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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz

Subject: Habib Mission: Your Meeting with the
Saudi and Syrian Foreign Ministers,
July 20

The temporary breakdown in negotiations which Phil Habib experienced last week due to Israel's ceasefire violations and checkpoint closures was rectified over the weekend and Phil has been meeting this week with the Lebanese and Israelis. It has become clear, however, that the process has gone as far as Phil can take it in the absence of some state or states willing to receive the PLO combatants, if only temporarily.

We are continuing to work on this problem, but we are not optimistic about finding a solution. Assad has said Syria will not take the combatants, and our approach to Algeria received a negative reaction, at least in the first instance. The Saudis say they are continuing to work on the Syrians and are also looking at a possible dispersal of PLO combatants to states who have issued them identity cards. There is, however, no easy solution yet in view.

Israel, meanwhile, now seems to recognize the quandry it is in. Begin has at last absorbed the implications of your message of last week. He understands that if he authorizes an assault on West Beirut he risks a serious rupture in the U.S.-Israeli relationship which, in turn, would cause him serious domestic problems. On the other hand, if he foregoes the military option and Habib's negotiations drag on without success, Begin will pay a heavy domestic price for having involved Israel in a major operation which has produced significant civilian casualties without accomplishing its ultimate objective.

The fact is that the negotiations are currently in the doldrums with no breakthrough in sight. While the Israelis apparently feel they have no choice but to give us more time to try to find a place for the PLO to go, Begin's sense of frustration with the situation could

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result in an attack order before very long. Iran's new military offensive into Iraq will be seen by some Israeli leaders as providing a convenient distraction for renewed Israeli military action.

At the very least, we can anticipate a break-down in the cease-fire at almost any time as the Israelis revert to their tactic of applying "pressure" on the PLO negotiators. We may be hard pressed to keep the next cease-fire breakdown from getting out of hand.

The foregoing describes the context in which you will be meeting on July 20 with Foreign Minister Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia and Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria, who will be visiting you on behalf of the Arab League. All parties involved in the Lebanon problem are aware of, and attach great importance to, this meeting. Indeed, some appear to be withholding what otherwise might be their next moves in the realization that for the next several days the negotiations will have shifted to Washington. The following is the conceptual framework within which we are now viewing the West Beirut negotiations and within which you might look ahead to your Tuesday meeting.

OUR OBJECTIVES

The situation in Lebanon has evolved to a point where the U.S. has acquired important interests in the manner in which the immediate Beirut crisis is resolved. There is no guarantee that we will be able to accomplish all of our objectives, primarily because we lack total control over the evolution of events. Nevertheless, our interests require a solution which satisfies as many of the following objectives as possible:

-- We must try to avoid the extensive bloodshed which would result from an IDF assault on West Beirut.

-- Accordingly, with a view toward Israeli impatience, the West Beirut crisis should be resolved sooner rather than later.

-- The PLO should not realize the tremendous enhancement in its status, both political and military, which would derive from its remaining intact in Beirut.

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-- We should try to acquire and retain leverage over Israeli actions in order to assure their eventual withdrawal from all of Lebanon.

-- We must attempt to further the peace process if the opportunity arises, but in any case to avoid setting it back any further than the crisis itself already has.

-- We want to emerge with our relations with key Arab states intact, particularly their perception that only we can make constructive things happen in the region.

-- We hope to the extent possible to receive the credit for a successful resolution of the crisis and avoid blame for failure, particularly if failure takes the form of an Israeli assault on West Beirut.

Possible Scenarios

At present we must continue with our current approach since we have not yet exhausted the possibilities of finding a destination for the PLO fighters leaving Beirut. Thereafter, if there is no breakthrough in the negotiations, we will have to anticipate the need to rethink our own approach or perhaps to confront an all-out Israeli attack on West Beirut. Our goal under any scenario will of course be to realize as many of our objectives as possible. The following are some possible scenarios:

-- Continue on Course. We could continue essentially along the course we have been on. This would make maximum use of the implicit pressure of potential Israeli military action to convince the PLO to negotiate seriously and quickly and, if necessary, find a state willing to receive them. On the down side, under this approach we have to accept the possibility that an Israeli attack might take place, although we would continue to make the Israelis aware of the impact of this on our bilateral relationship.

-- Open-ended Negotiations. We could try to give Phil Habib as much time as necessary to put together a package deal, revolving around the safe departure of the PLO from Lebanon, by doing everything in our power to forestall all Israeli military operations against West Beirut whatever the circumstances. This would minimize,

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but not eliminate, the risk that many additional innocent people would be killed. On the other hand, with the pressure off the PLO, it might be impossible to close a deal and our efforts to forestall an Israeli attack would severely complicate our relationship, with no guarantee of success.

