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VI. Production

A. Positive Intelligence Information

NOSENKO's positive intelligence production has been meager, and nothing he reported merited dissemination as an intelligence report. According to his biography, NOSENKO's entire adult life until defecting had been spent either as a student or as an intelligence officer, and in explanation of his lack of positive intelligence information, he has stressed that since the early 1950's he had few outside interests and "no real contacts" outside the KGB itself.* NOSENKO's assignments to the Soviet delegations to the Disarmament Conference in 1962 and 1964 were, he has said, for cover purposes only, and he neither had any connections with officials or organizations in the USSR concerned with arms control or disarmament policies nor did he take any part in the substantive work of the delegations.

During the period 18 to 23 February 1964, a wide range of questions covering various aspects of nuclear weapons, missiles, electronics, communications, unconventional weapons, military industry, military units and equipment, and research and development were put to NOSENKO in order to evaluate his knowledgeability. He had no direct knowledge of any of these topics, although he was able to identify in general a few of the KGB organizations which protect sensitive installations such as nuclear weapons production and storage sites. NOSENKO was given a set of requirements from the Defense Intelligence Agency on 24 February 1964. These questions were premised on his two TDY tours to the Disarmament Conferences in Geneva; they dealt with such matters as Soviet underground testing, Soviet efforts and progress in the fields of chemical and biological warfare, Soviet aims and purposes at the disarmament talks, and Soviet views of the corresponding attitudes and intentions of the United States. NOSENKO stated he had no information on any of these questions but expressed his personal opinion on a few of them, in general terms. NOSENKO's answers to other questions of a positive intelligence nature--those concerning the viability of the current Soviet leadership, plans for a new Soviet constitution, anti-Semitism as governmental policy, personality data on Soviet leaders, and other political and social matters--were couched in vague and general terms and were not based on concrete knowledge.

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*At the start of his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962, however, when explaining how he knew of the real state of affairs inside the USSR (as opposed to that presented by Soviet propaganda), NOSENKO said: "I circulate among ministers, with the friends of my father, and I hear what they say."

B. Soviet Intelligence Personalities

As indicated in the accompanying tabulation, NOSENKO has provided information on a total of approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens who are staff employees of, or have otherwise been affiliated with, Soviet intelligence and security organizations.

[redacted]

KGB Staff Personnel	
Leadership and administrative components	25
First Chief Directorate	165
Second Chief Directorate*	435
Third Directorate	7
Seventh Directorate	25
Eighth Chief Directorate	5
Ninth Directorate	11
Operational Technical Directorate	12
Border Guards Directorate	4
Republics and Oblasts	74
Retired or deceased	55
Possible KGB officers	12
Total	830
KGB Agents	
First Chief Directorate	15
Second Chief Directorate	116
KGB Trusted Persons, Cooptees (of primary use to First and Second Chief Directorates)	19
Total KGB-connected	980

[redacted]

GRU Staff Personnel

Current (1964)		14
Former		7
Suspect		1
Cooptee		1
	Total	23

Total Soviet Intelligence Staffers and Coopted Agents 1003

The following is a tabular summary of NOSENKO's information on First Chief Directorate personnel (who are the ones now abroad or likely to be stationed abroad).

Total Identifiable First Chief Directorate Personnel: 146 (and 3 possible)

Previously identified:*	103
Previously suspect:	9
New Identifications:	37

Of whom:

No record of any travel abroad:	6
Not abroad since 1963:	7
After NOSENKO defected, returned prematurely to USSR:	5
Were out when NOSENKO defected or came out thereafter and returned routinely	7
Deceased since NOSENKO's defection	1
Stationed abroad in December 1966	11

In sum, of the 37 First Chief Directorate personnel newly compromised by NOSENKO's defection, 24 were abroad at the time of his defection or have come abroad since.

C. KGB Headquarters

1. Structure and Functions

Prior to NOSENKO's contact with CIA in June 1962, the most recent information on KGB structure and functions had been provided by GOLITSYN, whose information was current as of December 1961 when he defected. GOLITSYN's data and that from the Polish defector GOLENIEWSKI were the first detailed new information on this subject available to the U.S. intelligence community since 1954, when DERYABIN, RASTVOROV, PETROV, and KHOKHLOV defected, just prior to the change-over from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) to the Committee for State Security (KGB). GOLENIEWSKI and GOLITSYN had reported on the 1959 reorganization of the KGB, the first major realignment of the KGB's functions since the abolition of the Committee for Information in 1951. It encompassed the absorption into the Second Chief Directorate of the duties of the former Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Directorates, which had been responsible for political, economic-industrial, and transportation security, respectively. It also included the upgrading of the Illegals Department to the status of a Special Directorate within the First Chief Directorate, the consolidation of counterintelligence operations abroad into one new department, the Fourteenth, and creation of a new department--Department "D" (Disinformation)--to coordinate and intensify the KGB's activities in the area of deception and misinformation. The latter, although placed in the First Chief Directorate, was established to serve the needs of the entire KGB.

NOSENKO's 1964 information on the organization and functions of the KGB indicated refinements of responsibilities in the Second Chief Directorate in accordance with the 1959 absorption of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Directorates. The formation of the so-called "Service" (Sluzhba) as a component of the Second Chief Directorate centralized those political security functions (formerly handled by the Fourth Directorate) which were unrelated to foreigners in the USSR; the creation of an element entitled "the Directorate" (Upravleniye) accomplished the same thing for industrial-economic functions formerly managed by the Fifth and Sixth Directorates. As for the First Chief Directorate, NOSENKO reported the upgrading of the Scientific and Technical Department to directorate status, and the expansion of the Information and Counterintelligence Departments to "Service Number 1" and "Service Number 2," respectively; according to NOSENKO, the latter organizational designation permits an increase in personnel without a corresponding rise in the bureaucratic level of the component.

The accompanying charts offer a comparison of the organization of the KGB in 1961, as known from GOLITSYN (and supported by GOLENIEWSKI), and in 1964, as given by NOSENKO. Comments on particular weaknesses in NOSENKO's information on the KGB organization since its formation in 1954 will be found in Part VII.B.1., Statements of DERYABIN.

TSYN Information: December 1961



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ENKO Information: January 1964



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ITSYN Information: December 1961



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NOSENKO Information: January 1964



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

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SENKO Information: January 1964



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2. Modus Operandi

Less measurable or precise in comparison with KGB structure and functions are the operational methods and Headquarters procedures of the KGB. NOSENKO himself has not been as productive in revealing Tourist Department methods as was the document which he provided on this subject in 1964. He has not been able to provide a systematic, detailed, or documented review of the methods of the other Second Chief Directorate component to which he was assigned, the U.S. Embassy Section, nor of the methods of the Surveillance Directorate with which he worked closely. NOSENKO nevertheless has furnished insights into the U.S. Embassy Section and Surveillance Directorate methods in the course of discussing specific operations.

NOSENKO brought to the Geneva meetings in 1964 a draft of a report to the Collegium of the KGB dated March 1963 on the work of the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He claimed to have written it himself, and it bore corrections in his handwriting. This draft described KGB investigations of and operations against Western tourists suspected of being agents of foreign intelligence services, primarily in the period of 1961-1962. It described the functions of each component of the Tourist Department and the number and qualifications of the operational staff, giving figures on length of service, educational background, foreign travel and languages, and training. It went on to cite statistics on the number of foreign tourists visiting the USSR, and the number of foreign agent suspects uncovered among them through the work of the KGB. A wide variety of techniques used by the Tourist Department were mentioned, with examples of certain successes interspersed in the discussion.

[redacted]

NOSENKO has made numerous references to the techniques described in this report, as discussed in the many cases reviewed in detail in the foregoing treatment of his KGB career. When interviewed for further information on the statistics which appear throughout the 1963 draft, however, NOSENKO was unable to identify the operations referred to in the numerical citations, nor those included as illustrative examples of operational techniques.

[redacted]

The document refers also to the role of the leadership of the Tourist Department in briefing other organs of the KGB on work against foreign tourists. NOSENKO was questioned on this activity but could not recall any information contained in such lectures or discussions. Although the document also emphasized the daily need for coordination of the Tourist Department activities with numerous other components of KGB Headquarters and with local organs of the KGB throughout the Soviet Union, NOSENKO was unable to explain how such coordination was effected in practice, nor could he describe requirements for the preparation and approval of correspondence pertaining to such coordination; in many instances he asserted that telephone calls sufficed, but he said he could not indicate who was authorized to coordinate informally in this way.

Apart from this information on Tourist Department modus operandi, NOSENKO has described the operational methods of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department and of the Surveillance Directorate in connection with their coordinated activities against Embassy targets. Of particular note is Part V.E.3.c., in discussions of operations against Embassy code clerks.

3. Staff Procedures

In recounting various operations in which he participated or which he supervised, NOSENKO described operations and events which encompassed various KGB procedures. Some of these were: authorization for recruitment; file checks; correspondence and coordination with other KGB departments, directorates, or regional units; technical support of operations; administration of safe houses; KGB files and reports; and travel authorizations and accountings. He was from time to time asked to describe such procedures systematically and in detail. From such questioning it was not possible to derive any detailed picture of current KGB procedures. The little NOSENKO was able to provide did not differ from information dated 1954, and was only a small fraction of the information available from earlier sources. He had no information on changes or developments in the interim. Examples of the level of NOSENKO's knowledge of certain procedures may be found in Part VII.B.1, DERYABIN's Comments, as may instances of inaccurate reporting of procedures.

D. KGB Activities

1. Operations Against Americans

In the context of KGB recruitment operations and investigations, NOSENKO has mentioned 111 Americans: Forty-nine of them were said to have been recruited, 33 were under development, and seven refused to collaborate with the KGB; investigations of nearly all the remaining 22 Americans were reportedly predicated on KGB suspicion or knowledge of their affiliation with U.S. Intelligence.

Of the 49 Americans recruited, NOSENKO attributed his knowledge of nine of them to his own direct, personal involvement in the approaches, usually as recruiting officer; these cases are discussed at greater length in connection with NOSENKO's KGB career (Part V). His knowledge of 11 other recruitments was said to have derived from either indirect involvement or contact with the targets of these operations; NOSENKO indicated that he became aware of these 11 persons through his duties at various times in the American and Tourist Departments of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. (Because of interest in American correspondents during 1954 and 1955 while in the American Department, for example, he was able to report that five of them were KGB agents, although he had taken no part in their recruitments, which had been achieved earlier; likewise, he learned of two recruitments when an American Department officer twice visited the Tourist Department with a request for operational assistance during 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of this department.) In four cases--all First Chief Directorate operations--NOSENKO said he learned of the recruitments unofficially from discussions with friends and from remarks by other case officers which he overheard. Two of these four cases were considered by NOSENKO to be among his most significant information, the penetration of the Orly Courier Transfer Station by U.S. Army Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON and the recruitment in Moscow and later handling of code-machine mechanic Dayle W. SMITH; detailed information on the JOHNSON and SMITH cases is presented after the tabulation (below) of NOSENKO's American leads.

NOSENKO has provided no sources for his information on 25 of the 49 successful KGB recruitment operations against Americans, although he has sometimes identified the case officers involved in them; most of this information was contained in handwritten notes, which NOSENKO carried to Geneva in 1964. According to NOSENKO, he learned of these cases casually while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department during 1962 and 1963; many of the recruitments were said to have been accomplished in 1960 and 1961 at a time when NOSENKO was serving in the American Department. He has explained these notes as follows: "If I did not participate in a case, I don't know much about it. Please understand me. Since 1962 when I first began to get ready for this act [defection], any time I got a whiff of something which smelled like an agent, I would put it down. I have a regular safe in my office and then I have a hidden wall safe. There I may put my personal papers, notes. I am the only one who has a key and any little notes, like those I mentioned, I would put in there."

The tabulation below presents NOSENKO's American case leads under the categories of successful recruitment approaches,* development operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and KGB investigations, in that order. Within each of these categories, the tabulation summarizes NOSENKO's information, his sourcing and the year he reported the lead to CIA, and the results of investigations of the NOSENKO leads by U.S. and other Western security services. As indicated in the tabulation, certain cases are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this paper.

Tabulation of American Leads

Successful Recruitment Approaches

Lead	Sourcing and Date of Report	Investigation Results
CTOR/PROCTOR: (NOSENKO has given th the ACTOR and PROCTOR names on rious occasions.) A valuable First ief Directorate agent who travelled ertly to Western Europe, where he tained a visa from Soviet contacts d went on to the USSR clandestinely.	Tourist Department officer V.N. NOSKOV learned of the case from an unidentified First Chief Directorate officer, and he reported it to NOSENKO. (1964 notes)	One Vernon W. PROCTOR traveled to the Soviet Union during the summer of 1963. Investigation continuing.
BRECHT, Nelson Charles: Born 1938 London, but a U.S. citizen recruited by the Soviets in 1960 on e basis of compromising material; gain visited the USSR in 1961 and old fellow tourists he was detained by the Soviets in 1960 for lackmarketeering.	Source not named. Recruited by Tourist Department during period NOSENKO in American Department. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
ARRETT, Robert: A guide at the .S. Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, ARRETT was trapped in homosexual mpromise by agents VOLKOV and EFREMOV, whom NOSENKO handled. hough resulting photographs were f good quality, a moratorium had een imposed on approaches at the xhibition because of KHRUSHCHEV's lanned trip to the United States. ame photographs were used successfully to recruit BARRETT when e returned with another exhibit n 1961.	Learned of compromise in 1959 through personal involvement as responsible case officer and handler of homosexual agents. Source for information concerning subsequent recruitment not given. (1964 notes)	BARRETT reported his compromise and recruitment to the FBI in January 1962, immediately after his return to the United States; claimed he was drugged at time of compromise. See Part V.D.4.m. for details.

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ENSTOCK, Natalie: Recruited by e KGB during a 1962 visit to the SR, with full knowledge of the B that she was an American Intel- gence agent; case turned over to epartment D," and if she returns the USSR an effort will be made break her; KGB knows of her le in the AIS attempt to contact e Soviet ballerina Natalia SLAVA- EVSKAYA.	Source not named. A Tourist Department case. Case officers were K.G. KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO. (1964 notes)	NOSENKO's information on BIENSTOCK's part in the AIS approach to SLAVACHEVSKAYA is correct. BIENSTOCK confessed in July 1964 to recruitment during tourist trip to Moscow in 1962 and to clandestine contacts with KGB upon return to USA; she claimed all contact was broken in late 1962 or early 1963, at Soviet initiative.
OCHES, Adam: Born in 1896; has latives in the USSR and was re- ited on ideological grounds ile there with a tourist group September 1960.	Source not named. Tourist Department case while NOSENKO in American Department. (1964 notes)	Born in 1890; has a brother Alexander born in 1896. GOLITSYN reported that Tourist Department officer told him in 1960 that Adam BROCHES had been Soviet agent in 1920's and 30's in Paris under V.M. ZARUBIN, then an Illegal; as guide for MAUPIN Tours visited USSR two or more times in 1959 or 1960 via Finland; KGB knew of his history as Soviet agent, but suspected his visits to USSR might be cover for American Intelligence operation aimed at effecting contact with ZARUBIN; KGB placed BROCHES under intensive surveillance, and the Chief of Tourist Department was planning to discuss with ZARUBIN what should be done about him. BROCHES interviewed by FBI;

NDARIN, fnu: Born in 1917 and o son of a Russian emigre ; was cruited in 1962 on ideological ounds; was an employee of the our Winds Travel Agency" in New rk City but left it; case is in- tive, but the KGB is waiting for m to open his own travel agency.	Source not named. Tourist Department case handled by Vitaly Grigorevich DERA. (1964 notes)	Eugene Peter BUNDARIN, born 25 April 1917, is the son of an emigre; travelled to the Soviet Union for 18 days in 1962; employed by "Four Winds Travel Agency" from June 1961 until April 1962, when he left to travel abroad; now working for Hermes Travel, Inc. of California; [redacted] interviewed by FBI in [redacted] 1965.
RGI, Richard: Recruited in Kiev in o on basis homosexual compromise NOSENKO and Deputy Chief of the urist Department, A.S. KOZLOV. RGI is a professor at Yale Uni- rsity. Recruitment historic- ly significant as it was first ccessful approach by Tourist De- rtment, established in 1955.	Personal involvement as responsible case officer and handler of homosexual agents. (1962)	[redacted] debriefed by FBI [redacted]
EW, George: Visiting the USSR a tourist in 1959, DREW was otted as a homosexual by NO- NKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFRE- V. NOSENKO recruited DREW in ningrad on basis of homosexual mpromise staged with assistance f a homosexual agent of the local B in Leningrad.	Personal involvement: Agents reported to NOSENKO who made the approach. (1962)	DREW reported the incident to the FBI [redacted]
PISON, Henry: U.S. citizen of rmenian origin; recruited in pril 1963 by the KGB of the Ar- enian SSR; recruitment based on deological grounds but not firm; s scheduled to return to the SSR in 1964, at which time the	Source not named. Tourist Department case. (1964 notes)	Henry APISSON, a naturalized U.S. citizen visited the USSR in 1963 and planned to return in 1964; owns a hotel and restaurant near West Point, N.Y.; interviewed in 1964 and admitted contacts with Soviets in Armenia; said he may have given

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KGB will attempt to consolidate the relationship; has access to a military installation in the New York suburbs.		impression of willingness to see Soviets in USA if they should visit West Point; said he did not realize the approach was for intelligence purposes.
FRIPPEL, Arsene: American Express Company representative in Moscow recruited by NOSENKO and V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, in 1959 on basis heterosexual compromise. NOSENKO handled FRIPPEL until he left Moscow in 1961 and met him when he later returned with tour groups. Unproductive agent.	Personal involvement: Took part in recruitment and was later handling officer. (1962)	American Express Company representative in Moscow from April 1959 to January 1961. Interviewed by FBI [redacted]
GROVER, Preston: Currently Associated Press correspondent in Moscow; is a recruited KGB agent.	Source not named. A Tenth Department case. (1964)	No derogatory information; GROVER retired in 1965 and now lives in France with his wife. Latter was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and apparently emigrated at about the time of the Revolution in 1917. GROVER met her in Moscow, where she was a correspondent for a French paper. FBI [redacted]
HARRIS, Gisella: An employee of the American Express Company in Salt Lake City, HARRIS visited the USSR as a tourist in 1958 and was recruited by NOSENKO on basis of her romantic involvement with Soviet male. Case turned over to First Chief Directorate and NOSENKO unaware of subsequent developments.	Personal involvement as recruiting officer. (1964)	HARRIS [redacted] interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

ARD, Herbert: Recruited by the during his four-month TDY to the Embassy in Moscow in the spring 1962; was on temporary USIA ser- e, on a publications procurement sion.	Source was G.I. GRYAZNOV, U.S. Embassy Section, asked NOSENKO's help in obtaining a hotel room near HOWARD's for a woman from Leningrad. (1964)	HOWARD has denied recruitment; an FBI [redacted]
FE, Sam: This ABC correspondent oscow is an active KGB agent tivated and recruited by V.A. KOV.	Source was G.I. GRYAZNOV, U.S. Embassy Section. In 1963, NOSENKO asked GRYAZNOV for an agent who could be used against a visiting American delegation, and JAFFE was suggested. At the time, NOSENKO was in Tourist Department. (1964)	Before NOSENKO's information was received, JAFFE reported recruitment by "Slava" KISLOV in October 1962; in a CIA interview in December 1966, JAFFE did not recognize A.K. KISLOV's photograph but identified a photograph of KUSKOV as being the KGB officer who recruited him in 1962. JAFFE was expelled from the USSR in October 1965; he is now serving elsewhere abroad and apparently has not yet been interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information.
NSON, Robert Lee: In 1962 and 3, the KGB had an agent, name nown, who was assigned to an ortant military installation Paris and had access to highly sitive materials. On six or en occasions technicians from Special Technical Section of Second Chief Directorate velled to Paris to assist in ning envelopes taken from the lt at this installation. ENKO described this First Chief ectorate case as the most im- tant information he learned le in Moscow during 1962-1964.	Sources were various technicians of the Special Technical Section who were directly involved in the case and with whom NOSENKO was on good terms by virtue their collaboration in Moscow Tourist Department operations. (1964)	Identified as Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON who, in January 1965, confessed having been KGB agent since 1953 and confirmed NOSENKO's description of vault entries at Orly Courier Transfer Station, Paris. JOHNSON is now in prison as result of NOSENKO lead. For full description see Part VI.D. 3.c.

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KRAFT, Virgil: Visited the USSR in [illegible] and 1963 and was approached by the KGB both times; although slippery, KRAFT said he would help the KGB in USA if contacted; distrustful of KRAFT, First Chief Directorate has not followed up on this approach; not an active case.

Source not named. A Tourist Department case. (1964)

KRAFT wrote a pamphlet about the 1958 incident which was available to lecture audiences at least as early as 1960.

LUNT, Horace G.: LUNT, an American professor of Slavic philology, was recruited in 1961 by the Bulgarian service in Sofia on the basis of a homosexual compromise. NOSENKO, who was in Sofia on temporary assignment as an advisor to the local service, helped the Bulgarians to mount the operation but did not participate directly. LUNT previously visited Moscow several times and his homosexual tendencies had been noted by the KGB.

Personal involvement as KGB adviser to Bulgarians; LUNT's homosexuality earlier reported to NOSENKO by one or both of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. (1962)

Immediately following his recruitment by the Bulgarian MVD on 6 May 1961, LUNT travelled to Yugoslavia where he recounted the incident in detail to Ambassador George KENNAN, an academic colleague. LUNT is currently a professor and Head of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literature at Harvard.

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SON, W.E.: A Baptist minister California, JOHNSON visited Soviet Union in 1962 and was cted mailing letters which were critical of Soviet life. It decided to approach him and e him to stop this activity. it has been determined that NSON was a homosexual, a compro- e was arranged involving one of ENKO's two homosexual agents, KOV and YEFREMOV. Compromising tographs were made in the Metro- Hotel in Moscow and JOHNSON was roached by NOSENKO, who obtained igned statement in which JOHNSON dged to stop criticizing the R. No attempt was made to re- it him for intelligence acti- y. JOHNSON was later seen enter- the U.S. Embassy, and it was umed that he had reported the roach. In 1962 NOSENKO said is happened in January of that ar; in 1964, he said the approach s made in the spring of 1962.	Personal involvement as handler of homosexual agents and Tourist Department officer who approached JOHNSON. NOSENKO alluded to the approach in 1962, without naming JOHNSON. In 1964 he brought a note to Geneva with JOHNSON's name and the date "5 January 1962." He insisted in 1964, however, that this date had no connection with JOHNSON and had no significance to him. (1962)	JOHNSON reported the approach to the American Embassy on 5 January 1962, describing his compromise and the approach by Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV [sic; NIKOLAYEV was one of NOSENKO's aliases]. [redacted]
NTOR, Melvin: A student at Har- r who was recruited on ideolo- cal grounds in 1961; case turned er to the First Chief Directorate.	Source not named. A Tourist Department case in 1961 while NOSENKO was in American Department. (1964 notes)	Marvin KANTOR, a Slavic-language instructor at the University of Michigan, visited USSR in 1958 and 1959; admitted Soviet Intelligence contact in 1959 when interviewed by CIA in 1961; reinterviewed by FBI [redacted]

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



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

KRAFT wrote a pamphlet about the 1958 incident which was available to lecture audiences at least as early as 1960.

LUNT, Horace G.: LUNT, an American professor of Slavic philology, was recruited in 1961 by the Bulgarian service in Sofia on the basis of a homosexual compromise. NOSENKO, who was in Sofia on temporary assignment as an advisor to the local service, helped the Bulgarians to mount the operation but did not participate directly. LUNT previously visited Moscow several times and his homosexual tendencies had been noted by the KGB.

Personal involvement as KGB advisor to Bulgarians; LUNT's homosexuality earlier reported to NOSENKO by one or both of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. (1962)

Immediately following his recruitment by the Bulgarian MVD on 6 May 1961, LUNT travelled to Yugoslavia where he recounted the incident in detail to Ambassador George KENNAN, an academic colleague. LUNT is currently a professor and Head of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literature at Harvard.



TOP SECRET

MERTENS, Robert: Professor from Tennessee who was recruited by the KGB in Minsk in 1959 on homosexual grounds; case of no value and was dropped by the KGB.

Personal involvement as responsible case officer who approached MERTENS. Reported without name in 1962.

NIXON, Dmitriy: American tourist recruited in Moscow in June 1963.

Source not named. NOSENKO said: "This is all I know. The Seventh [Tourist] Department recruited him but I don't know the case officer. I was on TDY at the time so I don't know any details." (1964)

PECHTER, Bernard: PECHTER was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1959.

Source not named. (1964 notes)

PRESSMAN, Patrick: Came to the USSR in October 1957 with a delegation of American metallurgists and was recruited by the KGB; case then handed over to the First Chief Directorate.

Source not named. (1964 notes)

[redacted]

Identified as Aron PRESSMAN, a long-time Communist and a close friend of Bernard KOTEN (see Part V.F.6.); in about 1945 sister married a Soviet citizen identified as a courier for Soviet Intelligence. She has been living in Soviet Union with him for many years since.

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ASK, Walter: President of World ide Tours; was recruited in the USSR n 1960 and has made several trips ince; used for spotting tourists ith intelligence affiliations; KGB as received only one open code essage from RASK since recruit- nt.

Source not named. Recruited by Tourist Department officer Ye.N. NOSKOV while NOSENKO was in American Department. Met by American Tourist Section officers on trips subsequent to 1960. (1964 notes)

[redacted]

BERTS, Spencer: Recruited on omosexual grounds in Sochi at he end of 1962; case turned over o First Chief Directorate; KGB fficer in USA hastily recalled hen ROBERTS confessed to FBI: onfession leaked to the KGB.

Source not named. Case run by American Department because ROBERTS formerly U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow. Case officers were V.M. MIKHAYLOV, V.A. KUSKOV, and V.M. KOVSHUK. NOSENKO learned of events in U.S. from B.A. SOLOMATIN, First Chief Directorate Officer assigned to the American Department. (1964)

[redacted] debriefed by the FBI

SS, Johnna: The former covertess to American Ambassador's amily and now teacher in American chool in Moscow was recruited on he basis of sexual involvements y the KGB.

Source not named. An American Department case. NOSENKO said he did not know who recruited her because he was not in U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, at time of recruitment. (1964 notes)

In 1962 ROSS reported to the American Embassy her arrest in Kiev in 1958 on charges of immoral behavior with a Soviet citizen; in [redacted] 1963 [redacted] FBI [redacted] now in USA.

UFE, John: During a 1959 visit o the USSR his homosexuality was iscovered but no action taken until 1962, when RUFE was recruited n a homosexual compromise; case was erminated in 1963 and while active as only of marginal value.

Source not named. A Tourist Department case at time NOSENKO serving there. (1964 notes)

In 1964 RUFE, a New York attorney, confessed that he had been compromised in the USSR in 1962 and was in contact with Soviets in USA during 1962 and 1963; contact broken in November 1963.

TOP SECRET

ERN, Gerald: Recruited in Moscow Tourist Department in 1958 or 1959 ideological grounds. He is valu- e all-purpose agent. His KGB ptonym is "EDVIN."	Sources were the Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the case officer, V.M. IVANOV. NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the section working against American, British, Canadian, and Commonwealth tourists at the time. (1964 notes)	Russian-born parents; name originally was Gennadiy SEVASTYANOV. Enjoys special residence arrangements in Moscow; strongly suspect as KGB agent prior to receipt of NOSENKO lead. [redacted] SEVERN has not returned to the United States since July 1961 and has not been interviewed by the FBI. GOLITSYN said that in early 1959, the American Section of the Fourteenth (Counterintelligence) Department, First Chief Directorate, had an agent whose KGB cryptonym was "EDVIN"; possibly an American with Russian background or relatives.
APIRO, Henry: Correspondent who s recruited some time prior to 53, when NOSENKO entered Ameri- n Department. Basis of recruit- nt unknown. SHAPIRO produced ly political information. His B cryptonym was "VALERIY" for ny years, but has now been changed "PETR." In 1953 SHAPIRO was be- g handled by Venyamin Alekseye- ch KOSLOV and in 1964 his case ficer was Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, e of the deputy chiefs of the cond Chief Directorate, At one me he was handled by Vladislav VSHUK.	NOSENKO read SHAPIRO's development file in 1953 when responsible for operations against American journalists. Case then being handled by NOSENKO's friend, V.A. KOZLOV. (1962)	SHAPIRO has lived almost exclusively in USSR since 1933 and is married to a Soviet citizen. GOLITSYN reported in 1961 that KGB officer KOVSHUK had been handling an American correspondent, whose cryptonym was "VALERIY"; GOLITSYN believed this was SHAPIRO. [redacted] FBI
IATTAUER, Sofia Greta: Recruited Poland by Soviets in 1946-47 t never contacted because KGB lieved she was known to American telligence; again recruited in ptember 1962 when she returned Soviet Union.	Source was D.A. DITYATEV, Tourist Department case officer who recruited SHATTAUER. (1964 notes)	[redacted] FBI

TOP SECRET

HUBIN, John: SHUBIN a professor t New York University, born 1915 n California, was spotted by KGB urveillance riding in a GRU car in oscow sometime during 1958 or 1959. nquiries were made with the GRU, hich requested that the KGB make no ttempt to contact SHUBIN. On this asis NOSENKO supposed SHUBIN to be GRU agent. SHUBIN was in Moscow gain in 1963.

NOSENKO was in the Tourist Department at time of SHUBIN's first visit, and because of his Russian background, special surveillance was assigned to SHUBIN. When SHUBIN arrived in 1963, NOSENKO, who was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, was informed by the Chief of the American Tourist Section, V.G. DERA. (1964)



John Andrew SHUBIN, born 20 February 1915, a professor of economics at NYU. In the mid-1940's SHUBIN was associated with [redacted] a GRU Illegal identified by Igor GOUZENKO. [redacted] FBI [redacted] SHUBIN was identified as [redacted] agent by [redacted] sources. [redacted] see sensitive source

MITH, Dayle: Name unknown, KGB ryptonym "ANDREY," a code-machine echanic at the American Embassy in oscow, was recruited by Norman lkhaylovich BORODIN sometime during 949-1953 (various dates given at arious times). "ANDREY" provided uch valuable information in Moscow nd after his return to the U.S., GB officer V.M. KOVSHUK travelled o Washington to reactivate him. As f 1962, "ANDREY" was working at ome military district command in ashington area and was furnishing information of value. This case ne of two items NOSENKO first ffered to sell CIA in 1962.

Various sources named at different times. KOVSHUK appears to be main source, but others mentioned were N.G. BAGRICHEV, V.A. CHURANOV, and G.L. ZHUKOV. (1962)

Identified as Dayle W. SMITH, who in 1963 confessed his recruitment by the KGB while in Moscow but has denied furnishing anything of value to the Soviets. SMITH is currently being questioned by the FBI. He retired from the Army in December 1961 and lost access to U.S. Government information at that time. See Part VI.D.3.b.

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SOCHUREK, Howard: The Time/Life man in Moscow for one or two years; was probably an agent of Vadim BIRYUKOV.	Source not named. Tourist Department involved in case in 1962. (1964)	SOCHUREK, who was in Moscow from 1958 until 1960, reported to the U.S. Embassy a number of instances when the Soviets attempted to pressure him and described contact with KGB officers; has named BIRYUKOV as the guide and interpreter who invariably accompanied him while stationed in the USSR.
STEIGER, Andrew J.: U.S. correspondent in Moscow and an agent of the KGB there, reporting on political matters; refused to cooperate with the KGB in the United States or in Geneva later on.	Source was perhaps V.A. KOZLOV, who was handling STEIGER in 1953. NOSENKO said he may have learned of the case "accidentally" when KOZLOV asked him to translate an AP dispatch. (1962)	Numerous reports of Communist affiliations and of suspicion that he was an informant for the Soviets; married to a Soviet national.
STEVENS, Edmund: Moscow representative of Time magazine; a KGB agent used primarily to provide information on American official viewpoints and reactions to Soviet declarations; his marriage to a Soviet woman and his involvement with other Soviet women may have been factors in his recruitment; KGB believes he may have homosexual tendencies and plans to use this to increase control over him. As of 1962, STEVENS was furnishing only superficial information.	Source not named. U.S. Embassy Section case when NOSENKO joined in 1953. Being handled by KOVSHUK during NOSENKO's 1960-1961 assignment to the American Department. NOSENKO may have seen STEVENS in company of KOVSHUK.	Formerly a member of the CPUSA, STEVENS claims to have broken with the Party in the early 1930's; soon thereafter he first visited Moscow and has lived there intermittently since; married to a Soviet; many reports on file of his extensive blackmarket and illegal currency activities and of his close relationships with Soviets; FBI interview, [redacted]
STEVENS, Francis: Former State Department employee assigned to Moscow; visited USSR in 1961 as a tourist; then working as a correspondent; was compromised in a blackmail operation in which he was accused of rape; agreed to cooperate. STEVENS described approach in a letter to his mother which he left at the Embassy. Letter was opened and read by Minister Counsellor, who at once dictated a cable to the State Department describing the events. This was heard by the KGB via	Source not named. U.S. Embassy Section case handled by V.M. KOVSHUK and V.A. KLYPIN when NOSENKO assigned to section in 1960-1961. (1964 notes)	Left a detailed written report at the Embassy for Ambassador THOMPSON immediately after the incident and was interviewed by Minister Counsellor the next day; FBI [redacted]

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he microphone in the Minister Counsellor's ffice. Case was given to First Chief Direc- orate. KGB planned to contact STEVENS in New ork, but NOSENKO was unsure whether this was one.

VENCHANSKIY, Alexander: Owner of "Afton auis," a New York travel agency, and of Russian-language bookstore in Chicago; as recruited by the Tourist Department in oscow in 1961; was used to spot interest- ng tourists coming to USSR. In autumn 963, NOSENKO, then First Deputy Chief of the ourist Department, took case over from Yev- eniy Nikolayevich NOSKOV and subsequently et twice with SVENCHANSKIY. Recruitment ased on SVENCHANSKIY's desire for commercial avors and was made only after suspicions he as FBI agent had been resolved.	Personal participation as senior Tourist Department officer after transfer from American Department in 1962. SVENCHANSKIY's case officer after mid-1963. (1964 notes)	Born in Russia, SVENCHANSKIY emigrated to USA in 1923. Has travelled frequently to Moscow; during and following World War II had extensive contacts with Soviets; close connections with numbers of known CPUSA members. Several accusations of Soviet espionage on record. Linked to Soviet espionage in USA by Harry GOLD in 1950. Another similar statement by GOLD reported in New York Times in 1953 (see Part V.E.5.).
ORREY, Carmen: Recruited by the KGB n 1960 on the basis of her love for a oviet; turned over to First Chief irectorate which helped her obtain em- loyment at the UN (also given as NATO).	Source not named. Recruited by Tourist Department while NOSENKO was in American Department. (1964)	In 1960 it was reported that TORREY planned to defect to the USSR because she was in love with a Soviet named Yuriy Petrovich NIKOLAYEV; in 1961 she married an American. In 1962 the KGB defector GOLITSYN reported KGB attempts to recruit an American identifiable with TORREY during an October or November 1959 visit to Moscow. There is no indication she has been employed by the UN or NATO, although she worked for the Pan American Union during 1954-1959.
OLKOV, Vasiliy Andreyevich: A construc- ion company employee; was recruited by he KGB in the summer of 1962 in the USSR or use in emigre operations.	Source not named. Recruited by Tourist Department in 1962, when NOSENKO there. (1964 notes)	A carpenter and religious fanatic living in California; has a record of many arrests; may be mentally disturbed; travelled to USSR in 1962. FBI [redacted]

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LSKIY, Boris: President of "Ameri- n Travel Abroad," VOLSKIY was re- uited in 1962 on ideological ounds; his mission is to spot spicious tourists and to notify e KGB by open code.

Source not named. Tourist Department case in 1962. (1964 notes)

Interviewed by FBI



LLACE, William: Student at Vienna iversity; recruited in 1961 in ssa on ideological grounds; now ndled by KGB First Chief Direc- rate.

Source not named. Tourist Department case in 1961, when NOSENKO in American Department. (1964 notes)

WALLACE visited the Soviet Union in 1961; interviewed on 28 February 1965 in Vienna, he admitted approach by unidentified Soviet but claimed he refused to "help them"; said there have been no further attempts to contact him.

ITNEY, Thomas: American cor- spondent Thomas WHITNEY was re- uited by the KGB in Moscow some- ne before 1953, when NOSENKO ined the KGB. In 1953 he was ing handled by Venyamin KOZLOV the American Embassy Section. was furnishing information the American Embassy, political ormation, and personal infor- ion on Americans in Moscow. used to cooperate further with KGB after leaving Moscow.

NOSENKO said he perhaps learned of the case "accidentally" from V.A. KOZLOV who was handling WHITNEY in 1953. (1962)

WHITNEY was interviewed by the FBI



CIA has no derogatory information. See Part V.C.2.

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OUNGER, Ralph and Evelyn: Arested as AIS agents and doubled by KGB in the USSR in 1962; they then failed to appear at a meeting site in Denmark.	Source not named. 1962 American Department case. NOSENKO's friend and former American Embassy Section subordinate, V.V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case, which took place when NOSENKO was back in the Tourist Department. (1962)	On mission for the U.S. Army at the time of their arrest, the YOUNGERs reported their recruitment immediately on leaving the Soviet Union. KGB officer KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen under alias in 1962, at the time the YOUNGERs were supposed to meet with KGB in Denmark.
IRING, Stanley: A student who as recruited, during his 1960 isit to the USSR, on the basis f involvement in blackmarketeering.	Source not named. Tourist Department case while NOSENKO was in American Department. (1964 notes)	Interviewed in London in 1964, ZIRING admitted blackmarketeering but denied recruitment; [redacted]
ame Unknown; KGB cryptonym SASHA": A U.S. intelligence officer, possibly military intelligence, who was stationed in ermany from 1955 to 1957, is a GB agent; "SASHA" returned to ermany as a department chief in ntelligence in late 1962 or arly 1963.	Source was M.A. SHALYAPIN, who recruited "SASHA"; also possibly heard of case from Yu.I. GUK, Yu.A. LOPUKHOV, and V.M. KOVSHUK.	Unidentified. Investigations by CIA, ACSI and the FBI continue. See Part VI.D.3.a.
ame Unknown: A U.S. citizen living in England; a furrier married to a Soviet national who is herself a long-time KGB agent. He was recruited when he visited Leningrad for fur exhibits between 1958 nd 1961.	No indication of source. (1964)	Unidentified, possibly Daniel Echiel SHERICH, who married a Soviet national in 1955; marriage was sufficiently unusual at that time to be [redacted] FBI

TOP SECRET

ame Unknown, KGB cryptonym TT": A KGB agent in Geneva ere he is employed by the nternational Labor Organiza- ion.	Source was Yu.I. GUK, in Geneva in 1962.	Unidentified, possibly Joseph Wilson HAYDON, long-time counsellor-librarian of the ILO; as early as 1950 was reported to be "well known for his Communist sympathies" and for being associated with Soviet Intelligence networks in the United States and Canada. Other possible candidates also under examination.
ame Unknown: K.N. SMIRNOV ravelled from New York City to eneva in 1962 (while NOSENKO as there) to meet an agent, writer who was a former U.S. tate Department employee, possi- ly with prior service in Mos- w; in 1962 this target had tremely good connections in fluential U.S. circles.	Source not named. Handled by SMIRNOV in Geneva in 1962. (1962)	Unidentified, possibly Francis STEVENS (see above).

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Development Operations

Lead	Sourcing and Date of Report	Investigation Results
MSTRONG, Robert: The Ambassador's dc In Moscow is a homosexual and close friend of Stephan HOFFMAN oc below); he is known to be hav- g homosexual relations with hannes BUHLE, a code clerk at the nish Embassy; no other informa- on available.	Source not named. A U.S. Embassy Section case at time NOSENKO said he was Deputy Chief of this section. (1964)	Recalled from Moscow on the basis of this information, ARMSTRONG admitted the truth of the allegations and resigned from the State Department in August 1964; he denied having been approached by the KGB.
Y. Frank: NOSENKO identified DAY a State Department code clerk in scow in the 1960-1961 period. He s a target of either KOSOLAPOV or YAZNOV (NOSENKO could not recall ich), but no active operational asures were taken against him for ck of opportunity. NOSENKO said did not remember anything inter- ting or unusual about DAY from con- aled microphones, telephone tapes, surveillance and that he did not member DAY's KGB file, although he d "skimmed it." NOSENKO also said at he did not know who DAY's osest American or foreign friends re, or the names or descriptions any agents working against him. also did not know of any trips Y may have taken outside the USSR d doubted that DAY took any inside e USSR. The KGB had no deroga- ry information on DAY and was aware of any vulnerabilities he ght have had.	Involvement as supervisor of operations against American code clerks. (1964)	DAY arrived in Moscow by train from Helsinki in May 1960 and served there until October 1961. After living alone for several months in America House, he moved into the Embassy compound where he roomed successively with State Department code clerks BRIDGEWATER, SALSAVAGE, and GARLAND. In July 1961 DAY travelled to the Caucasus with his friend G. Stanley BROWN, who was the Agricultural Attache at the Embassy [redacted] (see Part V.E.3.f.). DAY later reported to the State Department Office of Security that the two were followed by five surveillants at all times, that on one occasion when they returned to their hotel room they found four "repairmen" there, and that while traveling by train on this trip they shared a compartment with "an available and attractive Soviet female." DAY denied any approach by Soviet Intelligence, any homosexual activities, and any heterosexual activities with Soviet females in Moscow, or that he had participated in blackmarket activities while there. (He was aware of

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DWELLY, Robert: Reviewing a U.S. Embassy telephone list in September 1964, NOSENKO said he believed that DWELLY was a code clerk during the 1960-1961 period. NOSENKO said at this time that there was no approach made to DWELLY and that he did not know the details of the operational plan against DWELLY or the identity of any agents who might have been used against him. The case officers were V.V. KOSOLAPOV and G.I. GRYAZNOV. Under interrogation in February 1965, NOSENKO said that, on the basis of his "behavior when visiting a public men's room," the KGB was "100 per cent sure" that he was a homosexual. There was, NOSENKO said, "a big hunt for DWELLY." On a number of evenings when DWELLY was known to be free from work, NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and the two homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DWELLY would visit downtown Moscow and contact could be established with him. No photographs of DWELLY were obtained; there was no approach and no recruitment. NOSENKO could recall no other information on DWELLY at this time, but later he said that perhaps GRYAZNOV's homosexual

Personal involvement as supervisor of code clerk operations and handler of homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV. (1964)

the fact that a number of his acquaintances were involved in currency transactions with [redacted] KOSOLAPOV's agent, according to NOSENKO.) DAY said that he had sold a hi-fi set at a large profit to an Egyptian when leaving Moscow (probably [redacted] GRYAZNOV's agent, according to NOSENKO).

DWELLY was assigned to Moscow as a code clerk from April 1959 to July 1960. He was interviewed by the Office of Security of the Department of State in March 1966 [redacted] of NOSENKO's information



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nt "VOLODYA" had spoken with DWELLY
a public toilet in a museum or a
k and believed on this basis that
LLY was a homosexual.

[redacted] GOLITSYN also provided information concerning a KGB operation against a homosexual American code clerk at about this time. GOLITSYN reported that he had learned from discussions in the American Department in the spring of 1960 that the KGB had photographs of a code clerk engaged in homosexual acts but that KGB Chairman SHELEPIN had forbidden their use at that time because of possible political repercussions. (See Part VI.E.3.d. for details on this lead.) Apart from the coincidence of dates and the nature of the compromise, there is no information available to permit an equation of the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN information.

N, Thomas : A consul in Moscow,
N, was spotted by NOSENKO's homo-
ual agent VOLKOV, who exchanged
nces with FAIN and was "almost
per cent sure that FAIN is a homo-
ual"; this was in 1959, when FAIN
ited the USSR from his post in
oslavia, and there was insuffi-
nt time to mount an operation
inst him during this visit;
or, when FAIN arrived in Moscow,
KGB was planning to place a
osexual agent in his life; no
ther details available.

Reported to NOSENKO by his homosexual agent VOLKOV. (1964)

FAIN was interviewed by Security Office, Department of State, [redacted]

TOP SECRET

K, David: Professor in Phila- phia and frequent visitor to USSR, the Leningrad KGB hoped recruit him on ideological basis through use of a female agent; ause of sister's love affair with oviet he was refused a visa in 3, but the KGB has arranged it that he will be admitted if he lies again.

Case brought to NOSENKO's attention when FINK was denied a visa and the Leningrad KGB objected. NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of Tourist Department at the time. (1964)

FINK's sister was trying to marry a Soviet citizen, but the Soviets refused her a visa to do so; interviewed by the FBI

K, Norman: Visited the USSR as ourist in 1959, when he was essed as a homosexual; if he re- ns he will be a recruitment tar-

NOSENKO copied name when retiring file of one of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or YEFREMOV. NOSENKO said that when such a file is retired, KGB requires case officer to draw up a list of persons on whom the agent reported. NOSENKO made a copy of list and gave it to CIA. (1964)

FISK travelled to Europe and USSR with his wife and parents in 1959; interviewed by FBI

FEY, Joseph: Originally identi- d by NOSENKO as a military en- ted man in Moscow during 1960- l period who was an operational rget of Vladimir DEMKIN. In ruary 1965 he correctly identi- d him as a State Department le clerk, saying that V.V. KOSO- OV was the responsible case ficer and that he, NOSENKO, super- sed KGB operational activity sur- nding GAFFEY. The KGB attempted lure GAFFEY into downtown Moscow ing Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid in erica House and one of DEMKIN's ents. Despite her repeated invi- tions, GAFFEY would not meet her. her than IVANOVA, NOSENKO knew no foreign friends of GAFFEY or any trips he made have made in- de the Soviet Union or abroad.

Involvement as supervisor of KGB operations against American code clerks in Moscow. (1964)

GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961. Fred KADERA, a fellow resident at America House, reported during a State Department Security interview

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GB, NOSENKO said, had no deroga-
information on GAFFEY and was
ware of any vices he may have



time. GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962, before expiration of his regular tour, because of drunkenness. During questioning by the State Department Office of Security



RE, Eddy: American correspond-
was a KGB recruitment target
953-1954, but NOSENKO did not
whether he was subsequently re-
ted.

Personal involvement: When NOSENKO joined the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953, he was given GILMORE's developmental file to read and was responsible for handling agents reporting on GILMORE. (1962)

Eddy Lanier King GILMORE first went to Moscow in 1941 and was chief of the AP Bureau there from 1945 to the summer of 1953. Married a Soviet citizen.



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BERG, Professor (fnu): Came to
SSR in 1957 or 1958, when
ational contact was established
een him and the KGB; details of
act unknown.

Source not named. (1964)

Professor Michael GINSBERG reported to U.S. officials in Helsinki in August 1956 about a recruitment approach.

MAN, Stephen: Currently assigned
he American Embassy in Moscow;
indulged in homosexual acts
an Armenian in Yerevan and is
ndly with Robert ARMSTRONG,
her suspected homosexual (see
e); KGB is now mounting a com-
ise operation against HOFFMAN.

Source was G.I. GRYAZNOV, who came to NOSENKO, then in the Tourist Department, to arrange for compromising photography of HOFFMAN. (1964)



HUSTON (fnu): Travelled TDY to Moscow from Belgrade and was photographed making a blackmarket deal in a taxi; case not completed because HUSTON has not returned to the USSR.

Source not named. An American Department case in 1960, when NOSENKO was serving there. (1964)

USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON was arrested in Yugoslavia in 1954 for sexual activities; this, the only adverse information about him was reported to USIA on 30 October 1963; he claimed no recruitment was made in his 1963 interview and said he made two trips to USSR during Belgrade tour. Other than his arrest in 1954, he stated there were no other incidents in Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc which could be used to embarrass him. Currently serving in Taiwan with USIA and has not been interviewed on basis of NOSENKO's allegation.

JENNER, Paul Francis: In early 1960, when the KGB learned through normal channels that JENNER was to be assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it was supposed that he was a code clerk because he was listed as a Secretary-Archivist, a frequent cover for code clerks. As first step in development of JENNER, U.S. Embassy Section officer V.V. KOSOLAPOV travelled to Helsinki, where he boarded the train on which JENNER was travelling to Moscow, and then struck up an acquaintance with him. Additionally, a female KGB agent boarded the train after it crossed the Soviet border and she too became acquainted with JENNER. The plan was to continue these relationships in Moscow. Because JENNER refused to do so and because he turned out to be a pouch clerk and not a code clerk, the operation was put aside. No recruitment approach was made.

NOSENKO originated the idea for this operation, was involved in its planning and in arranging KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki; later KOSOLAPOV reported to NOSENKO on his trip and contact with JENNER. G.I. GRYAZNOV, case officer for the female agent, also submitted a report. (1964)

GOLITSYN described a similar operation involving KOSOLAPOV, dating it in late 1960. JENNER reported meeting girl and her brother to Embassy officials on arriving in Moscow, but reports no encounter with person matching KOSOLAPOV's description. Official Finnish travel records show KOSOLAPOV was not on same train as JENNER, but returned to Moscow two days after JENNER travelled from Helsinki to Moscow. See Part V.E.3.c.

S, fnu: A wealthy Baptist layman has visited the USSR six or seven s and has met with Russian Bapt- on each occasion; personally ainted with President JOHNSON knew President KENNEDY; under by the Second Chief Director- to obtain blackmail materials; 962, JONES became involved with viet female, and although she is a KGB agent, the KGB has taken relationship under control and unsuccessfully attempted to ob- compromising photographs on trips by JONES.	Source not named. Case handled by NOSENKO's Tourist Department subordinate, Vitaliy DERA. (1962)	[redacted] FBI [redacted] His earlier activities were [redacted] on in a 1961 Top Secret KGB docum[redacted] [redacted] by GOLITSYN in 19[redacted] citing JONES' Bible-smuggling act. vities and giving his name.
ZAI, Charles: Object of much interest during his 26 October- vember 1963 visit to the USSR; B officer under cover made con- with him and planned to continue contact in the United States.	Source not named. NOSENKO explained that the First Chief Directorate requested Tourist Department assist- ance in arranging contact with KHAMSAI in Moscow and that "we ex- erted all efforts to help them make this contact." NOSENKO at time was Deputy Chief of Tourist Department. (1964)	Charles P. HAMZAUI, son-in-law of Alexander SAFFIAN who was reported in contact with Soviets in the 192[redacted] HAMZAUI himself was noted in freq[redacted] contact with Soviets since arriving in the USA in 1955. [redacted] FBI [redacted]
OV (fnu): Visited the USSR in when he was assessed as a sexual; if he returns he will recruitment target.	Name included in list NOSENKO said he made when retiring file on one of his homosexual agents, see above entry for FISK. (1964 notes)	Only possible candidate so far i[redacted] [redacted] and is Swedish citizen, not an American.

TOP SECRET

NNEDY, Robert: In 1963 NOSENKO
arned from GRU Colonel G.N. BOL-
AKOV, who had been selected by Presi-
nt KENNEDY as a confidential channel
r correspondence with KHRUSHCHEV,
at Robert KENNEDY had long wished to
sit the Soviet Union. BOLSHAKOV also
ld NOSENKO that, when the Bolshoy
llet had been on tour in the United
ates, Robert KENNEDY had shown in-
rest in one of its leading perform-
s, Maya PLISETSKAYA. NOSENKO on
is basis proposed to G.M. GRIBANOV,
ief of Second Chief Directorate,
at KENNEDY be invited to the USSR, set
in private quarters, and given the
ed carpet" treatment, including
ISETSKAYA if he wanted. NOSENKO did
t propose that KENNEDY be compromised
that an attempt be made to recruit
m; the purpose of this plan was only
"promote a rapprochement" with the
S. and to take over the channel be-
een President KENNEDY and KHRUSHCHEV,
ich was then being handled by the
U. GRIBANOV thought the plan a good
e and said he would discuss it with
NICHASTNYY, Chairman of the KGB; noth-
g further was done, however, because
President KENNEDY's assassination
ortly thereafter.

