:

a. Should the U.S. resign itself to being unable to influence any further the French and U.K. positions at Geneva? (i.e., is it still not possible to stiffen their spines by any conceivable means - Presidential talks, threats, sending Mr. Dulles back with a new mandate, etc. - so as to assure they will not accept a dangerous compromise.)

b. Is or is not the U.S. prepared to commit its combat forces in the near future, in some form of regional effort if possible, to save the partition or loss of Indo-China? (A decision in principle seems necessary now. As the situation is at present we are saying we will consider this if the parliaments of Australia, New Zealand, etc. agree, but it is not clear whether we mean before or after Indo-China is lost.)

c. Is the U.S. prepared to acquiesce in the clearly engineered Communist aggression in and taking over of Indo-China - with Red Chinese support - even though we evaluate this loss as very serious to the free world and even though we have the military means to redeem the situation? (The A-bomb)

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum several days ago (see TAB A) recommending that you "secure governmental acceptance" of the following position:

"In the event of a cease fire in Indochina, the shipment of military end items under U.S. MDAP . . . will immediately be suspended, except for such spares and associated maintenance items necessary to the maintenance of equipment in operations. The entire question of U.S. aid to Indochina will be re-examined in the light of circumstances then existing."

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) has suggested you forward the memo to the NSC saying you concur, but you have not yet acted on the matter. You may wish to raise it during the discussion.

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May 6, 1951
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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA

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Info:

PRIORITY

Secretary held hour and half briefing of 25 leading members Congress yesterday. Generally friendly, constructive atmosphere, no direct criticism, although considerable discussion on future plans and weakness of British and French.

Secretary described set-up of Conference and briefly went over Korean developments. Explained difficulty with Allies on all-Korean elections and trouble finding someone to speak up in defense of US against Communist vilification. Congressmen showed interest in this and asked about positions our various Allies.

Turning to Indochina, Secretary traced developments in our thinking and plans since inception massive aid program last fall. Three prerequisites demanded from French had then seemed to be met: understanding A.S. become independent, effective program for rapid training of natives, aggressive military plan. Prerequisites would

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Drafted by: S/SR. H. Freeman Matthews, Jr.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/S-J. Stewart Cottman

Clearances: Approved in substance by
C/ D. MacArthur

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Page 2 of telegram to Amconsul GENEVA

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lead to our desired objectives. Navarre Plan still sound, but French will for offensive action and even ability govern themselves disintegrated. Following development united action concept and as French military situation deteriorated, we began think of US military intervention. In April 3 meeting with Congressman agreed objectives of earlier prerequisites must be met to increased degree and other interested nations must join in before such intervention could be authorized. Secretary described London-Paris trip and Eden's reneging on communique. Some adverse Congressional comment on latter and Secretary said thought Nehru had pressured British.

Secretary described two informal French requests for US air intervention on April 4 and 22 and his replies thereto. Described French mood of extreme urgency and British Cabinet confirmation of reversal of agreement in communique of April 13. British terrified by H-bomb, pressured by Nehru, contrasted their giving up India with French call for help to keep Indochina, and gave higher rating to risk of Chinese intervention and global war if West intervened. Secretary read from memo of conversation in which he had chastised Eden for British stand. Number adverse Congressional comments on

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British position, especially Judd.

Secretary said had reached three conclusions. US should not intervene militarily until and unless prerequisites agreed on at April 4 meeting were fulfilled. Conditions must exist for successful conclusion of war and such was not now case. Participation other allies academic since French had not fulfilled prerequisites. Considerable opposition to internationalization of war in France anyway. This was Administration position on intervention. No Congressional comments on this.

Secondly, US must push rapidly for development of SEA community, probably without Vietnam but hopefully with Laos and Cambodia. British ~~want~~ might come in and they might want Burma and India too. We were agreeable to Burma. This community might offer fair chance quote insulate unquote rest SEA against possible loss of Vietnam.

990.5/5-554
Third conclusion was we should not write off British and French in spite of their weakness in Asia. Lack of 100 per cent cooperation one of welcome disadvantages of democratic system.

DULTE 51 then received and Secretary read pertinent parts. Considerable discussion ensued on Eden's idea of

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quote five white powers unquote consultation and conclusions 2 and 3 above. Judd strongly against Eden quote plan unquote, wanted Asians in even without UK and France. Knowland agreed on importance of Asians, as did several others. Knowland said we should have commitments from UK, Australia, New Zealand and others to help us if needed in Korea or Japan, et cetera, if we were to have collective security pact with them for SEA, which he personally favored. Secretary said Burma, Thailand, Philippines plus A.S. would help and that he told Eden he wanted Formosa in if British brought in India. McCormack and Smith supported Secretary on conclusion three and several others did too.

Secretary described effect of Indochina developments on French government and EDC. Russell paid fine tribute to Secretary for briefings and cooperation with Congress and others expressed appreciation.

Dulles/jsc

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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7 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Negotiations with Respect to Indochina.

1. Attached for your consideration (Enclosure) are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to Department of State messages SECTO 106 and SECTO 110, both dated 5 May 1954, and message DA IN 59296, dated 6 May 1954.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that their views be transmitted to the Department of State for incorporation in the reply to SECTO 106 and SECTO 110.

3. Copies No. 2 and No. 3 of the Enclosure were delivered in advance to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE
ASST. SEC. Y. B. W. N.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE
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SecDef Cont. No. 3050

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COMMENTS TO BE FURNISHED TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RE RADIOS SECTO 106 AND SECTO 110, DATED 5 MAY 1954,
AND DA IN 59296, DATED 6 MAY 1954

1. Having due regard for interim developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adhere to their views regarding negotiations on Indochina, as expressed in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated 12 March 1954. The Secretary of Defense forwarded that memorandum to the Department of State with his full concurrence on 23 March. Understand Defense Member of US DEL holds a copy.

2. Outline of French armistice proposal furnished in SECTO 106 has been examined by JCS in light of their views referred to above. They consider that French proposal would be regarded by Asian peoples as a Communist victory, particularly in the light of the current military situation in Indochina. An armistice under the proposed conditions would, in their opinion, lead to a political stalemate attended by a progressive deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position ultimately resulting in the loss of Indochina to the Communists.

3. Even were the Communists to agree to undertake armistice negotiations pursuant to the French proposal, such negotiations would be expected to result either in a rapid capitulation of the French to obtain an early cease-fire or in a protracted

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wrangle characterized by steadfast Communist adherence to an inflexible position on important issues and by repeated substantive concessions by the French. Moreover, experience in Korea indicates that regardless of the military and administrative controls which might be embodied in the armistice conventions, it is certain that the Communists would flagrantly evade, circumvent, and violate the agreements to suit their ultimate purpose of subjugating all of Indochina. Even though the Communists should agree to international control machinery, Communist practices would render it impotent, as in the case of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.

4. Based on past performance, it is doubtful that the Communists would enter into a preliminary agreement to refrain from new military operations during the course of armistice negotiations. On the contrary, it is more likely that they would intensify military operations during negotiations in order to enhance their negotiating position, whereas the French would be under strong compulsion to avoid casualties during the negotiating period.

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5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff share the view of the US DEL that once armistice proposals are made the French would rapidly move toward acceptance of the probable Communist counterproposal of an immediate cease-fire. Should the United States associate itself with the French initial proposal, the United States would in all likelihood be confronted subsequently with the painful alternatives of continuing to support the French through retrogressive positions or of extricating itself at some point along the way.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that it is no longer realistic to insist that the French continue aggressively to prosecute the Navarre Plan. At the same time, they adhere to their view that no satisfactory settlement is possible without a substantial improvement in the French Union military situation, and that, in the absence of a settlement which would reasonably assure the political and territorial integrity of the Associated States, any armistice entered into would inevitably lead to the eventual loss of that area to Communist control.

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7. In the light of the current situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should now adopt the following as its minimum position. ^{because of the proof given in Korea that the Comm. will not be} The United States will not associate itself with any French proposal directed toward a cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory political settlement. The United States urges the French Government to propose that negotiations for a political settlement be initiated at once. During the course of such negotiations, the French Union Forces should continue to oppose the forces of the Viet Minh with all the means at their disposal in order to reinforce the French negotiating position. In the meantime, as a means of strengthening the French hand, ^{continue its program of aid and will} the United States will intensify its efforts to organize and promptly activate a Southeast Asian coalition for the purpose of preventing further expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia. [If the French Government persists in its intention to enter armistice negotiations or accedes to immediate cease-fire negotiations, the United States will disassociate itself from such negotiations in order to maintain maximum freedom of action in taking whatever measures may be feasible for opposing the extension of Communist control into Southeast Asia.]

*based
mutual
by the
terms
of an
armistice*

*pencil notes indicate
revisions made by President
AM, 7 May*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ✓
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

At a meeting in the President's office with the President, J. F. Dulles and Cutler, the President approved Paragraph 1b of the tentative Record of Actions of 5/6/54 Meeting of the National Security Council, but wished that the advice to Smith relative to Eden's proposal should also make clear the following points:

1. Five Power Staff Agency, alone or with other nations, is not to the United States a satisfactory substitute for a broad political coalition which will include the South East Asian countries which are to be defended.
2. Five Power Staff Agency examination is acceptable to see how these nations can give military aid to the Southeast Asian countries in their cooperative defense effort.
3. The United States will not agree to a "white man's party" to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations.

R. C.
ROBERT CUTLER
Special Assistant
to the President

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May 7, 1954

At a meeting in the President's office this morning with Dulles, three topics were discussed:

1. Whether the President should approve paragraph lb of the tentative Record of Action of the 5/6/54 NSC Meeting, which covers the proposed answer to the Eden proposal. The Secretary of State thought the text was correct. Wilson and Radford preferred the draft message to Smith for Eden prepared yesterday by MacArthur and Captain Anderson, and cleared by the JCS, which included in the Five Power Staff Agency Thailand and the Philippines. Radford thinks that the Agency (which has hitherto been not disclosed in SEA) has really completed its military planning; that if it is enlarged by top level personnel, its actions will be necessarily open to the world; that therefore some Southeast Asian countries should be included in it, and he fears Eden's proposal as an intended delaying action.

The President approved the text of paragraph lb, but suggested that Smith's reply to Eden's proposal should make clear the following:

1. Five Power Staff Agency, alone or with other nations, is not to the United States a satisfactory substitute for a broad political coalition which will include the Southeast Asian countries which are to be defended.

2. Five Power Staff Agency examination is acceptable to see how these nations can give military aid to the Southeast Asian countries in their cooperative defense effort.

3. The United States will not agree to a "white man's party" to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations.

I was instructed to advise Wilson and Radford of the above, and have done so.

2. The President went over the draft of the speech which Dulles is going to make tonight, making quite a few suggestions and changes in text. He thought additionally the speech should include some easy to understand slogans, such as "The US will never start a war," "The US will not go to war without Congressional authority," "The US, as always, is trying to organize cooperative efforts to sustain the peace."

3. With reference to the cease-fire proposal transmitted by Bidault to the French Cabinet, I read the following, as views principally of military members of the Planning Board, expressed in their yesterday afternoon meeting:

1. US should not support the Bidault proposal.

2. Reasons for this position:

- a. The mere proposal of the cease-fire at the Geneva Conference would destroy the will to fight of French forces and make fence-sitters jump to Vietminh side.

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b. the Communists would evade covertly cease-fire controls.

3. The US should (as a last act to save IndoChina) propose to France that if the following 5 conditions are met, the US will go to Congress for authority to intervene with combat forces:

a. grant of genuine freedom for Associated States

b. US take major responsibility for training indigenous forces

c. US share responsibility for military planning

d. French forces to stay in the fight and no requirement of replacement by US forces.

(e. Action under UN auspices?)

This offer to be made known simultaneously to the other members of the proposed regional grouping (UK, Australia, NZ, Thailand, Associated States, Philippines) in order to enlist their participation.

I then summarized possible objections to making the above proposal to the French:

a. No French Government is now competent to act in a lasting way.

b. There is no indication France wants to "internationalize" the conflict.

c. The US proposal would be made without the prior assurance of a regional grouping of SEA States, a precondition of Congress; although this point might be added as another condition to the proposal.

d. US would be "baling out colonial France" in the eyes of the world.

e. US cannot undertake alone to save every situation of trouble.

I concluded that some PB members felt that it had never been made clear to the French that the US was willing to ask for Congressional authority, if certain fundamental preconditions were met; that these matters had only been hinted at, and that the record of history should be clear as to the US position. Dulles was interested to know the President's views, because he is talking with Ambassador Bonnet this afternoon. He indicated that he would mention these matters to Bonnet, perhaps making a more broad hint than heretofore. He would not circulate any formal paper to Bonnet, or to anyone else.

The President referred to the proposition advanced by Governor Stassen at the April 29 Council Meeting as not having been thoroughly thought out.

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He said that he had been trying to get France to "internationalize" matters for a long time, and they are not willing to do so. If it were though advisable at this time to point out to the French the essential pre-conditions to the US asking for Congressional authority to intervene, then it should also be made clear to the French as an additional precondition that the US would never intervene alone, that there must be an invitation by the indigenous people, and that there must be some kind of regional and collective action.

I understand that Dulles will decide the extent to which he cares to follow this line with Ambassador Bonnet. This discussion may afford Dulles guidance in replying to Smith's request about a US alternative to support the Bidault proposal, but there really was no decision as to the US attitude toward the cease-fire proposal itself.

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MAY 8, 1954
GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA

Excerpts from the First Plenary Session
The Geneva Conference
Indochina Phase
May 8, 1954

The French Proposals

"....The French Government is thus confident that it has done everything in its power to put an end to the conflict. Not only has it removed all reason for this conflict to exist by recognizing fully and unreservedly the independence of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia but, furthermore, the French Government has manifested for a long time its readiness and its desire of obtaining a reasonable settlement which would allow for the hostilities to be brought to an end. This is the main and primary task assigned to this Conference....

"We propose that the Conference should, first of all, declare that it adopt the principle of a general cessation of hostilities in Indochina based upon the necessary guarantees of security....

"....in agreeing upon the withdrawal of the invading forces and the restoration of the territorial integrity of those states....

"....For France there is a Viet-Nam state of which the unity, territorial integrity and independence must be respected....

"....the most just solution of the political problem can be found and finally assured only when the population is in a position to express in complete freedom its sovereign will by means of free elections. For the present moment I repeat the problem is that of bringing about a cessation of hostilities and the guaranteeing of that cessation. These guarantees, in our opinion, must be of two kinds.

"....the regular forces of the two parties would be brought together in clearly demarcated regrouping zones....the implementation of the agreement should be placed under the supervision of international commissions....

"....the agreement....should be guaranteed in appropriate conditions by the states participating in the present Conference....

"....The French proposal is as follows:

"I. Vietnam

1. All regular units to be assembled in assembly areas to be defined by the Conference on the basis of proposals by the Commanders-in-Chief.

2. All elements not belonging either to the army or to the police forces to be disarmed.
3. All prisoners of war and civil internees to be released immediately.
4. Execution of the above provisions to be supervised by international commissions.
5. Hostilities to cease as soon as the agreement is signed. The assembly of troops and disarmament of forces as above provided to begin not later than x days (the number to be fixed by the Conference) after the signature of the agreement....

"II. Cambodia and Laos

1. All regular and irregular Vietminh forces which have entered the country to be evacuated.
2. All elements which do not belong either to the army or to the police forces to be disarmed.
3. All prisoners of war and civil internees to be released immediately.
4. Execution of the above provisions to be supervised by international commissions.

"III. These agreements shall be guaranteed by the States participating in the Geneva Conference. In the event of any violation thereof there shall be an immediate consultation between the guarantor States for the purpose of taking appropriate measures either individually or collectively.

"This, Mr. President, is the proposal submitted to the Conference on the responsibility of the French Delegation and by that Delegation. Thank you, sir....

The Viet Minh Proposals

"....In the same spirit, expressing the sentiment of the three peoples of Vietnam, Khmer, and Pathet Lao, the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam proposes to the conference that it invite the official representatives of the governments of resistance of Khmer and of the government of resistance of Pathet Lao to take part in its work. We submit this proposal having in mind the following:

"....the peoples of Khmer and Pathet Lao have liberated vast areas of their national territory....

"....These governments represent the great majority of the people of Khmer and Lao, the aspirations of whom they symbolize....

"....Alas, the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam proposes to the conference that it adopt the following resolution:

"'In view of the present situation of the countries of Indochina and in the interests of the thorough and objective examination of the question of the cessation of hostilities and the reestablishment of peace in Indochina, the conference recognizes the necessity to invite the representatives of the governments of resistance of Khmer and Pathet Lao to take part in the work of the conference in regard to the question of the reestablishment of peace in Indochina.'

"Having submitted this proposal to the conference, I would ask the President of this meeting to authorize me to continue my statement when the conference has discussed the proposal that I have submitted"

The United States Proposal

"The United States proposes that any idea of inviting these non-existent, so-called governments be rejected....

The Red China Position

"....The delegation of the Peoples Republic of China fully supports the views of Mr. Pham van Dong....

The Soviet Union Position

"In view of the aforesaid, the Soviet Delegation supports the proposal of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to invite the delegates of the Democratic Governments of Pathet Lao and Khmer to take part in our conference...."



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

9 May 1954

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Future U. S. Action Regarding Indo-China

1. In light of the French having tabled an armistice proposal at Geneva, the United States must now decide whether:
 - a. To intervene actively in the Indo-China war to redeem the situation.
 - b. To exercise all feasible pressure to require the French Government to avoid all compromise at Geneva and to take increased effective military and political action against the Viet Minh in Indo-China. This appears realistically possible only if the decision to implement a above is also made.
 - c. To adopt a passive policy toward the negotiations at Geneva while endeavoring to organize hastily a regional grouping, with U.S. participation, to hold what remains of Southeast Asia.
2. Decisions a plus b offer the only sure way to stop the Communist advance. They involve substantial risk of war with Red China and increased risk of general war. However, recognizing the steadily increasing Soviet capabilities in nuclear warfare and the consequent steady diminution of the present military advantage of the U.S. over the USSR, these increased risks can more surely and safely be accepted now than ever again.
3. Decision c would be a compromise involving clear possibilities for piecemeal advancement of Communist control over the balance of free Asia despite the best efforts of the U.S. to the contrary. The likelihood of further such advancement would be somewhat diminished if the U.S. made publicly clear that the further support by Moscow and Peiping of Communist aggression or subversion, as judged by the U.S., would entail direct military action by the U.S. against the source or sources of this support. However, it might be months or years before further subversion would enable such a U.S. judgment. By then the increased Soviet nuclear capability might well inhibit the U.S. Government from implementing its announced intention. Asia could thus be lost.
4. Therefore, it would appear that the U.S. Government must decide whether to take the steps necessary to contain Communism in Asia within Red China by intervention in Indo-China or accept the probable loss of Asia to Communism.

C. H. Bonestall
C. H. BONESTALL, III

Brigadier General, United States Army
Defense Member, NSC Planning Board

This document contains 1 pages.
Copy No. 1 of 3 copies. Series 6, 442

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4/5*

May 10, 1954.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bob:

Secretary Dulles has asked me to send you the attached draft instructions to our Delegation in Geneva.

He would appreciate receiving the urgent comments of the Department of Defense on these instructions, and if possible it would be very helpful if I could have at least your initial reaction by tomorrow morning.

I am also sending a copy of this letter with enclosure to Admiral Radford.

Sincerely yours,

Robert B. Murphy

Enclosure:

Draft Instructions.

The Honorable
Robert B. Anderson,
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
The Pentagon,
Washington.

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Posture

DRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

(Sent Mr. Anderson by Bob Murphy at JFD's request, 10/5)

The following basic instructions, which have been approved by the President, will guide you, as head of the United States Delegation, in your participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference.

1. The presence of a United States representative during the discussion at the Geneva Conference of "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" rests on the Berlin Agreement of February 18, 1954. Under that agreement the US, UK, France and USSR agreed that the four of them plus other interested states should be invited to a conference at Geneva on April 26 "for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" and agreed further, that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" would also be discussed at Geneva by the four powers represented at Berlin, and Communist China and other interested states.

2. You will not deal with the delegates of the Chinese Communist regime, or any other regime not now diplomatically recognized by the United States, on any terms which imply political recognition or which concede to that regime any status other than that of a regime with which it is necessary to deal on a de facto basis in order to end aggression, or the threat of aggression, and to obtain peace.

3. The position of the United States in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference is that of an ^{vital} interested nation which, however, is ^{technically} neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation.

we changes were suggested to Mr. A. 10 May

4. The United States is participating in the Indochina phase of the Conference in order thereby to ^{assist} in arriving at decisions which will help the nations of that area peacefully to enjoy territorial integrity and political independence under stable and free governments with the opportunity to expand their economies, to realize their legitimate national aspirations, and to develop security through individual and collective defense against aggression, from within or without. This ^{implies} that these people should not be amalgamated into the Communist bloc of imperialistic dictatorship.

5. The United States is not prepared to give its express or implied approval to any cease fire, armistice or other settlement which would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful governments of the three aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina, or which otherwise contravened the principles stated in (4) above.

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and influence

6. You should, in so far as is compatible with these instructions, cooperate with the Delegation of France and with the Delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of the Conference.

7. If in your judgment continued participation in the Indochina phase of the Conference appears likely to involve the United States in a result inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you should immediately so inform your Government, recommending either withdrawal or the limitation of the U.S. role to that of an observer. If the situation develops such that, in your opinion, either of such actions is essential under the circumstances and time is lacking for consultation with Washington, you may act in your discretion.

8. You are authorized to inform other Delegations at Geneva of these instructions.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

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Control: 3907
Rec'd: May 10, 1954
10:52 a.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4287, May 10, 1 p.m.

NIACT

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GENEVA 204.

DEPARTMENT AND GENEVA LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

Laniel asked me to come to see him at 10 Sunday night. I found him in a strong and courageous mood reminiscent of the conversations I had last summer at the beginning of the negotiations over the Navarre plan and quite in contrast with his mood of the past few weeks. He stated that he plans to take a very firm position in the National Assembly on Tuesday when Indochina problem comes up again. He plans to say that there are decisions of vital military importance to be taken daily at Geneva. If the National Assembly has someone else in mind whom they can put into office promptly to handle these decisions in a better fashion than he can, they should do so, but that if they are not (repeat not) prepared for the immediate reconstitution of a new government (which they are not) they should stop talking about Indochina and let the government get on with its difficult task.

Laniel then expressed considerable concern regarding (1) the prospects at Geneva; and (2) and more important, the military situation in Indochina. He felt that Indochina phase of Geneva conference had got off to a bad start and considered it very likely that in view of the division and weakness among the Western powers, the Communists will not (repeat not) accept the French proposal for a cease-fire with guarantees, but will press for what in effect would be total surrender.

He said it had been made clear to the French delegation by the Communists that they could not (repeat not) have any conversations direct with the Viet Minh at Geneva but must in all cases proceed through the Chinese. This, plus the fact of large scale Chinese intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu, made it clear that the enemy France

is facing

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-2- 4287, May 10, 1 p.m., from Paris.

is facing is not (repeat not) the Viet Minh rebels, but Communist China. Laniel observed that Communist China had fought the whole UN to a standstill in Korea. Obviously France alone was no (repeat no) match for China. The strength with which the French could oppose Chinese propositions at Geneva would have a direct connection with the amount of support they received from the other Western powers, particularly the US. In the final analysis, the only such support, which he felt would have any real effect on the Chinese, would be the direct threat of US military intervention. He very much feared that the Communist side would attempt to drag out the negotiations by interminable procedural debates on such subjects as the admission to the conference of non-existent Communist Governments of Laos and Cambodia until such time as they could gain a military decision in the field.

Laniel then turned to the immediate military problem. He said that the Viet Minh had announced that they would not (repeat not) cease operations this year during the monsoon. Their next objective, after Dien-Bien-Phu, would in all probability be Hanoi. Under ordinary circumstances it should take the Viet Minh approximately a month to move their troops from Dien-Bien-Phu to the Hanoi area. However, it might be possible to reduce this period to two or three weeks if the Viet Minh made an all-out effort. He also feared that in view of the success which the Chinese have had with their military intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu, they would not (repeat not) now hesitate to intervene further with supplies and even with additional personnel, to the extent necessary to gain a knockout victory at Hanoi.

It therefore was vitally important, as a first order of business, for the French to decide how to regroup their forces in Indochina so as best to protect the expeditionary corps. Laniel said that he would much prefer to take these military decisions with the aid of competent US military advice, rather than to take them by himself. He also said that he would have to know, in connection with making his decisions, what, if any, military action the US might be prepared to take in Indochina and under what, if any, circumstances. If there was no (repeat no) possibility of US military help at any point, the regroupment of forces would have to be much more drastic, and the first thing to be done would be the complete evacuation and abandonment to the Viet Minh of the entire territories of Laos and Cambodia. He stated that there were 15 French Union battalions presently in Laos which would have to be redeployed to the Delta or to some area near the sea. In addition, the French-held lines in the Delta would have to be greatly shortened.

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5/10/54, 2:45 p.m.
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Action: -3- 4287, May 10, 1 p.m., from Paris. Control 3907
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As a specific request, Laniel asked that a US General officer, fully familiar with the terrain and conditions in Indochina be sent to Paris immediately to confer with General Ely, Pleven and himself. He said that at least in the first instance, it would be imperative to preserve the utmost secrecy concerning this mission and that the only people who would be informed of it, in addition to the three previously mentioned, would be Bidault and Maurice Schumann. He said that it was impossible to spare General Ely at this time for a trip to Washington, which was the reason for his request that a US officer come to Paris. He emphasized the importance of the US officer being fully up to date and informed regarding the terrain and possibilities in Indochina. In addition to the help which this officer could give, Laniel said that he would also require definite information from me as to what the US Government might be prepared to do in the way of military effort. He emphasized the great need for speed and hoped that he could have an answer in principle very shortly to his request for advice from a US General. If the answer were favorable, the US General should arrive before the end of the week in order to be fully effective.

DILLON

DU:VH/11

Mr. Sturn's office (FE) notified 5/10/2:12 p.m.
Mr. Fisher's office (WE) notified 5/10/2:12 p.m.

Bureau of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 10 1954
5273
Department of State

DIRECTOR OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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10 May 1954

In reply refer to I-11999

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: United States "Posture" at Geneva Conference

Captain Grant and I went over with Mr. Hensel the State Department "Draft Instructions to the U.S. Delegation at Geneva." We all agreed that as presently drafted they imply that the U.S. is at Geneva to "cheer the players" rather than to "pitch." The following specific comments are to raise the basic question with State, which is: are we in Geneva to try to the limit of our capacities to influence the outcome along the lines we want - or are we content to take a passive role? We think that to accept the latter is to accept defeat in advance.

1. Regarding para. 3, the United States, while not a "belligerent," is certainly vitally interested in the successful handling of the Indochina phase at Geneva. Again, while not technically a "principal" in the negotiation it would seem the U.S. should act from its position as the strongest nation in the free world and endeavor consistently to influence the progress of negotiations towards our objectives. Consequently it is recommended that this paragraph be amended by the insertion of the word "vitally" before the words "interested nations" and the insertion of the word "technically" before the words "a belligerent or a principal."

2. Regarding para. 4, this could be strengthened somewhat to give proper guidance as to "posture," by changing the words "to assist in arriving at decisions" to "to promote decisions." It is further suggested that, in the last sentence, the word "implies" be changed to "means."

3. With regard to para. 6, the U.S. Delegation should manifest more positive efforts than merely those of "cooperation" with other Allied Delegations. To this end, this paragraph should be changed to read:

"You should, insofar as is compatible with these instructions, cooperate with and endeavor to influence the Delegation of France and with the Delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of the Conference in order to further the attainment of U.S. objectives."

4. With regard to para. 7, there appears to be a profoundly important point involved. This point is, in effect, will the United States admit diplomatic defeat and cease to use all means to influence the Conference towards its ends, if the Conference appears to be going against us. It has been argued that this should be done so as to relieve the U.S. of responsibility and permit the U.S. to pursue, with complete freedom of action, such

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steps as it then felt were necessary. Consideration must be given to what steps could be taken if we withdraw from a conference which we helped initiate and of which we were an inviting Power. If such steps to be contemplated include any direct military action in the area, the U.S. would be risking being called an "aggressor" if it tried to take action of this sort while the Conference was still in session. Para. 29 of NSC 5405, the approved policy on Southeast Asia, states "If the French actually enter into negotiations with the Communists, insist that the United States be consulted and seek to influence the course of the negotiations." You presumably will want to discuss this comment of paragraph 7 with Admiral Radford.

In case you want to send a written reply to Mr. Murphy we attach a draft. Note that it says you have discussed it with Admiral Radford who agrees. We have not shown it to Admiral Radford so you should do so before sending it (his office has been given a copy). Also note it questions the need for sending any such instructions on "posture" at this late date.

SIGNED

C. H. Bonesteel, III
Brig. General, USA

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for National Security Affairs

Attachment - 1
Draft Memo

Orig - DepSecDef
Cy 2 - Adm Radford
3 - Capt Grant, OFMA
4 - ISA(R&C) Files
5 - Stayback

CHBonesteel/m/10 May 54
OASD(ISA) 2E 840 78101

C O P Y

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

03630

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1954 MAY 11 PM 4:09

SENT TO: Amembassy Paris NIACT 4023

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

RPT Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 54

EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY

REURTEL 4287 and our 4017

1. We fully realize need for prompt decisions regarding internationalizing the war. Various factors combine to suggest that it may be premature to pose issue of internationalizing for decision at this moment.

(a) If raised before French realize fully that choice is between internationalizing and virtual surrender, proposal to internationalize might well be rejected, leaving no alternative but capitulation.

(b) British are more likely to support or acquiesce in intervention if Geneva has been shown to offer no prospect of solution.

(c) Australian government would almost certainly not take a position until after elections at end of May.

Even so it seems desirable for Laniel to know in general terms conditions we would require for intervention because of influence on current French decisions in military field in Indo-China and in political field in Geneva.

2. President

46185

Drafted by:

JED/ma 5-11-54
SS/S:JCK/

Approved by President Eisenhower

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2. President would ask Congress for authority to use armed forces of US in area to support friendly and recognized governments against aggression or armed subversion fomented from without, provided he could then state that following conditions had been or would be met:

(a) That US military participation had been formally requested by France and three Associated States;

(b) That Thailand, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom also had received similar invitations and that we were satisfied that first two would also accept at once; that next two would probably accept following Australian elections, if US invokes ANZUS Treaty; and that U.K. would either participate or be acquiescent.

(c) That some aspect of matter would be presented to UN promptly, such as by request from Laos, Cambodia or Thailand for peace observation commission;

(d) That France guarantees to Associated States complete independence, including unqualified option to withdraw from French Union at any time;

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(e) France would undertake not to withdraw its forces from Indochina during period of united - principally air and sea - action so that forces, from U.S./and others would be supplementary and not in substitution;

(f) That agreement was reached on training of native troops and on command structure for united action.

FYI Radford contemplates French Supreme Command with U.S. Air Command. END FYI

3. U.S. would require all these conditions to be accepted by French Cabinet and authorized or endorsed by French National Assembly. This would be especially important in view of uncertain tenure of any French government: U.S. would have fully committed itself once it agreed to intervene and would have to be able to rely on adherence to conditions by any successor French government.

4. You will realize that intervention might involve consequences of utmost gravity. Reactions of Communist bloc could not be predicted. Also, if it became necessary to proceed without active U.K. participation, the

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implications would be extremely serious and far-reaching. Removal any taint colonialism would be essential to success of operation in Indochina, to attraction of potential Asian support, and to forestalling opposition by other Asian and Middle Eastern countries. In view of these factors, you will appreciate that conditions indicated would be absolutely indispensable as basis for our action.

5. The U.S. would continue its efforts to broaden united action operation by seeking to bring in other countries whose interests are affected and to formalize the coalition as, for example, by negotiation of regional defense pact.

6. Unless you consider timing unwise in light of factors stated in para 1, you may outline foregoing orally to Daniel^{as}/your estimate of indispensable conditions in light of your knowledge of current high-level thinking in Washington in advance receipt by you of official reaction to your report of his proposal. You should leave nothing in writing with him. You should make clear to him, however, that we would not wish to proceed with any of this program unless National Assembly supports position of his government, as outlined first paragraph your cable. If that occurs and Daniel wishes

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to pursue matter on basis outlined above, he should formally request opening of discussions with us on procedure for fulfilling essential conditions. At that stage U.S. would expect to consult with U.K.

7. If you decide unwise to ~~ink~~ talk with Laniel now on above basis, please cable.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Washington

May 11, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Position of the United States Regarding the Provision
of Military Aid to Indochina in the Event of a Cease-
Fire

REFERENCE: NSC Action No. 1111

The National Security Council and Mr. Tuttle for the
Secretary of the Treasury at the 196th Council meeting on May 8, 1954,
discussed the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the sub-
ject, and adopted the following statement of policy with respect there-
to (NSC Action No. 1111):

In the event of a cease-fire in Indochina in advance
of an acceptable armistice agreement, including inter-
national controls, the shipment of military end-items
under US MDAP provided under the "Agreement for Mutual
Defense Assistance in Indochina between the United
States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Viet-
nam" will immediately be suspended. In such event, the
entire question of US aid to Indochina will be re-examined
in the light of circumstances then existing. The US also
assumes that, in such event, military end-items previously
delivered in Indochina by the US will be recovered or
destroyed to the maximum practicable extent.

Accordingly, the above statement of policy, as approved
by the President, is transmitted herewith to the Secretary of Defense
for guidance and appropriate action, and to the Secretary of State and
the Director, Foreign Operations Administration for information.

It is requested that special security precautions be
observed in the handling of the above statement on policy and that access
to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

Signed: JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

C O P Y

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TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

04125

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

1954 MAY 12 PM 2 09

PRIORITY

DC/T

SENT TO: AMCON GENEVA ~~XXXXXXXX~~ TOSEC 138

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Origin

Info:

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

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The following basic instructions, which have been approved by the President, and which are in confirmation of those already given you orally, will guide you, as head of the United States Delegation, in your participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference.

1. The presence of a United States representative during the discussion at the Geneva Conference of "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" rests on the Berlin Agreement of February 18, 1954. Under that agreement the US, UK, France, and USSR agreed that the four of them plus other interested states should be invited to a conference at Geneva on April 26 "for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" and agreed further, that "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina" would also be discussed at Geneva by the four powers represented at Berlin, and Communist China and other interested states.

2. You will not deal with the delegates of the Chinese Communist regime, or any other regime not now diplomatically recognized

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Drafted by:

S:JFDulles:cjp

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S:JFDulles

Clearance:

Approved by the President

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General
396.1-GE/5-1254

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by the United States, on any terms which imply political recognition or which concede to that regime any status other than that of a regime with which it is necessary to deal on a de facto basis in order to end aggression, or the threat of aggression, and to obtain peace.

3. The position of the United States in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference is that of an interested nation which, however, is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation.

4. The United States is participating in the Indochina phase of the Conference in order thereby to assist in arriving at decisions which will help the nations of that area peacefully to enjoy territorial integrity and political independence under stable and free governments with the opportunity to expand their economies, to realize their legitimate national aspirations, and to develop security through individual and collective defense against aggression, from within or without. This implies that these people should not be amalgamated into the Communist bloc of imperialistic dictatorship.

5. The United States is not prepared to give its express or implied approval to any cease-fire, armistice, or other settlement which ~~would~~ would have the effect of subverting the existing lawful governments of the three aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina, or which otherwise contravened the principles ~~stated~~ stated in (4) above.

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6. You should, insofar as is compatible with these instructions, cooperate with the Delegation of France and with the Delegations of other friendly participants in this phase of the Conference.

7. If in your judgment continued participation in the Indochina phase of the Conference appears likely to involve the United States in a result inconsistent with its policy, as stated above, you should immediately so inform your Government, recommending either a withdrawal or the limitation of the US role to that of an observer. If the situation develops such that, in your opinion, either of such actions is essential under the circumstances and time is lacking for consultation with ~~Washington~~ Washington, you may act in your discretion.

8. You are authorized to inform other delegations at Geneva of these ~~xxx~~ instructions. END VERBATIM TEXT

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MAY 13 1951

*Bonetti Proposal
Filed at PKB on 13 May*

A CONCEPT FOR ACTION WITH REGARD TO INDOCHINA

THE PROBLEM

1. To find a way to resolve the numerous conflicting factors of the Indochina problem in a way which will preserve Indochina to the free world.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The loss of Indochina to Communist control, either by negotiation at Geneva or by force of Vietminh arms, would have grave consequences to the free world.

3. The United States might be willing to intervene in Indochina if the following problems could be resolved:

a. The U.S. must not be supporting "colonialism" in such intervention.

b. The U.S. must intervene in some sort of allied action.

c. The United Kingdom and the Asian nations related to her, particularly India, appear to be opposing U.S. intervention. This opposition is presently being manifested by "Asia for Asians" proposals based on the Colombo nations supervising and guaranteeing an Indochina settlement.

4. There are two further factors bearing on U.S. intervention:

a. The need for Congressional agreement. This is at least partially contingent upon a clear resolution of the "colonialism" factor.

b. The possibility of Red Chinese intervention. This is a somewhat separate issue presently allowed for in NSC 5405.

5. The U.S. is endeavoring to avoid the loss of Indochina and to resolve the colonialism problem by the creation of a regional grouping. It is not clear that a grouping adequate to resolve the colonialism problem could be used for intervention in Indochina.