BOLSHAKOV, whom NOSENKO described as a friend whom he had known for "about two years" (since 1962). (1964)

BOLSHAKOV's role as a Soviet "disinformation" channel was publicized in the press in 1962, after he assured the White House that the Soviets had no offensive missiles in Cuba. [redacted] identified BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer. NOSENKO's developmental plan for Robert KENNEDY cannot be checked. Robert KENNEDY had already visited the USSR once, when he accompanied Supreme Court Justice William DOUGLAS in 1955 or 1956. See Part V.F.9.

TOP SECRET

A, Martin: A graduate student, A visited Moscow for about four hs in 1955 and homosexual tenden- were detected. KGB suspected A of intelligence ties. Compro- operation staged in Moscow l room, but MALIA insisted on ing off lights and no photo- hy possible. Consequently no oach made. Again visited USSR 961, but was more careful and her opportunities did not pre- themselves. NOSENKO also dates of MALIA's visits as 1959 1962.	Personal involvement as case officer; for this operation, NOSENKO borrowed Viktor BELYANOVSKIY, cryptonym "STROYEV," a homosexual agent of the British Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, and arranged the compromise operation in the Moscow hotel. (1964)	A U.S. Navy Intelligence officer during the Second World War [redacted] MALIA visited the USSR in 1955 and again in 1962. In the spring of 1963, he told [redacted] he had had no involvement with black-marketeers, homosexuals, or females on trips to USSR; [redacted] FBI.
O. Ralph: Suspected of having sexual tendencies during his visit to the USSR; will be a et for recruitment if he re- s.	NOSENKO noted name when retiring file of YEFREMOV or VOLFOV, his homosexual agents; see above entries for FISK and KARLOV. (1964)	Identity confirmed as Ralph MATLAW; case still under investigation.
NE, Joseph: State Department clerk Joseph MORONE was an ational target of the U.S. ssy Section in 1960-1961. he travelled to Warsaw on e in late 1960, a Polish girl was a UB agent was placed on train to seduce him. Com- ising photographs were made rsaw. At KGB request, the gent was later brought again oscow where more photographs made. Operation was termi- d before approach could be because Americans ordered NE out of Moscow before the of his tour, possibly because is intimate relations with et females at America House.	Personal involvement; NOSENKO in charge of code clerk operations at the time and helped plan the compromise on the train. At the time MORONE went to Warsaw, NOSENKO was on TDY in Cuba, but details were reported to him on his return. (1964)	[redacted] MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in [redacted] in May 1961 and admitted intimacies with the Polish female; he denied ever being approached by either the UB or Soviet Intelligence. He was transferred [redacted] in August 1961, a year after he first arrived in Moscow. See Part V.E.3. c.(iv).

TOP SECRET

SEN, Philip: NIELSEN's first to the USSR was in 1957 or 1958 tourist. Because he made the aintance of some "teddy boys" oscow and tried to acquire a of the Moscow Phone Directory them, the KGB suspected he was acted with CIA. NIELSEN was under surveillance during this all subsequent trips, but was observed in other intelli- e tasks. On one of his visits oscow, NIELSEN fell in love with agent Tamara KUNGAROVA, and the decided to use her in the de- pment of NIELSEN. For the pur- s of assessment, LEONOV, a ist Department officer, was sequently introduced to NIELSEN he role of KUNGAROVA's father, there were no positive results. r, perhaps in 1960 or 1961 NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy ion, he heard that the "active " section (penetration of Ameri- Intelligence operations) of the ican Department was planning to further on NIELSEN, but NOSENKO rned no more in this connection. id hear, however, that NIELSEN KUNGAROVA had married and as of were living in London. NOSENKO ulated that one of the reasons for failure of the recruitment opera- against NIELSEN is the possibility he learned that KUNGAROVA didn't a father or that she told him t the operation surrounding him.

NOSENKO was involved in the determination of NIELSEN's possible intelligence status on first trip. No source given for subsequent information. Tourist Department officer LEONOV and American Department officer Viktor KOPEYKIN were involved at various stages of the operation. (1964)

NIELSEN travelled to the Soviet Union by private car in April 1958;

[redacted]

NIELSEN met KUNGAROVA on a later trip, in January 1959, and returned to see her in Moscow in January 1960 despite indications and warnings that he was involved in what appeared to be a KGB operation. Because KUNGAROVA's "father" allegedly objected to the plans of the couple to marry, NIELSEN agreed to talk to him. Introduction was made at the Hotel Praga in Moscow. NIELSEN later noted that the "father" bore no resemblance to KUNGAROVA, although her brother "could have been her twin." [redacted] He returned to Moscow in 1962 and married KUNGAROVA. They subsequently lived in Paris. KUNGAROVA died in Franco in 1965 [redacted]

TOP SECRET

LICH, Paul: Contacted by the during the Squaw Valley Olym- s but not yet recruited; to be ntacted in Switzerland.

Source was K.G. KRUPNOV, case officer in American Section, Tourist Department, who arranged contact between OMELICH and First Chief Directorate officer, (fnu) ZAYTSEV, when OMELICH visited Moscow in August 1963. (1964)

EBRENNIKOV, Sergey: In 1955, , or 1957, SEREBRENNIKOV, an loyee of the Library of Congress, to Moscow with a Congressional egation. He had a brother, a ical doctor, living in Sverdlovsk, the KGB arranged to bring the ter to Moscow to meet SEREBRENNI- . NOSENKO told the FBI that it was ed to use the "reunion of the two thers as a possible wedge toward ruitment of SEREBRENNIKOV"; he told that the KGB had information indi- ing SEREBRENNIKOV to be connected h American Intelligence and that the pose of the meeting was "to feel out." NOSENKO himself arranged for EBRENNIKOV's brother to be brought Moscow and then briefed him to meet EBRENNIKOV "first as brother meeting ther." He told the brother that he would have further instructions for after the first meeting. A meet- did take place, but it was "very tional" and the brother later told KGB that he had no opportunity discuss with SEREBRENNIKOV the pos- ility of his helping the Soviet on. As SEREBRENNIKOV was only in cow for a few days, no further meet- s took place and no further action taken by the KGB. NOSENKO said t the KGB felt that SEREBRENNIKOV suspicious of his contact with his ther. No further details.

Personal involvement. (1964)

[redacted] FBI concerning his 1956 tour of the Soviet Union accompanying Senator Henry M. JACKSON and Lieutenant Colonel Edward HATHAWAY from the Pentagon. On his last night in Moscow he received a telephone call in his hotel room from a person who said he was SEREBRENNIKOV's brother from Sverdlovsk, whom he had not seen since 1918. The brother requested a meeting. SEREBRENNIKOV was convinced from the caller's uneducated speech and other signs that he was not in fact his brother. Therefore, he refused to see him. Immediately after the 10-minute conversation, SEREBRENNIKOV called Senator JACKSON's hotel room to report what had happened. Senator JACKSON sent Colonel HATHAWAY to SEREBRENNIKOV's hotel room, and they discussed the entire incident. At JACKSON's suggestion, SEREBRENNIKOV then moved into the Senator's room for the night. SEREBRENNIKOV also advised the U.S. Embassy of the incident. After his return to the United States, the story of the phone call was written up in Newsweek magazine. The article wrongly stated that SEREBRENNIKOV knew his brother was dead.

TOP SECRET

BURY, Harrison: A correspond- SALISBURY was an operational t of the U.S. Embassy Section, ican Department, during 1953 954, when NOSENKO was assigned with responsibility for such tions. NOSENKO read the de- mental file on SALISBURY but that it is impossible to tell such files whether the target recruited agent or not, nor SENKO know whether SALISBURY ater recruited.

Personal involvement. Read developmental file on SALISBURY and also handled two KGB agents, a chauffeur and a maid, who were reporting on him. (1964)

SALISBURY was first in Moscow in 1944 and again lived there from 1949 to 1954. He was closely associated with Thomas WHITNEY and WHITNEY's wife during later period (see above).

FBI

N, Horace: SUTTON, who for a tourist firm in the d States, visited the USSR veral occasions and became ved with KGB agent Larissa OVA, an Inturist interpr. SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's from 1956 until 1959, when ot married and retired. KO suspected that she had se relationship with SUTTON erhaps was intimate with she did not report this, er, and therefore NOSENKO not be sure. SUTTON used ite SOBOROVA letters and ards which he signed "aloha."

Personal involvement as SOBOROVA's case officer. (1964)

FBI

TOP SECRET



ASKA, William: New York City [illegible]; was worked on by the [illegible]inian KGB in June 1963 with [illegible]bt[illegible]ul results; had been pre-[illegible]ously worked on in Moscow dur-[illegible] an earlier trip in 1958, but considered a "stupid and un-[illegible]mising target" at that time.	Source not named. NOSENKO said he had no personal involvement, the 1958 and 1963 trips made during NOSENKO's service in Tourist Department; the 1960 trip, which NOSENKO did not mention, was when NOSENKO was in the American Department. (1964)
[illegible]YLOR, John: NOSENKO identified [illegible]LOR as a State Department code [illegible]rk who was a target of V.V. [illegible]OLAPOV. NOSENKO did not recall [illegible]e TAYLOR served earlier and [illegible]d he was not aware of any back-[illegible]und information the KGB might [illegible]e had concerning him. The Sov-[illegible] maid who cleaned TAYLOR's room [illegible]s a KGB agent, and at KGB direc-[illegible] succeeded in getting TAYLOR to	Supervisor of operations against American code clerks. (1964)

Travelled to the USSR in 1958, 1960 and 1963, [redacted] upon return from 1960 trip, reported details of KGB approaches in 1958 and 1960, denying acceptance of Soviet proposals. [redacted] FBI

TAYLOR served in Tel Aviv as a code clerk from March 1957 to September 1959. [redacted] He arrived in Moscow in February 1960 and, after living a month in a Soviet hotel, moved into quarters in the Embassy. His maid was Sophia ALEKSEYEVA; according to

apartment where she lived with
rlfriend. TAYLOR and the maid
me intimate; however, no com-
ising photographs were taken
er apartment as the KGB pre-
ad to lure him to a different
tment which was better suited
this purpose. By studying his
acter, the maid learned that
ough not a Communist, TAYLOR
sympathetic toward the people
way of life in the USSR. At
point it was decided to insert
LAPOV into the operation
ctly. To accomplish this,
LAPOV contacted the agent's girl-
nd and recruited her as an op-
ional contact. An evening
y was then arranged at the maid's
tment, and KOSOLAPOV was intro-
d to TAYLOR as a friend of the
friend. It was KOSOLAPOV's in-
ion to develop TAYLOR further
make a thorough assessment with
deological approach being the
l objective. This was toward
end of TAYLOR's tour. KOSO-
V never met him again, and
e was no recruitment approach.
as NOSENKO's opinion that no
mpt was made to recruit TAYLOR
his time partly because the
did not want to jeopardize
more important STORSBERG case
(Part V.E.3.c.) by risking a
p." The case was turned over
he First Chief Directorate when
OR was reassigned from Moscow.

TAYLOR, he began to have intimate relations with her in about September 1960. On the first four occasions, their relations took place in TAYLOR's quarters, but thereafter, because TAYLOR roomed with the code clerk Paul JENNER, Sophia invited TAYLOR to her apartment. TAYLOR recalled having been intimate with her four or five times there. Shortly after he began having relations with her. Sophia announced that she was pregnant; TAYLOR offered her money for an abortion but, he said, she refused to take the money. In about December 1960, Sophia invited TAYLOR to visit her girlfriend's apartment (she had no roommate). TAYLOR recalled that this was a well-furnished apartment with, he believed, a full length mirror on the closet door; TAYLOR thought the KGB could not have acquired photographs because the lights were out during their relations. Around Christmas or New Years 1960, TAYLOR also recalled, there was a party in Sophia's apartment; two Soviets who did not speak English were also present. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961. He has denied ever being approached for any purpose by Soviet Intelligence.

MPSON, John: In 1957 or 1958, an rican professor named THOMPSON, a cialist in Russian literature or his- y, became involved with Tamara KUNCA- A, a KGB agent within Intourist. Al- ugh Professor THOMPSON had intimate tions with KUNCAROVA and photographs acquired, he was not approached recruited by the KGB. It was planned continue assessment of THOMPSON and additional grounds for recruitment e returned to the USSR. He did not rn, however, and NOSENKO, after lowing the file (date not given), mmended that the case be retired GB Archives.

NOSENKO reviewed THOMPSON's file. (1964)



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

While in Moscow, on 17 June 1964, THOMPSON reported at the U.S. Embassy that a Soviet acquaintance [redacted] had told him that MOSKOV was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered [redacted] someone they are willing [redacted]

TOP SECRET

ROG, Leon: An American profes- TWAROG came to the Soviet Union 1962 or 1963 and was the target an operation run by K.G. KRUPNOV. ROG is a specialist in Russian erature and speaks fluent Rus- n. He was lured into a compromising uation by a female KGB agent and tographs were taken. At one point officer Yevgeniy NOSKOV was placed direct contact with TWAROG, but it decided not to approach him as compromising photography was not sidered sufficient basis for re- itment and he was expected to urn to the USSR in 1964 or 1965.

No source given. (1964)



FBI

N KRAKOV, Hugo: Lawrence ALLOYAN, American of Armenian background, ited the USSR in November 1963; he ntacted the KGB and told them of an erican Army captain in Military In- lligence who asked ALLOYAN to tell e KGB of American intelligence use f the Monterey Language School; KGB ens to contact the American captain, ose name is possibly Hugo VAN KRAKOV. Source not named. NOSENKO said "he was a tourist and that's why our man made the first contact with him." This was one of the leads which NOSENKO "simply jotted down because it crossed his field of vision." (1964)

N LAETHEM, George: Assistant Air tache at U.S. Embassy, Moscow. Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, s placed on a train going from rlin to Moscow some time in 1953 r 1954, in order to strike up an quaintance with VAN LAETHEM. e did become acquainted with im and gave him her address and hone number in Moscow. Although e was sure she would hear from im, he never did call her in scow. NOSENKO heard this story from P.F. DANKRATOV, whose agent LARIONOVA was. NOSENKO added that the case officer working against VAN LAETHEM himself was V.A. CHERKOV, who was responsible for work against all members of the Air Attache office at that time. (1964)



FBI

TOP SECRET

George VAN LAETHEM was Assistant Army Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953, and again from March to May 1955. He was the cryptographic security officer, in charge of the Embassy code room, and supervised the activities of the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and was also Roy RHODES' supervisor. VAN LAETHEM's 1955 assignment was related to the use of new and sensitive electronic equipment carried by military attaches on trips. This equipment was captured by the KGB in Stalingrad in May 1955. He has been interviewed on a number of occasions and has reported no incident similar to that described by NOSENKO. See V.C.3.(k) for de-

ERFORD, Frederick Payne: A guide
the American exhibition in Moscow
959 and roommate there of Robert
ETT (see above). WILLERFORD became
lved with NOSENKO's homosexual agents
OV and YEFREMOV and photographs were
Permission to approach him was
ed, however, because of a general pro-
tion on recruitment attempts at the
bition in connection with KHRUSHCHEV's
hcoming trip to the United States.

Personal involvement as case officer for agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV; was behind two-way mirror and viewed compromising acts. (1964)



S, Matthew Peter: NOSENKO supervised
SB development operation against
ary code clerk ZUJUS, who replaced
STONSBERG at the American Embassy
961. As part of this development,
NKO directed his agent [redacted]
[redacted] studying in Moscow,
ake ZUJUS' acquaintance at America
e. Eventually [redacted] was to help
lve ZUJUS with a Soviet female.
became friends with ZUJUS during
mber of visits to America House,
was able to accomplish and report
le as ZUJUS was reserved by nature.
ing derogatory was developed and
ing came of the operation.

Personal involvement as case officer. (1964)



G, Maurice: NOSENKO identified
G in 1964 as an American code
k who was "actively worked on" in
-pw during the 1960-1961 period;
NKO supervised activity against
. An agent, name unknown, an Arab
n the Egyptian Embassy, introduced
NG to Inga VARLAMOVA, an agent of
U.S. Embassy Section, and ZWANG
ited her apartment several times.
'NOVA did not like ZWANG, however,
did not want to have intercourse

Involvement as supervisor of operations against American code clerks. (1964)

ZWANG, a State Department code clerk, served in Moscow from February 1961 to January 1962. His maid from February to October 1961 was Sophia ALEKSEYEVA.



TOP SECRET

ith him. For this reason the case was
ropped and no recruitment approach was
ade to ZWANG. In 1965 NOSENKO said that
.V. KOSOLAPOV was the case officer respon-
ible for ZWANG and wrote the operational
aln concerning him. It was G.I. GRYAZNOV,
everthcless, who arranged for the Egyptian
gent to visit America House, where he met
nd developed ZWANG. GRYAZNOV was also the
ase officer for VARLAMOVA and arranged for
er to be introduced to ZWANG through the
gyptian. At the time NOSENKO left the
.S. Embassy Section in January 1962, there
as no further activity surrounding ZWANG:
here were no other agents in contact with
im; there were no vulnerability data con-
erning him; and no approach had been made
o him.



ZWANG has been described by fellow Americans in Moscow as a heavy gambler; he has also been reported by various sources to have been active in currency speculation and black market activities centering around [redacted] whom NOSENKO identified as KOSOLAPOV's agent. He resigned from the State Department.

TOP SECRET

Unsuccessful Approaches

Lead	Sourcing and Date of Report	Investigation Results
ER, Peter: The KGB attempted to re- BINDER, an Army sergeant assigned e U.S. Embassy in Moscow on the s of his involvement with a Russian at America House. The attempt d.	Source not named. NOSENKO said he never read BINDER's file, although he saw some "materials" concerning him in 1961 while in the U.S. Embassy Section. Saw no more information after return to the Tourist Department in early January 1962. Vladimir DEMKIN and S.M. FEDOSEYEV named by NOSENKO as participating in case. (1964)	BINDER reported the attempted recruitment at once and was recalled from Moscow; [redacted] FBI He served in Moscow from 16 March 1961 until 22 January 1963. See Part V.D.4.c.
NS, Horst Henry: A former Soviet zen who left the USSR with re- ting German troops in 1942, BRAUNS target of unsuccessful approach he returned to the Soviet Union tourist to visit relatives in . BRAUNS was told he would be ged with war crimes unless he pted recruitment; he initially ed, but later refused to co- ate. The KGB has dropped the .	Personal involvement as supervisory Tourist Department official and later as recruiting officer. NOSENKO reported that when BRAUNS refused to cooperate, he (NOSENKO) travelled to Leningrad to speak with him. Parts of lead learned from K.G. KRUPNOV, who originally approached BRAUNS in Moscow. (1964)	[redacted] FBI
[redacted]	No source given in 1962; in 1964 NOSENKO said he learned of the case from Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, V.M. KOVSHUK. Did not know who made the approach. (1962)	[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

SERS, James: The KGB discovered that SERS, a code clerk, was a homosexual n one of the KGB agents at America se spotted him kissing a member of isiting Ice Capades tour. Apparly the Americans determined KEYSERS' kness at the same time, as preparans were immediately made to remove SERS from Moscow. Because of lack time, all the KGB could do was to s KEYSERS a letter pointing out he in deep trouble and urging him to ct. KEYSERS reported this letter American officials. At the airport, n KEYSERS was leaving Moscow, he approached by NOSENKO, who made a al bid for KEYSERS to remain in the R. When originally reporting this d, NOSENKO named the American as US and then, a few days later, called pecial meeting with CIA to correct mistake

Personal involvement as American Department officer responsible for operations against U.S. code clerks; personally accosted KEYSERS at Moscow airport. (1962, without name)

KEYSERS, who performed code clerk duties for a short time in addition to his regular administrative functions in the office of the Military Attache, was recognized as a homosexual in the spring of 1961 and was removed from Moscow shortly thereafter. He had earlier been relieved of code clerk duties due to lack of interest and aptitude. Events including delivery of the letter and the approach at the airport were much as NOSENKO described. KEYSERS unable to identify NOSENKO photograph. See Part V.E.3.c.(vi).

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TH, Edward: KGB cryptonym "RYZHYY." urity Officer at the U.S. Embassy was the target of an unsuccessful recruitment operation in 1954 or 5. On the basis of falsified tos of SMITH and his Russian maid sexual relations, the KGB tried to italize on the fact that he was ieed having an affair with this maid. tographs were sent to him in a let- which set up a meeting with KGB. came to the meeting, but did not ee to recruitment; agreed to come another meeting. He did not appear, after receiving several more eatening letters from the KGB, confessed to the Ambassador and was t home.

NOSENKO claimed case officer involvement in the operation in 1962, but in 1964 retracted this and said he learned of the case from V.M. KOVSHUK who was the case officer. His only role was in a surveillance phone-watch. (1962)

GOLITSYN told of reading, some time in 1957, of a case against a U.S. Embassy Security Officer, not named, based on his love affair with his Russian maid or cleaning woman. By KGB instruction she told him she was being forced to work for the KGB and would be arrested if she did not. He helped her by passing her false information, until the KGB objected, after which he passed a mixture of false and true material. This took place between 1953 and 1957. Edward Ellis SMITH acknowledged [redacted] his having received letters (as described by NOSENKO)--in June 1956--but denied having personal meetings with the KGB . He did confess to the Ambassador, but only to having been intimate with the maid. Not until 1962, when confronted with the details from GOLITSYN, did he confirm the truth of the rest of the story as GOLITSYN told it. At all times he denied accepting recruitment. See Part VI.D.4.c. for details.

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ORSBERG, James Harry: Military code erk who was NOSENKO's principal re- uitment target during 1960-1961. ow-moving development operation nsisted of involving STORSBERG rst with a series of Soviet females th the aid of NOSENKO's agent, Johan EISFREUND, a Finnish businessman; cond in blackmarket activities; d finally, with the aid of N.S. VORTSOV (who posed as a French sinessman) with more female KGB ents. Compromising photographs

Personal involvement. NOSENKO said he devoted almost full time to this case for about a year. In 1964 NOSENKO said he was present in the hall outside the hotel room in which STORSBERG was approached. In 1962 NOSENKO had said that he personally approached STORSBERG. (1962, without name)

GOLITSYN reported two leads which may relate to this operation. First was to a military code clerk in Moscow who had been developed to the point where recruitment was virtually assured by spring of 1960. (STORSBERG was one of two American "military code clerks" in Moscow at the time.) Second lead was to American at U.S. Embassy who was successfully recruited with the aid of PREISFREUND in late 1960. (NOSENKO and PREISFREUND

obtained and STORSBERG was
oached on basis his activities and
ncial need shortly before he was
signed in late 1961. STORSBERG
sed to cooperate, but did not re-
the approach to the Americans and
be approached again by the KGB if
omes abroad.

ARZENBACH, Collette: SCHWARZENBACH
the target of an unsuccessful KGB
uitment approach in 1958 or 1959.
was working in Moscow at the time
fell in love with a male KGB agent.
KGB had compromising photographs
er with this Soviet, but it was
NKO's opinion that these were not
in the approach, which was based
ly on her affection for the Sov-
. NOSENKO did not know who made
approach or under what circum-
ces; he was certain the attempt
led.

NOSENKO said he was not sure from whom he learned this information, but it may have come from V.M. MIKHAYLOV of the U.S. Embassy Section who directed the operation. NOSENKO did not read the file on SCHWARZENBACH, but saw it and the compromising photographs. (1964)

reported that PREISFREUND took part in only one operation, against STORSBERG.)

[redacted] FBI and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). [redacted]

During 1955 and 1956, SCHWARZENBACH was secretary to Mrs. BOHLEN, the Ambassador's wife, and Director of the Anglo-American School in Moscow. In 1956 and 1957 she worked for Henry SHAPIRO, UP representative there (see Part VI.D.2.a.). While employed by SHAPIRO she became acquainted with one Viktor I. SERGEYEV, a functionary in the publishing business. In January 1959 she was approached by a KGB officer in Riga on the basis of compromising photography and was asked to provide specific information on the U.S. Embassy. She reported this at once to Henry SHAPIRO, who told Ambassador THOMPSON. SCHWARZENBACH left the USSR in early 1959, shortly after the incident. She was interviewed by the State Department Regional Security Officer in Geneva [redacted]

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. Investigations

BIDIAN, John V.: NOSENKO was the KGB ase officer responsible for ABIDIAN uring 1960-1961. ABIDIAN, the U.S. mbassy Security Officer, was [redacted] the ost important target of the Second hief Directorate in this period. owever, it was decided merely to atch him and not attempt recruit- ent in hopes of "catching another OPOV" (the GRU lieutenant colonel ho had been handled by former ecurity Officer Russell LANGELLE nd who, according to NOSENKO, was pprehended in 1959 through surveil- ance). NOSENKO received the report- ng from those agents who were in touch ith ABIDIAN and supervised surveil- ance coverage on him. At the end f 1960, ABIDIAN was noted visiting n address on Pushkin Street in Mos- ow which appeared suitable for a ead drop and special surveillance f this location was begun, but there ere no results. Only later, when OSENKO was no longer in the U.S. mbassy Section, was it learned that his drop site was related to the PEN- OVSKIY operation (GRU colonel who was gent source for CIA and British in- elligence).

Personal involvement as ABIDIAN's case officer. After ABIDIAN visited Pushkin Street address, NOSENKO inspected area and later received reports of stationary surveillance established across the street. (1962)

[redacted]

It took place on 30 December 1961, a year after the date given by NOSENKO and several days before NOSENKO allegedly transferred to the Tourist Department. See Part VI.D.7.b.

LBINGER, Donald: Born in 1937, a U.S. itizen, travelled to the USSR in 1963 nd was the target of a KGB investi- ation in Sochi; he was thought to be- ong to American Intelligence because f his contacts with a KGB agent, ryptonym "TRAPEZUND."

Personal involvement; supervised activities of local KGB organiza- tion; discussed case with the American Department and with O.M GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. (1964)

Donald ALBINGER travelled to the Soviet Union in 1963; [redacted] FBI, [redacted]

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ORN, Frederick: BARGHOORN, a sor at Yale University, was the of a KGB provocation operation 3; the KGB planted disinforma- n BARGHOORN and then arrested he purpose of the provocation counteract the FBI arrest of VANOV in New York in connection he BUTENKO case with a view to ly trading BARGHOORN for IVANOV discouraging future such arrests FBI. BARGHOORN was in the USSR ourist at the time of IVANOV's and was considered the most le available hostage for a	Personal involvement in preliminary discussions and selection of BARGHOORN as victim; NOSENKO was present during initial stages of BARGHOORN's interrogation following his arrest. (1964)	[redacted] Professor BARGHOORN was arrested in Moscow on 31 October 1963 after an unknown Soviet approached him on the street and placed what purported to be classified documents in his pockets. BARGHOORN's account of the provocation-arrest and its aftermath generally coincides with that given by NOSENKO. BARGHOORN recognized NOSENKO's photograph as that of one of the Soviets present at his interrogation. See Part V.F.7.
LEMY, Thomas Franklin: Twice urist groups to the USSR in nd was assessed as an Ameri- telligence agent; BARTHELEMY contact with [redacted] a Finn s a KGB agent.	Learned of BARTHELEMY's contact with LAINE from the Leningrad KGB while there on TDY in 1963. BARTHELEMY had been under observation by the Tourist Department in 1959 because KGB had information he had graduated from an intelligence school. This information was in his file in Tourist Department. (1964)	[redacted] name appears in a KGB document on Western tourist operations, supplied by GOLITSYN in 1962. BARTHELEMY reported contacts with [redacted].

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N, John S.: BENSON, an Army major, he Assistant Army Attache in Mos- n 1955; because of his status he ssumed to be an intelligence er and was therefore studied. long time the KGB had wanted ce of electronic intelligence ent being used by the Ameri- As early as the beginning of authorization was given the Embassy Section to steal this ent. This was accomplished in when BENSON was on a trip to ngrad with fellow attaches MULE and William STROUD. Hav- arned that the American attaches he equipment in their hotel room, fficers broke in at an appro- e moment and took it. All three ans were then declared persona ata. Other than normal sur- ance, no other action taken st BENSON during Moscow tour.	Personal involvement as U.S. Embassy Section officer working against military attaches in 1953-1955. Took part in initial attempts to secure electronic equipment, but had transferred to Tourist Department in June 1955, before the theft took place and was not involved. (1964)	In May 1955 the KGB officers forced their way into the Stalingrad hotel room occupied by Assistant Army Attaches BENSON, MULE and STROUD, pinioned the officers, and left with sensitive electronic equipment. The three were immediately declared persona non grata by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Part V.C.3.b. GOLITSYN also reported on the Stalingrad equipment seizure; he added that a KGB general organized the operation. When the Soviet General Staff gave the equipment a very high evaluation, it was then recommended for use by the Soviets abroad.
N, Harold: While visiting the t Union BERMAN, an American r and prominent jurist, was unded by KGB agents, but the KGB do nothing with him.	Source not named, and NOSENKO did not provide date he obtained this information. He said he did not know anything about BERMAN other than that he is a professor of law, came to the USSR quite often, and was being studied. (1964)	BERMAN is a professor at Harvard University specializing in the Soviet legal system; he has visited the USSR on several occasions for study and research and has described several incidents in Moscow which appear to have been provocations.
N: Lewis: In 1960 the KGB dered that Lewis BOWDEN was ecurity Officer at the American ssy and that he was "perhaps cted with CIA or the FBI." He lealing with counterintelligence ers such as "SK" [i.e., was con- ed with security of Americans scow]. The U.S. Embassy Section	KOVSHUK, who told NOSENKO about BOWDEN in 1959 when NOSENKO was in Tourist Department. NOSENKO used Arsene FRIPPEL, KGB agent recruited in 1959, as a source on BOWDEN. (1964)	BOWDEN was Second Secretary in the Internal Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in 1958-1960. He was not connected with CIA or the FBI at this time. He is the subject of the CHEREPANOV paper giving an operational plan, dated February 1960, which sets the goal of "exposing his possible agent

officer working against him .A. KUSKOV, and V.M. KOVSHUK was acquainted with him.		contacts, as well as his counterintelligence activity in the Embassy." See Part VI.D.7.c.
TNER, Robert Charles: CHRISTNER rrested while touring the Sovnion by automobile. (NOSENKO this case in passing while reng a list of Americans who had ed the USSR; he was not quesd further on it.)	None indicated. (1964)	As announced in the press and as stated in a KGB document on American tourists which GOLITSYN provided, CHRISTNER was arrested on charges of espionage in the summer of 1961.
LIN, Howard L.: A lieutenant el and Assistant Army Attache 1953 until 1954 or 1955, when s declared persona non grata taliation for a similar act United States. FELCHLIN utomatically assumed to be telligence officer and was ed accordingly.	Personal involvement as American Department case officer responsible for FELCHLIN. NOSENKO held FELCHLIN's file and directed agents surrounding him. (1964)	FELCHLIN, who arrived in Moscow in July 1953, was declared persona non grata with Major Walter McKINNEY on 25 March 1954; they were charged with spying while on a trip to Vladivostok. See Part V.C.3.b.
OUSER, Richard: The U.S. Embsection suspected that FUNR was a CIA officer because he specialist on Russia, partily economics. NOSENKO did call the names of agents reng on FUNKHOUSER but reported the case officer responsible im was V.A. KUSKOV.	Source not named. NOSENKO thought he may have read some of the "materials" concerning FUNKHOUSER, but could not recall their content. (1964)	FUNKHAUSER was Counsellor for Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in 1961-1962;
OFF, Ray: At Geneva disarma talks in spring of 1962 and lled to the USSR in 1963 and was ected by the KGB of being an ican Intelligence officer; NKO assigned to watch him in va in 1962 and close watch was	Source not named. Tourist Department case while GARTHOFF was in USSR. (1964)	GARTHOFF is an advisor to the State Department and instructor at the Sino-Soviet Institute at George Washington University; he is a specialist in Soviet political and military policy.

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n him in 1963, when KGB agents were gainst him; [redacted] [redacted]		
Bernard: A member of the CPUSA resident of New York City, KOTEN d a number of contacts with an ant KGB [redacted] agent [redacted] OTEN travelled to the Soviet in 1963, he carried with him the s of relatives of this agent and ed to visit them. KOTEN there- as considered to be a probable ent, and because of this and signs of FBI suspicion of the agent, the [redacted] Legal ncy began preparations to get agent out of the United States. KOTEN was in the USSR, he was sfully compromised by a KGB xual agent, was arrested, inter- d, and imprisoned. His deten- ad been requested by the First Directorate, which wanted to time for the [redacted] agent to es- efore KOTEN returned to the	Supervised the case as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department and sanctioned KOTEN's compromise and detention in the absence of O.M. GRIBANOV and NOSENKO's other superiors. (1964)	KOTEN, an instructor at NYU and member of a number of Communist front organizations, wasinterviewed by representatives of the State Department in January 1964. He described his arrest, interrogation, and month-long imprisonment in August-September 1963, saying that he denied being an FBI agent and that the Soviets later told him the arrest was all a mistake. He was released on 28 September 1963 after intervention by the CPUSA. In unprecedented move, fact of arrest on homosexual charges leaked to Western press by Inturist, and case received wide publicity in U.S. newspapers in 1963. [redacted]
Fillmore K.: Replaced MICKEL- Army Attache (see below) and, h, was automatically assumed to ilitary intelligence officer. surrounded with agents, and e entered the country for the time, his baggage was searched copy of his service record found. was no approach to him, and no esses or vulnerabilities were during his tour in Moscow.	Personal involvement as case officer responsible for military attaches during 1953-1955. NOSENKO was present when baggage was searched with assistance of the Special Technical Section of the Second Chief Directorate. (1964)	Army Attache in Moscow in 1954-1955, replacing MICKELSON. A number of incidents, including one recruitment approach, on record--none of which has NOSENKO reported. See Part V.C.3.b.

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LSON, Earl L.: Army Attache and ed military intelligence officer; fore, main task of U.S. Embassy on was not recruitment, but to nt him from carrying out his in- gence mission in the USSR by ant, heavy surveillance. MICKEL- file in the U.S. Embassy Section ined nothing unusual or interest- rom any source and no derogatory mation. P.F. PANKRATOV was the al case officer working against and the case was turned over to KO in 1954. It may have been LSON rather than MEARNS whose ge was searched (see above).	Personal involvement as responsible case officer in 1954. (1964)	Served as Army Attache from 1952 until December 1954. See Part V.C.3.b.
Walter: Captain MULE was an tant Army Attache in Moscow in 1955. In either 1953 or 1954, KO accompanied N.M. BORODIN and KOVSHUK to Leningrad, where BORO- ropositioned MULE to work for GB. MULE refused. In 1955, was with BENSON and STROUD in ngrad when the KGB broke into hotel room and stole classified ronics equipment. He was declared na non grata shortly afterwards. BENSON, above.)	Personal involvement as responsible case officer in 1954-1955. NOSENKO and KOVSHUK blocked MULE's exit from Leningrad hotel room so that BORODIN could talk to him in 1953 or 1954. (1964)	Leningrad incident took place on 29 September 1954 and was reported at once by MULE. Along with BENSON and STROUD, he was declared persona non grata on 7 May 1955. See Part V.C.3.b.
D Lee Harvey; When OSWALD in 1959 nced his desire to defect to the t Union and particularly after he ted suicide by slashing his wrists, B felt that there was "something " with him and decided to leave him ly alone. OSWALD was never ched by the KGB at any time during tay in the USSR or subsequently and r he nor his wife Marina were, at ime, KGB agents.	Personal participation; NOSENKO was first involved with OSWALD in 1959, when as a Tourist Department officer, he had a part in consideration of OSWALD's application for Soviet citizenship and the KGB's decision to "wash its hands of him." In 1963, after President KENNEDY's assassination, NOSENKO, then Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, took part in investigations of OSWALD. (1964)	Documents provided by the Soviet Government after the assassination are consistent with NOSENKO's account and give no indication of KGB interest in OSWALD. See Part V.D.6.

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REINER, Gabriel: Head of the Cosmos Travel Agency; has visited the Soviet Union and is of interest to the KGB which has placed officers in contact with him; however, he is believed to be in contact with the FBI, and no attempt has been made to recruit him for this reason; REINER is talkative, shrewd, and foxy, but he would not be good agent material, and any attempt to compromise him would be a waste of time.	Source not named. REINER was in contact with Tourist Department officer V.D. CHELNOKOV and was considered for KGB recruitment in connection with NOSENKO's plan to recruit tourist firm employees for use as spotters. (1964)	Born in Lithuania or Poland, REINER came to the United States in 1922; he is a member of the New York City Bar Association and has managed Cosmos since 1935; he had travelled extensively to the USSR and Satellite countries and is a registered foreign agent on Inturist; he has not been interviewed by the FBI.
RICHARDS, Ira S.: Lieutenant Colonel RICHARDS was an Assistant Army Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955 and as such was a subject of study. NOSENKO was responsible case officer and handled agents reporting on RICHARDS. There was nothing interesting or unusual in RICHARDS' KGB file.	Personal involvement; case officer. (1964)	RICHARDS was Assistant Army Attache from July 1954 to July 1956. He was interviewed [redacted] in November 1964 and mentioned a number of Soviets with whom he had contact and whom NOSENKO had identified as KGB agents. One of these was Lyudmilla GROMAKOVA, his language teacher, whom NOSENKO identified but did not associate with RICHARDS. See Part V.C.3.6.
SLESINGER, Alfred: An American who owns a photographic shop in New York City, SLESINGER has visited the USSR several times, possibly in 1960 and 1961, and is suspected of being an FBI agent. In New York he has had dealings with a number of Soviet visitors who came to his store and seemed to display more than normal interest in them. When it was thought he might make some contacts or do something interesting in the USSR, the Tourist Department put an agent, the owner of a Moscow photographic shop, in contact with him. They became friends and may have exchanged correspondence. There was no plan to	Sources not named. Tourist Department case officer was Yu.M. DVORKIN; SLESINGER visited USSR at time NOSENKO was in the Tourist Department. (1964)	FBI [redacted]

approach SLESINGER, but only to study him. NOSENKO had no other details.

STROUD, William R.: Captain STROUD was an Assistant Army Attache in 1954 and 1955. From concealed microphones the KGB learned before his arrival in Moscow that STROUD was an expert in electronic intelligence techniques. STROUD, together with BENSON and MULE (q.v.), was caught by the KGB in Stalingrad in possession of electronic intelligence devices and was declared persona non grata. Other than this, NOSENKO knew nothing interesting or unusual about STROUD from any source.

Personal involvement as responsible case officer in 1954-1955, but had left First Department in June 1955, before the Stalingrad theft took place. (1964)

Assistant Military Attache from 1954 until he was declared persona non grata on 7 May 1955 following the seizure of electronic equipment in Stalingrad.

WASHENKO, Steve: The KGB considered WASHENKO, the Agricultural Attache, to be either a CIA officer or contact. On trips outside Moscow he gathered information in manner of an intelligence officer and was heard discussing reports on his return via concealed microphones. He once mailed a letter, probably in 1959, to a KGB-controlled agent inside the USSR. Also, he continually checked for surveillance. American Department therefore instituted special surveillance, surrounded him with agents, and applied metka to his clothes to detect letter-mailings.

Source not named. NOSENKO said he joined U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960; WASHENKO was in Moscow until March 1960. (1964)

WASHENKO was in Moscow from January 1958 until March 1960;

S. George: WINTERS was the
o t ıe compromise of CIA agent
KGB surveillance detected WINTERS
g a letter to POPOV in January
nd in this way got its first indi-
that POPOV was working for CIA.
S, because of his conduct, had
onsidered a CIA officer and par-
n attention was given him prior
letter mailing. One of his KGB
ts was V.M. KOVSHUK, who used the
OMAROV and the cover of the Sov-
nistry of Foreign Affairs.
S was not declared persona non
with LANGELLE after the arrest
OV because the KGB did not want
eal how POPOV was discovered, in
pe that WINTERS might attempt
onal letter mailings. He was
ally declared persona non grata
0.

First heard of WINTERS from KOVSHUK probably in 1959, when KOVSHUK said that he had an appointment to meet WINTERS and therefore could not go out drinking with NOSENKO; KOVSHUK probably did not indicate that WINTERS was a suspected CIA officer at this time. After the POPOV compromise, NOSENKO learned from KOVSHUK that WINTERS, not LANGELLE, was the true cause of the compromise. (1962)

WINTERS served in Moscow from June 1958 until October 1960, when he was declared persona non grata for his part in the POPOV operation. (LANGELLE, POPOV's case officer in Moscow, was declared persona non grata a year earlier.) A CIA staff officer, WINTERS mailed one letter to POPOV in January 1959 and performed other support functions in connection with the case. In debriefings he has described his relationship with KOVSHUK, whom he saw frequently. The story of the POPOV compromise is also given in the CHEREPANOV Papers, many of which concern WINTERS. See Part VI.D.7.a.

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3. Selected Cases of Recruited Americans

Note: Of NOSENKO's leads to Americans recruited by the KGB, there were three who, he indicated, had access to classified U.S. Government information at the time he first reported on them to CIA. These three cases--"SASHA", "ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH), and the penetration source in France (Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON)--therefore have been selected for detailed discussion.

a. "SASHA"

(i) NOSENKO's Information on the Agent

At the first meeting with CIA in 1964 NOSENKO announced that he could not continue to work in place for CIA; he was going to defect outright, he said, rather than go back to the Soviet Union. He was told that in order to make the arrangements for his secure removal from Switzerland it would be necessary to expand the limited number of people in CIA who were aware of his case; in this connection it was extremely important that he think hard about whether he knew of any indication of penetration of CIA. His first reaction was to shrug his shoulders indicating that he had no idea, but upon his case officer's insistence he thought further about the question and finally said: "I do not know of any in CIA, but there is one in your military intelligence. This one worked in Germany and then returned to America in 1955, and then after 1955 he worked in Germany." He explained that he had first learned of this case from M.A. SHALYAPIN, who had been the case officer for this operation in Germany. This agent, whose name NOSENKO did not know, was still in Germany as of the time SHALYAPIN left Berlin in about 1957.* SHALYAPIN told him that this agent's KGB cryptonym was "SASHA," and that he had recruited "SASHA" himself in Germany, on a purely financial basis. Asked if "SASHA" wore a uniform while meeting his KGB handler, NOSENKO said he appeared in civilian clothes. He knew "SASHA" was of officer status, but whether he was in civilian or military intelligence he could not say; he thought, however, the agent was working against military targets. NOSENKO added that "SASHA" returned to the United States in the 1960's, then specified 1962, and returned to Germany again after that.

In February 1964, talking about another matter, NOSENKO said he had remembered something that might help to identify "SASHA." He had heard that the KGB had not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government during the Cuban missile crisis in late 1962.** SHALYAPIN had

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*On the basis of the collateral evidence on KGB officers in Germany named by NOSENKO in connection with SHALYAPIN (see below), it has been established that--despite NOSENKO's dates of 1955 to 1957--"SASHA" would have been in Germany and recruited some time between early 1957 and late 1959, when (according to NOSENKO) SHALYAPIN left Germany for an assignment to Cuba.

**See also Part V.F.10. for NOSENKO's statements about the role of GRU Colonel G.N. BOLSHAKOV in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

mentioned in this context that "SASHA" had been stationed in the United States during this period but had not been able to provide any information of value. NOSENKO concluded from this that "SASHA's" second assignment to Germany, where he served as a department chief in intelligence, did not take place until sometime after the Cuban crisis--November 1962 at the earliest, and perhaps not until the first part of 1963. (He later stated firmly that SHALYAPIN had not told him this part of the case, but he was unable to say who had.)

NOSENKO was not certain which department of the First Chief Directorate was originally responsible for "SASHA"; at first he thought it was the Third (European) Department, because the agent had been recruited in Germany, but then he referred to Germany as a special situation and said he thought it might have been the First (American) Department, since the agent was an American. In any event, NOSENKO stated, the Service No. 2 was the last First Chief Directorate element responsible for the case, which indicated that it was not a valuable operation producing intelligence--otherwise the American Department would not have given it up to the Service No. 2. NOSENKO knew no other KGB case officers who had been personally involved in the case with or after SHALYAPIN.

(ii) NOSENKO's Sourcing

NOSENKO was interviewed intensively about SHALYAPIN and the "SASHA" case on a number of occasions. Concerning SHALYAPIN, he said that this KGB officer had been stationed in the United States in 1944 or 1945, at which time he worked as an interpreter in the United Nations for the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, D.Z. MANUILSKIY. SHALYAPIN was in the United States for five or six years, but NOSENKO did not know in what year he returned to the USSR. Upon returning, he was assigned by the First Chief Directorate to work in the American Department as Chief of one of the four directions which then existed in the department--New York, Washington, Canada, and Latin America. At some later date SHALYAPIN was Deputy Resident and then Resident for the KGB in Uruguay, succeeding I.P. MISHIN in this capacity.* His next foreign assignment was Berlin. NOSENKO did not know definitely the period of this tour but believed it was from 1955 to 1957; he did know that V.V. KRIVOSHEY was in Germany for a short time after SHALYAPIN arrived.** N.S. SKVORTSOV was also there for a short while, because SHALYAPIN took over SKVORTSOV's cases before the latter left to return to Moscow. Although NOSENKO invariably has given 1955-1957 as SHALYAPIN's dates for his Germany assignment, he has also said that SHALYAPIN left Germany because he had to go to Cuba, and that he went to Cuba some time in 1959. He was recalled from Cuba around January 1962 because he had been rude to the Cubans, quarrelled with the Chief of Cuban Intelligence, and was drinking heavily. NOSENKO said that he met SHALYAPIN for the first

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*On the basis of this item from NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN was identified from photographs as being identical with M.G. KOTUKHOV, assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Montevideo from July 1950 to June 1955, with five or six months' home leave in 1953.

time in about September or October 1962, through Yu.I GUK, who had worked in the American Department of the First Chief Directorate in Moscow Headquarters with SHALYAPIN at some time, probably before GUK was assigned to the United States.*

When SHALYAPIN came back from Cuba, he was to be a case officer in the Latin American Department of the First Chief Directorate, under S.N. ANTONOV. SHALYAPIN, a full colonel at this time, resented this assignment, and there was also considerable animosity between himself and ANTONOV, whose work in America had been criticized by SHALYAPIN, the desk officer for ANTONOV at that time. Thus SHALYAPIN decided to retire, and he applied to the Medical Commission of the KGB for disability retirement on the basis of ailments he had contracted because of his work. (On one occasion NOSENKO claimed that a friend of a friend of his was on this commission, and NOSENKO used his influence with him to help SHALYAPIN get his medical retirement.) He retired on full pension, and NOSENKO then helped him to get a job with Inturist. When SKVORTSOV and ANTONOV heard of this, they tried to intercede with V.D. CHELNOKOV, Chief of the Tourist Department, Second Chief Directorate, to prevent him from getting the job, because they both wanted to revenge themselves on SHALYAPIN for his having exposed both of them in the past as poor work. NOSENKO, however, personally told CHELNOKOV of the true background of their efforts and pointed out to him how good a case officer SHALYAPIN was. NOSENKO got SHALYAPIN's file from the Tourist Department officer who ordered it in connection with the Inturist job and brought it to CHELNOKOV. As a result of this intervention by NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN got the Inturist job. These actions on NOSENKO's part made him a close friend of SHALYAPIN.

Because of this SHALYAPIN felt free to talk to NOSENKO, and over drinks he expressed his particular bitterness at the way the First Chief Directorate had treated him, since without him it would not have had an agent like "SASHA" in Germany at that time (1963). On a couple of other such occasions, SHALYAPIN told NOSENKO some of the details about "SASHA."

The above story is what NOSENKO most often cited as the background for his having happened to learn about "SASHA." Under intensive questioning, however, on exactly when and how he first learned of the "SASHA" case, NOSENKO backed off of his original attribution to SHALYAPIN; he said he did not remember when or from whom he had first picked this up, but that it could have been from GUK, or LOPUKHOV, maybe SHALYAPIN or others. He added, however, that he was sure that SHALYAPIN had talked to him about the case at some time.**

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*GUK was in the United States from August 1954 to September 1956. He had transferred from the Second Chief Directorate to the American Department of the First Chief Directorate in January 1952, according to GOLITSYN. Thus if he and SHALYAPIN served there together, it was either during the latter's home leave in May-October 1953, or in late 1956, before SHALYAPIN went to Germany.

**At this time NOSENKO had already met CIA representatives in Geneva and had agreed to collect information for them.

NOSENKO has indicated that others to whom the "SASHA" case was known were GUK, because he worked in the American Department when he returned from Switzerland in 1962; KRIVOSHEY, because he was a good friend of SHALYAPIN; LOPUKHOV, who was with NOSENKO when SHALYAPIN talked about "SASHA"; and SKVORTSOV, because he "is sly" and had many acquaintances. Also aware of the case was Ye.A. ZAOVSTROVTSEV, because he too "is sly" and "knows everything that is going on wherever he is"; ZAOVSTROVTSEV was in Germany for many years. NOSENKO said he thought KOVSHUK also knew about "SASHA."

Although he had first attributed the story of "SASHA" in relation to the Cuba missile crisis to SHALYAPIN, in subsequent discussions of the "SASHA" case, NOSENKO has denied that he learned of it from SHALYAPIN. He could not recall from whom he did hear this, "perhaps from (Yu.I.) GUK, from (Yu.A.) LOPUKHOV, or from (V.M.) KOVSHUK."

(iii) GOLITSYN's Lead to "SASHA"

GOLITSYN provided a lead to a KGB recruitment of an agent in Germany who had the KGB cryptonym "SASHA." This agent was connected with American Intelligence, and although originally this was an operation of the Emigre Department, KGB First Chief Directorate, it was taken over by the Fourteenth (Counterintelligence) Department, predecessor of Service No. 2. GOLITSYN first learned some details of this case in about 1955.

b. "ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)

(1) Introduction

In contacting CIA in June 1962, NOSENKO offered to sell two items of information about KGB operations in return for money to replace operational funds he had squandered on a Geneva bargirl. He first made this offer to David MARK on the afternoon of 9 June 1962, describing one item to MARK as the case of an American who had been recruited by the KGB in Moscow while assigned to the U.S. Embassy, and who was then (June 1962) working in Washington "near ciphers." On the evening of the same day he gave this lead in greater detail to a CIA case officer and said "ANDREY" was the KGB cryptonym. NOSENKO did not know his true name but gave some data which would permit identification. Early in the 1964 meetings with NOSENKO the "ANDREY" case was again discussed, and despite differences in certain particulars as compared with NOSENKO's 1962 account, it became apparent after further investigation that there was only one possible candidate for "ANDREY": Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, a code-machine repairman in the Moscow Embassy from April 1952 to April 1954, who had retired from the U.S. Army on 31 November 1961. SMITH was then questioned by the FBI on the basis of the NOSENKO lead. Although he at first denied any contact with or recruitment by the KGB, [redacted] to the FBI in December 1965, [redacted] regations.

The following review of the "ANDREY" case is divided into several parts: NOSENKO's information in 1962, his information in 1964, his sourcing for this information, and the results of the investigation of the NOSENKO lead.

(2) NOSENKO's Information in 1962

In 1962, at the first meeting in Geneva, NOSENKO introduced the "ANDREY" case:

NOSENKO: Now I will tell you (about the second of two cases). I did not work on this case personally. A code machine mechanic was recruited in Moscow. He was recruited with women and money. In 1950 or 1949.

Question: When was this?

NOSENKO: 1949, 1950. With this case it is more difficult. Because I will not be able to give you his name. But I will give you such facts which will allow you to find him... They recruited him. He worked in Moscow satisfactorily. He gave information on ciphers. He gave materials... He promised he would cooperate with us abroad, but he said he would not work with us in America. He said: "In no case do I want to sit in the electric chair." They paid him well enough. He did not want to work in America...

Question: He was recruited when?

NOSENKO: In 1949-1950, in Moscow.

Question: Yes, yes, I am saying, was he already at that time...

NOSENKO: I tell you I was not working on this case. He was recruited in 1949-1950.

Question: When did he leave Moscow?

NOSENKO: He left in 1950. It seems so, yes. He said that he would not work in the USA.

NOSENKO went on to say that "ANDREY" was the cryptonym assigned to the agent by the Second Chief Directorate at the time of his recruitment. Although NOSENKO was not sure of the dates, he was certain that this man, a U.S. Army Sergeant, had been spotted for the KGB by Roy RHODES, whose KGB cryptonym was "QUEBEC". RHODES was still in Moscow when "ANDREY" was recruited; he had told the KGB about many other U.S. Embassy employees, including military personnel, and the name "ANDREY" would mean nothing to RHODES because he did not know that the KGB had recruited this man.*

The mechanic worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB, providing materials and information on ciphers. "ANDREY" promised he would cooperate with the Soviets in future assignments abroad, but would not work with them in the United States as he did not want to "sit in the electric chair." He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow, and the Soviets wanted to pay him more but he refused to accept it because he said he could not plausibly explain the possession of too much money. When the KGB offered him diamonds and other gems for later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers that possession of a large diamond of more than a carat in the United States could arouse the attention of the police. In 1950 the agent left Moscow for the United States, and the KGB waited for him to reappear in some other country, but he did not. Finally in 1955 the KGB sent an officer, who had participated in the recruitment of the agent in Moscow, to the United States for the purpose of finding "ANDREY" and the officer had no other

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* After NOSENKO's first mention of Roy RHODES' role in this case, records were checked for the dates of RHODES' assignment in Moscow, which were April 1951 to July 1953. According to RHODES, the date of his own recruitment by the KGB was January 1952. When these dates were cited to NOSENKO on two separate occasions during the 1962 meetings he changed the original date for the recruitment from 1949 or 1950 to 1952 or 1953. In 1962, as well as in 1964, he said he was certain that the recruitment had already taken place prior to his (NOSENKO's) entrance on duty with the KGB. In 1962 he gave this date as March 1953. In 1964 and since he has given a variety of dates for this, ranging from the beginning of 1952 to April 1953. (See Part V.A.)

assignment. The man went under the name of KOMAROV* as a second or third secretary to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. After a long search, "ANDREY" was found. NOSENKO's impression was that the agent worked at the Pentagon then and that in 1962 he was still working at the Pentagon.

KOVSHUK (KOMAROV), with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in Washington, learned where the agent was living, identified his automobile, and contacted him finally at the end of 1955 or the beginning of 1956. Speaking of the difficulties the KGB had in locating "ANDREY", NOSENKO said: "... He (KOVSHUK) said they were looking for him a long time, the places where they looked for him. Then they found where he parked his car, where he lived - in a place where there were many other people and it was difficult to get close to him. Then (he told) about his surveillance, the hours of 'ANDREY's' return from work; sometimes he was sitting in the movies. But we knew that he had made a contact..." At first "ANDREY" was frightened and refused to work, but when at the third contact he was offered a package of $1,000, "it went differently." The agent finally accepted the money from KOVSHUK because, due to his gambling, he was again in financial straits. From that point on he worked well with the KGB. He again provided good information and was still doing so as of 1962. NOSENKO was not sure what kind of materials he was giving them, but he knew that he was close to codes at that time and this information was considered important by the KGB. NOSENKO believed that when KOVSHUK found him, "ANDREY" was working in the Pentagon and that he was still there in 1962.

In reference to the modus operandi for meetings between KOVSHUK and "ANDREY," NOSENKO reported that KOVSHUK knew he was under surveillance by the FBI, for the Soviets were intercepting the FBI surveillance-radio traffic which included references to "The Three Musketeers". The Soviet monitors knew this to be a term applied to KOVSHUK and his colleagues.** NOSENKO was not

* NOSENKO identified KOMAROV as the alias used abroad and in his Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover job in Moscow by V.M. KOVSHUK, who had become Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, by the time he was sent to Washington to locate this agent. GOLITSYN had previously identified KOVSHUK as an officer of the American Department who had come to Washington in 1957 for nine or ten months. He did not know the specific reason for the trip but said that in view of KOVSHUK's job it would be to solidify a developmental operation begun in Moscow or to recontact an agent already recruited in Moscow. He identified a photo of KOMAROV as KOVSHUK.

** 

aware of the identities of the other two Soviets comprising the trio. In addition, NOSENKO described the meetings as having taken place always in cars: KOVSHUK would lose his surveillance the day before the meeting and go to another state where he would wait by the highway; the American would drive by and stop his car; KOVSHUK would sit down with him in the car, receive the materials, and give him the money; then KOVSHUK would get out, and the American would drive on.

According to NOSENKO, the person who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL (Reino HAYHANEN, who defected to CIA in Paris in May 1957) also gave away information on Roy RHODES, who had been in Moscow as a garage superintendent. When RHODES was under investigation, "ANDREY" was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES in Moscow. "ANDREY" was the only person called as a witness, and he was called upon several times to tell how RHODES had behaved in Moscow. The agent, NOSENKO stated, could be identified by the fact that he was the only person who testified at the trial. He suffered during this investigation period and stopped meeting the Soviets. He was afraid he would be exposed and arrested too, as a result of RHODES' arrest. NOSENKO suggested that "ANDREY" may have had some suspicion of RHODES' involvement in his own recruitment, or he may merely have been panicky because he knew he could be accused of the same thing as RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed his meetings with the Soviets, having little other choice.

KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington Legal Residency and returned to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know who succeeded KOMAROV as the handler but said that this second officer eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV, who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961.* NOSENKO did not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but said in 1962 that the case was still alive.

(iii) NOSENKO's Information - 1964

When the "ANDREY" case was discussed with NOSENKO in Geneva in 1964 and in additional discussions after his defection, he altered several details of the 1962 story and supplied some new details about the recruitment, various officers knowledgeable of the case, and information provided by "ANDREY." Only where the 1964 information differs from that of 1962 or adds to it is it included below.

The recruitment of "ANDREY" took place in 1948 or 1949 according to one interview, in 1952 or earlier by another, and in 1953 according to a third discussion of the case with NOSENKO. The association in NOSENKO's mind between "ANDREY' and Roy RHODES remained firm, but he could not be certain whether "ANDREY" was still in Moscow in 1953 or that he heard nothing about the agent in 1954.

"ANDREY" used to play cards, NOSENKO reported, and may have played poker for high stakes. He also said that "ANDREY" had worked at the Pentagon - in codes - but by the time that KOVSHUK got in touch with him he was nearing the end of his

* BAGRICHEV was reassigned from Washington in June 1960 but returned on TDY from 3 July to 1 November 1961.

enlistment and was working in an Army recruiting office, where he still was assigned when BAGRICHEV took over the case from KOVSHUK.

NOSENKO was told by CIA that "ANDREY" had not yet been identified. He replied: "I'd like to say that you have selected a a slightly wrong way of trying to find him. You should not be looking for him during the trial. It was the investigation, during the investigation was when he made an appearance. Only once he appeared during the investigation. He was called just once, and he was scared to death..." Asked if he thought this information to be correct, NOSENKO answered: "Oh, absolutely. I'm absolutely sure it is. It's absolutely correct. The fact that they called him - they summoned him to be interrogated during the investigation - this is absolutely correct..." Later he said: "As I told you, take all those who were called up for the pre-trial investigation of RHODES, not who were at the trial but at the pre-trial and among those people must be 'ANDREY'..." Questioned further on whether "ANDREY" had testified at the trial of Roy RHODES, NOSENKO repeated: "No, he did not testify at the trial, and at the pre-trial investigation he was only called up once for questioning because he had worked with RHODES at one time."

Describing "ANDREY's" production in Moscow, NOSENKO stated that he explained to the KGB how the code machines in the U.S. Embassy worked and on one occasion NOSENKO expressed the opinion that "ANDREY" may have given the KGB parts of code machines such as "discs" (sic, meaning rotors). In this connection, NOSENKO recalled that one Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy department chief in the Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in the 'ANDREY' case: NOSENKO said he first saw him in 1953 during the period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow. SELEZNEV came to meetings in the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, held to discuss and plan the "ANDREY" operational meetings. The reason for SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with the questions to be asked of "ANDREY." Since SELEZNEV came to these meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO normally saw him in uniform in his visits to the First Department in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO speculated that SELEZNEV may have gone in person to some of the meetings with "ANDREY." NOSENKO was asked if SELEZNEV had instructed the case officers working with "ANDREY" to ask him for discs from inside the code machines, but NOSENKO replied that he did not know. Although he did not know how the KGB exploited him, NOSENKO repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY's" great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for them in Moscow. "Thanks to his help they were able to read your State Department codes. To date we have never been able to read your military codes..."* NOSENKO was asked if "ANDREY" had brought military code material to the KGB, and he replied: "No, I believe it was only State Department material. What he did mainly was to describe the operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic settings were made..."

According to NOSENKO, "ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that the first recontact was made until he ceased

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* See Parts V.3.c. and VI.D.9. on KGB operations against U.S. code clerks as KGB cryptologic successes.

meetings because of the RHODES trial; again after the trial he was able to furnish good material, not only orally but also in the form of documents, papers, and written material. This was true for the period KOVSHUK was handling him and also for the BAGRICHEV phase of the operation. NOSENKO was queried as to whether during the period between June 1962 and January 1964 he had heard about "ANDREY" continuing to supply good information. He answered: "No, something is going wrong there with this operation."

(iv) NOSENKO's Sourcing

NOSENKO was asked in 1962 how he had learned about the "ANDREY" case. He replied on the first occasion: "Well, because I was working in the First Department. Although I worked there quite a bit later.* But it was known. And KOMAROV, who went (to the United States) is my friend. There are friends in intelligence; here you hear something, there there are friends in the First (Chief) Directorate. BAGRICHEV himself was once working in the Second Directorate. Well, you ask: 'Kolya (BAGRICHEV), how were you working with him? Were we giving him much? What was he giving? How? Good material? 'ANDREY'?' But it is improper to ask for the name... At another meeting in 1962, NOSENKO said of this case: "I learned of this operation through both KOVSHUK and BAGRICHEV. BAGRICHEV had also been in the Second Chief Directorate at one time..."

Since he returned to Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO has attributed his knowledge of the "ANDREY" case to various KGB officers who were witting of the case. On one occasion he said that Yu.I. GUK knew all about the case, BAGRICHEV worked with him, and the basic recruitment was made by N.M. BORODIN. On another occasion he was asked again how he had learned about "ANDREY." He answered: "'ANDRZY'? It was in a conversation. KOVSHUK was there; (V.A.) CHURANOV knew about 'ANDREY.' Even - who else? - GUK knew about 'ANDREY'... I might have heard from similar guys - maybe from BORODIN, who said that when he was leaving he returned the stones..." NOSENKO said that it was from KOVSHUK that he learned about what had happened in Washington and about BAGRICHEV working with "ANDREY." KOVSHUK told him how "ANDREY" had been frightened at the time of the RHODES trial, and later GUK told him the same story. On yet another occasion NOSENKO was asked whether GUK knew of the case, and he asserted that he had never discussed "ANDREY" with GUK.

(v) Results of Investigations

As a result of NOSENKO's reporting on "ANDREY" in 1962, the FBI interviewed Roy RHODES



The FBI report [illegible]

* As noted in the preceding discussion, in 1962, NOSENKO gave his date of entry into the KGB as March 1953.





* The 1956 and 1957 [illegible] Arlington [illegible] area telephone books show Doyle W. SMITH listed at this same address. No other Doyle W. SMITH or Doyle [illegible] is listed.

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

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

has not yet been identified by name.

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

* Roy RHODES' name was first publicized when he appeared as a witness in Rudolf ABEL's trial, on 21 October 1957. SMITH was interviewed by the FBI concerning RHODES [redacted] BAGRICHEV was out of the United States from 19 June to 20 September 1957, when he returned to his post at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York City. [redacted] to Washington or elsewhere, from then until 21 November 1957, when he was transferred to the Soviet Embassy, Washington. KOMAROV (KOVSHUK) ended his TDY in the United States on 14 January 1958, and Roy RHODES' courtmartial opened on 11 February 1958, the date on which SMITH appeared as a witness for the prosecution. On the basis of these dates, it appears that the initial KGB contact with SMITH in the United States occurred in October or possibly November 1957; this seems to conflict, however, with the number and frequency of meetings with KOMAROV, as SMITH has described them.







c. The KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON)

(1) Introduction

The lead to the penetration of a sensitive U.S. military installation in the Paris area during 1962 and 1963 was the first piece of information NOSENKO gave CIA after reestablishing contact in Geneva in January 1964. NOSENKO characterized this lead then and later as the most important single counterintelligence item that he had acquired during the year and a half he had been a CIA collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow; the subject of the lead had provided the KGB with significant documents, some of which had been shown to Premier KHRUSHCHEV personally. Still active at the time NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva, the agent nevertheless had lost access to the sensitive information some months earlier. NOSENKO explained that the agent was scheduled to remain with the American Armed Forces in Paris until May 1964, when he would be rotated to the United States. In the interim, one of the Second Chief Directorate's special technicians, an expert at opening and resealing envelopes, had been assigned on extended TDY to the KGB Legal Residency in Paris against the possibility that access would be regained before this transfer. NOSENKO was unaware of any other services this agent may have earlier performed for the KGB and estimated that he had been recruited in 1962.

NOSENKO's lead eventually led to the identification of U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, JOHNSON's wife Hedwig, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, a friend, as KGB agents. All three had been recruited in Berlin in 1953 and had worked closely together since. Although Mrs. JOHNSON's direct participation (she served as a courier) ended with JOHNSON's transfer from Berlin in 1954 and despite KGB efforts to compartment the activities of JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH after 1959, all three were aware of the others' clandestine work. NOSENKO's lead to JOHNSON therefore compromised the other two.

While investigations of the NOSENKO lead were proceeding in the early autumn of 1964, JOHNSON deserted his duty assignment at the Washington Area Courier Station in the Pentagon and disappeared until the end of November, when he voluntarily turned himself in to Air Force Police officials in Las Vegas, Nevada. JOHNSON had arrived at his Pentagon assignment in May 1964; for the previous nine months he had been serving as noncommissioned officer in charge of the classified documents control section of the Seine Area Command Headquarters in Camp Des Loges, France; for two years before this, until August 1963, he had been assigned to the U.S. Armed Forces Courier Transfer Station at Orly Field in Paris. During the latter assignment JOHNSON had regularly stood weekend security watches in the Station's vault area, and it was to this period of time that NOSENKO's lead pertained.

In confessing to American authorities in January 1965, JOHNSON admitted having penetrated the Orly vault for the Soviets about seven times during December 1962 and the first five months of 1963. Although there were certain differences in timing and detail, JOHNSON's confession closely matched the complete description of this operation earlier given by NOSENKO. Except to implicate himself and other participants, JOHNSON added few essential details that were not already

known. JOHNSON's loss of access to the Orly vault in August 1963 coincided closely with the date when MINTKENBAUGH lost contact with the KGB, probably in September of that year.

NOSENKO has described the Paris operation as being entirely a First Chief Directorate case. He first learned of it in 1962, shortly after returning from his meetings with CIA in Geneva, in casual conversations with one or more Second Chief Directorate technicians who had been sent TDY to Paris to assist the local Legal Residency. NOSENKO was not sure which technician told him about the case, or under what circumstances. Additional information was similarly obtained "in bits and pieces" from one or the other of the technicians over the next year and a half, and NOSENKO had most recently discussed the case with the TDY "flaps and seals" expert in Paris while he (NOSENKO) was enroute to Geneva in mid-January 1964. NOSENKO explained that, although as a Second Chief Directorate officer he had no rightful access to information on this operation, he had worked with the special technicians in operations against tourists and other foreigners in Moscow and was on good terms with them. In such circumstances, NOSENKO said, it frequently happens that KGB officers will tell other KGB officers "some details of operations on which they are working."

The following discussion of the details of the operation commences with a review of NOSENKO's statements on the case and the way in which he learned about it. The remainder of the discussion covers events leading up to the confessions by the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH; the substance of their admissions, including the security problems posed by Mrs. JOHNSON's mental condition and the Soviet concern for her illness; and the assessment of the damage to U.S. interests caused by the activities of JOHNSON.

(ii) The Lead from NOSENKO

The agent was described by NOSENKO as being a U.S. military man, probably not an officer, who served nightime guard duty with others at an American military installation in France where an airfield was located and where top secret documents were held in a vault which he had helped the KGB to penetrate. He was scheduled to leave France in May 1964. Through him the KGB acquired documents on U.S. strategic bombing targets in the USSR and France; "almost all" of these materials were of interest to the Soviet Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO said. From early 1962 until the agent was promoted, the KGB Legal Residency in Paris effected six entries into the room with the assistance of technicians from the Special Section, KGB Second Chief Directorate,* whom NOSENKO named. After the agent lost his access, Fedor FOFANOV** was sent to

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* The Special Section, according to NOSENKO, handled surreptitious entries into Western embassies in Moscow.

**FOFANOV was assigned from June or July 1963 to February 1964 to the Soviet Embassy in Paris as an employee, and he is believed to have replaced a suspect KGB officer in this overt position; he abruptly left Paris immediately after NOSENKO's defection. NOSENKO indicated that FOFANOV was one of several technicians transferred from the KGB Operational-Technical Directorate to form the Special Group of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO proposed that he himself participate in [redacted] approach to FOFANOV in Paris.

Paris "in case he will get access again some time, even just a quick possibility." NOSENKO's statements concerning this lead are given in chronological order below.

NOSENKO said at the 23 January 1964 meeting* that he first learned of the successful agent penetration of the classified documents vault at an "important American military organization" in the Paris area shortly after returning from Geneva in June 1962. NOSENKO did not know the designation or precise nature of the installation involved in this operation, but because the documents included information on strategic targets in France as well as in the Soviet Union, he assumed that it was a "strategic planning installation." He also knew that the installation had its own airfield and that there were "procedures for bringing top secret documents in and for taking them out."

There had been six successful entries of the vault, four in 1962 and two in 1963. On each occasion Special Section technicians had travelled TDY to Paris under courier cover to assist the local KGB case officer in the technical details of the operation. Their function was to advise the case officer concerning the entry and later to process the documents. The case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instructions to his agent, and it seemed probable to NOSENKO that the technicians had never met the American.

Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the agent had used some radioactive substance to determine the combination. (NOSENKO thought that the agent had also photographed the lock for KGB study.) Subsequent entries were always made between two and five o'clock in the morning. The agent removed documents from the vault and delivered them to his case officer, who in turn passed them to the Special Section technicians. The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made, the documents were repackaged, and the envelopes were given back to the agent by the case officer for return to the vault. Thereafter, the Paris Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow, and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next opportunity for entry.

The last time the vault had been entered was in the fall of 1963. At about that time the agent, a military man, received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with his promotion, had obtained an extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still active in January 1964 and was still assigned to his military post, he therefore had lost access to the documentary information. NOSENKO characterized this information as highly sensitive and valuable to the KGB, adding that the Chief of the Paris Legal Residency as well as several case officers there had been rewarded for their part in the operation.

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* Because of technical difficulties in recording the first part of this meeting with NOSENKO, it is not possible to give a verbatim account of his initial statement on this case. What NOSENKO said at this time has been pieced together from remarks he made later in the meeting, from recorded recapitulations of his statements by his case officer later during the meeting and from notes taken at the meeting.

Finally, at the 23 January 1964 meeting NOSENKO reported that three of the Special Section technicians who had travelled to Paris to participate in the operation were S.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, and S.D. ILYIN; he said he could probably identify more if shown pictures of diplomatic couriers who had travelled to Paris. NOSENKO did not know the identity of the Paris-based case officer. With the exception of those concerning strategic bombing targets, NOSENKO had no information on the nature of the documents which had been obtained. He explained that he had never seen any of these documents, that the technicians who had seen them did not read English, and that they had learned about the targetting data only casually, from asking the case officer "What's this stuff?" at the time they were taking photographs.

Asked on 1 February 1964 whether CIA could do anything with its information concerning the travels of LEBEDEV which might help to identify the KGB agent of the Paris Legal Residency, NOSENKO replied: "Of course you can. For instance, find out when those couriers were in Paris, what were the dates of their stay there, keeping in mind that this will be one and the same LEBEDEV, (V.V.) SINITSYN, that Venyamin KARETNIKOV*... Not POPANOV - he came in the fall and did not get involved.** Then

* SINITSYN and KARETNIKOV, whose first name and patronymic have also been given by NOSENKO as Venedikt Vasilyevich were also in the Special Section, according to NOSENKO.

**NOSENKO gave CIA a similar clue concerning travel by the special technicians on 12 June 1962: "The Chief of the Special Section is Sergey IONOV, an excellent man. He is on a mission to Paris. (Note: CIA has been unable to equate any Soviet in Paris at this time with IONOV. There is no record that IONOV has been abroad under that name since December 1955. He made several trips to Paris and Brussels during the 1953-1955 period.) ...In the Second Chief Directorate there are good specialists, with experience. These lads sometimes go to Australia, to France, immediately when something is needed. At once. This means that there is something (going on) where they are sent... In this Section there are two or three specialists who can open any package and then seal it back up as it was. But there are only two or three of these altogether. Therefore, when there is something somewhere abroad, there is an immediate request to send these guys. One went to Australia one or two years ago. This means that there was something there. One went to France. Then this IONOV received the Boyevoye Krasnoye Znamya for this. Every time (they travel) they use a different last name. every time a different one... There are three men there that can open anything and then make it look as if nothing had been done... I know them. But they never come out in their own last names. Each time they have a different one. There were (M.I.) PREOBRAZHENSKIY, (V.Z.) KARETNIKOV, and LEBEDEV." In speaking of IONOV's assignment to Paris and the travel of KGB "flaps and seals" specialists to France, NOSENKO apparently was not referring to the JOHNSON case; NOSENKO said he first heard about the case after returning from Geneva in 1962, and JOHNSON stated firmly that the first entries of the Orly Courier Transfer Station did not begin until late 1962, about six months after NOSENKO made this statement. In 1964 NOSENKO named both LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV as having a part in the Orly penetration. Contrary to his statement, however, both travelled under true name on their temporary assignments. [redacted] no traces on

we must look at what kind of an organization (the U.S. installation is): Some leading American personality who has his own airport, who gets his mail delivered by plane, who has possession of strategic plans. And then take a look at the people guarding this establishment. Start from there. Then, see if you can get from the French a rundown on the activities of certain members of the (Soviet) Embassy during the period when these specialists were there. This in addition to a careful study of those who work there, of the guards, and who takes the night duty, specifically during those years and during those times. Also who among the guards got a promotion - jumped ahead. Try to pinpoint the American installation. This one has an airstrip. This installation would be the one which would hold the war plans, even bombing target data on France. Where would such materials be found? It seems to me that there would be only one such installation. It would not be in 10 different places... It is a private airdrome, not a public one. I don't know whose base it is, I only know that they have the airstrip and that people come from there carrying in mail. They bring mail from the airdrome, from their airdrome, their airplanes."

NOSENKO said on 6 April 1964 that before leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964, he had been told that the Paris Legal Residency agent had lost his access and that FOFANOV was sent to Paris in the hope that the agent would again be able to get into the vault before his transfer to the United States.* When NOSENKO arrived at the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to Geneva, FOFANOV "was on duty at the entrance to the Embassy. He was the duty man, and of course when he saw me, he said 'George, George!' So we chatted and he said he was not doing good, but he would probably be sitting there until May... So I asked him how this case was (going), was he doing any good, and he said that, for the present, he was not doing anything good but he had hopes that something might happen. That's all."

Also on 6 April 1964 NOSENKO stated that the penetration operation was "strictly a First Chief Directorate case." He then went on to describe the role of the Second Chief Directorate's technical specialists in gaining entry to the vault and in photographing the documents: "The specialists were not the ones that carried out the operation. It was carried out by the case officers of the Residency. The specialists worked on the packages which they would open and then reseal again later. When this happened and how they got the keys made, I

(footnote continued from preceding page)
LEBEDEV until he was placed on the official Soviet courier list in 1962; NOSENKO provided the first indication that he had intelligence connections and in July 1962, a month later, LEBEDEV took his first trip abroad under this name travelling to Brussels. [redacted]

* FOFANOV, a member of the Special Technical Section according to NOSENKO, applied for a French visa on 22 June 1963 and arrived in Paris on 27 July 1963. JOHNSON received notice of his transfer out of Orly on 4 August and left Orly on 5 August 1963. (see below).

don't know. LEBEDEV, by the way, said that they placed radioactive particles, with the help of this agent, into the lock of the door at the beginning. Then (LEBEDEV said) that the particles were removed and that they were picking the lock this way. The same thing was with the safe. After they had the keys to the room they still had to open the safe. Before everything was finally ready, they (the Special Section technicians) had to come there (Paris) several times. How many times they came in 1962, I don't know. I know it was the beginning of 1962."*

Questioned in detail about his knowledge of the Paris case, NOSENKO provided the following information on 29 July 1964: "I think he (the agent) was not an officer, considering that he was having this all night duty, but nothing was ever said about this either... (I imagine the operation was successful in 1962 because the boys from the Special Section were going several times in 1962. I think the Residency didn't have the chance to do this before 1962, because they couldn't do it without the help of these boys from the Special Section and they weren't going (i.e., did not go abroad) in 1960 and 1961.) I know he was working on the basis of money - they were giving him money. I think maybe he was recruited on the basis of money... I only heard that it was a big sum of money. I don't know if he was recruited in Paris and don't know if it was even a formal recruitment. I don't know what plans the KGB had for him after he leaves Paris. They were thinking that he must go soon. He was to leave in 1963. And then in mid- 1963 he got this step up, went a step higher, and so he was then to stay until mid-'64. He no longer had regular access and this is why FOFANOV was sent: In case he will get access again sometime, even just a quick possibility, then he can tell them and FOFANOV will be there to handle it immediately.

"Taking into consideration that I heard that almost all of the material they got was of interest to the Ministry of Defense," NOSENKO continued, "I think it was a military installation. It was a military installation. It was definitely an installation and not just a single person with access to these secret documents. I know the operations were carried out only at night. The whole operation was completed while the agent was on duty. The agent couldn't bring out a great deal of material, only what he could hide on his person. From what the boys were saying, I would think that he was not alone on duty. I was even asking the boys: 'How can he take these things out?' And they said: 'Oh, he just says that he is going out for coffee or a sandwich; he is gone only 5 or 10 minutes.' I think he was still in the same installation even though he lost immediate access to the room after his promotion. This is why FOFANOV was sent in mid-'63. FOFANOV said when I saw him on 18 January 1964 (NOSENKO means 19 January) that the agent is supposed to stay in Paris until May 1964. He said that the agent is supposed to leave in May and then he (FOFANOV) will be finished there.

* [redacted] This roughly matches JOHNSON's statement as to when the first penetration was made.

"I know that they went by car and that they were able to complete the whole operation during the tour of duty of the agent. They had to pick up the materials, drive some place - maybe the Soviet Embassy - open the documents, photograph them, close them again just as they were, and get back to return them to the agent all in this time. They did not specify which documents the agent was to bring out. But they were travelling as Soviet diplomatic couriers and I think their various stops were planned to coincide with the arrival of new materials at this installation. Also the fact that they had to open all the documents shows that they were sealed when they received them from the agent.

"I don't know if it was a key or a combination lock on the door," NOSENKO concluded. "I know they had to apply radio-active material to learn how to open either the door or the safe. The agent had to open the door and inside he had to open a safe."

(iii) NOSENKO's Sourcing

NOSENKO has been asked on a number of occasions to explain when and under what circumstances he learned of the Paris Legal Residency's operation against the U.S. military installation. He has always replied that he heard of the case "in little pieces" at separate times from various members of the Special (Technical) Section who participated in it. NOSENKO, however, has been vague and at times inconsistent in describing what he learned from whom and how and when he learned this information. Generally he gave either LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV as his principal source; under repeated questioning, NOSENKO has sometimes remained consistent in describing the time, place, and other conditions under which he learned a particular item of information, but he has said in one telling that it came from LEBEDEV while in the next that he learned it from KARETNIKOV. NOSENKO has also contradicted himself regarding which of these two originally told him of the operation and has said that he cannot recall which it was. The series of NOSENKO's statements about the sources of his information is presented in chronological order below.

"In connection with the thing in Paris...just exactly what did you hear about this military group?" NOSENKO was asked on 23 January 1964. "Who told you, in exactly what context, when, and so forth? Try to do it word for word... When and who?" NOSENKO answered: "Well, you know this Special Section, this is IONOV and LEBEDEV and well now, let's see, (pause). In Moscow that's PREOBRAZHENSKIY, and ILYIN was in Paris. They are subordinate to the Technical Section. They were counting the agents and what was needed - the target, the rooms, safe, and everything else. He took molds and samplings of radio-active substances which could reflect characteristics in this American military installation." The subject changed without NOSENKO answering the next question, about what the Special Section officers had done in this operation. NOSENKO volunteered no additional information concerning his sources for the lead, and he was not questioned further on the matter during this, the first of the 1964 meetings. The transcript of this meeting suggests, however, that NOSENKO got his information from one of the technicians who not only travelled to

Paris to instruct the Legal Residency case officer on the technical aspects of the entry but also was involved in photographing the documents provided by the agent.

NOSENKO told CIA on 28 January 1964 that he had learned of this operation, shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962, from a friend in the KGB, one of several technicians who participated in the operation. NOSENKO thought the source of this information was either LEBEDEV or FOFANOV.

During intensive debriefing on 6 April 1964 NOSENKO stated: "I first heard about this from KARETNIKOV." After describing the functions of the Special Section in Moscow, he went on to say that KARETNIKOV came frequently to the Tourist Department to see him. The reason for their association was that NOSENKO then supervised work with the Moscow hotels designated for use by foreign tourists, while the Special Section set up equipment in various rooms of these hotels. The debriefing continued:

NOSENKO: Why do they come to see me? First of all, they know me quite well and, secondly, simply because I supervise this (American Tourists) section. IONOV would come...to chat among other things. KARETNIKOV told me about this, in Paris.

Question: What did KARETNIKOV say when you first heard about this?

NOSENKO: That they had carried out operations several times in Paris, that two had already been there for this purpose, that they went there as diplomatic couriers to Paris... (NOSENKO at this point repeated KARETNIKOV's description of the role of the Special Section technicians in advising the Paris-based KGB case officer and the methods which were used to gain initial access to the vault.)

NOSENKO: KARETNIKOV was the first and then LEBEDEV. LEBEDEV was later.

Question: These were the only two people, you say?

NOSENKO: Only two, only two.

Question: But you told me before that FOFANOV told you about it too.

NOSENKO: FOFANOV, FOFANOV. I knew that FOFANOV is here in Paris. He was on duty at the entrance to the Embassy... (Here NOSENKO told of his conversation with FOFANOV about the case. NOSENKO then explained that he had already heard from LEBEDEV that the agent had lost his access and that FOFANOV had been assigned to Paris against the possibility that he would regain it.)

According to NOSENKO on 29 July 1964, he "first heard about this case from officers of the Special Section in 1962 - from LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV, but I can't remember which was first. LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV visited my office and maybe I might say:

'I haven't seen you in a long time, what have you been doing?' And he would say: 'Oh, I have just been to Paris on a trip.' Or maybe I asked KARETNIKOV where LEBEDEV was because I hadn't seen him in a long time, and he told me that LEBEDEV was away on a trip."

When asked on 29 July 1964 which officers had ever mentioned this case to him, in any way at any time, NOSENKO replied: "KARETNIKOV, LEBEDEV, and IONOV in Moscow and FOFANOV in Paris in January 1964." He affirmed that he had never discussed the case with, or mentioned it to, anyone else. "Yes," he continued, "I think LEBEDEV was the first one to speak to me about this case, because in 1962 I was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and was supervising the work of the Third Section on hotels and restaurants.* LEBEDEV was a member of a commission which had been set up in the KGB to plan for the operational exploitation of new hotels which were being built or planned. He was coming to see me about these matters. So while I might hear just a little bit about this from IONOV, I would hear more from LEBEDEV, because he was a good friend and was coming to my office on business."

The following is from the protocol which NOSENKO signed on 18 February 1965:

> "I first learned of the penetration of an American installation in Paris after my return to Moscow in June 1962 and at a time that I was a conscious and willing collaborator of the CIA and was attempting to gather information of interest to American Intelligence. I immediately recognized the importance of this information to American Intelligence when I first heard it.
>
> "I learned of this case in small pieces, in several conversations (some in my KGB office and possibly others elsewhere) with several different officers of the KGB over a period of several months. These officers were KARETNIKOV, IONOV, and LEBEDEV, all members of the Special Technical Section of the Second Chief Directorate.
>
> "I do not remember from which of these three officers I first heard of the case, which of these officers told me what portions of the story, or when I learned the individual details of this case which I have reported to CIA, or the season of the year in which I learned them.
>
> "I do not know why these officers told me of the Paris case, except that we were in good relations. In such circumstances it frequently happens that KGB officers will tell other KGB officers some details of operations on which they are working.** I don't know whether they told other KGB officers this information. As my relations were equally good with each of those three officers, any of them could have told me any part of it.

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* This would place NOSENKO's earliest knowledge of the case sometime after July 1962, when he said he became Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

**This sentence was added at NOSENKO's request prior to signing the protocol.

"Although I had not spoken with POFANOV about this case before he left Moscow for Paris and although POFANOV had no idea that I was aware of any details of this case at the time, he answered my two or three questions about this case during a short stop in Paris while I was enroute to Geneva in January 1964. I may have told him that I knew about it."

(iv) JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH

After preliminary investigation of the NOSENKO lead by the FBI, CIA, the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Department of the Army (ACSI), it was decided in early September 1964 to concentrate on Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON as the likeliest candidate for being the KGB agent in this operation. On 2 October 1964, however, JOHNSON disappeared from his home in Alexandria, Virginia, after telling his wife that he was on his way to work. JOHNSON, a courier with access to "secret" materials at the Pentagon, failed to appear for duty on Monday, 5 October. Army counterintelligence officers then called at the JOHNSON home to interview his wife. Mrs. JOHNSON said that she had detected nothing unusual in her husband's behavior during the previous several weeks, that he had simply left for the office at about 2:45 p.m. on Friday, the 2nd, and had not returned. She did not know why he had left or where JOHNSON might have gone. Mrs. JOHNSON repeated this statement in two later interviews, one toward the end of October and the second in the middle of November 1964.

Soon after JOHNSON's disappearance, representatives of ACSI interviewed an Arlington, Virginia, real estate salesman, James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. He had been identified by Mrs. JOHNSON as her husband's closest civilian acquaintance, having known JOHNSON from the time 12 years earlier when they served together in the Army. MINTKENBAUGH had first learned of JOHNSON's disappearance on Sunday, 4 October, when he telephoned the JOHNSON home and had talked to Mrs. JOHNSON. Twice the same day and once the next MINTKENBAUGH had telephoned the Pentagon in hopes of locating JOHNSON. During the interview, he told the ACSI representatives that he had no idea where JOHNSON was. The last time he had seen JOHNSON, MINTKENBAUGH said, was several weeks earlier, at which time everything seemed normal, although JOHNSON had complained of difficulties raised by his wife's mental condition.*

JOHNSON failed to reappear by 9 October 1964, the Army thereupon declared him a deserter, and the FBI was brought into the case. The FBI reinterviewed both Mrs. JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH on several occasions in search of information which might lead to JOHNSON's whereabouts. On 10 November, immediately following his third FBI interview, MINTKENBAUGH asked his roommate, [redacted] to take him to CIA Headquarters to discuss "a matter of importance." During an interview that same evening MINTKENBAUGH confessed to a CIA representative that he had been a Soviet agent since 1952 or 1953, following his recruitment by JOHNSON. He described in general terms his own espionage activities during this 11 or 12 year period as well as those of Sgt. and Mrs. JOHNSON. No mention was made of the Orly penetration, however. The next day, while his roommate was out of the apartment, MINTKENBAUGH packed his things and disappeared, leaving a note saying that he would be "back in the spring."

* JOHNSON had told a Pentagon co-worker shortly before he went AWOL that, "My wife is driving me crazy!" Others there had noticed that JOHNSON appeared nervous and seemed to be drinking heavily in the days immediately preceding his disappearance.

JOHNSON remained at large, his whereabouts unknown, until 25 November 1964. At that time he turned himself in to a U.S. Air Force policeman in Reno, Nevada. He had, he said, run out of money. JOHNSON was immediately incarcerated on the charge of being absent without leave.

On 1 December representatives of the FBI and ACSI visited Mrs. JOHNSON to inform her that her husband had been found. Then, for the first time, she launched into a long, detailed account in which she implicated JOHNSON, MINTKENBAUGH, and herself in espionage activities for the Soviets. (She had not confessed earlier, she said, because of fear of what JOHNSON might do to her.) Mrs. JOHNSON described what JOHNSON had done on behalf of the Soviets while stationed in Berlin during 1953 and 1954, while serving in the United States from 1957 to 1959, and during his recent tour in France from 1959 to August 1964. JOHNSON, she said, had told her in 1962, when he was assigned to the Orly Field Armed Forces Courier Station, that he had removed documents from the vault there on three occasions and had passed them to the Soviets.

A joint FBI-ACSI team two days later began to interrogate JOHNSON on the basis of the information which had been received from NOSENKO, Mrs. JOHNSON, and MINTKENBAUGH. JOHNSON steadfastly maintained his innocence: He had gone AWOL, he said, only in order to force the Army to hospitalize his mentally ill wife and to require the Army or some other agency to find a means of taking care of his children. (He later insisted that he had had no idea of the suspicions concerning him at the time he deserted.) During these interrogations, which lasted until 22 December, JOHNSON was confronted with the allegations made by his wife and MINTKENBAUGH. He made a point-by-point denial. Meanwhile, MINTKENBAUGH himself had been located by the FBI on 5 December at his brother's mountain cabin in California and was under interrogation.

JOHNSON was courtmartialed for desertion in December 1964 and was sentenced to reduction in grade, forfeiture of pay, and was ordered to reimburse the government for the cost of returning him to Washington. The sentence included no confinement and, as he continued to profess his innocence, he was home for Christmas. FBI-ACSI plans called for a resumption of questioning on the espionage charges after the New Year. On 1 January 1965, however, before the new interrogations began, JOHNSON walked in and made a voluntary confession. His reason for doing so, he said, was solely to help his children and his wife, whose mental condition was worsening. The substance of this confession is given in the section which follows.

(v) Information from Other Sources

The confessions by the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH constitute the bulk of evidence on the case. They indicate that the operation which began in 1953 reached its peak in late 1962 and early 1963 when JOHNSON penetrated the vault at Orly, that Mrs. JOHNSON's mental condition posed a serious threat to the security of the operation and that the KGB recognized this fact no later than late 1960. After August 1963 KGB interest in JOHNSON's access to classified information declined markedly, and MINTKENBAUGH's contact with the KGB was severed at approximately the same time. The JOHNSONs and MINTKENBAUGH were

mutually supporting in all major respects, for they paid little heed to KGB efforts at compartmentation and continued to discuss their clandestine activities with each other. Their statements are summarized below, followed by a detailed presentation of their accounts of the operation. Mrs. JOHNSON's revelations to others about the agent status of her husband, and the Soviet reactions to Mrs. JOHNSON's mental illness which caused her to make these revelations.

An effective and reliable agent from 1953 on, JOHNSON arrived at Orly in May 1961, but it was not until the fall of 1962 that he obtained the combination of the vault. Probably in December JOHNSON made the first of his seven entries into the vault. Five more penetrations appear to have been made during the period January to March 1963, and the final one occurred in May 1963. As summer approached and the days became longer, JOHNSON's KGB case officer told him he was suspending the operation, on the grounds that the shorter hours of darkness had increased the risk beyond acceptable limits, but the vault entries would recommence and intensify in the fall. In August, however, JOHNSON was transferred to the Seine Area Command headquarters at Camp Des Loges, France, and lost access to the vault. As noncommissioned officer in charge of the Classified Control Center at Camp Des Loges, JOHNSON had access to all classified documents originating with the Headquarters command and with certain other commands as well; yet the KGB never pressed him to produce these documents and, JOHNSON said, seemed uninterested in the documents he offered to provide. When he was transferred to the United States in 1964 following NOSENKO's defection, JOHNSON received the impression from his KGB handler that he was being "dropped." JOHNSON claims to have had no contact with the Soviets during the six months between his reassignment to the Pentagon and his apprehension in December 1964.

MINTKENBAUGH first served the KGB as a spotter of American personnel in Berlin during 1953 and 1954 and later, from 1956 to 1959, as a courier between JOHNSON and officers of the KGB Legal Residency in Washington, D.C. At the time JOHNSON was assigned to Orleans, France, in late 1959, MINTKENBAUGH was taken to Moscow to prepare for his "most important assignment." At KGB instruction, MINTKENBAUGH moved from California to Arlington, Virginia, in 1960. The plan was for him to establish a self-owned business so that he could be joined by a female (a KGB Illegal) who was to become his wife and operational assistant. Once this was accomplished MINTKENBAUGH was to act as a courier, servicing a network of KGB agents throughout the United States. Despite repeated KGB pleadings and admonitions, he took no further steps to establish the desired cover, and for this reason the Soviet plan never materialized. Moreover, MINTKENBAUGH has said, by early 1962 he was depressed and disillusioned and was looking for a way to break contact with the KGB; from this point or somewhat earlier he claims to have performed his various KGB assignments in a perfunctory way or not at all. Contact was finally broken sometime in the late summer or early fall of 1963 when MINTKENBAUGH was unable to read directions for further meetings which the KGB passed him on photographic film via deaddrop. The KGB took no steps to reinstitute contacts, and MINTKENBAUGH's own efforts - after apparently experiencing a change of heart - proved unavailing.

Hedwig JOHNSON's espionage career was limited to the 1953-1954 period, when she acted as a courier between JOHNSON in West

Berlin and the KGB at Karlshorst. Although she was subsequently aware of the details of JOHNSON's work and even on occasion accompanied him to operational meetings in France, she apparently never again played an active role.

a JOHNSON's Statements

Having admitted his espionage activities to ACSI and the FBI, JOHNSON gave what he said was the complete history of his relationships with Soviet Intelligence since the early 1950's. The following account is based largely on ACSI reports to the U.S. Security Board on 12 and 26 January 1965; they provide the details of his original confession and elaborate on his activities during his most recent tour in France.*

In 1952, JOHNSON was stationed in West Berlin where he was the acting first sergeant of a Transportation Corps company. Despondent because he was passed over for promotion and not given the first sergeant position, and believing that his application to marry would be disapproved, JOHNSON decided to defect to the Soviets. His first attempt to defect was aborted in February 1952 when Hedwig admitted to JOHNSON at the last minute that she had lied to him when she had informed him earlier that she had contacted the Soviet authorities in East Berlin and arranged for their defection as he had requested. After the initial attempt to defect, JOHNSON persuaded Hedwig to return to East Germany to contact the Soviets, which she did. About a week after the aborted effort to defect, Hedwig and JOHNSON met with the Soviets in East Germany. JOHNSON informed the Soviets he was "fed up with the American way of life" and wanted to defect to the USSR. JOHNSON was told there was no hurry about his proposal to defect, a statement with which he agreed. Another meeting was arranged for the following week. During the period between the first meeting and his marriage to Hedwig on 25 April 1953, JOHNSON met almost weekly with the Soviets. JOHNSON was finally told that he would be of more use to the Soviets if he were to remain in the American Sector. He agreed to do so and at the same time to perform tasks for Soviet Intelligence. JOHNSON has stated that he refused the money the Soviets offered for his services at that time, but he continued to work for Soviet Intelligence until his transfer to Rochefort, France, in April 1954.

During his Berlin assignment JOHNSON conducted the following activities on behalf of Soviet Intelligence:

- He was given a Minox camera by the Soviets and trained in its use.

- JOHNSON's first important assignment was to call on a man named "Willie" (presumed by Hedwig JOHNSON to be Willie BRANDT, present Mayor of Berlin) to wear his uniform at the time he called on "Willie," and to get "Willie" in his jeep by telling "Willie" the Americans wanted to speak with him. He was to drive "Willie" to the Checkpoint between East and West Berlin where "Willie" would be taken into custody by the Soviets. JOHNSON was instructed to use any force necessary, and he agreed to bring "Willie" to the Checkpoint dead or alive. JOHNSON went to the address in Schoenenberg, West Berlin, provided by the Soviets, entered the residence, but made no further attempt to carry out his orders.

* Although the FBI subsequently debriefed JOHNSON in depth on his entire espionage career, these two ACSI reports contain the main substance of his story.

- After his marriage on 25 April 1953, JOHNSON spent a week in Brandenberg, East Germany, as a guest of the Soviets, during which time various meetings were held, usually in JOHNSON's room. During the week there JOHNSON was questioned extensively about his personal life and was asked routine questions about his organization. He was given a book on the history of Communism which he read several times, and on one occasion he was questioned to such a degree on general subjects that JOHNSON felt he was possibly being psychoanalyzed. When JOHNSON returned to West Berlin, Hedwig remained in East Germany to act as courier between JOHNSON and the Soviets. JOHNSON subsequently met with Hedwig on a weekly basis.

- JOHNSON was directed by the Soviets to try to obtain an assignment with CIC or the Military Intelligence Detachment (MID). He believes he may have tried to get into CIC, and he definitely applied for an assignment in MID but was turned down.

- JOHNSON was given the assignment of furnishing the names of CIC personnel in Berlin. He accomplished this by utilizing the Berlin Post Telephone Directory, which he also subsequently supplied to the Soviets. The Soviets were extremely pleased with this accomplishment.

- In about May 1953, JOHNSON was reassigned to the G-2 Section of the Berlin Command, with a secret security clearance and assigned duties as a Message Center clerk. Because MINTKENBAUGH, then assigned to the G-2 Section as chief clerk, would be able to detect JOHNSON taking photographs in the office and because JOHNSON believed that MINTKENBAUGH could act as a lookout for JOHNSON during the period he was photographing documents, JOHNSON decided to recruit MINTKENBAUGH. He subsequently "tested" MINTKENBAUGH and recruited him to commit espionage for the Soviets. The recruitment was accomplished without the prior knowledge or approval of the Soviets. JOHNSON believes MINTKENBAUGH was agreeable because of the excitement of the idea. JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH subsequently lived together and were closely associated in espionage activities. Hedwig later escorted MINTKENBAUGH to East Berlin, after which MINTKENBAUGH came under the direct supervision of the Soviets and no longer worked for JOHNSON.

- During his assignment with G-2, JOHNSON photographed almost everything in his office, including cables, rosters, intelligence summaries, alert plans, evacuation plans, and possibly clearance documents. Usually he photographed the documents on his lunch hour. JOHNSON also wrote reports containing his personal observations and activities, which he photographed for transmittal to the Soviets. Hedwig acted as their courier, carrying the film to East Germany in the hollowed out portion of the heel of her shoe.

- When JOHNSON informed the Soviets that he expected to be transferred out of Berlin some time in 1953 due to an overage in his MOS, he was instructed to try to obtain an assignment in Heidelberg, Germany. At that time JOHNSON was disillusioned with the Soviets since they had

informed him that much of the information he passed to the Soviets was of no interest to them. He therefore made no attempt to obtain the Heidelberg assignment. Instead, JOHNSON took leave to Wiesbaden, Germany. When JOHNSON next met with his Soviet handler in Karlshorst, East Germany, JOHNSON informed the Soviets he had been to Heidelberg and had requested an assignment in the G-2 Section there. He was questioned in detail about his trip, but believes he was able to convince the Soviets of the truth of his statements.

JOHNSON stated he had no contact with the Soviets after his transfer to France on 3 April 1954 until recontacted by the Soviets in the United States in 1957, through MINTKENBAUCH.

In July 1956 JOHNSON was discharged from the Army and moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. In the early part of 1957 MINTKENBAUGH recontacted JOHNSON in Las Vegas and gave him a present of $500 from the Soviets. No conditions were attached to the gift, but JOHNSON was offered a salaried job if he would re-join the Army and again work for the Soviets. The Soviets instructed JOHNSON to obtain some type of work involving security. JOHNSON re-joined the Army as instructed on 18 February 1957 but applied for missile training on his own initiative. JOHNSON was assigned to Fort MacArthur, Los Angeles, California, on 18 February 1957 and from there sent to the NIKE-Ajax Missile School at Palo Verde, California, for training. JOHNSON stated that, while assigned to the school, he:

- Photographed all training manuals he could procure. Most were believed to be unclassified, although one or two could have been classified "confidential."

- Stole a sample of JP-4 NIKE fuel.

- Photographed a Hercules missile in detail. JOHNSON estimated he took 15 to 20 photographs of the missile from all angles.

- Took several photographs of the installation while on duty as a security guard in a tower overlooking a secure area at the missile school.

- Photographed the inside of a NIKE Missile Site, but with negative results as the photos did not come out.

JOHNSON maintained contact with MINTKENBAUGH on a bi-monthly basis. He passed photographs, personal reports and the JP-4 fuel sample to the Soviets through MINTKENBAUGH and was paid by the Soviets on an average of $300 per month. JOHNSON was paid an additional bonus for the JP-4 fuel sample, which was of particular interest to the Soviets. He signed receipts for all payments received.

In 1958 JOHNSON was transferred to Fort Bliss where he was assigned duties as a supply sergeant with no access to classified

information. During this assignment, JOHNSON accompanied MINTKENBAUGH to Washington, D.C., on one occasion and was introduced to MINTKENBAUGH's handler.*

JOHNSON was transferred to Orleans, France, in the fall of 1959 and reported there on 29 October for duty with the Mutual Security Section, U.S. Army Supply Control Agency. The Soviets were aware of this transfer, and within several days of his arrival JOHNSON was contacted by MINTKENBAUGH who explained that he had been sent in order to arrange contact between JOHNSON and the Soviets. A day or so after this, MINTKENBAUGH, JOHNSON, and JOHNSON's wife travelled to Paris, where the JOHNSONs were met by Vitaliy URZHUMOV, who introduced himself as "Viktor."** In Mrs. JOHNSON's presence, URZHUMOV expressed an interest in JOHNSON's new duty post, a NATO supply installation, and in JOHNSON's job, which involved the handling of requisitions for supplies and replacement parts for NIKE missile sites. He asked JOHNSON to renew his intelligence work, and JOHNSON agreed.

Beginning in early January 1960, JOHNSON had approximately eight meetings with URZHUMOV in Paris. These meetings took place on the first Saturday of each month, and during the first few of them JOHNSON was accompanied by his wife.*** Originally it was planned that Hedwig would act as a courier, but this plan was discarded because it would have required that JOHNSON give her a detailed oral explanation of the information which he was furnishing the Soviets. The meetings with URZHUMOV lasted from 15 to 30 minutes, and at them JOHNSON passed the information he had managed to collect underwent training, and assisted in the development of dead drops and emergency plans.

While stationed at Orleans, JOHNSON furnished the Soviets with photographs of documents, typewritten reports of his observations, and personality data on other persons working in the Mutual Security Brance of the ordnance agency. Specifically he passed information on the French S-10 and S-11 anti-tank wire-controlled missiles, then in use by the NATO forces and on parts supplied to NIKE-Ajax units in Italy as well as the locations of these units. He also gave the Soviets a complete description of his own job and duties and of the organization and structure of the ordnance agency.