DISCUSSION

6. To date there has been some lack of understanding amongst our Allies, "in Europe and Asia" as to firm U.S. intentions with regard to Indochina. This may arise because of a lack of an overall concept which will guide the U.S. as to its objectives and actions.

7. The following is an admittedly imperfect attempt to set forth a possible concept.

a. The U.S. is unwilling to permit the loss of Indochina to Communist control by whatever means.

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b. The U.S. is prepared to join actively in two regional groupings. The first such grouping will include nations ready immediately to intervene in Indochina provided certain conditions are met. The second such grouping should be defined, with wider participation, to guarantee against Communist aggression or subversion, all of Southeast Asia with the exception of Indochina so long as active fighting continues.

c. The smaller regional grouping, for active intervention, should consist of at least the U.S., France, the Associated States, Thailand and the Philippines. A precondition of its formation is the absolute declaration by France of the independence of the Associated States.

d. The second regional grouping should be open to all countries who wish to join, including the Colombo countries, Korea and, perhaps, the Chinese Nationalists. The Asian members, definitely including the Colombo countries, would be invited to maintain the peace and security of the area of Indochina progressively liberated according to the procedures set forth below.

e. Intervention in the Indochina conflict by the first regional grouping would be on invitation by the Associated States. Operations would be conducted from as many Vietnam held areas as possible to destroy organized Vietminh resistance therein and to develop a "front" which would delimit the areas of independent Vietnam. These areas would be expanded as rapidly as was consistent with the destruction of organized Vietminh forces therein. As soon as a substantial area was "liberated", the "active" regional grouping, i.e., the U.S. and France, would turn over the maintenance of order, anti-guerrilla operations and anti-subversion to the Vietnam Government assisted by the Asian members of the second and "peaceful" regional grouping. Military installations necessary to support active combat could be kept as "enclaves" within the liberated area.

8. The above concept, complicated though it may be, would seem to resolve to a considerable degree the problem of U.S. intervention being construed as "colonialism." It would further be an offer to the Colombo nations to guarantee the progressive settlement of Indochina by force of arms in which they are not asked to participate. It would clarify to the world that the U.S. means what it has frequently said, that the U.S. is determined that Communist expansion by aggressive force of arms shall not be permitted.

9. The concept, to be effective in halting the deterioration of the free world position in Indochina and at Geneva, would need to be publicly presented to the world, after the decision to do so was reached by the Executive Branch and Congress. It would have to be presented in its entirety to obtain the psychological as well as factual resolution of the "colonial" problem.

RECOMMENDATION

10. It is recommended that this concept be given appropriate study and further definition by the interested Departments and Agencies.

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Department of State

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Control: 6668
Date: MAY 14, 1954
6:39 P M

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4383, MAY 14, 10 PM

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Ref. sent May 15
File

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 4383, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT GENEVA 237.

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I SAW LANIEL AND SCHUMANN THIS EVENING REGARDING DEPTTEL 4023. BEFORE DISCUSSION STARTED ON REFTEL, LANIEL MADE A NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AND ASKED TWO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SENDING GENERAL ELY TO INDOCHINA IMMEDIATELY. HE WILL LEAVE ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY AND WILL STAY IN INDOCHINA ONLY TWO TO FOUR DAYS. PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT IS TO CHECK UP ON MILITARY SITUATION ON THE SPOT AND ON PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION OF GENERAL NAVARRE. BECAUSE OF ELY'S PROSPECTIVE ABSENCE FROM PARIS, LANIEL SUGGESTED THAT GENERAL TRAPNELL, OR WHOEVER ELSE WE PLAN TO SEND TO PARIS IN ANSWER TO LANIEL'S REQUEST FOR AMERICAN MILITARY ADVICE, ARRIVE APPROXIMATELY THURSDAY OF NEXT WEEK. GENERAL ELY WILL UNDERTAKE SUCH RE-GROUPING OF FRENCH FORCES AND SHORTENING OF LINES AS MAY BE NECESSARY. THIS WILL PROBABLY INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF PORTION, AND MAYBE LARGE PORTION, OF THE FRENCH FORCES NOW IN LAOS. FINAL DECISIONS, HOWEVER, WILL ONLY BE TAKEN UPON RETURN OF GENERAL ELY TO PARIS.

LANIEL THEN POSED FOLLOWING TWO QUESTIONS: ONE, COULD THE UNITED STATES FIND A WAY TO GUARANTEE THE BORDERS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA. IF SUCH A GUARANTEE COULD BE MADE, HE FELT IT WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP AFTER THE FRENCH FORCES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. LANIEL'S SECOND QUESTION DEALT WITH ACTION UNITED STATES WILL TAKE IN THE CASE OF INTERVENTION BY MIG 15'S AIRCRAFT. HE SAID THAT FOR HIS OWN PROTECTION HERE HE WOULD LIKE DEFINITE ASSURANCE, WRITTEN IF POSSIBLE, THAT U.S. AVIATION WOULD COME INSTANTLY TO THE HELP OF FRENCH FORCES IN DELTA IF THEY WERE ATTACKED BY MIG'S. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO DEFENSE BEFORE PARLIAMENT OR FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION IF HE WAS NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN SOME SUCH ASSURANCE AS THERE WERE NO ADEQUATE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES IN THE DELTA.

FINALLY, MAURICE

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-2- 4383, MAY 14, 10 PM, FROM PARIS

FINALLY, MAURICE SCHUMANN TRANSMITTED A REQUEST OF BIDAULT'S THAT U.S. DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN THE NEXT DAYS TO ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF PLANES AND EQUIPMENT IN THE EVENT THAT A CEASE FIRE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED AT GENEVA WHICH WOULD NATURALLY BRING TO A HALT SUCH DELIVERIES.

I THEN REFERRED TO QUESTION OF LOCATION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EXPRESSED DEPT'S VIEWS IN FAVOR OF PARIS. SCHUMANN AND LANIEL AGREED THAT PARIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO WASHINGTON AND ACCORDINGLY IT CAN BE ACCEPTED AS AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ALONG LINES OF REFTTEL WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE IN PARIS.

I THEN OUTLINED REQUIREMENTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF REFTTEL. LANIEL AND SCHUMANN LISTENED VERY QUIETLY AND SERIOUSLY AND ON THE WHOLE APPEARED WELL PLEASED WITH THIS CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POSITION. THEY SAID THAT NATURALLY THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY INFO REGARDING THE VIEWS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AND THEY WOULD APPRECIATE BEING KEPT INFORMED BY U.S. OF PROGRESS TOWARD FULFILLING CONDITION INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2(B) WHICH WAS BEYOND THEIR CONTROL. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED AND PLEASED BY INDICATION IN THAT PARAGRAPH THAT ACTUAL PARTICIPATION BY U.K. WAS NO LONGER A PREREQUISITE TO U.S. ACTION.

LANIEL AND SCHUMANN HAD ONE SERIOUS OBJECTION TO U.S. CONDITIONS. THIS, AS EXPECTED, WAS TO THE CONDITION THAT FRANCE PUBLICLY ACCORD TO ASSOCIATED STATES RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM FRENCH UNION AT ANY TIME. WHEN I EXPLAINED U.S. REASONS FOR THIS POSITION AS OUTLINED IN DEPTTEL 4064, THEY SAID THEY COULD SEE HOW SUCH A STATEMENT MIGHT BE OF SOME HELP WITH NEHRU BUT THAT FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NEVER UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT WHEN IT HAD NEVER BEEN REQUESTED BY ANY OF THE THREE ASSOCIATED STATES. THEY THEN POINTED OUT THE FACT THAT THE VIET MINH ARMISTICE PROPOSALS, DISHONEST THOUGH THEY WERE, NEVERTHELESS LOOKED TOWARD THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VIETMINH JOINING THE FRENCH UNION. (COMMENT: I AM CERTAIN THAT UNLESS WE CAN FIND SOME WAY TO GET AROUND THIS REQUIREMENT, FRENCH WILL NEVER ASK FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.) AFTER HEARING STRONG STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT BY BOTH LANIEL AND SCHUMANN, I SAID THAT I HOPED WE COULD CONTINUE CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT IN ORDER TO FIND A FORMULA THAT WOULD SATISFY U.S. REQUIREMENTS AND AT THE SAME TIME COULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT. LANIEL AND SCHUMANN AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TALK FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT.

LANIEL AND SCHUMANN HAD ONE OTHER QUESTION REFERRING TO SUB-PARAGRAPH 2(E) WHICH STATES THAT FORCES FROM U.S. WOULD BE

PRINCIPALLY AIR

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-3- 4383, MAY 14, 10 PM, FROM PARIS

PRINCIPALLY AIR AND SEA "AND OTHERS". THEY ASKED ME TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS MEANT BY OTHER FORCES. LANIEL INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE ARTILLERY FORCES AS WELL AS SOME GROUND FORCES. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF MARINES. COMMENT: I FEEL THAT WHILE FRENCH GOVT WOULD NOT LOOK FORWARD IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE NECESSITY OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL INVOLVEMENT BY U.S. GROUND FORCES, THEY NEVERTHELESS FEEL THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE PROVIDE AT LEAST SOME TOKEN GROUND FORCES SO THAT OUR PARTICIPATION IS NOT LIMITED STRICTLY TO NAVAL AND AIR FORCES.)

BOTH LANIEL AND SCHUMANN ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION AS BEING WHOLLY JUSTIFIED U.S. REQUIREMENT THAT CONDITIONS BE ACCEPTED BY FRENCH CABINET AND ENDORSED BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY THEN SAID THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO SPEAK TO ME OVER THE WEEKEND AFTER THEY HAD HAD TIME TO THINK FURTHER REGARDING U.S. CONDITIONS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT CONDITIONS AS OUTLINED REPRESENTED PRESENT HIGH LEVEL THINKING IN WASHINGTON AND DID NOT REPRESENT AS YET ANY COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF U.S. GOVT. SCHUMANN THEN SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE GREATEST SECRECY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS FULL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. HE SAID THAT PREMATURE PRESS LEAKS COULD MAKE THINGS MOST DIFFICULT AND HE REFERRED TO AN AP PRESS STORY TODAY FROM WASHINGTON. LANIEL AND SCHUMANN THEN SAID THAT THEY HOPED THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONTINUE RAPIDLY AND THAT WHEN AND IF FULL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE PUBLIC DECLARATION OF A SORT WHICH WOULD INFLUENCE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA.

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1954 MAY 15 PM 12 30

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TELEGRAM
INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SENT TO: AMEMBASSY PARIS ⁴⁰⁹⁷ NIACT
^{TE DUL 73}
NIACT RPT INFO GENEVA ⁷²³ EYES ONLY.
UNDER SECRETARY

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

REUR 4383

757900/5-1457

1. ~~Trapnell~~ Trapnell's trip delayed as requested. However, we are inclined to question desirability of sending him next week in light of Ely's trip. Request your recommendation.
2. We know no (rpt no) way to guarantee borders and independence of Laos and Cambodia. From military standpoint such guarantee would be impractical. From legal standpoint the processes requiring Senate action would be too complicated to affect present situation. Believe best course regarding Laos and Cambodia is to have them join with Thailand in seeking UN Peace Observation Commission. This would carry at least certain moral implications if the move was strongly backed by US and other powers.
3. If collective defense arranged as contemplated, this would of course embrace situation resulting from intervention by MIGS. If such intervention

46210

Drafted by: S:JFDulles;cjp

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S:JFDulles

Clearances:
Admiral Radford
C - Mr. MacArthur
G - Mr. Murphy

J. MacArthur

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should occur prior to conclusion of collective defense arrangements, then the US reaction would have to be judged under circumstances of the moment, but in any case President would expect to make his action dependent upon Congressional authorization, assuming US interests not (rpt not) directly attacked. However, Defense advises that their intelligence does not (rpt not) indicate that Chinese airfield situation is such as to make such intervention seem likely.

4. Our normal processes of delivery of planes and equipment are proceeding and do not (rpt not) plan any interruption. We must be vigilant to prevent what in effect would be turning over equipment to the enemy. It is of course absolutely indispensable that any French cease fire or armistice negotiations should protect the right of the US to repossess itself of the planes and equipment which it has delivered for purposes of fighting Communists under agreements which give us the right to recapture if this use no longer contemplated.

5. Note acceptance Paris as place of negotiations.

6. Respecting conditions named our 4023, would like your suggestion regarding condition 2(d). We believe there might be some flexibility on our side regarding formulation but there cannot be any equivocation on completeness of independence if we are to get Philippines and Thailand to associate themselves. Without them, whole arrangement would collapse

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(rpt not)

because we are not/prepared to intervene purely as part of a white Western coalition which is shunned by all Asian states.

7. The phrase "and others" was designed to refer to other forces than those of US and France. The formula "principally air and sea" was not (rpt not) designed to exclude anti-aircraft artillery, and limited US ground forces for protection of bases which might be used by US ~~forces~~ naval and air forces.

8. Will do best respecting secrecy. The press report referred to Suggest Laniel that Fr Emb Wash be instructed to exercise utmost discretion almost certainly came from French Embassy. Are these negotiations.

9. FYI, we believe as suggested your last sentence principal French motivation is to use US position to get better terms at Geneva. We have no (rpt no) objection to this, provided action is consistent with the principles which we think necessary and have reported to Under Secretary at Geneva as essential to avoid thinly disguised capitulation. We would expect if the French and ourselves are working together to create collective defense of the area, we should also work closely at Geneva and the French Delegation ~~would not~~ (rpt not) agree at Geneva to terms which we felt involved virtual abandonment of area to Communist forces. Certainly we should have full opportunity to know what was going on and have timely opportunity to express our views, and if they are ignored, ~~publicly~~ publicly to disassociate ourselves.

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
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10. Re final sentence para. 6, TEDUL 54, we consider Laniel's comments in Paris 4383 as preliminary observations and not (rpt not) as constituting formal request for opening discussions. Therefore we will not (rpt not) consult with UK and possibly others until we hear results of your further talk with Laniel over weekend. We assume that French will talk to no one but you at this juncture.

11. We are also not (rpt not) clear how Laniel proposes to handle this question procedurally with Cabinet and Parliament and would appreciate your own comment on this. We ourselves would have to have consultations with Congressional leadership if we reach agreement in principle with the French prior to presentation by Laniel to French Cabinet which will most certainly leak.


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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 7430
Rec'd: May 17, 1954
10:30 a.m.

Handwritten signature/initials

FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4402, May 17, 2 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 4402, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 243.

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Re DEPTTEL 4023, paragraph 2D.

I would like to propose for consideration a radically different approach to the clarification of the full independence of the Associated States, and in particular of Vietnam. The establishment of the right of withdrawal from the French Union seems to me to be a purely juridical approach, which does not go to the roots of the problem. It is also unacceptable to French opinion for a large number of reasons, among which are (1) that it throws into question the entire concept of the French Union as a union of free and independent peoples, and (2) it casts doubt on the veracity and honor of France in her recent statements that Vietnam has now been granted full independence and, subsequent to the granting of that independence, has chosen to retain membership in the French Union.

The real problem to me seems to be how to establish in US and Asian opinion the fact that the Associated States have, or will have, a similar degree of independence to that possessed by Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. I consider that the two basic treaties recently negotiated between France and Vietnam (A) granting full independence, and (B) establishing Vietnam's membership in French Union do establish this type of independence for Vietnam. However, the situation is obscured and complicated by the following factors:

1. The presence on Vietnamese soil of a large French expeditionary corps.
2. The existence of a state of war requiring a French commander as supreme military commander in Vietnam.
3. The absence of a truly powerful Vietnamese national army.

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-2- #4402, May 17, 2 p.m., from Paris

The present situation in Indochina is in some ways comparable to that during the darkest early hours of the Korean war, when there was treachery and disaffection on all sides in South Korea, when the lines were being held primarily by American troops, and when a large part of world opinion regarded the South Korean Government as a US puppet. The real independence of the South Korean Government only became fully apparent when South Korea came into possession of an army of its own capable of independent action. I feel that independence of Vietnam will become perfectly clear after a strong national army has been created and after the bulk, if not all, of the French Expeditionary Corps has been withdrawn.

I would assume that the agreement which we will require regarding training of troops would give the US primary responsibility for the training and equipping of a Vietnamese national army. There has in the past been doubt as to the ability and good faith of the French military command in this direction. An agreement giving this responsibility to the US should remove these doubts and do more than anything else to make clear the independence of Vietnam. In addition, I would think it possible for the French to make some sort of statement saying that after peace had been established, and a Vietnamese national army had been established, it was their intention to withdraw the Expeditionary Corps. In this connection, the base rights which the French have in Laos by virtue of the recently negotiated Franco-Laotian treaty, and those which they expect to acquire in Vietnam by virtue of military conventions now under negotiation in Paris, even if they should be maintained, are of no more importance, and probably of less importance, than US base rights in the Philippine Republic. Such a statement would be in accordance with general desire in France to withdraw troops from Indochina and should be useful as assurance to Chinese Communists that non-Asian troops were being withdrawn from proximity to her frontiers.

When and if peace is restored in Indochina and Vietnam has a strong national army, it is obvious that the fundamental ties between Vietnam and France will be cultural, i.e., language, and whatever financial self interest there may remain. Vietnam's association with the French Union will be based on a treaty freely negotiated between Sovereign States, and it is obvious that if Vietnam so desires, it will then be in a position to abrogate or nullify this treaty at any time it so desires. A public statement by Bao Dai that Vietnam's association with the French Union is the result of the free desire of the Vietnamese people might be helpful.

If this

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-3- #4402, May 17, 2 p.m., from Paris

If this picture can be presented in clear terms, which presentation will in considerable measure be a US responsibility, I should think that the independence of the Associated States would be fully clarified in US opinion and in the opinion of friendly Asian states. I would appreciate receiving Department's comments on this type of approach prior to discussing it with the French.

DILLON

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

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FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4440, May 19, 4 p.m.

Control: 8774
Rec'd: May 19, 1954
3:11 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4440, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 257

EYES ONLY UNDERSECRETARY

DEPARTMENT LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Re DEPTTEL 4130

I have been much concerned about EDC situation for some time. Two things are perfectly clear.

1. That as long as present state of acute crisis exists regarding Indochina there is no hope of a successful debate on EDC. The singleminded effort for a period of at least two weeks of all pro-EDC elements in government will be necessary in order to have chance of ratification of EDC by French Parliament.
2. Any attempt to force EDC to a vote before Indochina crisis has been further clarified would lead to indefinite postponement or defeat of EDC.

While pro-EDC members of French Government originally saw no connection between EDC and Geneva, the fall of Dien Bien Phu and present military crisis in Indochina has drastically changed situation. EDC is for the moment inextricably intertwined with both Geneva and Franco-US negotiations regarding united action in Indochina. While there is no direct logical connection between the two, the way in which we handle present Indochina negotiations with French is bound to have great effect on our friends in French Government who are supporting EDC. The two key elements in this situation are (1) the finding of a solution to the clarification of the independence of Associated States that will not require France to publicly proclaim right of withdrawal from French union and (2) the question of Marines for Indochina as raised by Schumann in EMBTEL 4416. Unless we can satisfy this request for Marines, I am very much afraid that the emotional reaction here will be such that there will be no hope of EDC ratification at least for months to come.

Indeed, if we

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-2- 4440, May 19, 4 p.m., from Paris

Indeed, if we fail to reach agreement with French for joint, effective and hopeful action in Indochina, the Laniel government which is living on borrowed time granted by National Assembly in the hope that, thanks to United States support, an honorable solution can be reached at Geneva, will probably fall. A government pledged to peace in Indochina at any price is then likely and such a government is also likely to bury EDC for good. As regards Geneva, I am sure that Soviets must be well aware of the reaction of Indochina crisis on EDC situation here. Therefore, I would assume that they would, while endeavoring to appear reasonable in public and before world opinion, take action to prevent any agreement in Geneva other than ignominious surrender at least until July when there would no longer be time to debate EDC here prior to summer recess. Therefore, the only way that I can see to push EDC to a vote here with a reasonable chance of success is to bring present United States-French negotiations on Indochina to a successful conclusion in next two or three weeks. Such a result would enable us to give solid support to French at Geneva and would recreate the spirit of alliance between our two countries which has been lacking since Dien Bien Phu.

Meanwhile, technical progress on EDC has continued. I do not consider that French have failed to live up to agreement regarding setting date for debate as Saar precondition has not yet been met. Delay on this is clearly a joint Franco-German responsibility and cannot by any stretch of the imagination be imputed solely to French. There has been real progress in these negotiations which as reported are now concerned almost entirely with the two words "corresponding relations" in Article 12 of Naters' report. Schumann told me that if Teitgen and Adenauer could not reach complete agreement at Strasbourg he expected another meeting with Hallstein. He also told me that if no new points were brought up by Hallstein, it should be possible to reach complete agreement at this next meeting. There has also been real progress on protocol signature problem as has recently been reported by Bruce mission. If Socialist Party Congress should live up to Mollet's expectations, Laniel's position regarding EDC will be greatly strengthened, not only in Parliament, but also in committees and, in particular, in Steering Committee where first test of strength will take place. MRP Congress due May 27 and 28 also expected take strong pro-EDC position.

In view of above, I feel that present is not quite the time for letter such as described in reference telegram. I feel we should concentrate our immediate efforts on conclusion of Indochina negotiations with France and on bringing about a Saar settlement and agreement on signature of the protocols, all prior to June 1.

Delivery

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-3- 4440, May 19, 4 p.m., from Paris

Delivery of letter of type indicated in reference telegram at this time, in the midst of crucial France-US negotiations on Indochina, would in my opinion not have effect of exerting pressure on French, but would simply ensure defeat or indefinite postponement of EDC and would greatly strengthen group in French Government favoring peace at any price in Indochina.

By June 1 situation should be much clearer and then if, after further conversations with Laniel, there still should be no progress on EDC I feel that the time would be ripe to consider seriously the delivery of a formal letter regarding intentions to the French. Status of Indochina crisis will, however, still have to be taken into consideration in reaching our final decision. Meanwhile I suggest that our action be limited to oral communications by me regarding importance of EDC to Schumann or Laniel or both the next time I see them regarding Indochina.

DILLON

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Indo-China

1. I am becoming increasingly concerned over the frequency of statements by individuals of influence within and without the government that United States air and sea forces alone could solve our problems in Indo-China, and equally so over the very evident lack of appreciation of the logistics factors affecting operations in that area.

2. Indo-China is almost totally devoid of local resources which would be of use to our Armed Forces. It has a tropical, monsoon climate with pronounced wet and dry seasons and the disease and morale hazards are high for Caucasian troops. The population, when not hostile, is untrustworthy. However, the principal deficiency of Indo-China as a base for the support of large military operations lies in the inadequacy of its facilities for the movement of supplies.

3. The two principal ports are Saigon and Haiphong, with a combined daily capacity of 15,100 short tons. Both are inland river ports requiring considerable dredging before maximum potential can be obtained. There are nine secondary ports whose tonnage capacities vary from 100 to 1,400 tons.

4. Because of the inadequacies of the road, railroad, and waterway systems north from Saigon, this port would be of very little use for the support of operations in the Tonkin Delta. Haiphong could not be used without augmentation of its capacity including full use of secondary ports and all beaches. The tonnage capacity of the road and railroad system from Haiphong to Hanoi is even now less than the port capacity of Haiphong.

5. It would be necessary to make full use of the air for supply and evacuation as well as for tactical support. Much construction, to include lengthening and reinforcing of runways, of extreme difficulty during the rainy season, would be necessary. Only three airfields in Indo-China, Haiphong/Cat Bi, Tourane and Tan Son Nhut (near Saigon), have runways over 7,500 feet long and have reported pavement strengths which could support B-45 bomber operations. Eight fields can handle transport planes as large as a C-119; an additional seven fields can accommodate C-46's. Sustained operations could not be undertaken on most of these fields in the rainy season. Within the Delta itself, there are ten airfields of all types of which only one, Cat Bi, is currently being used by C-119's or C-54's.

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6. Even were it decided to limit the employment of United States forces to naval and air, which in itself would be a basically faulty military decision, it would devolve upon the Army to perform the bulk of the logistical services and it is essential that the magnitude of the effort required be clearly understood.

7. The adverse conditions prevalent in this area combine all those which confronted United States forces in previous campaigns in the South and Southwest Pacific and Eastern Asia, with the additional grave complication of a large native population, in thousands of villages, most of which are about evenly divided between friendly and hostile.

8. The complex nature of these problems would require a major United States logistical effort. It explodes the myth that air and sea forces could solve the Indo-China problems. If United States land-based forces are projected any appreciable distance inland, as would be essential, they would require constant local security at their every location, and for their every activity. The Army would have to provide these forces, their total would be very large, and the time to provide them would be extensive.

Robert T. Stevens
Robert T. Stevens
Secretary of the Army

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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20 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Military Participation in Indochina.

1. In recent discussions between the French and the Department of State relating to U.S. military intervention in Indochina, the U.S. Government specified certain conditions which would have to obtain if U.S. military intervention were to be undertaken. Among these conditions were:

a. That France would undertake not to withdraw its forces from Indochina during period of united action so that forces from U.S. principally air and sea and others would be supplementary and not in substitution;

b. That agreement would have to be reached on training of native troops and on command structure for united action.

2. On the assumption that United States armed forces intervene in the conflict in Indochina, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that a Department of Defense position should be formulated as to the size and composition of U.S. force contributions to be made and the command structure to be established. In formulating these views the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided by several factors, among which are:

a. The limited availability of U.S. forces for military action in Indochina.

b. The current numerical advantage of the French Union forces over the enemy, i.e., approximately 5 to 3.

c. The undesirability of basing large numbers of U.S. forces in Indochina.

d. The primary need of an expanded and intensified training program as being the current greatest need.

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e. The lack of required facilities for superimposing U.S. Air Force forces on existing facilities in Indochina.

f. The implications of a reaction by the Chinese Communists in the event of U.S. participation.

g. Atomic weapons will be used whenever it is to our military advantage.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the basic principle underlying any command structure for operations in Indochina which is acceptable to the United States must enable the U.S. to influence future strategy in Indochina. In addition, they believe that some new means to furnish the military guidance which heretofore has come from Paris must be found. A possible solution for over-all strategic guidance is a Military Representatives Committee with membership from those nations contributing the principal forces of the coalition with a steering or standing group along the lines of NATO. This group would be served by a staff organized along the lines of the U.S. Joint Staff composed primarily of U.S. and French officers.

4. Although the Allied Commander in Chief in Indochina should be French, there must be a U.S. Deputy with sufficient staff assistance to provide liaison with the French and coordinate U.S. activities with the over-all operations. CINCPAC would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina. In addition, a U.S. Air Advisor would be provided the French Commander in Chief for the purpose of advising him concerning the air effort.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the best military course for eventual victory in Indochina is the development of effective native armed forces. Thus far the French have been unsuccessful in their efforts to develop such forces. A firm commitment by the French and firm requests from the respective governments of the Associated States for the training and development of native forces by the United States should be a prerequisite of U.S. participation. It is estimated that an augmentation of MAAG Indochina on the order of 2250, with an appropriate logistic support force, would be required to initiate this program. The size of this force and security arrangements therefor will be determined in light of recommendations requested from CINCPAC and Chief, MAAG Indochina.

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6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that U.S. participation be limited primarily to Naval and Air Forces. The composition of these forces should be on the order of the following:


a. Naval Forces. A fast carrier Task Force and supporting forces as necessary in accordance with developments in the situation.

b. Air Forces. U.S. Air Force units operating from present bases outside Indochina as may be required. The order of magnitude of this effort cannot now be estimated since it will depend on developments in the situation.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the principal sources of Viet Minh military supply lie outside Indochina. The destruction or neutralization of those outside sources supporting the Viet Minh would materially reduce the French military problems in Indochina.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that committing to the Indochina conflict Naval forces in excess of the above or basing substantial air forces therein will involve maldeployment of forces and reduced readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East. From the point of view of the United States, with reference to the Far East as a whole, Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces to that area would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

21 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Defense of Southeast Asia in the Event
of Loss of Indochina to the Communists

1. As a result of recent military and political developments, including certain public statements by high-level officials of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is incumbent upon them to determine what military forces and resources would be required to hold Southeast Asia against further Communist aggression in the event Indochina is lost to the Communists.
2. Currently approved United States Government objectives regarding Southeast Asia are based on the considerations that:
 - a. The passing of the countries of Southeast Asia into the Communist orbit would be inimical to the security interests of the United States, and
 - b. The loss of Indochina to the Communist orbit could lead to the eventual loss of the other countries of Southeast Asia to the Communist orbit.
3. In the event that Indochina is lost to the Communists, the United States must take as an objective the prevention of the loss of the rest of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Burma, and Malay) to the Communists.
4. There are two basic military concepts for the defense of Southeast Asia:
 - a. Static type defense (Korea type).
 - b. An offensive to attack the source of Communist military power being applied in Southeast Asia.

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5. The force requirements and inherent logistic implications for a "static" defense of the remaining countries of Southeast Asia-Burma, Thailand, and Malaya are of the order of magnitude as shown in Appendices "A" and "B" hereto. So long as Burma and Thailand are not under Communist control, the geography of the area and the lack of a Chinese Communist capability for a major overseas attack renders Malaya secure from external attack. Therefore, the force requirements are limited to those necessary to defend Burma and Thailand and to provide internal security against infiltration and subversion in Malaya. Should Burma and Thailand be lost, to the Communists prior to an Allied decision to hold a line in Southeast Asia, the defensive position would have to be established in Malaya.

6. A study of the above requirements and implications reveals the following extensive and damaging weaknesses inherent in this concept:

a. It is estimated that it would take a minimum of 12 months to build up the necessary base complex and facilities required to support the forces indicated.

b. These forces would have to remain for an extended period.

c. The commitment in manpower and material incident to maintaining these forces in Southeast Asia for such a period would be unacceptable from the overall viewpoint.

d. The presence of large numbers of United States Commonwealth, and French troops in this area would provide a basis for Communist propaganda to develop and intensify anti-Western sentiment.

e. The dissipation of allied strength through the commitment of forces of this magnitude to a "static" defense of Southeast Asia would contribute to the realization of the politico-military objectives of the USSR vis-a-vis the free world.

f. Execution of static defense plan would result in maldeployment and seriously reduce the flexibility of employment of United States forces. This could seriously jeopardize the United States capability of supporting logistically our present war plans.

7. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that from the military viewpoint the concept of a static-type defense is unsound.

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8. In stating certain implementing actions to the current military posture of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated inter alia:

"Certain other countries such as Indochina, to which the United States has no specific commitment, are of such importance to the United States that an attack on them probably would compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the point of attack or generally against the military power of the aggressor."

It is considered that the rest of the Southeast Asian countries are included in the above category.

9. In view of the above, the United States should adopt the concept of offensive actions against the "military power of the aggressor," in this instance Communist China, rather than the concept of "reaction locally at the point of attack," which is the thesis of the action outlined in paragraphs 5 and 6 above.

10. The force requirements and the logistic support for the operations envisaged in paragraph 9 above are being considered but have not been fully developed. However, it is felt that adoption of this concept would provide a more acceptable return for the manpower and resources expended than would be the case in the concept of a static defense.

11. Upon the decision to implement either one or the other of these courses of action, it would be necessary to insure the degree of mobilization required to take care of the increased possibility of a general war.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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Action
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Info

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DUL/TE 100, May 23, 2 p.m.

Control: 10635

Rec'd: May 23, 1954 WE/JSW
10 a.m.

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PRIORITY

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

Your TEDUL 107.

Action taken
by Secy
5/27
Technical
[Signature]

I will advise Eden in accordance with your instructions and provide him with a confirming memorandum. Will omit paragraph four, since Australia and New Zealand have been informed and are participating and our relationship to ANZUS is well understood.

With regard to final paragraph of TEDUL 107, it is completely impossible for me to understand the reasoning which prompts the decision by our Joint Chiefs of Staff that they should downgrade the rank of our representation on these five power staff conferences. Regardless of the actual outcome, the simple fact that very senior military officers of the five powers were meeting in Washington would convince the Russians and Chinese, who inevitably would know about it, that, regardless of protestations or statements to the contrary, we really intended serious business. I really regret this decision more than I can say.

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TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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1954 MAY 26 PM 7

DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 4272

RPTD INFO: Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC 269
Amembassy SAIGON 2418

-757900/5-2654

Origin

Info:

We have given consideration (Embtel 4514, repeated Geneva 267, Saigon 542) to question of further clarification of independence of Associated States and following views should guide your discussions with French:

1. While fully aware of importance of juridical and constitutional factors in establishment of permanent and complete independence of Vietnam, it seems to me what is primarily needed now is something which will have immediate and convincing impact on world opinion and above all on Vietnamese themselves. We cannot wait for abolition of all deep-rooted abuses and extra-territorial privileges in times like these. We can, however, attempt have it made unmistakably clear that the Treaty of Independence between France and Vietnam represents full and unqualified commitment on part of France which will be carried out in practice.

2. Our present thinking is that in order achieve this, certain declaration and measures are required in immediate future, both by France and by other countries associated in regional grouping for collective defense. United States in addition to such appropriate statements as might be made by President at time of his going to Congress for authority to intervene, might join with other countries concerned in a formal pledge of fulfillment of full independence and

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S/S-CA
MAY 28 1954 P.M.

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sovereignty provided by Article I of Treaty of Independence. This statement, couched in form of a common declaration of purpose, would have to be simple and explicit so there would be no room for doubt as to validity of pledge or as to intentions of countries participating in it.

3. Following represents certain minimum measures which we believe French should take now, and which we feel will not (repeat not) place government in more difficult position than it is already:

a. France and Vietnam should sign draft treaties promptly.

b. At moment of signature, President of Republic, in his capacity as President of French Union, should make statement to effect that Union is composed of equal and sovereign states.

c. A declaration that French will withdraw their expeditionary force from Indochinese states at earliest practicable date after end of hostilities, consistent with France's obligations to Associated States, unless invited by respective governments of Associated States to maintain their forces. (Comment: We consider this to be at heart of any action French could take to convince world opinion they are in earnest. We feel such declaration should be made at actual time of signing or at least immediately after. Would appreciate your views as how and by whom this could be most effectively made.) This provision would not (repeat not) prejudice any base agreements which might be reached with Associated States. If United States or any other forces have been committed, we and any other countries would join in or make similar declaration.

4. Unless above are followed promptly by concrete actions which bear out professed intentions of good faith, hoped-for favorable reaction will not (repeat not)

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take place, and disappointment will set in correspondingly quickly. We suggest therefore that following measures be taken simultaneously, or as soon as practical:

a. Participation of Associated States in programming all aid and direct receipt of military materiel aid. (This might require eventual renegotiation of pentapartite military agreement, but should not (repeat not) delay its implementation.)

b. French should promptly find specific ways of giving Associated States, and particularly Vietnam^{ese} Ministry of Defense and Vietnam national army greater sense of participation in measures required for defense of their territory. We conceive such participation as being progressive in character.

5. Fundamental to problem is establishment at earliest date possible of representative and authentic nationalist governments. We would hope insofar as Vietnam concerned that French would join with us in impressing Bao Dai with necessity adopting prompt and effective measures to this end.

6. Furthermore, we believe series of measures could be taken locally, even in advance of full implementation Treaties, which should have favorable public effect in Associated States. These could take form of liberalization existing Franco-Associated States accords in such manner as to attain some^{of} objectives toward which we are working. Owing to rapid military and political developments in Associated States, we are unable specify at this time exactly what these measures may be, but believe Embassy Saigon and Commissariat General in consultation may be able make appropriate recommendations to Department and Paris.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

26 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Studies with Respect to Possible U.S.
Action Regarding Indochina

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated 18 May 1954, subject as above, wherein the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to prepare certain studies, and agreed outline answers to certain questions relating thereto, for discussion with the Acting Secretary of Defense on or before 24 May, and for subsequent submission to the National Security Council (NSC).

2. a. The studies requested by the Acting Secretary of Defense were developed within the parameters prescribed in the memorandum by the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated 18 May 1954, subject as above. This memorandum is interpreted as assuming no concurrent involvement in Korea. This assumption may be quite unrealistic and lead to malmloyment of available forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out their belief that, from the point of view of the United States, with reference to the Far East as a whole, Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities. The principal sources of Viet Minh military supply lie outside Indochina. The destruction or neutralization of these sources in China proper would materially reduce the French military problems in Indochina.

b. In connection with the above, it may be readily anticipated that, upon Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina, the French would promptly request the immediate deployment of U.S. ground and air forces, additional naval forces, and a considerable increase in MDAF armament and equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their

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belief that committing to the Indochina conflict naval forces in excess of a Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces, as necessary in accordance with the developments in the situation, of basing substantial air forces in Indochina, will involve maldeployment of forces and reduce readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East. Simultaneously, it is necessary to keep in mind the considerable Allied military potential available in the Korea-Japan-Okinawa area.

c. In light of the above, it is clear that the denial of these forces to Indochina could result in a schism between the United States and France unless they were employed elsewhere. However, it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have plans, both approved and under consideration, which provide for the employment of these forces in combat operations outside Indochina. Nevertheless, it is desired to repeat that this particular report is responsive to the question of U.S. intervention in Indochina only.