In late 1960 JOHNSON found it necessary to seek a transfer from Orleans because of his wife's mental condition.**** He discussed this transfer at length with URZHUMOV, who agreed that the

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* MINTKENBAUGH took JOHNSON to Washington on his own initiative, when, according to MINTKENBAUGH, he told his case officer that JOHNSON was waiting in a drugstore on Wisconsin Avenue and wanted to meet him. The Soviet became greatly disturbed and took MINTKENBAUGH to task for acting without instructions. Nevertheless, he went to the drugstore and visited with JOHNSON.

** URZHUMOV was in Paris as an Attache in the Political Section of the Soviet Embassy as of March 1959. He replaced a suspected Soviet Intelligence officer, and GOLITSYN stated that he was almost"convinced" that URZHUMOV was a KGB officer. URZHUMOV was scheduled to leave Paris in early 1965.

*** In a later debriefing, JOHNSON said that the met "generally every two weeks." JOHNSON's wife apparently attended meetings on a regular basis until some time in November 1960.

**** Hedwig JOHNSON's mental condition is discussed further below.

information coming from the ordnance agency at Orleans was "not too important." URZHUMOV advised JOHNSON to try to get an assignment either at SHAPE or EUCOM since the Soviets could use a source at either of these headquarters.* JOHNSON reenlisted in April 1961, and having requested assignment at Headquarters, Seine Area Command Paris, he was posted to the courier station at Orly Field, a unit which he knew handled top secret and cryptographic material. According to JOHNSON, URZHUMOV appeared to be very happy when he heard this.

JOHNSON arrived at the Orly Courier Transfer Station in May 1961 and for the next year met frequently with URZHUMOV. He was, however, unable to furnish anything of intelligence interest because of stringent security precautions, but he did give URZHUMOV reports of personal activities, personality sketches, and suggestions as to which individuals seemed to be potential recruits for the Soviets. At one of their regular meetings in the fall of 1962, URZHUMOV introduced JOHNSON to a new Soviet case officer, G.N. VLASOV, who called himself "Felix."** Thereafter JOHNSON saw very little of his former handler.

According to JOHNSON, the nature of the operation changed after VLASOV took over. VLASOV's handling, JOHNSON said, proved to be more direct and less discreet than URZHUMOV's had been: Whereas under URZHUMOV most of JOHNSON's time was spent on locating dead drops, the formulation of emergency plans, and training, penetration of the vault now became his primary mission. The first break in this direction came, JOHNSON said, when he was able to obtain the combination to the door leading to the vault area;*** one of the officers in charge had thrown in the trash can a piece of paper containing the combination in coded form and JOHNSON retrieved it after the officer left the room. (JOHNSON had earlier made an impression of the key to the inner door of the vault when one of his co-workers had inadvertently left the key in the door. The Soviets had made a copy.) JOHNSON described this phase of the operation as being slow and careful. He first wrote reports on every detail of the courier service, including schedules for arrivals, deliveries, and handling of classified materials. On VLASOV's instruction he also photographed the vault door and the office and made detailed measurements of the door and the vault; this was accomplished at night, using a Minox camera furnished by the Soviets.

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* JOHNSON later said "Viktor" had told him that the only information of value that he had supplied while stationed at Orleans was that concerning the S-10 and S-11 missiles.

** VLASOV was scheduled to be replaced in Paris in January 1965.

***JOHNSON has described the courier station as consisting of two rooms, an office area and the vault. "Entrance to the vault from the outer room was through two metal doors. The first door was secured by a steel bar at either end of which was a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock. The second door was secured by a key lock."

During this period, too, JOHNSON began to establish a work pattern by volunteering to work straight through the weekend beginning Saturday morning and ending Monday morning. (He explained to his superiors and fellow workers that he wanted to have Monday and Tuesday off in order to do the shopping and housecleaning for his wife, who was not well. This arrangement was agreeable to all, as everyone would have every weekend off.) JOHNSON also began to bring his shaving equipment and food to the office in an Air France bag; this bag was to be used in the operation, and it was necessary that it be thought commonplace for him to carry it around.

JOHNSON estimated that about a month elapsed between the time he obtained the combination to the vault and the first penetration. During this time he and VLASOV met about every third night to discuss the penetration and plans were discussed for removing the documents, the Soviets' processing of them, and their safe return to the vault. The plan, as finally agreed upon, called for a meeting on the Friday night before the penetration was to be made to discuss details and arrange meeting sites. All penetrations were to be carried out during the midnight hours on Saturday; JOHNSON was to enter the vault at 2305 hours, obtain the material, leave the office at 2313 hours, and make the delivery to the Soviets at 2315 hours. As things worked out in practice, JOHNSON said he sometimes entered the vault somewhat earlier. His selection of documents was on the basis of their addressees; all were wrapped.* He would then go outside to make sure no U.S. personnel were in the area, then lock the front door, open the vault, take the materials, lock the vault, and with the documents in his Air France bag drive to the meeting site a short distance away. There he would exchange the bag for an identical one provided by the Soviets, containing sandwiches and a bottle of doped cognac, and return to his duty post. JOHNSON explained that if on returning to the station he was confronted by a visitor, he was to say that he had gone out to get some food; if it appeared that the visitor planned to stay long enough to upset the plan, the cognac was to be used (it never was used). A second contact with the Soviets, to retrieve the materials, was scheduled for between 0300 to 0400 hours at a different meeting site, about six minutes' drive away.

On one or perhaps two occasions when the combination to the lock had been changed, JOHNSON used a special device (supplied by VLASOV) to determine the new combination. On 23 February 1965, JOHNSON said that he was quite certain he used this device twice, in February and March 1963. This device was in two sections, one of which was a plate. The device fit snugly over the lock, the plate being placed to the rear of it, and the device recorded the combination of the lock by means of radioactive material in one section of it. JOHNSON said that VLASOV gave him the new combination to the lock about a week after he had placed the device on the lock as instructed. JOHNSON had earlier made photographs and detailed measurements on the locks used to secure the vault door; because the

* JOHNSON did not know precisely what documents he gave the Soviets. ACSI confirmed that there is a document, such as that described by NOSENKO, which lists bombing targets in France and that it had been sent to France during this period.

radioactive device supplied by VLASOV fitted them exactly, he supposed that it had been made especially for this penetration operation.*

JOHNSON could not recall the date when the first penetration of the vault was made, but he said that it could not have been before November 1962 as his car was out of commission throughout October. Definitely, according to JOHNSON, there was a penetration just before or after Christmas 1962, and the first four penetrations were spaced closely together. Questioned in detail on this subject during February 1965, JOHNSON eventually arrived at the estimate that there was no penetration made in November 1962, that two entries were made in December, and that five more penetrations took place during January-May 1963. Regarding the December penetrations, he first believed that they might have been on the 15th and 29th of the month, then later said that he thought they had taken place on consecutive Saturdays, and finally reaffirmed his belief that one was made on the 29th and ruled out the possibility of one on the 22nd. He believed that the January entry took place in the middle of the month, probably the 19th, and said he was quite certain that an entry took place on 26 April.**

The operation proceeded without disruption until it was terminated during the summer months of 1963 on instructions from VLASOV, who felt that the days had grown too long and that the operation could not be carried out in daylight. Plans were discussed for expanding the operation when it was resumed in the fall, however. Up until this time JOHNSON had been instructed not to take out more than 12 or 15 envelopes at a time as the Soviet technicians*** could not handle a larger quantity during the time available. In the stepped-up operation, according to VLASOV, sufficient personnel and facilities would be available to process approximately 30 envelopes.

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* NOSENKO, however, described this device, or one very similar to it, in Geneva on 12 June 1962 "X-rays are beamed against a safe in order to determine the combination by radiation... that is, in order to open a new safe, any safe... The (special) equipment is contained in two suitcases; they turn it on and rays are emitted in order to sense which combination should be chosen." JOHNSON said the device was contained in two separate pocket-sized packages as a guard against harmful radiation, and both JOHNSON and NOSENKO have described the possible effects of this radiation on the health of its operator. NOSENKO was not asked and did not volunteer why, if this equipment was available at least as early as June 1962, it was not used earlier in the Orly penetration operation.

** By matching Saturdays with the dates on which CIA records show the special technicians named by NOSENKO to be in Paris, ACSI arrived at the following possible dates for the penetrations: 15 December 1962, 22 December 1962, 19 January 1963, 26 January 1963, 16 February 1963, 2 March 1963, and 25 May 1963.

***JOHNSON, who never met them, was told that it was necessary for the Soviets to fly the technicians into Paris from Moscow for each penetration of the vault.

There were, however, no further penetrations. On 4 August 1963, JOHNSON received orders transferring him to the Seine Area Command at Camp Des Loges, not far from Paris. He went to his Commanding Officer and told him that he did not want the transfer, that he was happy with his current assignment, and that it was better for his wife to be near the hospital facilities in Paris. The officer replied that he would try to find another replacement for the position at Camp Des Loges but that, in the meantime, JOHNSON would have to report for duty as ordered. (Prior to leaving Orly, JOHNSON informed VLASOV of the transfer and offered to attempt to recruit a fellow-worker to take his place in the penetration operation; VLASOV gave him definite instructions not to make any recruitment attempts.) His assignment at Camp Des Loges as non-commissioned officer in charge of the "Classified Control Center" was accompanied by a promotion. JOHNSON reported for duty on 5 August 1963.

JOHNSON served at Camp Des Loges for nine months, until May 1964. During this time he took part in only one operation for the Soviets, photography of a Seine Area Command catalogue, classified "secret". This 27-page document gave a synopsis of each Seine Area Command evacuation plan.*

JOHNSON managed to photograph this document during normal working hours, probably sometime at the end of 1963 or in January 1964 using a special "roll-over" camera, which he then returned to VLASOV. About a week later, JOHNSON again met with VLASOV, who told him that he did not consider the information worth the risk involved and called off future attempts. The main purpose of the operation, VLASOV said, which was to acquaint JOHNSON with the "roll-over" camera and its use, had been accomplished.

JOHNSON described this camera as having a built-in light source and as resembling a cigarette case. To expose the film, JOHNSON rolled the camera across the pages. According to JOHNSON, the Soviets attached great importance to this camera, and it was not given to him until he had provided detailed plans and descriptions of the building and office in which he worked, locations of the safes, and descriptions of the personnel there. Furthermore, JOHNSON was instructed to return the camera to his case officer the night after taking the pictures or in any case within three days whether or not he had been able to take the pictures.**

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* JOHNSON later identified this document as the "Combat Operations Index and Status of Emergency Plans." Classified "secret," it summarizes the contents of various individual emergency and evacuation plans for units under the Seine Area Command.

During an interview on 18 February 1965, JOHNSON stated that he did not feel that his espionage efforts at Camp Des Loges had been very profitable for the Soviets. It was his opinion that the most important document to which he had access during this period was the top secret one on Seventh Army plans for retreat to the Pyrenees in the event of a Soviet Army attack. When he proposed that he attempt to obtain it for the Soviets, however, VLASOV showed a complete lack of interest. VLASOV's attitude led JOHNSON to believe that the Soviets already had the document. JOHNSON stated further that it was his usual practice to scan documents which came into his possession and to make oral and sometimes written reports to the Soviets on their general contents. He specifically recalled discussing with VLASOV the periodic counterintelligence summaries issued by CIC to which he had access, but VLASOV had not seemed interested in them. JOHNSON believed these discussions came up in connection with possible use of the "roll-over" camera, and that VLASOV's response had been that the information involved was not worth the risk of his exposure.*

JOHNSON recalled that "at their last meeting and for a few meetings prior thereto, he and 'Felix' (VLASOV) did not stop at a cafe as had been their practice."** Instead, the entire meeting was conducted as they walked in the area of their point of contact in Paris. At one of these meetings 'Felix' appeared to be visibly upset. In fact, he had not appeared for a meeting on the appointed date. The contact was not made until the alternate date. At that time 'Felix' suggested that he (JOHNSON) knew why they had not met as scheduled. When he (JOHNSON) replied that he did not know, 'Felix' explained to him that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected in Geneva and that they had to be extremely cautious. 'Felix' told him that he did not have to worry, that the officer did not know him, but 'Felix' instructed him to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intelligence. 'Felix', who normally was very calm and self-assured, was completely out of character on this occasion. At this and succeeding meets before he returned to the United States, he (JOHNSON) tried to tell 'Felix' about the status of his expected rotation to the United States in May. 'Felix' did not appear to be interested in anything he had to say. Finally,

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* JOHNSON said that in the Classified Control Section he had access to all classified documents originating with Seine Area Command and to some classified documents originating in other Headquarters; he was responsible for supervising the printing of classified documents and for accounting for and distributing all authorized copies of these documents. JOHNSON was asked on 18 February 1965 whether it would have been possible for him to take original documents or copies of them to his Soviet handlers. He replied that he could have forged receipts and taken a document from the Center on his person and, in addition, he could have made extra copies of any classified document. He did not do this with regard to the one document he did copy, he said, because he had an interest in seeing and using the "roll-over" camera.

** This change apparently occurred following NOSENKO's defection in early February 1964.

at a meeting in early April, when 'Felix' told him that it was their last meeting, which came as a surprise to JOHNSON, he (JOHNSON) raised the question of how he was to notify 'Felix' in the event there was a change in his anticipated assignment to the Courier Station in Washington for which he had not yet been given official orders. 'Felix' in reply instructed him to place on a designated wall of a building somewhere in Paris the letter 'W' if he received orders for assignment in the Washington area and the letter 'X' if he received orders for assignment elsewhere."

At this meeting VLASOV also told JOHNSON that he was not to worry if contact was not established immediately upon his return to Washington. He then gave JOHNSON contact instructions which called for the first meeting to take place in New York City in December 1964, eight months later. At some point in his discussions with VLASOV, JOHNSON told the FBI, he was surprised to see URZHUMOV enter the cafe where they were sitting and join them at the table. This was the first time that all three had met together since URZHUMOV had turned him over to VLASOV in 1961, prior to the Orly penetrations. For URZHUMOV's benefit, VLASOV again reviewed the arrangements for reestablishing contact in December, which gave JOHNSON an opportunity to express concern that he was to be out of contact for such a long time and to suggest the desirability of some sort of emergency contact arrangements such as he had had during his duty tour in Paris. VLASOV and URZHUMOV told JOHNSON that such arrangements would not be necessary.*

JOHNSON claimed to have had no contact with the Soviets during his assignment at the Pentagon Courier Transfer Station from May 1964 until he went AWOL in October of that year.

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* According to MINTKENBAUGH, when JOHNSON contacted him in Arlington after his return to the United States, JOHNSON said that when he was leaving Paris the Soviets treated him as though he was being "dropped." JOHNSON said he had been instructed to get rid of all materials used in the operation before leaving France. He also told MINTKENBAUGH that another reason for this belief was the fact that he had asked for instructions regarding emergency meeting procedures but had been told by the Soviets that none were needed. MINTKENBAUGH remarked to the FBI that this was a change in usual procedures.

(b) MINTKENBAUGH's Statements

When he walked in to CIA on 10 November 1964 and during his first interview by the FBI on 5 December 1964, MINTKENBAUGH described his recruitment by JOHNSON in Berlin in the summer of 1953 and his collaboration with JOHNSON in the clandestine photography of documents and their transmittal, via Mrs. JOHNSON, to the Soviets in East Berlin until the fall of that year. He also described his role in JOHNSON's reactivation as a KGB agent in early 1957 and his own activities as a courier between JOHNSON and Soviets stationed in Washington, D.C. until the summer of 1959. On the basis of this personal involvement, he has been able to give what purports to be a fairly complete account of JOHNSON's espionage activities during this six-year period. With a number of minor variations, which appear attributable to memory, MINTKENBAUGH's description is consistent with the story given by JOHNSON. Highlights of his confession are given below, separated into two sections, one on what MINTKENBAUGH said about JOHNSON and one on what he said about himself.

On Robert Lee JOHNSON

After JOHNSON was transferred to Orleans, France, in 1959 and following MINTKENBAUGH's special training in Moscow (see below) that fall, the KGB instructed both agents to sever all ties with one another in an attempt to compartment what now had become separate operations. Both JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH ignored these instructions. The two corresponded by mail throughout JOHNSON's service in France and one of the first things JOHNSON did after getting settled in Washington upon his return to the United States in the spring of 1964 was to look up his old friend. The two got together and swapped espionage stories. From this, MINTKENBAUGH was able to tell the FBI in considerable detail about the Orly Courier Station penetration. Although MINTKENBAUGH's information added nothing to and was far less detailed than that later given by JOHNSON, the two accounts were consistent.*

On His Own Activities

MINTKENBAUGH pictured himself as an agent with no unique access to signigicant intelligence, initially distrusted by the KGB, later used as a spotter and then as a courier, ineffectual in carrying out the one important assignment given him by the KGB, but partly successful in

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*JOHNSON and his wife also were knowledgeable of MINTKENBAUGH's activities during the 1959-1963 period. MINTKENBAUGH apparently told them that he had been to Moscow for espionage training. From his letters to them in Orleans and later Paris, the JOHNSONs had a good idea of MINTKENBAUGH's principal mission in the Washington area, and when JOHNSON contacted him after returning from France in 1964, MINTKENBAUGH described his other assignments as well.

fulfilling other less important KGB tasks.* He also indicated that, during the latter part of his agent career, he was a reluctant collaborator and became a handling problem for his KGB case officers.

MINTKENBAUGH's career as a KGB agent began in the summer of 1953, shortly after a chance encounter with his old acquaintance, JOHNSON. Within a matter of weeks JOHNSON told MINTKENBAUGH that he was a Soviet agent and then, without consulting the KGB, recruited MINTKENBAUGH as an assistant. JOHNSON's KGB handlers were "extremely upset" when they learned what JOHNSON had done; and it was not until October 1953, some months later, that they would agree to meet MINTKENBAUGH. In the interim he assisted JOHNSON by standing watch while the latter photographed documents. From October 1953 to April 1954, when MINTKENBAUGH was transferred temporarily to duty with a military hospital in France, he carried out a number of assignments for the Soviets, almost all connected with the spotting and assessment of Americans stationed in Berlin. For the five-month period he was in France, MINTKENBAUGH claimed to have been out of touch with the KGB. Upon returning to Berlin in September 1954, he resumed his spotting activities and spent a part of his time learning photography, the construction and use of dead drops, and secret writing techniques in preparation for his impending transfer to the United States. He left Berlin in February 1956.

MINTKENBAUGH performed his next espionage assignment a year later when, in January 1957, he visited and reactivated Sergeant JOHNSON at KGB instruction. The following month he began service as a courier between JOHNSON, who was stationed first in California and then in Texas, and the KGB in Washington, D.C. Other than these periodic courier trips, MINTKENBAUGH carried out no other KGB assignments until the late fall of 1959.

Probably in October 1959, MINTKENBAUGH flew to Berlin and from there, in company with a KGB officer, to Moscow, where he was lodged in a safe apartment. For about three weeks he received individualized training in photography, cryptography, and manual Morse reception, with emphasis on the latter. At the end of this period, his case officer asked for the first time whether MINTKENBAUGH was willing to marry a Soviet woman and live with her in the Washington area. According to the KGB plan as explained to MINTKENBAUGH at this time, he would "establish a roof over his head" near Washington, preferably in Arlington; then, with the assistance of his "operational wife" he would serve as a courier.

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* Although NOSENKO did not report on MINTKENBAUGH, he and JOHNSON were so closely connected operationally and had such complete knowledge of one another's activities, that the confession of either agent would almost inevitably result in the apprehension of the other. For this reason MINTKENBAUGH's story is given here in some detail. This account, for the most part, was given as part of and subsequent to MINTKENBAUGH's confession of complicity in Soviet espionage, but before he was convicted for conspiracy.

collecting information from a network of Soviet agents for delivery to the KGB via dead drops. Several days after this, while MINTKENBAUGH was still considering the KGB proposal, he was visited by "Alex." MINTKENBAUGH was told "Alex" was a senior KGB official and a "very important person." ("Alex" was later identified as Aleksandr FEKLISOV, then Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate and later, under the name FOMIN, KGB Legal Resident in Washington.) "Alex" told MINTKENBAUGH that his Soviet wife would serve only as a cover for MINTKENBAUGH's espionage: Her presence would allow MINTKENBAUGH to travel freely throughout the United States (New York, California, and New Mexico were mentioned specifically) without having to worry about a "nagging wife." She also would be able to help him operationally, particularly with radio communications. From "Alex's" manner and questions, MINTKENBAUGH gathered that he had come mainly to "size him up" for this assignment, which MINTKENBAUGH now agreed to accept.

Subsequently MINTKENBAUGH was introduced to his intended bride, known to him only as "Irene,"* and the two spent some time together to get acquainted. She had either been informed or recognized that MINTKENBAUGH was a homosexual and told him she knew.** MINTKENBAUGH returned to the United States at the end of December 1959. His only assignment from the Moscow trip was to establish his own business in the Washington area as soon as possible so that "Irene" could join him.

Following KGB instructions, MINTKENBAUGH moved to Arlington, Virginia, in about October 1960, but failed to do anything about his "roof." Shortly after his arrival and without advising or securing the approval of his KGB handler, he entered into a home-remodeling venture with a female friend from his days in Berlin. When MINTKENBAUGH told his case officer about this after the fact, the latter became "extremely upset," explaining that in instructing MINTKENBAUGH to establish cover, the KGB had meant to determine what business he was to enter. He told MINTKENBAUGH to get out of the partnership as soon as possible and into a business of his own. While still continuing this activity (he eventually persuaded the KGB to accept his participation and to contribute financial support) MINTKENBAUGH took out a Virginia real estate license in the spring of 1961 and found employment with an Arlington dealer. MINTKENBAUGH said that although his KGB officer seemed "pleased" that MINTKENBAUGH was working for this firm, it was indicated that eventually the KGB would like him to get a real estate office of his own, which the Soviets would finance. MINTKENBAUGH took no steps to do so.

MINTKENBAUGH was also given a number of other assignments during this period. One of these struck him as being probably related to "Irene's" dispatch to the United States. Some time in 1960 (MINTKENBAUGH is not sure of the date) he

*Presumably "Irene" was to become a KGB Illegal who would enter and live in the United States under a false identity.

**Although MINTKENBAUGH is certain that the KGB knew of his homosexuality from the start of the operation, this is the only mention of it to him by the KGB personnel during his entire agent career.

was sent to Vancouver, Canada, to secure the birth certificate of a female Canadian citizen, about the same age as "Irene"; this female had emigrated to Finland with her family as a child. Because of her age and "Irene's" Baltic origin, MINTKENBAUGH speculated that the assignment might be related to his principal one. In November 1960 MINTKENBAUGH was turned over to a new Soviet case officer who, probably some time in 1961, gave him a list of assignments which required that MINTKENBAUGH travel to Oklahoma to locate a number of missile sites. He was also to trace a petroleum pipeline running from Texas to Pennsylvania, to pinpoint the location of a U.S. Department of State high-frequency transmitter near Warrenton, Virginia, and to determine the location of underground facilities of either the State Department or CIA near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. MINTKENBAUGH was successful in carrying out some of these tasks and failed in others.

By early 1962, according to MINTKENBAUGH, he was in considerable financial difficulty. The real estate firm where he was employed was going bankrupt, his remodeling business required sizeable additional expenditures, and money was also needed to support other real estate ventures in California. MINTKENBAUGH again approached the KGB for funds, which were reluctantly given. The KGB case officer was "quite upset" on this occasion and told MINTKENBAUGH that the KGB could not continue to "pour money into the [remodeling] operation." He again instructed MINTKENBAUGH to finish up the business as soon as possible so that he could "stop wasting time" and establish his own cover firm.

Depressed by his financial reverses, MINTKENBAUGH now "began to feel increased pressures" because of his involvement with the Soviets. He has since claimed that at this time he wanted desperately to break off his relationship with the Soviets but did not know how to do it. He has stated his emotional condition "became so serious that he decided that he had better leave town for a while before he had a nervous breakdown." During this period, MINTKENBAUGH claimed, he was furnishing no information of value to the KGB but was merely going through the motions of cooperation.

For these reasons, MINTKENBAUGH sold his share in the house-remodeling business to his partner in the spring of 1962, resigned his position with the real estate firm, and unbeknown to the KGB, flew to Florida for about a month.* He financed the trip with part of the money he had recently received from his KGB handler. Shortly before departure MINTKENBAUGH wrote a letter to JOHNSON in France explaining that he was sick, that he was in dire financial difficulty and needed more money, and that he was going away for a while. He told JOHNSON to pass the letter to the Soviets. MINTKENBAUGH later told the FBI that he had no intention at

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*This was not the first time MINTKENBAUGH made such an unannounced trip. In 1958, on his own, he flew to Berlin to complain about his current handler in Washington, whom he considered "creepy," and to request a change in case officers.

the time to remain permanently in Florida: The trip was in reality an attempt to "run away, to drop out of his espionage activities." He hoped the KGB would lose interest in him in his absence. The letter to JOHNSON, MINTKENBAUGH said, was to give the Soviets a logical explanation for his absence.*

Nevertheless, MINTKENBAUGH returned to Washington in time for his next scheduled meeting with his KGB case officer. He returned, MINTKENBAUGH told the FBI, "to face the music." The KGB officer was reportedly furious that MINTKENBAUGH had written to JOHNSON, a violation of the very specific instructions MINTKENBAUGH had earlier received to destroy JOHNSON's address and break all contacts with him. Shortly after his return, MINTKENBAUGH found a job with another Arlington real estate agency. From this point on to the end of the operation, his principal assignment was to photograph rental applications submitted by persons he knew or believed to work for CIA or otherwise to be of interest to the KGB.

The subject of the independent cover business and of "Irene's" arrival in the United States was not dropped, however. Soviet efforts reached a high point, MINTKENBAUGH estimated, in August 1962 when he was summoned to a special meeting and found "Alex" (FEKLISOV), whom he had last seen in Moscow, waiting for him at the meet site. In what impressed MINTKENBAUGH as a "pep talk," it was explained by "Alex" that he had come all the way from Moscow to see him.** MINTKENBAUGH, he stated, was worth a great deal of money to the Soviets, who were willing to give it to him, but MINTKENBAUGH must take immediate steps to establish his own business. FEKLISOV indicated that there had been no change in the plan to send "Irene" to Washington once this was done. Emphasizing this point, "Alex" said that the Soviets would assume responsibility for all expenses involved in setting up such a business and would cover any loses which might result. Moreover, he advised MINTKENBAUGH to devise some sort of cover story to explain the large amounts of money the KGB was prepared to give him. Other aspects of MINTKENBAUGH's performance, including his failure to follow up on various assignments in the Washington area, were also discussed.

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*In fact, if MINTKENBAUGH had not written to JOHNSON, it is likely that his absence would have gone unnoticed by the KGB, for he had no dead drops to service or meetings scheduled in this period. There are other examples of this alleged ambivalence on MINTKENBAUGH's part. He has told the FBI on several occasions that he was looking for a way to break contact with the KGB and once said the "during recent years he had been intentionally careless from a security standpoint and did not care whether he would be apprehended in connection with his Soviet operation." On the other hand, JOHNSON has said that MINTKENBAUGH was depressed when the KGB finally did drop contact with him and that MINTKENBAUGH went to considerable lengths to reestablish it.

**The August 1962 date is apparently incorrect, as is "Alex's" statement that he came to the United States especially to see MINTKENBAUGH. Travel records indicate that FEKLISOV, who arrived in Washington in 1960, was out of the country from 18 July to 10 September 1962.

Mention continued to be made of the KGB plan at meetings subsequent to "Alex's" talk; MINTKENBAUGH had no doubts that, as he had been told in Moscow, his primary mission was to establish himself in a cover business of his own. At one of these meetings MINTKENBAUGH was told that "Irene" had become ill, but that the KGB planned to send someone else in her place as soon as MINTKENBAUGH could provide cover. The latest mention of the plan which MINTKENBAUGH could recall was at a meeting in the late summer of 1963. At that time, his KGB case officer was distressed because no steps had been taken and told him: "I have been here two years with you and this has not happened." There is no indication in MINTKENBAUGH's confession that he ever took any decisive steps to comply with KGB wishes in this regard.

These meetings in the late summer and/or early autumn of 1963 were apparently the last direct contacts MINTKENBAUGH had with the KGB. At one of them, he recalled, his KGB handler reveiwed the verbal recognition signals to be used in the event that it became necessary for an unknown Soviet to contact him and said that he, the KGB officer, "might not be around in the future."* MINTKENBAUGH next unloaded his dead drop probably in September 1963, and he attempted to develop the film on which, according to established procedures, schedules and sites for future meetings and dead drops were given. Only parts of the KGB instructions could be made out, however. MINTKENBAUGH took the blame for this, telling the FBI that he had "botched up the film" by using faulty developer. He was able to determine only that his emergency meeting site had been changed and that his next dead drop was scheduled for loading on 23 November 1963, but he did not know the location of either. MINTKENBAUGH's means of contacting the KGB therefore was broken. Although thereafter he appeared at various of his previous meeting sites in the Washington area and called the emergency telephone number given him by his case officer, MINTKENBAUGH was unsuccessful in reestablishing contact. The KGB took no initiative to do so, insofar as MINTKENBAUGH knew.**

JOHNSON's disappearance and an FBI interview concerning JOHNSON on 10 November 1964 caused MINTKENBAUGH to prevail on his roommate, [redacted] to drive him to CIA Headquarters. There, during the night of 10-11 November, he confessed his espionage activities to a CIA representative. The next day, before the FBI had a chance to talk to him, MINTKENBAUGH moved out of his apartment in Arlington and disappeared. The FBI located him on 5 December 1964 at his brother's mountain cabin in California.

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*MINTKENBAUGH's case officer at the time was S.D. ROMANOVTSEV, who did not leave the United States until December 1964, more than a year later.

**According to JOHNSON, MINTKENBAUGH told him in the spring of 1964 that he was considering as a last resort travelling to Mexico under a false identity in order to recontact the Soviets there. There is no evidence that he attempted to do so.

Tearfully, MINTKENBAUGH claimed that he was "in the position of a man with a rope around his neck," that he deserved to be indicted and arrested for his past deeds, that he was "one of God's mistakes," that he had not found out he was "queer" until he was 27 years old and this revelation had "almost killed him," that revenge "got into him" and he had to get even, and that it was all "God's fault." When finally in control of himself, he made a detailed confession.

(c) Hedwig JOHNSON's Statements

Mrs. JOHNSON's active participation in Soviet espionage was short in time and limited in scope, encompassing only the period from 1953 to 1954 when she acted as a courier for JOHNSON in Berlin. She did, however, remain knowledgeable of JOHNSON's, and to a lesser degree MINTKENBAUGH's, intelligence activities and was later able to describe these to the FBI.

Mrs. JOHNSON's account of her recruitment generally agrees with that given by her husband. She told the FBI how JOHNSON, embittered over his failure to receive an expected promotion, had sent her to East Germany to contact Soviet officials for the purposes of offering them his services. Mrs. JOHNSON said that JOHNSON was primarily interested in revenging himself against the U.S. Army and had forced her into accepting this mission by telling her that he would not marry her otherwise. Her first attempts to establish contact with the Soviets at Karlshorst in early 1953 were fruitless, and it was not until about three months later that she succeeded in delivering JOHNSON's message. She was told to return to Karlshorst the same evening with her husband.

At this first meeting, the JOHNSONs were questioned by a group of about seven Soviets concerning JOHNSON's desire to cooperate against the United States and his motivations for wishing to do so. JOHNSON gave the Soviets no classified information at this time and no decision was made that night about using him. The Soviets said they first wanted to check on JOHNSON and his wife. At the close of the meeting, Mrs. JOHNSON was given false identity papers to facilitate future crossings of the sector border.

Shortly thereafter, Mrs. JOHNSON accompanied her husband to a second meeting with the Soviets. Again, she said, JOHNSON passed no information to the KGB other than a copy of his leave papers. After the meeting, however, JOHNSON asked her for a pair of shoes so the Soviets could alter the heels to form a concealment device. This was done. On four of five occasions prior to JOHNSON's transfer to the United States in 1954, she crossed the border carrying film negatives which JOHNSON had placed in the shoes. According to Mrs. JOHNSON, she never knew what was on the film and she received no money other than for expenses from the Soviets. JOHNSON married her, as promised, in April 1953.

This apparently comprised her total espionage career, but JOHNSON was in the habit of discussing the details of his activities with her. In addition, she often accompanied JOHNSON to operational meetings after his return to France in 1959 and until her deteriorating mental condition made this inadvisable in November 1960. (She still went with JOHNSON to the vicinity of the meetings and waited for him.) Her knowledge of his activities thus was practically total. JOHNSON, for example, gave her full details of the Orly Penetration, including descriptions of the methods used to achieve initial entry, how he selected documents for the Soviets, and the procedures used to pass the documents to his case officer and later return them to the vault.

Mrs. JOHNSON's knowledge of MINTKENBAUGH's espionage activities was less detailed. She had accompanied MINTKENBAUGH when he was first introduced to the Soviets and was present at at least one later meeting; she was aware that he was involved in the photography of documents with JOHNSON in Berlin; Mrs. JOHNSON knew that MINTKENBAUGH had "gone to Russia and there received an assignment from the Soviets." From MINTKENBAUGH's letters to her and JOHNSON while they were stationed in France, Mrs. JOHNSON learned of MINTKENBAUGH's real estate ventures and got the impression that "MINTKENBAUGH was using his real estate background to assist Soviet agents in getting located [in the United States]." JOHNSON, she said, put a stop to the exchange of letters with MINTKENBAUGH, telling her that MINTKENBAUGH had written things he should not have mentioned and that Mrs. JOHNSON (who was about to enter a mental hospital for treatment) "might talk about Soviet agents entering the United States and setting up business firms."

(d) Mental Condition of Hedwig JOHNSON

Mrs. JOHNSON's mental instability first manifested itself in serious form in late 1960, while JOHNSON was assigned to the ordinance agency of the Orleans Area Command in France. At that time, JOHNSON said she persisted in claiming that she was being followed by a black sedan, that there was a microphone in the refrigerator, that she had been acquainted with the recent American defectors Martin and Mitchell, and that JOHNSON was having an affair with a local French girl who stayed with their children.*

As a result, Mrs. JOHNSON was admitted to the Army Hospital at La Chapelle, France, in November 1960 and was later moved to another hospital at Landstuhl, Germany. She was under professional observation for about a month on this occasion and returned home shortly before Christmas 1960. Following her release from the hospital, Mrs. JOHNSON was unable to sleep, and as the local doctor would not prescribe more than two sleeping pills a week, JOHNSON took her to Vienna in January 1961. After she had been examined, JOHNSON was told that she would have to remain in a private hospital there for an indefinite period of time for medication. When JOHNSON later returned to Vienna, the hospital doctors advised him to have Mrs. JOHNSON live for several years in Vienna with her family or, as an alternative, in some other large city with a German-speaking population in order to provide an environment to which she had been accustomed.

She returned twice to Vienna for shock treatment and examinations while JOHNSON remained in France. When JOHNSON travelled to Vienna to get Mrs. JOHNSON after the second of these visits in the fall of 1962, her doctor told him that she had referred to him (JOHNSON) as a "Russian general" and had accused one of the nurses of being a Soviet spy. (Earlier, in the presence of neighbors, JOHNSON was accused by his wife of being a spy.) JOHNSON learned from his father-in-law that Mrs. JOHNSON had also told him that JOHNSON was a Russian general. Eventually Mrs. JOHNSON was persuaded to commit herself to a U.S. Army hospital, and at the end of April 1964 she was evacuated from France to Walter Reed Hospital in Washington. (JOHNSON and his children returned to the United States several days later.) She was released shortly afterward, but her erratic behavior, JOHNSON said, prompted his disappearance in October 1964.

The FBI report of this debriefing of JOHNSON states that "as an overall analysis of his wife, he described her as over-sexed. During the past 10 years her sexual demands had tripled over what they had previously been and she never seemed to be sexually satisfied." MINTKENBAUGH's statements tend to confirm this evaluation. He has described Mrs. JOHNSON as being a nymphomaniac who indiscriminately indulged in any kind of sexual activity with persons of either sex. Furthermore, for two years she prostituted herself regularly with JOHNSON's knowledge while weekending in Las Vegas; he gambled with the proceeds.

Mrs. JOHNSON is now confined in a Virginia mental institution.

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*JOHNSON has denied the latter charge. Nevertheless, JOHNSON on his own initiative did tell the French girl that he was a Soviet spy, and he sounded her out concerning her willingness to work for the Soviets.

(e) Soviet Concern About Mrs. JOHNSON's Illness

When it became apparent that his wife's treatment in Vienna had been unsuccessful and that he would have to leave Orleans to find a more suitable environment for her, JOHNSON discussed the matter in detail with his KGB case officer. In the fall of 1962, after he made photographs of the vault door for URZHUMOV, "the Minox camera was returned to the Russians. This [according to JOHNSON] was done because of Soviet concern over Hedy's mental condition. JOHNSON was instructed to retain no incriminating materials in his possession." After URZHUMOV learned of Mrs. JOHNSON's confinement in a U.S. military hospital, JOHNSON said he became "all shook up" about the possibility that she might talk. URZHUMOV told JOHNSON to inform his wife that he was no longer working for the Soviets, and JOHNSON must never again bring her to an operational meeting. URZHUMOV also advised JOHNSON to cease all intelligence activity for a while, and all espionage paraphernalia was to be returned to the Soviets.* Revised and more elaborate emergency contact arrangements, providing for contact in Vienna and Washington as well as Paris, were agreed upon to replace earlier, unsuccessful procedures, and preparations were made for JOHNSON's escape should he be compromised. He said on 6 January 1965 that there was no particular pressure concerning the emergency contact and escape arrangements "except that there was always the question and concern that his wife might talk."

Soviet fear that Mrs. JOHNSON might talk also was reflected in the handling of MINTKENBAUGH in Washington. MINTKENBAUGH explained to the FBI that "during the period when Hedy was confined to an Army hospital in Europe [November and December 1960] his KGB case officer arranged with him to effect an 'eye-to-eye' meeting at Brentano's Bookstore in downtown Washington, D.C. MINTKENBAUGH was scheduled to visit the bookstore three times a week for a three-week period. The Soviet indicated that this procedure was to be adopted in order that it would be assured that Hedy had said nothing during her hospital confinement which would expose the operation. MINTKENBAUGH said that he presumed that the Soviets had effected arrangements in Europe to become aware in the event Hedy would reveal any facts concerning her knowledge of Soviet Intelligence. In the event Hedy did talk and a dangerous situation resulted, the Soviets were to advise MINTKENBAUGH through a drop or by a meeting."

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*In other tellings, JOHNSON has also said that the espionage equipment, which included a Minox camera and tripod and a flashlight with a "hollow-battery" concealment device, was returned to URZHUMOV at his (JOHNSON's) own suggestion.

(vi) Damage by JOHNSON to U.S. Interests

The following excerpts are from a preliminary damage assessment* of JOHNSON's espionage activities since 1953 which was submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board by its Security Committee on 11 January 1966:

> "The relatively low level of sensitivity of the information which JOHNSON passed to the Soviets during his assignments in Berlin, the U.S., and Orleans, France, coupled with the passage of time since those activities, permit an initial assessment of relatively minor damage.
>
> "The damage done by JOHNSON at Orly, however, is of another order of magnitude. Extensive investigative efforts by the affected members of the U.S. intelligence community [NSA, CIA, State Department, DIA, and the military services]...have succeeded in identifying both the type, and in some cases, the specific documents, which were in the Orly vault at some time during the period November 1962 to May 1963. But it has not been possible to identify precisely which documents were in the vault on the dates of the penetrations.... The only viable assumption...is that all the documents to which JOHNSON had physical access during the period of his vault penetrations, i.e., all the documents in the vault, were subjected to possible compromise by the Soviets....The review, which is continuing, involves a considerable volume of documents which may total more than a thousand.
>
> "The full extent of damage will only be known when the current review of documents by all affected agencies is completed.** The damage assessments prepared by the military services, however, based on a review of their documents to date, indicate that as a result of access to documents in the Orly vault, the Soviets may have learned:
>
> 1. Details of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) including the attack plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the identity of Soviet targets, the tactical plans of USAF elements including weapons systems and methods of delivery.

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*Compilation of the final damage assessment has been complicated by three factors. One was the difficulty involved in determining what specific documents may have passed through the Orly Courier Transfer Station during his assignment there. Second, since all documents remained wrapped while at the station, JOHNSON himself has been of little assistance in identifying them, although he has said that he concentrated his selection on documents addressed to particular commands. Finally, Armed Forces courier service records for this period have been destroyed.

2. U.S. Intelligence holdings on Soviet military capabilities, atomic energy production, weapons storage facilities, industrial complexes and order of battle.

3. Daily U.S. Intelligence summaries including our comments and reports on military and political developments around the world.

4. Comprehensive comparisons of U.S. and Soviet SAM Systems.

5. Indications of the scope and success of the U.S. national SIGINT effort.

6. A wealth of material for use in cryptoanalysis.

"From these preliminary reports...it is evident that Sgt. JOHNSON's cooperation with Soviet Intelligence has resulted in most serious damage to U.S. national security."

The initial damage assessment does not cover the period from August 1963 until May 1964, when JOHNSON had access to all classified documents originating with the Seine Area Command and to documents from a number of other commands. JOHNSON has insisted that, during this period, he passed only one "Secret" document to his Soviet handlers; he has admitted, however, providing oral and some written reports concerning documents he read which were classified "Secret" and "Confidential" and which concerned emergency and evacuation plans of the Seine Area Command. Having claimed no contact with the Soviets after he began his duty tour at the Pentagon, JOHNSON has thus indicated that he furnished no information to the KGB for that period, which began in June 1964 and ended in his disappearance in October 1964.

4. Unsuccessful Approaches to U.S. Citizens*

a. The HARMSTONE Case

(1) Introduction

After providing the two promised leads** at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO then volunteered that the KGB in 1958 or 1959 had made an unsuccessful recruitment approach to Richard C. HARMSTONE, Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Initially NOSENKO said that the KGB had photographs of HARMSTONE in homosexual as well as heterosexual acts, but in 1964 he stated that although the KGB knew HARMSTONE to be a homosexual, it had no photographs of him in such activities. The KGB, thanks to microphones in the Embassy, learned that HARMSTONE did not tell U.S. authorities the full story of the approach, omitting the fact that the approach was based partly on his homosexuality. HARMSTONE's report of the approach was not, however, made in the Embassy. When HARMSTONE was reassigned from Moscow, a summary of his KGB file was turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO indicated that he was unaware of any developments in the case thereafter. Since the approach was made prior to his transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in January 1960, NOSENKO said he did not personally participate in the operation but was informed of it by V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the Section. The officers who did take part in the case could not be identified by NOSENKO.

HARMSTONE, a bachelor, was posted to Moscow in October 1957. He went to the security office in the Embassy on 23 May 1959 to report a series of events which had culminated the day before in his having been approached for recruitment by a self-admitted KGB officer (then known to HARMSTONE only as "Sergey" but later identified as KOVSHUK). The approach was based, with accompanying photographs, on his alleged homosexuality, an allegation which HARMSTONE denied in his interview by the Embassy Security Officer. He refused to collaborate, HARMSTONE said, but he had agreed to meet "Sergey" on 23 May. In keeping with his instructions from U.S. authorities, HARMSTONE lunched with "Sergey" that afternoon and thereafter avoided holding meetings with him. After his reassignment from Moscow in October 1959, HARMSTONE admitted to the Department of State Security Office that he had a homosexual background and the photographs shown to him by KOVSHUK had been genuine, but he again claimed to have rejected the recruitment attempt. HARMSTONE subsequently resigned from the Department.

Among the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Moscow Embassy in November 1963*** was a document dated August 1958 on the KGB plans for operational activity against HARMSTONE.

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*NOSENKO has described a total of five unsuccessful attempts by the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate to recruit U.S. Embassy personnel stationed in Moscow. Two of these, the attempted recruitments of military code clerks KEYSERS and STORSBERG in which NOSENKO says he participated personally, are discussed in Part V.E.3.c. The remaining three are described here.

**These are the BELITSKIY and "ANDREY" leads, discussed in Parts VI.D.6. and VI.D.3.b., respectively.

***For further information on the CHEREPANOV papers, see Part VI.D.7.c.

Details on the HARMSTONE case from NOSENKO and other sources are presented below.

(ii) Information from NOSENKO

On 9 June 1962, at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva, NOSENKO said at the outset that he would sell two items of information in return for the money he needed, and that he would tell CIA no more. After he had finished describing the "ANDREY" case, however, he volunteered a story about HARMSTONE, a Second or Third Secretary at the American Embassy in Moscow. The KGB tried to recruit him, but he refused the approach. Previously the KGB had used both female and male agents against him, and the KGB had photographs of the homosexual side as well as his activities with girls. NOSENKO believed that HARMSTONE did not tell the whole story to the U.S. officials, reporting only that there had been an approach to him based on compromise with women. The report on the approach had not been submitted in the Embassy. (NOSENKO did not say where he reported it, however.) At this meeting, having called the BELITSKIY case the first matter he would give to CIA and "ANDREY" the second, NOSENKO characterized the HARMSTONE case thus: "HARMSTONE. HARMSTONE. This is already the third item. Be patient. That's enough for today. (Laughing.)"

In February 1964 at CIA request, NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREMANOV documents, one of which concerned a KGB plan for operations against Richard HARMSTONE. Part of the plan, according to the document, was to get HARMSTONE drunk and photograph him in intimate relations with a Soviet girl. NOSENKO said this was in fact the way the KGB did get the material on which it based the later approach to him: "They got him drunk. At the same time they had him photographed. And after that they talked with him. They tried to recruit him, but he evaded the proposition. He declined the recruitment. But he also said nothing; he did not report. For this reason they consider that if he comes into their view again somewhere, even in a third country, then they will get to him and say: 'How about recruitment? This happened on such and such. You did not report it. Have you thought it over? You are hiding it for so long from your government, from the State Department, that you had contact with Soviet Intelligence.'" NOSENKO was asked how the KGB knew HARMSTONE had not reported the approach. He replied: "He was monitored, and we would have heard if anything about this matter was reported....Undoubtedly if he reported it, something would have been heard from [the KGB microphone in] the Minister Counsellor's [office]....They would dictate a message on this...."

Asked who tried to recruit HARMSTONE, he said, "I do not know. That was prior to my coming into the department. This was in the year 1958 or 1959. I don't know who was the case officer who spoke to HARMSTONE." Asked if this officer was still in the American Department, he replied: "I don't think he is. I don't think he is concerned with it anymore."

Later reinterviewed concerning the HARMSTONE case, NOSENKO repeated his assertion that he could not identify the KGB officers who were personally involved in the case, adding that he had learned of the case from KOVSHUK. He also repeated his statements that the KGB knew HARMSTONE

had not given the Embassy a full account of the recruitment approach; this was known from the microphones in the Embassy, from the telephones, and from the fact that HARMSTONE did not leave the Soviet Union immediately. (He thought that HARMSTONE had left the Soviet Union not long after the approach was made, toward the end of his tour, and it was not an early departure.) The KGB also knew HARMSTONE to be a homosexual, but did not have any pictures of him in this kind of activity; the KGB did have, however, a series of nude pictures of him with a female agent, and NOSENKO believed these photographs had been shown to HARMSTONE in the course of the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO thought that the KGB may have had more information on HARMSTONE than he, NOSENKO, was aware of and could tell CIA--otherwise, he said, the KGB would not have made the approach. After HARMSTONE left Moscow, NOSENKO added, a summary of his file was given to the First Chief Directorate, but he never heard whether they had made an attempt to contact him thereafter.

(iii) Information from Other Sources

HARMSTONE, one of the economic attaches at the Embassy, shared an office with William TURPIN, also an economic attache, until TURPIN was replaced in August 1958 by George WINTERS.* WINTERS and HARMSTONE worked together until HARMSTONE finished his tour in October 1959.

The KGB plans for operational activity against HARMSTONE outlined in the CHEREPANOV document dated August 1958 tally closely with information reported in Foreign Service dispatches by TURPIN, HARMSTONE, and James RAMSEY, and subsequently confirmed by HARMSTONE in interviews conducted by the FBI. The descriptive details in the CHEREPANOV document about the agents to be used against HARMSTONE are quite specific and, when matched against the Foreign Service dispatches, make it possible to identify them even though the document uses only cryptonyms when referring to them. For example, the plan states: "Through the agent 'NIKONOV,' who works in the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences USSR, continue to render to HARMSTONE small favors on a reciprocal basis (cooperation in arranging visits with economists, visits to the institute, etc.) trying, on his part, to obtain from HARMSTONE materials on the economics of South America (the specialty of 'NIKONOV')." TURPIN, HARMSTONE himself, and WINTERS each reported having many contacts with Yu.V. BELOV, who was the American Embassy's liaison contact with Soviet economists, particularly in the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences. BELOV was fluent in Spanish, and was concerned with economic problems of South America. Similarly, most of the other agents have been identified with individuals on whom there was detailed information available from overt contacts in Moscow.

HARMSTONE came to the security office in the Embassy on the morning of 23 May 1959 and stated that he was in serious difficulty and wanted to discuss the matter. He told of having been drugged while dining at the home of BELOV in April 1959; also present was a "cousin" of BELOV's who was

[redacted]

an actor. A few weeks later, HARMSTONE said, he and WINTERS were invited to the BELOVs for the afternoon, but WINTERS was busy so HARMSTONE had to go alone. He named the various other Soviets who were part of the day's outing, among them a couple named "SOKOLOV" (identifiable in the CHEREPANOV paper as the case officer A.M. MIKHAILOV and the agent "KRUCHININA"). At a visit to a dacha after lunch, a friend named "Sergey" was present and made HARMSTONE's acquaintance. A few days later "SOKOLOV" invited HARMSTONE to have lunch, and mentioned that "Sergey" would probably join them, as he did. After lunch the three went out to visit "Sergey's" dacha, where "SOKOLOV" soon disappeared to take a nap. "Sergey" then identified himself to HARMSTONE as a worker of the KGB who had been investigating the case of a "notorious homosexual," naming BELOV's "cousin."

[redacted] "Sergey" then made recruitment overtures, which HARMSTONE rejected, but he did agree to lunch with "Sergey" the following day. Also, "Sergey" offered to assist HARMSTONE in his career, and gave him his office number, to be called from outside the Embassy lest HARMSTONE should be overheard making the call.

Following the initial interview with the Security Officer, the latter reported the situation to the Minister Counsellor, Richard DAVIS, who concurred in the Security Officer's belief in HARMSTONE's innocence of the homosexual allegation. The two agreed that HARMSTONE might keep the scheduled appointment to have lunch with "Sergey" that same afternoon.

"Sergey" did most of the talking that afternoon, according to HARMSTONE, commenting on a number of the Embassy personnel and various prominent Soviet personalities. "Sergey" planned for HARMSTONE to lunch with him the following week, but, following instructions of the Security Officer and Minister Counsellor, HARMSTONE thereafter fended off "Sergey" by telling him it was pointless for HARMSTONE to see him, that the KGB knew the situation to be "completely phoney," and that the KGB should stop harassing him; he wanted no assistance, no further luncheons, no other appointments with KGB personnel. HARMSTONE successfully avoided contacts with "Sergey" thereafter, until the latter broke in on a dinner HARMSTONE was having in a restaurant with a casual Soviet contact (a student) in August 1959. HARMSTONE said he repeated his refusal to see "Sergey" and the latter departed.

In August or September of 1959 HARMSTONE passed a note to the Security Officer in the Embassy in which he reported that he was certain that his KGB friend "Sergey" was identical with George WINTERS' contact in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V.M."KOMAROV."* He explained how he had come to this discovery:

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*KOMAROV is the alias used by KOVSHUK on his ten-month visit to the United States in 1957-1958 and later in Moscow with his American contacts, until 1963 when he began to use his true name.