3. ASSUMING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS INTERVENE

3. Strategic Concept and Plan of Operation

Seek to create conditions through the destruction of effective Communist forces and their means for support in the Indochina action and by reducing Chinese Communist capability for further aggression, under which Associated States forces could assume responsibility for the defense of Indochina. In the light of this concept the major courses of action would be as follows:

a. Employing atomic weapons, whenever advantageous, as well as other weapons, conduct offensive air operations against selected military targets in Indochina and against those military targets in China, Hainan, and other Communist-held offshore islands which are being used by the Communists in direct support of their operations, or which threaten the security of U.S. and allied forces in the area.

b. Simultaneously, French Union Forces, augmented by U.S. naval and air forces, would exploit by coordinated ground, naval, and air action such successes as may be gained as a result of the aforementioned air operations in order to destroy enemy forces in Indochina.

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c. Conduct coordinated ground, naval, and air action to destroy enemy forces in Indochina.

d. In the light of circumstances prevailing at the time, and subject to an evaluation of the results of operations conducted under subparagraphs a and b above, be prepared to take further action against Communist China to reduce its war-making capability, such as:

- (1) Destruction of additional selected military targets. In connection with these additional targets, such action requires an enlarged but highly selective atomic offensive in addition to attacks employing other weapons systems.
- (2) Blockade of the China coast. This might be instituted progressively from the outset.
- (3) Seizure or neutralization of Hainan Island.
- (4) Operations against the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalist forces.

4. Forces Required of Each Nation Participating

The forces which would be employed under current plans during the initial phases of the above operations are those indicated in the Appendix hereto. The duration of the commitment of these forces would depend on the success of French Union forces operations supported by U.S. naval and air operations in defeating communist forces in Indochina.

5. Normal Service logistic arrangement for United States Forces would prevail. CINCPAC would be responsible for providing logistic support. CINCFE would assist by providing material and logistic support as mutually agreed with CINCPAC, or as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The facilities of MATS and MSTS would be made available to CINCPAC as directed. Existing U.S. bases in Western Pacific are available. Bases with limited facilities in Indochina and the Philippines (other than U.S.) would be available. Effort would be made to obtain or utilize bases on Formosa, if required. The French would provide their own logistic support within capabilities. United States logistical support of French Union Forces and Associated States would be provided as required. The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina, would coordinate and arrange for utilization of facilities and services and would provide logistic support to the United States Liaison Groups and Training Missions. In the event operations should involve the use

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of NORC Forces, United States logistic support above the current NORC MDA Program would be provided.

6. Plan for Command Structure

In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, CINCPAC would exercise unified command of assigned forces. He would insure the coordination of all operations in Southeast Asia and provide for the necessary ground-air coordination between French Union Forces and U.S. Navy and Air Force forces which operate in support of the land battle. In addition, CINCPAC would select targets and conduct air operations with assigned forces against military targets in Indochina and those in China which directly support Chinese Communist aggression. COMSAC would support CINCPAC in these operations, and in addition would conduct air operations to further reduce the Chinese Communists war-making capability, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCFE will continue to provide for the security of Japan and the Ryukyus in accordance with his priority mission and in addition would support CINCPAC and COMSAC in their operations as agreed mutually.

7. Plan for Training Native Troops

For the United States to initiate training of Associated States Forces, it is estimated that approximately 2,270 U.S. personnel would be required, as an augmentation of the existing Military Assistance Advisory Group, to carry out this program. In addition, U.S. personnel would be required to provide appropriate logistic support. The exact size and composition of the training mission, the logistic support requirements, and the security requirements and arrangements will be determined in light of recommendations which have been requested from CINCPAC and the Chief, MAAG, Indochina. The training of Associated States Forces would be patterned after the training program conducted for RCK forces in Korea.

8. Plan for World-Wide Military Aid

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that action should be taken to insure appropriate degree of mobilization to provide for the greater risk of a general war and be prudently prepared under this alternate assumption. In view of the increased risk of general war involving the Soviet Bloc, immediate action would

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have to be taken to strengthen our allies. However, due to the overriding mobilization requirements for U.S. forces, such aid would be limited to those allies who could directly support the U.S. strategic concept for general war. This aid would further be limited to combat essential material, essential replacements, and spare parts which are beyond the capabilities of the individual countries to provide from their own or other allied resources.

ASSUMING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS DO NOT INTERVENE

9. Strategic Concept and Plan of Action

Seek to create conditions by destroying effective Communist forces in Indochina, under which the Associated States Forces could assume responsibility for the defense of Indochina. In the light of this concept, the major courses of action which would be undertaken are as follows:

a. Conduct air operations in support of allied forces in Indochina. The employment of atomic weapons is contemplated in the event that such course appears militarily advantageous.

b. Simultaneously, French Union Forces augmented by such armed forces of the Philippines and Thailand as may be committed would, in coordination with U.S. naval and Air Force forces, conduct coordinated ground, naval and air action to destroy enemy forces in Indochina.

10. Forces Required of Each Nation Participating

The forces which would be employed under current plans during the initial phases of the above operation would include:

a. French Union Forces currently operating in Indochina.

b. A U.S. Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces as necessary in accordance with developments in the situation.

c. U.S. Air Force units operating from present bases outside Indochina as required.

d. Forces as may be contributed by other friendly nations.

The duration of commitment of these forces cannot be determined at this time.

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11. Plan for Logistic Support

The plan for logistic support would be the same under this assumption as under the assumption that Chinese Communists intervene (see paragraph 5 above) -- except for the last sentence of paragraph 5.

12. Plan for Command Structure

Although the Allied Commander in Chief in Indochina should be French, there must be a United States Deputy with sufficient staff assistance to provide liaison with the French and coordinate U.S. activities with the over-all operation. CINCPAC would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina. In addition, a U.S. Air Advisor would be provided the French Commander in Chief for the purpose of advising him concerning the air effort. This officer would have no command responsibilities but would be under the direction of the U.S. Deputy.

13. Plan for Training Native Troops

The plan for training native troops would be the same under this assumption as under the assumption that Chinese Communists intervene (see paragraph 7 above).

14. Plan for World-Wide Military Aid

a. Initially, there would be no requirement for additional material and equipment over and above current IDAP for the French and other allied forces in Indochina. MDA programs, however, would require augmentation within approximately 6 months to provide equipment and support necessary to equip initially and maintain a total of 3 new ROK-equivalent Associated States' divisions. Thereafter, increased MDA programs would be required to support additional Associated States' divisions as developed. The maximum number of such divisions probably would not exceed 20.

b. All other military assistance should proceed as currently programmed.

c. Current programs for equipping and modernizing U.S. forces must not be curtailed as a result of any of the foregoing.

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METHOD OF FINANCING COMBAT OPERATIONS

15. Whether or not the U.S. intervenes in Indochina, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is vital that the war in Indochina be financed by a method separate and distinct from the world-wide MDAP. It is imperative that the commander be provided with the necessary equipment to wage war effectively without the financial and legal restrictions imposed by MDAP procedures. The current practice of diverting MDA funds from approved programs to support emergency requirements such as those resulting from combat operations in Indochina has already had the effect of hindering the attainment of our world-wide strategic objectives. Only by divorcing the fluid requirements which exist in local combat situations from the normal MDA programming methods and procedures can the orderly achievement of our objectives in other world areas be achieved.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(Signed)

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

May 26, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum, May 25, 1954, subject: "Defense of Southeast Asia in the Event of Loss of Indochina to the Communists", with an attached memorandum to you from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May 21, 1954, same subject.

2. Your memorandum indicates that the paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deals with the military defense of the rest of Southeast Asia, if Indochina is lost, "against an overt Chinese Communist attack" (although these specific words are not used in the paper). Given this clarification, the paper takes the position, in the event of overt Chinese Communist attack, that a static-type defense is militarily unsound and that the proper concept is an offensive against Communist China.

3. It is clear in the current policy of the United States towards Southeast Asia that, in the event of "overt Chinese Communist attack" against Burma, Thailand, or Malaya, the United States will "take appropriate military action against Communist China" (Paragraphs 42, 46, and 48, NSC 5405) rather than employ a static-type defense.

4. In view of this existing policy, the Joint Chiefs' paper does not appear to involve a new policy issue necessarily requiring its circulation to the members of the National Security Council at the present time. On the other hand, if you feel that it would be desirable to circulate the paper on a limited basis, with an appropriate explanatory note as above, I shall be very glad to do so.

Mr. Cutler misses the point that we are considering a "regional grouping" in SE Asia with possibly U.K. and others in it.

Robert Cutler
ROBERT CUTLER
Special Assistant
to the President

NSC 5405 may express U.S. policy, but U.K. and others might not accept it. JCS paper is warning not to get involved in such a grouping unless all parties accept possibility of direct action in the area.

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2-12

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

RECEIVED

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B
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S/S
Info

FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4566, May 27, 6 p.m.

Control: 12804
Rec'd: May 27, 1954
8:15 p.m.

*File in
MAY 29 1954*

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MAY 29 1954
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SENT DEPARTMENT 4566, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 305, SAIGON 550.

EYES ONLY SECRETARY; GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY; SAIGON EYES ONLY CHARGE

PASS DEFENSE FOR DEPARTMENT ARMY FOR RIDGEWAY

THIS IS JOINT EMBASSY-TRAPNELL MESSAGE

After arriving Paris, Trapnell called first on Ambassador for general background discussion and subsequently on General Gruenther for same purpose. He was originally scheduled to call on Laniel May 28 before seeing Ely but because of Prime Minister's preoccupation with Cabinet meetings and other urgent business meeting was postponed. Trapnell accompanied by Ambassador seeing Laniel at latter's home tomorrow morning. Meanwhile Laniel suggested that Trapnell make direct contact with Ely. This was done this morning when Trapnell, accompanied by Embassy Officer, had hour and half interview with Ely, accompanied by Colonel Brohan.

*MR
11-55*

As conversation opened, it became apparent that Ely was not fully aware of reason behind Trapnell's presence in Paris. After this was explained Ely launched into a general review of the Indochina situation giving particular emphasis to following points:

1. He recounted content of talks he had had in Indochina with O'Daniel. He was agreeable to principle of American instruction Vietnamese forces but not entirely in accord with O'Daniel's proposal that national army be reorganized on divisional basis. He believed that divisional units were perhaps too weighty and that lighter units of perhaps 6, 7 or 8 battalions per division were more practicable. Yet, he did not wish to press this point as he regarded it as a detail which could be worked out subsequently. He pointed out that if O'Daniel's concept was followed and US instructor-advisers remained with units upon completion of training, they would have to accompany units into battle and, therefore, major question of whether US prepared to participate in combat operations would arise. Only alternate to this would be replacement of US instructor-advisers by French as units were

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-2- 4566, May 27, 6 p.m., from Paris

prepared to enter combat. This would be unsatisfactory because training and advising methods of French and Americans were dissimilar.

2. Ely stated that O'Daniel had presented an operational plan for continuing the war but that he found it unrealistic on basis that it gave priority to operations in the south while the principal and immediate threat is in the north.

3. Ely referred to increasing frequency of American criticism of French conduct of war. He explained that it was easy to criticize post facto and when things went wrong. As Trapnell knew, the war in Indochina was of a very special nature and it was unfair for people who perhaps didn't understand this fact as well as he and Trapnell to criticize. It was useless to compare the wars in Korea and Indochina; they were entirely different. He hoped that Trapnell could use his influence to reduce the degree of present US criticism of past and present French performance in Indochina in the interests of good Franco-American working relations in the important joint tasks at hand.

4. At about this stage of the conversation, Ely remarked that it was virtually impossible to discuss specific military questions in Indochina without getting into the major political questions including the possibility of US intervention, the prospects for a Pacific pact and the whole question of where the defense of Southeast Asia was to take place and by whom. Trapnell referred to his terms of reference which prevented him from discussing other than specific military questions, particularly that of the regrouping of existing forces in Indochina for the defense of the Delta.

5. When Trapnell asked Ely what the immediate military prospects were in the Delta, he replied that the five Viet Minh divisions released from Dien Bien Phu were moving rapidly forward and should be at the Delta perimeter between the 10th and 15th of June. Normally at that season they would return to their regrouping areas for rest, "self-criticism" and general revision. Whether they will do so this year or not is still uncertain, although there are indications at the moment that some Viet Minh forces are moving to regrouping areas.

6. When Trapnell asked what Ely was doing to regroup his forces for the defense of the Delta he replied two basic things; First, removing units from pacification and other static missions to the Delta to become part of mobile defense groups; secondly, he was recovering units from inactive posts in Laos, Central Annam and other areas for transfer to the Delta to become part of these same mobile forces.

7. Ely's plan

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-3- 4566, May 27, 6 p.m., from Paris

7. Ely's plan for the defense of the Delta centers around the defense of what he termed the Hanoi-Haiphong axis. No specific detail was given as to the number of units, where they were to be retained, or the exact area to be defended. He was particularly and, no doubt, designedly pessimistic on the aspects for the defense of this axis, stating that if Hanoi had to be surrendered French Union Forces would move to Haiphong, and if Haiphong were lost they would at least be able to move out from there to "possibly another stand in the south". This, too, depended entirely, according to Ely, on what was decided about US intervention and other pending high-level political decisions.

8. Trapnell pointed out that French superiority in aviation and armor could be extremely effective against a Viet Minh coordinated attack in the Delta because of the terrain. Ely not only admitted this fact but stated that it "is our trump card".

9. When Trapnell pressed Ely for an opinion as to what was required between the period of the immediate threat and the period when, it was hoped, the Vietnamese army would be on an effective footing, Ely replied that the General was obviously thinking of how many US Marines would be required to assure the defense of the Delta. He went on to say that in his opinion, if one or two US Marine divisions intervened "there would be no problem".

Comment: The conversation was largely unsatisfactory from our standpoint because our efforts to obtain specific commitments from Ely, including any statement regarding French intentions concerning despatch of reinforcements from metropolitan France and North Africa to Indochina, were unsuccessful. Nor did Ely appear particularly interested in Trapnell's recommendations concerning the redeployment of forces. We attribute this to the fact that Ely is still busily engaged in consultations with the Prime Minister, Plevin, and the High Council of National Defense, and was probably being very careful not to make any commitments which had not yet been cleared by the government. He was aware that Trapnell is seeing Laniel tomorrow morning with the Ambassador, at which time more specific matters may be discussed. In the meanwhile, Ely requested that Trapnell continue his conversations with Colonel Brohan for the time being and that, of course, Ely would be seeing Trapnell again after the interview with Laniel.

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DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

28 May 1954

Dear Admiral Davis:

Developments over the past few days very clearly indicate that we are approaching a stage in the conference where it is evident that the French are going to settle on terms which the U.S. could not, under present NSC directives, associate itself with. The British have long favored an Indochina settlement on the basis of partition. The Viet Minh in their proposals submitted at the restricted session on May 25 (TOSEC 302) made a proposal which would in effect be partition. The Russians and Chinese have, of course, supported the Viet Minh proposal. In the face of this, the French have no firm position, nor has there been an indication that they have a minimum position. As a result, I feel that we are moving toward the probability that there will be a settlement which will, directly or indirectly, result in the partition of Indochina.

I have discussed the foregoing points at considerable length with Herman Phleger and Alex Johnson. They both recognize the dangers of partition and the impossibility of supervising an armistice in Indochina. There appears to be a feeling of hopelessness inasmuch as the U.S. is not in a position to control the situation. The U.S. position is not at all clear. Someone indicated before the conference we should be flexible - I would say we are now fluid. At the morning staff conferences, during the past two days, there have been discussions of U.S. tactics, and General Smith has indicated that the U.S. should remain firm. He has indicated, however, that we should be realistic, and face the probability that there will be some sort of a negotiated settlement which will result in a loss of at least part of Indochina, and will result in some type of partition. There has been no mention of the point at which the U.S. will disassociate itself from the negotiations. On the contrary, there have been indications that the U.S. will probably have to go along with a settlement even though it is unsatisfactory to the U.S.

Yesterday I attended a meeting with General Smith, Alex Johnson and Ambassador Heath in which we met with Eden and Bidault. The subject of discussion was Eden's proposal which he put forth at the sixth restricted session. Bidault had thoughts of his own on the subject taking a slightly different approach as you will note from the enclosed copy of his proposal. The thing I noted most in the discussion was the all-out effort that the various conferees are making to develop a position to which they feel the Communists will agree. Both Eden and Bidault referred to international supervision of the cessation of hostilities. However, it was quite clear from the discussion that neither are aware of the many difficult problems which will be involved in enforcing an armistice in Indochina. The question

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was raised by one of Eden's staff regarding the number of troops required to enforce the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. Various estimates were discussed. However, it was generally agreed that the number of troops required would be in excess of two divisions.

Since it is obvious that the conference is headed toward partition, I feel it significant to bring the foregoing information to your attention. There is very little that the Defense Department can do to influence the negotiations, since a political decision has been made that the U.S. will continue to participate even though we know that partition of Indochina, whatever form it may take, will ultimately result in its loss to the Communists. The view seems to prevail in the U.S. Delegation that there is very little the U.S. can do to influence the French and no useful purpose would be served in disassociating ourselves from the negotiations. I have little to offer in the way of recommendations. I have continued to point out the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of staff that from a military viewpoint a settlement in Indochina which results in leaving the Communist military forces intact will ultimately result in the loss of the area to Communist control. Also, there should be little doubt that there is no form of international supervision that will effectively stop further Communist infiltration and their eventual control of Indochina. Although there seems to be general agreement with the U.S. Delegation on these points there is a feeling that we cannot disassociate ourselves from the negotiations.

In outlining this gloomy situation I would like to mention one bright spot. As a result of your recommendations to General Smith I have been given every consideration and there has been complete cooperation. Due to the small number of U.S. representatives who can attend the restricted sessions on Indochina, I have not been to all of them. However, I have been included in all important discussions. Though there is obviously a difference in view between the Defense and State Department representatives here on Indochina, it is a frank, honest and friendly difference. I fully appreciate the State Department's difficulties, and though they share our view on what will ultimately result from partition, they feel compelled not to break with our Allies.

I shall keep you informed of further developments.

Respectfully,

(Signed)

CHARLES A SULLIVAN

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Department of State

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25-D.

Action

Control: 13397
Date: May 28, 1954
6:32 p.m.

EUR

FROM: Paris

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Info

SS
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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4508, May 28, 8 p.m.

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[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

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I saw Schumann this afternoon and gave him information contained in DEPTTEL 4286. He made careful note of points 1 and 2, and said he felt personally that they were entirely satisfactory. He did not get into any discussion of details so subject matter in FYI portion of DEPTTEL 4286 never came up. Schumann also told me that he had been informed by Parodi regarding my discussion with him yesterday and that Schumann again personally was very pleased with the information in DEPTTEL 4272.

While we do not as yet have formal French answer on either of these two DEPTTELS, Schumann said that only things that now remained unsettled were military conversations to arrange details of training, command structure, and war plans. He said that French were most anxious to get at these conversations immediately. He then read me portion of telegram from Bidault in which Bidault said that an increased show of Franco-American solidarity in Indochina was now vitally necessary in order to have any hope of sound progress at Geneva. As possible concrete steps Bidault suggested:

1. US promptly take over responsibility for training Vietnamese National Army.
2. US agree to provide assistance toward improving airfields in Indochina for use of jet aircraft.

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Schumann told me that at Cabinet meeting this morning it was decided to leave to Pleven's discretion decision as to whether Elj or Valluy should represent France at 5-power military discussions opening in Washington next week. In view of French understanding that Radford will not be present for these meetings Elj has told Trapnell that he is disinclined to go himself. However, Schumann today asked whether it would be possible to undertake

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-2- #4508, May 28, 8 p.m., from Paris

undertake these Franco-US military negotiations in Washington at the same time or parallel with 5-power military talks. If so, he said he felt it was most important that Ely attend and he would so inform Pleven, who, he was sure, would agree. He requested a prompt answer so French could take necessary decision as to whether or not to send Ely. He said French had been anxious for some time to initiate these military discussions and he hoped that US was now ready and willing for them to begin.

During course of my visit he had a telephone conversation with Massigli in London regarding a telegram which Massigli had sent reporting on British attitude regarding Southeast Asia Pact. Schumann showed me the telegram, key portion of which indicated British reluctance, as expressed by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick to undertake any sort of military operations in any portion of Indochina, as they thought that all Indochina, including Cambodia, was infested with Communists and so it was not practical for military operations. Schumann was quite upset by this telegram which he made clear to Massigli on the telephone, saying it was now clear that British were only interested in defending Southeast Asia when question became an immediate problem of the Defense of Malaya. Schumann then brought up another question which he said was giving great concern to Pleven. This was possibility of Chinese air attack on the delta. He said that French Air Force has informed Pleven that Chinese Communist planes operating from present bases had capability of remaining over Hanoi for 15 minutes. This would be enough time to cause great destruction and Pleven felt that if such an attack were not opposed immediately by US jets, Communists in 3 to 5 days could cause enough damage to make the delta effectively indefensible. Schumann wondered whether something along following lines might be possible. Provided French decided to strongly reinforce the delta and use conscripts in Indochina, could the President go to Congress and ask for discretionary authority to use US air power to defend the delta if it should be attacked by Chinese Communist planes. A request to Congress coming after the event would necessarily cause a few days delay which, in Pleven's view, would be fatal. Schumann thought present United Action Program might not be ready in time as he did not know what if any progress US was making with other powers in order to satisfy point 2B of conditions posed in DEPTTEL 4023.

I told Schumann naturally I could venture no opinion as to whether the President would be able to make such a limited request for discretionary authority but that from my personal knowledge of Washington thinking I felt that it would be absolutely necessary in any event that French take action along lines of paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4272 regarding clarification of independence of Associated States.

As I left

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-3- #4508, May 28, 8 p.m., from Paris

As I left Schumann again emphasized his hope that a prompt reply would be forthcoming from Washington regarding possibility of holding Franco-UK military talks in Washington next week.

DILLON

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 13983
Rec'd: May 30, 1954
12:41 p.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4607, May 30, 3 p.m.

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PRIORITY.

SENT DEPARTMENT 4607, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 321.

GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

Reference: Department telegram 4325.

7519.00 / 5-28 5/15

Second paragraph of reference telegram may indicate extremely serious misunderstanding between US and French. French draw sharp distinction between (1) US intervention in present circumstances with Viet Minh bolstered by Chinese Communist materiel, technicians and possibly scattered troops and (2) US reaction against full-scale air attack mounted from Communist Chinese bases. Regarding point (1) French fully understand that conditions outlined Department telegram 4023 apply to any possible US intervention. As regards point (2), however, the French fully count on US military reaction against such an open Chinese Communist attack. The only limitation on such US reaction which French recognize is the time required for Congressional action which they would hope to be a matter of not more than a day or two. In second case, they feel that US statements to the effect that full-scale Chinese Communist intervention could not be permitted are still binding whether or not there is time to create collective action. The Secretary's radio speech of May 7, indicating that while Chinese had given very considerable support at Dien Bien Phu they had avoided full-scale intervention, was taken to mean by French that if there had been full-scale Chinese intervention US would have responded differently to their request for military assistance.

Schumann reverted last night to this question of protection against a possible air attack and gave me more accurate information than that contained in Embassy telegram 4580 regarding French apprehensions. He said that what French General Staff fear is an attack from bases on Hainan Island against Haiphong. Best French estimate is that Chinese jets coming from Hainan

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-2- 4607, May 30, 3 p.m. from Paris

could remain over Haiphong for 20 minutes on each mission. A massive Chinese air attack (Schumann mentioned figure of 100 planes) could completely knock out French air capabilities in the delta and could so seriously damage the port of Haiphong that it would be impossible to conduct a successful withdrawal of French forces through the port. The loss of French air potential would drastically tip the scales in favor of the Viet Minh and make total defeat of French forces in the delta inevitable. It is against this eventuality that the French wish to have protection. Paragraph 9 of Embassy telegram 4605 indicates Ely's belief that he already has commitment from Admiral Radford on this type of attack. What French feel they are asking for now is not, in fact, a new commitment from US but assurances that US reaction will come within a matter of hours and even, if possible, in time to meet attacking Chinese planes. Schumann said he felt that only circumstances in which Chinese would make such an attack would be if they felt that US, for one reason or another, was not in a position to respond promptly and effectively. Therefore, Schumann suggested that if it should be impracticable to obtain preliminary approval of such military action from US Congress, it might be equally useful to have a clear warning from either the Secretary or the President that a massive Chinese air attack would meet with US opposition. Schumann said he felt certain that if Chinese realized that an air attack would cause US intervention they would never take the risk of mounting such an attack.

I have previously stated to Department that if we allowed delta to fall to the Viet Minh without a successful evacuation of the French expeditionary Corps, the effect here would be disastrous. If such a disaster should come about because of open Chinese Communist air attack to which we had not responded by US military action, the result here would be nothing short of catastrophic. We would have to count on a strong movement in France that could well be successful in favor of making peace at any price with the Soviets rather than continuing to count on US support through NATO. The effect of such action by France on the North Atlantic Alliance is obvious. In addition, I do not feel that we could exclude possibility, if the Soviets play their cards right, of a popular front government arising to carry out such a new policy. This naturally would incur the danger of an eventual Communist take-over in France. I do not have any means of evaluating effect in Asia of a unilateral US response to a Chinese attack, but Department should be constantly aware that lack of US response to a full-scale Chinese Communist air attack on the delta would place in jeopardy the North Atlantic Alliance and our whole position in Western Europe.

Schumann has

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-3- 4607, May 30, 3 p.m. from Paris

Schumann has never asked me whether US response to a Chinese attack would be subject to same conditions posed in Department telegram 4023 and I have never, in any way, indicated to him what the US requirements would be for reaction in such an emergency except to point out that full clarification of the independence of Vietnam would be most important. See Embassy telegram 4580.

MRM:VRS-11

DILLON

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

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Control: 14091
Rec'd: May 31, 1954
9:32 A.M.

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4612, MAY 31, 1PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4512, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 327

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WHEN TRAPNELL AND I ARRIVED AT LANIEL'S HOUSE FOR MEETING THIS MORNING, WE FOUND MAURICE SCHUMANN AND ELY ALSO PRESENT. THE MEETING WAS SHORT AND IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT ELY WOULD GO TO WASHINGTON FOR BILATERAL MILITARY TALKS. HIS MISSIONS WILL OSTENSIBLY BE TO ATTEND FIVE-POWER MILITARY TALKS, AND IT IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL REMAIN SECRET. ELY IS UNABLE TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON THIS WEEK AND VALLHY HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT HIM BOTH AT FIVE-POWER TALKS AND AT COMMENCEMENT OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ELY STATED HE UNDERSTOOD WERE TO COVER TRAINING OF LOCAL TROOPS, COMMAND STRUCTURE AND WAR PLANS. VALLUY WILL ALSO ARRANGE DATE FOR ELY'S ARRIVAL WITH JCS. ELY SAID HE WAS GOING LONDON TOMORROW FOR ONE DAY VISIT WITH HARDINE WHOM HE DOES NOT RPT NOT KNOW WELL, FOR PURPOSE OF MAKING FRIENDLY CONTACT PRIOR TO OPENING OF FIVE-POWER TALKS.

LANIEL ONCE MORE MENTIONED FRENCH FEAR OF CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR ATTACK. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRENCH REGARD PRESENT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AS A PRECLUDE TO U.S. INTERVENTION SHOULD GENEVA FAIL OR SHOULD COMMUNISTS DRAG NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA WHILE ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN A MILITARY DECISION IN THE DELTA. ON THE OTHER HAND, LANIER CLEARLY CONSIDERS THAT AN ALL-OUT AIR ATTACK ON THE DELTA BY THE CHINESE, WHILE NOT RPT NOT LIKELY, IS A POSSIBILITY AND SHOULD BE PLANNED FOR. HE FEELS THAT SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD COMPLETELY CHANGE THE PRESENT SITUATION AND WANTS THE BEST ASSURANCES POSSIBLE OF PROMPT U.S. HELP IN THE EVENT OF SUCH A CHINESE ATTACK. ELY CONFIRMED THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WITH RADFORD ON THIS SUBJECT WAS PURELY A TECHNICAL ONE BETWEEN CHIEFS OF STAFF AND WAS SUBJECT TO POLITICAL DECISION BY U.S. HE SAID THAT RADFORD HAD PLANS READY SO THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE COULD COME VERY RAPIDLY ONCE THE POLITICAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. I INFORMED LANIEL THAT AFTER MY MEETING WITH SCHUMANN SATURDAY NIGHT AT WHICH SCHUMANN HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT, I HAD SENT AN INQUIRY ON SUNDAY TO WASHINGTON EXPLAINING IN FULL FRENCH VIEW THAT (1) U.S. INTERVENTION BECAUSE OF CONTINUATION AND AGGREGATION OF PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN INDOCHINA, AND (2) U.S.

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-2- 4612, MAY 31, 1 P.M., FROM PARIS

REACTION TO AN ALL-OUT CHINESE AIR ATTACK WERE TWO VERY SEPARATE PROBLEMS, AND THAT SOME ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE MADE TO HANDLE A CHINESE AIR ATTACK IF IT SHOULD OCCUR PRIOR TO CREATION OF A SEATO ALLIANCE.

IF WE SHOULD INFORM THE FRENCH THAT WE WILL NOT RPT NOT REACT TO A CHINESE AIR ATTACK EXCEPT AFTER MAKING THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, I AM AFRAID THAT THIS WOULD HAVE A PROFOUND AND IMMEDIATE EFFECT BOTH ON FRENCH ATTITUDE IN GENEVA AND ON PRESENT FRENCH PLANS FOR BOLSTERING THE DEFENSE OF INDO-CHINA. WE GAVE LANIEL GENERAL TRAPNELL'S OPINION THAT ELY'S OVERALL PLAN SEEMED GOOD AND THAT FRENCH SHOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD AREAS WHICH ELY PLANS TO DEFENS. ELY THEN ARRANGED FOR FURTHER TECHNICAL DISCUSSION WITH TRAPNELL LATER IN MORNING. SEE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

DILLON

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Re DEPTTEL 4332.

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Information contained in paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4094 was conveyed by me to Schumann immediately upon receipt and he fully understands it. My concern as evidenced in EMBTEL 4607 stemmed from fact that last sentence of DEPTTEL 4325 clearly goes much further than paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4094, which reference telegram now confirms to be Department's policy. Last sentence of DEPTTEL 4325 carries clear implication that U.S. would not participate under any circumstances, except as part of a broader collective effort, while paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4094 states that U.S. reaction to Chinese air attack would be "judged under the circumstances of the moment", but that, in any event, the President would require congressional authorization. If in fact last sentence of DEPTTEL 4325 was not intended to indicate any change in this policy, there is no misunderstanding between our governments.

However, we must bear in mind that French for practical purposes draw the inference from instructions in paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4094 that the President would request Congress for authority to act in the event of a sudden and unprovoked mass attack by Chinese aircraft. They realize, however, that this is only an inference on their part and that U.S. position, as expressed in paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4094, makes no commitment one way or another regarding what action the President might take. From their point of view this is an unsatisfactory situation. All the recent French requests from Schumann, Laniel, Ely, et cetera, regarding guarantees against a possible Chinese attack were brought about by the vagueness of U.S. policy as expressed in paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4094.

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French are now attempting to clarify what U.S. position actually will be in the event of a Chinese air attack on the Delta prior to the conclusion of collective defense arrangements. As it we have three possible courses open to US:

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42- 4625, June 1, 1 p.m. from Paris

1. Maintain position outlined in paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4094. In this event French will continue to believe in their hearts that President will in fact request Congress to act if there should be an all-out Chinese air attack.
2. Tell French that if there should be such unprovoked attack, President would expect to request Congress for authority to use U.S. forces.
3. Tell French that U.S. would not come to French assistance even in the event of a Chinese air attack except as a part of a collective action.

If in fact intention is to give assistance to French in event of a Chinese air attack, it would seem immaterial whether we follow courses No. 1 or No. 2 and I can see many reasons in favor of sticking to course No. 1. However, if we stick to course No. 1, and then do not come to assistance of French in the event of a Chinese air attack, I feel that the results here in France will be as outlined in EMBTEL 4607.

Therefore, if we do not intend to react to Chinese air attack except in the framework of collective action, I feel that it would be better to adopt course No. 3 so as to avoid the risks described in EMBTEL 4607. If we adopt course No. 3, however, we must realize that it will come as a shock to the French and would probably have a prompt and serious effect on French attitude in Geneva and on present French plans for reinforcing Indochina. If it became public knowledge that course No. 3 was our policy, it would probably hasten fall of Laniel and generally militate against our European policy, though nowhere nearly to the extent indicated in EMBTEL 4607.

When Ely arrives Washington next week, he will be under specific instructions to attempt to clarify U.S. policy on this point if answer has not previously been given. Therefore, if our decision is to stick to policy outlined in paragraph 3 of DEPTTEL 4094 with no further explanations, all personnel who will be talking with Ely should be carefully briefed regarding the subject.

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June 1, 1954

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

STUDIES WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE
U. S. ACTION REGARDING INDOCHINA

References: A. NSC 5405
B. NSC Action Nos. 1086-b and c,
1104-b, 1106, 1110 and 1112

The enclosed studies with respect to possible U. S. action regarding Indochina have been prepared by various departments and agencies in response to requests authorized by the President. In the event that conditions established by the President as prerequisites for United States intervention in the conflict in Indochina are met, these studies will provide the basis for further consideration by the Council of the question of such intervention.

These studies were prepared on the assumption that United States armed forces intervene in the conflict in Indochina, and on the alternate assumptions that the Chinese Communists: (a) intervene with armed forces in Indochina, or (b) do not intervene with armed forces in Indochina.

A draft of a Presidential message is being prepared by the Department of State and will be circulated later for insertion in Part I of this report. Additions and amendments to the enclosed reports may be circulated from time to time.

Pursuant to Presidential directive, distribution of this report is being limited to one copy to each Council participant, which is being transmitted through the Planning Board members.

NSC 5421

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It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosures and that access to them be strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis. These reports may NOT be further reproduced in any form without the permission of this office.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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STUDIES WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE
U. S. ACTION REGARDING INDOCHINA

Table of Contents

- I. By the Department of State
 - Economic Warfare Against Communist China
 - United Nations Action in the Event of United States Armed Intervention in Indochina
 - Juridical Relations in the French Union: Giving Effect to the Independence of the Associated States of Indochina
 - Draft of President's Message (to be circulated)

- II. By the Department of Justice
 - Constitutional and Legal Aspects, Including Appropriate Form for Joint Resolution, of President's Request for Authorization "to Intervene in Indochina"

- III. By the Central Intelligence Agency
 - Communist Capabilities in Indochina

- IV. By the Department of Defense
 - Under Alternate Assumptions that Chinese Communists Intervene or Do Not Intervene:
 - Strategic Concept and Plan of Operation
 - Forces Required of Each Nation Participating
 - Plan for Logistic Support
 - Plan for Command Structure
 - Plan for Training Native Troops
 - Plan for World-Wide Military Aid

- V. By the Office of Defense Mobilization
 - Industrial Mobilization
 - Manpower Mobilization
 - Economic Stabilization Mobilization

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VI. By the Foreign Operations Administration

Plan for U. S. Economic and Technical Aid in Event
of Intervention

VII. By the Operations Coordinating Board

Plan for Gaining Maximum Support for U. S. Intervention
in the Associated States from the Indigenous Peoples
Plan of Political Warfare (Including Guerilla and
Paramilitary) Action Against the Vietminh
Plan for Gaining Maximum Support of Other Free World
Countries
Plan for Political Warfare Organization as Integral
Part of Intervention
Plan for Keeping China out of War or Reducing Its
Effectiveness

VIII. By the Bureau of the Budget

Preparation of Any Necessary Request for Supplemental
Appropriations
Preparation of Any Necessary Requests for Additional
Statutory Authority Required for Appropriations
Revision of FY 55, 56 Budget Plans

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Section I

SUMMARY OF STUDIES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. There are three parts to the State study:
 - a. Economic warfare against Communist China.
 - b. U.N. action in the event of U.S. armed intervention in Indochina.
 - c. Juridical relations to the French Union: Giving effect to the independence of the Associated States.

2. Economic warfare against Communist China.- The paper seeks to determine whether, in the event of U.S. intervention in Indochina, intensified and broadened economic warfare measures would deter Communist China from openly intervening or hinder its military effort if it did intervene. The study concludes that the divisive risks of seeking an international program of broadened and intensified economic warfare measures against Communist China would be too great to be undertaken if the full support of the United Kingdom were absent. Even such a program as could be obtained with United Kingdom support would nevertheless not constitute a serious deterrent or countermeasure to open Communist Chinese intervention in Indochina in terms of economic impact. It might be possible, however, to achieve some deterrent psychological impact through the device of an advance multilateral declaration of the economic consequences of massive Chinese Communist intervention.

The paper does not deal with the question of a naval blockade, which State considers to be a military measure.

3. U.N. action in the event of U.S. armed intervention in Indochina - With the exception of action under Article 51 (individual or collective defense against "armed attack") the U.S. as a U.N. member is obligated not to use armed force except in response to orders or recommendations of the U.N. Therefore, "united action" without prior U.N. authorization would have to be taken under Article 51.

There are three possible types of U.N. action related to "united action":

- a. U.N. action prior to U.S. intervention, designed to lay the foundation for "united action."
- b. U.N. action following and supplementing the "united action."
- c. Possible U.N. action in the event the Chinese Communists resumed hostilities in Korea as a result of "united action" in Indochina.