"George WINTERS' contact in Foreign Ministry V.M. KOMAROV called the other day, asking for George. His voice sounded so much like that of 'Sergey' that I asked George if I could see a photograph of KOMAROV on his 1957 visa application. If KOMAROV is not 'Sergey,' he could easily be latter's twin brother. The only difference is that when I have seen "S" he was always wearing glasses. In the picture he is not wearing glasses. George has never seen him wearing glasses..." HARMSTONE's note then went on to mention other points which support the identification.

In October 1959 HARMSTONE completed his Moscow tour and returned to Washington. [redacted] but reiterated his rejection of recruitment. He subsequently resigned from the Department.

TOP SECRET

b. Edward Ellis SMITH

(i) Information from NOSENKO

In 1962 NOSENKO told a detailed story of a KGB attempt to recruit the Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in 1954 or 1955, a man named SMITH. His KGB cryptonym was "RYZHYY" (redhead) because he had red hair.

NOSENKO reported that SMITH was having an affair with his Russian maid, but the KGB could not manage to get photographs of them in compromising situations because their intimate relations took place in his apartment in the Embassy. The maid was therefore given a camera to take photographs of herself within the apartment, in various sexual positions; the KGB superimposed photographs of SMITH in a photomontage and used these to make a recruitment approach to him. The KGB mailed him a letter instructing him to come to a personal meeting, enclosing copies of the photographs with the letter. He came to the meeting and Second Chief Directorate Chief O.M. GRIBANOV himself made the recruitment approach. SMITH wavered, saying neither yes nor no, but agreed to come back to another meeting. He did not appear for the second meeting, however, and NOSENKO claimed that at this time he personally was sent after the Russian maid to find out why SMITH had not come. She reported that he could not make up his mind what to do, that he had been up all night, first deciding that he would cooperate, then deciding that he would not. The KGB then sent him several more letters threatening to expose him. Finally, after three days, SMITH broke down and told the Ambassador of the situation. He was immediately sent home, and that ended the operation.

In 1964 NOSENKO denied that he had had any personal role in the case, explaining that as a junior officer in the U.S. Embassy Section at the time, working on correspondents,* he would not have taken part in so important an operation. He said that he had heard about the operation from V.M. KOVSHUK, whose case it was at the time. (On a later occasion NOSENKO claimed that in a legal sense he had a personal role in the case; he was assigned to a phone-watch to receive surveillance reports on the operation.) Otherwise, the accounts by NOSENKO of the SMITH operation have been consistent with the story he related in 1962.

(ii) Information from GOLITSYN

In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1947 he had read a two-volume study on KGB operations against American Intelligence in the USSR, prepared by S.M. FEDOSEYEV, which gave examples of sucoessful work against the U.S. Embassy in

*See Part V.C. for NOSENKO's dating of his responsibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953-1955; he claimed to have been working on correspondents until June 1954, when he took over the Army Attaches. He stated that he left for the Tourist Department in June 1955. Edward Ellis SMITH arrived in Moscow on 20 July 1954. The first letter was dated 1 June 1956 and received on 2 June 1956 by SMITH.

Moscow. One case concerned an American, probably single, who was either the Security Officer or the counterintelligence representative in the Embassy. He had a dog, and lived in an apartment in the city or a country house outside Moscow. His Russian maid or cleaning woman was his mistress. The KGB thought he would not be recruitable by ordinary blackmail on the basis of his intimate relations with his maid, so the maid, a KGB agent, was instructed to confess to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. He agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters. He also recalled that the American first supplied only disinformation to the KGB, but when the KGB complained, he provided a mixture of truth and disinformation. GOLITSYN said this case study was based on a true incident which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure if the operation really did result in a successful recruitment as was alleged in the study.



(c) The BINDER Case

(i) Information from NOSENKO

While reviewing notes he had brought to a meeting in Geneva on 26 January 1964, NOSENKO first mentioned the unsuccessful attempt to recruit Peter BINDER. NOSENKO said that BINDER, the "top Sergeant in charge of America House," had been having sexual relations with a Soviet female in his room at the America House for some time and had been obtaining articles such as dresses and coats for her from the United States. Because BINDER's activities were confined to America House, the KGB was unable to photograph his indiscretions and thus had little means to exert pressure on him. The recruitment approach consequently failed.

In later interviews by CIA and the FBI, NOSENKO identified the woman involved as Galya MORELLI, a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher. NOSENKO said that Vladimir DEMKIN of the U.S. Embassy Section was the case officer working against BINDER, and that S.M. FEDOSEYEV, Chief of the American Department, took part in the approach. This was in 1962, NOSENKO said, after he had transferred to the Tourist Department, and for this reason he could provide no further details on the case.

(ii) Information from BINDER

Master Sergeant Peter BINDER arrived in Moscow, where he was assigned as manager of America House, on 16 March 1961.* He was approached by the KGB on 15 January 1963 and reported the KGB attempt to U.S. Embassy officials the same day. On 22 January 1963 BINDER was withdrawn from Moscow before the completion of his tour. At the airport as he was leaving, the Soviets attempted to prevent his departure by saying that he had never been properly accredited to the USSR. The plane was delayed for about 15 minutes while a heated exchange took place between Soviet officials and the American officers accompanying BINDER. He then was allowed to leave. The following description of the Soviet recruitment attempt is drawn from debriefings of BINDER by the U.S. Embassy Security Officer in Moscow on the day of the incident and from debriefings by the FBI and Department of the Army after his return to the United States.

In about December 1961, according to BINDER, he first became intimate with MORELLI, a dishwasher at America House whom he has described as being a pretty, intelligent, well-manicured girl of about 26. Their relationship continued until June or July 1962, at which time MORELLI "disappeared" from her job without notice while BINDER was on leave. During

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*It was BINDER who summoned the Embassy Security Officer, Hugh MONTGOMERY, to America House in the summer of 1962 when he became suspicious of "LILLIAN," the "Austrian" girlfriend of the U.S. military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS. After telling MONTGOMERY that she was going to her hotel to get her passport, which would prove her nationality, "LILLIAN" disappeared and was not seen again at America House. NOSENKO reported this incident, but associated it with the development of another military code clerk (see Part V.E.3.c.).

their affair, BINDER occasionally gave MORELLI gifts of money and clothing but restricted his meetings with her to his room in the dormitory. In about February or March 1962 MORELLI came to BINDER and said that she thought she was pregnant; she made no demands of BINDER, however, and said nothing about getting an abortion. Although at his first interview in Moscow BINDER said that MORELLI at no time indicated that she was required to obtain information for the Soviets, he told the FBI in late February 1963 that on one occasion in his room at America House MORELLI admitted to him that she was sent to America House by the Soviets and that all employees there were required to meet in two groups once a month with their contacts [KGB officers] to discuss the America House personnel.

On the morning of 15 January 1963, the day of the approach, BINDER left America House on foot to get a haircut at a Soviet barbershop, some 300 yards away. While he was enroute, a car pulled up beside him, three "goons" strong-armed him into the back seat, and he was driven to a nearby Militia station. After some perfunctory questioning, one of the Militiamen made several phone calls, and an interrogator arrived a few minutes later.

The interrogator had a letter which he said had been mailed by MORELLI to the U.S. Embassy and had been intercepted by the KGB. The letter contained numerous allegations against BINDER, which the interrogator proceeded to list. Among them, BINDER was able to recall the following:

-On 25 November 1961 there was a party at America House for Soviet employees, after which BINDER and MORELLI went to BINDER's room. Subsequently BINDER and MORELLI lived together as man and wife.

-At another party, in December 1961, BINDER pointed out five enlisted men living in America House [the letter named them] telling MORELLI that they were informants for John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer.* He told MORELLI that the girls working in America House should be particularly careful of Charles GIDARO, as he was ABIDIAN's right-hand man.

-In February 1962, MORELLI told BINDER that she was pregnant, and BINDER instructed her to get an abortion.

-At the George Washington's Birthday Party in 1962 BINDER pointed out ABIDIAN to MORELLI and Svetlana IVANOVA, another employee of America House, and told them to be careful of him as he was the Embassy Security Officer.

-At some point BINDER gave a sewing machine to a Soviet citizen to sell for him. At another time BINDER ordered from the United States a coat for the America House employee Luba TISHKINO, but then told her that it had been lost in the mail. The coat was not really lost, however; BINDER gave it to one of the old cooks at America House because she paid him money for it.

*See Part V.E.3.d. concerning NOSENKO's responsibilities for the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN. NOSENKO has not reported that the KGB was aware of these enlisted men serving as informants for ABIDIAN.

-After asking whether BINDER was acquainted with Mr. LOHRER of the West German Embassy, the interrogator asked if BINDER had given LOHRER goods to sell on the Soviet market.

-In April 1962, BINDER told MORELLI that Hugh MONTGOMERY had arrived at the U.S. Embassy as Security Officer, that MONTGOMERY was a good friend of his, and that he had told MONTGOMERY about his affair with MORELLI but MONTGOMERY had told him not to worry about it.

-BINDER told MORELLI and Svetlana IVANOVA that Richard C. JACOB,* a U.S. Embassy employee, was a "well-trained spy" and that MORELLI and IVANOVA should therefore be careful of him.

In describing his conversation at the Militia station, BINDER said that, after the interrogator had asked a number of questions, he, BINDER, complained that the Soviet was talking too fast. An interpreter was thereupon called in and remained until BINDER was questioned concerning JACOB. At this point, the interpreter left and the interrogator continued to question BINDER on personal matters. Except for the relatively short time the interpreter was there, all questioning was in Russian, which BINDER generally understood. After discussing BINDER's family, the interrogator asked BINDER what ought to be done about the letter and the charges it contained. He suggested that if the letter were sent on to the American Ambassador, to whom it was addressed, U.S. officials would not believe BINDER's denials of the charges, his career in the Army would be ruined, and BINDER would no longer be able to support his two daughters. According to BINDER, his reply was that there was nothing he could do if the Soviets decided to forward the letter, and "that would be that." The interrogator then left the room.

When he returned about 15 minutes later he spoke to BINDER in a friendly manner, commenting that BINDER had been in Moscow for almost two years and that it was obviously important for him to finish his tour there and remain in the Army. BINDER agreed with this. The interrogator then said that BINDER's actions while in the Soviet Union had been quite proper, that he had always been very fair to the Soviet girls who worked for him, and that he, the interrogator, had decided to help him. The Soviet continued that he was going to forget about the letter and all the charges contained in it and that the letter would not be forwarded. He also pointed out that as the letter was not going anywhere, there was no need for BINDER to mention the incident of his arrest to anyone. BINDER was then driven back to the barber shop.

BINDER summed up the entire incident, which lasted a little over two hours, by saying that the approach was very low-key and that at no time was he specifically asked to supply information to the Soviets, although this was implicit in the remarks of his interviewers.

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*See Part VI.D.7.b. regarding the detention of JACOB in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case.

During questioning by U.S. authorities afterwards, BINDER said that he had denied the truth of the allegations, point-by-point, and that, apart from the charge that he was intimate with MORELLI, none of them, in fact, were true. Specifically, BINDER told Army questioners in June 1963 that he had laughed at his interrogator when the latter attributed to him the above statements concerning MONTGOMERY and JACOB [redacted] BINDER denied to his U.S. Army interviewers (as he said he had to the Soviets) that he knew MONTGOMERY personally, that he had told MONTGOMERY of his affair with MORELLI, and that he had told MORELLI he had done so. He said that he told the Soviet interrogator that it was "ridiculous to believe that Richard JACOB was a spy." In fact, BINDER said, he had no knowledge of JACOB's duties in Moscow and had only slight personal contact with him.

5. Operations Involving Other Westerners

a. Tabulation

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO has provided identifying information on 90 KGB agents, probable agents, and operational contacts of Western (but non-American) citizenship and he has described an additional 12 development and investigation operations against such third-country nationals. As indicated in the following tabulation, 55 of NOSENKO's recruitment leads and five of the 12 investigative and developmental leads were contained in the notes which he brought to the meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1964 and which enabled him to provide specific information on these individuals, for example, their dates of birth and precise dates of recruitment. At the same time, however, NOSENKO generally furnished comparatively fewer details concerning the KGB operations against other Westerners than he did in his leads to American cases; often his information did not exceed that written in the notes. He has disclaimed personal participation in all but four of his recruitment leads and two of his investigation/development cases. For the most part NOSENKO's foreign leads are based upon information which he said he learned casually and noted for passage to CIA during the time he was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department in 1962 and 1963. (With certain exceptions, NOSENKO has been questioned less about his other Western leads than about his American cases, particularly with regard to sourcing.)

Agent Leads

LEADS	SOURCING AND DATE OF REPORT	INVESTIGATION RESULTS
Afghanistan		
[redacted] in Moscow, is a long-time agent. NOSENKO did not know the t date of recruitment, the basis of uitment, nor what type of informa- [redacted] had provided to the KGB. elieved A.P. DAVIDYAN was the case der for [redacted]	Source not named. (1962 and 1964)	[redacted], the [redacted] in Moscow from 1956 until 1963, [redacted] Earlier CIA suspicions that he is a KGB agent stemmed from his long tour in Moscow, his pro-Soviet attitudes, and his ability to conduct large-scale blackmarket activities in Moscow with impunity. [redacted] was in official liaison with Soviet representatives in Kabul prior to his assignment to Moscow; his relations with these Soviets were reportedly cordial. [redacted] apparently gave his full personal support to Prime Minister DAUD's program of expanding Afghan military and other ties to the Soviet Union. Contrary opinions have been received which describe him as pro-West or at least staunchly nationalistic. NOSENKO information on [redacted]
Argentina		
[redacted] Born in Odessa now an Argentine citizen; was con- ted in Odessa by the Chief of the ond Department of the Odessa KGB, u) VARYUS*; he was met again in	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	Identified as [redacted] the investigation so far has disclosed no contacts with Soviet Officials in Argentina.

.o second departments of local KGB units are provincial counterparts of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow.

TOP SECRET

ow by an officer of the Tourist
rtment, Second Chief Directorate,
was recruited. Currently a business-
in Buenos Aires and has relatives in
ina; this case has been turned over
he First Chief Directorate.

, fnu: Argentine [redacted] Source not named. (1964) [redacted] employee of the Argentine Embassy in Moscow, confessed to his superiors on 5 December 1961 that he had been recruited by the KGB on homosexual grounds. The case officer who acted as interpreter in [redacted] recruitment was V.L. ARTEMYEV, whom NOSENKO has identified as one of the case officers under his supervision in 1960-61.

recruited in Moscow in 1961 or 1962
homosexual grounds. Recruited by
. MALYUGIN of the Fifth Section,
rican Department, Second Chief Direc-
ate, in Moscow in 1962.*

Australia

: An Australian who Source not named. (1964 notes) Not identified, but [redacted]
to the USSR as a tourist in 1960
was contacted at the request of
First Chief Directorate; she
eed to cooperate and is an opera-
nal contact, not an agent.

Austria

(fnu): [redacted] NOSENKO first learned about [redacted] when he was working in the American Department in 1960 and 1961, but he could not pinpoint the date more precisely. Source was Nikolay IGNATOV, who visited the Department on the orders of O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, to obtain requirements. (1964) [redacted] in Moscow from 1957 to 1962. [redacted]
in Moscow was possibly
ruited after an extensive culti-
ion by GRIBANOV in the period
0-61.

*According to NOSENKO, the Fifth Section of the American Department is concerned with Latin American Embassies in Moscow.

[redacted] An East-West trader [redacted] and a KGB agent; cruited in Vienna by two KGB offi- rs there on TDY.	NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva a copy of the official KGB summary report on [redacted] He learned of [redacted] through Tourist Department involvement. (1964)	[redacted] the subject of several denunciations as a Soviet agent, is Communist sympathizer; he offered his services to CIA in March 1961 but was terminated in 1962 on the basis of an unsatisfactory polygraph examination, lack of production, and general suspicions concerning his probable KGB agent status.
ME UNKNOWN: The code clerk at the serian Embassy in Moscow in 1960 s a KGB agent.	O.S. BUBNOV of the Third Department, Second Chief Directorate, told NOSENKO in 1960 about this agent. (1962)	[redacted] a code clerk in Moscow during the late 1950's, became involved with a young Russian girl and was questioned about this by his superiors, who suspected KGB sponsorship; he was removed from cryptographic work in 1961 and placed in a non-sensitive job. After reviewing CIA information on [redacted] NOSENKO confirmed that this was the name of the agent on whom he had reported.
) Belgium		
[redacted] cruited on 29 July 1962 by Lt. Col. EKSEYEV and Capt. ROMANOVICH of the xth Section (Auto Tourists) of the urist Department; she is a tour ader for [redacted]	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted] also known as [redacted] visited the Czech Embassy in Brussels on at least one occasion. (See entry on van de [redacted]
[redacted] A Belgian, was re- uited on 14 July 1962 by the Tourist partment; he is a bus driver for [redacted] and is used as a otter.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	His identity has been confirmed. (See entry o[redacted]

TOP SECRET

[redacted] A KGB agent
has given material; he is a bus
or for the
el agency.

Source not named. (1964 notes)

[redacted] 1963 that he had been recruited by Soviet Intelligence. He indicated that other employees of the [redacted] agency were also Soviet agents. (See also comments for [redacted]

UNKNOWN: An officer of unknown
ionality, who is employed at a NATO
tallation in Belgium, is an ex-
ely valuable KGB agent; the agent
be involved in cipher work, as he
supplied large quantities of infor-
ion which has assisted the KGB in
ding enciphered NATO communications.
erts from the Special Technical
tion of the Second Chief Director-
travelled TDY to Brussels to assist
the operation during 1962.

NOSENKO learned of this from L.A. LEBEDEV, Second Chief Directorate technician, who assisted in an entry into the installation. (1964)

LEBEDEV's travel to Belgium [redacted] indicates this operation took place in July or October 1962. [redacted]

[redacted] Recruited on
August 1962 by the Tourist Depart-
t; he works for [redacted]

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

A guide [redacted] denied any KGB contact. (See entry on van [redacted]

[redacted] Source not named. (1964 notes)

[redacted] recruited in 1961 but re-
ud to meet with her case officers
n she returned to the USSR in 1963;
is an interpreter for [redacted]
this case will probably be
ired to KGB Archives.

[redacted] denied any contact with the KGB. (See entry on [redacted]

f) Brazil

[redacted]: A Russian emigre ow living in Brazil, where he owns a ourist firm; recruited by the Tourist epartment in 1963.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	Suspicions that he is a KGB agent pre-date 1963. Interviewed in June 1965 and denied any approach by the KGB.
[redacted]: A composer and conductor; was recruited in Moscow in ugust 1957.	Source not named. (1964 notes)	[redacted], a long-time Brazilian Communist. His contacts with Soviets are open.

g) Canada

[redacted] A naturalized anadian citizen of Latvian origin; as recruited, at the request of the GB First Chief Directorate, by the altic KGB while visiting the Baltic ountries in about October 1963.	Source not named. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
AME UNKNOWN: A former citizen of ermany was brought to the Soviet nion for Illegals training in 1963 nd was in contact with Yu.I. GUK. his person is active in Canada, where e is subordinate to and in contact ith the KGB Legal Residency. Much dentifying data known by NOSENKO.	NOSENKO learned of this case from GUK in 1963. (1964)	Identified as [redacted] double agent [redacted] A former agent of U.S. Army CIC in Germany [redacted] was compromised to the Soviets and doubled by them in the 1950's. Confessed Soviet recruitment immediately to U.S. handlers and was aided in emigration to Canada. Later recontacted by KGB in Canada and reactivated. (See Part VI.d.5.c.)
AME UNKNOWN: Canadian Embassy code lerk, who was recruited in Moscow bout 1957; he later went to Warsaw here he was contacted by a KGB offi- r on TDY.	Source not named.	A Canadian Embassy guard who confessed his recruitment has been confirmed by NOSENKO as the subject of this lead. [redacted]

[redacted]: A Canadian of Ukrainian
entage was contacted by the Tourist
partment while in the USSR as a tourist
December 196?; although not fully re-
ited, he came to an agreement with a
officer and may be contacted in
ada by an Illegal.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)



[redacted]: Canadian
recruited by KGB on
sexual grounds about 1953 or 1954;
GRIBANOV personally involved in
se; NOSENKO thought that [redacted] did
cooperate with KGB after he left
scow. NOSENKO commented that a case
high level as this would not be a
rd" recruitment, i.e., there would
necessarily have been a direct
proach, and no secrecy agreements or
ceipts would normally be required.

In 1962 when NOSENKO first supplied this lead, [redacted] he said he had learned of the case from conversation with the case officers. In 1964 he said that V.D. CHELNOKOV, who was later his immediate supervisor in the Tourist Department, had participated in the recruitment while he was in the Second (Anglo-Canadian) Department, Second Chief Directorate, in about 1953. NOSENKO also said that he first heard of the case in 1955 or 1956 during an official visit to the city of Vladimir, where the local KGB told him the story of [redacted] having visited Vladimir in 1954; while there he manifested homosexual tendencies while he was drunk; NOSENKO said [redacted] got so drunk that he lost his shoes and they were later returned to him through the mails in Moscow. (1962)

GOLITSYN provided information about KGB operational interest in [redacted] during [redacted] first tour in Moscow, between 1948 and 1951; the KGB was aware that [redacted] was a homosexual; GOLITSYN knew that the KGB was working on [redacted] but did not know whether he had been approached. In 1964 [redacted] was interviewed concerning his experiences in Moscow. He admitted having been compromised, on the basis of homosexual activities, during his tour as [redacted] between March 1954 and April or May 1956.



[redacted]

(h) Egypt

NAME UNKNOWN: A low-level employee of the Egyptian Embassy in Moscow was a KGB agent targetted against America House; he was recruited in Moscow prior to 1961 on the basis of speculatory activities. G.I. GRYAZNOV and V.V. KOSOLAPOV of the American Department helped the agent's case officer in the Sixth Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, sell 200 to 300 watches that the agent had obtained abroad. This case officer and GRYAZNOV met with the agent; NOSENKO did not know who had recruited him.	Source not known. (1964)	[redacted] in the UAR Embassy, Moscow, was known to residents of America House. He reportedly involved several American code clerks with women and in black-market activities. See Parts V.E.3.c. and VI.D.2.

(i) Finland

[redacted]: A KGB agent, she works for the [redacted] firm and also for the Finnish Tourist Association; recruited by the Tourist Department and the local KGB organs in Leningrad.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted] Recruited in 1959 by the Tourist Department with the aid of the Leningrad KGB; she works in a travel bureau in Finland.	No source given, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]

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[redacted] Recruited by e KGB; he is a bus driver for the nnish tourist agency [redacted] the KGB believed [redacted] was interest to American Intelligence.	Source not named. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted] (now known as [redacted]): He worked r the [redacted] tourist agency, but ft it in 1963; recruited in 1961; s case has been retired to KGB chives.	Source not named. (1964 notes)	Identified [redacted]
[redacted] Recruited 1962 by the Tourist Department; s is a tour leader at the Finnish avel agency [redacted]	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]

[redacted] A KGB agent; she is a secretary [redacted] ersity. Recruited (date unspecified) y the Seventh Department jointly with he Leningrad KGB organs.	No source given, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted] mployed by a travel ureau; a KGB agent recruited by the ourist Department jointly with the eningrad KGB organs in 1962.	No source, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted]: Was recruited in 1963 y the Tourist Department, but has pro- ided no information as yet; she works or the [redacted]	No source given, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
j) France		
[redacted] o [redacted], was reported by NOSENKO in 96? to be a recruited agent of the KGB; n 1964, NOSENKO said he was not cer- ain [redacted] was an agent.	NOSENKO gave this lead first in June 1962. NOSENKO reported on 30 January 1964 that he learned of the [redacted] operation in 1961, when he accompanied O.M. GRIBANOV to a reception of the Indian Embassy and realized from a comment made by [redacted] that he was a friend of GRIBANOV's and an agent. On 16 February 1965 NOSENKO said he learned of the case mainly through friends, and that the Indian reception had been held in 1958 or 1959. (1962)	[redacted]

[redacted] (fnu): O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief the Second Chief Directorate, is rsonally handling this important agent, prominent French businessman; he was ruited as early as 1956 or 1958, and frequently comes to Moscow [redacted]

NOSENKO said he knew there was such a French agent but did not know the name until "there was a call placed to the General (GRIBANOV), and when I asked from whom is the call, then I found out it was from [redacted] then it was clear to me." (1964)

[redacted]

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[redacted] he made a half-dozen trips to the USSR and reportedly boasted of being in contact with General GRIBANOV and others there. (See also [redacted]

[redacted] ruited in 1963 by Tourist Depart-t; he is a section head in the nch tourist firm [redacted]

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

[redacted]

[redacted] es in Paris; was recruited in 1959 the Tourist Department; he works as uide and interpreter for various nch tourist agencies.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	Not identified.
[redacted] Correspondent [redacted] in Moscow; a long-time ond Chief Directorate agent. NO- KO said [redacted] was working for the rth Department (counterintelli- ce against employees of embassies	NOSENKO heard passing references from case officers of the Second Chief Directorate. (1964)	[redacted]
[redacted] : Recruited in 1959 by the rist Department; she was an inter- ter for tourist groups visiting the viet Union during 1957-59; [redacted] this case is closed.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	Not identified.
[redacted] A ssian citizen living in Paris; was cruited in 1963 by the Tourist De- rtment; he is a teacher of geography d history at some college and works the summers for the National Tour- t Center.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	Not identified.
[redacted] Re- ited in 1960; he is the Director of e [redacted] agency in ris.	NOSENKO learned about [redacted] from Yu.G. GRICHMANOV, Chief of the Second Section, Tourist Department. (1964 notes)	[redacted] handles most travel for the Soviet Embassy in Paris.

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[redacted] Recruited on 16 ist 1962 by officers from the Tour- Department and the Ukrainian KGB; is a bus driver for the [redacted] rist agency.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	Not identified.
Germany		
[redacted]; formerly a KGB agent in Kazakhstan was re-recruited by the Tourist artment in 1963.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted] Recruited in 1963 the Tourist Department; lives in nkfurt and is employed by the [redacted] tourist agency.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted] Owner of the [redacted] vel agency; recruited in 1962 by Tourist Department.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted] is a Communist-controlled firm.
[redacted] KGB cryptonym TO"; an employee of the [redacted] vel agency, was recruited by the rist Department in 1963.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]

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ME UNKNOWN: West German businessman d KGB agent who meets personally with M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second ief Directorate, when the German nes to Moscow.	NOSENKO heard about the lead from the Tourist Department officer A.P. SARAPKIN. (1964)	[redacted]
ME UNKNOWN: West German journalist o is a KGB agent; [redacted] no other identifying information available.	Source not named. (1964)	Not identified.
ME UNKNOWN: West German code clerk s recruited by the KGB in 1961. NOENKO thought this agent was no longer Moscow as of 1962.	O.S. BUBNOV of the Third Department, Second Chief Directorate. (1962)	Not identified.
ME UNKNOWN: KGB cryptonym "AUGUST"; West German citizen; he owns a conruction firm; was recruited in the SR by the Tourist Department in 1960.	Source not named. (1964 notes)	Not identified.
[redacted] Served as a KGB torant while a POW during World r II and was re-recruited by the urist Department on a visit to the SR in 1963; he now works in [redacted] the Hamburg nicipal Government.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
) Greece		
[redacted] Travel agency [redacted] was recruited in 1962 by e Tourist Department; the KGB susts he may be a double agent; the se is of no value.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]

India

[redacted] An employee of the [redacted]an Embassy in Moscow from 1957 [redacted]1961 and a KGB agent.

No source named. (1964)

[redacted] no derogatory information on file.

[redacted] Indian diplomat [redacted] either a agent or solid contact, [redacted] he was met by [redacted] GUK in Geneva. GUK returned [redacted]eneva in August 1963 to meet

Yu.I.GUK told NOSENKO about this case in Geneva in 1962, and NOSENKO told CIA then. The 1963 detail NOSENKO learned from GUK also.

[redacted]

Indonesia

[redacted] [redacted]s in Moscow had been recruited [redacted]ULACKI, the Assistant Naval Attache [redacted]e U.S. Embassy in Moscow, but had [redacted]ady been recruited by the KGB. [redacted] 1964, NOSENKO gave the same in- [redacted]ation but named [redacted] as the agent who was recruited by DULACKI. [redacted]tioned on this change, NOSENKO said [redacted] he was now not sure who it was and [redacted] maybe there were two separate cases. [redacted]n a diplomatic list which indicated [redacted] there was nobody named [redacted] at the [redacted]ssian Embassy, but that there was [redacted] NOSENKO [redacted]ve must have made a mistake in name earlier; in 1962, NOSENKO had [redacted]ed the name [redacted]

DULACKI's attempt to recruit [redacted] was overheard by means of a portable microphone on the restaurant table where the conversation took place. NOSENKO was at that time Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section (in October 1966, NOSENKO said that this took place after he had relinquished his responsibilities for Naval Attaches--which included DULACKI, a Marine--in the spring of 1960). (1962 and 1964)

[redacted]

Iran

[redacted] UNKNOWN: A member of the Iranian [redacted]ssy in Moscow is a KGB agent. No [redacted]ils.

No source given. (1962)

Not identified, but two Iranian Embassy employees are known to have been recruited in Moscow, one in 1958

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and the other in 1962. The name [redacted] on the Iranian diplomatic list seemed vaguely familiar to NOSENKO. This name appears in the CHEREPANOV Papers (Part VI.D.7.c.).

Personal involvement in the KGB investigation of Pavel SHAKHOV as a possible American agent. (October 1966)

[redacted]

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

Not identified.

) Italy

[redacted]: One of a group of [redacted] tourists detected mailing letters for [redacted] the NTS in 1963; was detained and [redacted] was then doubled by the KGB and released.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted] at the [redacted] in Moscow; was recruited on homosexual grounds; he [redacted] a brother employed at the U.S. Embassy.	Source not named. (1964)	This appears to refer to [redacted] sister was employed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. [redacted]
[redacted] in the U.S. Embassy in the late 1950's; was recruited by the KGB on the basis of blackmarket dealings. He was recruited subsequently by Embassy Security Officer [redacted] and reported this to the KGB.	Involvement with NOSENKO's target, ABIDIAN (see Part V:E.3.d.). (1962)	[redacted] Interviewed by CIA, he repeated denials that he was a KGB agent and said he made up the story of his recruitment by ABIDIAN to "scare the KGB off."
[redacted]: An Italian citizen born in [redacted] in Moscow; he was recruited in the USSR by the Tourist Department in May 1961; he is a guide and interpreter for tourist groups and at Italian exhibitions.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]

ME UNKNOWN: Italian journalist cruited in 1963; basis of re- uitment was not known.	NOSENKO heard from two officers of the Tenth Department, Second Chief Directorate, that V.I. KEVORKOV of that Department "must go meet his Italian correspond- ent."	Not identified.
[redacted] Recruited 1962 by the Tourist Department homosexual grounds; he is a pro- ssor of [redacted] at the University Rome.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
) Japan		
[redacted] recruited in the SR in 1961 when he was caught in ie intelligence activity in Baku; was planned to turn him over to e First Chief Directorate during e Tokyo Olympics in 1964.	Source not named. (1964 notes)	[redacted] In correspondence connected with his 1961 trip, CIA in Japan characterized [redacted] as a "well-known intelligence purveyor, though not known to be an actual fabricator. He was suspected of selling stock in his trip to all hands."

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[redacted] Representatives of [redacted] Company, which deals with the Soviet Union; has been recruited by the KGB (no date given).

Source not named. (1964 notes)

[redacted] KGB cryptonym "KAPA"; director of [redacted] steel company; recruited in the USSR in 1960 by the Tourist Department; has not yet been turned over to the KGB Legal Residency in Tokyo for handling.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

[redacted] KGB cryptonym "TAYGA"; recruited in September 1957 on homosexual grounds; was later used as a double agent, since he told the KGB he had reported the KGB recruitment when he returned to Japan.

Source not named. (1964 notes)

NAME UNKNOWN: KGB cryptonym "VALENTINA"; a Swedish citizen of Russian origin; [redacted] recruited in the USSR in 1960 at the request of the First Chief Directorate.

Source not named. (1964)

NAME UNKNOWN: A code clerk in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow in 1962 was a KGB agent; assisted the KGB in entering the Embassy to photograph code materials.

Source not named. (1962)

[redacted] (fnu): Japanese businessman in Moscow recruited by the Tourist Department in 1957 or 1958.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

[redacted] KGB cryptonym "VLADIMIR"; recruited by the Tourist Department in 1962 and was to be turned over to the KGB Legal Residency in Tokyo for handling.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

(s) Mexico

[redacted] Mexican diplomat who was in Moscow from 1960 to 1962; KGB agent.

Source not named. (1964)

[redacted]

[redacted] has had longstanding business connections in the USSR.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(fnu): A publisher and writer recruited by N.M. YELISEYEV the Latin American Section, American Department, in 1961 while a rist in USSR; "very valuable agent"; o later turned over to the KGB st Chief Directorate; in January 2 he received $1,000 from the KGB al Residency in Mexico City for fillment of an assignment. (In ater interview in 1964, NOSENKO d that was a valuable agent the Illegals Directorate, First af Directorate, and it was from s component that the $1,000 came.)	NOSENKO received this information from YELISEYEV. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
Netherlands		
Recruited by the irst Department during July 1963; us driver for the Dutch firm ; he has provided material to the KGB.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
Recruited 1959 by the Tourist Department the basis of a sexual compro- d in a park; she lives with her band in [redacted] this is a good case, of stinct interest to the First Chief rectorate.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
Norway		
A Norwegian journal- named was recruited in scow in 1957 or 1958. NOSENKO ok part in the operation by	Personal involvement in developmental stages of operation. (1964)	[redacted] a journalist travelled to the USSR in 1957; later wrote an article in which he told of recruitment on basis of blackmarket activities, but didn't mention sexual

introducing [redacted] to girls and then by netting him up for arrest on charges of blackmarketeering. Recruitment made by K.N. DUBAS, Chief of Tourist Department. [redacted] reported the approach after leaving USSR, but did not tell whole story.		[redacted] Described person who played role NOSENKO said he played. See Part 4.D.4.g.
(v) Peru		
[redacted] KGB agent handled by the KGB Legal Residency in New York City; his son, Serge, was a student at Lumumba University in Moscow in 1962.	No source named. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
(w) Sweden		
[redacted] KGB cryptonym "[redacted]"; recruited by the Tourist Department in 1961; a Greek citizen born in Turkey; and has been living in Stockholm since 1958; he has two children in the USSR.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted] KGB cryptonym "NINA"; a Swedish or Finnish national; was recruited by the Tourist Department in either 1958 or 1961; she works for the Swedish tourist agency [redacted] and lives in Sweden.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
[redacted]: KGB cryptonym "POSKREBNIK"; recruited in 1963 by the Tourist Department on the basis of homosexual materials gathered during a 1962 trip to the USSR; he is a representative of the [redacted] Travel Agency.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]

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x) Switzerland

AME UNKNOWN: KGB cryptonym "LUKA"; [redacted] he as recruited in Switzerland. By 964 apparently not cooperating with oviets any more because of fear.	NOSENKO was told of this case by Yu.I. GUK in 1962 and S.I. GAVRICHEV in 1964. (1962)	Unidentified; investigations continuing.
[redacted] (fnu): KGB cryptoum "ZHANNA"; a woman born in Italy nd now living in Geneva; was reruited in 1959 and turned over to he Geneva Legal Residency of the GB; she has contacts with Americans. Reported in 1962 without name or any etails except that there was a fe- ale agent of the Geneva Legal Resiency whose KGB cryptonym was ZHANNA"; S.I. GAVRICHEV was meetng her at that time.)	In 1962 heard from Yu.I. GUK of an incident involving her. (1962 and 1964 notes)	[redacted]

y) Tunisia

AME UNKNOWN: KGB cryptonym "MADRID"; [redacted] was recruited by the Tourst Department while a tourist in he USSR in 1960.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	Not identified.

z) United Kingdom

[redacted] (fnu): In June or July 1959, OSENKO personally recruited a ritish subject named [redacted] fter he had been compromised by omosexual agents YEFREMOV and OLKOV.	Personal involvement. (1964)	Not identified. [redacted]

[redacted] Recruited by the Department on 16 July 1962; he lectrical engineer, but owns ses and was to be used as a	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)	[redacted]
KNOWN: NOSENKO personally re- t [redacted] (name not recalled) basis was homosexual com-	Personal involvement. (1964)	[redacted]
KNOWN: KGB agent within Brit- nterintelligence (service un- who supplies information on intelligence and on agent ons; possibly from this agent received a report on the NATO nce in London that also contained methods of operations of n and British counterintelli- although specific agents t named in the report.	Yu.I. GUK told NOSENKO about this agent in April 1962. See Part III. B. which describes NOSENKO's involvement with a Scottish girl in Geneva and GUK's warning that the KGB has an agent in British counterintelligence who could report indiscretions. (1962)	Not identified. (George BLAKE, a KGB agent in MI-6, passed the KGB copies of minutes of CIA-MI-6 conferences on legal travel operations; one of the conferences was held in London in 1959; BLAKE was arrested in April 1961; thus he could not have been the Soviet referred to by GUK in 1962; see Part V.D.7.b.)
KNOWN: A member of the Brit- iralty recruited on homosexual in Moscow in 1957.	NOSENKO was told of this case by V.A. CHURANOV of the British Department, Second Chief Directorate. (1962)	Identical with William J.C. VASSALL; see Part V.D.5.b. for detailed discussion.
[redacted] correspond- Moscow; was the target of a ruitment operation in early OSENKO was not certain whether recruited.	No source named. (1964)	[redacted]

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fnu: By himself NOSENKO recruited a British citizen named [redacted] in Moscow during the 1959 tourist season on the basis of homosexual compromise involving one of his homosexual agents, either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV. Case turned over to First Chief Directorate.

Personal involvement as case officer of homosexual agent and as recruiter. (1964)

[redacted]

aa) Uruguay

[redacted] A Uruguayan citizen who lives in Montevideo and is prominent [redacted] there; recruited in Moscow in 1960 at the request of the KGB Illegals Directorate; he was then turned over to that directorate for handling in Montevideo.

Source not named. (1964 notes)

[redacted]

bb) Venezuela

[redacted] A dentist in Caracas; recruited in 1959 by the Tourist Department and turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

[redacted]

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ii) Developmental and Investigation Cases

LEAD	SOURCING AND DATE OF REPORT	INVESTIGATION RESULTS
[redacted] Travelled to the USSR summer of 1957 as an interpreter [redacted] Russian background [redacted] nce contact [redacted] was placed contact with [redacted] and ccompanied them during their tour. nly purpose was to watch [redacted] be- ause of possible intelligence mission. o approach contemplated or made.	Personal involvement. (1964)	[redacted]
[redacted] (Cpl): A British citizen and [redacted] who visited he USSR in 1959 and several times ince; the KGB is actively working n this case, but has not recruited im.	Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964)	[redacted]

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[redacted] Director of the [redacted] tourist agency; was under development by the Tourist Department; First Chief Directorate asked that case be turned over to them. This was done.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

[redacted]

[redacted] Owns [redacted] ships in Hamburg and goes to the USSR every year. NOSENKO himself was in contact with [redacted] about 1957 or 1958 but did not recruit him at this time. [redacted] had realized what was happening and severed the relationship. [redacted] still goes to the USSR and the KGB continues to surround him with agents but he has not been recruited.

Personal involvement.

[redacted]

[redacted] (fnu): A canadian; is known to have engaged in homosexual acts while in the USSR as a tourist in 1959; the KGB will attempt to recruit him if he returns.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

[redacted]

NAME UNKNOWN: KGB cryptonym "KOMETA"; a British woman who works for some publication in London which publishes in the Russian language; she visited the USSR in 1961 and 1962 with a spotting mission for British Intelligence, there had an affair with a KGB agent, and has corresponded with him; when the agent wrote that he would be coming to the West on a visit in 1963, she replied by mail that she would like to see him, but could not at that time; the KGB is waiting for the British to make the next move.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964)

Not identified.

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NAME UNKNOWN: In 1960 or 1961 the KGB as preparing a recruitment operation gainst a British audio technician who ame to the British Embassy in Moscow; KGB female agent enticed him into ier apartment, where compromising hotographs may have been taken; as far as NOSENKO knew, the KGB never made a recruitment approach in this case.	Source not named. (1962)	Not identified.
NAME UNKNOWN: A former Russian now in Frankfurt, Germany, [redacted] the KGB was trying to recruit him in 1961 through his sister or cousin who still lives in the USSR; the KGB has met him in France; the outcome is unknown.	Source not named. (1964)	[redacted]
NAME UNKNOWN: A young female Swiss tourist in the USSR who works for the police in Basel or Zurich was contacted by the KGB on her complaint of stolen money; the KGB arranged to return the oney to her; she was assessed and the lead was passed to the First Chief Directorate.	No source named. (1964)	[redacted] She is in contact with KGB officers in Switzerland.
[redacted] A Swedish tourist in Leningrad during June 1963; tried to recruit a Soviet citizen [redacted] the Soviet was a KGB agent, and the entire approach was recorded; if [redacted] returns to the USSR an attempt will be made to recruit him.	Source not named. (1964 notes)	[redacted]

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[redacted] (fnu): A Dutch citizen; ravelled as a tourist to the Soviet nion in 1959; he was photographed in omosexual activity and this will be sed as a basis for recruitment pproach if he returns to the USSR.

Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)

[redacted]: Lives on [redacted], raunschweig, Germany; visited the SSR in 1959; the KGB suspects he is homosexual and will attempt to recruit him if he returns.

Source not named. (1964 notes)



b. The VASSALL Case

(1) Information from NOSENKO

At the 11 June 1962 meeting with CIA, NOSENKO first mentioned the lead which was later equated with William J.C. VASSALL, the KGB agent in the British Admiralty. Neither then nor later in 1962 did NOSENKO identify this agent by name.

NOSENKO was asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had ever heard of the KGB agent George BLAKE, "the man who compromised the famous tunnel operation in Berlin."* NOSENKO replied: "Yes, I did. But I'll tell you this, that there was a far more important Englishman who was our agent than BLAKE.** He is a very big man, and from him we get all kinds of materials. We get all the details about NATO. He is our number one agent, the best of all intelligence information. He had been in Moscow, and we recruited him there. We got him on a homosexuality charge, a very extreme one involving multiple persons. The case officers who recruited him received the Order of Lenin... He is not an intelligence man. He is a high-ranking man. He is working on all kinds of NATO matters and is delivering most valuable information... He was in Moscow some time ago. My friend and three others in the KGB section running him received the Order of Lenin. That is a very high distinction for the KGB... I do not know the man's name, but I do know when he was in Moscow, and I know that he has a very high position. He is in London now." NOSENKO was reluctant to go into further details at this, his second meeting with CIA, but he added: "I'll tell you all about him tomorrow, my brothers. I will tell you many things tomorrow, and the day after... This is our number one operation. There is no sum of money we would not be willing to pay him."

The next day NOSENKO was asked for additional information about the "high level British agent," and he told his case officers: "I don't know the exact content of the material (he was giving) except that they were very valuable military documents, and I know that he even brought in draft copies when he was here in Moscow. He went to London, and I believe he works in a Ministry. I think it is in the office of the First Lord of the Admiralty. He still meets with our case officer even now. He brings them extremely valuable material. He is either a deputy or a First Secretary, or a member of the secretariat; the most important thing being that all material of the greatest significant value passes through his hands. He was recruited in 1956 or 1957. I don't know when he returned to London, but he was working with the (KGB Legal)Resident there, who was at that time a man whose name is Major General (N.B.) RODIN.*** RODIN

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* BLAKE, a British MI-6 officer, has admitted that he informed the KGB of the Berlin tunnel operation (which involved the intercept of Soviet and East German telephone conversations by CIA and MI-6) prior to the time the operation became active in May 1955; it was terminated in April 1956.

** In September 1964 CIA sought more details from NOSENKO about BLAKE. He responded: "BLAKE? Who is BLAKE?" When reminded, NOSENKO said: "I don't know what kind of information he (BLAKE) gave. I think he gave information, but I don't know what kind or how much. This is a mistake on what I supposedly said before." For a further discussion of BLAKE, See Part V.D.7.b.

***RODIN, who served in London under the alias KOROVIN, was previously known to have been Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in London.

also received an Order of Lenin for his participation in the case, but this was for the obtaining of valuable documents and not because of any involvement in the agent's recruitment. RODIN was personally in contact with the agent in London... I don't know what position he (the agent) held in Moscow. I don't want to tell you anything I don't know. Remember, this was handled by another section and I could not very well ask them. You see, it's none of my business. He gave us everything on military and political matters. I found out (about this agent) from my friend (V.A.) CHURANOV. He was involved in the recruitment personally. He is in Moscow now. He returned about a year ago from Copenhagen. He was there as the (KGB Legal) Resident, under the cover of First Secretary. Prior to that he was the Chief of a section in the English Department of the Second Chief Directorate. That was about three years ago, and at that time he personally recruited the Englishman."

NOSENKO told CIA on 13 June 1962 that the "high-level British agent" had on one occasion provided a report on an Anglo-American conference in London, which contained references to American and British Intelligence operations.* During the final meeting in 1962, a day later, NOSENKO again stated that RODIN had received the Order of Lenin for his part in the operation. When asked whether the name KOROVIN meant anything to him in connection with operations against the British, he replied: "I have heard that name, but I cannot associate it in any way. Possibly he is the man in London now."**

After recontacting CIA in 1964, NOSENKO reported that he had already provided almost all he knew about VASSALL, who had been arrested in 1962. VASSALL, NOSENKO summarized, was recruited in Moscow and turned over copies of official Embassy documents while there. After he returned to England and while he was working in the Admiralty, he was considered to be the KGB's best agent. His value, NOSENKO said, was indicated by the fact that CHURANOV had received a KGB award for his role in the recruitment and then later, when VASSALL was producing in England, the Order of Lenin along with RODIN, the handling officer in London.***

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* NOSENKO on 1 February 1964 said: "In general it was known from some source important information was coming in from the British, specifically, information about NATO. As soon as the NATO Intelligence Services would hold a meeting in London, we had the information as to what was discussed. When the American, Canadian, and British groups met in London. The material came in from that VASSALL, or from someone else--I don't know." On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO commented further that in 1960 or 1961, about the same time he heard about these materials, he also learned that the KGB First Chief Directorate had a good source in British counterintelligence. NOSENKO said that he did not know whether VASSALL had access to this type of information or whether this indicated another source.

** NOSENKO was asked on 29 January 1964 whether RODIN, VASSALL's handler in London, was also known as KOROVIN. He replied he thought so.

*** Questioned on CHURANOV's reaction to VASSALL's arrest, NOSENKO stated on 29 January 1964 that CHURANOV had said: "Well, this is all. This is the end of my career and I'll never go abroad again." Shortly afterwards, CHURANOV went to GRIBANOV to ask to be returned to the Second Chief Directorate for this reason.

NOSENKO added a few details concerning the compromise of VASSALL. The KGB, he said, had evidence of homosexual acts between VASSALL and one homosexual, but then the KGB managed to acquire photographs of him involved with three homosexuals at the same time. NOSENKO was unable to recall the names of two of them, whose KGB cryptonyms were "MUKHIN" and "SIBIRYAK" (the latter a young scientist and the only one of the three who could speak English); the third was Viktor BELYANOVSKIY, an actor in Moscow who also took part in operations against the American citizen Martin MALIA and [redacted] CHURANOV told NOSENKO that VASSALL was 'really shocked" and became sick when he saw the photographs.

NOSENKO told CIA on 24 January 1964 that he had been very worried in 1963 when it was reported in an article by Joseph ALSOP that VASSALL had been apprehended by the British as the result of a lead from the Americans. "I remember," NOSENKO said, "the press stated that there was a defector who was a diplomat and who was about to come to England from the States and that he was instrumental in having unearthed this Soviet spy, at a high-level place, whose name was VASSALL.* The First Chief Directorate was in an uproar when they read this ALSOP article. As a matter of fact, at the KGB conference I insisted that our recent flaps were a result of information from GOLITSYN, particularly (on) VASSALL. When they asked me how I knew, I said we have records here that he was given VASSALL's material to read in connection with his own work."

NOSENKO said on 8 September 1964 that his fears that the articles in the Western press might eventually bring him under suspicion were allayed when he learned from CHURANOV some time later that the First Chief Directorate had reluctantly decided that GOLITSYN must have been the source to the VASSALL lead. The leaders of the First Chief Directorate did not want to believe at first that GOLITSYN was the source of the lead, but it was known that although GOLITSYN did not know VASSALL's name, he had on one or two occasions translated materials received from VASSALL.

(ii) Information from GOLITSYN

On 26 March 1962 GOLITSYN was being interviewed by British authorities and provided information leading to the identification of VASSALL as a KGB agent. GOLITSYN said that he worked in the International Treaty Organizations Section of the Information (Reports) Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, from September 1959 until May 1960. During this period he received documents from the British Admiralty which were copies of papers from top Admiralty officials concerning the construction and financial expenditures relating to a naval base at Clyde, dated July 1959. On the basis of many of these documents GOLITSYN had to prepare a report for the Soviet Minister of Defense. He said that he was told that the British Department of the First Chief Directorate had also disseminated such information, and after contacting the British Department he was given a large file of copies of original documents from British Admiralty, including documents of the First and Second Lords of the Admiralty. (The documents he read were Russian translations of copies of original British documents.) There were other

* The defector source referred to by ALSOP was GOLITSYN (see below).

documents covering all Admiralty activity mentioning navy bases, fleet commands in the Mediterranean, Aden and other cities in the Mediterranean area. There were also documents dealing with bases in England and concerning important questions and decisions in the Admiralty.

According to GOLITSYN, these documents were received from an agent source in London, covered the period 1958-59, and were usually received at two-month intervals. He related that he had talked in 1955 to a KGB officer friend, Ye. G. KASHCHEYEV,* who was recalled to the USSR in 1954 from London. KASHCHEYEV told GOLITSYN that at that period KGB had two other important agents, one of whom was BLAKE. The other important source was working in naval intelligence in 1954, but GOLITSYN said he did not know the identity of the KGB officer handling the Admiralty agent source. He suggested, however, it could have been A.V. BARANOV because that officer received the Order of Lenin for his work in England at about that time.

During a 5 April 1961 interview GOLITSYN was shown a selection of documents concerning the British Naval Command Organization in the Mediterranean. He selected two documents he thought he had seen before, although he said he was not sure. These documents were: (a) Internal Admiralty Memorandum, Subject: "Command in the Mediterranean," dated 2 July 1959; and (b) internal Admiralty documents, Subject: "Unified Headquarters for the Middle East," dated 22 January 1960.

When GOLITSYN was shown additional British documents on 7 April 1962, he recalled he had seen documents concerning "the whole infrastructure program, the whole of NATO," as well as documents concerning notes of meetings held in the Admiralty.

GOLITSYN said on 25 May 1962 that the photographic reproductions of the documents were of medium or better quality, indicating they had been reproduced by a process better than hand-held Minox camera production.



By 12 September 1962 British authorities had focused sufficiently on VASSALL to arrest him. VASSALL immediately confessed.

* See Part V.I.7. for NOSENKO's statements on KASHCHEYEV.