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4. Judical relations in the French Union: Giving effect to the independence of the Associated States - Our goal here must be to have France make it unmistakably clear to world opinion, and above all, the Vietnamese that the Treaty of Independence between France and Vietnam represents a full and unqualified commitment on the part of France which will be carried out in practice. Since the peoples of the Associated States are still mistrustful of French promises, French actions must be underwritten by the U.S.



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8 June 1954

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL BONESTEEL

SUBJECT: Comments on Study of Possible U.S. Action Regarding Indochina.

Pursuant to your memorandum dated 4 June 1954, the following comments are submitted:

a. Economic Warfare Against Communist China.

1. It is noted that this paper does not deal with the question of a naval blockade. This office has no comment on the non-military economic warfare measures discussed in this paper.

2. Despite the improbability of obtaining agreement of all the important allies of the United States to a full economic embargo of goods and services to Communist China, it is recommended that the United States should attempt to obtain such agreement in the event of further involvement in Indochina.

3. We should maintain that a total naval blockade would be the only effective economic warfare measure against Communist China.

b. United Nations Action in the Event of United States Armed Intervention in Indochina

1. No comment except that paragraph 3 has been overtaken by events.

c. Juridical Relations in the French Union: Giving Effect to the Independence of the Associated States of Indochina

1. Concur.

d. JCS paper "Studies With Respect to Possible United States Action Regarding Indochina"

1. Concur wholeheartedly in the entire paper.

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d. (Continued)

2. A firm stand should be taken to support particularly paragraph 14, "Plan for Worldwide Military Aid."

e. FOA paper "Studies with Respect to Possible United States Action Regarding Indochina"

1. Concur on the condition that the paragraph 14 of the JCS paper is made applicable.

5 Attachments:

1. State Study dtd 25 May 54
2. State Study dtd 26 May 54
3. State Study dtd 25 May 54
4. DOD Study dtd 27 May 54
5. FOA Study dtd 24 May 54

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 June 1954

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1. No comment except that paragraph 3 has been overtaken by events.

c. Juridical Relations in the French Union: Giving Effect to the Independence of the Associated States of Indochina

1. Concur.

d. JCS paper "Studies With Respect to Possible United States Action Regarding Indochina"

1. Concur wholeheartedly in the entire paper.

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The interest of the Department of Defense in the legal conclusions summarized above would appear to be far less than that of the State and Justice Departments. So long as the action taken is broad enough in scope to permit the Department of Defense to carry out the responsibilities which will be assigned to it, there would appear to be no grounds for objecting to the conclusions offered. This study concludes that the wartime power of the President may be exercised in a state of emergency and that the proposed Resolution provides a political solution of the constitutional question which is broad enough to cover a possible extension of hostilities. These are the principal points of concern to the Defense Department and since I agree with these conclusions and also with the practical conclusion regarding the Red Cross, Prisoner-of-War, and related conventions, it seems to me that there is no reason for this Department to challenge the conclusions of the memorandum.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, I venture to offer two comments on the general problem presented. First, it seems to me that the term "intervention" might just as well be avoided altogether. It now appears prominently throughout the Department of Justice study, but not in the draft resolution. The political connotations of the word are, as you know, the subject of much anti-American comment in Central and South America. Moreover, apart from this, as a matter of technical international law the word implies a dictatorial ^{1/} interference in the affairs of another state. I understand there is no thought of going into Indochina except on the basis of an invitation on the part of the lawful recognized government. Our action would not, therefore, be "intervention" in the strict sense of the term as used in international law.

I recognize that the word "intervention" does not now appear in the text of the draft Joint Resolution and it seems to me, for the reasons set forth above, that it should not appear, either there or in the public declarations of Administration spokesmen.

1/ Thus Professor Oppenheim states: "But it must be emphasized that intervention proper is always dictatorial interference, not interference pure and simple. Therefore intervention must neither be confused with good offices, nor with mediation, nor with intercession, nor with co-operation, because none of these imply a dictatorial interference. Thus, for example, in 1826, at the request of the Portuguese Government, Great Britain sent troops to Portugal in order to assist that Government against a threatening revolution on the part of the followers of Don Miguel; and in 1849, at the request of Austria, Russia sent troops into Hungary to assist Austria in suppressing the Hungarian revolt." I. Oppenheim, International Law (1948) 273.

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Second, I think it preferable that the word "justified" be used in place of the word "authorized" in both paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft Joint Resolution. The Joint Resolution of Congress approving President Wilson's action at the time of the Tampico incident designedly employed the word "justified" in order to avoid the implication that Congress was exercising the power which it alone has to declare war. 2/ Moreover, I have taken the position internally within the Department of Defense that, as a matter of constitutional law, the President has authority to use the armed forces to repel aggression abroad without specific approval from the Congress where the circumstances of the situation require it. If this draft Joint Resolution is passed in its present form it will be a precedent for the proposition that the President must under the Constitution have an authorization from the Congress before he can use the armed forces to repel aggression abroad in cases of this sort in the future where the time element may be even more critical than in the present case.

I think the first of these two points is worth mentioning. I think the second is worth pressing for.

(Signed)

Wilber M. Brucker
General Counsel

2/ See 6 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 1940 (1952).

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SUMMARY OF III.
III. STUDY BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN INDOCHINA

1. Communist capabilities to oppose U.S. armed intervention in Indochina are estimated on two assumptions: (a) Viet Minh alone, receiving indirect Chinese Communist aid; and (b) Chinese Communist and Viet Minh forces receiving Soviet support. However, this study does not consider the effect on enemy capabilities of U.S. counter-action or of enemy action not directed against Indochina. This assumption is very misleading, especially in view of the fact that national policy toward Southeast Asia (NSC 5405) in the event of Chinese Communist intervention calls for U.S. military reaction not limited to the area of Indochina.

2. Under assumption (a) (Viet Minh alone), the Viet Minh will be capable of:

a. Maintaining guerrilla warfare throughout Indochina and mounting attacks in northern Indochina with a force of up to six divisions - almost complete logistic dependence on Chinese Communists.

b. Expanding the present combat forces of 290,000 by an additional 150,000.

c. Making air fields available, although the Viet Minh do not possess an air force.

d. Negligible naval activity.

e. Regarding political warfare, appealing to nationalism and denouncing U.S. intervention as colonialism; subverting and intimidating the Indochinese people. In spite of Allied victories, a hard core of Communists would remain.

3. Under assumption (b) (Chinese intervention), the Chinese Communists will be capable of:

a. Committing five of their thirteen armies (36,000 men each) within 10-20 days.

b. Supporting Communist combat forces, over present lines of communications, of 600,000 men. This capability exists in the dry or rainy season.

c. Intervening immediately with an air force of 120 aircraft (fighter and bomber).

d. Limited naval activity.

e. Regarding political warfare, infiltrating and conducting guerrilla warfare in support of Viet Minh activities.

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SUMMARY OF SECTION IV

STUDY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

This study is based on the assumption that there will be no concurrent U.S. involvement in Korea. It points out that from the point of view of the U.S., Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and that, consequently, the committing to the Indochina conflict of naval forces in excess of a Fast Carrier Task Force and supporting forces, as necessary in accordance with the developments in the situation, or basing substantial air forces in Indochina, will involve mal-deployment of forces and reduced readiness to meet probable Chinese Communist reaction elsewhere in the Far East.

Assuming the Chinese Communists intervene, we should, inter alia, employ atomic weapons, whenever advantageous, conduct air operations against military targets in Indochina, China, and Communist-held offshore islands, blockade the China coast, seize or neutralize Hainan, and have Chinese Nationalist forces undertake operations against the mainland. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, CINCPAC would exercise unified command of assigned forces. To train Associated States Forces, approximately 2,250 U.S. personnel would be required to augment the existing MAAG. Meanwhile, action should be taken to insure an appropriate degree of U.S. mobilization to provide for the greater risk of a general war, and we should undertake to strengthen those allies who could directly support the U.S. strategic concept for a general war.

In the event the Chinese Communists do not intervene, we should, inter alia, conduct air operations in support of allied forces in Indochina, employing atomic weapons if such a course appears militarily advantageous. Although the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be French, there should be a U.S. Deputy and a U.S. Air Adviser. CINCPAC would exercise command over all U.S. forces based in Indochina and other forces assigned to him for operations in Indochina. The plan for training native troops would be the same as under the assumption of Chinese Communist intervention.

Whether or not the U.S. intervenes in Indochina, the UCS consider that it is vital that the war in Indochina be financed by a method separate and distinct from the world-wide MDAP.

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SUMMARY OF ODM STUDIES RE MOBILIZATION PLANS IN THE EVENT OF U.S.
ARMED INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA WITHOUT CHINESE INTERVENTION (SITUATION
A) OR WITH CHINESE INTERVENTION (SITUATION B)

GENERAL

The need for mobilization actions depends far more on the induced effects of public interpretation of events than on the direct impact of military outlays. The expectations and interpretations of the public will lead to serious economic consequences unless offset by appropriate government action. The increased direct effects of the military programs would be moderate for either Situation A or B in FY 55 and FY 56. The induced effects of either situation could have a very serious result particularly on price level and less seriously on the supply and distribution of materials. They would have only a slight effect on overall manpower availability. The measures which ODM proposes are most comprehensive in the field of stabilization and least so in manpower.

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

1. The Defense Materials System will continue to be a key element in industrial mobilization.
2. The rate of stockpile accumulation for a selected few critical materials will be protected.
3. Inventory controls will be imposed in both Situations A and B.
4. Funds will be requested to erect plants and acquire equipment to overcome deficiencies in the mobilization base.
5. Preparatory work for more serious military conditions will go forward.

MANPOWER MOBILIZATION

1. The potential supply of military manpower available in the selective service pool and military reserves is sufficient to meet anticipated requirements under Situation A or B. However, certain policies and actions would be required to meet the demands of Situation B. Briefly they are:

- a. Statutory authority for involuntary recall or reservists.
- b. Statutory authority for extension of terms of service.
- c. Elimination of fatherhood as a basis for deferment.

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ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

Measures to be taken in this area are:

1. Price, rent and wage controls.
2. Direct consumer rationing.
3. Credit control.
4. An adequate tax program to offset the inflationary effects of direct outlays.

ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

ODM will regroup its activities to form four major divisions:

1. Materials and production.
2. Manpower.
3. Stabilization.
4. Telecommunications.

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VI

SUMMARY OF STUDY BY FOA
of

PLAN FOR U.S. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID IN THE EVENT OF INTERVENTION

1. The objectives of the plan for economic and technical aid to the countries of Southeast Asia in the event of U.S. action in Indochina would be (a) to gain the support and cooperation of the indigenous peoples, (b) to strengthen their ability to support the military effort, and (c) to strengthen allied appeal to neutral or hostile indigenous peoples.

2. The magnitude of the aid is dependent on the size of the area open to operations, the speed with which developments take place and the outcome of the military activity. The type of program would be determined largely by the degree of stability in the area involved.

3. a. Activities necessary whether conditions are stable or unstable: those which supplement the war effort or contribute directly to the needs of the people; activities involving economic control.

b. Additional activities as rear areas progressively stabilize: projects which contribute toward building the basic strength of a country and its peoples; projects which assist indigenous governments to operate efficiently and gain popular support, i.e., agriculture and public works, health and educational standards.

4. Outlines for the specific countries of Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and the Philippines are presented (paragraph 21).

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SUMMARY OF SECTION 7

STUDIES BY THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

1. The OCB studies present five plans designed to facilitate U.S. objectives after we have intervened in the Associated States as a member of a regional grouping. These plans are:

- a. Plan for gaining maximum support for U.S. intervention from indigenous peoples.
- b. Plan of political warfare campaign against Viet Minh.
- c. Plan for gaining maximum support of other free world countries.
- d. Plan for political warfare organization as integral part of intervention.
- e. Plan for keeping China out of war or reducing its effectiveness in war by political warfare means.

2. Highlights of the various plans are as follows:

- a. Maximum support for U.S. intervention from the indigenous peoples should be achieved by clarifying for them the issues involved.
- b. There should be established in Southeast Asia, probably at Bangkok, a council of representatives of all members of the regional grouping. It should be independent of the military command but advisory to it and to all member governments. It would pool the resources, ideas, and plans of all the nations involved.
- c. A Korean-type training program should be established for the Vietnamese Army, and training programs for Laos and Cambodia should also be established.
- d. As fast as practicable, the people of Viet Nam should be given a voice in the government.
- e. Political warfare against the Viet Minh should include continued support for the 10,000 French-controlled guerrillas in Viet Nam and Laos, and sabotage teams should be developed and trained to operate in Southeast China, North Viet Nam and North Laos. Escape and evasion safe areas and "rat lines" should be established to the coast or to Thailand. CAT has been alerted for any necessary logistic or operational air support requirements unable to be met by military air support. In order to increase Allied support in the absence of Chinese Communist intervention, we should continue our effort at Geneva, explore the possibility of UN action supporting collective intervention, and in the event nuclear weapons are used, take steps to minimize adverse effects upon our Allies or potential Allies.
- f. In order to increase Allied support in the event of Chinese Communist intervention, we should make every effort to restrict the conflict to China and the Associated States and seek a favorable basis for a negotiated settlement.

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g. Political warfare measures designed to prevent the entry of Chinese forces into the war should include:

(1) Threats to retaliate, including a show of air and naval strength in the area.

(2) Assurance that hostilities will be limited to the Associated States if China does not intervene.

h. In the event of Chinese Communist intervention, we should try to minimize the effectiveness by:

(1) Indicating that South Korea and Nationalist China will be encouraged to attack, thus confronting the Chinese with a 3-front war.

(2) Commencing rapid rearming of Germany in order to put pressure on the USSR and to increase Soviet logistical support of China.

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SECTION VIII

STUDIES OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

SUMMARY

1. A summary of the studies prepared by the Bureau of the Budget is attached as Tab A.

COMMENTS

2. The Acting ASD (Comptroller), whose comments are attached as Tab B, feels that the sums for economic aid appear excessive in relation to the mutual military assistance program. He further notes an increase in additional new obligational authority for "economic stabilization, selective service, stockpiling, etc.," while the amount of additional funds for stockpiling is not known. He makes the point that there is serious doubt whether the U.S. should accelerate its stockpiling program in the event of U.S. action in Indochina, or whether the stockpile should be immediately utilized. He questions whether the several agencies contributing studies have based their programs and program estimates on the same policy guidance.

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SUMMARY OF SECTION VIII

STUDIES OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

1. The Bureau of the Budget was asked to prepare studies to cover:
 - a. Revisions of FY '55 and '56 budget plans.
 - b. Preparation of any necessary requests for supplemental appropriations.
 - c. Preparation of any necessary requests for additional statutory authority, these studies to be made under the alternate assumption re Chinese Communist intervention.

2. The key to the upward revision in budget plans centers around Defense programs (60 per cent), plus mutual military aid and foreign economic assistance. The submissions by agencies indicate that without Chinese Communist intervention, additions to current budget plans will be of the following order:

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>
	(In billions)	
a. New obligational authority	\$2.1	\$4.5
b. Expenditures	<u>1.1</u>	<u>4.2</u>

3. Under the assumption of Chinese Communist intervention, additions to current budget plans of the following order have been indicated:

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>
	(In billions)	
a. New obligational authority	\$5.7	\$9.6
b. Expenditures	<u>2.5</u>	<u>8.9</u>

4. Regarding necessary requests for supplemental appropriations, BOB says merely that supplemental appropriations would be necessary.

5. Regarding necessary requests for additional statutory authority, BOB says that at this stage, they have not prepared any legislation.

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Origin

Info:

Laniel's views reported Embtel 4593 that we and French have Quote now reached accord in principle on political side Unquote on conditions for US military participation Indochina seem to us serious overstatement this stage and potentially dangerous for reasons given Deptel 4356 (repeated to Geneva TEDUL 149).

While one major obstacle to agreement removed now that formula proposed Deptel 4272 for clarification independence Associated States acceptable (subject to discussion with Bidault, see DULLE 135 repeated Paris 367), we need from French soonest possible precise statement how they propose handling their action or commitments to meet our conditions listed Deptel 4023 paragraph 2 as modified by Deptel 4272. Until we have obtained such statement from Laniel we cannot (repeat not) be sure basis for any firm agreement does in fact exist. Once such statement received and judged by us fulfill conditions we would then be in position proceed accordance with other necessary steps which would have to be taken, assuming situation warranted it.

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(Offices Only)

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June 67
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Dulles
DULLES

46236

Drafted by:

EUR:WE:WRTylor:nt 6/3/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Clearance:

G - Mr. Murphy

EUR - Mr. Merchant

S/P - Mr. Bowie

C - Mr. MacArthur

FE - Mr. Drumright

ASA: P95

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Classification
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7519.00/6-454

7519.00/6-454

1556

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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Action

EUR

Info

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Control: 2493

Rec'd: June 4, 1954

FROM: Saigon

5 AM 7 10 10:35 p.m.

TO: Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WT

NO: 2656, June 4, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2656; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 943, GENEVA 193.

Department telegram 4272 sent Paris repeated Geneva TOSEC 269 Saigon 2418 was delayed in receipt due to extensive servicing. This accounts for our tardy comment.

I am in full agreement with general tenor of reference telegram and have only minor observations to make. Those are:

Re numbered paragraph 3-C, it might make French declaration more palatable both in France and in Asia generally were we likewise to announce intention to withdraw US technical and military assistance as soon as practicable. It must not be forgotten that in Communist and neutralist Asian eyes US is principal threat in Eastern Asia and not what is generally regarded to be a decadent France. Since Communist propaganda has already overstressed alleged unduly large role of FOA Mission here and Peking radio daily proclaims that US is sending military equipment to slaughter Asiatics, such a declaration might be useful from psychological warfare point of view.

Reference paragraph 4-A, it is essential that we commence forthwith to review terms of reference which now limit MAAG to purely logistical function. Under present set of rules, General O'Daniel is being asked to train Vietnamese troops with ever present French veto hanging over his head. In my opinion, we should approach French Government on terms of September 29, 1953 agreement, point out that Navarre plan no longer exists, that conditions have changed, and that new terms of reference for MAAG should be drafted forthwith.

Implicit in paragraph 3-A but not specifically touched upon is problem of ancillary agreements which will spell out turn-over by France to Vietnam of sovereignty in specific fields as, for example, control of currency, Custom Union, Civil Aviation, and Mixed Courts. French, whether through incapacity of government to move in present Parliamentary crisis or by deliberate design, have not moved at all in completing these agreements although telegrams from Embassy Paris have indicated that so far as experts were concerned, these accords were almost ready

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for signature.

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AUG 25 1954

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-2- 2656, June 4, 5 p.m., from Saigon.

for signature. Likewise Vietnamese experts, feeding at the flesh pots, have shown no alacrity in pressing for final action. It is not enough to broadcast a fine-sounding treaty of independence without knowing exactly where Vietnamese will find themselves in respect of control of their finances, their courts, and their right to request technical assistance from any quarter, and not exclusively from France.

As for question of elections to which Department quite rightly attaches importance, it is now of less significance in Vietnam than before owing to general feeling of panic and anxiety lest entire country be lost through unfortunate armistice terms. Press has announced that decrees will presently be signed by Bao Dai providing for municipal elections and, with exception of Saigon-Cholon, for direct election of mayors. This should to some extent meet Department's requirement in this regard although it is far less than national elections or preparations for National Constituent Assembly.

Upon DeJean's return from north today, I plan to discuss with him measures which should be taken locally as suggested numbered paragraph 6. I intend to suggest to DeJean necessity of providing Vietnamese administrators and technical experts with know-how derived from actual participation in the affairs of government. Likewise, Department heads and Ministers should be given greater opportunity to participate in forward planning as this will result in sense of responsibility to the nation which has heretofore been lacking. Another suggestion which has frequently been advanced is that French, by turning over Norodom Palace to Vietnamese, would give graphic evidence of their intention to retire from this country and to confirm Vietnamese independence. Main question, however, would be whether Chief of State would return to occupy Palace.

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TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Department of State

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Classification

02516

1954 JUN 7 PM 5 23

DC/T

(5a) (4c)

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 169 PRIORITY

Origin

Info

39616E/6-759

I have your Dulte 157. I share the views there expressed, emphasizing however your remark that we should seek to avoid formal identification with ^{open} partition or the creation of two states where one now exists.

Referring to your SECTO 389 I feel that Heath has somewhat overstated the case, perhaps deliberately for morale reasons. Our military authorities do in fact take a rather gloomy view of military situation and the QTE explorations UNQTE ~~designed~~ designed to strengthen military and political position are pretty much at a standstill not by our election but because the French themselves have never yet ^{really} ~~decided~~ decided on whether they want the war to be QTE internationalized UNQTE ~~on~~ on the conditions which long ago we laid down at Paris. Therefore Dupont's advice to us to make up our mind QTE quickly UNQTE is rather irrelevant. We made up our mind sometime ago with the qualification however that we reserve the right to review the situation if by the time the

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396.1-GE/6-759

Drafted by

S:JFD:sg 6/7/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

S:JFD

Clearances:

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

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Classification
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Page 2 of telegram to Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL NIACT

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French acted the situation had deteriorated beyond salvage. The latter seems to be happening.

I have long felt and still feel that the French are not treating our proposal seriously but ^{playing} ~~playing~~ with it just enough to use it as a talking point at Geneva.

Dulles

534

TOP SECRET

Classification

4735

TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET

Classification

02569
1954 JUN 7 PM 6 27

DC/T

SENT TO: Amconsulate Geneva TEDUL 171

Rptd to: Amembassies Paris 4448

Saigon 2527

EYES ONLY AMBASSADORS
RE SECTO 389.

Defense Dept reports that five-power military conference at its plenary session of June 4, under chairmanship General Valluy, amended and approved Conference Study No. I: "Intelligence Survey of Military Situation in SEA Area."

In connection with review of intelligence survey, Gen Valluy presented his own evaluation military situation Tonkin Delta as follows:

1. If Tonkin is lost, military line will not rpt not be reestablished anywhere.

2. Anyone can find on map a line with tactical characteristics which theoretically should permit reestablishment, such as Laos bottleneck or eighteenth parallel, but Valluy said he could affirm there would be no forces to man this line.

3. Valluy said he was not rpt not speaking of French forces in this connection but meant to indicate that there were no rpt no southern Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese names.

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Drafted by: L:PSA:PJStur:cas:ejf 6/7/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

D. MacArthur
Douglas MacArthur II

Clearances: Cld in substance
Idm Radford

Cld w/EUR:WE:WRT: [unclear] S/R: [unclear]

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Page 2 of telegram to Geneva TEDUL . . . PARIS SAIGON

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4. Ho Chi Minh's objective is Tonkin, to be attained either by negotiation at Geneva or by assault on Hanoi.

5. Ho Chi Minh wishes to entangle us in negotiations by admitting now, for first time, that there is a Communist northern state and a non-Communist southern state and saying that both might be incorporated in French Union.

6. What Ho Chi Minh seeks is Tonkin and its political capital Hanoi from which he was driven in 1946. He wishes obtain Tonkin either by negotiation (Valluy admitted "among military men" that Ho Chi Minh finds across negotiating table receptive French ears) or by military action. To prepare for such action, he is drawing out negotiations to gain time for his battle corps to be in position and ready, if action is called for.

7. In course of negotiating toward a ceasefire (which is demanded by French public opinion) concept of partition appears, as Ho Chi Minh wants occupy all Tonkin. If conditions are too hard and talks are broken off he will strive to obtain Tonkin by force. In such a ~~strikazry~~ military action his chances of success are good.

8. It has been said at this Conference that if Tonkin is ~~not~~ lost we will fight in south. However French will not fight nor will Vietnam. To man line in south, conferees will have to provide own men. Moreover it will be an artificial line for defense of which Laos, Cambodia and Thailand can do nothing.

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4737

Page 3 of telegram to Geneva TEDUL Paris Saigon


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9. Decisive point in military conference is this: if other conferees do not rpt not underwrite today's battle for Tonkin, tomorrow they will fight without French in Saigon and Bangkok. Valluy said he could affirm that if Tonkin were lost, no Vietnamese would fight against other Vietnamese, and sooner or later (probably sooner) whole of Vietnam will become Communist.

10. Valluy said he did not rpt not mean to dramatize but only to be realistic among soldiers. Truth cannot be disguised. Each of allies has share of responsibility and if battle for Tonkin is lost, allies will have to fight alone on actual main line of resistance much ~~farther~~ farther away.

Admiral Carney remarked that Gen Valluy's appraisal was of interest and important to all conferees and suggested it might be put in writing and appended to intelligence survey as representing unilateral views of one representative. End Defense Dept summary.

Foregoing for your own info only. Valluy was speaking in confidence and as an individual. Your comments requested.



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Classification

4738

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC 368
RPTD INFO: USUN, New York 626
Amembassy LONDON 6632
PARIS 4454
Bangkok 2438

Secretary believes it is of overriding importance to push on with action on Thailand appeal, and to avoid getting bogged down in argumentation about geographical scope of sub-commission activities. Nevertheless, it seems clear UK and French will not agree to move along in SC ;ntil we have reached understanding on this question. SECTO 366 and SECTO 371 indicate language included TOSEC 229 and in Thai speech to SC June 3 should meet Eden's desire that resolution not specifically (repeat specifically) extend scope of POC beyond Thailand, while allowing actual observation to be extended later without further SC or GA action. However, French delegation in NY has firmly contended sub-commission must be restricted to Thailand alone while British were most concerned that there be no immediate request by Laos and Cambodia for observation.

Since we now desire quick action, suggest you meet with Eden, Prince Wan and Bidault to work out agreement which will permit delegations in NY to press matter in SC. Hope we could get their agreement next meeting of SC should be held preferably Friday and certainly not later than Monday or Tuesday, June 14 or 15. Possibly they would agree on text contained TOSEC 229.

UNA:UNP:DHPopper:rs 6/7/54

UNA - Mr. Key

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Page 2 of telegram to Amconsul GENEVA TOSMC

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If ^{not} ~~there is any possibility of reaching an agreement~~, we would be interested to know what constructive suggestion they have. ~~As~~ Soon as agreement on resolution reached we would want to have it introduced in SC, although we would hope next meeting could be scheduled even if text of resolution not yet firm. In this event next meeting would be limited to speech-making.

Foregoing discussed with Thai Ambassador here today. He most eager avoid delay in SC and feels strongly we should not give up our bargaining position by yielding on scope of UN observation at least at this time. He is notifying Prince Wan you may discuss matter with him.

DULLES

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(D.L.)

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TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

03299

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

TOP SECRET

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1954 JUN 8 PM 9 19

(40)

DC/T

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 175

PRIORITY

RPTD INFO: Amembassy PARIS 4470

Origin

Info:

Re DULTE 156.

Numbered paragraph 1 Reftel. We would be interested any specific ideas

Bidault might propose with view simplifying request to other nations, so long they meet basic condition that US will not (repeat not) intervene alone. Until we have full agreement, at least in principle, with French on conditions US military participation there would be no actual negotiations with other

interested nations. So far we have kept them generally informed concerning current discussions in Paris and have obtained their tentative views. We would seek firm views once French ~~authoritatively tell us they want to inter-~~ nationalize the Indochina war. ~~almost certainly~~

Meanwhile, UK views are well known and soundings indicate ~~and probably Australia~~ Zealand/would not (repeat not) participate without UK.

~~Our soundings indicate Thailand and Philippines~~ would most likely come along.

Numbered paragraph 3. We agree undesirable President should make formal pledge unilaterally and refer you paragraph 2 Deptel 4272, repeated Geneva ROSEC 269, which stressed joint character any such pledge. President would necessarily deal with independence question in any request to Congress for authorization use US forces for combat in Indochina.

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Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

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19.00

Page 2 of telegram to Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL

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Numbered paragraph 4. While we would agree substitution words Quote after re-establishment peace Unquote for Quote after end of hostilities Unquote we feel our phrasing for rest sentence definitely preferable to that proposed by Bidault. His text carries overtone France retaining right decide timing first and then getting Vietnamese Government to agree after, which precisely type implication we consider it necessary avoid if independence of Viet Nam to be crystal clear.

Numbered paragraph 5. We feel Bidault's proposed text for paragraph 2 of Deptel 4286, repeated Geneva TEDUL 133, conflicts with assurance sought by our text. While Bidault's language might be helpful for EDC debate it provides loopholes for abusive interpretation justifying later claims right withdrawal on one or other of counts listed. When occasion offers suggest you point out to Bidault that we could not (repeat not) commit forces and US prestige in situation when there would be any question concerning premature French withdrawal their forces.

Numbered paragraph 6. After full agreement reached on all conditions and French Government has reached decision it wishes request US intervention, US must have opportunity at that time make its own decision whether prevailing circumstances warrant ~~We cannot grant French an indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration.~~ implementation of formal steps leading to US military participation. Only after these decisions taken would we expect Laniel submit agreement and request for internationalization to Parliament for endorsement and ratification; also he must not (repeat not) prejudice our liberty of decision by approaching Parliament in such way that we would appear be morally committed intervene prior to our decision.

Dalles
Jew

We cannot grant French
an indefinite option on
us without regard to intervening
deterioration

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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UNITED NATIONS
AFFAIRS

1954 JUN 9 AM 9 22
MESSAGE CENTER

3877
June 8, 1954
9:33 p.m.

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- OSD
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- NAVY

FROM: New York
 TO: Secretary of State
 NO: 810, June 8, 7 p.m.

Re Indochina

Dixon (UK) asked me this morning our understanding of the present status of Thai appeal in SC. I told him I understood Smith had been instructed to urge on Eden and Bidault importance we attach to very early meeting. I also indicated our understanding Thais strong feeling scope should not be too strictly limited. Dixon said his instructions remained (A) timing should be dependent entirely on developments at Geneva; (B) scope should be limited to Thailand. He said if Russians veto resolution in SC limiting the scope to Thailand, consideration could then be given to broadening scope in GA resolution. We pointed out broadening the scope in GA after Russian veto of limited scope resolution in SC would be likely to alienate votes; it was our impression there is more give in UK position on scope than indicated by Dixon but that there is probably very little give on the question of timing.

Lucet (France), who was present, indicated to us in an aside that he personally thought a reference to "the general area of Thailand" was too broad and that perhaps language could be worked out which permitted POC group to go into "neighboring" states at the request of those states.

Hoppenot is in hospital and will be out of circulation for at least week or two. We agreed to get in touch this evening or tomorrow morning if any of us have any word from Geneva.

Khoman (Thailand) came in this afternoon for general discussion. He knew about Sarasin's talk with Key. He very strongly emphasized Thai Government's negative attitude towards limiting scope to Thailand. He also recorded strongest opposition to have Czechoslovakia or any other satellite as member of POC group. He asked if we thought it would be useful for him to talk with other delegations in order to build up support for GA action in event of Soviet veto in SC. We advised him it would be desirable to begin laying strong foundations now (A) in favor of convening GA promptly, and (B) in support of desirable objective when GA convenes. He would like to know US thinking at present on resumed GA or special session. He would

also like

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-2- 810, June 8, 7 p.m. from New York.

also like to know our thinking on composition of POC group in the event India cannot be persuaded to serve. He mentioned Iraq as one possibility.

Khoman also asked us to ascertain the Department's latest thinking on sponsorship of SC resolution. He indicated Thailand would be quite willing to introduce resolution itself on understanding, of course, that United States and others would ask it be put to vote in accordance with rules as useful debating material. Khoman mentioned recent story in PRAVDA or some other Russian paper on active fighting in Cambodia close to border of Thailand.

At lunch today Johnson (Canada), although noncommittal, seemed generally more sympathetic to our ideas of timing and scope than Perry (New Zealand) who tended to argue current UK line in New York re limiting scope to Thailand.

FBH/14

WADSWORTH

Mr. Murphy

Belo

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Department of State

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Control: 4201
Rec'd: June 9, 1954
9 a.m.

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4766, June 9, noon

File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SENT DEPARTMENT 4766 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 370.

DEPARTMENT LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY

Reference: DEPTTEL 4421 and DULTE 156.

I saw Schumann yesterday afternoon and endeavored to explain to him our need for a French statement as to how they proposed to handle their actions as described in second paragraph of reference Department telegram. Schumann had difficulty understanding just what it was we wanted at this time as he considers that the basis for an agreement in principle has been reached and that it was impossible to go further until the Geneva conference had definitely failed. He pointed out that since the basic US requirement was that any French request for military assistance must be approved by the French Parliament, such a request could not (repeat not) be made while there was any hope for progress at Geneva because of the strong feeling in the Parliament that everything possible should be done to reach an agreement at Geneva.

He then told me that Under Secretary apparently agreed that agreement had been reached in principle and he read me a telegram from Bidault reporting same conversation as that reported in DULTE 156. Bidault reported that Under Secretary had expressed pleasure that agreement in principle had now been reached. Regarding numbered paragraphs of DULTE 156. Bidault's report had following items of interest:

(June 6)

Paragraph 1. Bidault reported that Under Secretary agreed with him that this problem was over-complicated and should be simplified.

Paragraph 2. Bidault stated that he felt that the Thai resolution took care of this problem and he stated that the Under Secretary agreed with him that this problem had now been solved.

Paragraph 3. No difference.

Paragraph 4.

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-2- 4766, June 9, noon from Paris

Paragraph 4. No difference. Schumann however pointed out the great importance of this change of wording as "the end of hostilities" could well be interpreted to mean a state of armistice, whereas what was really meant was that troops should only be withdrawn after peace had been established. The whole Viet Minh effort has been to reach some sort of armistice that would force the withdrawal of the French troops and leave the country to them.

Paragraph 5. No difference. However, Schumann stated that he had told Bidault prior to his interview with Under Secretary that he felt that new language suggested by French was too broad and that US would require more specific pledge. Bidault reported that Schumann had guessed wrong as Under Secretary had seen no (repeat no) difficulties in proposed language pointing out that conditions named in new draft were inherent in sovereignty of any great power. Bidault also reported Under Secretary had said he would refer this language to Department for final decision.

Paragraph 6. No difference.

Schumann then stated that in view of meeting of minds between Bidault and Under Secretary he was sure that with the possible exception of new wording suggested in paragraph 5 of DULTE 156, there were no (repeat no) political differences between us. He then said that he had just received a very disturbing cable from Bonnet. Before he could read it to me a call came through on the telephone from Bonnet in which they talked further about the same subject.

Subject is Valluy's negotiations regarding use of US Marines. Valluy has reported to Pieven and Bonnet that it is very doubtful if US would agree in any circumstances to sending a Marine division to Indochina. I pointed out to Schumann that US response on this subject had never been blanket pledge to use Marines but had only stated that their use would not (repeat not) be excluded provided an agreed upon war plan required their presence. I further said that it would depend upon the war plan which Valluy submitted as to whether or not our JCS would be convinced that Marines should be committed. Schumann said he fully understood this and would explain it further to Plevel, but no emphasized crucial importance this matter.

Comment: As I pointed out in EMBTEL 4503 French military have assumed that any war plan which was satisfactory to our JCS would show necessity for the use of at least one Marine division. While from our point of view this problem quite properly should be judged on its military merits, we must realize that it also has strong political aspects here and that French Parliament in my opinion will not (repeat not) in any circumstances vote to ask

for US

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TOP SECRET

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-3- 4766, June 9, noon from Paris

|| for US assistance in Indochina unless government can at least make strong inference that Marines will be sent to Indochina.

Thus, most crucial part of present Franco-US negotiations from both military and political point of view would seem to be conversations Valluy is carrying on at Pentagon.

|| If our JCS takes position that US has not (repeat not) the military power to be able to afford the commitment of even one Marine division to Tonkin delta, French will draw the obvious conclusion that arguments which force JCS to such a conclusion apply with approximately five-fold effect to France. This will push them irresistibly toward abandonment of Indochina. Thus if we want French military assistance in showdown with Communists in Southeast Asia it is in my opinion vital that JCS find it possible to approve a joint war plan justifying the use of Marines.

Dillon
JOYCE

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INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAM

Department of State

TOP SECRET

Action

SS

Info

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DULTE 164, June 9, 10 p.m.

Control: 4526

Rec'd: June 9, 1954
7:45 p.m.

2

NIACT

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

I had a long talk with Eden this morning. He said that we are clearly coming to end here on Indochina. Three major issues have emerged on which we cannot compromise and on which Communist show no intention of receding. These are (1) separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia, which are clearly victims of Viet Minh aggression; (2) status and powers of impartial international supervisory authority; and (3) composition of international supervisory authority.

He is convinced that we can get no further on these issues and should break within next few days. While he feels no useful negotiating purpose would be served, he is inclined to think that for public opinion it would be desirable that he privately see Molotov once more before a break in order to make clear to Molotov firmness our position and obtain Communist position. He is hopeful of forcing Molotov into public rejection Colombo powers for supervisory organization. This will have very beneficial effects in south and southeast Asia. I pointed out, and he agreed, that French situation is such that we would probably have to leave the French and Viet Minh military officers here talking about zones in Vietnam.

Immediately following break he feels Cambodia and Laos should put their cases to the UN entirely divorced from Thailand request. (I gathered that he was thinking of something more than just a POC.) He thinks it highly important that they move rapidly after the conference is wound up, but equally important until that time there be no hints or press leaks whatever that such action is contemplated. He feels that if properly handled and appeals are spontaneous on their part, with no implication of US-UK initiative or prodding, they will receive general Asian support. I pointed out, and he agreed, that France might oppose but we should go ahead anyway. In meanwhile he feels very strongly we must not now complicate matter by insisting on broadening Thailand appeal to Laos and Cambodia. He rightly points out that language in Security Council draft resolution is largely academic, as it will in any event be vetoed. Resolution can be written any way that appears desirable at the time matter comes

547

before

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-2-#DULTE 164, June 9, 10 p.m., from Geneva

before General Assembly. He said he would send instructions to Dixon to try to work out with Lodge some language that would meet his point, while not necessarily precluding POC operations outside Thailand. I am sending separate telegram repeated to USUN replying to your TOSEC 378 giving only latter part this paragraph.

Eden said he had not yet put to cabinet his ideas with regard to UN appeal by Cambodia and Laos, and therefore asked that the matter be treated with strictest secrecy.

Eden also said he was considering recommendation reduce strength of Commonwealth division in Korea by about half or one brigade in order to reinforce Malaya. If things eased up in Egypt, he was also hopeful that forces could be spared from there for Malaya. I told him that in view of more critical situation in southeast Asia and our ability within the armistice to train and equip ROK forces as replacements, I thought we would have no objection.

✓ Clear that Eden now considers negotiations here have failed. Believe he is prepared to move ahead quickly in southeast Asia coalition which would guarantee Cambodia and most of Laos under umbrella of some UN action with respect to those two countries. He expects active cooperation from Burma, and hopes for benevolent neutrality from India. He apparently does not feel much can be salvaged in Vietnam.

As you know, Bidault is not here and we will not know where French stand until Assembly debate completed, if then. If French continue negotiations, point will probably arrive shortly when deteriorating military situation will force them accept simple cease-fire in attempt temporarily salvage something. Therefore one question we may shortly face is what we and UK do if France insists on continuing negotiations somewhat longer. It is one thing to withdraw if France negotiates an agreement with which we cannot publicly associate ourselves, and another to withdraw prior to that time.

Eden's tactics recommend themselves very strongly to me.

fd ✓ Chauvel spoke to me after the above was dictated. In Bidault's absence he and others have been considering recommending to Bidault that France and three Associated States together make appeal to UN. He had reports from Valluy, part of which he read to me. He is obviously convinced that things will go badly in Delta. I made no comment except to suggest that Laos and Cambodia commanded a certain sympathy in Asia and Middle East which France plus Vietnam did not. I asked him categorically if France wanted to internationalize on conditions we had tabled some time ago, saying neither you nor I knew where France stood.

He replied

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-3-#DULTE 164, June 9, 10 p.m., from Geneva

He replied that he did not know: -- that "Bidault still hoped to get something here".

I would appreciate your thoughts and guidance.

With respect Korea, Eden indicated he would probably speak next plenary (which we plan for Friday or Saturday). He would not be adverse to making this last session on Korea. However, not all of sixteen are yet prepared to do this. I do not know whether we will be able get them lined up. If not, one more plenary may be necessary.

SMITH

JJL:12

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TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PRIORITY

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 178

Rpt to Amembassy, PARIS 4476
Amembassy, SAIGON 2551
Amembassy, LONDON FOR MERCHANT AND DILLON 6684
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS

Ambassador bonnet came to see Secretary Dulles Wednesday afternoon and raised question of participation of US Marines Indochina. He said he had received telegram from Maurice Schumann expressing excitement and dismay at information from Valluy that Radford had said there was no rpt no question of utilization Marines Indochina. Ambassador said this conflicted with what French Govt had hitherto understood to be intentions US Govt this respect. He further stated suggestion made by Radford to Valluy that three Korean divisions might be used in Indochina was unacceptable.

Secretary said US position had been clear from start and that we were not rpt not willing to make commitment ahead of time which French could use for internal political maneuvering or negotiating at Geneva and which would represent a kind of permanent option on US intervention if it suited their purpose. A month ago, French had been explicitly informed conditions which must be met and fulfilled by them before President took decision whether to go to Congress and ask for authority use American armed forces in relation Indochina. Among these conditions was need for French and Associated States to request US and certain other interested countries to come in. We were still in dark as to what French intentions really were.

EUR:WE:WRTyler:ejf

(signed)
Douglas MacArthur

FE - Mr. Drumright
EUR - Mr. Barbour

Cleared with: Secretary

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of telegram to TEDUL : Embassy PARIS, Embassy SAIGON

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Classification

957600/6-457
Re. Indochina
see also
[unclear]

Secretary said he felt French desire obtain firm commitment from us on which they could draw was understandable, but equally understandable in circumstances is our determination not rpt not to give them such blank check. Secretary confirmed US position as stated by Dillon (4766 from Paris) that use of Marines would not rpt not be excluded provided an agreed operational plan required their presence. He said it was useless and illusory to attempt to obtain from us at this time a commitment more specific on this point than that which we had already given.

With regard to what we would do in event act of open aggression by Chinese, Secretary read relevant extracts (last four paragraphs of section III Roman four) from his Los Angeles speech which is being separately transmitted.

Bonnet expressed surprise that we considered that French Govt had not rpt not made up its mind with regard to internationalization of Indochina war and said he considered request had already been made by French. Secretary pointed out that our offer on basis certain specific conditions had been made a month ago in context of situation at that time, which confirmed and made precise much earlier representations. Since then things had changed rapidly and would doubtless continue to change. For this reason delay was regrettable, and further delay would not rpt not improve situation with regard to any role we might consider playing.

Dillon

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Department of State

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Action

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UNA

FROM: Saigon

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2714, June 10, 2 p.m.

Control: 4747

Rec'd:

June 10, 1954
6:33 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2714, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 967, GENEVA 214.

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR.

GENEVA FOR UNDER SECRETARY.

General Valluy's appreciation of the situation as set out Department telegram 2527, sent Geneva TEDUL 171, repeated Paris 4448 is exceedingly good--in fact almost too good. Although there are one or two points to which we might take exception from purely military aspect, I desire to confine my comment to political connotations of Valluy's statement. I have impression that under instructions he made this very concise evaluation less with military considerations in mind than with political objectives in view. I think that Valluy was looking as much at the French Parliament as he was at the Tonkin delta when he made his speech. General Ely has twice in my presence stated that his keenest desire is for United States to enter this war. Only yesterday his Chief of Staff, Colonel Brohan, repeated this comment. My belief is that purpose of Valluy statement was either to bring us and, if possible, other five powers into conflict here or, failing that, to prepare excuse before history for an impending armistice which French would then request of Viet Minh.

Action Assigned to ^{PS} MCCLINTOCK

Action taken

noted

Date of action *6/11/54*

Action taken Symbol *PSA*

Name of officer *PS*

Classification *File*

JAK-8

Bureau of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 10 1954
5834
Department of State

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TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 4508
Undersecretary, Geneva TOSEC 392
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

Following translation text message from Ely to Radford received evening
June 9:

QUOTE: I have not yet made a survey of the military situation, especially
in Tonkin. However, it seems to me that the decision I will have to take
regarding the operations will rest on the US intentions, in the present
situation, as well as those they anticipate in the future.

QUOTE: Therefore, I would very much like to have, either in Paris, where
I expect to be possibly on the 19th June, or here in Saigon, as soon as possible
an exchange of views with a qualified representative of Admiral Radford, in
order to know what I can expect on the part of the U.S.A. UNQUOTE.

Prior to French decision to request internationalization, we consider
undesirable to start yet another series conversations which would inevitably
provoke on French side all kinds hopes and interpretations with regard basic
issue US intervention which would only cause further confusion. In other words,
it is our feeling that we should not be eased into a series of
piecemeal commitments resulting from collateral military conversations in the

EUR:WE:WRTyler:vh 6/10/54

Robert Murphy

C - Mr. MacArthur

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Embassy Paris

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Classification

absence of an understanding with the French Government based on our general proposal described in TEDUL 54. Radford has accordingly informed General Valluy orally that US position was given to Ambassador Bonnet by Secretary June 9 and that he is not (repeat not) in position at this time to respond to Ely's request for conversations on subject raised his message.

With regard to US training Vietnamese troops, we feel that situation Viet Nam has degenerated to point where any commitment at this time to send over US instructors in near future might expose us to being faced with situation in which it would be contrary to our interests to have to fulfill such commitment. Our position accordingly is that we do not (repeat ~~not~~ not) wish to consider US training mission or program separately from over-all operational plan on assumption conditions fulfilled for US participation war Indochina.

MURPHY

Murphy
Acting

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 6854
Rec'd: June 14, 1954
7:26 p.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4841, June 14, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 4841; REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 393.

DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY SECRETARY

GENEVA EYES ONLY UNDER SECRETARY

1. In all probability one of first acts of any new French Government will be request precise statement immediate and future US intentions regarding military intervention Indochina.
2. During past week, I have gathered the very definite impression that because of (A) our reluctance to send ground forces to Indochina; (B) deterioration of military and political situation in Indochina during last month; (C) extreme reluctance, if not refusal, of ANZUS partners to consider joining US in any military intervention in Delta area, the chances of US responding favorably to French request for military assistance even after they have met all conditions are approximately nil.
3. Hardening of Communist position in Geneva as indicated by Molotov and Chou En-lai last week would seem to indicate that Communists no longer fear possibility of US military intervention in Indochina provided there is no overt Chinese attack. It would seem, therefore, that Viet Minh and Chinese will not accept any armistice which does not clearly pave the way for Communist takeover in Indochina.
4. Lacking the possibility of US military support, it would seem to be only a question of time, weeks or a few months at very most, before French are forced to accept Viet Minh terms. In the meantime, there is the constant risk of an all-out assault on the Delta which could lead to a serious French reverse, if not total annihilation of expeditionary corps in Tonkin.

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have continually pointed out that such a reverse might have a disastrous effect on French public opinion. Today I am more certain than ever that such would be the case. Rightly or

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wrongly

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Handwritten notes and stamps on the right side of the page, including a large vertical stamp that reads "SIG. 00/8-1454" and various initials and signatures.

TOP SECRET

-2- 4841 June 14, 5 p.m., from Paris.

wrongly, US would be blamed by French public opinion for having built up French hopes of intervention and then for having failed in the crisis. The result could well be a neutralist government in France that would reduce French military commitments to NATO and would, at the same time, be completely intransigent on question of German rearmament. Such a government would also, in all probability, make a strong effort to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and to recreate the wartime Franco-USSR alliance in order to prevent German rearmament.

From this distance, I cannot judge what the effect of such French actions would be on American public opinion and particularly on our Congress, but I suspect that it might lead to an irresistible demand for the recall of some, if not all, of our troops from Europe, which, in effect, would mean the end of the North Atlantic Alliance followed eventually by the isolation of the Western hemisphere.

5. In view of these very serious and grave dangers which we will run if we allow the French to be defeated militarily in the Delta, and if my assumption in paragraph 2 above is correct, I recommend that you give serious consideration to promptly informing the French that because of either (A) the deterioration of the military situation in Indochina or (B) the reluctance of the ANZUS powers to take action, or both, the President is no longer prepared to request military intervention from the Congress even if the French should now fully meet our conditions. While such action on our part would hasten what now appears to be the inevitable loss of Vietnam and might cause a certain additional temporary loss of face for the US, it would put the French on notice that they should promptly accept the Viet Minh armistice terms and thus would save the French Expeditionary Corps from possible military disaster. In the event of a withdrawal from Indochina under such circumstances, I would not foresee any serious or long term repercussions on France's position in the North Atlantic Alliance. If we allow the French to continue to fight in the false hope that in the event of a crisis in the Delta, they may get US military assistance, the best we can hope for is to delay the Communist conquest of Vietnam by a few months, while we risk the very existence of the North Atlantic Alliance.

From my viewpoint here in Paris, the possibility of a few months delay in the Communist takeover of Indochina does not seem at all commensurate with the risk of the possible collapse of the defense of Western Europe.

6. While

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-3- 4841, June 14, 5 p.m., from Paris.

6. While I have several times made it clear, both to Laniel and Maurice Schumann, that, as indicated in paragraph 8 of your TEDUL 185 from San Francisco, our decision would have to be made in the light of "conditions at the time"; this is not at all clear to French public opinion and is not even very clear to Schumann himself, as he has no means of knowing how we will judge "the conditions at the time". Therefore, what I am in effect recommending is that we adopt your suggestion contained in paragraph 8 of TEDUL 185 of putting a time limit on our intervention offer with the additional proviso that I would suggest that the time limit be now.

DILLON

JEF

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TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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1954 JUN 14 PM 8

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA PRIORITY TEDUL 197

Origin

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757 gnd/6-1254

Re DULTE 174

Department is giving this thorough consideration with Defense. My personal opinion is that we should try to carry situation along with avoidance of either formal refusal now train Vietnamese and also without anything like a massive commitment of some two to three thousand MAAG personnel which under present conditions could not but carry strong political overtones and might raise Congressional complications.

With reference to your last paragraph suggestion on QTE ^{to expedite} ~~expediting~~ conclusion of final agreement with French UNQTE this is quite impossible so long as French have ~~xxxxxx~~ not made up their mind whether or not they want to internationalize war and now are further from internationalizing it than ever before. They want, and in effect have, an option on our intervention ~~xxxx~~ but they do not want to exercise it and the date of expiry of our option is fast running out.

751G.00/6-1204

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DULLES

751g.00/6-1254

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S:JFDulles:cjp

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S:JFDulles

Clearances:

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Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT,
 CHARGE TO

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Classification (44)

1954 JUN 14 PM 8 58

DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 4579 E PRIORITY
RPTD INFO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 199 PRIORITY

Origin

Info

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND UNDER SECRETARY FROM
SECRETARY

FYI

It is true that there is ^{where?} less disposition now than two months or one month ago to intervene in Indochina militarily. This is the inevitable result of the steady deterioration in Indochina which makes the problem of intervention and pacification more and more difficult. When united defense was first broached, the strength and morale of French and Vietnam forces were such that it seemed that the situation could be held without any great pouring-in of U.S. ground forces. Now all the evidence is that the morale of the Vietnamese Government, armed forces and civilians ~~have~~ ^{has} deteriorated gravely; the French are forced to contemplate a fall-back which would leave virtually the entire Tonkin Delta population in hostile hands and the Saigon area is faced with political disintegration.

What has happened has been what was forecast, as for example by my Embassy Paris 4117 ¹¹⁰ TEDUL 78 of May 17. I there pointed out that probably the French did not really want intervention but wanted to have the possibility

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS

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as a card to play at Geneva. I pointed out that the Geneva game would doubtless be a long game and that it could not be assumed that at the end the present U.S. position regarding intervention would necessarily exist after the Communists had succeeded in dragging out Geneva by ~~sacking~~ winning military successes in Indochina. This telegram of mine will bear rereading. That point of view has been frequently repeated in subsequent cables.

I deeply regret any sense of bitterness on Bidault's part, but I do not see that he is justified in considering unreasonable the adaptation of U.S. views to events and the consequences of prolonged French and U.K. indecision.

I do not yet ^{wholly} exclude possibility U.S. intervention on terms outlined ~~xxx~~ PARIS 402 TEDUL 54. UK it seems is now more disposed to see movement in this direction but apparently the French are less than ever disposed to internationalizing the war.

Duella

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Page 2 of telegram to Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL

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3. We believe that you should leave Geneva no (repeat no) later than Eden.

4. Assume that you will as soon as appropriate opportunity offers talk with Bidault as well as Eden about these matters.

Dulles
DULLES

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031842 SNIE 10-4-54
15 JUNE 1954

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

REF ID: A66000
CLASSIFICATION CONTROL SNIE 10-4-54
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
US COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

APWINDC TSC # 673-64

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 15 June 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Director of Intelligence, AEC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of the jurisdiction of the FBI.

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COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the courses of action and consequent situations indicated below.¹

THE ESTIMATE

PART I

ASSUMPTIONS

- A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will have been signed.
- B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly including also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed.
- C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military participation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.
- D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their military commitment in Indochina.

REQUIREMENT 1

To estimate the initial Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the participation of US air and naval forces with French Union forces and token Thai and Philippine forces in coordinated ground, naval, and air operations designed to destroy the Communist mili-

tary forces in Indochina. Air operations would be limited to targets in Indochina. Nuclear weapons would be employed if their use were deemed militarily advantageous but nuclear attacks on the Indochinese civil population as a target system would be avoided.

Chinese Communist Reaction

1. The intervention of US and allied forces in Indochina probably would cause the Chinese Communists to believe that sooner or later they would have to decide whether to

¹The assumptions and estimative requirements stated herein were furnished to the intelligence community for the purposes of this estimate. We interpret the hypothetical action as occurring within the next twelve to eighteen months.

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accept the defeat of the Viet Minh or to intervene in force in order to try to prevent such defeat. Their decision would probably rest mainly, though not exclusively, upon their weighing of the risks and disadvantages arising from the Viet Minh defeat against the likelihood of involvement in major war with the US and the probable consequences of such a war for Communist China. Available evidence gives no unmistakable indication of what the Chinese Communist decision would be. On balance, however, we believe that the chances are somewhat better than even that the Chinese Communist would decide to take whatever military action they thought required to prevent destruction of the Viet Minh, including when and if necessary, open use of Chinese Communist forces in Indochina.^{2 3}

2. The nature of the assumed US action is such that ample warning would almost certainly be given in advance of actual operations. The Chinese Communists have the capability now to intervene quickly and in such force as to drive French Union forces out of the Delta. The Chinese Communists might choose to exercise this capability before US intervention could be effected.

3. We believe it somewhat more likely, however, that even if the Chinese Communists had determined not to accept the defeat of the Viet Minh they would not intervene openly immediately following the assumed US intervention. They might estimate that US air

²The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, recommends deletion of the last sentence of this paragraph and would substitute the following:

"However, their decision would be largely determined by the Chinese estimate of the probable extent and effect of US initial action."

³The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the last sentence of this paragraph should read as follows:

"Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major power. However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

and naval forces could not, in the absence of US ground forces, decisively alter the course of the war. They might therefore consider their intervention unnecessary at this point and might postpone final decision as to their course of action until they had observed the initial scale and success of the allied military operations and had estimated the probable nature and extent of US aims in the conflict.

4. In this connection, US use of nuclear weapons in Indochina would tend to hasten the ultimate Chinese Communist decision whether or not to intervene. It would probably convince the Chinese Communists of US determination to obtain a decisive military victory in Indochina at whatever risk and by whatever means, and of the consequent danger of nuclear attack on Communist China. Whether this conviction would precipitate or deter Chinese Communist intervention would depend on the military situation in Indochina at the time, the observed military effect of the use of nuclear weapons, and the observed political and psychological effect of such use, particularly its effect on the coherence of the regional security grouping and the Atlantic alliance.

5. In any case, the Chinese Communists would almost certainly greatly increase their logistic support, delivery of arms and equipment, and technical assistance to the Viet Minh. The Chinese Communists would probably increase their deliveries of AA weapons and might send in Chinese AA gun crews. Moreover, the Chinese Communists would probably deploy ground and air units near the Indochina border in order: (a) to warn the US and its allies, and (b) to have forces ready either to intervene on behalf of the Viet Minh or to defend the southern border of China.

6. While maintaining a posture of military readiness, the Chinese Communists would intensify political and propaganda activities designed to exploit anti-Western and anticolonial feelings of the indigenous population of Indochina and the war-fears of neutralist Asian nations and of certain US allies. They would also seek to label the US as an aggressor. In the meantime and throughout the

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period of military operations, the Communists would almost certainly agitate and propagandize for a "cease-fire" and political settlement, which would preserve the Communist position and prospects.

Soviet Reaction

7. In the assumed situation, the USSR probably would estimate that the US action, though limited to air and naval forces, would considerably increase the risks of unlimited war between the US and Communist China. The USSR would probably prefer that such a war not develop out of the Indochina situation. Nevertheless, the USSR would assure Communist China of continuing military assistance. The USSR would also give complete diplomatic and propaganda support to Communist China and the Viet Minh regime.

REQUIREMENT 2

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the success of the operations envisaged in the assumptions above (i.e., to the impending effective destruction of the Communist forces in Indochina).⁴

Chinese Communist Reaction

8. As stated in Paragraph 1, we believe that the chances are somewhat better than even that the Chinese Communist, in the assumed situation, would intervene militarily to prevent the destruction of the Viet Minh. If they decided to do so, we believe that the exact timing and nature of their action would depend on various factors, but principally on the scope and character of the US/allied operations they were seeking to counter.^{5 6}

Soviet Reaction

9. In this assumed situation, the USSR would probably continue to support the Chinese Communists. If the Chinese Communists intervened openly in support of the Viet Minh, the USSR would rapidly increase military assistance to Communist China. The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the US would continue full-scale, and the USSR might ask the UN to condemn the US as an aggressor. Thinly veiled threats of Soviet involvement in the fighting and references to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 would multiply.

⁴The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believes that the results in this requirement could not be achieved by the unbalanced and insufficient forces envisaged.

⁵The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

"Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely to expose its fundamental national strengths in war with a major power. However, we believe that Communist China's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and judgment of its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action danger-

ously unpredictable under outside pressure of any appreciable magnitude."

⁶The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that paragraph 8 should read as follows:

"Communist China would conclude from the assumed impending destruction of Communist forces in Indochina, by limited forces employing nuclear and conventional weapons, that its open military intervention would invite an extension of similar action to Communist China, and would, therefore, probably not intervene militarily."

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PART II

ASSUMPTIONS

A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will have been signed.

B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly including also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed.

C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military participation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.

D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their military commitment in Indochina.

E. The Chinese Communists will have openly intervened with military forces in Indochina in order to counter US direct participation as defined in Requirement 1.

REQUIREMENT 3

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to an extension of allied offensive air operations to include military targets in Communist China directly supporting Communist military operations in Indochina or directly threatening the security of Allied forces in the area.⁷ Nuclear weapons would be employed in these operations if it were deemed militarily advantageous to do so, but nuclear attacks on the Chinese civil population as a target system would be avoided.

Chinese Communist Reaction

10. We consider it probable that before intervening in Indochina the Chinese Communists would have accepted the likelihood of US air attacks against military targets in China. Consequently, they would not feel compelled to withdraw their forces from Indochina solely as a result of the initiation of the air operations assumed above. At the same time, we

⁷In this requirement we interpret targets "directly supporting" Communist military operations to be generally south of the Yangtze River and to consist primarily of transport lines, troop concentrations, and air fields in the area.

believe that the Chinese Communists, in order to prevent further destruction to this area of China and particularly to avoid the spread of unlimited US attacks to the whole of China, would intensify efforts to induce the US to enter negotiations for a settlement which would preserve the Communist position and prospects in Indochina.

11. Meanwhile the Chinese Communists, to the full extent of their capabilities, would prosecute the war on the ground in Indochina and attack allied air bases, aircraft carriers, and other installations directly supporting allied operations in the area. They would, however, probably try to keep the war centered in Indochina and, as a consequence, probably would confine their attacks to such directly supporting bases and installations.

12. The use of nuclear weapons under the restrictions given above would greatly increase Chinese Communist concern about US intentions but probably would not by itself cause them to adopt new courses of military action at this time. However, they would threaten nuclear retaliation. They would also exploit to the fullest resultant psychological opportunities and in particular would

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charge that the US was using weapons of mass destruction on the civilian population.⁸

13. The Chinese Communists would attempt by all means possible to convince other Asian nations that the US had undertaken to destroy the Chinese Communist regime in order to thwart its efforts on behalf of an indigenous independence movement. If the Chinese had not previously done so, they would probably appeal to the UN to brand US action as a threat to the peace.

Soviet Reaction

14. In this assumed situation, the USSR would greatly increase its military assistance to Communist China, especially supplying modern aircraft and small naval vessels, possibly including submarines, with Soviet personnel to train and advise the Chinese and probably to participate in air defense operations. The USSR would probably not openly commit combat units of the Soviet armed forces and probably would not release nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist use.

15. The Kremlin would also continue its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the

US, undertaking in the UN to brand the US as an aggressor if this had not previously been attempted. The USSR would support Chinese charges concerning the use of nuclear weapons against civilian populations. At the same time, the USSR would probably advise the Chinese Communists to negotiate for a cessation of hostilities on the basis of the status quo at the time and would try, to establish a position as peacemaker.

REQUIREMENT 4

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the following additional allied courses of action, undertaken subsequently to those above:

a. Extension of allied offensive air operations to additional selected military targets in Communist China, including the use of atomic weapons under the same conditions as above.

b. Naval blockade of the China coast.

c. Seizure or neutralization of Hainan.

d. Chinese Nationalist operations against the Chinese mainland.

Chinese Communist Reaction

16. As a consequence of this allied broadening of the war, the Chinese Communists would probably conclude that the US was prepared to wage unlimited war against them. They would continue to defend themselves to the limit of their capabilities and would probably make vigorous efforts to secure the full participation of the USSR. At the same time, they would intensify their efforts to end the war by negotiations, and might eventually indicate in some way their willingness to withdraw from Indochina in order to obtain a cease-fire⁹. If unable to obtain a cease-fire agreement, the Chinese Communists would accept the fact of unlimited war with the US and would wage such war to the full extent of their remaining capabilities.

⁸The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes this paragraph should read:

"Nuclear weapon attacks on Communist China would undoubtedly result in a much greater Chinese Communist reaction than nuclear attacks on the Indochinese battleground. In addition, such attacks would probably indicate to the Chinese Communists a US willingness to exploit its superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery capability to force them out of Indochina. Since the nuclear attack contemplated in this requirement is of a limited nature, the Chinese Communist rulers would retain control of the government and country and, with the initial attacks, they would probably make urgent appeals to the USSR for nuclear weapons and additional military assistance. They might also increase the tempo of their military operations and would undoubtedly endeavor to induce the United States to enter negotiations in the hope of forestalling further attacks. A Chinese Communist decision to withdraw or not would be dependent primarily upon continued or increased US nuclear attacks and other US action as well as upon Soviet reaction. It is believed, however, that the Chinese Communists would be willing to withdraw from Indochina rather than be subjected to further destruction of their homeland."

⁹The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, suggest that the words "might eventually" in this sentence should be replaced with "would probably."

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Soviet Reaction

17. In this assumed situation, the USSR would continue to provide military assistance to Communist China as indicated above, but would probably refuse Chinese Communist demand for full Soviet participation in the war. The Kremlin would strongly urge the Chinese Communists to negotiate for a cessation of hostilities on the basis of withdrawing from Indochina.¹⁰ If the Chinese Communists could not obtain a cease-fire agreement, the USSR would provide Communist China with military assistance in every way short of openly committing combat units of the Soviet armed forces in operations against US and allied forces outside Communist-held territory. The USSR would provide military resources and equipment for Chinese Communist attacks on US bases or US forces anywhere in the Far East. At this stage of the conflict, the USSR might provide Communist China with nuclear weapons and the technical personnel required for their use.^{11 12}

18. The USSR would continue its diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the US, insisting that the Soviet aim was purely the defense of China against outright aggression. The USSR would also begin at least partial mobilization of its own military forces on a war basis. It would issue thinly veiled threats of general war, suggesting attacks on

Western Europe and on the continental US, but would probably confine its operations to the defense of China so long as the US did not attack Soviet territory.

REQUIREMENT 5

To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the success of the foregoing operations (i.e., to the impending effective destruction of the Chinese Communist capability to conduct military operations outside the borders of Communist China).¹³

Chinese Communist Reaction

19. Unless the USSR was willing to make an unlimited commitment of Soviet forces to prevent the success of the assumed US and allied operations, we believe that the Communist Chinese, under the assumed circumstances, would accept any US terms for a settlement which preserved the integrity of China under the Chinese Communist regime.

Soviet Reaction

20. In this assumed situation, we believe the USSR would urge the Chinese Communists to accept any US terms for a settlement which preserved the integrity of China under the Chinese Communist regime.¹⁴ So long as the fighting continued, however, the USSR would continue its aid to China.

¹⁰The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, recommends the deletion of "on the basis of withdrawing from Indochina," believing that at this state of the conflict the Kremlin would not willingly acquiesce in the surrender of any Communist-held territory in Indochina or elsewhere.

¹¹The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and Director of Intelligence, USAF, believe that this sentence should read:

"We do not believe that the USSR would release nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist use."

¹²The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Department of the Army, substitute for the last sentence:

"It is also believed that the USSR would give serious consideration to making a substantially greater military contribution including nuclear weapons and the technical personnel required for their use."

¹³The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believes that the results assumed in this requirement could not be achieved by the unbalanced and insufficient force envisaged.

¹⁴The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, would add "and retained a Communist foothold in Indochina."

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TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Department of State

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Classification

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

06832

1954 JUN 16 PM 8

DC/I

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 208 PRIORITY

RPID INFO: Amembassy PARIS 4624 PRIORITY

Origin

Info

FOR UNDER SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR

Bonnet has just left after reading a long message from Bidault, the substance of which was that the French no longer felt that US was committed to intervention on the conditions stated in our May 11 basic cable to Paris and that this left them in a very difficult negotiating position at Geneva.

I said that it was quite true that the French could not have a continuing option to call US into war at some future undetermined date and under conditions which could not now be foreseen. On the other hand if and when there was a French Government which had the confidence of the Assembly and if it should then decide that it could not conclude an honorable armistice and that it was thus necessary to continue the struggle, the US would be prepared promptly to respond and that response would probably be along the lines of our May 11 telegram unless in the meantime the situation had further deteriorated to a point where the making of a stand in Indochina had become impracticable or so burdensome as to be out of proportion to the results

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(Office Only)

Drafted by:

S JFD:ma

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S JFDalles

Classified by:

S/S JFD

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Classification

Anal 27
Ref
Cmt

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751G.00/6-1654

MP

Page 2 of telegram to Amconsul GENEVA

TOP SECRET
Classification

obtainable.

I said that I regretted not being able to make a response that would be more satisfactory to Bidault but that I could not conceive that it would be expected that the US would give a third power the option to put it into war at times and under conditions wholly of the other's choosing.

I suggest that Under Secretary or Ambassador paren whoever sees Bidault first end paren should summarize foregoing to Bidault as am not confident that ~~XXXXXX~~ Bonnet who was in highly emotional state will adequately report.

Duella
DUILLA

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TOP SECRET
Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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Action Assigned to [Signature]

Action
FE

Control: 8142
Pas'd: June 16, 1954
3:57 pm

Info
SS
G
SP
C
EUR

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DULTE 187, June 16, 6 p.m.

Bureau of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 17 1954
5944
Department of State

Date of [Signature] 6-17-54
Action of [Signature] 1 [Signature]
Director of [Signature] [Signature]
Delegation [Signature]

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 187 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 443

PARIS EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

Reference TEDJL 198 repeated information Paris 4850 Saigon 2601

Chauvel informed me this morning that in Franco-Viet Minh "underground military talks" (conducted by Colonel de Brebisson on French side) Viet Minh had demanded all of Tonkin and entire delta area including Hanoi (to become Headquarters Viet Minh Army) and Haiphong be turned over to Viet Minh. French without agreeing had implied that if anything like this settlement were made, French would demand free hand in south, indicating area south of line starting approximately 18 parallel on Laotian border and running southeast approximately to Badon (this line marked somewhat indefinitely on map in Chauvel's office), French had also indicated necessity for enclave and port in delta area, implying temporary tenure for troop withdrawal. Chauvel indicated Ely felt he could not defend delta area and better have French forces therein by negotiations than lose them in battle. French raised question evacuation their troops, French citizens, and Vietnam Catholics from Tonkin area but had received no reply from Viet Minh. Chauvel also stated French had made clear that Laos and Cambodia were not involved in this proposed settlement. No mention was made regrouping Viet Minh forces south this line. Last conversation three days ago and nothing has developed since. Chauvel continued that Vietnamese had no knowledge this proposal and if acceptable to French it would be most difficult to sell it to them, which might be necessary within next few days. He implied that Ambassador Heath might be of real service this connection.

I informed Chauvel of Zhukov-Kingsbury Smith conversation (SECTO 423 repeated Paris 418) emphasizing advisability French retaining foothold in north preferably Haiphong-Hanoi area, but at least Haiphong. This, with possibly, small compensating enclave for Viet Minh south of line, would avoid appearance of outright partition. Chauvel was somewhat dubious whether this would be possible but thought that maybe foothold on delta coast at Hon Gay, where there are important French coal interests, might be retained.

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-2- From Geneva DULTE 187

I told Chauvel that we did not wish be suddenly placed in position where these secret negotiations might have result of our being abruptly confronted with agreement or proposed settlement which we would not feel able accept and from which we might have to disassociate ourselves, and stressed need our being informed on continuing basis of converstations. Suggested Colonel Dwan be liaison officer this respect. Chauvel agreed entirely.

SMITH

PEP

Note: Advance Copy to Mr Draper SS 6/16/54 4:15 p.m. PEP

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Del sent by

21
Action

Cent: 8753
Rec'd: June 17, 1954
2:49 p.m.

Sec. Dept

FE FROM: Geneva
Info TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: DULTE 193, June 17, 5 p.m.

Office of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 18 1954
5968
Department of State

1954 JUN 18 AM 6 58

DEPT. OF STATE

6-18-54
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SP C EUR UNA SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 193, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 298,
PARIS 452, SAIGON 176

LONDON, PARIS AND SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADORS

Reference SECTO 463, repeated information London 297, Paris 451, Saigon 175

Dennis Allen (UK) gave Johnson this morning additional details on conversation with Chou-En-lai. Chou stated that in case Cambodia's resistance forces were small and all that was necessary was a political settlement by the present royal government with them "which could easily be obtained." In case of Laos, the resistance forces were larger, and it would be necessary recognize this fact by formation of regrouping areas along the border with Vietnam and China. The task in both states was twofold: The removal of foreign forces and dealing with the problem of domestic resistance movements. The military staff should get down to this task.

In reply to Eden's query as to whether it would not (repeat not) be difficult obtain Viet Minh admission Viet Minh forces were in Laos and Cambodia, Chou stated it would "not (repeat not) be difficult" to get Viet Minh to agree to withdrawal their forces from those two states in context with withdrawal all foreign forces. Chou made no (repeat no) direct reply to Eden's reference to French-Laotian treaty on French bases in Laos. Eden expressed personal view that Chou wants settlement, but has some doubt with regard to degree of control he exercises over Viet Minh.

In long talk with Bidault this morning (first direct contact between Chinese and French Chou substantially repeated what he told Eden yesterday (in conversation with Bidault, Chou referred to Viet Minh forces in Laos and Cambodia as "volunteers"). Bidault had also seen Molotov this morning and reported that both Molotov and Chou are obviously greatly concerned over any break-up Indochina conference in pattern of Korean conference as well as of lowering level conference below level of Foreign Ministers. Bidault said they clearly want to keep the conference going. Bidault and I agree (Eden did not (repeat not) comment) that it was important we do nothing dispel Chou's worries over US bases in Laos and Cambodia.

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I also

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-2- DULTE 193, June 17, 5 p.m., from Geneva

I also expressed personal opinion that important Laos and Cambodia move ahead as quickly and as vigorously as possible with appeal to UN. Eden and Bidault agreed, Eden adding that important Vietnam not (repeat not) get mixed up with Laos and Cambodia cases UN.

Chauvel showed me handwritten note from Ely, in his political capacity, urging against attempting hold any enclave in delta and recommending straight partition formula. I could not (repeat not) resist expressing contempt for such an easy "sell-out" of last remaining foothold in north and said we could under no (repeat no) circumstances publicly associate ourselves with such a solution.

SMITH

RSP:MEJ/12

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TOP SECRET

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SECRET

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 212 PRIORITY

From your DULTE 187 it is evident that QUOTE underground military talks UNQUOTE, even more than conference proceedings, are pointing toward de facto partition under conditions such that Communist take-over of all Vietnam looms ahead clearly.

Chauvel's mention of difficulty of QUOTE selling UNQUOTE Vietminh proposal to Vietnamese and his doubt that Hanoi-Haiphong area can be held indicate to us that French may end by accepting any Vietminh proposition which offers hope of extricating Expeditionary Corps. In this connection we note failure of Vietminh thus far to react to French question regarding evacuation French troops and citizens and Vietnamese Catholics.

There can of course be no repeat no question of US participation in any attempt to QUOTE sell UNQUOTE a partition to non-Communist Vietnamese.

(Signed)

Dulles

FE:PSA:PJSturm:tas 6/17/54

J. F. Dulles

C - Mr. MacArthur

EUR - Mr. Merchant

FE - Mr. Drumright S/F - Mr.
Bowie

576
TOP SECRET

TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Department of State

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Classification

08129

1954 JUN 18 PM 8 40

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 222 PRIORITY

DC/1
RECEIVED
JUN 18 1954

Origin

Info

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NO DISTRIBUTION

TEDUL 221

396-GE

Supplementing immediately-preceding cable, five-power staff report suggesting Thakhek-Donghoi line, coupled with rapid Delta deterioration, is leading us to reexamine possible de facto partition Vietnam.

DULLES

Dulles

Dist. Desired

(Offices Only)

s/s Merchant
E. W. Bowie
MacArthur

DC/1
Anal ✓
Rev ✓
Clt ✓

Drafted by:

S JFD:ma 6/18/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S JFDulles

Clearance:

SP Bowie

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TOP SECRET

Classification

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396.1-GE/6-1084

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

19-H

SECRET

Action
SS

Control: 9200
Rec'd: June 18, 1954
12:05 p. m.

Info
G
SP
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EUR
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FROM: Geneva
TO: Secretary of State
NO: DULTE 195, June 18, 3 p. m.

Bureau of
OF EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 18 1954
5985

6/19/54
PSA
General Files
DC/N
751G.00/6-1854

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT DULTE 195, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 455,
SAIGON 177.