(iii) Information from VASSALL

On the day of his arrest, 12 September 1962, VASSALL confessed that he had spied for the Soviets almost continuously since the spring of 1955.* (A search of his quarters immediately after his arrest resulted in the discovery of 15 rolls of exposed film which, when developed, revealed 140 photographs of pages from 17 official Admiralty documents dated between 24 July and 3 September 1962; all were reported to be secret documents, "the exposure of which would gravely damage the security of the state.") In his confession, VASSALL described his recruitment by CHURANOV and another man, known only as "Nikolay" in March 1955 on the basis of compromising photographs taken during the course of a "homosexual orgy" involving himself and a number of Soviets at the Berlin Hotel in Moscow at the end of October 1954. From about September 1955 on until he returned to England, VASSALL bought KGB silence by bringing CHURANOV and "Nikolay" documents from the British Embassy. In May 1956, in anticipation of his departure for home, VASSALL was introduced to a third Soviet, subsequently identified as RODIN/KOROVIN, who was to become his contact in London. Their first meeting in England took place about the end of August 1956. VASSALL continued to meet RODIN once every three weeks until the arrest of Soviet Illegal Gordon LONSDALE in January 1961, which resulted in a four month moratorium on personal meetings. To these meetings VASSALL would bring documents that he obtained from his office in the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty; the documents would be photographed and returned to VASSALL during the same meeting.

Several months after RODIN had broken off contact as a result of the LONSDALE arrest, VASSALL was contacted by N.P. KARPEKOV** and there were infrequent meetings from then until May 1962. It was not until May 1962, however, that VASSALL was told to resume his espionage collection; he was trained to operate an Exakta camera and used it thereafter until his arrest. The last two meetings with KARPEKOV took place on 13 and 17 August 1962. At the meeting on 13 August, KARPEKOV told VASSALL that he was going away on holiday and the further meeting four days later was arranged so that VASSALL could hand over anything he had obtained before KARPEKOV left. At their final meeting, KARPEKOV arranged for their next meeting to take place on 30 October 1962. (KARPEKOV left London for the Soviet Union on 6 September 1962.)

By VASSALL's account, the first time he received any money from the Soviets was just before Christmas 1955, when he was given "at least 1,000 rubles." Thereafter, at every fourth

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* VASSALL served in Moscow as clerk in the office of the British Naval Attache from 3 March 1954 until 2 June 1956, when he left the Soviet Union to resume his former duties as a clerk in the British Admiralty.

** KARPEKOV was identified to British authorities as a KGB officer by KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY (see Part VI.D.6.) in April 1960, before KARPEKOV was handling VASSALL. RODIN was reassigned from London in April 1961. BELITSKIY gave CIA the same information in July 1961.

meeting during his stay in MOSCOW he was given sums of 2.000 rubles. On his return to England, RODIN and later KARPEKOV paid him sums varying from 50 to 200 pounds. According to VASSALL, the annual totals of these amounts varied between 500 and 700 pounds, an estimate which the British consider "modest, to say the least" judging from VASSALL's luxurious way of life.

c. The Illegal [redacted]

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO's only identifiable lead to a Soviet Illegal concerned a German immigrant to Canada who was in Moscow during the fall of 1963 for meetings with Yu. I. GUK and A.A. KARDASHEV* of the American Department, KGB First Chief Directorate. From his friend GUK, NOSENKO learned many details about this Illegal but not his name. He commented that he had been informed of the case by GUK unofficially, over after-hours drinks while the Illegal was in Moscow, and that GUK "absolutely will not" volunteer to the KGB that he had given these details to NOSENKO.

A check of NOSENKO's information with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police disclosed that the person [redacted] formerly an agent of U.S. Army Intelligence [redacted] From December 1950 until January 1956 [redacted] was engaged in clandestine collection activities in East Germany for the U.S. Army, but during this period he had once been detained by the Soviets and in October 1955 he had agreed to collaborate with Soviet Intelligence. [redacted] reported this to his American superiors and was terminated by them in early 1956. With U.S. assistance, he applied for immigration to Canada after failing to gain entry into the United States, and he arrived there in June 1956, settling in Vancouver. [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked why this Canadian was considered to be an Illegal rather than an agent. Reaffirming that he was an Illegal, NOSENKO explained that "an agent always has legal status. This man may run an Illegal net. And they may give him money to support other Illegals, and therefore that is the category assigned to him." The CIA case officer summed up this new information by saying: "Therefore, in addition to the classic type of Illegal who is a Soviet citizen and who is trained for a long time and then goes to a foreign country to develop his legend for entry into his target country, there are foreign nationals

* KARDASHEV, who according to NOSENKO is a close professional associate of GUK, served in Washington from April 1958 to April 1961 [redacted]

who would be called Illegals if they are members of a Soviet Illegal's net or if they run an Illegal net themselves, irrespective of the nationalities of the members of the net." NOSENKO agreed that this summation was "absolutely correct."

(ii) Information from NOSENKO

While reviewing the notes he brought to a meeting with CIA on 26 January 1964, before his defection, NOSENKO came across an entry which prompted him to say: "I know one Canadian. I'll give you his description. I have it written down. I don't have his first name or his last name, but I know that he is a Canadian, his age, when he was in the Soviet Union. He went there on a podvisnaya visa. This Canadian actually is of German origin, from Germany. He's a Canadian citizen, and he is an Illegal. He took a trip to Moscow in 1963, he was met by GUK, and he was given money to open a business. He is supposed to start a business enterprise in Canada. They wanted to set him up as an Illegal Resident in Canada to run some agent. There are a few other things I'll tell you later." NOSENKO was asked why GUK had met this man in Moscow, and he answered: "GUK somehow got in contact with him. It wasn't KGB. It was simply an acquaintance."

In later interviews NOSENKO added that the Illegal:

- was [redacted] married, and the father of two children;

- may have been escorted to Moscow in 1963 by KARDASHEV, since KARDASHEV had gone to a French port to meet a foreigner and accompany him on a Soviet ship to the USSR;

- was given false documents in Moscow for travel from Moscow back to Europe;

- in Moscow received "$10,000 or something like that" to open "some kind of optical business;"

- returned to the West via a Satellite country, either Hungary or Rumania, and then flew to Geneva where his genuine documents were returned to him.

NOSENKO also said that the KGB had decided to have the Illegal remain in Canada after originally planning to assign him to New York City, where he would be under the control of the local KGB Legal Residency.

[redacted]











* NOSENKO reported that S.I. GAVRICHEV, the KGB Legal Resident in Geneva, was in Moscow on IDY during the period of the agent's visit and that he handcarried [redacted] true [illegible] documents back to Switzerland, where [redacted] them up enroute home. NOSENKO did not know [illegible] what means the valid documentation was passed to [redacted]. NOSENKO did not think GAVRICHEV had met the agent. CIA travel records show that GAVRICHEV went to the Soviet Union from Geneva in September 1963, but they fail to indicate the date of his return. When shown GAVRICHEV's photograph, [redacted] [illegible] him.



* DUPATIY arrived in New York in November 1957 as a translator in the UN Secretariat, a position he held until July 1962 when he returned to Moscow. He was identified as a probable KGB officer on the basis of his activities and associates, and this was confirmed [redacted] DUKATIY arrived in Ottawa as [redacted] January 1963 and as of the middle of the year his only known intelligence activity consisted of [redacted]

by sensitive sources.



6. The BELITSKIY Operation

a. Introduction

When NOSENKO first contacted CIA in June 1962, one of the two pieces of information which he said he was willing to sell was the fact that the CIA agent BELITSKIY was under KGB control. (B.Ye. BELITSKIY, a Radio Moscow broadcaster and Soviet Government interpreter, had been a CIA agent in place since his recruitment at the Brussels Exposition in September 1958.) At the time NOSENKO made his information known, BELITSKIY had met CIA representatives in the West in debriefing sessions on three separate occasions. The last occurred in Geneva in May 1962 while BELITSKIY was serving as an interpreter for a WHO Conference. At that time NOSENKO was also in Geneva, participating in the Disarmament Conference.

b. Information from NOSENKO

(i) Statements in 1962

In the discussions with CIA officers on 9 and 11 June 1962, NOSENKO revealed considerable information on BELITSKIY. He also described his own connection with the case and offered his opinion on how CIA should proceed in the light of his revelations. He claimed that he had first heard of the BELITSKIY case, by its code name "BELKIN," when he was working in the U.S.Embassy Section American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. Not directly involved with the agent, he learned of the case through his friendship with the chief of the section (name not given) which was then running him.* "So I already knew there was this 'BELKIN,'" said NOSENKO. He did not actively participate in the case, however, until the spring of 1962. During his tour with the Disarmament Conference, NOSENKO said, he received a cable from Moscow directing him to give advice to the "young" and "inexperienced" case officer, V.L. ARTEMYEV in the event that American Intelligence should contact BELITSKIY in Geneva. Actually, NOSENKO continued, the Second Chief Directorate had "inserted" BELITSKIY into the WHO delegation in the hope that CIA would "find him." There was such a contact, NOSENKO said, and therefore he knew about the handling of the case insofar as the Geneva meetings were concerned, although he had not been personally involved in it before.

NOSENKO described BELITSKIY as a KGB agent whom the Americans had recruited in London and never met inside the Soviet Union. NOSENKO stressed both of these points a number of times: "So I knew that in due course he was recruited in London... There was never any contact with him inside." NOSENKO stated that BELITSKIY was an agent of the American Department in 1962, although he had once worked for the Second (British) Department. He

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* NOSENKO said that at that time he himself was Deputy Chief of the U.S.Embassy Section. It follows from this that he would have become aware of the BELITSKIY case between January 1960 and January 1962. In 1964 NOSENKO identified the friend who had told him about BELITSKIY as V.I. PETROV, Chief of the Second Section, American Department, responsible for penetrating American Intelligence operations, mainly those in the USSR.

claimed not to know the date of recruitment but said that he knew that the case was already in progress during his second assignment with the U.S. Embassy Section (January 1960-January 1962), and "The first time he went abroad he was already our agent. He had been our agent for a long, long time..."

NOSENKO indicated that the KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting with the agent inside the Soviet Union. In this way, the KGB hoped to learn the channels and means through which American Intelligence communicated with agents inside the Soviet Union. This, said NOSENKO, was the "most important task" of the Second Chief Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, in meeting with his American case officers, continually pleaded fear of contacting or being contacted by American Intelligence in Moscow, NOSENKO claimed that this was a ruse and that the real KGB intent was to use BELITSKIY "to draw you to us - to the Soviet Union - so that you would work with him not abroad." He said that after BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on with him... didn't hold any meetings with him." Nevertheless, he said, the KGB "cherished the hope...to lead him in somewhat deeper...well, now they have."

NOSENKO commented that the KGB First Chief Directorate, with its own responsibilities and objectives, was unaware of the purpose of the Second Chief Directorate in the BELITSKIY case. The First Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformatsiya (disinformation, referred to by NOSENKO as "deza") at the Second Chief Directorate's request, but in this case, as in other "games," it did not know for what ultimate purpose the "deza" would be used. NOSENKO indicated that in such cases I.I. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not even know in what country the disinformation was to be used, let alone the identity of the agent. The Second Chief Directorate, moreover, was at liberty to add or discard items from the "deza" provided by Department D.*

NOSENKO stated that after the directive from Moscow arrived, he participated in the direction of BELITSKIY's meetings with the American case officers, advising ARTEMYEV on specific steps to be taken. For example, NOSENKO said, when the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he could establish contact with some Soviet on the Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMYEV not to use anyone from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rather, he told ARTEMYEV that BELITSKIY should pretend

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* While on this general subject, NOSENKO commented that the Second Chief Directorate was looking to the day when its officers in the field would not have to be subordinate to the KGB Legal Resident in a given country, always a member of the First Chief Directorate. In Geneva, NOSENKO said, the local Legal Resident was "weak" and "over-cautious." According to NOSENKO, this man had been ordered by Moscow to help in the BELITSKIY case "if anything is needed" but tried to interfere with the actual running of the case. At that point, NOSENKO told him: "We don't need your help. We shall run it ourselves."

that he was getting information from the head of the American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV, who was then in Geneva.* The information BELITSKIY furnished to the Americans would, of course, be "deza" from the KGB. This plan was carried out, and BELITSKIY reported information "from KISLOV" to his American case officers. To backstop this part of the operation, in case the Americans "checked up," NOSENKO and ARTEMYEV arranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.

According to NOSENKO, Department D prepared other disinformation for BELITSKIY to give to his American case officers in response to their positive intelligence requirements. The Second Chief Directorate asked Department D to "make it good information, so the opposition will not sense that it is "deza." ** "Moscow is happy," NOSENKO reported, because KGB Headquarters believed that CIA had accepted "at face value" the information which BELITSKIY gave. Among these pieces of disinformation, NOSENKO said, was the name of a Soviet Intelligence officer in the WHO in Geneva.

Concerning the individuals involved in this case, NOSENKO related that BELITSKIY had been met in Geneva first by the American case officer "Bob" and later also by "Henry" who was "called out from the States." The KGB case officer, ARTEMYEV, was "still a young fellow," although he had good potential, and had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow. He had been sent to Geneva to work on counterintelligence matters and to direct BELITSKIY if the Americans should make contact with him.*** After the WHO conference ended, NOSENKO said, the Soviet participants left in groups; BELITSKIY departed on 26, 27, or 28 May but ARTEMYEV stayed a few days longer.

According to NOSENKO, Moscow believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona fides. From the KGB standpoint, while BELITSKIY was "not a bad agent," he was apt to go a bit too far sometimes and to "add things on his own." For this reason, NOSENKO said, the KGB decided not to let him spent too much time with CIA, fearing that he might say something "which would cause you to sense that he is a plant."

NOSENKO strongly and repeatedly advised CIA to "continue the game" but under no circumstances to meet the agent inside the Soviet Union. He indicated that he considered it "in your interests" to continue to play BELITSKIY, and he remarked that the KGB would guess how CIA found out about the case if it were

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* See Part III.D.5 for further details on NOSENKO's relationship with KISLOV.

** NOSENKO commented, concerning disinformation in general and speaking of this case in particular, that it is "very difficult" to pass disinformation, and that there is a certain "danger" connected with passing it - in providing "that which is almost true, changed just a little bit," the agent might give away something that is of real value to the opposition. There is also the danger of arousing suspicion in the minds of the opposition's case officers if the information is not good enough, he implied.

***See Part V.D.7.c. for additional information on ARTEMYEV's operational activity.

terminated - he and ARTEMYEV were the only officers abroad who knew about the operation. (At that very moment, he said, the KGB was waiting for someone to arrive in Moscow and contact the agent.) NOSENKO proposed a plan through which CIA could cause the KGB to send BELITSKIY abroad again, and two days later he again urged that this plan be adopted: CIA should choose an elderly couple who were travelling to the USSR and give them a letter to mail to BELITSKIY immediately on their arrival; in the letter there should be a hint through which BELITSKIY (and the KGB) would realize that CIA wanted him to come out and did not plan to contact him inside; the KGB would then be forced to send BELITSKIY abroad again in order to continue the "game." This reaction would be in line with the mission of the Second Chief Directorate "to recruit the foreigners... and then pass them on to you for your recruitment. That is our mission - give our own Russians to you for recruitment and recruit foreigners." NOSENKO also continued: "Don't trust him for a second but... give the impression that you believe him." He stressed that the travellers chosen for this task be "elderly," that they not be connected with CIA in any way, and, most important, that they mail the letter immediately on their arrival. NOSENKO also advised CIA to do something about the safe apartment in which "Bob" and "Henry" had met BELITSKIY. He complained that BELITSKIY had noted that the name on the door was not that of the American Counsellor whose apartment it was supposed to be, and he said that BELITSKIY had also reported that he felt it had an "un-lived in" look.

(ii) Statements in 1964

When he came to the West again in 1964, NOSENKO again discussed the BELITSKIY case.* In January 1964, he was asked his advice about CIA's handling BELITSKIY. Again he suggested that CIA "continue the plan" in order to determine "what actions they will undertake when they will see that you do not plan to have Moscow contacts." He commented: "You have a realistic basis for not doing this in view of the PENKOVSKIY case, etc." ** Again he expressed the opinion that "what they are trying to do in this case is to pull for a Moscow contact... The hope is that you would go out to meetings with him in Moscow." The Second Chief Directorate did not consider the BELITSKIY case a big operation: "it was only a small success from our viewpoint."

NOSENKO claimed, as he had in 1962, to have been personally involved in directing the meetings BELITSKIY had had with the Americans in Geneva. ARTEMYEV "was a very young man. Therefore, a cable came from Moscow ordering me to take over the direction of the case over ARTEMYEV... in case a contact was made, and it was." NOSENKO indicated that it was O.M. GRIBANOV himself, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who had ordered him to take charge.

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* In the meantime, CIA had continued the "game." In October 1962, during the week of the Cuban missile crisis (discussed in Part V.F.10.) BELITSKIY attended a conference and was met several times by CIA representatives. (See Page 528.)

** See Part VI.D.7.b. for details on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY.

He said he had learned about the case originally "in 1960 or 1961" from PETROV, Chief of the Second Section of the American Department. "I don't know when the case began, but it was going in 1960 and 1961," he said. In 1962, he obtained more details from ARTEMYEV, who was in the same delegation as BELITSKIY, and then the cable came from Moscow ordering him to help ARTEMYEV in the case. NOSENKO said he did not know who recruited BELITSKIY for the KGB, but it was not PETROV. This operation, like all "games" of the Second Section, was supervised by M.G. MATVEYEV, Deputy Chief of the American Department.

In 1964 NOSENKO made a number of comments and observations which he had not brought up in any way in 1962. In noting, for example, that BELITSKIY had originally been a British Department agent, he remarked: "Maybe they tried to serve him up to the British, and maybe the British didn't bite." As for the character of BELITSKIY and the KGB's view of their agent, on 29 January 1964 NOSENKO stated: "If you were to stop it, then wait until the appropriate moment, confront him, tell him the 'game' is up - you know all about him - then he might go for this and you may recruit him." On 2 February 1964, when the CIA case officer suggested that perhaps BELITSKIY might not have reported everything to the KGB, especially the amount of money he had been given by CIA, NOSENKO agreed that perhaps this was so "because I was very much surprised how little money the Americans gave BELITSKIY... I was convinced that something was not right, and I told ARTEMYEV that I didn't believe that the Americans could pay such small sums. I was convinced that BELITSKIY only reported that he received a small part of what he actually got." NOSENKO said that when he told PETROV that he did not believe BELITSKIY, PETROV said he had not quite accepted his reports either, because every time BELITSKIY came home from abroad, "he always tries to hand me some gift and therefore I'm inclined to agree with you." NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been thoroughly investigated but that he himself felt that "it is possible that at any given moment a person would change his mind and go off." NOSENKO mentioned for the first time, on 10 June 1964, that the British Department had a file "in which material had been placed which would indicate that there were some suspicions" about BELITSKIY, but that "this 'suspicious' file was not given to the Second Section, American Department, when they took over."

(iii) BELITSKIY Photograph

In October 1966 NOSENKO said that he had seen BELITSKIY in person on several occasions in Geneva in 1962. Shown BELITSKIY's photograph a few days later, NOSENKO failed to recognize it.

c. Information from Other Sources

BELITSKIY was a chemist by training and a translator and radio commentator by profession. At the time of his recruitment, and throughout his relationship with CIA, he was employed by Radio Moscow. Fluent in English, he was used primarily as a scientific commentator on programs beamed to the British Isles. In addition to his radio work, BELITSKIY frequently served as an interpreter for the Soviet Government, both at home and abroad, and achieved considerable recognition in this capacity during such widely publicized events as the POWERS trial and GAGARIN's visit to England. Ostensibly he was fully trusted by the Soviet authorities and was allowed an unusual degree of freedom in his association with foreigners.

BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in Brussels in September 1958 while he was serving as an interpreter at the Soviet Pavilion of the World's Fair. During the period in which he was being assessed as a potential agent, BELITSKIY created the impressions that: first, he was not in full agreement with the current Soviet regime and probably even harbored some grudge against the Soviet system because his father had been purged under STALIN; second, he was not averse to considering defection at some future date, provided he could do so with his wife; and third, he was eager to pick up extra money, in return for which he was willing to provide information acquired in the course of his duties.





The possibility of BELITSKIY's being a Soviet provocation was thoroughly and frequently considered, both initially and as the case progressed. In view of available evidence, combined with the personal impressions of the CIA case officer who



felt that BELITSKIY was sincere, it was judged at the time of his recruitment that BELITSKIY, whatever his true motives, was not controlled by the KGB. During the 11 hours of meetings in Brussels, the case officer observed, BELITSKIY "did not oversell himself," "claimed no military friends," "offered no operational leads (even when requested)," "did not attempt to elicit information," "refused AIS contact inside the Soviet Union," "did not use a single intelligence term," and convincingly appeared to be unfamiliar with secret writing systems. The case officer felt that the Soviets would have more to lose than gain in sending a provocation agent with the scientific background and access to information which BELITSKIY appeared to have. This, plus the Soviet's expressed fear for his own security (including his staunch refusal to contact American Intelligence inside the USSR), and his apparent ignorance of intelligence terminology and professional techniques, contributed to the initial judgment that he was not under KGB control. BELITSKIY's motivation appeared to be a combination of factors, including revenge for the persecution of his father, disaffection with the oppression by the Soviet regime of Jews and intellectuals (he fell into both categories) and the shortage of consumer goods for the average Soviet citizen. When asked point-blank why he was willing to cooperate with American Intelligence, BELITSKIY replied with the question: "Did you read Dr. Zhivago?" Although certain aspects of his past behavior were somewhat puzzling, none was actually inconsistent with, nor aroused any strong suspicion concerning, his claims that he was acting entirely on his own initiative.

In April 1960 BELITSKIY was in London but did not contact CIA. He later explained this in terms of his personal security and also indicated that he thought CIA might contact him. In June 1960, CIA sent a summary of the operation to MI-6, requesting any assistance it could provide and offering to share the product of the operation. In August MI-6 gave CIA its view: BELITSKIY had come to London with a Soviet intelligence brief; his attempts to contact Westerners were so blatant that the KGB must have known about them; but it was possible that not all of the agent's activities were necessarily controlled by the KGB. In September 1960 CIA advised MI-6 of its agreement that BELITSKIY "undoubtedly had an RIS mission when he came to the UK earlier this year," adding the opinion that he probably had been used in the past by the KGB; also, that the only way to resolve the unexplained points, CIA stated, was to engage in a secure interrogation which would include a polygraph examination. As of October 1960 the CIA position on the case was stated as follows: "As matters now stand we have our doubts as to the bona fides of BELITSKIY, but are not convinced that all his actions have been controlled by the RIS. We consider him too valuable a potential source to drop without exploring all possible avenues of investigation. Subject has acknowledged access to high-level Soviet scientists and to information of high priority interest."

In October 1960, BELITSKIY attended a World Journalists' Rally in Vienna but, he explained later, had no opportunity to contact American Intelligence during his 10 day visit.

The next personal contact with the agent was made in London in July 1961* when a series of meetings took place;

* PENKOVSKIY (see Part VI.D.7.b.) was also in London (on TDY alone) in July 1961.

during two of these BELITSKIY was given a polygraph test. He was questioned closely (albeit in a friendly manner) about his relationship with the KGB. He explained that he was frequently in contact with persons whom he suspected to be KGB, both in his work at Radio Moscow and particularly in connection with his travels abroad, but that his only official briefing by the KGB was in connection with the POWERS trial. On another occasion, he said, he was told how to handle himself if the "wrong" questions were asked at the MARTIN/MITCHELL press conference in Moscow, but this was not openly a KGB briefing. BELITSKIY also indicated that all travellers leaving the USSR were routinely interviewed and briefed, and were told to "sort of keep their eyes open" to locate potential targets of information. He said he felt that "whatever he had been able to do along this line" had resulted in his being given TDY's abroad and having relative freedom of movement.

At the end of the London debriefings it was concluded by MI-6 and CIA that BELITSKIY "did not appear to be practicing deception or to be controlled by the RIS." Both did agree, however, that he was "evasive when pressed, then glib, but without volunteering information."* The majority view at that time was that the agent's prime motivation was a financial one, coupled with an assurance of CIA assistance upon his defection. It was also believed that BELITSKIY had by then become so deeply involved with CIA that it would be very difficult for him to break contact and/or to report his plight to the KGB.

The third contact with BELITSKIY was made in Geneva in May of 1962. The CIA case officer met the agent six times, for a total of approximately 12 hours. At this series of debriefings a second American case officer was introduced. In his report on the contact the original case officer stated that he felt "stronger than ever that Subject's potential as an agent is unlimited." He stated that his original views on BELITSKIY's bona fides had not changed and that he felt the latter realized that he had passed the point when he could afford to report his collaboration with CIA to the KGB. The second case officer reported that the reservations which he had had about the agent's bona fides before the meetings with him had been dispelled by the latter's manner. He also reported, however, that on two occasions during the meetings he had had a "sinking feeling" that "the relationship was not kosher." He said that during the discussion of the two factions which BELITSKIY claimed were then vying with each other in the Soviet Union (the "moderates" vs. the "hard-liners"), he had the feeling "that the tale was concocted and maybe the agent was trying to convey

* Throughout the course of this operation various individuals participating in it expressed doubts about BELITSKIY's bona fides. Whatever doubts may have existed, however, they did not affect the conduct of the case; the general consensus was that the agent was not controlled by the KGB, and the case continued to be run as if he were not. Moreover, the polygraph examiner reported that BELITSKIY had been "substantially truthful in his answers to the questions asked," although he did recommend that the agent be re-examined under controlled conditions.

to U.S. authorities something that someone wanted to have conveyed and could not have done through normal channels." The second case officer was also struck by a change which he perceived in BELITSKIY's manner when they were discussing the matter of contact inside the Soviet Union: At first, BELITSKIY was very concerned, but toward the end of the meeting he seemed to abandon all caution and to be quite happy about it, even suggesting that a CIA courier could perhaps bring him some scarce goods.

Throughout the relationship, however, BELITSKIY exhibited great concern for his personal safety. During the period between the initial and the second series of meetings, CIA sent him two open letters containing secret writing. He responded to the first (in time to validate the terms of the contract), but not to the second, explaining in a later meeting that his failure to do so had been due to fear for his own safety. His reasons for this fear (including the fact that the handwriting on the open letter was "typically American"), were judged plausible and convincing, and his desire to discontinue this type of communication was respected. Although BELITSKIY did not wish to communicate by secret writing, he did later agree that "in a matter of gravest importance" he would permit CIA to send him a message via someone with whom he could be, logically, in professional or social contact. He stipulated, however, that it be someone who was entirely "clean" and completely unwitting of the true nature of his relationship with CIA. He insisted, moreover, on a guarantee that if CIA ever did have to communicate with him by any means, it should never refer to the subject of a previous conversation. He felt that under such circumstances he would stand a better chance of refuting any accusations, since there would be no evidence that he had responded to the overtures of American Intelligence. BELITSKIY also expressed concern on several occasions for the case officers' welfare as it related to his own, cautioning them, for instance, never to go to Berlin or to Moscow.

BELITSKIY was deemed from the first to have access through his work to information of unusual value to the United States on the Soviet political scene, scientific personalities, and science-related events. In addition, it was hoped that through various relatives, friends, or acquaintances, he would be able to provide some information on certain other high-priority requirements. During each of the series of debriefings he was able to furnish some general information on Soviet political factions and currents, on many scientific and governmental personalities, and on missile and space-related events. This information was in general, however, either not of great value, already known, or impossible to evaluate or corroborate. Nevertheless, the case officer felt that the agent had "no way of measuring the usefulness of any particular piece of information" and that he was "going out of his way to provide us with everything he thought might be of possible use."

BELITSKIY was not able to answer specific requirements in the highest priority fields of missiles and atomic energy. However, as he himself stressed, he did not have direct access to classified documents, and CIA had not expected that he would be successful in these areas. On the other hand, he did appear to have access to some military information of a classified nature through his status in the military reserves. Although previously, he said, he had not been interested or

attentive at these meetings and had managed to avoid all but one refresher course, he promised to attend in the future and to try to remember everything he could which might be of value to CIA. Before any benefit from this aspect of his life could be reaped, his reserve status was changed to "limited availability" and he was no longer expected to attend meetings.

On the other hand, BELITSKIY was successful in cultivating a number of individuals who were potentially valuable sources of information to him on priority target areas. One of these, for example, was a cousin who allegedly was chief engineer in a plant concerned with nuclear submarines. Furthermore, the type of information which BELITSKIY was reporting indicated that, in the course of his work and through cultivation and extension of his broad range of acquaintances, he should be able in the future to provide CIA with extremely useful information. He was able, for example, to report those items which were censored from his scientific program manuscripts because of their security implications. He also occasionally received interesting news in advance of its publication. He had learned of the ouster of the American diplomat, Kermit S. MIDTHUN 'some time before it was officially announced, in October 1952. He also had knowledge of the attitudes and activities of certain non-Soviets in Moscow who were of interest to CIA, such as Francis Gary POWERS, and was acquainted with several Westerners who had defected to the USSR. Also, BELITSKIY remarked that he had once known someone who had lived in the house of "the real Rudolf ABEL," this friend had told him that Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL, the KGB Illegal arrested in the United States, had merely assumed the identity of the real ABEL, who had died.

With regard to certain specific assignments which he failed to carry out, BELITSKIY invariably offered explanations for his inability to do so (usually relating fear for his personal security) which were difficult to regard as unreasonable. One example was his decision 'at the last minute' not to bring to CIA the Radio Moscow telephone book which he had been asked to get. He "had it in his hand while packing," he said, but felt that "because of a current reorganization at the Radio" the information would be "outdated" by the time CIA got it and that therefore he did not think it worth risking its being found if his baggage should be inspected.

Evaluations of BELITSKIY's behavior, attitudes and apparent motivation, and production were continually made in the course of the case. Although there was a definite feeling that he had not been frank about the full extent of his relationship with the KGB, neither the results of the polygraph examination, the conclusions of a graphological analysis, nor the judgments of the two individuals who had contacted him personally during the three series of debriefings tended to contradict these conclusions directly.

Moreover, as the case progressed, it appeared that his reputation within the Soviet Union was growing and that his usefulness to CIA was increasing correspondingly. His personal contacts and potential sources of information became more numerous as his job responsibilities increased. The trust which his superiors placed in him seemed to be borne out by the

freedom he was allowed. It appeared that there was a good chance he would be permitted to exit the Soviet Union from time to time and would therefore be able to get information to us despite his reluctance to communicate from within. He was thus considered, on the whole, to be a highly useful potential, if not actual, source of positive intelligence information who was basically motivated to help American Intelligence.

After the NOSENKO information was received in June 1962, CIA continued the BELITSKIY operation. A fourth series of meetings was held with the agent in the United States in October of 1962. BELITSKIY was at that time accompanying a Soviet delegation to "The Second Informal Conference of Influential Americans and Soviets"(at Andover, Massachusetts), a gathering of prominent Soviet and American citizens to discuss international problems in the interests of world peace.* The Soviet delegation of 16 was headed by a member of the CPSU Central Committee, who was listed as a representative of the Soviet Trade Union Press. The conference occurred during the Cuban crisis, 21 to 27 October 1962.**

During this extremely critical period in Soviet-American relations, BELITSKIY communicated the following points to his CIA case officers:

- The members of the delegation had been briefed in Moscow by the First Deputy Foreign Minister to be conciliatory, even to the degree of pointing out that the Soviet Union disagrees with China on the distribution of nuclear weapons to other powers, and to avoid any position which could be regarded as offensive to the American participants.

- BELITSKIY "personally" regarded President KENNEDY's announcement of a "blockade" of Cuba as appalling. He stated that he was convinced that Cuba could have been weaned from the Soviet Union by very careful handling without alienating opinion in other countries, and that the President's action tended to strengthen the position of the "hard line, tough talk" faction in the Soviet Government. Immediately following the President's announcement, the delegation was instructed to make the Soviet position plain, but to do so in a moderate tone.

- The leader of the Soviet delegation had participated in a discussion with Norman COUSINS, of The Saturday Review, who explained to him the reasons for

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* This conference is an extension of the "Pugwash" conferences, originally sponsored by Cyrus EATON, identified by PENKOVSKIY as a GRU contact.

**Also participating was S.I. BEGLOV, who had conferred with G.N. BOLSHAKOV on 19 October 1962 in New York, ostensibly on matters connected with the USSR magazine. See Part V.F.10.

the President's stand on Cuba. According to BELITSKIY, who had acted as interpreter, the Soviets' reply to COUSINS was that the USSR had refused to give nuclear weapons to China and that there would be no point in risking an affront to Communist China by giving advanced weapons to Cuba. He said the Soviet Union was willing to enter into negotiations with the United States on the question of the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. (COUSINS' explanation of President KENNEDY's stand was that he was pressured by the coming election and the need to circumvent criticism by the Republican Party; by Congressional leaders; and by a report that Congress would soon learn of the irrefutable evidence concerning the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba.

Except for once sailing abroad on a Soviet cruise ship, BELITSKIY has not been seen in the West since his October 1962 visit to the United States. His voice, however, has been heard frequently in broadcasts from Radio Moscow since that time. Among BELITSKIY's broadcasts was a two-part series of 22 November and 2 December 1965, beamed to the United Kingdom and to eastern North America, called 'Inquest Into the Facts' surrounding the publication of The Penkovskiy Papers.

7. KGB Investigations

a. Compromise of POPOV

(i) Introduction

Twice during the first meeting with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 NOSENKO alluded to the compromise of the CIA agent penetration of the GRU, Lt. Col. P.S. POPOV, and at the next meeting he attributed the compromise to KGB surveillance of a CIA officer in Moscow mailing a letter to POPOV. Essentially the same story of the POPOV compromise was given by NOSENKO in 1964, with certain additional details being supplied at that time.

[redacted] and two of the CHEREPANOV papers* confirm that KGB surveillance led to the discovery of POPOV's status as a CIA agent, but [redacted] also said that POPOV was under some security suspicion prior to the letter-mailing incident. Neither NOSENKO nor these other two sources, [redacted] supplied a precise date for this incident beyond the statement in one of the CHEREPANOV papers that it occurred in January 1959. The actual date of the letter mailing was the 21st of that month, and hence according to NOSENKO, [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers, it was then that the KGB established the fact of POPOV's collaboration with CIA. Information from GOLITSYN, however, places the time of the compromise as early as 1957, and GOLITSYN has also stated that a KGB agent (rather than KGB surveillance) was the cause of the compromise.

Presented below are selected portions of the CIA operation with POPOV, followed by the information on POPOV's compromise from NOSENKO, CHEREPANOV, [redacted] and GOLITSYN.

(ii) CIA Operation with POPOV

After 32 months of contacts with CIA while he was stationed in Austria, POPOV was transferred in September 1955 to East Germany to become a case officer at the GRU (tactical) intelligence point in Schwerin, and contacts with CIA were resumed in January 1956. The GRU reassigned POPOV on 28 June 1957 to the Inspection Directorate, a strategic intelligence element in Berlin/Karlshorst, where he handled some of the Illegals being dispatched from, returning to, and training in East Berlin. There he remained in contact with CIA until his recall to Moscow in November 1958 (see below). Meanwhile:

- During July and until 13 August 1957 POPOV handled a total of five Illegals passing through East Berlin and was made responsible for a sixth Illegal in training there. He was relieved of the latter responsibility on 2 November 1957.

- The next and last Illegal to be assigned to POPOV, in early October 1957, was a woman whose true identity is believed to be M.N. TAIROVA. She was destined to join her husband, I.A. TAIROV, in the United States. Before her dispatch from Berlin on 1 November 1957 to New York

* The CHEREPANOV papers are discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.c.

[redacted] the FBI placed the woman under surveillance when she entered the United States at New York City on 27 November 1957, and the FBI observed her first meeting with TAIROV on 8 December 1957, in accordance with the plan which POPOV had reported to CIA. The TAIROV couple remained under FBI surveillance until their disappearance on 12 March 1958. POPOV subsequently expressed concern for his personal security, as an aftermath of learning that the TAIROV couple told the GRU about having been under surveillance.'

- From 12 December 1957 to 19 January 1958 POPOV was on leave in the USSR. Upon his return to Berlin/Karlshorst, he was removed from the Illegals-handling unit and placed in the unit dealing with Illegal support agents.

- POPOV reports of March through October 1958 show that the KGB was then conducting investigations of the Illegals-handling unit and that two KGB counterintelligence officers were taking the initiative in associating with him.

In November 1958 POPOV was recalled to Moscow for the expressed purpose of discussing an Illegal support agent of his, and he did not return to Berlin/Karlshorst. Brush contacts between POPOV and Russell LANGELLE, a CIA officer stationed at the Moscow Embassy, took place on 4 and 21 January, 18 March, 23 July, 18 September, and 16 October 1959. George WINTERS, also a CIA officer at the Embassy, mailed a letter to POPOV on 21 January 1959. POPOV passed a message to LANGELLE on 18 September 1959 reporting that he had been arrested and doubled by the KGB in February of that year.** At the final brush contact, on 16 October 1959, Soviet authorities detained, questioned, made recruitment overtures to, and eventually (several hours afterward) released LANGELLE. He was then declared persona non grata by the Soviet Government.***

[redacted]

** There are strong indications that this message revealing POPOV's arrest in February 1959 was prepared at the direction of the KGB. The message opened with the following remarks: "Concerning my compromise, I was arrested in February. The compromise started from the compromise of our Illegals (the husband and wife in the U.S.)... Then your first letter to (me at my home in) KALININ was intercepted." (This is a reference to the letter mailed by WINTERS.)

***The Soviet Government declared WINTERS persona non grata on 26 August 1960, and at that time the Soviet press linked him to LANGELLE-POPOV case. NOSENKO was asked on 1 July 1964 why WINTERS was not expelled from the USSR at the time LANGELLE was, in October 1959. He answered: "First of all, why should we (the KGB) show how we found out (about POPOV)? Then it was thought that if WINTERS stays, maybe we can find more POPOVs, if WINTERS sends some more letters."

(iii) Cause and Date of the Compromise

(a) Information from NOSENKO

Early in the first meeting with CIA in June 1962, NOSENKO outlined the terms for his cooperation with CIA and said: "Never in my life will I go in contact (with CIA) in Moscow or the USSR. never in my life. I also know about LANGELLE and POPOV; I know this matter. When it was abroad it was fine, but when you decided to meet him in Moscow..." He went on to explain that he did not want to have happen to him what had happened to POPOV. Near the end of the meeting NOSENKO remarked: "I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV - not LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him - for your future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another person was responsible for the compromise. Next time."

NOSENKO fulfilled this promise. He began by praising LANGELLE, whom he described as a competent officer employing sound operational techniques, and said: "LANGELLE did not blow the operation. WINTERS blew it." WINTERS, NOSENKO continued, had been observed mailing a letter by one or two members of a KGB surveillance team (no date given). The KGB intercepted the letter, arrested POPOV, and controlled his future meetings with LANGELLE, about three in number.*

During an examination and discussion of that portion of the CHEREPANOV papers bearing on the POPOV case, NOSENKO on 3 February 1964 confirmed the authenticity of their contents and reaffirmed that surveillance of the letter-mailing by WINTERS had led to the identification, arrest, and doubling of POPOV by the KGB. Although at this time NOSENKO commented that the WINTERS letter to POPOV definitely did not contain metka, he said in June 1964 that the letter had been chemically treated, i.e., with metka.**

NOSENKO was asked in July 1964 to describe the format and contents of the official KGB orientation on the POPOV case, entitled "Boomerang," which he claimed to have read. According to NOSENKO, this top secret document made no reference either to WINTERS or to the letter-mailing incident. He added that the document was not entirely factual and some of it contained sanitized information.

(b) Information from [redacted]

Besides the suspicions attached to POPOV because of the TAIROV case, [redacted] reported [redacted] that POPOV was recalled to Moscow because of his correspondence with his Austrian girlfriend via a conspiratorial address in Berlin; [redacted]

* As previously indicated, four brush contacts were made subsequent to 21 January 1959.

** "Metka," the Russian word for "mark" or "sign" is used to refer to a "thief powder;" it is said by NOSENKO to have been a KGB operational aid used in the detection of clandestine mail.



(c) Information from the CHEREPANOV Papers

Two of the CHEREPANOV documents, dated October 1960, discuss the activities of LANGELLE and WINTERS as known to the KGB. In particular, they state that surveillance of WINTERS mailing the letter "in January 1959" was the sole cause of POPOV's compromise.

(d) Information from GOLITSYN

Three reports by GOLITSYN pertain to the [illegible] of the KGB's identification of POPOV as a source of CIA

- According to GOLITSYN's recollection of the official KGB orientation on the POPOV case which he read in late 1959 or early 1960, the review opened with the statement that a KGB agent reported there was a leak in the Soviet military intelligence system (GRU) involving information of a military, intelligence, and political nature. GOLITSYN believed the orientation indicated that the agent's report was received by the KGB in about 1957.**** The orientation also said: The KGB thereupon began an investigation; learning that LANGELLE was posted to Moscow for the purpose of handling a special agent, the KGB immediately placed him under surveillance;***** in the course of this surveillance the KGB observed a brush contact between LANGELLE and



****George BLAKE, the British Intelligence officer arrested in April 1961 on charges of espionage for the Soviets, has admitted passing to the KGB in May and June 1957 information from and related to POPOV; the details which he has acknowledged giving the KGB, however, were not sufficient for the KGB to have identified POPOV as the source, nor to have placed the agent in the Illegals-handling unit in Berlin/Karlshorst.



*****LANGELLE arrived in Moscow in January 1958.

POPOV; after the second such contact, POPOV was arrested.*

- GOLITSYN named a KGB officer who had been stationed in Vienna where he was working on Yugoslav targets; this officer was aware of POPOV's association with the Austrian woman (see above), suspected POPOV, and although he reported his suspicions, nothing was done about them. All of this occurred while POPOV was serving in Austria (until September 1955). Some time in 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN continued, the KGB was told by a source that POPOV was an agent. The KGB then assigned this KGB officer to Germany because he knew POPOV and was familiar with the background.**

- General I.A. SEROV was Chairman of the KGB when the first information about POPOV's agent status was received. ***

In summary, what GOLITSYN has said about the compromise indicates that a KGB agent provided the lead to POPOV and that this lead was received in 1957 or 1958.

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* As stated above, POPOV's message of 18 September 1959 said he had been arrested in the previous February; if this portion of the message is correct, the orientation therefore indicates that the KGB observed the first LANGELLE-POPOV brush contact, on 4 January 1959, and POPOV was arrested some time after the second brush contact, on 21 January 1959.

** Although GOLITSYN gave this officer's name as KOTOV, GOLITSYN's other facts about him make it clear that he was referring to KGB Colonel M.V. ZHUKOV. Stationed in Vienna during the 1953-55 period and, like POPOV, working against Yugoslav targets, ZHUKOV was personally known to POPOV. On 23 November 1957 POPOV said: "Can you imagine whom I ran into in Karlshorst two or three times? It was my competitor on Yugoslav operations when I was in Vienna. Do you remember ZHUKOV of the KGB?... He may be assigned here or /may be/ on TDY, but he has just come recently." (A year later POPOV reported that ZHUKOV was still in Berlin/Karlshorst working, he believed, in Anglo-American operations.) It would thus appear that the KGB sent ZHUKOV to Berlin not long before 23 November 1957 and in connection with the investigation of POPOV.

***SEROV was KGB Chairman until the latter part of 1958.

(i) Introduction

In January 1964 NOSENKO gave a detailed account of the compromise of GRU Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY, the CIA and British Intelligence (MI-6) penetration agent whose arrest by the KGB was announced on 2 November 1962. In subsequent debriefings and interrogations NOSENKO has offered further information on certain aspects of the PENKOVSKIY compromise, continuing to maintain that it was brought about by KGB surveillance in Moscow during 1962. Also according to NOSENKO, it was not until the latter stages of the operation that the KGB realized American Intelligence was involved with MI-6 in this operation.

The reports by NOSENKO and other sources on the PENKOVSKIY compromise are presented below, but to place them in context, they are preceeded by a brief summary of the PENKOVSKIY operation from the CIA and MI-6 standpoint.

(ii) Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Operation

In August 1960 PENKOVSKIY gave two American tourists a package of materials to deliver to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. These materials included a description of a proposed dead drop site at Number 2 Pushkin Street, which PENKOVSKIY had selected for a possible communication channel; in the letter PENKOVSKIY enclosed in the package, he also gave his home telephone number and instructions for a call to be placed to him at a certain time to indicate that the package had been received and that the Americans were interested in further contact with him. Efforts to make this telephone contact with PENKOVSKIY failed, as did several additional efforts on his part to establish contact with the U.S. Embassy. The Pushkin Street address was checked from the outside on two occasions thereafter by [redacted] who walked past the building on 12 November and 4 December 1960. On 21 January 1961 [redacted] went inside the building and checked the precise location of the dead drop site, behind the radiator in the vestibule of this building. (On 30 December 1961, John ABIDIAN, U.S. Embassy Security Officer and coopted CIA worker, also went inside the building to check for possible loading of the dead drop by PENKOVSKIY.) In April 1961, PENKOVSKIY succeeded in making contact in Moscow with the British businessman, Greville WYNNE, with whom he was already acquainted from previous trips to Moscow by WYNNE. Through WYNNE, PENKOVSKIY passed to MI-6 documents and notice of his forthcoming trip to London in April. MI-6 promptly notified CIA, and the two services jointly conducted the operation until it was terminated by the KGB on 2 November 1962.

Throughout this period PENKOVSKIY served in a GRU element under cover of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in Moscow, and it was under GKKNR cover that PENKOVSKIY travelled abroad three times, to England in April-May and July-August 1961 and to France in September-October 1961. In addition to PENKOVSKIY's personal meetings with American and British case officers while on these TDY's, there were 27 exchanges of materials in Moscow. The CIA and MI-6 intermediaries used for these exchanges were WYNNE, on his business trips to the USSR; Mrs. Anne CHISHOLM, wife of an MI-6 officer stationed at the British Embassy;* [redacted]

* The KGB penetration agent in MI-6, George BLAKE, had identified CHISHOLM as a fellow officer prior to the time this couple was posted to Moscow. He had also identified [redacted] to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to [redacted] arrival in Moscow.

PENKOVSKIY himself reported having observed surveillance coverage at two street meetings with Mrs. CHISHOLM in January 1962,* and both PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE noted surveillance of their meeting in early July 1962. The operation came to an end when WYNNE was arrested in Hungary and Richard JACOB, of the CIA Station, responding to an emergency signal to service the Pushkin Street dead drop, was apprehended at the scene on 2 November 1962. In May 1963 a public trial was held in Moscow, followed by an announcement of PENKOVSKIY's execution and WYNNE's imprisonment. WYNNE was released on 22 April 1964, in exchange for a KGB Illegal jailed in England, and he was subsequently debriefed by CIA and British authorities on his experiences at the hands of the KGB.

(iii) Statements by NOSENKO

(a) [redacted]

At the 1962 meetings with CIA in Geneva, about four months before the PENKOVSKIY operation was terminated, NOSENKO made no reference to PENKOVSKIY and the Pushkin Street dead drop. (In 1964 he said that before his first meeting with CIA he had known of the visit to the dead drop by the U.S. Embassy Security Officer, John V. ABIDIAN, but that as of June 1962 there was no reason for him to recall or report this incident.) In June 1962, however, NOSENKO did raise a matter which appears to be directly related to PENKOVSKIY. This item concerned U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Leo J. DULACKI, the Assistant Naval Attache.** NOSENKO volunteered that DULACKI was an active intelligence officer believed by the KGB to belong to CIA. The KGB "overheard" (from a microphone in DULACKI's office) that the Assistant Naval Attache was to meet an Indonesian in a restaurant, and the KGB therefore placed a concealed microphone at their restaurant table. From the monitored conversation the KGB learned that DULACKI was attempting to recruit the Indonesian [redacted] and was

* After the second such observation, on 19 January 1962, the last of their street meetings, PENKOVSKIY broke contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM until 28 March 1962.

** DULACKI, who has had no affiliation with CIA, served in Moscow from August 1958 until April 1961. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 for the first time that he personally supervised American Embassy Section operations against all U.S. Military Attaches, which would have included DULACKI, from approximately January 1960 until May or June 1960. On 20 October 1966, NOSENKO indicated, also for the first time, that from about February 1960 until about April 1960 he personally was the case officer for Naval Attache personnel at the U.S. Embassy in addition to his general supervisory responsibilities. (See Part V.E.3.e.) According to NOSENKO, DULACKI was neither recruited nor approached for recruitment by the KGB; he could not remember the names of the KGB agents who might have been targetted against DULACKI, and the only item of interest obtained about DULACKI by the KGB from any source was that concerning this meeting with the [redacted]

seeking information from him on Soviet shipments to Indonesia. NOSENKO spelled the Indonesian's name [redacted]* At a later meeting in 1962 NOSENKO added that the KGB had recruited [redacted] in 1961, but he did not indicate whether this had occurred before or after the restaurant meeting with DULACKI.

Speaking of DULACKI's restaurant meeting, NOSENKO told CIA in 1964 that DULACKI was working against the Indonesian [redacted] and he made no reference to the [redacted] or to the name [redacted]. Asked why he had given a different name for the Indonesian in 1962, NOSENKO replied: "Maybe there were two different ones."

NOSENKO was questioned further about DULACKI and the Indonesian during the October 1966 interrogations:

Question: Who was DULACKI's agent?

NOSENKO: As I was telling you, there was a conversation in a restaurant with [redacted] of the Indonesian Embassy. This was his only agent. In 1961 this was. I don't remember when. It was when I was supervising work against code clerks. When I began to work, after a month or so, I took the files on Naval attaches and then, after two months, I gave them to BELOGLAZOV. I immediately went on leave after two weeks, for a month. I took the files either before or after leave.

Question: Why only the Navy?

NOSENKO: It was decided by KOVSHUK. Take only the Navy while you're getting acquainted with the Section. At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring. He handled only the Naval officers. I didn't take the Army or Air Force. This incident took place later with [redacted]

Question: Can you give a more definite time?

NOSENKO: He was sitting with [redacted] at a table. Their conversation was controlled by N-extra /a miniaturized transistor temporary microphone/.

Question: How did you hear about this?

NOSENKO: I was Deputy Chief of the section. I don't remember who reported it. I saw the svodka (report) myself.

* The [redacted] in Moscow from 1959 to 1962 was named [redacted] While being debriefed on 22 January 1965 about his post-arrest interrogation by the KGB, WYNNE reported that the KGB played back a portion of a tape recording of his conversation with PENKOVSKIY at the Budapest Restaurant in Moscow on 27 May 1961. This portion, WYNNE said, dealt with PENKOVSKIY's remarks to WYNNE about a girlfriend with whom he had become acquainted during the April-May 1961 TDY to London; PENKOVSKIY called the woman [redacted] (or [redacted]). The KGB interrogators indicated to WYNNE that they thought [redacted] was a cryptonym, and they demanded that WYNNE explain its significance, but WYNNE was unable to do so.

Question: Any other details?

NOSENKO: What I remembered I reported before.

Question: Who gave you the name [redacted]

NOSENKO: DULACKI was also acquainted with [redacted] but there was no recorded conversation like [redacted] He knew [redacted] also. An Indonesian.

Question: How did you hear about this?

NOSENKO: Working in the First (U.S. Embassy) Section I heard maybe from BELOGLAZOV. I don't remember who. I also heard this opinion that maybe he was a contact or an agent. But no proof.

Question: What was his position?

NOSENKO: A military officer, that is, intelligence. I don't remember anything else.