PARIS EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR; SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

Johnson saw Chauvel this morning and discussed with him conference situation in light TEDUL 211. Johnson stated seemed to us that such fundamental questions as composition, voting procedures and authority or international control commission should be dealt with in conference rather than by committee. If conference reached decision on fundamental principles, working out of details could be done by committee of experts of principally interested parties in same pattern as present Franco-Viet Minh military conversations.

Chauvel said this would be agreeable except that question of authority, which he termed "relationship between international commission and joint committees" could be dealt with by technical committee, thus implying France not (repeat not) prepared to maintain principle of subordination joint committees to international commission. As French have already circulated proposal contained SECTO 460 through secretariat, it was agreed we would make suggestion along foregoing lines at today's restricted meeting. Chauvel said they did not (repeat not) yet have any further indication as to what attitude Chinese would take on French proposal entirely clear from conversation with Chauvel that his main interest is in keeping some conference activity of nine going and that if regardless of level representation we prepared continue some conference meetings would probably meet French point of view. Appears French proposal made on assumption that there would be complete recess of conference with departure of Smith and Eden.

Chauvel made reference to his conversation with Smith yesterday (DULTE 193--last paragraph), making inquiry as to exactly what we had in mind. Johnson in reply read to him paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 basic instructions (TOSEC 138) stating that French willingness surrender even minimum enclave in north of Haiphong would so clearly contravene the principles which the US considered essential as to require our public dissociation with such a solution.

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In reply

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-2-DULTE 195, June 18, 3 p. m. from Geneva

In reply to Chauvel's questions, Johnson made it clear we were speaking only of public disassociation from such a settlement. The US had in the past and of course would continue working with and supporting France in every possible way and wherever we could. Chauvel indicated full understanding our position. He said they had come to conclusion that what he termed any "leopard spot" solution was entirely impracticable and unenforceable. From standpoint of future it would be much better to retain a reasonably defensible line in Vietnam behind which there would be no (repeat no) enclaves of Viet Minh and do all possible behind that line to build up effective Vietnamese Government and defense. They had no (repeat no) intention of "any immediate surrender of Haiphong" which in any event must remain under their control for a considerable period for purely military reasons to effect evacuation of French Union Forces from the north. However, if, as appeared likely, choice was giving Viet Minh an enclave in south in exchange for French enclave in Haiphong, they thought it preferable to give up Haiphong. He said no (repeat no) French parliament would approve conditions which the US had laid down for its intervention, and French had no (repeat no) choice but made the best deal they could, obtaining as strong position as possible in south. Chauvel understood fully we would probably not (repeat not) be able to publicly associate ourselves with such a solution, but he hoped that when it came time to put it to the Vietnamese the US would consider it possible very discreetly to let the Vietnamese know that we considered it best that could be obtained under the circumstances and our public disassociation would not (repeat not) operate so as to encourage Vietnamese opposition. Johnson replied he did not (repeat not) see how it would be possible for us to do this, and in any event he would of course have to see what the solution was. Chauvel said that such a solution as partition should come as no (repeat no) surprise to the Vietnamese as Buu Loc had sometime ago indicated to DeJeanthere had been conversations between Vietnamese and Viet Minh in which Viet Minh had made it clear that only two alternatives were coalition government or partition. Chauvel said Ngo Dinh and Diem are very unrealistic, unreasonable, and would probably prove to be "difficult".

Chauvel said the line French had in mind had been made available to US defense representatives at some five-power talks, but was vague about time and place. He referred to it as "line of the chalk cliffs", which he said was defensible position running from the sea across Vietnam and Laos to the Mekong. Undersatn this is a line roughly 19 parallel running from vicinity of Dong Hoi to Thakhek. Replying to query, Chauvel said French Union Forces removed from the north would be deployed along that line.

Chauvel said all indications were Mendes-France would succeed in forming government next day or two and would probably himself assume Foreign Minister post. Said he had been in touch with Mendes-France and had sent emissary to Paris this morning to brief him on situation in Geneva. Chauvel said was anxious to show complete continuity of French effort here in Geneva and hoped there could be another restricted meeting tomorrow. Chauvel said, "Under-ground military talks" last night had been completely unproductive, Viet Minh obviously taking strong line in view of French Government situation.

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GB:LOF/12

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

1426

June 19, 1954

Sent to: SECSTATE DULTE 202

RPTD INFO: Amembassy Moscow 138 EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

I saw Molotov at his villa yesterday evening at my request to inform him of my departure, and because I felt time had come to sound a note of warning. Talk lasted more than hour and a half. Molotov asked what I thought would be best thing to do with Conference, to adjourn it temporarily or to keep it going. I replied as far as we concerned should be kept going while there was hope of reaching reasonable settlement, but that there was no use referring to "committees" matters of major policy which must be decided by the Conference as a whole. Before my departure I felt it would be desirable to exchange views, in order that mistakes of the past should not be repeated as the result of misunderstanding of our respective positions. With regard to Korean phase, I had only to say that in reserving our position re final Chinese proposal had not implied to exclude Communist China from future discussions on Korean question. As matter of fact, China was belligerent there against UN and for practical reasons would have to be party to settlement.

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Regarding Indochinese phase Molotov said he had impression US avoided reaching solution and cited in this regard Robertson objection in yesterday's restricted session to acceptance Chou's proposal on Laos and Cambodia. I said that while proposal might be satisfactory in some respects it made no mention of Vietminh withdrawal or of adequate supervision. So long as regular Vietminh forces remained in Laos and Cambodia we could not help but view situation in very serious light. Molotov cited Pham Van Dong's remarks regarding withdrawal Vietminh "volunteers" and emphasized importance of beginning direct negotiations regarding Laos and Cambodia of type now taking place regarding Vietnam. I regretted that I was not at all convinced that Pham Van Dong really meant what he said. His statements sounded well enough, but his written proposals did not bear them out.

I said I wanted to make our position on Laos and Cambodia entirely clear. In addition to regular Vietminh forces in these countries, which I enumerated, there were some dissident elements in Laos and a much smaller number in Cambodia. If regular Vietminh forces were withdrawn, elections could be held, with guarantees that individuals would be discriminated against as regards their electoral rights for having supported either side. Dissidents would

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be able to vote for any candidates they chose, Communists included. However, while Vietminh forces remained in these countries, there could be no peace nor could free elections be held.

In private conversations with Mr. Eden and others, Communist delegates, in particular Chou En-lai, had taken an apparently reasonable view on Laos and Cambodia, but that here again, when we came to the point of trying to get open agreement on specific points we were unable to do so. I specifically mentioned Chou En-lai's statements to Eden in which he said that China would have no objections to recognizing the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia or to these States having forces and arms sufficient to maintain security, or their remaining in French Union so long as they were not used as military bases by the United States. We could not disagree with any of this, although if we kept out the Chinese would have to keep out, and these small states would have to be allowed to join with their neighbors in whatever regional security arrangements would best protect their integrity without constituting a threat to any one else. Chou En-lai might be anxious about possibility of US bases in Laos and Cambodia. We wanted on our part to be sure that these countries were not handed over to the Chinese. Molotov said that while he did not know about what attitude Chinese might have on other questions in

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- 4 -

future, he could assure me that Chinese attitude on this particular questions was not at all unreasonable, and that there was nothing in it which would give rise to conflicts. He added, however, that if we continued to take a one-sided view and insist on one-sided solutions, he must "in all frankness say that this would not succeed." There were, he said, some differences of view between us on Laos and Cambodia, especially in regard to our refusal to recognize resistance movements; point he wanted to make, however, was that basis for reaching agreement was present and that agreement could be reached so long as neither side "adopted one-sided views or put forward extreme pretensions." This, he said, could only lead to other side's doing same.

Resistance movements existed, in Laos and Cambodia, Molotov asserted. About 50% of the territory of Laos was not under the control of official government. It was true that much smaller resistance movement existed in Cambodia. He said that in fact conditions in all three Indochinese countries were different---large resistance movement controlling three-quarters of territory in Viet Nam, substantial movement in Laos controlling, as he had indicated, about half territory, and much smaller movement in Cambodia. I said, with regard to two latter countries

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solution was simple. Withdraw invading Vietminh forces and let dissident elements elect communist representatives to general assemblies if they wished. But the elections must be actually "free". Regarding Viet Nam, I said we recognized relative strength of the Vietminh but they were demanding too much. It seems Vietminh demanded all Delta, including both Hanoi and Haiphong. The French were our allies, and we took grave view of this extreme pressure. Molotov said that if French were to have something in South and something in North, and probably in center as well, this would add up to three-quarters of country or better, which was wholly unreasonable. He said there was old Russian proverb that if you try to chase two rabbits at once you are apt to miss both of them, and added that in this case wanting something in North and in South was like chasing two rabbits. If French were to give way to Vietminh in North, they would gain territory probably greater in extent in South in recompense. I said appearance of "partition" was repugnant to US, and that as far as proverb about rabbits went I felt that Vietminh were chasing two rabbits in wanting both Hanoi and Haiphong. Vietminh demands for all the Delta, or efforts take it all by force prior to reaching political solution through elections, was serious

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- 6 -

matter in view of my Government. Molotov disagreed, stating that present French position in area was due only to Vietminh restraint, and that two cities did not even have normal communications between each other. In regard to US aversion to partition, he said that this problem could easily be solved by holding elections at once, which would decide "one way or the other." He repeated that important thing in reaching agreement on any of these questions relating Indochina was to be realistic about actual facts, and to avoid putting out one-sided views or extreme pretensions. If French were encouraged to disregard actual situation and to ask for too much, he said, one could only expect conflict to continue. (He made it clear that he considered US as party likely to do the encouraging.) I replied that US was not one of principals to Indochinese dispute and did not cast deciding vote, to which Molotov remarked "maybe so, but you have veto, that word I hear you use so often." and went on to say that among other delegations present at Conference there seemed to be real willingness to reach agreement. Agreement had in fact, he added, very nearly been reached, although he hoped I would realize this was not information for publication. (This remark, obviously, referred to private French-Vietminh military conversations which I have mentioned.) I said I must emphasize my Government held serious views on issues involved in Indochina situation,

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more serious, perhaps, than did some of other governments represented at Conference. I hope he would give consideration to this, and assist in overcoming some of the deep-rooted suspicions of Asiatic participants, which became apparent every time we tried to reconcile formal proposals.

COMMENT:

Throughout conversation Molotov maintained friendly and mild tone evident in all informal conversations. He is completely sure of himself and of his position. What he had to say regarding Delta, Laos and Cambodia confirms Communist intentions to play all the cards they hold. His avoidance of endorsing Chou's remarks to Eden concerning Laos and Cambodia indicated that simple withdrawal of Vietminh forces from these countries was not acceptable and that some form of de facto partition was intended in Laos, at least. His remarks seemed to indicate that Communists have eye on as much as half of country. This conversation, together with the inflexible position which Molotov took during his last conversation with me regarding the composition of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for Indochina, as well as his speech on Tuesday, June 8, and all subsequent speeches on the Communist side, which took firm positions on points the Communists know to be

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unacceptable to Eden, Bidault and me, are highly significant. The recent emphasis by all three Communist spokesmen that France should carry on direct political as well as direct military negotiations with Vietminh show their interest in having a convenient way of holding out for greater gains in their direct negotiations with the French as well as within the framework of the Conference.

Molotov in effect told France in his June 8 speech that her position and that of the Government she was supporting in Indochina were hopeless and that she had best face up to facts and capitulate in direct negotiations with the Vietminh. His speech, of course, was in large part intended to assist in the destruction of the French Government for the implications that that would have on the European as well as the Asiatic scene. Nevertheless, his harsh and even insulting language seemed to reflect the confident, nearly triumphant mood in which he has been lately. It would be misleading to ascribe the harder line which Molotov brought back with him from Moscow entirely to Soviet tactical considerations in regard to the French Government crisis. While the Soviets may think that the blocking of EDC through the destruction of the French Government would reduce future threats to them in Europe, the fact remains that the Indochina conflict potentially involves a much more immediate threat

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of general war.

It is probable that initial Soviet tactics were to forestall US intervention in the Delta by some kind of a compromise formula involving Hanoi and Haiphong if it appeared that such intervention were imminent. The recent raising of the ante in the negotiations here by the Communist side probably reflects an estimate on their part that our intervention is improbable and that they are safe to go ahead there, keeping, of course, a sharp eye out for indications of change in our attitude.

While the Communist position on Laos and Cambodia remains more flexible than their position in regard to the Delta, they will get all they can in Laos now. In the whole are the determining factor for the Communists will continue to be their estimate of the likelihood of US or joint intervention and nothing short of a conviction on their part that this intervention will take place will stop them from going ahead with their plans for taking all of it eventually, through military conquest, French capitulation, or infiltration.

Realize much of above is repetitious, but it will serve as final summary.

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SMITH

USDEL:JKeppel/ph
Rewritten: WBSmith:hed
19 June 1954

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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
25-N
Action
FE

Control: 12359
Rec'd: June 24, 1954
6:05 p.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 5035, June 24, 10 p.m.



Info
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PRIORITY

Chou recognizes 2 govt.

SENT DEPARTMENT 5035; REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 443.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

Since Mendes was tied up in National Assembly today, he asked me to see Parodi and Chauvel regarding his talk with Chou. Chauvel did all the talking and described the meeting as follows:

He said that Mendes opened the meeting telling Chou that he had been glad to agree to Chou's idea of a meeting and that he was interested to hear anything Chou had to say. Chou then spoke very fully and most of the time at the meeting, which lasted a little over two hours, was taken up by Chou's statements and the necessary translations.

Chou in general followed the same line as he previously had taken with Eden and Bidault, with certain important exceptions, which Chauvel considered to represent a considerable advance over Chou's previous position.

Chou started by talking about Laos and Cambodia. He said that the immediate problem was to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign forces including Viet Minh from the entire territory of both countries. He said that then the governments of the two countries should arrange political settlements within their own countries based on the will of the majority of the people. Chou said that while there should be no persecution of minorities, he had no objection to the two countries retaining their monarchical form of government if they so desired. The one thing upon which he insisted was that there should be no (repeat no) US bases in either Laos and Cambodia. He stated that he saw no objection to Laos and Cambodia remaining within the French Union, provided they so desired.

The talk then turned to Vietnam where Chauvel considered important advances in Chou's position were revealed. Chou said that he recognized that there were now two governments in the

territory

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-2- 5035, June 24, 10 p.m., from Paris.

territory of Vietnam, the Viet Minh Government and the Vietnamese Government. According to Chauvel, this was the first time that Chou had recognized the valid existence of the Vietnamese Government.

Chou then said that the settlement in Vietnam should be reached in two stages. First, an armistice which should be reached as soon as possible, and second, peace, which would obviously take longer to achieve. Chauvel said that Chou clearly accepted, and for the first time, the French thesis that there should be two phases; first military and second political to the eventual settlement of Vietnam. Regarding military settlement, Chou said that there should be regroupment of troops in large zones in order to stop the fighting. Chou said that he was ready to discuss the division of zones if Mendes so desired. Mendes answered that he was not yet prepared for such a detailed discussion and said he preferred that it be handled by the delegations at Geneva. Therefore, there was no discussion in detail regarding the make-up of the eventual zones.

Regarding the final political settlement, Chou said this should be reached by direct negotiations between the two governments in Vietnam, i.e., the Vietnamese Government and the Viet Minh Government. Chou further said that France might be able to help in these negotiations. He added that he saw no reason why the eventually united state of Vietnam should not remain within the French Union.

Mendes at this point said that since the war had been going on for 8 years and passions were high, it would take a long time before elections could be held as the people must be given a full opportunity to cool off and calm down. Chou made no objection to this statement by Mendes and did not press for early elections.

Mendes then told Chou that negotiations with the Viet Minh for reasons not very clear to the French had been at a practical standstill for the past week or ten days and he suggested that a word from Chou to the leader of the Viet Minh delegation might be helpful in speeding things up which seemed to be Chou's desire as well as Mendes'. Chou agreed to intervene with the Viet Minh and ask them to speed up negotiations.

The conversation never touched on any subject other than Indochina. According to Chauvel, no other item of Far Eastern policy was touched upon, nor was Europe nor the UN or possible

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-3- 5035, June 24, 10 p.m., from Paris.

recognition of China by France ever mentioned.

Chauvel is returning to Geneva tonight and will see the head of the Viet Minh delegation tomorrow in an attempt to get the military talks under way again.

MRS/12

DILLON

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

TOP SECRET
Classification

11646
1954 JUN 28 PM 7 10

DC/T

For DC/T only

SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 4852
RPTD INFO: Amembassy LONDON (BY-POUCH) 7146
Amembassy SAIGON 2746
Amconsul GENEVA SECTO 489 (BY-POUCH)
TOSEC

Origin

Info:

Following is translation aide memoire delivered by Bonnet to Secretary and Edén June 26. Text coordinated US-UK reply contained next following message.

"The coming weeks will be of decisive importance insofar as Indochina is concerned. Following his conversation with Mr. Chou En-lai, the head of the French Government has instructed M. Chauvel to approach M. Phan Van Dong with a view to carrying on with him directly negotiations to ascertain whether a basis can be found, in his opinion, for a territorial settlement in Vietnam or not.

"The objective of the French Government is to arrive at a regrouping which will assure the State of Vietnam a territory as solid as possible, and without the de facto division which will result being too cut up. That is the reason why the French Government will insist on maintaining Haiphong as long as possible and on obtaining the neutralization of the bishoprics of Bui Chu and Phat Diem.

"It is difficult to predict the result of this negotiation in which the French authorities must face two sorts of difficulties: on the one hand it

will be most difficult to obtain concessions from the Viet Minh in the north; and on the other hand the negotiations risk causing, if the agreement

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Drawn by:

EUR:WE:RHMcbride:em 6/28/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Douglas MacArthur II

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Merchant (in substance)

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S/S - CK

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JUN 28 1954 P.M.

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS

TOP SECRET
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is concluded, dangerous reactions by the Vietnamese Government whose citizens are serving at the present time under the orders of the French command, comprising a major proportion thereof.

"The French Prime Minister feels that the allied American and British governments should be as well informed as possible of these possibilities. M. Mendes-France wishes especially to call the attention of these two Governments to the following aspects of the situation:

done

"(1) If the Viet Minh appears disposed to negotiate, it is for a series of reasons among which figure without doubt the fear of a spreading of the conflict, a spreading which nothing at the present time would lead us to expect, but which the general world situation does not permit us to exclude. Although the fear of such an extension of the conflict may have a determining influence on the decisions of our adversaries, the French Government realizes that precise declarations on this subject are not possible at this time. But it considers it would be very useful if the final communique of the Anglo-American talks in Washington could state in some fashion or other that, if it is not possible to reach a reasonable settlement at the Geneva Conference, a serious aggravation of international relations would result.

"(2) The problem which is posed with regard to Vietnam is different. It is to be feared that any solution providing for an indefinite period a division of the country will cause a violent and unreasoning reaction on the part of the Vietnamese patriots. While this reaction may be in a large measure inevitable, every effort should nevertheless be made to canalize this reaction in a direction

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
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Page # 3 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS

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in conformity with the interests of Vietnam, France and their allies.

"To this end it appears highly desirable to the Prime Minister of France to obtain the assurance of the United States Government that nothing will be done by the latter which might even implicitly encourage such a reaction. Under present circumstances such action could lead to no result but to ruin any hope of seeing Vietnam consolidate herself in such a fashion as to create in the face of the Viet Minh an authentically national and independent force. It is for this reason that the French Government strongly hopes it can count on the United States at the proper moment to intervene with the Vietnamese to counsel upon them wisdom and self-control and to dissuade them from refusing an agreement which, if it is reached, is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning them, but on the contrary by the desire to save in Indochina all that can possibly be saved, and to give the Vietnamese state, under peaceful conditions, opportunities which have not always been possible heretofore because of the war."



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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 15292
Rec'd: June 30, 1954
6:59 p.m.

FROM: Paris
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 5117, June 30, 7 p.m.

Bureau of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 1 - 1954
6172
Department of State

SENT DEPARTMENT 5117, REPEATED INFORMATION SAIGON 634, GENEVA 449.

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Jebb came to see me this morning after his interview with Mendes-France in the course of which he delivered reply to French aide-memoire of June 26 (DEPTEL 4853) in the form of aide-memoire, followed by verbal comments along lines outlined in paragraph 2 reference telegram.

Jebb reported that Mendes was pleased with text reply and stated that Parodi would give us definite French position in day or so. Mendes also confirmed that negotiations with Viet Minh at Geneva were stalled (Geneva SECTO 544, repeated Paris as 519).

Mendes was somewhat perplexed by reference to "line running generally west from Dong Hoi" as possible partition line for while Dong Hoi is approximately at 17.5 degrees French had been holding out for 18th parallel in face Viet Minh wanting 13th.

On question of elections, Jebb quoted Mendes as stating that the Viet Minh wanted them to be held in six months but that the French were taking the position that they should be delayed for a year after final settlement and withdrawal of troops had been achieved. This, as presently envisaged, would mean a year and half to two years from now.

As reported EMBTEL 5099, we delivered reply to aide-memoire to Foreign Office this morning.

PSA

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[Handwritten notes and stamps]
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Department of State

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Control: 1248
Rec'd: July 2, 1954
11:12 p.m.

1954 JUL 3 AM 7 20

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NO: 32, July 2, 8 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 32, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 2, SAIGON 4.

Re DEPTTELS 5 and 8.

I took up reference telegrams with Mendes this afternoon. Regarding present withdrawals in the delta Mendes said that these had been planned in May by the Laniel government and he had made no change in the original plan. The withdrawals represent a definite shortening of the French lines to protect Hanoi, Haiphong and the connecting road.

He said he had been much surprised to read in the papers that a State Department spokesman had said that the US had not had prior information regarding these withdrawals. He had assumed, he said, that Ely had fully informed O'Daniel of his plans. He then accordingly asked Ely this morning if that was not the case and Ely had told him that he had not informed O'Daniel. Mendes accordingly offered his apologies and said that he had instructed Ely in the future to keep O'Daniel fully informed on the spot.

Regarding withdrawals themselves he said they were necessary to ensure the safety of the French Expeditionary Corps. He said that the French had offered to take with them those members of the local population who desired protection and that the French forces had provided transportation for such people. He said he had not seen the latest figures but a fairly substantial number of people had availed themselves of this opportunity. On the other hand, there had been many who preferred to stay where they were.

In this connection he said that since Dien Bien Phu the Viet Minh had not conducted reprisals when they occupied new territory but had behaved very well toward the local population. He said that he realized that this might only be a temporary policy to facilitate negotiations at Geneva, but that for whatever it was worth, it was the fact. He then said that the withdrawals were not yet completed and showed me on a rough map where further withdrawals were scheduled. These include the Phu Ly area and a portion of the area to the west of Hanoi.

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-2- 32, July 2, 8 p.m., from Paris

Regarding the right of population transfer as contained in paragraph 6 of DEPTTEL 4853, Mendes said that he was thoroughly in accord that this would be a good thing from the French point of view. He said that it had been mentioned to the Viet Minh in Geneva and that they had made no answer either favorable or unfavorable. When I reiterated the importance that we attach to this subject, Mendes made a note of it and said that he was writing Chauvel tonight and would include in his letter of instruction a reference to this subject. I think it would be useful if Johnson would stress this subject in his next talk with Chauvel.

Mendes then said negotiations in Geneva had been at a standstill and that he had instructed Chauvel to go to Berne for two days to show that the French were in no greater hurry than the Viet Minh. He said that the Soviet representative at Geneva had told Chauvel not to worry about the slow pace of the negotiations as at conferences such as these everything was always settled in last few hours.

Regarding DEPTTEL 8, use of word "withdrawal" was intended only to mean deployment into agreed regroupment areas. Mendes said that the French on timing of election are holding out for 18 months after completion of regrouping which, he said, would mean 22 or 23 months after cease-fire. Viet Minh are asking for elections six months after cease-fire. Mendes expects the final result will be a compromise somewhere in between.

He then commented that Diem had made an unhelpful speech the other day in Saigon when he was quoted as having said that he was in favor of the elections within a year. Mendes thinks that this is too soon and not in the interests of Vietnam, and it runs counter to what the French were trying to obtain at Geneva.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FROM: Geneva

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: SECTO 557, July 3, 8 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 557, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 10, SAIGON 8.

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In Johnson's absence, Chauvel this afternoon, informed Bonsal regarding his talk with Kuznetsov last night and with Dong this morning.

Chauvel raised with Kuznetsov pending questions on control. He found Kuznetsov adamant on necessity of inclusion Communist power and rejection thesis Communists can not (repeat not) be neutral. Kuznetsov added that Colombo powers are after all sworn to influence of London which in turn is influenced by Washington. Upshot of talk on this point was that matter of composition might be set aside for present and left for Ministers to settle when they return. Concerning acceptance by parties of decisions or recommendations of international commission, Chauvel stressed importance of establishing "rule of law" accepted beforehand by both sides. Chauvel had impression Kuznetsov not (repeat not) unmoved by his arguments this point, although he gave no (repeat no) indication of change in Soviet position.

On military questions, Chauvel made clear to Kuznetsov that these are held up because Viet Minh have made unacceptable proposal of demarcation line along thirteenth parallel (about Tuy Hoa). On other hand, Chauvel stated French have proposed line acceptable not (repeat not) only to French, but one which French have reason to believe would be acceptable to conference as a whole, and thus would avert risk of internationalization of conflict. Kuznetsov replied that difficulty arises from fact that three provinces south of Faifo have been held for many years by Viet Minh (area in question would appear to run from just south of Faifo and include provinces of Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon and perhaps all or part of Song Cau; Department will recall in this connection, recent violent Viet Minh attack against

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Rec'd: July 3, 1954
5:39 p.m.

Bureau of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 6 1954
Department of State

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-2- #SECTO 557, July 3, 8 p.m., from Geneva.

French forces withdrawing from Ankhe which is in this general area). Kuznetsov suggested French and Viet Minh might examine area between fourteenth and eighteenth parallel and exchange views as to specific areas of particular interest to each party. Chauvel stated this could not (repeat not) be considered and repeated position regarding line French have already offered.

Chauvel's talk with Dong took place this morning at residence of Chinese Communist delegation. There was an exchange of views about control and particularly regarding prior agreement to accept decisions or recommendations of international commission. Dong stated that he would consider this further. He is aware that French, British and Soviet delegations are working on specific proposals (SECTO 553).

Chauvel reports that he spoke most firmly to Dong regarding military discussions. He said French have accepted Viet Minh proposal that Viet Minh receive Tonkin area, including Capital, but that further Viet Minh proposal for demarcation line is unacceptable. Chauvel reiterated in strongest terms fact that French proposal for demarcation line just north of Dong Hoi would be acceptable to conference and would thus eliminate danger of extension of war. (Chauvel stated to Bonsal that of course French would have to hold Haiphong and adjacent zones for considerable period.)

Dong raised question of Viet Minh troops and sympathizers in area south of Faifo. Chauvel stated he assumed regular troops would be evacuated and others would return to their villages. He said that presumably there would be no (repeat no) objection to any persons desiring to do so removing to Viet Minh controlled territory. (Bonsal expressed interest and emphasized United States view this subject as set forth paragraphs of aide memoire contained Department telegram 4853.)

Dong endeavored to raise question of eventual political settlement, but Chauvel stated that in present discussions must be limited to military matters and reaching of armistice. He stressed purpose of present conversation is to make arrangements for removal from Tonkin of 300,000 Franco-Vietnamese troops. He said that French have no (repeat no) aggressive military intentions, although obviously it is essential for French to reinforce their position both by regrouping their forces in delta and by measures agreed on in Paris in order to insure so far as possible, security of their troops. (He told Bonsal he did not (repeat not) believe either French or Viet Minh would take aggressive military action under present circumstances.)

Alluding to political matters, Chauvel took occasion to point out to Dong that elections have not (repeat not) yet been held in Communist China and that Dong would probably agree on need for considerable period of pacification and reconstruction before elections

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-3- #SECTO 557, July 3, 8 p.m., from Geneva.

elections would be held. Dong made no (repeat no) comment.

Chauvel read Bonsal passages from letter he had received from Mendes-France indicating that French negotiators should avoid appearance of overeagerness to reach settlement. Deadline date of July 20 which Mendes-France has set himself is not (repeat not) so pressing as to induce French to accept Viet Minh proposal of thirteenth parallel.

In view Department telegram 9, Bonsal drew Chauvel's attention to presence here of new Vietnamese representative Tran Van Do and to latter's interest in seeing Chauvel. (Chauvel apparently not (repeat not) fully informed by his subordinates on this score.)

JOHNSON

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Department of State

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1954 JUL 3 PM 1 49

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SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS ⁵² PRIORITY

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We are considering here what position we should take as regards the French negotiations in Indochina. These negotiations appear to have gone underground and we have little reliable knowledge of what is really in the minds of the French Government or what is likely to emerge. We have ourselves agreed with the British on the 7 points previously communicated to you. However, we have the distinct impression that the British look upon this merely as an optimum solution and that they would not encourage the French to hold out for a solution as good as this. Indeed, during the talks here the British wanted to express these 7 points merely as a "hope" without any indication of firmness on our part. The word "respect" was agreed on as a compromise. The fact is however that the US would not want to be associated in any way with a settlement which fell materially short of the 7 point memorandum.

We fear the French may in fact without prior consultation with us of more than perfunctory character agree to a settlement which though

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S:JFDulles:cjp

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S:JFDulles

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Page 2 of telegram to

Amembassy PARIS

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superficially resembling the 7 points will in fact contain such political clauses and restrictions that Laos, Cambodia, and Southern Vietnam will almost surely fall in a few months under Communist control. No doubt such a solution would be accepted with satisfaction by the French people and parliament who would rejoice in the ending of the fighting and close their eyes to the possible future implications of the settlement. At this point the US may be asked as one of the powers which convoked and participated in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference to sign, or otherwise adhere to the settlement. ~~There is a possibility that~~ ^{Also} Also the Communists may insist upon this and take the position that if we did not do so that would be a violation of the understanding upon which the armistice was negotiated and they might even threaten to withdraw ~~and~~ their armistice terms if the US did not adhere to them. This Communist tactic would well serve their purpose of creating animosity between France and the US at a time when the defeat of EDC is a major Soviet objective.

We are giving consideration to various possibilities such as the withdrawal of the remnants of our delegation from Geneva or clarification of our position as regards the French position. This latter matter would ~~not~~ ^{not (rpt not)} serve the desired purpose unless it were public and if it were public it might be looked upon as a threat which would create the French ~~an antagonistic~~ antagonistic reaction which we want to avoid.

Possibly you could find out ~~the~~ whether or not there is the danger which we apprehend and whether or not the French are negotiating on the assumption that we

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS

TOP SECRET
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may not be a party to the settlement. If the French are operating on this basis and if they know that the Communists also accept this premise, the situation is not dangerous. If either or both French and Communists are operating on assumption we will adhere to any settlement they agree to, then we may be headed for serious trouble. I would like your personal thoughts on this matter.

Dulles (Roc)
DULLES

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Control: 1719
Rec'd: July 4, 1954
2:53 p.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 41, July 4, 3 p.m.

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

Reference DEPTTEL 52.

Bureau of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 6 1954
Department of State

*July 3/54
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I can well understand difficulties we face as described in reference telegram. I feel that French position is fairly clear as of now but difficulty may well arise in last days or hours of conference after Ministers have returned to Geneva.

In that connection we face following problem. If we withdraw delegation from Geneva we lose all possibility of influencing French to stand firm, and we also throw away whatever restraining influence we may still have on Communist delegations. French would feel abandoned and, with only Eden to advise, would undoubtedly accept a result more favorable to the Communists than if we stayed at Geneva. The same effect but to a lesser extent would result if neither Under Secretary nor you return to Geneva for closing negotiations.

On the other hand even if we do maintain a full delegation at Geneva headed by you or Under Secretary there is always the possibility and maybe even probability that French will accept a settlement that does not fully accord with 7 points in US-UK agreement. This will be particularly apt to happen if Eden does not stand firm in final negotiations.

I do not feel that public statement of our position would be helpful as it would create the antagonism mentioned in next to last paragraph of reference telegram.

Even if we do not consider final settlement satisfactory to us, I feel that unless we agree not to use force to upset it we will be in an untenable position here vis-a-vis Soviet and neutralist propoganda that will picture US as the nation which by its acts clearly shows that it wants war.

Mendes is fully conscious that we may feel that we cannot be a party to the settlement. However, I do not feel that this would necessarily weigh very heavily with him in final settlement, particularly if he can obtain Eden's support. Naturally I have no idea what is in mind of Communists on this score.

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-2- 41, July 4, 3 p.m., from Paris

We have one strong card which so far we have apparently not cared to use. That is we can trade willingness to give full diplomatic support to French in their effort to sell settlement to Vietnam in return for a settlement that we can support. The indication which French now have that no matter what the settlement may be, we cannot be counted upon for support with Vietnam obviously greatly weakens our influence with French.

In conclusion if we base our actions solely on the attempt to get the best possible settlement I feel that we should (1) maintain our delegation at Geneva, (2) have you or the Under Secretary return to head the delegation when the other Foreign Ministers return, (3) tell the French at once that we will support them in selling settlement to Vietnam provided that settlement is satisfactory to us, (4) maintain close contact with and pressure on Eden so he sticks to 7 points US-UK agreement.

I fully realize that domestic political considerations must also be taken into account, but I am not in a position to evaluate them so I have confined these thoughts to a description of the best method available to US to influence the final settlement at Geneva in the direction we desire.

DILLON

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1954 JUL 6 PM 2 22

Control: 2037
Rec'd: July 6, 1954
10:07 a.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NO: 50, July 6, 1 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 50; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 11, SAIGON 8,
GENEVA 4.

Re DEPTTEL 4853.

7519.5-MSK

Parodi this morning gave me French reaction to US-UK terms for Indochina settlement. He said the terms generally parallel present French position and are welcomed by French Government. However, they have one important reservation in that they consider that paragraphs 4 and 5 may be mutually contradictory.

French feel that eventual agreement will have to contain provisions for elections which would comply with paragraph 5 of US-UK agreement. However, if elections should go wrong way, this would seem to contradict paragraph 4 of US-UK agreement, which says there should be no (repeat no) political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area. Accordingly, they request clarification from us as to US and UK position regarding elections.

In addition Parodi said that French do not (repeat not) fully understand what we mean when we say we would be willing to "respect" agreement. Parodi said that the word "respect" seemed weak and unclear and French would like clarification if at all possible.

DILLON

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Control: 2201- *Power*
Rec'd: July 6, 1954
4:20 p.m.

FROM: Geneva *Further Notes.*

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 560, July 6, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

Bureau of
Far Eastern Affairs
JUL 7 1954
Department of State

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 560, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 12,
SAIGON 10.

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PARIS EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

This morning Chauvel expressed to me serious concern re reports he had had from Bonnet of two statements by Secretary and one by Under Secretary to effect US not (repeat not) being adequately informed. He asserted with much emphasis that he had and would continue keep me fully and frankly informed. My own belief is that Chauvel has not (repeat not) deliberately withheld information.

Chauvel had seen Dong this morning. On question of demarcation lines, Dong again referred to status of populations sympathizing with Viet Minh who would be left south of demarcation line proposed by French. He said this question would be easier for him if he could get some general political assurances regarding eventual status these people. Chauvel said Dong indicated that with such assurances he might be able to accept Dong Hoi line.

In reply to Dong Chauvel stated that such assurances would have to be very general. They might refer to such matters as eventual unity, territorial integrity, democratic conditions, etc.

Chauvel told Dong that any attempt to go further into detail on political matters would result in prolonged discussion and delay in achieving the armistice which all desire.

Chauvel suggested to Dong that it might be advantageous to have the agreement on the armistice purely one between the commands of each side and not (repeat not) between governments. This would obviate immediate problem of securing consent of Vietnamese Government. Agreement would, of course, have to include certain questions not (repeat not) purely military. The agreement could

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751G.00/7-554

CH-102

TOP SECRET

-2- SECTO 560, July 6, 7 p.m., from Geneva.

then be submitted to the conference. Perhaps conference might then make a general statement of political principles which would be included in a final declaration by conference. Dong agreed with this general approach. He referred to his own statement of May 12 in which he had advocated that agreements regarding cessation of hostilities should be bilateral.

X Chauvel stated that in his talk with Dong he referred to fact military conversations not (repeat not) moving well. He wondered whether it might not (repeat not) be possible to supplement them with some conversations between civilians on certain subjects not (repeat not) purely military. Dong agreed and Chauvel designated Offroy while Dong indicated that Tran Cong Tuong (Vice Minister of Justice in Viet Minh Cabinet and member Viet Minh delegation here -- he was also in Fountainebleau Conference in 1946) would be his representative.

Chauvel told me French delegation is working on draft of paper on control system which will be submitted to British and Russian delegations and of which he will give us a copy as soon as completed. Although his position remains that parties should agree accept decisions or recommendations of international commission, he is somewhat skeptical on how system will work in practice on major questions. He stated that decisions could be by majority or unanimous vote, but that in case of majority decisions on major questions implementation would obviously be difficult. He pointed out that eventual recourse to guaranteeing powers, i.e., conference powers will obviously not (repeat not) work in event serious disagreement. He stated that it will be necessary in this case "for us to work out something among ourselves".

Chauvel told us that he is leaving for Paris tomorrow to see Mendes-France in order to get his instructions. He indicated that Mendes-France has been in touch with London regarding future plans for conference. He has impression from Massigli that Reading or Caccia will be returning here shortly and that ✓ Eden is expected about 12th, (Lamb subsequently told me he has no (repeat no) information on Eden's plans and knows nothing about Reading or Caccia returning in advance of Eden).

- ✓ Mendes-France himself may come here between 10th and 12th, probably not (repeat not) before Eden. The Chinese Communist representative apparently indicated to Chauvel that Chou En-lai's return is expected, but gave no (repeat no) details.
- ✓ Molotov is apparently still due about 8th, although Soviets have not (repeat not) directly said anything on this.

I again raised matter Haiphong enclave by asking Chauvel if

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any recent

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-3- SECTO 560, July 6, 7 p.m., from Geneva.

any recent Viet Minh reaction on this. Chauvel said that Dong had given no (repeat no) definite indication regarding maintenance French enclave there. Chauvel said French would in any event obviously have to remain there for some time to come. In reply my further question, he said that French military do not (repeat not) attach great importance to retention of Haiphong from military point of view.

I also again raised with Chauvel question of anti-Communist civilian population in zones evacuated by French under any agreement. Chauvel said he expected Offroy to take this up with Dong's representative. Such matters as amnesty for alleged political offenses could also be discussed. Chauvel stated that problem of forcible repatriation of prisoners had not (repeat not) risen and that he did not (repeat not) expect that it would.

I asked Chauvel regarding liaison with Vietnamese. He replied he was handling this through members of his staff and was avoiding direct contact with Vietnamese in order not (repeat not) to have to answer their questions.

JOHNSON

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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-1

Action

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EUR

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 66, July 6, 11 p.m.

PRIORITY

Control: 2355
Rec'd: July 7, 1954
2:11 a.m. signed to [initials]

Bureau of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 7 1954
6-23
Department of State

MAIL ROOM
7/7/54
7/15/54
9/8/54

SENT DEPARTMENT 6, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 8, SAIGON 11.

After finishing discussion of Kerr article, Mendes said that the second major thing which he wished to discuss with me was the question of the resumption of the Geneva talks at the Ministerial level. He said that it was now clear that the Ministers would have to make the decisions as the technical committees had been unsuccessful. Therefore, and in view of his July 20, deadline, he personally hoped that Ministerial discussions could commence as soon as possible.

In this connection he mentioned a report that Molotov might return to Geneva on July 8. He said that Chauvel had tried to confirm this with the Russians at Geneva but they replied that they were without information. Mendes said he very much did not (repeat not) want to be in a position of talking at Geneva with only Molotov and Chou En-lai. Therefore, he would like very much to find out what US intentions and plans were as to when the Secretary or Under Secretary would return to Geneva. He said that Massigli was making similar inquiries of Eden on his arrival today.

I said that I was unfamiliar as to US plans and asked Mendes what his understanding was as to when the conference would resume. He replied that it was his definite understanding that all five Foreign Ministers had agreed to return to Geneva not (repeat not) later than July 12, to recommence their discussions. Referring to US, he indicated that he expected that either the Secretary or the Under Secretary would return at that time. I told him that I was not informed but that I would inquire and let him know as soon as possible.

Mendes then informed me that he will announce tomorrow to the National Assembly that if a cease-fire is not (repeat not) agreed to prior to July 21, it will be necessary for the Assembly to approve the sending of conscripts to Indochina and that the last act of his government before resigning will be to introduce a law to authorize the sending of conscripts to Indochina. This law would be introduced on July 21, and the Assembly would be required to vote on it the same day as they will have had two

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-2- 65 July 6, 11 p.m., from Paris

weeks from the date of his announcement to consider the matter. He said that his government would definitely not (repeat not) resign until such a law had been passed. Mendes also said that the shipping to move the first group of conscripts to Indochina would be ready on July 25, so that his schedule for parliamentary action would cause no (repeat no) delay in the movement of troops.

I then mentioned DEPTTEL 39, and Mendes said that he recognized that this posed a real problem. He said that Ely had been instructed to keep Dien as fully informed as possible and that he had stressed the matter again in a telegram to Ely. Mendes said, however, that no (repeat no) matter what occurs or what action is taken, he expects there would be difficulties with Dien, and he said that he wanted again to ask for our assistance at that time. He said he realized that the US would probably be unable to underwrite any settlement which might come out of Geneva. He said he also realized that it would not (repeat not) be easy for us to tell Dien, to accept everything. Mendes said he did not (repeat not) want to ask us to do anything we could not (repeat not) do, but that he hoped we could by unofficial means discourage Dien from being too stubborn and difficult if a solution along general lines of US-UK formula had been reached.

DILLON

EOC:RJB/9

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TELEGRAM

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Department of State

TOPSECRET

Classification

762
JUL 7 AM 10 14
DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy LONDON NIACT 101
Rptd Info Amembassy PARIS NIACT 68

Origin

Info:

EYES ONLY ALDRICH AND DILLON FROM SECRETARY

Please deliver following personal message to Eden:

QTE Dear Anthony: We have an inquiry from Mendes-France as to whether or not Bedell or I will return to Geneva and if so when. He apparently contemplates a reunion at the ministerial level July 12. I understand he is making a similar inquiry of you.

It is my present feeling that it would be better if neither Bedell nor I went back. As you know, it would not be feasible for us to be parties to a settlement which fell below the seven point paper which we drew up together in Washington and gave the French through our Ambassadors. Our position in that respect is perhaps a little different from your own. In any event, I fear that the French, whether or not Bedell or I are there, will take a solution considerably worse than this and in that event our high-level presence at Geneva might prove an embarrassment to all concerned. In view, however of our joint efforts for this area, I wanted to let you know of our present

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Drafted by:

S JFD:ma 7/7/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S JFDulles

Clearance:

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Classification

46297

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Page 2 of telegram to

Amembassy PARIS

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Classification

thinking and I would welcome quickly knowing how you yourself visualize this matter working out. Sincerely yours, Foster. UNQTE

Dulles (for)

DULLES

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Classification

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TELEGRAM

Department of State

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INDICATE: collect
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Classification

1954 JUL 7 PM 8 08

DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 77
RPTD INFO: Amembassy LONDON 129
Amembassy SAIGON 67
Amcongen GENEVA TOSEC 523

Origin

Info:

Re EMBTEL 50

9519.00 / 9-654

We see no real conflict between paragraphs 4 and 5 US-LK terms. We realize of course that even agreement which appears to meet all seven points cannot constitute guarantee that Indochina will not one day pass into Communist hands. Seven points are intended provide best chance that this shall not happen. This will require observance of criteria not merely in the letter but in the spirit. Thus since undoubtedly true that elections might eventually mean unification Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh this makes it all more important they should be only held as long after cease-fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give democratic elements best chance. We believe important that no date should be set now and especially that no conditions should be accepted by French which would have direct or indirect effect of preventing effective international supervision of agreement ensuring politic as well as military guarantees. Also note paragraph 3 of President

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Drafted by: S:JFD:scr
R/WE:WTyler:RMcBridger:ab

7/7/54

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S:JFD

Clearance: C - Mr. MacArthur
FE - Mr. Sturm
EUR (Mr. Merchant in draft)

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7519.00/7-654

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS

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and Prime Minister joint declaration of June 29 regarding QTE unity through free elections supervised by the UN UNQTE.

Our interpretation of willingness QTE respect UNQTE agreement which might be reached is that we would not (repeat not) oppose a settlement which conformed to seven points contained Deptel 4853. It does not (repeat not) of course mean we would guarantee such settlement or that we would necessarily support it publicly. We consider QTE respect UNQTE as strong a word as we can possibly employ in the circumstances to indicate our position with respect to such arrangements as French may evolve along lines points contained DEPTTEL 4853. QTE respect UNQTE would also mean that we would not seek directly or indirectly to upset settlement by force.

You may convey substance above to French.

Dulles (Dai)
DULLES

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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27-H
Action
EUR

Control: 2737

1954 JUL 8 AM 7 29
Rec'd: July 7, 1954
3:56 p.m.

1

FROM: Paris

Info
SS
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FE

TO: Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NO: 81, July 7, 8 p.m.

NIACT

FOR SECRETARY AND LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Handwritten: ocr
file

In going over file since drafting EMBTEL 73 we have determined that Department as well as Defense were informed of French plans to withdraw to inner perimeter of Tonkin delta on May 30. At that time General ELY handed General Trapnell, former chief MAAG Saigon, who had been sent to Paris by General Ridgway to take part in Indochina talks, copy of new Defense plan and permitted Trapnell to make notes on it. EMBTEL 4605, repeated Saigon as 318, Geneva as 560 for Chiefs of Mission and passed to Defense for Ridgway informed Department of new plan in numbered paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. Details of plan were carried to Washington few days later by Trapnell himself.

7516.00/7-754

It therefore cannot be alleged that French did not (repeat not) inform us in advance through both military and diplomatic channels of their plans to withdraw to inner perimeter of Tonkin delta. We cannot (repeat not) help but feel that Kerr Article plus what Department's own spokesman has been quoted as saying can only serve to make our position here vis-a-vis Mendes and his government increasingly difficult and undermine the confidence of both the French Government and people in our own candor in these most difficult times.

DILLON

MEJ/9

JAC

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Department of State

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SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS ⁸⁵ ~~XXXXXX~~ PRIORITY
Rptd Info Amembassy LONDON ¹⁵¹ PRIORITY.
Amconsul GENEVA PRIORITY TOSEC 526

Origin

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FOR DILLON, ALDRICH AND JOHNSON
true

I think it is probably ~~xxxx~~ that if we had put together all of the bits of information given at various times and various political and military levels at Paris, Geneva, Washington, Saigon and Hanoi, the result would have been a reasonably clear picture of French military intentions as now revealed. I have never harbored any thought of any wilful concealment. Also I have always conceded that the French were clearly within their rights in making their own plans. I have repeatedly said at press conferences that we recognize that the French had the primary position in Indochina and that our role was that of a friendly observer who wanted to help if and when our help was wanted.

I do feel that there is a certain lack of any intimacy which is perhaps due to the fact that we have not in the past worked closely with the personalities of the present Government who have been plunged into an immense and engrossing task. In this respect they have our sympathy and I hope that

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Drafted by:

S JFD:ma 7/8/54

Telegraphic transmission on
copy approved by

S JFDulles

Approved:

EUR Merchant
U Smith

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[you will try to remove any impression of carping criticism on our part. ^{TP} ~~1954~~ We are quite prepared to agree that France has been overextended in relation to Indochina and we are not quarelling with present French policy designed to limit its commitments more nearly within the bounds of its strength.

Our present intentions to leave representation at Geneva at the present level of Ambassador Johnson is primarily because we do not want to be the cause of any avoidable embarrassment by what might be a spectacular disassociation of the United States from France. Whatever France may be determined to do, we accept as within its prerogatives. We only regret that we cannot agree to associate ourselves in advance with an end result which we cannot foresee. Equally, we do not want to be in a position of seeming to obstruct an end result which from the French national standpoint seems imperative to its parliament and people.

Since starting to dictate this, I have received through Bonnet a message from Mendes-France strongly urging that either Bedell Smith or I should come back. This apparently based on my today's press conference statement that neither of us had any present plans for returning.

I told Bonnet the substance of the preceding paragraphs to the effect that while we would be only too happy to contribute to a united front, we could not do so without knowing on what position that front was based. If there were a position which France was able to define and state that she would not accept anything else, then we would be able to judge whether or not that afforded the foundation for a

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS

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united front. At the moment, it seems to me that there is less danger of doing irreparable injury to Franco-American relations if we avoid getting into a position at Geneva which might require a disassociation under spectacular conditions which would be deeply resented by the French as an effort on our part to block at the last minute a peace which they ardently desire.

We have not yet taken any irrevocable decision and even if no one from here comes over for the 12th, we would be standing by here under circumstances such that if developments at Geneva seem to indicate that our presence there would serve a really constructive purpose one or the other of us could get to Geneva overnight.

Unless you perceive objection, I would like you to explain orally my position to Mendes-Franco, making clear that we are motivated by our estimate that in the end our presence at Geneva, even though initially it seemed an asset, might subsequently prove a liability to Franco-American relations.

Code Room: - Please note

DUBLES
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FOR LONDON ONLY

Please show Eden portion of this cable which follows first two paragraphs.
Portion begins QTE We are quite prepared, etc. UNQTE

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TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 3983
Rec'd: July 9, 1954
5:47 p.m.

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 578, July 9, 9 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 578; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 28,
SAIGON 19.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

PARIS EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

I called on Chauvel following restricted meeting today. He has just returned from Paris. His impression is that Mendes-France position unchanged and that he does not intend make further concessions to secure agreement with Communists. Mendes-France anticipates active week of discussions followed possibly by last minute agreement on evening July 19. Mendes-France arrives here tomorrow afternoon. He will see Molotov tomorrow evening.

Chauvel dined last night with Communist Chinese. Li Konung and Chang Wen-tien, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to USSR who has just returned here, were present. Atmosphere was "very cordial". Chauvel informed Chinese that military discussions with Viet Minh not going well and that latter had made both for Vietnam and for Laos unacceptable proposals wholly out of harmony with what Chauvel had understood Chou En-lai's position to be. Chinese expressed surprise but did not go into details of situation. He told Chauvel that Chou En-lai would probably return here early next week saying it takes three to four days to fly here from Peking depending on weather. Vice Minister stated Chou En-lai had had "very good meeting" with Ho Chi Minh and results "would be helpful to French". Vice Minister has spent last two weeks in Moscow and Chauvel believes Communist Chinese and Soviet positions regarding problem have been coordinated, with Chinese views on Asian problems being given major weight.

There was an "underground" meeting between French Colonel Brebisson and Viet Minh military representative yesterday. At this meeting Viet Minh made two proposals (1) A demarcation

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-2- SECTO 578, July 9, 9 p.m., from Geneva

line about 40 kilometers north of Tuyhoa line and (2) "neutralization" of delta in order to permit total evacuation of French Expeditionary Corps in three months period. French representative stated both these proposals wholly unacceptable and not even worthy of discussion. He refused to set date for next meeting.

Chauvel saw Molotov this morning. Molotov expressed interest in being informed of progress of conference. Chauvel gave him general review touching particularly on question of demarcation line, attitude of extreme intransigence being adopted by Viet Minh in military talks and problem of international controls. Molotov expressed interest but claimed unfamiliarity with details. Chauvel suggested desirability of contact between French military representatives and members of Soviet delegation in order that Soviet delegation might be fully informed of difficulties being encountered and of attitudes adopted by Viet Minh. Later in day Soviet delegation got in touch with French delegation and these contacts will be set up. Molotov stated that he had seen Chauvel's working paper (SECTO 575) and that while there were points requiring clarification and further study he thought it was a useful contribution.

Chauvel has impression both Russians and Chinese give Viet Minh fairly free hand to see how far they can go but that when they find Viet Minh demands have gone beyond limit which French can be expected to accept, they intervene. Chauvel made point to Molotov that any agreement reached must be acceptable not only to Franco-Vietnamese side and to Viet Minh but also to other conference members. He is hopeful that, as he says occurred previously, Chinese-Russian moderating influence will now be brought to bear on Viet Minh. Chauvel expressed confidence that if he were negotiating only with Russians and Chinese, he could almost certainly achieve a settlement in line with provisions of US-UK aide-memoire.

Chauvel told me that he is having his staff prepare drafts of an armistice agreement and related documents so as to be ready in case ministers reach agreements on major matters. He stated that information we had furnished regarding Korean armistice was most useful to them and was much appreciated.

JOHNSON

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 9 1954

Dear Mr. Murphy:

I refer to my letter of June 19th regarding U. S. assistance to the French in the formation and equipping of three light infantry divisions for use in Indo-China. The evaluation referred to in that letter has been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as set forth in the attached memorandum, with which I concur.

Since no additional indication of French intentions has been received in the Department of Defense and the new Premier has promised to end the war in Indo-China by 20 July or resign, I shall leave to you the timing of any additional U. S. actions which may be desired. I desire to point out, however, that in the event a formal request is received there is, in addition to the points contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, the additional problem raised by Section 106a(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (Richards Amendment), as approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which could bar the United States from replacing this equipment.

In the event that you determine that this French plan is worthy of further action, I suggest that the above point be included in those requiring resolution since the impact on NATO of the removal of equipment, if permanent, would be considerable.

Sincerely yours

(Signed)

R. B. ANDERSON
Acting

Incl. - 1

Copy 3 of JCS Memo, 24 June 1954

The Honorable Robert Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary of State
Department of State

cc: General Bonesteel

624

TOP SECRET

Department of State

03472

1954 JUL 10 PM 10

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ROUTING TELEGRAM
INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification
NIACT

SENT TO: AMEMB PARIS ¹²⁷ 7/10/54
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INFO. LONDON AND GENEVA ²¹

Origin

Info:

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Following is personal message from Secretary Dulles to Mendes-France which is to be delivered by Ambassador Dillon to Mendes-France in person as promptly as possible as instructed by separate cable.

BEGIN TEXT: My dear Mr. President:

President Eisenhower (who has been kept closely informed) and I have been greatly moved by your earnest request that I or General Bedell Smith should return next week to Geneva for what may be the conclusion of the Indochina phase of the Conference. I can assure you that our attitude in this respect is dictated by a desire to find the course which will best preserve the traditional friendship and cooperation of our countries and which will promote the goals of justice and human welfare and dignity to which our two nations have been traditionally dedicated. We also

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S: JFDulles: pdb

Stamp: Telegram, Mission and Classification Approved by: JFDulles
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Classification

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Page 2 of telegram to AMEMB PARIS

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attach great value to preserving the united front of France, Great Britain and the United States which has during this postwar period so importantly served all three of us in our dealings with the Communists.

What now concerns us is ~~that~~ that we are very doubtful as to whether there is ~~in fact~~ in relation to Indochina, a united front, and we do not believe that the mere fact that the high representatives of the three nations physically reappear together at Geneva will serve as a substitute for a clear agreement on a joint position which includes agreement as to what will happen if that position is not accepted by the Communists. We fear that unless there is the reality of a united front, the events at Geneva will expose differences under conditions which will only serve to accentuate them with consequent strain upon the relations between our two countries greater than if the US does not reappear at Geneva, in the person of General Smith or myself.

Beginning early last April the US worked intensively with the French Government and with that of Great Britain in an effort to create a common position of strength. ~~This~~ This did not prove possible. The reasons were understandable, and derived from fundamental ~~causes~~ causes which still subsist and influence the possibility of achieving at the present time a genuine "united front".

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Page 3 of telegram to AMEMB PARIS

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During the talks of Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden with President Eisenhower and me, an effort was made to find a common position which might be acceptable to the two of us and, we hoped, to the French Government. This was expressed in the seven-point memorandum of which you are aware. I believe that this represented a constructive contribution. However, I do not yet feel that there is a united position in the sense that the three of us would be prepared to stand firmly on this as a minimum acceptable solution and to see the negotiations break off and the warfare resume if this position was not accepted by the Communist side. We doubt very much that the Communists will in fact accept this seven-point position unless they realize that the alternative is some common action upon which we have all agreed. So far, there is no such alternative.

Under these circumstances, we greatly fear that the seven points which constitute a minimum as far as the US is concerned will constitute merely an optimum solution so far as your Government and perhaps the UK are concerned, and that an armistice might be concluded on terms substantially less favorable than those we could respect.

We gather that there is already considerable French thinking in terms of the acceptability of departures from certain of the seven points. For example:

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Page 4 of telegram to AMEMB PARIS

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Allowing Communist forces to remain in Northern Laos; accepting a Vietnam line of ^{military demarcation} ~~of/~~ ~~considerably~~ south of Donghoi; neutralizing and demilitarizing Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam so as to impair their capacity to maintain stable, non-Communist regimes; accepting elections so early and so ill-prepared and ill-supervised as to risk the loss of the entire area to Communism; accepting international supervision by a body which cannot be effective because it includes a Communist state which has veto power.

These are but illustrations of a whittling-away process, each stroke of which may in itself seem unessential, but which cumulatively could produce a result quite different from that envisaged by the seven points. Also, of course, there is the danger that the same unacceptable result might come about through the Communist habit of using words in a double sense and destroying the significance of principles ~~good-sounding words~~ with stultifying implementations.

We do not for a moment question the right of the French Government to exercise its own judgment in all of these respects. Indeed, we recognize that the issues for France are so vital that the French Government has a duty to exercise its own judgment. I have from the beginning recognized the preponderant interest of your Government as representing the nation which has borne for so many years the burden of

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Page 5 of telegram to AMEMB PARIS

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a cruel and costly war. However, my Government equally has the duty not to endorse a solution which would seem to us to impair seriously certain principles which the US believes must, as far as it is concerned, be kept unimpaired, if our own struggle against Communism is to be successfully pursued. At the same time, we do not wish to put ourselves in the position where we would seem to be passing moral judgment upon French action or disassociating ourselves from the settlement at a moment and under circumstances which might be unnecessarily dramatic.

~~It is also to be considered that if our~~
conduct creates a certain uncertainty in the minds of the
Communists, this might strengthen your hand more than our
presence at Geneva in a form which would expose probably
to the world, and certainly to the Communists themselves, differences which the Communists would exploit to the discomfiture of all three of us.

Under all these circumstances, it seems to us that the interests of both of our countries are best served by continuing for the time being the present ~~type~~ type of US representation at Geneva. This consists of able and responsible persons who are in close contact with the President and me.

If circumstances should alter so that it appeared that

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Page 6 of telegram to ANEMB PARIS

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our common interests would be better served if higher ranking officials became our representatives, then we would be alert to act accordingly.

It is because I am fully aware of the serious and solemn nature of the moment that I have gone into the matter at this considerable length. It is possible that by the first of the week, the Communist position will be sufficiently disclosed so that some of the answers to the foregoing queries can be foreseen. This might clarify in one sense or another the thinking of us all.

In this connection, let me emphasize that it is our ardent hope that circumstances might become such that consistently with the foregoing either General Bedell Smith or I can personally come to Geneva and stand beside you.

END TEXT

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8:23 p.m.

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 134, July 11, 9 p.m.

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FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

I delivered Secretary's message Department telegram 127 to Mendes in Geneva after lunch Sunday. At same time, I gave him personal message contained in first paragraph Department telegram 128. In view Eden's absence (SECTO 585), I did not (repeat not) see him. Johnson will deliver message to Eden tomorrow, if Aldrich has not (repeat not) already done so.

Mendes was very touched by personal message in Department telegram 128 and twice asked me to be sure and thank Secretary on his behalf for this thought.

Regarding Department telegram 127, Mendes expressed extreme disappointment and gave concern at United States decision not (repeat not) to be represented at Ministerial level. He divided his remarks into two categories, first, the effect of our decision on Conference itself, and second, the overall effect of our decision on world affairs.

Regarding first category, Mendes stated that our absence made French bargaining position far weaker. He stated that if Secretary was present, France would not (repeat not) accept anything at Conference that was unacceptable to United States. As he put it in his own words, presence of Secretary would give United States in effect a veto power on decisions of Conference. He felt it particularly important that we have someone at Geneva who could take strong personal position with Molotov, if and when necessary, and without having to refer to Washington for instructions. Mendes also feels that United States absence at Ministerial level will lead Communists to increase their pressure and be more demanding in order to deepen the obvious rift between the Western powers. He said France had not (repeat not) as yet departed from the Seven Point

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Point United States-United Kingdom position and he did not (repeat not) make any commitment to hold to these points during coming week, except for statement regarding United States veto power if Secretary present.

On the overall effect of our decision, Mendes pointed out that this will be first time since the war that United States not (repeat not) represented at equal level with other powers in an important conference. He said he felt certain that Europe would interpret United States absence as first step in return to a policy of isolationism. This he felt, would have catastrophic effects not (repeat not) only in Far East, but also in Europe and would be great cold war victory for Communism. According to Mendes, we would in effect be saying "do your best, you have our sympathy, but result is no (repeat no) real concern to us."

I tried hard to dissuade Mendes from this viewpoint, but without much success. His statement regarding United States veto power if Secretary present, led me to point out that there must also be an agreed alternative if Conference failed. Mendes promptly replied that only alternative to cease-fire at Geneva would be internationalization of war with United States military forces coming promptly to assistance of French. This aspect of our talk being covered more fully in separate telegram, being repeated to Saigon.

Finally, Mendes asked if there was anything he could do specifically to create a situation that would make it possible for Secretary to come to Geneva. He asked me to pass this question on to Washington. In this connection, he specifically questioned sixth paragraph of Secretary's letter, and said he knew of no (repeat no) French thinking along such lines, except possibly on subject of international supervision. He wondered where United States had got the ideas expressed in this paragraph.

While I was talking with Mendes, Johnson talked with Chauvel and showed him a copy of Secretary's letter. Chauvel showed Johnson a cable from Bonnet which indicated that Bonnet may have given Secretary the impression that French were considering retrating from Seven Point program.

Chauvel and Johnson joined us at end of our talk, and Johnson and I suggested that if Mendes developed any concrete ideas which would help meet United States fears, it would be helpful if he put them into a reply to Secretary's letter. While Mendes was non-committal as to a formal reply, I rather expect he will make one. In closing, Mendes said he would keep in close touch with Johnson. During talk, Mendes made it clear that while presence of Under Secretary at Geneva would be most helpful, he very much hoped that Secretary himself could come.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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FROM: Paris

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TO: Secretary of State

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SENT DEPARTMENT 133 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 20, SAIGON 12, LONDON 34

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FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR DILLON

During conversation with Mendes at Geneva, I informed him of contents of DEPIEL 84 and of our feeling that Vietnam Government should be kept more fully informed by French. I told him that we felt time had now come for Vietnam to be informed of general lines of seven point program. Mendes said he would consider informing Vietnamese after discussing matter with his advisors during afternoon. He said he had originally felt it preferable not to inform them until he could assure them that (US) was prepared to guarantee them against further aggression or subversion.

He then spoke at length of necessity for a clear-cut US guarantee that would protect Associated States in the event that the Communists did not honor the spirit of any agreement that might be reached at Geneva. Without such a guarantee he said that a settlement would not be worth the paper it was written on. Mendes asked me to inquire as to whether if a settlement within seven point framework was obtained, Secretary would then be willing to come to Geneva to close conference and to work out necessary guarantees to protect Associated States.

He then discussed in some detail the situation which would arise if no settlement was reached at Geneva. He said the sending of conscripts to Indochina would then be debated on July 22 and 23. If the National Assembly approved, the first division would leave on July 25 and the second division about 10 days later. It would take a month to reach Indochina and three more weeks to get troops ready for action. Therefore the first division of conscripts would not be ready in Indochina until about September 15.

This schedule for reinforcements would be known to Viet Minh and

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the result

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7/13/54 4:40 p.m.
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R -2- 133, July 11, 9 p.m., from Paris

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The result would undoubtedly be a massive Viet Minh assault during August prior to arrival of new troops

Mendes said he doubted if French alone could successfully resist such an assault. He said that French Government would officially inform US of these facts at end of July if no cease-fire reached.

I reminded him of US requirements for action on our part, and he said he could not foretell how French Parliament might react. They might react strongly and request US help to continue the war or they might have what he termed a "nervous breakdown" and push for capitulation at any price to save expeditionary corps.

If no cease-fire, Mendes will resign, but in view of the above, I feel it is possible that if no cease-fire is reached the French Government which will succeed Mendes may appeal for US armed help, and may meet all US terms. Not possible to estimate timing of such an appeal but it could occur during August when US Congress no longer in session.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JUL 13 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: U.S./U.K. Discussions on Southeast Asia

Three meetings of the Joint U.S./U.K. Study Group on Southeast Asia, established as a follow-up to the Eisenhower/Churchill discussions, have been held. In addition, there have been several meetings of the U.S. side. Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith is the Senior U.S. Representative. The U.K. is represented by Sir Robert H. Scott.

The views of the U.K. with respect to collective security in the Southeast Asia area may be summarized as follows:

a. It is the British view that a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia should be considered in two contexts, (1) on the basis of a settlement in Indochina, and (2) on the basis of no settlement. In the event of a settlement which does not pose an immediate military problem, the British would prefer a generalized collective security arrangement designed to bring in as many states as possible. This approach would include such states as India, Indonesia, and Burma. On the other hand, if there is no Indochina settlement at Geneva the British would agree to immediately establish an organization to meet the military threat. Such an organization would presumably be limited to those countries who would make military commitments to halt the Communist aggression.

b. Under the arrangement which the British prefer be established in the event of a settlement, there would be three principal elements to the organization: a council which would include all participants in the organization, an economic and political council which would include as many of the states as possible and would deal with the economic and social problems of the area, and a military organization which would have fewer members, since states such as India would unquestionably not wish to participate in the military aspects of the organization.

c. In the event that there is no agreement in Indochina, the British would immediately move ahead with an effective military arrangement designed to obtain as much support as possible for an organization to resist further Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

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Page 1 of 3 Pages

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In addition to the foregoing, there are several points which have come out in discussions with the British which are worthy of mention:

- a. The British have no intention of "pressing forward" with a Southeast Asia Collective Security Organization until the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference has been terminated.
- b. The British representative has referred on a number of occasions to use of military force to repel overt Communist aggression. However, the British attitude with respect to infiltration and subversion is vague.
- c. The British consider that the principal problem in dealing with Southeast Asia after an Indochina settlement would be a large-scale economic assistance program. Although there has been no discussion as to support of the economic assistance program for Southeast Asia, there is little doubt which state would be the principal contributor.

During the course of the meetings, General Smith has maintained that regardless of whether there is a settlement in Indochina it is necessary that an effective collective security organization be established. Further, it is necessary that the organization be established immediately in order that we will be in a position to deal with the probable adverse political and military repercussions in the Associated States that will result from an unsatisfactory settlement of the Indochina conflict. It has also been pointed out to the British that inasmuch as the principal danger of further Communist aggression in Southeast Asia will probably take the form of infiltration and subversion, the organization must be in a position to deal effectively with this situation.

Since approval of a collective security organization would probably require considerable time for action by the various governments concerned, the United States representatives have proposed that consideration be given to the establishment of an interim organization to deal with the situation. The British have indicated tentative agreement with this idea. A further point has been made by the U. S. representatives that no geographical limitation should be put on the treaty covering the collective security area. I recommended, and Secretary Dulles agreed, that the area covered by the treaty should not be restricted to Southeast Asia, but rather should be open to permit inclusion of non-Communist states of the entire Far East area. Although Sir Robert Scott did not object to this view, it is possible that when the formal British position becomes clear they might not agree to leave open the area to be covered by the Treaty.

An additional point which has been discussed with the British has been the question of a declaration to be made in the event of a settlement at Geneva on Indochina. Secretary Smith informed the British that the U.S. is planning to make a unilateral declaration and hopes that

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
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declarations which the British and other allies make would not vary substantially from the U.S. declaration. Sir Robert Scott indicated that the British prefer a multilateral declaration to include at least Australia, New Zealand, and possibly India and other nations having an interest in the area. The British do not exclude the possibility of a multilateral declaration including Communist participation. The British were informed that it would be impossible for the United States to participate in a multilateral declaration which includes Communist China.

Several documents have been exchanged by the U.S. and U.K. delegations. At a meeting on 10 July a U.S. draft treaty was submitted to the British for their consideration. British comments are expected at a meeting on 13 July. Following receipt of the British comments, it is planned that the draft treaty will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. If the views of the U.S. and U.K. on a draft treaty can be resolved, the Department of State plans to establish a working group consisting of the U.S., U.K., and other countries which are likely to participate in a collective security organization, with a view to developing an agreed draft of a treaty. I shall keep you informed of further developments in this matter.

FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA):



A. C. DAVIS
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Office of
Foreign Military Affairs

cc: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 179, July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

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SENT DEPARTMENT 179; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 45, GENEVA 27.

Paris Talks - III

In addition to the following agreed texts of Paris meeting, the Secretary's party will bring full memoranda of conversations: (The following documents are classified and not (repeat not) for release.)

A. Agreed French-United States position paper on Indochina.

QUOTE

1. France and the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are recognized to be those which, on the non-Communist side, are primarily interested in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference.

The United States is interested primarily as a friendly nation which desires to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just settlement, but who will not (repeat not) seek, or be expected, to impose its views in any way upon those primarily interested.

2. The attached 7 points constitute a result which France believes to be obtainable by negotiation at Geneva and which would be acceptable to France and, France believes, to the Associated States. The United States, while recognizing the right of those primarily interested to accept different terms, will itself be prepared to respect terms conforming to the attached. The United States will not (repeat not) be asked or expected by France to respect terms which in its opinion differ materially from the attached, and it may publicly disassociate itself from such differing terms.

3. If the settlement is one which the United States is prepared to "respect" its position will be expressed unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states in terms

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-2- 179, July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Paris.

which apply to the situation the principles of non-use of forces which are embodied in Article 2 (4) and (6) of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. The United States is prepared to seek, with other interested nations, a collective defense association designed to preserve, against direct and indirect aggression, the integrity of the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia following any settlement.

5. If there is no (repeat no) settlement, the United States and French Governments will consult together on the measures to be taken. This will not (repeat not) preclude the United States, if it so desires, bringing the matter before the United Nations as involving a threat to peace as dealt with by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

6. France reaffirms the principle of independence for the Associated States in equal and voluntary association as members of the French Union.

UNQUOTE

B. Annex to above document consisting of the 7 points regarding a settlement which could be respected as agreed during Churchill-Eisenhower conversations. (Please note following phrase which has been added with the full consent of Eden and Mendes-France at the beginning of paragraph 2 of the 7 points.)

"In connection with the line of military demarcation, preserves--"

"Memorandum of points referred to in paragraph 2 of the France-United States position paper.

An agreement which:

"1. Preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces therefrom;

"2. In connection with the line of military demarcation preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam and if possible an enclave in the deltas; in this connection, we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi;

"3. Does not (repeat not) impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces

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-3- 179, July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Paris.

for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers;

"4. Does not (repeat not) contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;

"5. Does not (repeat not) exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of the Vietnam by peaceful means;

"6. Provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and

"7. Provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement."

C. Letter from Mendes-France to Secretary (unofficial translation of French text).

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Following our frank and friendly conversation of last evening, I believe I understand fully the position of the United States with regard to the negotiations at Geneva concerning Indochina.

If I interpret your views correctly, you recognize fully the primary right of France, the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, to decide the conditions for the settlement of a war in which they are the only belligerents on the non-Communist side. You wish to aid us through your good offices in obtaining a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested peoples. However, you are not (repeat not) prepared to participate with the Communist countries in any settlement which might appear to retain for them the benefits of aggression or the domination of non-willing peoples. In any case, if a settlement should be arrived at between the parties holding the primary responsibility, you would agree to indicate that you would comply with the principles which are contained in Articles 2 (4) and (6) of the United Nations Charter and you would consider any violation of the settlement by the Communist regimes as being of grave concern.

DULLES

MRS/1

NOTE: Mr. Drumright (FE) notified 10 p.m., 7/14, MPL (CWO)

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 179, July 14, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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It being your belief that the continuation of the war would involve a serious risk of an extension of the conflict, both as concerns the combat areas and the belligerent countries, the question of the participation of the United States would be guided by the terms defined in the fourth paragraph of the letter addressed on July 16, 1954, by President Eisenhower to President Coty.

You have indicated to me that you would fear, in the present state of negotiations, that the sending by the United States to Geneva of representatives chosen at a high level and bearing instructions from President Eisenhower to adhere to the principles noted above, could cause a situation capable of giving rise in France, under the most regrettable circumstances, to a feeling that our two countries are divided and that it might risk affecting seriously their good relations which are so important to the whole free world.

I have noted your hesitation to come to Geneva in the fear of having eventually to disassociate yourself from an agreement, or certain of its terms, which you might not (repeat not) be able to respect. This appears to me to be understandable, but in my opinion it does not (repeat not) respond to the situation. In effect, I have every reason to think that your absence would be precisely interpreted as demonstrating, before the fact, that you disapproved of the conference and of everything which might be accomplished. Not (repeat not) only would those who are against us find therein the confirmation of the ill will which they attribute to your government, concerning the re-establishment of peace in Indochina; but many others would read in it a sure sign of a division of the western powers. Finally, the negotiations would thus be deprived of the element of balance indispensable to the seeking of a solution as recommended in the memorandum of June 30.

I consider thus that such an absence would produce an effect

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diametrically opposed to the intentions which you have expressed and which I have cited above. In a situation as difficult as this only the unity of the western democratic front, supported by the immense potential which we have in common, can bring about the very military and strategic unity which we should seek eventually to establish in that part of the world.

It is in this spirit that the French Government envisages, aside from the assurances which the conference itself could furnish, the establishment of a collective guarantee by virtue of which the signatories would declare themselves prepared to intervene if, in Indochina, one of the three states was a victim of aggression.

I am fully conscious of the position of the government of the United States and I have noted with care the consequences which it might imply; but for the reasons which I have just enumerated, I have the profound conviction that the common interests of our two countries and of the three Associated States would be effectively defended only if you, yourself, or the Undersecretary should represent in person your government at Geneva.

If the situation should nevertheless evolve in a manner which would confirm your fears, I engage myself, on behalf of France, to make known publicly the conditions under which you have acceded to my request.

UNQUOTE

D. Letter from Secretary to Mendes-France.

QUOTE

My Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of July 14 with reference to participation by the United States in the final stages of the Indochina phase of the Geneva conference.