(b) Reports on the Compromise

When asked in January 1964 whether he knew how PENKOVSKIY was compromised, NOSENKO answered that he had "all the details" and then gave the following account:

> Ever since the POPOV case (see Part VI.D.7.a.) there had been intensive surveillance of personnel from the U.S. and British Embassies in Moscow. As a result of this surveillance, Mrs. CHISHOLM was seen ducking into an alcove, evidently following a Soviet citizen whom the surveillance team was unable to identify. Surveillance coverage of Mrs. CHISHOLM - and, indeed, on all British Embassy personnel - was immediately increased, and she was soon observed following the same Soviet citizen on the street in a clandestine manner. The Soviet citizen was identified as PENKOVSKIY.
>
> The KGB immediately launched a full investigation of PENKOVSKIY, including a complete check of his background. To avoid alerting him, knowledge of the investigation was kept to a minimum, and surveillance of him was restricted to stationary points in the neighborhood of his residence and office. As one part of the investigation, a man who closely resembled PENKOVSKIY and dressed like him was made to walk in front of Mrs. CHISHOLM when she was on a Moscow street; when she began to follow this man, the KGB thus obtained confirmation of its identification of PENKOVSKIY. Another part of the investigation entailed a search of the PENKOVSKIY apartment; to accomplish this, he was given a drug which made him so ill that hospitalization was necessary, and Mrs. PENKOVSKIY was lured from the apartment on a ruse; nothing was found during this search. The KGB next aimed a powerful telescope at the window in PENKOVSKIY's apartment and obtained an apartment directly above his; from the overhanging balcony of the apartment occupied by the KGB some

flower pots were suspended, one of them able to take pictures through the window of the apartment below; in this manner the KGB photographed PENKOVSKIY removing "suspicious materials" from the back part of his desk; in the search of the apartment which followed, these materials were found in the desk, but the KGB left them there.

By the time WYNNE visited Moscow in July 1962, both he and PENKOVSKIY were under surveillance, and their suspicious behavior in front of the Peking Restaurant on 5 July gave the KGB another conclusive indicator of PENKOVSKIY's activities. Also, the KGB was able to monitor conversations between PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE in the latter's hotel room, despite the fact that PENKOVSKIY turned on water faucets while they were talking.

PENKOVSKIY was arrested only when the KGB knew that WYNNE was scheduled to go to a Satellite country. PENKOVSKIY gave a complete confession, and it was only at this point that the KGB realized American Intelligence was involved in the operation. After PENKOVSKIY revealed details about the Pushkin Street dead drop, the KGB correlated this information with that contained in the surveillance report of ABIDIAN's presence at the spot.* Nevertheless, in arranging a trap at Pushkin Street on 2 November 1962, the KGB expected the dead drop to be serviced by someone from the British Embassy. Instead, JACOB [redacted] was apprehended there.

The KGB felt that it had obtained all pertinent information from PENKOVSKIY and that he was "beyond redemption" even for future interrogation. PENKOVSKIY was executed.

In subsequent questioning soon after his defection, NOSENKO repeatedly claimed that the KGB had no prior knowledge of American Intelligence participation in the PENKOVSKIY operation until JACOB's arrest on 2 November 1962 at the Pushkin Street dead drop.

NOSENKO was asked in July 1964 for details on the KGB official report (obzor) about the PENKOVSKIY case. He said that he had never read the report because, although printed, it had not been circulated as of the time of his departure for Geneva in January 1964. By O.M. GRIBANOV (Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate) and "various other case officers," however, NOSENKO was told of certain of the items which would appear in the KGB official report and most of which he had already reported. The fact that the KGB surveillance team had failed to identify PENKOVSKIY at his first observed meeting with Mrs. CHISHOLM, NOSENKO added at this time, would not be included in the report. According to GRIBANOV, whereas the report would state the KGB knew PENKOVSKIY was working for both the British and American services, in reality the KGB did not know of the Americans' involvement until PENKOVSKIY was arrested. With regard to this latter point, NOSENKO said that the KGB investigation of PENKOVSKIY was handled by officers from the British Department rather than the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

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* See Part V.E.3.d. for details of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop on 30 December 1961.

except for V.M. KOVSHUK of the latter department. Furthermore, NOSENKO stated, the KGB interrogators attempted to force JACOB to admit he was a British citizen.*

In February 1965 NOSENKO provided his most complete account of the PENKOVSKIY compromise and the KGB investigation which ensued:

> "The first that PENKOVSKIY appeared in life of the KGB was during one of WYNNE's visits to Moscow. The KGB knew of PENKOVSKIY's acquaintance with WYNNE and that he was even visiting him in the hotel where WYNNE was staying. The KGB checked with the GRU, and the GRU answered that PENKOVSKIY was working on WYNNE as a target. PENKOVSKIY was working in the GKKNR as a cover, and WYNNE was one of his acquaintances. Later, there was massive surveillance of the employees of the British Embassy - I don't know exactly with whom - but PENKOVSKIY was noticed being in contact with someone from the British Embassy but surveillance lost him.... Later he was noticed with the wife of British Embassy officer CHISHOLM. At this point, the KGB didn't tell the GRU anything, because the GRU had no right to have any contact with any foreign embassy people without telling the KGB - except at official receptions and functions, and even here they have to tell the KGB so that surveillance will know. And when surveillance noticed PENKOVSKIY with Mrs. CHISHOLM, they immediately recognized him as the guy they had lost.
>
> "This was the beginning of the very active work on PENKOVSKIY - without telling the GRU. They (the British Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate) were checking his work at the GKKNR. They managed with the help of the KGB Third Directorate** to look at his file. And they tried to control him at home. They were afraid to put him under regular surveillance because he would immediately find out - he was a capable officer - but they put surveillance on him from time to time. However, they set up a closed (fixed surveillance) post in a building opposite his apartment, about 200 meters away. They got a flat there, set up a post, and watched his window with a telescope. They also used the flat directly above PENKOVSKIY's flat. Here they even put microphones to hear his conversations with his wife and tapped the telephone of course. Then they noticed that he was hiding something in his desk, taking the drawer out and putting something behind. And when he was taking off his shirt he was putting notes (inside). They noticed him taking pictures. Above his flat there was a balcony with flower boxes. They put a camera in the flowers somehow which could be lowered so that it could take pictures through PENKOVSKIY's window by command (remote control) from the closed post. This was to get evidence, to see the documents he was working with.
>
> "There was another meeting with WYNNE. PENKOVSKIY met WYNNE in WYNNE's hotel. They spoke in the bathroom

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* JACOB has not indicated that such an attempt was made.

** This Directorate is responsible for counterintelligence and security in the Soviet Armed Forces.

with the water running. But the KGB managed to intercept the conversation - not everything, but several words indicating there was something incriminating. PENKOVSKIY called WYNNE and they agreed to meet at the Peking Restaurant, but PENKOVSKIY was checking (for surveillance) and did not go with WYNNE into the restaurant as they had agreed, but walked about the city with him. Surveillance tried to monitor their conversation from a distance of 200 meters with a special microphone like a long pipe. one meter long, or maybe a little less.

"They decided to enter PENKOVSKIY's apartment and see what was hidden in his desk. In the GRU they controlled what documents PENKOVSKIY was taking...

"They used a drug to put him in the hospital, a preparation which they put on his chair. He inhaled it into his body and got sick. His skin became reddened and he felt pain and had to go to a doctor, a military doctor who put him immediately in the hospital. He went to a military hospital - they were ready for him there - and was hospitalized... They considered his wife. then his wife s mother, or his mother, or maid - I don't know - and the elder girl in school. On the second day of his illness a KGB officer disguised as a soldier came to PENKOVSKIY's flat and told his wife that the doctors wanted her to be checked because it was possible PENKOVSKIY had a contagious disease. not serious. She went to the hospital, and the flat was entered. Keys had been made before. They took pictures of everything. They found many things, code pads and so on, which showed that he was really working. After that they decided to arrange his arrest.

"PENKOVSKIY was supposed to go abroad, and the KGB did everything to prevent it, but in such a way that he wouldn't understand. They even cancelled a whole delegation.* This was while they were still trying to get proof.

"Then WYNNE came to Hungary. They arrested PENKOVSKIY and I think one or two days later they took WYNNE.

"The manner of arresting PENKOVSKIY was such that even GRU wouldn't know about it. (D. M.) GVISHIANI (head of the GKKNR) took part. He told PENKOVSKIY to come with him to the Central Committee, and when they were down in his car he said: "Wait here a minute while I get a document I forgot." There was an entrance on Gorky Street, but the car was in the courtyard behind. The KGB was waiting here. PENKOVSKIY got in the car, and that was it - he couldn't call out, no one saw it.

"Two days later I know that (General S.G.) BANNIKOV (Deputy Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate) flew to Hungary and took WYNNE. I don't know the details of WYNNE's arrest, but I know that BANNIKOV returned with WYNNE...

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* PENKOVSKIY was scheduled to travel to the United States in April 1962, but this visit was postponed because, allegedly, the Soviet learned the Americans' plans to conduct provocations against the delegation PENKOVSKIY was to accompany.

"I know that during the search PENKOVSKIY's daughter came home from school early. I know that one of PENKOVSKIY's female relatives or one of his wife's female relatives was a former KGB agent, and she intercepted the girl...

"Mrs. CHISHOLM was walking on the street and they dressed a man just like PENKOVSKIY - he entered a telephone booth or an apartment house entrance or something. She saw him. It was necessary that they see each other at a distance before making contact. I don't remember exactly, but there was a little park or square, and there was something connected with CHISHOLM's child, something connected with candy.

"And about the Pushkin Street you know - that was for PENKOVSKIY.

"The investigation was a big secret. I found out only when he was arrested. It was in 1962. Maybe a month or half a month before the arrest I might have heard that there was something hot in the Second (British) Department... The Second Department officers were running around. (G.V.) BONDAREV (of the British Department) was running to GRIBANOV and didn't have to wait. Something was up, but what? Maybe (A.V.) SUNTSOV (of the British Department) told me: 'Soon we will have an outstanding success.' I think that he said that to KOVSHUK and me, because it was obvious that something was going on. In GRIBANOV's outer office it was noticeable that BONDAREV was running to GRIBANOV every day... GRIBANOV then dismissed others, even turning away his deputies. BONDAREV was always there. So I knew something big was going on, but I didn't know what - maybe it was a recruitment.

"Of course, I could have heard something from surveillance. I was going to the dining room with Venyamin KOZLOV (Chief of the American Department, KGB Surveillance Directorate). I was close to him in 1960-1961. I went with him in the general's dining room occasionally... KOZLOV would say: 'Something is going on in the Second (British Department, KGB Surveillance Directorate).' Because he knew the chief of surveillance for the Second Department...

"I don't remember where I was when the arrest was announced... The officers in the First Department didn't know what was going on. BONDAREV asked JACOB to confirm that he was an Englishman. They were expecting an Englishman, not an American. The First Department was stunned when they found out that an American had come to Pushkin Street...

"The first time the KGB saw PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE together they asked the GRU about it, I think even (GRU Chief I.A.) SEROV himself, whether PENKOVSKIY was working with WYNNE. And PENKOVSKIY had written up something about his contact with WYNNE. The GRU replied that the contact was official... WYNNE was coming as a businessman. The GRU doesn't have a counterintelligence mission against businessmen. The Second Chief Directorate does, and they noticed. Maybe PENKOVSKIY went to WYNNE's hotel room,

"I heard these things from SUNTSOV and from different officers. GRIBANOV gave lectures, and BANNIKOV too. GRIBANOV in Caucasus (I heard it myself). GRIBANOV spoke for three and a half or four hours without stop. During the first half hour GRIBANOV spoke about the work of American Intelligence. Then he told them about the PENKOVSKIY case, talking from notes. When I left in January 1964 I heard that the case study on PENKOVSKIY was finished but not yet printed. BANNIKOV also gave a lecture, for the officers of the Second Chief Directorate, which I did not attend...

"I even visited the trial, not the first day and not the last day. I went with some of the officers... We got tickets from the Second Department. I went with one of the officers from the Journalists Section and stayed there for about an hour. Some of the officers from the Seventh Department also went during the trial. I sat in the third row from the end. It's a small hall; there were about twelve rows in front of me. While I was there they were putting questions to PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE and they were answering this and this. It wasn't interesting. For me it was interesting to look at PENKOVSKIY. In GRIBANOV's and BANNIKOV's lectures there was a big stress on PENKOVSKIY the man, that in Turkey he was acting badly, and that there was a bad kharakteristika (fitness report) in his file... In the trial they never said that he was a colonel or that he was in the GRU. In the case study there was more. They said many things - that he didn't give money to his wife, only five rubles a day.

"I don't know the exact date that the surveillance saw PENKOVSKIY and lost him. Maybe already in 1961. I remember that while I was working in the First (American) Department in 1960-61, maybe in 1961, there was a period when - maybe once or twice - they took surveillance teams away from us, despite the need for several brigades for ABIDIAN, and gave them for a time to the Second Department...

"I learned these details after the arrest. I heard it from officers in the Second Department. SUNTSOV told me, (S.K.) ROSHCHIN could have told me. GRIBANOV didn't mention surveillance losing PENKOVSKIY in his lecture... I think the massive surveillance on the British Embassy was November-December 1961, but I don't know exactly. PENKOVSKIY was in contact with someone else before this woman, Mrs. CHISHOLM. The KGB knew who it was. It was a British employee, but I don't know who... This might have been in GRIBANOV's lecture. But GRIBANOV didn't speak about surveillance losing him, or give the technical details of the closed post or the details about the balcony. There was something in the case study that SUNTSOV wanted to change, but I don't know what - the case study hadn't yet appeared in January 1964. I didn't read it and don't know what it was. If it had appeared I could have found out. SUNTSOV would have said: 'Here we changed something!'

[redacted] the KGB had been aware of PENKOVSKIY's cooperation with the Americans, and in particular with JACOB, for about two and a half months prior to the arrests.* This awareness resulted from a series of talks between members of the KGB and PENKOVSKIY.

[redacted] stated [redacted] that every asset of the KGB Surveillance Directorate was utilized against U.S. Embassy targets during the several months prior to the arrests, and that this coverage resulted in the detection of an American entering a Pushkin Street apartment building. The KGB established a 24-hour surveillance on this address. Eventually, PENKOVSKIY was observed entering the apartment and was immediately seized, interrogated, and debriefed concerning his collaboration with American and British Intelligence.

[redacted] later, speaking [redacted] elaborated on the February report: When massive surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this address the first time, the American was not followed inside by surveillants, but on the second occasion he was followed closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling down, apparently tying his shoe.** [redacted] went on to say that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American had been observed visiting the same address on two occasions for no apparent reason. Therefore the KGB established 24-hour coverage utilizing close circuit TV camera equipment. PENKOVSKIY was observed casing it; an American was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit (radiator); the KGB tagged the drop material with a radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the drop and proceeding to his office, where he secreted the material in a concealment area in his desk; utilizing a radioactivity detector, the KGB located the concealment area in the desk; the KGB also continued in surveillance of the dead drop site, observed PENKOVSKIY load the dead drop, and seized an American who came to unload it. PENKOVSKIY was then confronted with photographic evidence of the loadings and unloadings and could offer no defense.

[redacted]



* [redacted]

** In his official report of his check of the Pushkin Street dead drop, ABIDIAN noted that while he was in the vestibule a woman entered, and he knelt down and pretended to tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the stairs.

*** [redacted]

(vi) Information from [redacted] Source

[redacted] husband was identified by PENKOVSKIY as a fellow GRU officer under GRNR cover. When she first related the cause of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, [redacted] attributed her information to her KGB friend, V.G. SVIRIN.* According to [redacted] the KGB was aware of PENKOVSKIY's practice of selling in the USSR articles which he had purchased on his trips to Europe, but the KGB did not consider this adequate grounds to warrant investigation. "About two years before PENKOVSKIY's defection" (presumably about 1959, two years before his first contact with British and American authorities) a KGB officer who was a friend of PENKOVSKIY was compromised in an extra-marital relationship during a trip to Sweden "with a commission." Although there was no attempt made to blackmail him, the KGB officer approached PENKOVSKIY for advice, and PENKOVSKIY advised him to forget about it. Two years later, when the woman in the affair re-contacted the KGB officer, he was compelled to report the matter, but included in his report his approach to and advice received from PENKOVSKIY. Because PENKOVSKIY had failed to report the incident, the KGB initiated an investigation which led to the detection of his espionage on behalf of the United States and Great Britain. [redacted] expressed her own opinion that it was PENKOVSKIY's conduct that was the determining factor in PENKOVSKIY's compromise.

Subsequently, [redacted] related a second account concerning PENKOVSKIY in which she attributed his discovery to his own indiscretions--excessive spending and selling of foreign merchandise--which led to a KGB investigation. From numerous "friends" [redacted] learned that PENKOVSKIY was under surveillance for about a year prior to the arrest (i.e., about October or November 1961). [redacted] also recalled that in about November 1961 SVIRIN had indirectly warned herself and her husband to stay away from PENKOVSKIY. She added that after the arrest she learned that PENKOVSKIY had been surrounded by the KGB" when he attended her husband's birthday party in April 1962.

[redacted]

* NOSENKO said SVIRIN was one of several officers who received awards for their part in uncovering PENKOVSKIY.

[redacted]



(ix) Information from the Official KGB Report

A document provided by a sensitive source is purportedly the official KGB report on its investigation of PENKOVSKIY. According to this document, surveillance of Mrs. CHISHOLM on 30 December 1961 revealed her suspicious contact with a Soviet male. This person was not identified initially; Mrs. CHISHOLM was observed at what appeared to be possible meeting places on 5 and 12 January, but no contact was seen. On 19 January 1962 surveillance of Mrs. CHISHOLM detected a contact between her and a Soviet man, who was then identified as PENKOVSKIY.*

(x) Information from WYNNE

WYNNE's statements to CIA and MI-6 in early 1965 relating to the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY were largely based upon events during his (WYNNE's) interrogation by the KGB. In trying to obtain a confession, WYNNE said, the KGB insisted that it knew everything about the operation and that PENKOVSKIY had made a complete confession. WYNNE stated

* PENKOVSKIY reported on 28 March 1962 that he had observed surveillance on Mrs. CHISHOLM, but not on himself on 5 and 19 January. He had not observed surveillance on the 12 January meeting. As a result, PENKOVSKIY broke off street contacts with Mrs. CHISHOLM.

that he himself resisted confessing, whereupon the KGB produced evidence consisting of tape recordings of conversations, photographs, and WYNNE's own business diaries.

The KGB played for WYNNE two tape recordings of conversations he had had with PENKOVSKIY, and WYNNE (who was convinced that the recordings were genuine) pinpointed the dates when the conversations were held: 27 May 1961 and 2 July 1962. The 27 May 1961 conversation was the one in which PENKOVSKIY mentioned his girlfriend "ZEP"; it further consisted of an exchange of cryptic remarks as PENKOVSKIY indicated to WYNNE that he had material he wanted to pass to him. WYNNE told him not to discuss it then and there but to wait till they were out of the restaurant.

The photographs were of WYNNE alone, of WYNNE with PENKOVSKIY, of WYNNE with unknown Soviets, of PENKOVSKIY with Mrs. CHISHOLM in a park,* and of JACOB at the Pushkin Street dead drop. Concerning the photographs of himself, WYNNE was able to give the dates when they were taken, and the earliest of these dates was 27 May 1961--the same day his restaurant conversation with PENKOVSKIY was recorded. This photograph showed WYNNE approaching the CHISHOLM residence in Moscow. Another photograph, taken during his August 1961 visit to Moscow, demonstrated that the KGB observed an exchange of materials between PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE. At the time the photograph was taken, PENKOVSKIY had brought a satchel to WYNNE containing materials for British Intelligence. (The satchel appeared in the photograph.) WYNNE took the satchel from PENKOVSKIY, left PENKOVSKIY waiting while he went upstairs and emptied it, came back downstairs with the empty satchel, and returned it to PENKOVSKIY.

* PENKOVSKIY and Mrs. CHISHOLM met twice in a park, in July and December 1961; WYNNE believed that the photograph he saw showed trees in full foliage.

c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO brought to his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 an official KGB "temporary duty authorization" showing that he had been permitted to participate in the USSR-wide search for A.N. CHEREPANOV the month before.* At this meeting and subsequently NOSENKO gave details on CHEREPANOV's background, his transmittal of KGB papers to an American in Moscow, his compromise, his efforts to escape to the West, and his eventual fate. Essentially, according to NOSENKO, CHEREPANOV was a dissatisfied former KGB officer who provided American authorities with genuine KGB documents and whose treason was discovered as a result of the U.S. Embassy handing over the documents to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Other Soviet sources [redacted] have verified the authenticity of the CHEREPANOV papers and their information tends to confirm NOSENKO's account of events after the Embassy placed the documents in MFA hands. There is, in addition, from non-Soviet sources considerable information on CHEREPANOV pre-dating the November 1963 incident as well as reports from Americans involved in this incident.

In the following sections are presented available data about CHEREPANOV and what ensued after he gave the papers to an American tourist for delivery to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Also given below are NOSENKO's comments on the contents of the CHEREPANOV papers.

(ii) Earlier Information on CHEREPANOV

CHEREPANOV's name first was brought to CIA's attention in October 1953 as a potential Soviet defector.

Jack RAYMOND, Belgrade correspondent for the New York Times, telephoned a Third Secretary of the U.S. Embassy there to tell him that he had a man in his office with information "from behind the Iron Curtain"; RAYMOND suggested that someone from the Embassy would find the man of interest, but the man allegedly did not want to come to the Embassy. The Third Secretary went to RAYMOND's office, where he met the unnamed individual in the presence of RAYMOND's Yugoslav secretary. RAYMOND explained that the man had been writing to him from his home village, but RAYMOND had not replied until recently when he told the man to stop at his office, as he had just done that day. RAYMOND added that the person had offered information of a kind that he did not feel he could use in his news reports. The Third Secretary took the man to his quarters and interviewed him, then interviewed him again later the same day in his office in the Embassy.

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*According to the "temporary duty authorization" NOSENKO held the rank of lieutenant colonel, as NOSENKO himself told CIA. He later retracted this claim, placing his rank in 1963 as captain. See Part V.G.

The man, Tihon DUNAYEV, was about 65 years of age and claimed to be of Ukrainian origin. He said he had been "mixed up in the Balkan wars," had fought with the White Russians, and in 1920 had escaped with General WRANGEL to Istanbul, coming to Yugoslavia the same year. He recounted a history in Yugoslavia which included both military and civilian service with the Yugoslav Government, by virtue of which he was retired on a government pension. He indicated that in 1924 he had made the acquaintance of Captain Rase NEDELJKOVIC, who had been a close friend ever since. The latter had told him of having been in Russia in 1915 with a Prisoner of War Commission, and claimed to have lived with a Russian family at that time. NEDELJKOVIC allegedly had a picture which was taken of him with this family. NEDELJKOVIC, according to DUNAYEV, was in 1953 employed at the post office near the railway station in Belgrade, and had met several Russians during the past year or two. (These Russians called at the post office for packages which they received from Switzerland.) Several weeks prior to the October interviews, an official had come to the post office, and NEDELJKOVIC, in conversation with him in Russian, told him of his experiences in Russia in 1915. It soon developed that this Russian official was the son of the family with whom NEDELJKOVIC had stayed, and a fast friendship had resulted. After several meetings the Russian finally told NEDELJKOVIC that he was "up to his neck" with the situation in the USSR and that he wanted to defect immediately. He would if he were in the West, but being in Yugoslavia, he was afraid that the Yugoslavs would return him to the USSR. He allegedly told NEDELJKOVIC that when he left the Embassy he would not leave empty-handed--he would "bring something with him," material of intelligence value. DUNAYEV understood from his friend that the Russian was the assistant to the Soviet Military Attache. (In these two interviews, DUNAYEV claimed he knew only that the Russian called himself "George.") After NEDELJKOVIC had told the story to DUNAYEV in order to get his advice, DUNAYEV decided that the New York Times correspondent was the man to put him in contact with the U.S. Embassy.

DUNAYEV was informed that the Embassy could give no guarantees, although interested in the case. First, however, it would be necessary to know who the Russian official was, the full story on his relationship with NEDELJKOVIC, and the firmness of his intent to defect. DUNAYEV agreed with this and added that if this did not work out, "we will try to get him into Austria illegally." DUNAYEV left the Embassy just minutes before mobs gathered before the building and stoned it, in protest against U.S.-British action concerning Trieste.

He returned to the Embassy 15 days later, explaining that he had been unable to report immediately on his discussions with NEDELJKOVIC because the militia had been preventing people from approaching the Embassy. He said he had visited NEDELJKOVIC the night he had left the Embassy and had told him that he had contacted "interested persons," without saying they were Americans. NEDELJKOVIC had given him a recognition phrase which he and the Soviet had agreed upon should a third party contact the Soviet. NEDELJKOVIC had given him identifying information on the Soviet: His name was CHEREPANOV, he was a Soviet Embassy official working

"under cover" of consular duties; his age was given as 35 to 40, and in addition to giving a physical description, DUNAYEV reported that he was single, spoke good Serbian, some French and English.* DUNAYEV further reported that CHEREPANOV was now prepared to deliver intelligence documents and escape Yugoslavia. From NEDELJKOVIC's daughter, however, DUNAYEV said he had learned that after certain recent demonstrations--two days after he had last seen him--NEDELJKOVIC had fled Belgrade planning to escape from Yugoslavia and had not been heard from since. DUNAYEV nonetheless was prepared to help the Russian himself, and said that he now knew that CHEREPANOV visited a warehouse at the railway station twice a week to pick up packages for the Soviet Embassy. He described his plan for approaching CHEREPANOV there, using the recognition phrase, and setting up a meeting later the same day in a park, where he could then pass to CHEREPANOV the Americans' instructions for communicating via a dead drop. (The dead drop had been designed so that the site could be monitored by Americans surreptitiously from inside a U.S. Mission building.)

This was the last time DUNAYEV appeared in the case. He apparently never came back to the Embassy, and in any event further contact with him was forbidden by the American Ambassador who wanted no U.S. personnel personally involved further in the case.

The dead drop site was observed as planned for the several dates which DUNAYEV had been instructed to give CHEREPANOV. CHEREPANOV did not appear on any of these dates, but, on the day after the first date, what appeared to be surveillance was noted by the U.S. observers. CHEREPANOV's failure to appear at the drop site was considered to be the end of the operation because there was no way left to contact him.

[redacted]

An American military attache lived in the same apartment building with CHEREPANOV, and he agreed to try to entice him into his apartment to discuss defection and asylum. This was planned for the end of December 1953, but the unexplained absence of CHEREPANOV and his family from 25 December until

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*Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV was identified from diplomatic lists as Second Secretary and Consular Officer at the Soviet Embassy. He was known to be married.

sometime late in January 1954 delayed the approach. It was then found because of many other Soviets in his apartment building, there were no opportunities for a secure approach. Before an approach could be made under any set of circumstances, the same American military attache had a half-hour conversation with CHEREPANOV while attending the Soviet Embassy's Red Army Day reception in February 1954. The attache used each of the several occasions when the two were alone to probe under various pretexts for CHEREPANOV's desires regarding a further contact, but CHEREPANOV responded either with noncomittal answers or not at all. The attache reported his impressions that CHEREPANOV was a "confirmed and loyal Soviet official of no special stature," and that he was "neither interested in nor desirous of further contact with the West."

Two years later, in February 1956, it was reported that CHEREPANOV maintained limited social contacts with the U.S. Air Attache and Consul in Belgrade.

In April 1956, at a "farewell intimate luncheon" attended by a representative of the American Embassy, CHEREPANOV stated that he was returning to Moscow where he hoped to be assigned for a year or two, but he was not certain.

According to a report dated June 1956, CHEREPANOV had been active in courting people from the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, and as of the time of the report, had gone back to the USSR "probably to work in the Foreign Office."

More extensive information on CHEREPANOV was provided in 1957 by Milos GREGOVIC, a Yugoslav who defected to the British in October 1957. He had been a UDB agent working in Belgrade against foreign diplomats. CHEREPANOV was one of his operational targets. According to this source, CHEREPANOV was first posted to Belgrade in 1948 or 1949,* and was one of the very few Soviet diplomats who remained in Belgrade after the break with the Cominform, at which time he was charge d'affaires. In 1952 or 1953 he became First Secretary and head of the Consular Department.** At this time he was identified by the UDB as a Soviet intelligence officer. The main reason for the UDB certainty about this was the wide scope of his contacts with Yugoslav workers

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*The break between Yugoslavia and the Cominform took place in June 1948. There was no formal break in diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, although there was no Soviet Ambassador present in Belgrade from 1950 to 1953, and there was no Soviet military attache representation present from 1951 to 1953. According to the Yugoslav diplomatic lists, Aleksandr CHEREPANOV arrived in Belgrade sometime in 1952, appearing on the diplomatic list for the first time in November 1952, as Second Secretary. He was one of only seven Soviets appearing on the diplomatic list at this time. The new Soviet Ambassador appeared for the first time on the November 1953 list, bringing the total diplomatic representation up to eight.

**CHEREPANOV was Second Secretary throughout his tour in Belgrade, according to the diplomatic lists.

and students, a number of whom were arrested by the UDB on suspicion. On several occasions the UDB had felt it had almost enough evidence to enable the Yugoslav Government to expel CHEREPANOV, but the evidence was never completely satisfactory.

Thus in 1954 GREGOVIC was assigned the task of compromising CHEREPANOV's wife, Irene. Approximately three months after he met her, GREGOVIC personally succeeded in compromising Irene. He continued to handle her as an informant over a period of about a year and a half, during which time he also maintained their personal relationship on a spasmodic basis. Irene's information enabled the UDB to discover that CHEREPANOV had established a network of informants among workers and students, mostly in Belgrade and its vicinity. Subsequent information established the fact that he was also in close contact with trade union leaders and particularly with river port workers, a number of whom were subsequently found to be anti-Yugoslav and pro-Soviet in their outlook. Another Soviet, an intelligence officer who had been recruited by the UDB, confirmed to GREGOVIC that CHEREPANOV was a member of Soviet Intelligence. The Soviet said also that CHEREPANOV had been an intelligence officer during the war and had at one stage been parachuted behind the German lines on a special services operation which resulted in the kidnapping of a German general.

GREGOVIC described CHEREPANOV as "always smiling but in fact an extremely cold and cruel individual." Although he did not appear to be emotionally attached to his wife, he was extremely jealous and watchful of her. He frequently urged his wife to use her exceptional beauty and seductive charm in cultivating Yugoslav officials in order to obtain information. GREGOVIC also said that CHEREPANOV was very fond of hunting, which "appeared to give relief to his excessively sadistic nature."

CHEREPANOV was recalled to Moscow in mid-1956, according to GREGOVIC.

(iii) Reports by Americans

In October and November 1963 a university librarian from a midwest campus visited the USSR on a book-buying mission for his university. He had not made any official arrangements to contact MEZHKNIGA (International Book Agency, under the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade) in advance of his trip, but called at its office in the Ministry of Foreign Trade building after he arrived in Moscow. He explained his interest in obtaining second-hand books. In a few minutes an English-speaking Soviet was sent to the lobby, and he identified himself as Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV. After discussing the librarian's needs with him, the man agreed to cooperate with the American. There were three more contacts with CHEREPANOV, all in the lobby of the same building.

The last contact was on 4 November, at which time CHEREPANOV informed the librarian that the book procurement listings, except for a few items, had been approved for release. Then, speaking softly and quickly in Russian, he passed the librarian a thick envelope which he said contained information of no value to the librarian but of much value to the American Embassy. He asked that it be passed immediately to "Mr. Morton" who worked on cultural affairs in the Embassy, and, if Mr. Morton was not there, to give it to someone else whom the librarian might know or recognize as trustworthy. CHEREPANOV further requested that the librarian call him from outside the Embassy to let him know (by use of a code word) if the envelope had been delivered successfully to the Embassy. He cautioned the librarian not to mention his--CHEREPANOV's--name in the Embassy. (The envelope was delivered to the Embassy according to CHEREPANOV's instructions, except that in the Embassy the librarian did mention CHEREPANOV's name as the Soviet who had presented the package.) Subsequently the librarian called CHEREPANOV, as instructed, to confirm the safe delivery of the package.*

The envelope from CHEREPANOV contained a bundle of documents, some typed and some handwritten. Upon examination they appeared to be classified KGB file materials. Fearing Soviet provocation, which could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy on the grounds of possessing classified Soviet Government documents,** Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next day, 5 November, turned the originals over to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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*At the librarians's request, on 16 November the Embassy placed a phone call to a man who identified himself as CHEREPANOV in order to follow up on the $1,000 order for books left by the librarian; an innocuous telephone conversation resulted. The individual who called himself CHEREPANOV said he had written to the librarian the day before (i.e., 15 November 1963) concerning the matter. The librarian later confirmed that he had received such a letter from CHEREPANOV dated mid-November.

**Such a provocation had actually been directed against another U.S. Embassy in another Iron Curtain country shortly before these events took place.

(iv) Information from NOSENKO

Note: All of the information which follows was furnished by NOSENKO.

CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or 1921. During World War II he was a KGB officer working with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in Yugoslavia for four or five years, the dates not known. CHEREPANOV was probably Deputy Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade. While there, his wife had an affair with either an Englishman or an American.

When CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow, he had some (unspecified) problem getting a job, but finally the KGB Second Chief Directorate took him into the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, working against the Administrative Section of the Embassy. He worked in the same room as V.A. KUSKOV, and was responsible for three targets: Richard SNYDER, a consular officer; John McVICKAR, a consular officer; and Marion ALBAMONTE, secretary to the personnel officer. CHEREPANOV's work as a case officer was poor, and as it grew worse, the KGB decided to retire him. Because of his service in World War II, for which he received three years' pension credit for each year of military service, he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for retirement. Also, he was just over the minimum age (40) for retirement from the KGB.

Upon retiring in July or August 1961, CHEREPANOV got a job with MEZHKNIGA. Unhappy about his enforced retirement and angry at the KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when MEZHKNIGA turned down his several attempts to go abroad.

Prior to leaving the KGB, CHEREPANOV stole draft copies of documents he had handled in the U.S. Embassy Section. In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own handwriting, evidently being unable to steal the document himself. All of the documents he had stolen were intended for destruction.

When the U.S. Embassy officials saw the CHEREPANOV documents, they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB provocation, and they said to themselves: "What are the Russians trying to do to us?" The Embassy officials photographed the documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the Americans gave the documents to the Ministry, the KGB said: "What did the Americans give this back to us for? Maybe they were afraid of provocation, but maybe another thing--maybe they are trying to destroy the American Department, to confuse them. And it did, it did."

In November 1963 Yu.I GUK came to visit NOSENKO and brought news about "a catastrophe" in the KGB. GUK said he had the story from B.F. MAKASHEV, a mutual friend of GUK's and NOSENKO's.* MAKASHEV had been in Foreign Minister Andrey GROMYKO's office when the CHEREPANOV papers were brought there, after their delivery by Thomas FAIN of the U.S. Embassy. MAKASHEV saw the name of O.M. GRIBANOV (Chief of the Second Chief Directorate) on some of the papers and saw that one of them was a plan for agent operations against an

*NOSENKO said he first met MAKASHEV in Geneva in 1962, when both were there with the Disarmament Delegation; he subsequently saw MAKASHEV occasionally in Moscow.

and picked up the papers. The KGB began an investigation of all the people who had been working in the American Department during the time period covered by the papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961.

The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB, and its investigation went on for no more than 20 or 25 days. When the KGB examined the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's handwriting, but no documents were found which pertained to CHEREPANOV's own case work, or that of the U.S. Embassy Section where he worked. (NOSENKO also noted that the KGB found no documents dated later than 1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959, 1960 and 1961.) Thus there were a number of indications pointing towards CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961. The KGB did not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him, but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous action on the basis of these suspicious points, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him and, in the course of conversation, to mention the great disturbance in the KGB because someone had passed stolen KGB documents to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the news and was quite cool about the matter. The next day the fixed surveillance post observed him leaving his house in the morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work, but the fixed surveillance post at his office soon reported that he had not arrived at work. He had "simply dropped out of sight."

An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued then spread throughout the Soviet Union. Border controls were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to Republic and local KGB and militia offices, all means of transport were covered. Reports began coming in from various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV's description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there. Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast strongly indicated the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence there, so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check the reports.*

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life." On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

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* When NOSENKO first told this story, at the first meeting in Geneva in January 1964, he pulled from his pocket a document which he said was his official KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast for the CHEREPANOV search. He noted that he had brought it out illegally, to show CIA. The document, authorizing the Gorkiy KGB office to extend cooperation to NOSENKO, was valid from 15 to 30 December 1963.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They picked him up and headed immediately back to Moscow, interrogating CHEREPANOV on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KCB, very angry," and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to this American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because of the fact that CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that had he detected surveillance on himself he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution," and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof.

CHEREPANOV was in prison when NOSENKO left the USSR (on 18 January 1964) and would be shot, but the affair would not be publicized. In addition to his wife, CHEREPANOV would leave a daughter as a survivor.

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FOR REVIEW



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

(Will) information from [redacted] Source

In [redacted] 1965 [redacted] reported to CIA that on a social occasion in her apartment, some time during May or June 1964, [redacted] had a conversation between her husband, [redacted] and her KGB friend, Vassily G. [redacted]. [redacted] was present during this conversation. She learned that CHEREPANOV, a 1958-1959 classmate of her husband's at the Military Diplomatic Academy (the GRU's surrogate intelligence school) had been shot in early 1964. [redacted] believed that his crime was attempting to [redacted] from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to a representative of the U.S. Government.

When asked for further details, [redacted] claimed to have learned the following information [redacted] society of unspecified nature. CHEREPANOV was born about 1922, and had fought and been injured in World War II. Lacking "pull" or "connections," he was not posted abroad after his

graduation from the Military Diplomatic Academy in 1959, and he became bitter and resentful. After he had finally obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, he tried to gain revenge by passing Ministry documents to a U.S. Government official visiting the Ministry. Because the U.S. Government believed this act to have been a Soviet provocation, the documents were subsequently returned to the Soviet Government. CHEREPANOV was arrested, tried, and shot. His widow, Irina, works in a hairdressing shop at 15 Petrovka Street in Moscow, which is patronized by wives of Kremlin officials; he also left a daughter, about 16 years old. [redacted] said she could provide no further details.

Source

In the course of a CIA interview with [redacted] SOURCE in [redacted] 1966, she described the Soviet Union as being "like a cage, like prison, where people sometimes run away, but they [the authorities] are able to track them anywhere." She stated that she knew for a fact that a person was shot in Moscow, CHEREPANOV, who worked in the same (Military-Diplomatic) Academy as her husband. During the war CHEREPANOV was an officer in intelligence, and was a "good, brave and resourceful soldier. Then he came to the Academy, where he was unhappy. He wasn't a good worker there, considering it a personal slight to have been sent there with all his background." He became so bitter that he gave important documents to the Americans about 1963 or 1964. The Americans, however, thought that the documents were "fake," so they gave them to the Soviets. In two days CHEREPANOV was arrested and in two months he was shot. [redacted] SOURCE said that she knew this man personally, and his wife as well, though only slightly. Her husband, however, was a friend of CHEREPANOV's, and being "very loyal," he went to see his widow, although he had only met her once. (She was unable to recall from whom her husband had learned of CHEREPANOV's death.) CHEREPANOV's wife told [redacted] Source's husband that CHEREPANOV had "really meant to do what he did; he really had taken [redacted] Mrs. [redacted] quoted CHEREPANOVA as saying: "I remember how he took these papers out of the house. Then he returned and took something from the cabinet or something. And I asked him, 'What is that?' He said, 'It is something unimportant.' And two days later he was arrested." [redacted] commented that CHEREPANOV had not known the American very well when he gave him the papers, but he was "a foreigner, a friend." When asked if CHEREPANOV was a GRU officer, [redacted] said she thought he was a KGB officer, but was not certain of this. However, the documents were "very important ones, important enough that he was shot."

SECRET



(ix) Contents of the CHERNYAYEV Package

The KGB documents in the CHERNYAYEV package totalled 103 pages in the original Russian version, divided almost equally between typewritten reports in final form and handwritten draft reports or notes, plus two examples of letters written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy.

The longest single document is a 33-page TOP SECRET report, dated 18 April 1959, entitled 'Operational Conditions in the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence Organs against Soviet

Installations and Soviet Citizens in the U.S.A. in 1957-1958."* The report bears the signature of Colonel A. FEKLISOV,** whose title is given as "Chief, First [American] Department, First Chief Directorate, Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers USSR." Attached to this document is a sheet of 16 signatures, with dates after all but four, indicating that these individuals had read the report (CHEREPANOV's is included). At the bottom of this sheet is indicated the fact that the report was typed in two copies, copy number one, which this copy is, addressed to the Second Chief Directorate, and copy number two addressed to a file, No. 1976, volume 5.

The rest of the documents pertain entirely to KGB coverage of the U.S. Embassy and American diplomats in Moscow for a period of over two years: The earliest is dated August 1958 and the latest 15 October 1960. Most of them were prepared by or for one senior case officer of the U.S. Embassy Section, First Department, SCD, Major V. KUSKOV.***

Two reports are on Americans who had already left the Soviet Union; in addition to summarizing the information collected on them while they were in Moscow, these reports indicate the processing required for the file's contents prior to retirement to KGB Archives. The subjects of these reports are Edward L. KILLHAM, Second Secretary from July 1957 to July 1959 (document dated October 1960) and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache from June 1956 to July 1958 (document dated October 1960).

There are four operational plans for agent work against American diplomats stationed in Moscow at the time the plans were prepared: Richard HARMSTONE, Second Secretary (document of August 1958; Lewis W. BOWDEN, Second Secretary (document of February 1960); James A. RAMSEY, Second Secretary (document of February 1960); and George WINTERS, Attache (no date).****

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*One paragraph of the document refers to American surveillance of Soviets in New York City, and the next paragraph begins: "The intensity of surveillance was uneven. From November 1957 to April 1958 a decrease was noticed in the number of surveillance teams assigned to work directly against Soviet employees. This did not mean, however, that the American surveillance service reduced its surveillance of Soviet employees as a whole." The dates cited here approximate the period, from late November 1957 to mid-March 1958, when the FBI was conducting surveillance of two Illegals in New York City as an outgrowth of an operational lead from CIA source POPOV (see Part VI.D.7.a.). Information from NOSENKO relating to FBI surveillance is discussed in Part VI.F.

**FEKLISOV is the true name of the former KGB Legal Resident who served in Washington, D.C., under the alias "FOMIN."

***NOSENKO identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer in the Second Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, and said that CHEREPANOV worked in the same room with KUSKOV.

****For a further discussion of the role of George WINTERS in the POPOV case, see Part VI.D.7.a.

Another document is typed on a preprinted letterhead form entitled "Agent Report"; the form has all of the KGB organizational titles printed on it, with blank space left to be filled in for the date, the number of the section, department, and directorate, the name of the agent source and that of the case officer who received it. This particular report is that of the agent "LILIANA," concerning her contacts with WINTERS between 3 and 6 March 1959. The report describes how she made his acquaintance and what transpired at each of her meetings with him thereafter. Following her report is a brief statement of future plans for the use of this agent against WINTERS. A notation appears on the first page that the report was translated from Spanish, although the name of the translator is not given. (This seems to suggest that the agent wrote her own account of her activities, as she is identified in the report as having recently repatriated to the Soviet Union from Argentina.) The typing date appears as 18 April 1959, and the signature line was prepared for Major KOVSHUK, "Deputy Chief, First [American] Department" of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.* KOVSHUK's name also appears as the case officer who received the report from the agent.

One handwritten document, entitled "Conclusions on the Matter of Operational Development LANGELLE,"** is on a kind of paper different from that used for any of the other documents; it is lined and columned, and the headings at the top of the columns (e.g., number and date of document, to whom addressed or from whom sent) suggest that the paper is a record sheet or log of correspondence. It bears the date of October 1960, but is not signed, nor does any designation of section, department, or directorate appear. The document is a summary of LANGELLE's activities in the Soviet Union, primarily details of his activity as an intelligence officer for CIA. One facet of LANGELLE's operational activity is described in some detail, as follows: "On the 28th of May 1958 L. loaded a dead drop at Lenin Hills. He attempted to give the visit to Lenin Hills for the purposes indicated above the outward appearance of an innocent outdoor recreation trip with children. Incidentally, prior to loading the dead drop L. had previously cased the travel pattern of his surveillance, the situation at Lenin Hills, and had visited that area with his wife.

"As a consequence, it was established that this dead drop belonged to a person recently arrested by the Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers

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*NOSENKO identified V.M. KOVSHUK in this position around this time.

**For a further discussion of the role of Russell LANGELLE in the POPOV case, see Part VI.D.7.a.

of the USSR for the City of Moscow, REPNIKOV, who had been recruited by American intelligence...."* His meetings with POPOV in Moscow are set out accurately, with dates. WINTERS' mailing of a letter to POPOV is mentioned, but in contrast to exact dates used throughout the paper for other events cited, the date of WINTERS' mailing is given only as "January 1959."

There is a handwritten document comprised of names and addresses of Soviet citizens, headed with a statement that these are authors of letters addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, but intercepted by the KGB. Where dates of the letters are given, they are for October 1960. In a few cases the contents of the letters are characterized (e.g., "request for financial aid--5,000 rubles," "complaints about inability to live on pension"). Under two of the names a note appears, which looks as though it had been added at a different time or with a different pen, but in identical handwriting; the note says "letter enclosed." These two letters were enclosed in the package of documents.

The two documents described above--the LANGELLE "Conclusions" and the list of Soviets who wrote to the U.S. Embassy--appear to have been written by the same person. Although the sample on the document described next is only a signature, it may well be the same hand. The name is CHEREPANOV's. This document, the only document having for its subject a Soviet citizen, is a typewritten summary of derogatory information on a Soviet youth who began to lead a dissolute life in 1957, becoming a black market speculator and a homosexual. As a consequence he was expelled from the Komsomól and from the Institute at which he had been studying. He nonetheless continued his criminal activities, including contacts with foreigners for purposes of fleeing the USSR, despite warnings by the militia and the KGB, and he had two long meetings with Attache Richard SNYDER, "Consul of the American Embassy," to discuss his wish to go to America. The document, dated February 1960, is signed by Lt. Col. A. CHEREPANOV, "Senior Case Officer [no section indicated], First Department," of the Second Chief Directorate. (Presumably the document is relevant to the American Department because of the contact with an American diplomat.)

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*On 24 May 1958 LANGELLE visited the area of the dead drop site referred to herein with his wife to case and photograph the site area. The site had been described to him as a certain section of a wooden staircase in the park area. When his report was received at CIA Headquarters it was obvious that because of inadequate information, he had cased the wrong staircase, so he was told to go back as soon as possible and repeat the casing for the other staircase. He did this on 28 May 1958, bringing his children for cover. He did not put a drop down at this or any other time. A legal travel agent actually put the drop down on 7 June 1958. This drop was not intended for the agent referred to in the CHEREPANOV document, REPNIKOV, who in fact was not even a recruited agent at the time, although efforts were being made--unsuccessfully--during this time to recruit him. At no time was any dead drop put down for REPNIKOV, nor were any ever planned for him.

The remaining papers are handwritten drafts of reports pertaining to various of the Americans named above, some incomplete, and extensive rough notes which appear to be extracts from surveillance reports, most of them on WINTERS. All these notes are in the same handwriting, which appears to be that of KUSKOV.

(x) NOSENKO's Comments on the CHEREPANOV Papers

On 3 February 1964 NOSENKO was shown all the CHEREPANOV papers with the exception of the FEKLISOV report on operational conditions in the United States. Just before they were given to him to read, NOSENKO was asked if he had been shown the papers before he left Moscow; he replied that he had not. He said he knew that the documents pertained to BOWDEN, RAMSEY, HARMSTONE, WINTERS, and LANGELLE, but he had not read them. Asked who in the Second Chief Directorate knew exactly which documents were involved, NOSENKO named S.M. FEDOSEYEV, Chief of the American Department at the time; GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate; and G.I. GRYAZNOV, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. These three officers, he said, had possession of the documents after they were returned by MID to the KGB.

NOSENKO then proceeded to examine and read aloud the contents of the documents, making occasional explanatory comments as he went along. He identified the handwriting of CHEREPANOV himself, as well as that of KUSKOV, KOVSHUK, and BELOGLAZOV. Concerning the substance of the documents, NOSENKO made very few comments. In discussing the operational plan for work against WINTERS, NOSENKO noted that this document, which was a handwritten draft, had been signed by KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section; NOSENKO then said: "He should not have signed this. I do not know why he signed it. He should not have signed it." Asked why not, he said: "Because it is a draft. He should have signed the typed copy. And why he signed the rough draft I do not know..."

As he studied the agent report which KOVSHUK received from source "LILIANA," concerning WINTERS, NOSENKO commented on KOVSHUK's failure to fill in the line which is intended to identify the safe apartment or operational apartment where the report was received. "It is obligatory to indicate the place, in the second line," he added. "It is obligatory to write in the number of the personal file [this did appear in the document] and where the contact took place."

Reading aloud the agent plan for BOWDEN, described therein as the FBI man in the Embassy, NOSENKO came to the section which states: "Ironically one day as though by chance he [BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent 'SHMEDOVA' 'ARTUR's* affiliation with American Intelligence." He was interrupted to be asked who "SHMEDOVA" was; NOSENKO said: "Cleaning woman undoubtedly. An affiliation of 'ARTUR' with American Intelligence." He was then asked: "What connection did 'ARTUR' have with American Intelligence?" To this

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*"ARTUR" was the KGB cryptonym for NOSENKO's agent Arsene FRIPPEL; see Part V.D.5.

NOSENKO replied: "That I cannot say." The CIA case officer remarked: "Why, you should know, you're his case officer..." NOSENKO ignored this comment and continued to read the document aloud. A little further on in the document reference is made to use of future agents to report on BOWDEN; again "ARTUR" is mentioned, and NOSENKO identified him this time as FRIPPEL. Then he said: "I asked FRIPPEL, and he said 'But I know nothing.' 'How is it you do not, when he is the counterintelligence man in your Embassy? He interrogates you!' And he answered: 'But no, he is a good man.'"

In reading a draft report which appears to have been an attempt to summarize the KGB information on WINTERS, NOSENKO read out the sentence: "During his stay in the USSR, WINTERS sent eight espionage letters,* and loaded a drop in connection with a game the KGB played with American Intelligence." He was asked if he knew about those eight letters, but he said he did not.

[redacted]

NOSENKO retorted: "But at that time I would not have run him down. He did not know that he had Metka on him.** Prior to the year 1962 did you know about Metka? No, I don't believe you did." At this, he was asked: "Oh, you mean those eight letters were detected from Metka? NOSENKO said: "Of course." The case officer asked: "Not from surveillance?" NOSENKO said: "No. Beyond the fact that he could be seen mailing them, the rest Metka gives....Well, that letter which was mailed by WINTERS to POPOV was without Metka. That which was for POPOV definitely was without Metka. But the other letters, that was not so. I would not blame him. How would he know? He put them in his pocket--that's all." NOSENKO added that the letter which was sent to POPOV was one of the eight letters to which the document refers.

NOSENKO then reviewed the document concerning Richard HARMSTONE.*** He repeated his earlier statement that HARMSTONE had been compromised and had been approached by the KGB, that he turned down the recruitment offer, but that he did not report the approach to the U.S. Embassy. He was asked how the KGB knew that he had not reported the approach, to which NOSENKO replied: "He was monitored and we would have heard by audio if anything about this matter had been reported....Undoubtedly if he reported it something would have been heard from the Minister Counsellor's materials as to what this might be. And they would dictate a message about this."**** Later NOSENKO was asked who tried to recruit HARMSTONE.

[redacted]

**The first source of information on KGB use of Metka, the KGB code name for thief powder or detecting powder, was NOSENKO, in June 1962.

***See Section VI.D.3.e. for a discussion of the HARMSTONE case.

****HARMSTONE did report the KGB approach, and the Minister Counsellor's office was the site of a discussion of the case.