In the light of what you say and after consultation with President Eisenhower, I am glad to be able to inform you that the President and I are asking the Undersecretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith, to prepare to return at his earliest convenience to Geneva to share in the work of the conference on the basis of the understanding which we have arrived at.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity which we have had to

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-3-#179, July 14, 9 p.m., (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Paris

confer together and I believe that it has added a new chapter to the honorable and precious tradition of Franco-American cooperation.

UNQUOTE

E. Letter to Mendes-France from Eden.

QUOTE

My Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for providing me with copies of correspondence exchanged today between yourself and Mr. John Foster Dulles on the present phase of the Indochina conference at Geneva.

I have noted their contents and wish to assure you that, as a friend and ally, I shall do my best to help you to achieve a settlement on the basis set out in this correspondence.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Dulles.

UNQUOTE

DULLES

EL/6

Note: Mr. Drumright (FE) notified 10 p.m., 7/14, NPL.

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SECRETARY DULLES' REPORT ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO PARIS

At the NSC meeting of 15 July, Secretary Dulles reported on his recent trip to Paris as follows:

1. He had been in practically continuous meetings with Mendes-France and Mr. Eden from the time of his arrival to his departure, sometimes with one or the other individually and sometimes with the two together. He had told Mendes that, in his opinion, most of France's troubles stem from a lack of French decision on EDC. Because of this, the Soviets were being successful in splitting France and Germany. Therefore, he put the greatest urgency on French action on EDC. Mendes said that it might not be possible now to get a constitutional majority of 314 votes in the Assemblée without some face-saving formula. He hoped this could be done through minor amendments which would not require renegotiation, but in any event, Mendes had promised Secretary Dulles action by the Assembly by early August. Mr. Dulles had pointed out that the U.S. public was getting a trifle short-tempered on the EDC topic and that if Mendes was not careful, the U.S. Congress might terminate aid to NATO which would be detrimental to the military effort of all Europe, especially France.

2. a. Regarding the dilemma of U.S. participation in the Geneva Conference, Secretary Dulles had pointed out that if the U.S. participates in the Conference and then finds itself unable to guarantee the results, a violent French public reaction against the U.S. would ensue. Similarly, if the U.S. participates and so stiffens French will that France does not accept the Communist best offer, then again, the U.S. would be blamed and a major strain placed upon U.S.-French relations. Therefore, the U.S. was seeking to play an inconspicuous role.

b. The original VM proposal had been for a partition line along the 14th parallel; their second proposal, along the 16th parallel. Both had been rejected and the French position was to hold out for the 18th parallel, along with the guaranteed independence of Laos and Cambodia.

c. The Secretary had worked up with the French a joint U.S.-French paper along the lines of the seven points of the U.S.-U.K. paper which had resulted from the Churchill-Eden talks. Mr. Dulles had said there would be no U.S. guarantee of the settlement, but rather a unilateral declaration that the U.S. would not attempt to change it by force. Mendes had provided Mr. Dulles with a letter of reply and acceptance of the U.S.-French position paper. Accordingly, Gen. Smith was returning to Geneva with his instructions contained in these two papers.

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Sullivan
Crosby*

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3. Mr. Dulles said that the Mendes Government put more emphasis on the granting of independence to the Associated States than had the Lanier Government. Mendes even agreed that French functionaries and eventually armed forces would have to leave the area. It was current French planning to hold Haiphong until French forces and their equipment could be evacuated but not to attempt to maintain Haiphong as a permanent enclave.

4. When asked if the VN would agree to the seven points, the Secretary said he was not sure but he could count on support from Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Allen Dulles felt the possibility of VN uprising against the French was a real one.

5. Mendes had assured Secretary Dulles that if the Geneva Conference was a failure, he would send two additional French divisions to Indochina, although they could not arrive before September, 1954.

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FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 626, July 16, 7 p.m.

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SAIGON 44.

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4:12 p.m.

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Saw Chauvel this afternoon. He told me that Mendes-France and Molotov had dinner last night, and Soviets had launched into substantive discussion even before cocktails were served and continued throughout dinner, and Mendes-France and Molotov had discussion following dinner with only interpreters present which lasted more than 3 hours until almost 1:00 a.m. Discussion covered whole range of outstanding questions at least once; according to Chauvel some of them "twenty times". Chauvel said Mendes had stuck firmly to French positions and with very minor exceptions of elections mentioned below, Molotov had, while being very pleasant, not (repeat not) budged an inch. On elections Molotov finally made suggestion that conference agree on date by which two governments of Vietnam would have decided date for elections. Mendes rejected this. Chauvel's assessment was that Communists expected to find Mendes "soft", are somewhat confused at his firmness, and are still testing him.

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There have been no (repeat no) other major developments. I called Chauvel's particular attention to paragraph 3 of position paper on Indochina agreed at Paris and noted that French were still using term "guaranteeing powers" in draft armistice, and asked how he perceived the situation in this regard. He said that he conceived guarantee to be more than that embodied in French draft of conference declaration (SECTO 597). I pointed out that position paper made it clear that US will express its position unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states, and was not quite sure how French concept of conference declaration fitted therewith. I said I had particularly instructed Bonsal reserve our position on last paragraph of French draft providing for consultation among conference powers on reports of violations by supervisory commission. Although I had no (repeat no) instructions on subject, I did not (repeat not) believe US would be willing assume continuing obligation consult with all conference powers including Communist China and Viet Minh. Chauvel said that in light of paragraph 3 of position paper, French draft provided only for conference "noting armistice agreement."

646

Chauvel

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TOP SECRET

-2- SECTO 626, July 16, 7 p.m., from Geneva

Chauvel said French were concerned over reports continued contacts between Fran Van Do and Dong. They did not know exactly what was happening, they know very little about Do, but they had impression he was unsophisticated and might be "taken into camp" by Dong. They felt after zones between defined and two governments each clearly responsible for own territories, such contacts would probably be desirable and necessary, but in present situation might be dangerous and could even result in surprise more bringing about something in nature of coalition government. Chauvel said De Jean was going to see Bao Dai to determine what Bao Dai knew about the matter and whether he had approved.

In reply to my question on what French conceived to be major outstanding issue, Chauvel listed: (1) military demarcation line in Vietnam, (2) regrouping in Vietnam, particularly in delta area, where Chauvel said Viet Minh would be required to move out two divisions from areas that they now occupied so as permit separation from French-Vietnamese forces. In Laos he said major question retention small number French troops there (consideration was being given to "changing their flag" from French to Laos), and also political questions in Laos. He said there were no major issues on Cambodia.

Chauvel also mentioned international control and asked whether I had any new instructions on subject. I said I had not and subject had not been discussed at Paris in any detail.

UK informed me today that meeting was proposed this afternoon between Mendes, Eden and Molotov to go over present stage of work of conference and make catalogue of work to be done. They asked whether I wished to be present, pointing out if US were present Soviets would probably insist on presence of Chinese, thus turning meeting into "five power affair". I replied that I had no objection to their going ahead on three-power basis.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action assigned to *PSA/PSA*
Control: 7473
Rec'd: July 17, 1954
3 p.m. *noted*

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FROM: Geneva
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 632, July 17, 7 p.m.

Date of Action *7/18*
Action Control Symbol *PSA*
Action to DC/R *file*

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 632; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 79, SAIGON 50.

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396.1-GE/7-1754

Following account of Mendes-France-Eden-Molotov meeting last night is based on report of this meeting to Foreign Office made available to Johnson by Caccia. This telegram expands upon and supersedes preliminary account transmitted in first three paragraphs SECTO 630 (repeated information Paris 76, Saigon 48).

At Eden's suggestion, French enumerated documents before conference:

(A) Armistice agreements to be signed by local commanders-in-chief. French have prepared drafts for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodians draft for Cambodia. Viet Minh delegation preparing counter draft for Vietnam.

(B) Control arrangements. French have circulated papers for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

(C) Political arrangements. After having seen military documents, certain delegations might make unilateral statements. For example, Laos and Cambodia are preparing statements on their willingness to limit their armed forces. Conference as whole would then agree upon common statement taking note of military agreements and unilateral declarations. French have circulated draft of such statement. Soviets have prepared counter draft and French second redraft.

French explained that if conference did not (repeat not) have time to agree on all details of armistice, it might approve only parts providing for cessation of hostilities and first stage of regroupment. Remaining aspects of agreements could be covered by statement of general principles for guidance of experts who would work out details after conference had dispersed.

It was agreed that British, French, and Soviet experts would meet July 17 to consider various drafts.

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At Eden's

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-2- SECIO 632, July 17, 7 p.m., from Geneva.

At Eden's suggestion, Mendes-France summarized main outstanding problems as (A) demarcation line for Vietnam; (B) elections, and (C) control arrangements. Concerning demarcation line, he said French had proposed line near 18th parallel whereas Viet Minh proposed 16th parallel. On elections in Vietnam, he said question was whether to fix firm date now (repeat now) (Soviets had proposed June 1955) or whether, as French proposed, to settle now (repeat now) only manner in which date would be set. Elections in Laos and Cambodia already provided for in constitutions for August and September 1955, respectively. On control, he said main questions were: Whether there should be one commission or three, composition, voting, execution of commissions' recommendations, and freedom of movement for inspection teams.

Molotov added to outstanding issues: (D) time required for regrouping (French have proposed 300 days and Soviets 6 months); and (E) prevention of importation of new arms and military personnel subject to certain exceptions for Laos and Cambodia, prohibition of foreign military bases, and prohibition of military alliances by three states.

Eden added (F) question of regroupment areas for resistance forces in Laos.

Discussion then turned to substantive issues:

(A) Elections in Vietnam. Molotov said conference should fix date for elections. He conceded more flexible formula might be found than firm date of June 1955 previously proposed by Soviets and suggested agreement merely that elections be held during 1955 with precise date to be fixed by Vietnamese and Viet Minh authorities.

Mendes-France argued that it would be imprudent to fix date as early as the end of 1955. He suggested two ways of providing necessary flexibility in arrangements: Date for elections might be fixed after completion of regrouping; or exact date might be fixed now (repeat now) and international control commission be given authority to advance date if necessary.

Eden supported Mendes-France on need for flexibility and suggested that two parts of Vietnam fix date after completion of regrouping. Mendes-France agreed to consider this suggestion, but Molotov continued to urge elections during 1955.

(B)

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-3- SECTO 632, July 17, 7 p.m., from Geneva.

(B) Demarcation line. Molotov argued that in moving from 13th to 16th parallel, Viet Minh had made substantial concession which called for proper response from French. Mendes-France disagreed, arguing that Viet Minh would be giving up much less in Annam than they would be getting in Tonkin. He said that Pham Van Dong had admitted that line on 16th parallel would require special arrangements for Tourane, Hue, on route No. 9 leading into Laos. Mendes-France stated that necessity for such special arrangements showed how unnatural demarcation line at 16th parallel would be. He said that there was no (repeat no) chance of persuading French Government to accept line which excluded either Hue or route No. 9. Eden supported Mendes-France.

Molotov suggested that discussion move to question of control arrangements. Mendes-France replied might be better to postpone such discussion. He observed that questions of elections and demarcation line had been discussed together and might be linked in sense that conceivably one party might yield on one question and another party on other.

SMITH

MRS/8

NOTE: Read by Mr. Sturm (FE) 5:30 p.m. 7/17/54 LQ5.

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23-B

Action Assigned to *PSA/Dir*
Control: 7478
Rec'd on July 17, 1954
4:22 p.m. *noted*

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FROM: Geneva

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: SECTO 633, July 17, 8 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 633, RPTD INFO PARIS 80, SAIGON 51

Nguyen Huu Chau of Vietnamese delegation handed USDEL copy of note which was given to French delegation today. He said French requested contents be kept secret for moment, and that French not aware copy given to this delegation. Following is unofficial translation:

BEGIN QUOTE

Just as the French High Command in Indochina evacuated, without fighting and in spite of the strongest protests by President Ngo Dinh Diem, zones vital for the defense and the existence of a free Vietnam, the delegation of the Vietnamese National Government learned only by the papers and by the messages which were sent to it yesterday, July 16, that the French delegation appears already to have accepted abandoning to the Viet Minh all of that part situated north of the eighteenth parallel and that the delegation of the Viet Minh might claim an even more advantageous demarcation line.

The National Government of Vietnam has also been left in complete ignorance of the proposals on the fate of Vietnam made by the French Government to the American and British Governments, particularly at the meeting in Paris.

The delegation of the State of Vietnam must express its surprise at this situation.

This delegation finds it hard to understand that peace in Vietnam is being negotiated without previously consulting with its qualified representatives.

The de facto partition which seems to have been adopted from the outset by the delegations of France and of the Viet Minh--at discussions bearing only on the materialization of the partition--does not take any account of the unanimous will for national unity of the Vietnamese people.

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396.1-GE/7-1754

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-2- SECTO 633, July 17, 8 p.m. from Geneva

On the other hand the regroupment of non-national armed forces in the zones resulting from the partition implies their consolidation outside of any danger of combat and thus reinforces the threat that they constitute to the free expression of the will of the people.

Therefore not only does such a cease-fire not lead to a durable peace, since, ignoring the will for national unity, it provokes the people to "unify" the country, but, by the consolidation of the armed forces now facing each other, it violates in advance the liberty of the future elections.

The delegation of the State of Vietnam, which more than any other wishes the return of peace, is pleased with the efforts put forth by the other delegations in favor of this object. However, it greatly fears that the cease-fire, such as it seems to be accepted by certain delegations, far from leading to peace, makes peace improbable and precarious.

Aware of these very grave dangers and certain that it is expressing the profound aspirations of all true Vietnamese, including most of the Viet Minh fighters themselves, and in full accord with the Chief and the Government of the State of Vietnam, the Vietnamese delegation asks not only a cease-fire but the disarmament of all the belligerent forces in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese delegation asks that the entire territory of Vietnam be placed provisionally under the control of the United Nations pending the complete re-establishment of security, of order and of peace in their minds and in their hearts which will permit the Vietnamese people to decide their destiny by free elections.

His Majesty Bao Dai, Chief of State of Vietnam, thus shows once more that he places the independence and the unity of his country above any other consideration, and the National Government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional control by the United Nations over a truly unified and independent Vietnam to its maintenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned to slavery.

The Vietnamese delegation reserves its right to develop its proposal at a later time.

END QUOTE

SMITH

AB:PAF/3

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Note: Read by Mr. Sturm (FE) 5:30 p.m. 7/17/54. IQB

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WIRING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 639, July 18, 1 p.m.

NIACT

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY

Control: 7566
Rec'd: July 18, 1954
9:58 a.m.

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*delivered by
Sec. Dept.
July 18
PSA/PSA*

Following despatch given us in advance by Topping of Associated Press apparently represents official Chinese Communist position and was given Topping in order that we would become aware of it. It begins:

QUOTE

The Communist bloc has demanded that the United States guarantee the partition peace plan for Indochina and join in an agreement to neutralize the whole country, a responsible Chinese Communist informant said today.

The informant, who reflects the views of Red China Premier Chou En-lai, said the Communists are hopeful of a cease-fire agreement by next Tuesday's deadline if the Western powers agree to 'bar all foreign military bases from Indochina and keep the three member states out of any military bloc.'

The informant said the Communists are pressing for the stamp of American approval on the armistice agreement--already okayed in principle by Britain and France--which would divide Vietnam between Communist leader Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh and Bao Da 's pro-Western regime.

'We believe that the US as a member of the conference should and is obligated to subscribe to and guarantee any settlement. Morally, there is no reason for the US to avoid this obligation.'

But the informant did not (repeat not) rule out the chance of an Indochina cease-fire even if the US refuses to okay the armistice agreement.

The Eisenhower administration has told France and Britain that they can go ahead with their plan for an Indochina settlement based on partition of Vietnam. But Washington has made it clear that it is not (repeat not) ready to associate itself formally with the plan which would sanction putting millions of Vietnamese under Red rule.

505.1-GE/7-1954

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-2- SECTO 639, July 18, 1 p.m., from Geneva

The Communist informant said the 'crucial issue' now in the Geneva peace negotiations revolves around whether the Western powers will agree effectively to neutralize Indochina.

Refusal to join in such a guarantee,' the informant said, 'could seriously deter a final settlement. On other important points in the negotiations we are in agreement or close to it. We are hopeful and we believe that there is time to reach a settlement by July 20.'

French Premier Pierre Mendes-France has promised to resign with his Cabinet if he fails to end the bloody eight-year-old war by next Tuesday. Fall of the French Government probably would doom the Geneva negotiations. The informant declared that American efforts to organize a Southeast Asia Treaty organization (SEATO) is 'a threat to any possible Indochina agreement.'

'Success or failure of the Geneva Conference may depend on the attitude of the American delegation in this regard,' he added.

END QUOTE

The above seems to me extremely significant, particularly in view of the fact that in my discussion with Eden last night he expressed pessimism, which he said was now shared for the first time by Krishna Menon. Latter had begun to feel, as I do, that Molotov wishes to force Mendes-France's resignation. Eden remarked that Molotov had now become the most difficult and intransigent member of Communist delegation. You will note obvious intention to place on shoulders of US responsibility for failure of Geneva Conference and fall of French Government if this occurs.

Molotov is insisting on a meeting this afternoon which French and British are trying to make highly restricted as they are apprehensive of what may occur. If such a meeting is held and if demands are made for US association in any agreement, I will simply say that in the event a reasonable settlement is arrived at which US could "respect", US will probably issue a unilateral statement of its own position. If question of participation Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in security pact is raised, I will reply that this depends on outcome of conference.

Eden has already told Molotov that security pact is inevitable, that he himself favored it some time ago and that he would not (repeat not) withdraw from that position, but he made the mistake of saying that no consideration had been given to inclusion of Laos and Cambodia.

This final

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-5- SECTO 639, July 18, 1 p.m., from Geneva

This final gambit is going to be extremely difficult to play and I do not (repeat not) now see the moves clearly. However, my opinion as expressed to you before leaving, i.e., that Molotov will gain more by bringing down Mendès Government than by a settlement, has grown stronger.

SMITH

DU:MEJ/5

Note: Mr. Halla (SS) notified 10:40 a.m., 7/18/54, CWO/FED

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OUTGOING
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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC 565 NIACT

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FOR
FROM SECRETARY ~~RR~~ UNDER SECRETARY

3401-GE/7-1754

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Does SECTO 637 fourth paragraph mean that Eden has given away ~~X~~ position which Mendes-France took in Paris, namely that he was willing to have Communist state on Control Commission without veto, or unanimity if no Communist state a member, but he would not (rpt not) take both a Communist state and unanimity rule?

Your SECTO 639 received. It may be useful for you to bear in mind that Executive has no Constitutional power to give "guarantee". This can only be done by treaty, ratification of which would surely be rejected. Executive can only reaffirm in relation to Indochina its general undertakings expressed in UN Charter.

An fearful Eden will try to push Mendes-France into agreement far short of 7 Points which will confront us with dilemma of either agreeing to "respect" it or repudiation which might involve our responsibility for breakup. This precisely result which I apprehended and fully discussed with

Dist. Desired
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Drafted by: S. JFDulles:cjp

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S. JFDulles

Clearance:

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Page 2 of telegram to Ameonsul GENEVA

~~TOP SECRET~~
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Mendes-France Paris and I must count on him to strive to protect both our countries against consequences of this Communist maneuver which Eden might unwittingly abet.

Jules

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~~TOP SECRET~~
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INFO: J5-2 NMCC-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 DIA-15
CSA-1 CNO-9 CSAF-1 CMC-3 CJCS-1 DJS-3

SECTIONS 1 AND 2
OF 55684

J3-8 SACS-3 G/C-1 ASD/PA-1 ASD/SA-3 FILE-1(59) JH/RA

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

Control: 7613
Rec'd: July 18, 1954
9:33 p.m.

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FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

Action Assigned to

NO: SECTO 654, July 18, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 654, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 94,
LONDON 19, SAIGON 63, TOKYO 6, MOSCOW 7.

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE; TOKYO PASS CINCPAC; SAIGON PASS
VIENTIANE AND PHNOM PENH

Twenty-third Indochina restricted session Sunday, July 18,
Molotov presiding. This session-called at urgent request
Soviets; French and British had requested that participants
be confined to chiefs of del plus one adviser. This latter
relaxed to permit two advisers.

Molotov spoke first, noting that last meeting of Foreign
Ministers held on June 19, just one month ago. He believed
that today's session presented good opportunity to gauge
importance of period which had passed since last meeting
and work performed by deputies. He believed that results
achieved through private meetings and discussions had been
not (repeat not) inconsiderable. Of course, not (repeat not)
all of the questions had been resolved nor everything done
which had to be done, but one should recognize the value of
what had been achieved.

Molotov said first of all he wished to note that as far as
the most complicated problem was concerned, that of peace in
Indochina, a basis for reestablishment of peace had been ac-
hieved as a result private negotiations which had opened possi-
bility of agreement on that question. He believed all parti-
cipants would attach appropriate significance to this accom-
plishment. He felt it was also important to recognize the
work done with reference to establishment of peace in Laos
and Cambodia. In this connection, it is perhaps true that
everything had not (repeat not) been done that could be done
but it appeared conference was on way to agreement concerning
Laos and Cambodia.

Molotov said that all this shows recent private talks have
had success and he expressed belief that such success would

658 **CONFIDENTIAL**

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- SECTO 654, July 18, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from
Geneva

continue.

Describing situation as it appeared to him, Molotov noted that drafts for agreements on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and Laos had been presented to conference. Two drafts would be available today. The same was also true for Cambodia. He hoped parties concerned would display goodwill necessary to agree on unresolved points in these drafts.

Molotov noted also were two drafts of Geneva conference declaration dealing with important political matters.

Two drafts have also been presented concerning the question of international control pertaining to implementation of the agreements. Question of control commission has long been discussed and Molotov felt that final agreement on this subject would not (repeat not) require great deal of time.

Molotov concluded by saying that he had made these observations in order to give general picture of the conference at present and that his remarks were naturally not (repeat not) complete. He believed that today's meeting could make progress re the questions under discussion and would contribute to solution of problems facing conference.

After long pause Tran Van Do (Vietnam) spoke next, saying he had learned this morning that today's meeting was to review final declaration of Geneva conference. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, he wished to state firmly that Vietnam del could not (repeat not) associate itself with any discussion of this declaration. Vietnam position based on following points

1. Vietnam does not agree to conditions advanced for cessation of hostilities.
2. Vietnam delegation has not (repeat not) as yet advanced proposals on behalf of Vietnam Government for solution of problem based on principles of peace; independence and unity.

With regard point number one, Do referred to French draft of July 16 of conference declaration (SECTO 628 repeated Paris 74, Saigon 46). This draft spoke of division of Vietnam into zones. For example, article 6 said settlement must permit Vietnamese people enjoy fundamental liberties guaranteed by democratic institutions formed following free elections.

659

SMITH

JM

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO: J5-2 NMCC-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 DIA-15
CSA-1 CNO-9 CSAF-1 CMC-3

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Control: 7615
Rec'd: July 18 1954 492
10:15 p.m.

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 654, July 18, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 654, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 94, LONDON 19, SAIGON 63, TOKYO 6, MOSCOW 7, VIENTIANE, PHNOM PENH UNNUMBERED.
TOKYO PASS CINCFE.

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE.

supervised by international commission. Elections would take place when in opinion of competent representative authorities in each zone restoration of peace in country has made sufficient progress, et cetera. Article 7 speaks of a settlement which would give Vietnamese people right decide freely as to zone where residence desired.

Vietnamese representative next referred to Soviet draft of July 15 (SECTO 615, repeated Paris 63, Saigon 35). Article 8 of Soviet draft speaks of "consultation between competent representative authorities of northern and southern zones of Vietnam". Article 10 states that representative authorities in northern and southern zones of Vietnam, as well as authorities of Laos and Cambodia, will not permit persecution of persons who have collaborated with other side.

In view Vietnamese delegation, this indicates that Vietnam will be divided into north and south zones. Everyone is talking of the division of Vietnam and mention is even made of parallels at which division will be accomplished. Delegation of Vietnam can only protest the idea of partition. Based on point number one cited earlier in statement of Vietnamese representative, Vietnamese delegation flatly rejects both drafts submitted to conference.

Vietnamese representative then stated that Vietnamese delegation has not had opportunity, on behalf of new Vietnamese Government, to express own views. It reserves its right to submit a draft declaration and to elaborate on it at a plenary meeting in near future. Vietnamese delegation therefore requests a plenary meeting for this purpose.

680 **CONFIDENTIAL**

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-2- SECTO 654, July 18, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO), from Geneva.

Do noted further that there was no mention of State of Vietnam in either French or Soviet drafts. Vietnamese delegation cannot accept declaration or agreement where Vietnam, which invited to conference as existing state, not even mentioned.

After pause following Molotov's request for other speakers, General made following statement:

"If no one else desires to speak, I think it would be helpful if I made clear position of US in these last critical days of conference. I do this because I have recently seen the advance drafts submitted to the conference and have had a chance to review them.

"One position of the United States with respect to this conference has consistently been that it is willing to assist, where desired, in arriving at a just and honorable settlement which will contribute to the establishment and maintenance of peace in the area. The United States is not a belligerent in this conflict and it has not and will not seek to impose its views in any way upon the belligerents, who are the parties primarily interested.

"If the agreements arrived at here are of a character which my government is able to respect, the United States is prepared to declare unilaterally that, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and particularly Article II(4), it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, and would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern.

Since no other representatives requested floor following General Smith's statement, Molotov suggested intermission. After intermission had lasted for 45 minutes, it was informally agreed that meeting should be adjourned without returning to conference room. No communique issued.

Comment: Today's restricted session strangest performance to date. Apparent Molotov had not set stage even with Communist colleagues for any particularly important announcement despite his insistence that meeting be called. Molotov had said to Mendes-France just before meeting that he thought would be well underline progress made and to show how close conference was to reaching agreement.

During recess, Chou En-lai said he had no desire make any statement. He seemed as much in dark as everyone else as to why Soviets had called meeting.

SMITH

SMD:JG/11

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Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air, OSD 7/18/54, 11 p.m. JEF

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FROM: Geneva
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 655, July 18, 11 p.m.

Control: 7610
Rec'd: July 18, 1954
Act: 8:36 p.m.

Action Taken

Noted
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PSA

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 655, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 95, SAIGON 64.

At recess after today's meeting Tran Van Do and Tran Van Chuong immediately approached Johnson stating they wished US clearly understand reasons they felt compelled make their statement at today's meeting (SECTO 654) and why they were asking for a plenary session. They said they desired at such a plenary session put forward position contained their note to French (SECTO 637) and asked Johnson's opinion on position. Johnson replied that did not feel it was practicable proposal, to which they responded they fully realized that it was not practicable and would be rejected by other side; but they felt they must make moral position their government clear to world and to Vietnamese people. If other side rejected it, position of their government would have been improved. Upon rejection by other side they would be prepared accept settlement along lines now being discussed.

Johnson pointed out that time was short and it was late for such proposal to which they replied that Mendes could of course ask for and obtain additional time from French Assembly. Johnson expressed strong doubt and urged they speak directly with French. After repeated strong urgings they finally approached Mendes, who listened sympathetically and at length. He suggested and they promised to consider formulation their proposal in writing and circulation to other delegations. He categorically stated he could not even if he so desired ask Assembly for any extension time he has given self.

Johnson told Mendes he was concerned over reaction to Vietnamese statement and reminded Mendes of US position on Vietnamese concurrence with any agreement. Mendes stated he was very conscious of and was asking De Jean immediately go to Cannes to see Bao Dai.

Chauvel said that from De Jean's previous talk with Bao Dai it appeared Bao Dai had no knowledge of De's conversations with Dong and in general had given delegation here free hand.

596.1-GE/7-1854

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Action

Control: 7750
Rec'd: July 19, 1954
8:55 a.m.

FE FROM: Geneva

Info

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: SECTO 661, July 19, 1 p.m.

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Re SECTO 639

Topping has supplied in confidence following back round information concerning his story on views of Chinese Communist delegation.

He stated his informant was Huang Hua, whom he has known for many years. Interview was at Huang's initiative, was called on short notice, and was conducted in extremely serious manner without propaganda harangues.

Topping said he had reported Huang's statement fully in his story but had obtained number of "visual impressions" during interview. When Huang spoke of possibility American bases in Indochina or anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia, he became very agitated, his hands shook, and his usually excellent English broke down, forcing him to work through interpreter. Huang also spoke seriously and with apparent sincerity concerning his belief that I have returned to Geneva to prevent settlement.

Topping believes Chinese Communists convinced Americans made deal with French during Paris talks on basis of which Mendes-France has raised price of settlement.

SMITH

MEJ/6

NOTE: Advance copies to SS-R 10:15 a.m. 7-19-54 CWO/FED

Action Assigned

Action Taken

Noted

Date of Action

7-20-54

Action Office Symbol

PSA

Name of Officer

PJS

Direction to RCM

File

663

4308

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3/10/55

OC [signature]

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396.1-GE/7-1954

MAR - 1955

JUL 19 11 50 AM '54

Bureau of
INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS
JUL 19 1954

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

1-D

TOP SECRET

Action
FE

Control: 7917
Rec'd: July 19, 1954
2:18 p.m.

1

FROM: Geneva

Info
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TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 666, July 19, 7 p.m.

NIACT

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE UNDERSECRETARY.

The outlines of international control now clearly emerge. Composition will probably be Poland, India, and Canada or Belgium. The French prefer Belgium and so do I. Both Poland and Canada or Belgium will have veto on important questions. Commission will have full freedom of movement in demilitarized zones which will separate forces at each stage of regrouping and in all frontier and seacoast areas.

Taking everything into consideration, I strongly feel this is satisfactory and much better than we were able to obtain in Korea. French feel, and Eden and I agree, that with such composition built-in veto will work to our advantage. This setup is best French or anybody else could get, and I feel it is within spirit of point 7.

SMITH

BB:BD/11

Note: Advance copy to SS/R 2:50 p.m. 7/19/54 (CWO/FED)

505.1-GE/7-1954

CH

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1954 JUL 19 PM 3 35

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action Assigned to

Control: 7974

Action Taken

Roc'd: July 19, 1954
3:41 p.m.

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 669, July 19, 8 p.m.

NIACT

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY

I had long talk with Mendes-France this afternoon, as I told you. He urgently asked that we expand our proposed unilateral declaration so as take note not (repeat not) only of agreements between military commands, but also take note of paragraphs one to nine proposed conference declaration. (See SECTOs 628 and 647). I made it clear that we could under no circumstances associate ourselves with conference declaration even though it is anticipated it will be only conference document and not signed agreement, nor could we note or otherwise imply any acquiescence in or approval of paragraph 10 which provides for consultation among conference members on questions transmitted to them by international control commissions.

Text of declaration not yet agreed between French and Communists, but I am transmitting immediately by following telegram French estimate probable final text. I am also transmitting texts of unilateral statements to which Laos and Cambodia have agreed which are referred to in paragraph 4 draft declaration and draft French unilateral declaration referred to in paragraph 8.

French position is this conference declaration is integral part of agreements reached at conference and they will be sorely disappointed if we simply disassociate ourselves from declaration without even taking note in same manner as with respect to cease-fire agreements. I recommend that I be authorized to amend our proposed declaration (Annex B my instructions) by inserting a brief addition taking note of paragraphs one to nine of conference declaration if its final content does not too greatly differ from that which French have indicated they prepared to accept. I would like some latitude on this, and am sure I know what would be acceptable to you. I will, of course, have to state in conference that the US is unable to join in a multilateral declaration (since the one planned would include the Communists) but it is making a declaration of its own position, et cetera. This may come to a head tomorrow afternoon or evening, and while it would be possible to make

our declaration

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305.1-GE/7-1954

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--2- SECTO 669, July 19, 8 p.m. from Geneva

our declaration later it is infinitely preferable to do it at the time of settlement. Otherwise we will have to disassociate ourselves with a lengthy and detailed conference declaration without anything of our own to offer except the very brief declaration we already have prepared.

SMITH

TT/1

DEPT. OF STATE

1954 JUL 20 AM 7 18

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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666

TOP SECRET

Department of State

06419
1954 JUL 19 PM 7 42
DC/T

TELEGRAM
INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

TOP SECRET
Classification

SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC 576 NIACT

395.1-GE/7-1954

FOR UNDER SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY
Your SECTOS 666, 667, 668, 669.

As requested 669 you may expand proposed unilateral ~~witox~~
declaration so as to take note of paragraphs 1 to 8 of the proposed
Conference declaration with understanding that US obligations ~~witox~~
QTE with regard to aforesaid agreements and paragraphs of
Declaration UNQTE are limited to those expressed Subparagraphs 1 and
of Annex B of your instructions.

The ~~wk~~ foregoing is on the assumption that the Declaration in its
final form does not materially differ from SECTO 667. As to non-
materiality of differences, would like you to obtain Phleger's legal
judgment.

Have no objection to including first portion of paragraph 9 of proposed
Conference declaration ~~x~~ but am concerned as to effect of including second
portion of paragraph 9 as this seems to imply a multilateral engagement
with Communists which would be inconsistent with our ~~basic~~ basic
approach and which subsequently might enable Communist China to charge
us with alleged violations of agreement to which it might claim both

Origin
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Dist. Desired
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DC/T
395.1-GE/7-1954
MB

Drafted by: S:JFDulles:cnp
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S:JFDulles

Cleances:
C - Mr. MacArthur
FE - Mr. Sturm

667

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Classification

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4828

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Page 2

of telegram to

Amconsul GENEVA

TOSEC

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NIACT

TOP SECRET

Classification

governments became parties.

While we don't want to take responsibility of imposing our views on the French, I feel particularly concerned about provisions of paragraph 6^{7?} which gives the Control Commission constituted as per SECTO 666 authority also to control the general elections. The ink is hardly dry on the Declaration of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill of June 29 to the effect that "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly." It is rather humiliating to see that Declaration now so quickly go ~~down~~ down the drain with our apparent acquiescence.

With reference to 668 believe something like this is acceptable if obtainable. Believe that this would not necessitate these states dealing only with or through France as suggested your 650 and 652. We hope that this possibility of direct assistance for genuinely defensive and internal security purposes and not involving very any US bases can be preserved as it may ~~xxxx~~ well be that as a result of surrender in Tonkin Delta French will become so highly unpopular that their effort to maintain authority in other areas would in fact lead to these other areas surely falling under Communist domination.

DILLON

668
TOP SECRET

Classification

4829

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

ACTION COPY

SECRET

28-21

Control: 8058

Rec'd: July 19, 1954

6:51 p.m.

PSH/ROE

Action

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FROM: Geneva

Info

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: SECTO 673, July 19, 9 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 673 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 106,
SAIGON 75.

IOP

OCB

CIA

OSD

ARMY

AIR

NAVY

Vietnamese DEL handed us late this afternoon their new proposal. It is elaboration of idea in note to French (SECTO 633) and conference was advised of its preparation in yesterday's restricted session. Unofficial translation follows:

QUOTE

French, Soviet, and Viet Minh drafts all admit the principles of a partition of Vietnam in two zones, all of North Vietnam being abandoned to the Viet Minh.

Although this partition is only provisional in theory, it would not (repeat not) fail to produce in Vietnam the same effects as in Germany, Austria, and Korea.

It would not (repeat not) bring the peace which is sought for, deeply wounding the national sentiment of the Vietnamese people, it would provoke trouble throughout the country, trouble which would not (repeat not) fail to threaten a peace so dearly acquired.

Before discussing the conditions of a de facto partition with disastrous consequences for the people of Vietnam and for the peace of the world, the DEL of the state of Vietnam renews its proposal for a cease-fire without a demarcation line, without partition, even provisionally.

The Vietnamese DEL therefore proposes:

1. A cease-fire on present positions
2. Regroupment of troops in two zones which would be as small possible.
3. Disarmament of irregular troops.
4. After a period to be fixed, disarmament of Viet Minh troops and simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops.

4323

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AUG 4 1954

SECRETARY OF STATE (RMS)

669

SECRET

-2- SECTO 673, July 19, 9 p.m., from Geneva

5. Control by the United Nations:
- A. Of the cease-fire
 - B. Of the regroupment
 - C. Of the disarmament and the withdrawal
 - D. Of the administration of the entire country
 - E. Of the general elections, when the United Nations believes that order and security will have been everywhere truly restored.

This proposal made on the formal instructions of His Majesty Bao Dai, and of the President Ngo Dinh Diem, shows that the chief of state of Vietnam once more places the independence and the unity of his country above any other consideration, and that the national government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional UN control over a truly independent and United Vietnam to its maintenance in power in a country dismembered and condemned to slavery..

Vietnamese DEL renews its request that a conference session be devoted to the study of its proposal for a cease-fire without partition.

In adding this proposal to those of other members of the conference, the DEL of the state of Vietnam means to bring a positive contribution to the search for a real and durable peace which conforms to the aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

Geneva, July 19, 1954.

END QUOTE

Comments follow.

SMITH

RSP:MS/9

670

4324

SECRET

(This unilateral declaration by the United States Government sets forth its position with regard to the Geneva Accords, which it did not sign.)

**STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE¹
AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1954²**

As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters:

Declaration

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:

In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future.

¹ Walter Bedell Smith.

² Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 2, 1954, pp. 162-163.

21 JULY 1964
FINAL DECLARATION ON GENEVA

IC/43/Rev. 2
21 July 1954
Original: FRENCH

GENEVA CONFERENCE

INDO-CHINA

FINAL DECLARATION, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

IC/43/Rev. 2

page 2

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.

The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Nameese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, at the requests of the Governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

IC/43/Rev.2
page 4

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.