He answered: "I do not know; that was prior to my coming into the department. This was in the year 1958 or 1959. I don't know who was the case officer who spoke to HARMSTONE." NOSENKO was asked: "Is he still in the Department?" He replied: "I don't think he is. I don't think he is concerned with it any more."*

NOSENKO read the document which set forth highlights of LANGELLE's operational activities in Moscow, chiefly devoted to the POPOV case, but also including information (inaccurate in detail) concerning a dead drop site in Lenin Hills.** As he read this section he commented: "Incidentally, they [the KGB] found the dead drop and contents by accident. Little children, children." Asked if he knew anything about this incident of Lenin Hills, he answered, "Kids. Russian children found it by accident. For after LANGELLE had left the area, surveillance checked over the area, but they found nothing...." Reading further he came to the statement that it was later established that the dead drop was intended for the person already arrested by the KGB, REPNIKOV. To this he added that REPNIKOV was known as Stanislav "Slava" REPNIKOV, who had been recruited by some tourist; these details were not included in the CHEREPANOV document. He was asked if REPNIKOV had been arrested and was thereafter working under KGB control, but he said this was not the case. He explained that he had been arrested, and the KGB thereafter "roughed him up once in a while" because he was of the category of Soviets who were known to associate with foreigners. He did not know what American tourist had recruited REPNIKOV, but he was aware of the fact that REPNIKOV had not been arrested until after the tourist had left the USSR.***

When he was reviewing the summary of information on LITTELL, who had left the USSR before the summary was prepared, NOSENKO was asked if he knew anything about one of the Soviets named as a one-time contact of LITTEL's, B.P. VORONTSOV. The document, a rough draft with corrections, contained a statement that a meeting between LITTEL and

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*KOVSHUK was identified by HARMSTONE as the KGB officer who made the approach.

**See the foregoing section on the contents of the CHEREPANOV package for details on the inaccuracies included in this document.

***REPNIKOV had been reported as a dissident Soviet youth as early as 1955, and in 1957 he told one of his American contacts that he had once been arrested and served time in a Soviet prison at some time for one of his attempts to escape illegally from the USSR. He was arrested again thereafter for a second plan for escape, and he was given psychological treatment as a result. REPNIKOV was in contact with a number of Americans and other Western travellers again in 1958 and 1959. In September 1959 another Soviet, a friend of his, told an American tourist that REPNIKOV had been arrested after receiving a letter from an American which thanked him for his interest in being an agent and gave him directions for future contacts. In the summer of 1960 there was a long article in Komsomolskaya Pravda about the arrest of REPNIKOV and a friend of his on charges of being agents of CIA. Neither was.

VORONTSOV took place on the street, and they went to a restaurant together. It further said that VORONTSOV was continuously in contact with foreign tourists. These two lines are crossed out in the draft, and in their place is written: "The Second [Counterintelligence and Security] Department of the UKGB for the city of Moscow is fully oriented concerning him." NOSENKO was told that VORONTSOV most recently worked for Inturist at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow, and that he had had a number of meetings with American students and with tourists. NOSENKO commented: "This is agent work. He is an agent." He was asked, "But to you nothing is known?" NOSENKO said, "Absolutely nothing."*

NOSENKO went over the rest of the CHEREPANOV documents rapidly, for the most part simply reading them aloud, with side remarks on topics unrelated to the documents or the Americans discussed therein.

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*In the summer of 1963, VORONTSOV had contacted two different groups of young Americans and told them of his plans for escape from the Soviet Union. He also told them he had information about KGB agents through his Inturist employment, and that the American authorities should be told of him and his plans; he passed on an elaborate code system which was to be used to get in touch with him to assist him in his escape plans. He was so open in his contacts, unrealistic in his plans, and insecure in his conversations with the young Americans (none of whom had any intelligence connections) that when they reported to American embassies in the West, VORONTSOV was immediately assumed by U.S. authorities to be either a clumsy provocateur or a fanciful, immature youth. Nothing further was heard from VORONTSOV. There had been no previous record of him in CIA files; the CHEREPANOV document was the only confirmation of his other contacts with foreigners.

d. Report on KAZAN-KOMAREK

(i) Introduction

Vladimir Joseph KAZAN-KOMAREK was the subject of reports made to the FBI by both NOSENKO and [redacted] source [redacted] According to their information, the Soviets had agreed to lure this naturalized American to the USSR in connection with his Cambridge, Mass., travel business; once there, he would be arrested and turned over to the Czech Ministry of the Interior (the MV, the Czech counterpart of the KGB) to face charges of espionage. KAZAN-KOMAREK is the only individual on whom these two sources--NOSENKO on 26 February 1964, [redacted] -supplied mutually confirming information. In addition, it is the only known instance of NOSENKO giving the FBI details on a person while failing to offer the same or similar details to CIA.

Warned by the FBI in March 1964 against travelling to the Soviet Bloc, KAZAN-KOMAREK went to Moscow in October 1966 to attend an Intourist travel agents' conference. His last previous trip to the Soviet Union had taken place in early 1965. En route from Moscow to Paris after the conference ended, the Aeroflot plane on which he was a passenger was diverted to Prague. There KAZAN-KOMAREK was removed from the aircraft and placed under arrest by Czech authorities. CIA subsequently examined KAZAN-KOMAREK's background as a native Czech and former agent in Czechoslovakia of a [redacted] intelligence service, resulting in speculation by CIA that he might have been under KGB control from the time of his clandestine activities for the [redacted] in the early 1950's. third country

(ii) Statement by NOSENKO

The FBI report of its 26 February 1964 interview of NOSENKO concerning KAZAN-KOMAREK reads as follows:

[redacted]

(iii) Statement by [redacted]

The FBI reported the following on its interview of [redacted] regarding KAZAN-KOMAREK:

[redacted]



* KALAY-KOMARIK has not had any covert relationship with CIA or other U.S. Intelligence agencies.

** See Part V.F.6. for details on the BERGHOORN case.

e. Alfred SLESINGER: Suspected Source of the FBI

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO first reported on Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER (also spelled SLEZINGER) on 3 July 1964 when he said that an American of this last name, owner of a photographic shop in New York City, was suspected by the KGB of having connections with the FBI. Consequently, NOSENKO said, when SLESINGER travelled to Moscow the KGB Tourist Department arranged to place him in contact with an agent of the department, and while SLESINGER was in Odessa the Tourist Department instructed the KGB organization in that city to have him "surrounded" with agents.

[redacted] SLESINGER himself has told the FBI of having been questioned by Soviet authorities about his association with the FBI, first during a 1962 trip to Odessa and again while visiting there in 1966.

Details from NOSENKO, [redacted] and SLESINGER on this subject are presented below.

(ii) NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER was under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate, according to NOSENKO, because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who came to his store and in whom he seemed to display more than normal interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets and was trying to study them. Upon learning of his forthcoming trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting."** The KGB, NOSENKO said, wanted to study SLESINGER as being a possible agent or operational contact of the FBI.

The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and responsible for this case was Yu.M. DVORKIN, a senior case officer in the American Section of the Tourist Department. An agent of the Tourist Department (name not give by NOSENKO [redacted] was director of a photographic shop in Moscow, and on KGB instructions he became friendly with SLESINGER during the latter's trip to Moscow; NOSENKO thought that the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa,

[redacted]

** The FBI [redacted]

NOSENKO believed for the purpose of visiting relatives, and DWORLIN directed the Odessa KGB to have him "surrounded" with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of SLESINGER's being engaged in intelligence activities, NOSENKO said on 30 September 1961, he would have been arrested and a KGB recruitment approach would have been made on that basis. Since nothing pertinent was developed by the KGB, NOSENKO added, no such approach was made.

When he first raised SLESINGER's name with [redacted] on 8 July 1964, NOSENKO said SLESINGER had been to the USSR several times; he thought these trips had occurred in 1960 and 1961 (the years when NOSENKO has said he was serving his second tour of duty in the American Department, Second Chief Directorate). On 30 September 1964, however, NOSENKO stated that he was unsure of the years of SLESINGER's trips to the Soviet Union but that they occurred while he was in the American Department (June 1958 to January 1960 and January 1962 to January 1964).*

[redacted]

* SLESINGER told the FBI that [redacted]

** Born in Odessa on 27 September 1908, SLESINGER came to the United States in about 1923 and subsequently became a naturalized citizen. [redacted]





8. Technical Penetrations of the West German Embassy

a. Introduction

Besides his information on the KGB microphones in the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO in 1962 and 1964 reported on the presence of concealed microphones in several other Western embassies in Moscow.* The greatest detail he furnished on this topic, apart from that on the U.S. Embassy, concerned the KGB capability to overhear the West German Ambassador dictating cables and other official correspondence in his office at the embassy.

Independent of NOSENKO's information, the West German Security Service, the [illegible]



* For a discussion of the KGB's technical coverage of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, see Part V.E.3.g. NOSENKO said that he knew of microphones being in the Argentinian and Uruguayan Embassies, as well as in the apartments of British Embassy employees, and of a KGB order to install microphones in the Brazilian Embassy; he was also aware that no microphones had been placed in the British Embassy; these facts, according to NOSENKO, comprised the remainder of his knowledge of KGB technical penetrations of Western embassies in Moscow.



states on 12 June that the KGB had been successful in effecting clandestine entry into foreign embassies in Moscow and had, in fact, been able to get into all of them with the exception of those of the United States and Great Britain. NOSENKO was then asked whether the KGB had also been able to enter the West German Embassy. He replied: "The situation is worse with the Germans. It is worse. It's a different matter with the Germans. They are being listened to. KROLL, the Ambassador,* is a very intelligent and skilled analyst, and he provides a great deal of solid information... KROLL dictates everything and even his own memoranda. The memoranda he dictates are very interesting, very interesting memorada. That is, the information we receive from the microphones is very solid information, very solid information, because he knows everything. He knows what ADENAUER will think ahead of time. A very intelligent man and an excellent, excellent analyst. His analysis is tremendous. Also, [U.S. Ambassador] THOMPSON visits and talks with him, and we know that THOMPSON was there and what took place. Valuable information. He is very talented, this KROLL."

[redacted]

* Hans Anton KROLL became West German Ambassador to Moscow in 1953. From 1953 to 1955 he had been Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and from 1955 to 1958, Ambassador to Japan. His only previous Soviet tour was during 1923-1925, when he was the German Vice-Consul in Odessa. In March 1962, KROLL received a considerable amount of publicity in the Western press when, according to the New York Times (2 March) there was "an outcry in the West German press all week over reports in Die Welt and Bild, Hamburg newspapers with the same ownership, that Dr. KROLL had recommended major concessions to the Communists for a German-Soviet settlement." As a result, ADENAUER publicly recalled KROLL to Bonn for consultations. He had been under fire for similar reasons the previous November and was recalled then, too. He left Moscow permanently at the end of 1962.

Embassy Section, American Department, Second Chief Directorate. During these visits she would open her bag and Source could see the large documents which were destined for the Chief of the Third Department. The cover letter read: 'List number _____. To (Chief of the Third Department). Translated from German by _____.' Source often joked with Tatyana and in this view would complain to her that she always brought very thin documents for the American Department but very thick documents for the Third Department. On several occasions Tatyana would be late delivering material to Source's section, and she would state that the typists in the Operational Technical Directorate were busy doing something for the Third Department. On the basis of his experience Source knew that something important must have been received from the microphones concealed in the German Ambassador's office.

"All of the intercepted material obtained by the Operational Technical Directorate was sent first to the Informational Group of the Second Chief Directorate. This group decided which information should be seen by the Central Committee. According to Source, a large amount of this material was considered very significant at the time and was sent to the CPSU Central Committee over the signature of the Chairman of the KGB.

"Source never read any of the above material. Source does not know if the microphones are still in place and still operational.

"Source does not know if the KGB was able to break the German codes."




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

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

9. Cryptologic Successes Against the U.S. Embassy

a. Introduction

At his second meeting with CIA in June 1962, NOSENKO expressed fear that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow might be advised of his contact with CIA. This would be a fatal move, he said, since the KGB was reading all State Department enciphered cable traffic between Moscow and Washington. NOSENKO explained that he knew this because, as a senior officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, he saw the deciphered cables every day. On this same basis and also because of his personal and direct responsibility for the section's operations against American code clerks, NOSENKO assured his CIA handlers on several occasions that the KGB could not and had never been able to read traffic enciphered in the U.S. Armed Forces (attache) cryptographic system.*

Meeting with CIA the next day, NOSENKO tempered his earlier statement about KGB cryptologic successes. He reported that "only certain" of the State Department ciphers were being read by the KGB, and that he personally saw the deciphered plain text only on rare occasions. This information was further qualified during the interrogations of February 1965 when NOSENKO said that State Department enciphered traffic was broken "very, very seldom" during the 1960-1961 period and that "we [the U.S. Embassy Section] never saw these documents." NOSENKO has not changed his original statement that the KGB has never been able to break the military codes.

NOSENKO has stressed that he has no aptitude for technical matters and had no interest in or access to information on specific techniques used by KGB cryptologists to break the American codes. He suggested in general terms, however, that KGB successes in this field were made possible in part by information obtained from American cryptographic personnel who defected and were recruited in the late 1940's and the 1950's, in part by information from the microphone installations in the two military code rooms and certain U.S. Embassy offices. NOSENKO has not specified how this information was used or which of these two categories of sources was of greater value, although he did report that the loss of KGB ability to read the State Department codes coincided with and was largely a result of the installation of an acoustically secure enclosure for cryptographic operations. (The date was late 1961 or early 1962, according to NOSENKO, but actually late 1962, according to U.S. authorities.) At the same time, NOSENKO indicated, the microphone in the military code room (which was probably effective until late 1960, [redacted] was of little use.

There is a degree of correlation between NOSENKO's information on KGB cryptologic successes and that earlier reported by

* It was for this reason that his own and the section's "number-one mission" in 1960 and 1961 was to recruit a military code clerk, but this had not been accomplished; see Part V.E.3.c.

GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN told CIA that "three or four messages of State Department cipher traffic were broken sometime in the period 1945 to 1950; past traffic could be read on this basis. I have not seen the evidence, but they read the telegrams of the Foreign Service in Moscow in 1960, and evidently later." GOLITSYN then went on to say: "I am sure they had as an agent a code clerk of the Foreign Service." NOSENKO's statements contradict GOLITSYN.*

The following sections summarize NOSENKO's information regarding KGB cryptologic efforts, methods, and successes and, since they have a bearing on his report, provide excerpts from NSA and USIB damage reports on the KGB microphones found in the U.S. Embassy in 1964.

* See Part V.E.3.c.

b. Information from NOSENKO

From his personal experience, NOSENKO said in 1962, he knew that the KGB Eighth Directorate had broken the enciphered messages of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow but not those of the military elements there. At the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962, however, the KGB cryptologic success ended, according to NOSENKO in 1964. He has furnished some details on the types of Embassy enciphered traffic being read in clear text and on the way in which the clear text was treated within the KGB Second Chief Directorate; in addition, NOSENKO has indicated that the KGB used microphones in the Embassy and exploited human sources to further its cryptologic work. These points are reviewed separately below.

(i) Breaking U.S. Ciphers

The first reference by NOSENKO to KGB cryptologic successes against U.S. Government enciphered traffic was made at his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962. At that time he raised the subject in connection with his personal security now that he was in contact with CIA. He said: "If possible, handle things in such a way that only a small group knows. Listen, I don't trust your records because there are people even there. I will tell you something more. We are reading certain of your codes. Therefore I don't trust this business and, therefore, I ask... It is better to list me somewhere in your records as an intelligence officer who you have under development. But don't indicate my rank anywhere.* Listen, here is what I fear--I even had the idea of going home and putting a bullet through my head and ending it all. Because I don't trust you. I don't trust your methods and I don't believe that you can keep a secret 'secret.' I am afraid that something will go wrong.

"Listen, we are reading your ciphers. We are even reading your ciphers. Certain of your ciphers are being read. We are reading [them] at the present time. I am afraid to tell you this. Why? You will change them and they will guess at once why there has been a change after everything had been going smoothly for so many years. You must give some thought--Let them read [the codes]. Nothing has happened, America has not disappeared. America is just as strong as it always has been.

"We are reading all the State Department ciphers. Understand, [we are reading] all the State Department [ciphers], but not the military [ciphers]. This is the situation: We are reading all the State Department ciphers. [Several words unintelligible, as NOSENKO is whispering.] What THOMPSON has said, what his present Counsellor, McSWEENEY, [has said]. All this is being read, i.e., these ciphers are being read, but the military [ciphers] are not. The military are not. [I know this because] I worked in this business, against the American Embassy... I was a deputy section chief. I know everything and I am telling you everything. And my main work was with a code clerk...**

* Later in this meeting, NOSENKO said he was a major; for a further discussion of NOSENKO's rank, see Part V.G.1.

** James STORSBERG, see Part V.E.3.c.(ii).

I can even tell you that we tried to get him there, but it didn't work out...

"So, we are reading all the State Department ciphers. But if you change something right now, they will understand at once that it could have come only from me... All ciphers that go from Moscow to Washington are being read, but not the military [ciphers], the State Department ones. Because we still are unable to understand the military ciphers, but the State Department ciphers are being read. But, if you wish to protect me, you must--I don't know what to do--let them be read. Listen, I saw them every day, every day, i.e., the ciphers, all enciphered State Department cables which went from the Embassy. We had them all, down to the last one. I saw them every day..."

During the third meeting, on 12 June 1962, NOSENKO revised his statements made the day before. He now said that only certain of the State Department codes had been broken, and that he had only rarely seen the clear text of deciphered cables. NOSENKO repeated that military cipher systems had not been broken. His statements were as follows: "[We are reading] not all, not all, of course. Some are being read... All things which are sent in cipher are, of course, intercepted, but not all are being read. It is impossible to read them. It is necessary to know the [illegible] ciphers to read them. Well, let's suppose that we send [enciphered cables] from the United States. You pick all of them up, but you cannot read them. It's the same with us. Everything that leaves the Embassy, everything like a teletype machine, all this is noted, everything, no matter how it is transmitted. But everything is not read... The State Department ciphers are being read, not all, but they are being read... I mean that what the military sends we are not able... but we can read some of what your diplomats send. Not we [the KGB Second Chief Directorate] but the [KGB] Eighth Directorate. They are reading some things."

Asked whether the KGB was reading all the State Department's enciphered traffic or only a small part of it, NOSENKO replied: "Not all. We are not reading all the State Department [traffic]." He also said, contrary to his statement of 11 July 1962 that he saw the deciphered traffic "every day," these documents reached him "very seldom"--at the most "ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 1961.

Following his defection, NOSENKO reported that he had learned in discussions with G.I. GRYAZNOV of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, during 1962 and 1963 that the KGB could no longer break State Department enciphered traffic by the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962.* (Earlier, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that he knew "definitely" that the KGB Eighth Directorate was then having no success in breaking enciphered traffic of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.) At about the same time that State Department traffic could no longer be read, NOSENKO reported, various U.S. Embassy officers were less often heard

* According to NOSENKO, he was transferred to the Tourist Department from the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, about this time.

discussing significant information over the concealed microphones in their offices. This development had led GRYAZNOV and S.M. FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the American Department) to conclude that a "room-within-a-room" had been installed in the Embassy and that other security measures had been instituted there.* After his transfer from the American Department in early 1962, NOSENKO continued, he also had occasion to discuss the KGB loss of code-breaking capability with GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate; from him NOSENKO learned that the Central Committee of the Communist Party was exerting considerable pressure on the Chairman of the KGB for continuation of the material formerly obtained in this manner; consequently, the KGB Chairman was demanding maximum effort from all officers in the recruitment of code clerks.

In the second series of hostile interrogations, on 20 February 1965, NOSENKO made the following statement concerning KGB crypto-logic success during 1960-1961: "Occasionally the Eighth Directorate would break messages, but very, very seldom, and we never saw the documents."

(ii) Handling of Deciphered Cables

In mid-1964 NOSENKO was debriefed on the procedures used by the American Department, during his reported tenure there in 1960-1961, in handling the clear text of deciphered cables of the U.S. Embassy. The report of NOSENKO's statements on this subject is as follows: "The Russian text of those State Department coded messages which had been broken was sent to SEMICHASTNYY, the Chairman of the KGB, who sometimes forwarded it to Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the material to Vladimir Alekseyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, or KLYPIN's successor, S.M. FEDOSEYEV. NOSENKO saw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and later on FEDOSEYEV's desk, but was never permitted to read it. NOSENKO knew, however, that the reader had to sign for those articles that he read. Nikolay ZEMSKOV, from the Secretariat of the Second Chief Directorate, brought a book containing the broken State Department messages to KLYPIN or FEDOSEYEV. He would open the book to certain pages which had red paper and permit KLYPIN or FEDOSEYEV to see the material. This was Eighth Directorate material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how ZEMSKOV got it... At times portions of this material were read aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, but they concerned the position of the American Ambassador or the U.S. Government on political questions and were of no significance to him. Infrequently there was mention of the expected arrival of Americans who were not permanently assigned to the Embassy, and NOSENKO remembered that one such item concerned the arrival of one or two men, a 'commission,' to check the work of the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of State or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on certain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest in the information as it did not relate to agents or

*See Part V.E.3.g. for a further discussion on NOSENKO's information on the decline in quality of intercepts resulting from the decreased efficiency of the KGB microphone installations in the U.S. Embassy.

agent activities. NOSENKO noted, however, that the material concerned messages from the American Ambassador, Moscow, to the Secretary of State and from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador, Moscow. All of this material was highly sensitive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated more carefully than Top Secret information."

(iii) Methods of Cryptologic Attack

Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State cryptographic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate various methods applied to the problem as known to him from his position as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and his responsibility for handling the production of KGB microphones concealed in the Embassy. One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on 12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts were picked up on the KGB microphones,* the Eighth Directorate compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by other means. The two other methods indicated, analysis of equipment sounds and exploitation of human sources, are discussed in greater detail below.

NOSENKO has twice referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations picked up by the microphones in the State Department and military code rooms. He said on 24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [equipment noises which drowned out conversations].** In the military code room--that was where [James H.] STORSBERG and later [Matthew P.] ZUJUS worked--we didn't get much. We could hear STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers. This was, of course, all recorded and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding. Of course, all other intercepts were turned over to them also." NOSENKO reported on 14 May 1964: "In 1960 and 1961 from the State Department code room [we heard] always the sounds of machines only. Machines only. Three times during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of the guys said several numbers. Jim STORSBERG was sitting alone in the military area. The reception was good. He seldom spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself and sometimes a mechanic of code machines came to him, a military guy, a sergeant... I forget his name.*** They said two or three phrases: 'Did you

* See Part V.E.3.g. concerning the KGB microphones in the U.S. Embassy.

** Until December 1962 when an acoustical room was installed within the State Department to enclose cryptographic equipment, teletype and code machines were vulnerable to the one microphone later discovered in this area. Since that time presumably only the teletype equipment could be heard. Here NOSENKO is speaking of the earlier period. On 20 February 1965 he said, however: "The microphone is not in the State Department code room, but next door where the teletype machines were located." This information was true only after the secure room was installed.

*** William Stanton HURLEY, a Warrant Officer who supervised military communications, repaired cryptographic equipment, performed stand-by cryptographic duties when STORSBERG was unavailable, and supervised other sensitive activities (see Part V.E.3.c.).

check this? Yes. This side good.' And so on. This was 1960 and 1961, and everything from these two rooms--State and military--was put in one special place. Colonel Aleksandr [Nikolayevich] SELEZNEV from the Eighth Directorate came and looked at them. There were numbers. He took them for one or two days and then returned them."

NOSENKO was more specific with regard to another source of analytic information. Questioned on 24 January 1964 concerning the recruitment and use of code clerks by the American Department, NOSENKO enumerated the recruitments known to him and then said: "As I recall, way back in 1948 or 1949, there was a man of yours who defected. He stayed behind. I believe his name was McMILLAN.* I don't remember his exact name, but he stayed behind in the USSR and I know he helped them a great deal. Then, after him, was this 'ANDREY.' Thanks to his help they were able to read your State Department codes.** To date we have never been able to read your military codes. 'ANDREY' was not a code clerk. I believe he was a code-machine technician. After that there were many efforts made, but there were no successes. Right now I know definitely that the Eighth Directorate, which is involved with decoding, does not have anything at all. In the past they have submitted reports to KHRUSHCHEV and the Central Committee on their intercepts. But now they are not getting anything at all. Therefore, right now the highest priority mission given to the First [American] Department and the Second [British] Department is to get at code clerks. But in any event, they never were able to get at your military codes." The debriefing continued:

Question: But did not 'ANDREY' bring out military code material?

NOSENKO: No, I believe it was only State Department material. What he mainly did was to describe the operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic settings were made.*** Then, of course, those two who were very

* James H. McMILLAN, a code clerk on the staff of the U.S. Military Attache in Moscow, defected in 1948, because of his devotion to a Soviet woman.

** Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym: "ANDREY") was in Moscow 1952-1954. It is not clear from NOSENKO whether the benefits of SMITH's information were limited to this period or extended to 1960-1961. Apparently the same type of cryptographic equipment was in use by the State Department for the entire time. See Part VI.D.3.b. for further details on this case.

*** At the time of SMITH's Moscow tour there was only one code room at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, used both by State Department and military personnel. As the only cryptographic machine technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access to both State and military cryptographic equipment, although he was an Army sergeant assigned to the office of the Military Attache. In his statements to the FBI, SMITH has claimed that, in fact, the only information he gave the Soviets in Moscow was fabricated by himself and therefore useless.

knowledgeable of such matters, MARTIN and MITCHELL, they gave tremendous help.* Then there was some American code clerk who they brought into the USSR, I believe, via India.

Question: Was this HAMILTON?**

NOSENKO: I don't know his name. This was after MARTIN and MITCHELL... He helped them a bit. No question about it. To some degree anyway. After that so far as I know there was nothing at all with results. Now they are attempting to get a code clerk.

Question: Were there other attempts made?

NOSENKO: Yes, there was an attempt against Jim STORSBERG.***

* William Hamilton MARTIN and Bernard Furguson MITCHELL were NSA mathematicians who defected to the Soviets in July 1960. Both had previously served with the Naval Security Group in Japan and were familiar with U.S. intercept and cryptologic efforts. No indication is available that either had any detailed knowledge of U.S. cryptographic procedures and equipment.

** Victor Norris HAMILTON (also known as Fouzi di Mitri HINDALI), a native of Palestine, worked as a linguist in the Arab Section of NSA from 1957 to 1959, when he was released for medical reasons (paranoid schizophrenic). He defected to the Soviets in Prague on 12 June 1959. He was not a code clerk.

*** See Part V.E.3.c., which describes the STORSBERG case and other unsuccessful KGB recruitment operations involving American code clerks during 1960 and 1961.

c. U.S. Evaluations

NOSENKO's statements about the KGB microphones in the American Embassy led to investigations by U.S. authorities which resulted in damage assessments, part of which are germane to the NOSENKO reports on KGB cryptologic successes. NSA examined the question of cryptographic security in light of the microphones found in the State Department and military code rooms at the Embassy, while the USIB Security Committee studied the security ramifications of other microphones which were discovered in the Embassy. Extracts from the NSA and USIB Security Committee reports are given below. Although the latter report does not specifically mention the cryptologic potential held by the microphones, it states that classified cables were dictated in the Internal Political Section offices until December 1963; most of the military cables, the report adds, were typed by the originator, but certain ones were dictated in the Military Attache offices.

(i) NSA Report

"... There were two code rooms in the Embassy, one serving the Department of State and the other serving the attaches. An operating microphone was discovered in each of these two rooms. *

"During the fall of 1962, special enclosures were built for each of these rooms, and all cryptographic operations were performed in these enclosures beginning in December 1962. Enclosures of this type are built to rigid specifications and have been exhaustively tested. They are designed to protect against just such networks as discovered in Moscow. Thus, we may conclude that there has been no compromise of information in Moscow due to cryptographic operations since December 1962, so long as the enclosures were operated in accordance with the proper procedures. Between 1952 and 1962, however, the code rooms were not protected against this type of surveillance...

"... It was technically feasible for the Soviets to have recovered the plain texts of the messages encrypted and decrypted by machines in these code rooms. This stems from the fact that teleprinters and cryptographic equipments do not run silently; they emit acoustical and electromagnetic energy--that is, they make noise as they type, print, and punch information. The sounds emitted by the machinery involve minute differences in amplitude, frequency, and timing as different letters and characters are processed by the equipment. Relatively insensitive pick-up devices can detect these differences if they are placed at fairly close range to the equipment as was the case in each of the Moscow code rooms. When these sounds are recorded and analyzed the plain text of messages can be reconstructed. Considering the specific equipment used, we must conclude that the Soviets could have recovered the texts of most messages sent to or from the Moscow Embassy from the time of occupancy until December 1962 in the case of Department of State traffic, and through 1960 in the case of attache traffic...

"In addition to the recovery of the plain texts of individual messages being processed during this time period in Moscow, it is possible that information on the cryptographic operation

* According to all knowledgeable sources queried in the investigation of Dayle SMITH, all cryptographic operations, both military and State Department, were performed in a single room on the ninth floor of the new Embassy building in 1953 and 1954. Separate code rooms were established sometime after this and before 1959.

of the MCB (State Department cipher machine) and the KL-25 (Attache cipher machine) was recovered... This results from the fact that the sounds made by these equipments reflect the internal mechanical workings of the cipher machine; these sounds can be recorded, analyzed, and the cryptosystem itself could have been reconstructed. If this did occur, not only the messages processed in Moscow, but also those messages processed by other posts using the same machines and the same cryptomaterial could have been lost to the extent that they were intercepted...

"The attache cryptomaterials are similarly compartmented. During the period 1952 to 1960, various rotor machines were used.

[redacted] From 1955 to 1958, the KL-1 was used, and from 1958 to date the KL-7 has been used. In October 1960, the KL-7 was placed in a special sound-proof box which prevented any attache traffic from being recovered after that time, since all attache messages were processed either in that system or in one-time pad...

"In Moscow, the Department of State during the period October 1960 through February 1961 enciphered nearly all messages classified Secret and Top Secret in one-time pads, resulting in the loss only of the Confidential traffic during that period. Department of State found it necessary to revert to the use of one-time tape machines for messages classified up to Secret from March 1961 until the enclosures were installed. Therefore, most Confidential and Secret traffic was probably lost during that period; but Top Secret messages were still enciphered in one-time pads and thus secure...

"We must assume that all Department of State communications that were machine-processed in Moscow could have been compromised from 1952 to December 1962. These consisted of messages of all classifications until October 1960; Confidential messages only from October 1960 until February 1961; and Confidential and Secret messages from February 1961 until December 1962.

"Most Department of State classified messages involving Iron Curtain posts exclusive of Moscow should also be assumed to have been compromised during 1952-1959 through cryptomachine information derived at Moscow. It can be assumed that such messages during 1960-1962 were not compromised by this means. State Department classified messages which excluded Iron Curtain posts would not have been compromised by the Moscow penetration because of the isolation of crypto systems.

"Machine enciphered military attache traffic processed in Moscow should be assumed compromised until October 1960, but was secure after that date.

"During 1952 to 1954, all traffic in the entire attache net which included Moscow could have been compromised.

"There is no reason to believe that any information was compromised through cryptographic operations after December 1962 when special enclosures were installed, so long as the enclosures were operated in accordance with the proper procedures..."

TOP SECRET

(ii) USIB Security Committee Report

"The security practices and procedures [at the American Embassy] appear to have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at which time the first plastic [acoustical] room was installed. A change occurred in the work habits [in May 1960] in that the more senior State Department officers utilized the plastic room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The room could accommodate only a limited portion of the Embassy classified discussions and, accordingly, a number of classified discussions were held outside of this secure area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an accepted practice of the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices routine classified operations of the Embassy and to dictate classified documents and telegrams. Extremely sensitive matters such as high-level political decisions, matters pertinent to the most sensitive U.S.-Soviet relationships and positive intelligence operations were not dictated and if discussed, were mentioned in a cryptic manner...

"In the External Political Section during the 1953-1960 period there were daily staff meetings... Work assignments were given at these meetings to individual officers who, in turn, prepared classified dispatches or telegrams to the [State] Department. It was reported that the officers of the External Political Section frequently dictated classified material, including telegrams, within their offices. Officers of the Internal Political Section generated few classified telegrams... These were, however, typed in the offices. From May 1960 to date [1964] the Ambassador-DCM operation conducted their most sensitive classified discussions and actions in the acoustic room; however, routine classified day-to-day operations were discussed and dictated in the offices. Ambassador KOHLER reported that since August 1962 he and members of his staff working on substantive or sensitive matters utilized the secure room and that all material to be encrypted was drafted in long-hand or dictated in the acoustic room.

"The pattern for the External Political Section and the Internal Political Section remained basically the same during the period of May 1960 to the present time; however, the most sensitive matters were discussed or dictated in the acoustic room or drafted in longhand... In September 1962 the second acoustic room was erected for the typing section for the handling of sensitive classified material. From December 1963 to date it was indicated that no classified telegrams have been dictated outside of the acoustic rooms. It was stated, however, that the day-to-day operations including analysis of developments within the Soviet Union were openly discussed in various offices and the conclusions reached later became the basis of classified documents or telegrams...

"The military attaches reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or typed by the originator and then turned over to the code clerks for transmission. In certain instances cables were dictated in the offices..."

1. Introduction

NOSENKO, as previously indicated, came to Geneva with the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference in mid-March 1962 and established contact with CIA in June of that year. His arrival in Geneva and his first meeting with CIA thus occurred three months and six months, respectively, after Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN defected to CIA from the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki, on 15 December 1961,* and was exfiltrated to the United States.

A discussion of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO appears in Part V.I.7.

Presented below are, first, a summary on GOLITSYN, then a survey comparing GOLITSYN's and NOSENKO's leads, and finally, a protocol on GOLITSYN which NOSENKO signed.

2. Background Information on GOLITSYN

GOLITSYN, a KGB counterintelligence officer, was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in July 1960 under the alias of Anatoliy KLIMOV. In defecting to CIA, he provided more than 20 documents taken from the Helsinki KGB Legal Residency files as well as extensive information about KGB officers and operations acquired during his 16-year career in the KGB.

GOLITSYN had had a variety of job and training assignments in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow and training assignments in the Second Chief Directorate.** The bulk of his career was spent in work against the American target for the First Chief Directorate; this was his responsibility in Helsinki and had also been his principal area of responsibility during his previous tour abroad, in Vienna from 1953 to 1955. (In the latter assignment he had been known to Petr DERYABIN, who defected to CIA in 1954, and this was the reason for GOLITSYN being assigned to Helsinki under alias.)

Among the GOLITSYN documents was a study of American Intelligence operations exploiting tourists visiting the USSR, the so-called "legal travel program."*** This study, which runs to sixteen pages in translation, was prepared in KGB Headquarters and was sent to the Helsinki Legal Residency under a cover letter, dated 7 April 1961, which suggested a number of steps to be taken in order to counter such operations. The study was based on two principal sources:

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* According to NOSENKO, GOLITSYN defected on or about 15 January 1962, after NOSENKO had been reassigned to the Tourist Department.

** As a result of this service, GOLITSYN was the original source of numerous leads to identifiable penetrations of Western Governments, including agents with access to classified information such as William VASSALL (see Part VI.D.5.b.) and the French officer in NATO, George PACQUES.

***See Part V.D.7.c. for details.

- The minutes of CIA and MI-6 joint conferences on legal travel operations, held in 1959 and 1960. (The KGB agent George BLAKE confessed that he had passed these documents to the KGB.)

- Actual cases of American legal travel operations in the USSR which had been revealed to, or uncovered by, the KGB. (Some of the cases had been publicized through Soviet announcements of arrests and trials, but the majority of those cases cited by name in the study had not previously been known to be compromised. In a few instances activities of the American Intelligence agents appear to have been embroidered upon by the KGB, while in some others innocent tourists were wrongly accused by the KGB [redacted]

Among recommendations made in the cover memorandum was the instruction to recruit or place agents in tourist agencies handling travel to the USSR. These agents could then provide information on the use of these firms by foreign intelligence services in work against the Soviet Union.

GOLITSYN had information on certain aspects of the KGB Second Chief Directorate work against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Prior to his assignment in Helsinki he had conferred several times in April and May 1960 with officers of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, concerning possible assistance he could render them in their work against American code clerks transiting Helsinki en route to their Moscow posts.* During his assignment to Helsinki he travelled to Moscow on TDY in January 1961, at which time he discussed with these same officers the possibility of his using in Helsinki a Finnish businessman, Johannes PREISFREUND, who had been recruited by the Second Chief Directorate for an operation against an American code clerk in Moscow.** GOLITSYN acquired further information about such operations on at least two occasions, when Second Chief Directorate officers visited Helsinki on TDY and either called on him for support or chatted with him about officers and operations.

3. GOLITSYN Leads and Information from NOSENKO

a. Microphones in the U.S. Embassy

In his visits to the American Department GOLITSYN learned by accident of KGB technical operations against the U.S. Embassy

* NOSENKO denied that GOLITSYN visited the American Department at any time in 1960.

**Although knowing that GOLITSYN went to the American Department in 1961, NOSENKO said that the month was not January but July, for it was in July that he (NOSENKO) was on leave; GOLITSYN's passport, however, verifies he was in the Soviet Union in January 1961 and shows no entries for July of that year. See Part V.E.3.c. for further details on PREISFREUND.

in Moscow. When asked in April 1962 about the product from such operations, GOLITSYN said he had heard about results many times, but the only concrete example he was in a position to give was the following: During one of his visits to the American Department in 1960* he heard and saw that a report or reports of the results of audiosurveillance in the U.S. Embassy had been lost. While he was present, the Department Chief ordered all the personnel to search once more for these papers, and as GOLITSYN stood there they went through all their files. GOLITSYN said he could see that there were many such reports, each having a red line on it, which signified that these reports were the property of that department of the KGB Operational Technical Directorate (OTU) which was responsible for making the installations. He explained that this meant that the American Department had to return the reports to that Directorate, and this was the reason for a search being made. The only office in the U.S. Embassy which was specifically mentioned in connection with this search was that of the Minister Counselor.**

b. Other Leads Corroborated by NOSENKO

There are twelve KGB operations on which both GOLITSYN and NOSENKO have given mutually confirming information, although their respective reports do not always cover the same data. These operations, all discussed elsewhere in this paper, are:

- Henry SHAPIRO	Part V.C.2.a
- BENSON, MULE, and STROUD	Part V.C.3.b.
- Thomas BARTHELEMY	Parts V.D.7.c. & VI.D.2.d.
- Carmen TORREY	Part VI.D.2.a.

* Elsewhere GOLITSYN has stated that he visited the American Department several times between April and June 1960 in preparation for his assignment to Helsinki in July 1960. He has also incorrectly stated that he visited the department in December 1960 (his passport and CIA travel records show this was actually January 1961); GOLITSYN therefore may have been referring to this later visit.

** In June 1962, NOSENKO told CIA that there were microphones in the offices of the Minister Counsellor at the U.S. Embassy, and he said at that time that he had seen intercept reports of conversations or dictations by successive Minister Counsellors. In 1965 NOSENKO volunteered a story about the loss of one of the intercept reports which the American Department had received in 1960 or 1961; he identified it as one which recorded the Minister Counsellor giving dictation. According to NOSENKO, the American Department was turned upside down for a month, December, in the search for the missing report. Although the document was never found, neither the Chief of the American Department nor O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, was subjected to any punishment because the draft from which the missing report had been typed was found to be in the possession of the Second Department of OTU. From this the investigators concluded that the document itself had probably been returned to the OTU and burned, and that inadvertently no paper had been executed to record its destruction.

- [redacted]	Parts V.D.7.c. & VI.D.2.b.
- [redacted]	Part VI.D.4
- [redacted]	Part VI.D.4.
- [redacted]	Part VI.D.4.
- Canadian Code Clerk (name not known)	Part VI.D.4
- [redacted]	Part VI.D.4.
- William J. VASSALL	Part VI.D.5.a.
- Clandestine entry into Swedish Embassy	Part VI.D.9.

c. Leads Conflicting with NOSENKO Reports

Either through direct contradictions on a key point or through omissions by NOSENKO about a major feature, there are five operations on which GOLITSYN and NOSENKO have supplied conflicting information. These operations, all discussed elsewhere in this paper, are:

- James STORSBERG & Johannes PREISFREUND	Part V.E.3.c.*
- Adam BROCHES	Part VI.D.2.a.
- Gerald SEVERN	Part VI.D.2.a.
- "SASHA" (KGB cryptonym)	Part VI.D.2.a.
-Edward E. SMITH	Part VI.D.4.b.

d. Leads to Operations Against U.S. Embassy Not Covered by NOSENKO

GOLITSYN reported on six operations against personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow which have not appeared in the reporting by NOSENKO.** These operations are summarized below.

GOLITSYN heard in about 1957 of the recruitment of a female employee--"like a secretary"--of the U.S. Embassy. With another American girl, she had travelled to Georgia in 1957. There the KGB placed in her path a KGB agent, a Georgian male. They began living together, and this relationship continued in Moscow where she was recruited.

* GOLITSYN's lead to the American recruited with PREISFREUND's help is equated to STORSBERG on the basis of NOSENKO's and PREISFREUND's statements that PREISFREUND participated in no other operation. GOLITSYN reported that the target of this operation was recruited; NOSENKO reported that STORSBERG rejected the KGB approach.

** By virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, he was directly responsible for knowing of all KGB operations against personnel at the Embassy in that period and definitely would have known of any successes since his earlier tour; he knew that "ANDREY" was the last successful one (1953-54).

of the U.S. Embassy Section that the latter had as an agent a code clerk in the Embassy who was scheduled for transfer to Helsinki. This subject came up in a discussion of GOLITSYN's forthcoming assignment to Helsinki, and GOLITSYN was told that if the agent was transferred to Helsinki, GRYAZNOV might let GOLITSYN have him as his agent. GRYAZNOV gave GOLITSYN no details about the operation other than the fact that the agent had provided the KGB with some information and the KGB considered him "a real agent."

Also in the spring of 1960, GOLITSYN learned from GRYAZNOV that he, GRYAZNOV, had developed an operation against a military code clerk at the U.S. Embassy to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited. From the accounts given by NOSENKO and STORSBERG, this does not appear to concern the STORSBERG operation, which was just beginning at this time. NOSENKO has mentioned no other operation against a military code clerk.

I.Y. KURILENKO told GOLITSYN that while serving in the U.S. Embassy Section he had followed an American diplomat returning to the United States in 1959, and there he had completed the recruitment which had begun while the diplomat was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.* According to KURILENKO, he had travelled to the United States under cover of the Soviet Exhibit Committee.

GRYAZNOV informed GOLITSYN in April or May 1960 that an American, possibly a code clerk, but definitely an employee of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on a homosexual basis beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The KGB had photographs of the American in various homosexual acts. However, SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments at this time; SHELEPIN said that this method of approach was "too dirty" and the KGB should find another way. SHELEPIN did not exclude the future use of the photographs, which the KGB would hold in reserve.

Another case mentioned by GRYAZNOV to GOLITSYN was that of the attempted recruitment of an American female secretary on the basis of her relationship with a KGB agent, either a lover or a close friend. The agent, with the help of a KGB officer, tried to influence her, but failed. She left the USSR prior to July 1960, but the KGB planned to work on her again, as she was to return to Moscow.

On a TDY trip to Helsinki in November 1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV of the U.S. Embassy Section told GOLITSYN that he had come there in order to ride back to Moscow on the train with a U.S. Embassy code clerk with whom he planned to strike up an acquaintance to be continued in Moscow.** In about September 1961 a friend of KOSOLAPOV's came to Helsinki on TDY, and GOLITSYN tried to get him to talk about KOSOLAPOV's train operation, but he would not discuss the case. From this GOLITSYN was certain that the recruitment had been successful.

GOLITSYN learned from V.M. KOVSHUK, apparently in January 1961, that the Finnish agent Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American at the U.S. Embassy. NOSENKO has described no successful operations in which PREISFREUND took part (see preceding section).

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* NOSENKO said that there was no operational reason for KURILENKO's travel to the United States at the time of the Soviet Exhibition in New York City, and that KURILENKO's duties related only to security; the KGB Resident in New York City, NOSENKO added, could have given KURILENKO some special task if he wished.

** See Part V.E.4.b. for discussion of KOSOLAPOV's TDYs to Helsinki.

4. NOSENKO's Information on GOLITSYN

In February 1965, after he had been questioned by CIA about GOLITSYN, NOSENKO signed the following statement concerning his knowledge of GOLITSYN:

"I have never met or seen Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN.

"During the period 1960-1961, while I was serving as Deputy Chief, First [U.S.Embassy] Section, First [American] Department, Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, I remember that Anatoliy GOLITSYN visited the Section to discuss the proposed use of my agent "PROKHOR" [PREISFREUND] in the operations of the Helsinki Residentura. I was away from Moscow at the time of GOLITSYN's visit, but I know that he talked to V.M.KOVSHUK, and that at KOVSHUK's request he also talked to [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY [of the American Department] about American diplomatic couriers travelling through Helsinki en route to and from Moscow, and to KOSOLAPOV about American code clerks. I do not remember what they specifically discussed. I learned about this visit from KOVSHUK after I returned to Moscow from leave, and also heard about it from KOSOLAPOV and GROMAKOVSKIY.

"I do not know the date of this visit of GOLITSYN's, but I do know that it was after he was posted to Helsinki. I believe that it was in the summer of 1961. I know for certain that I was away from Moscow at the time on leave, because KOVSHUK told me about it after I returned from leave. Since he discussed code clerks, I would have met him if I had been there.

"I have been told by my interrogators that this visit of GOLITSYN's took place in January 1961. I do not believe this to be true because I know that I was away on leave when he came and my leave was in July 1961.

"I never heard of any other visits by GOLITSYN to the First Section, First Department, during the time that I served there in 1960-1961.

"I have been told by my interrogators that GOLITSYN visited the First Section, First Department, three times in May-June 1960 before going to Helsinki and that he talked at length to KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV about what he could do in the Helsinki Residentura to assist our Section in its operations against code clerks coming to the American Embassy in Moscow. I am sure that GOLITSYN did not make any such visits in 1960 and that no such conversations took place at that time. Since I directly supervised the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and shared the same office with them, any professional discussions by them with GOLITSYN about code clerks would be either with my knowledge or would be reported to me. If he did in fact make such visits in May-June 1960, I cannot explain why I do not know about them.

"I have been told by my interrogators that KOSOLAPOV visited Helsinki in November 1960 to accompany an American code clerk on the train to Moscow. I have also been told that on this trip he had official contact with GOLITSYN concerning this code clerk and concerning one of GOLITSYN's assignments to assist the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate by developing information on code clerks before they left Helsinki for Moscow. I do not know that KOSOLAPOV went to Helsinki in November 1960. I do not know that KOSOLAPOV accompanied any American code clerk to Moscow from Helsinki, except Paul JENNER. I do not know that KOSOLAPOV met with GOLITSYN and discussed the subject of code clerks with him in Helsinki in November 1960 or that KOSOLAPOV ever saw GOLITSYN in Helsinki.

"I do not remember that exact date of GOLITSYN's defection, but I know that it was in January 1962, I believe on the 15th or 17th of January. I do remember that he defected on a Saturday and that it was not discovered until the following Monday.* I am certain that GOLITSYN's defection took place after I had transferred back to the Seventh [Tourist] Department in January 1962. In the ensuing investigation within the KGB, I was never questioned on what code clerk operations GOLITSYN may have known about.

"I know that no written damage report on GOLITSYN's defection was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate. In the Seventh Department, where I was serving at the time of GOLITSYN's defection, I remember that V.D. CHELNOKOV, the Chief of the Department, was questioned about the orienterovka [study] on tourist operations which GOLITSYN was known to have taken.

"I have been told by my interrogators that GOLITSYN defected on the night of 15 December 1961. I cannot accept this date because I know that I was no longer in the First Department at the time of GOLITSYN's defection. I agree that the true date of GOLITSYN's defection must be known to the CIA, and I can only assume that my interrogators have either made a mistake or are trying to trap me. In any case, I still maintain that GOLITSYN defected after I moved to the Seventh Department in January 1962."

F. Surveillance of Soviets in the United States

1. Information from NOSENKO

At the second meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO related that V.A. KOZLOV, Chief of the American Department of the KGB seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, had gone to the United States the year before to investigate the suspected cessation of surveillance of Soviets stationed in New York City

* The 15th of January 1962 fell on a Monday.

and Washington, D.C.*

"We have sensed that something has happened in America," NOSENKO said at that time. "We do not feel surveillance. There is no surveillance." The KGB Legal Resident in New York City, B.S.IVANOV, had reported the situation to the KGB First Chief Directorate which, in turn, had sought the Second Chief Directorate's opinion as to why no surveillance was being noted. Unable to suggest a reason, the Second Chief Directorate asked whether the surveillance of Soviets could have been called off temporarily. The First Chief Directorate doubted that this could be the case but did state that radio traffic normally used in U.S. surveillance "was not on the air." KOZLOV consequently was sent to the United States to assess the situation, and in the course of a month, NOSENKO said, he visited both New York City and Washington. KOZLOV discovered not only that there was no surveillance of Soviets but also that "they dropped our democracies -- Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary. They temporarily took them [surveillance] off."

Also at this meeting NOSENKO commented that:

- "If your surveillance comes up on the radio, they [KGB monitors] pick them up everywhere."

- The practice of KGB case officers was not to proceed directly from a Soviet installation to a meeting with an agent, but rather to use other Soviets as decoys "so that you will think we are working on somebody, whereas in fact we are not working on them. [American] surveillance is onto everybody as soon as they come out the door" of a Soviet installation.

NOSENKO's only other reference to surveillance in the United States was made on 29 January 1964 during a discussion of the "ANDREY" case.** While V.M.KOVSHUK was in the United States trying to reestablish contact with "ANDREY", NOSENKO said, he was usually accompanied by two other KGB officers. KGB monitoring of FBI surveillance communications revealed that KOVSHUK and the others*** were referred to by the FBI as "the Three Musketeers."

2.Information from Other Sources

a. GOLITSYN

In early 1962 GOLITSYN reported that the KGB was well

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* KOZLOV was in New York City from 15 November to 30 December 1961, except for a two-week period (from 5 to 19 December) when he was in Washington. His departure from New York City fell on the same day that John ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street dead drop in Moscow and that, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV later went to the dead drop site (see Part V.E.3.d.). KOZLOV had earlier been in the United States with the Bolshoy Ballet, from 12 April to 14 June 1959.

** For further details on the "ANDREY" case, see Part VI.D.3.b.

*** The others, V.M.IVANOV and A.K.KISLOV, were not named by NOSENKO.

acquainted with American counterintelligence surveillance tactics, and since about 1953 the KGB, through special apparatus, was able to monitor radio traffic stemming from American surveillance of Soviet Embassy personnel. While at the KGB Juridical Institute in 1957-58, GOLITSYN said, he had read studies on the methods used by U.S. counterintelligence in conducting surveillance of Soviet officials in Washington and New York City. The studies included some American documents, obtained through KGB agent sources, containing instructions for carrying out surveillance on Soviets. The KGB, GOLITSYN added, used this information defensively abroad and in adapting its own surveillance techniques within the USSR.



c. CHEREPANOV Document

One of the documents provided by CHEREPANOV in November 1963* was entitled "Operational Conditions in the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence Organs Against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in the U.S.A. in 1957-58." Nearly half of this document, signed by A.S. FEKLISOV,** was devoted to a discussion of the organization and methods of FBI surveillance of Soviet officials stationed in New York City and Washington. The information (sources not indicated) covers radio communications between fixed surveillance posts and mobile surveillance posts.

* The CHEREPANOV documents are reviewed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.c.

** FEKLISOV, under the alias FOMIN, previously served as KGB Legal Resident in Washington.