-- Fixed Deadline. We could establish a date certain (perhaps several weeks hence) by which the negotiations must be completed and the PLO on the move, and prior to which we would insist that the Israelis forego any military action. If the PLO deals seriously, we can bring about their withdrawal without further Israeli military action, thus maximizing the benefits to us. If not, however, and if the Israelis then attack, it will appear as if we had provided a "green light" and we would pay a heavy price in our Arab relations.

-- Temporary Relief. We could arrange for the transfer of the PLO leadership and combatants to the north of Lebanon (in the Tripoli area and the Bekaa Valley) as a temporary measure. This would probably remove the risk of an Israeli assault on West Beirut but, by relieving the pressure, could further complicate our search for a receiving state to facilitate the departure of the PLO from Lebanon completely. Such a "fallback" solution also would increase the chances of a "North Korea/South Korea" type situation for Lebanon, with the north dominated by Syria and the PLO and the south under Israeli hegemony.

-- An Israeli Assault. Whatever we say or do, the Israelis can decide at any time to launch an attack on West Beirut rather than risk letting the PLO off the hook. Both from the humanitarian point of view and in terms of our Arab relations, this is the worst outcome. Nevertheless, there would be the kind of adverse public reaction in this country, as well as worldwide, that would enable us to maximize our leverage over the Israelis, thereby facilitating our effort to get them to withdraw from Lebanon and make concessions in the peace process.

Your Tuesday Meeting with the Saudi and Syrian Foreign Ministers.

Unless we get a breakthrough sometime in the next few days on the problem of acquiring a recipient state for the

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PLO, there appears to be no alternative to using your and my meetings with the two Arab Foreign Ministers on Tuesday to try to move this situation forward within our current game plan. I suggest that to make the best use of this opportunity, we inform the foreign ministers in advance that we will be looking to them on Tuesday for concrete ideas on resolving the West Beirut crisis, specifically as regards resolving the "recipient country" problem. Otherwise they almost certainly will present us with nothing more than requests for U.S. concessions on recognizing the PLO.

I will be sending you more specific recommendations concerning how best to handle this meeting. We will need a comprehensive way of dealing with the various issues of interest both to us and to the two Ministers. Our immediate objective will be to move the ministers and their leaders toward a breakthrough on the problem of a place for the PLO to go. Whether we can bring this about, and how we try to do it, will make a difference as to how Phil Habib proceeds on the West Beirut issue. It could as well have an effect on our long-term policy approaches to larger questions such as the future of Lebanon, the peace process, our relations with the Gulf Arab states in the context of the Iranian offensive, and capitalizing on Syria's possible disenchantment--with the Soviets. We are also considering very carefully how you might best address the PLO factor when it arises. This is not to put too much significance on these meetings with the two foreign ministers, but the reality is that there are several sensitive factors at play and we need to address them with an awareness that they are interrelated.

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
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DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY--APPROXIMATE TIMETABLE



A maximum U.S. diplomatic effort between now and November 19 will set stage for your meeting with Begin. If Israel and Lebanon have not made substantial progress toward agreed withdrawal and security measures at that point, we will need to press our own views. The Begin visit can be a fulcrum to move the Israelis to withdraw in return for practical assurances regarding the security of their northern border. We need to show Begin major progress with Lebanese, PLO and Syrians.

Our working deadlines, some of which will necessarily change as negotiations proceed, are as follows:

By November 8:

- Conclude initial consultations with the Lebanese, French, Italians and Israelis about possible additional MNF participants. A short list of countries to approach first has already been developed.
- Lebanese should have contacted possible participants. We will follow-up with letters to their Foreign Ministers and call in their Ambassadors in Washington.
- The GOL will have established a commission to negotiate with the Israelis on southern Lebanon security arrangements.
- Draper has shuttled between Beirut and Jerusalem to establish modalities for direct Israeli-Lebanese talks.
- Draper has probed for maximum Lebanese flexibility in both security and normalization areas. What does GOL think it can offer as inducement to Israel?
- Draper to have visited Damascus and Riyadh prior to November 8. Mission: Develop Syrian flexibility and Syrian/Saudi support for Lebanese Government's objectives.

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- The Lebanese have followed up their initial contacts with the PLO and the Syrians. Draper has urged Lebanese to engage both PLO and Syria in serious negotiations.
- Gemayel has been to Rabat and may visit other Arab capitals to enlist support. We have urged moderate Arabs to be helpful and have conditioned the Israelis to accept Gemayel's need to strengthen his Arab base.
- PLO is positioning itself to seek Lebanese guarantees for Palestinian civilians in return for PLO withdrawal. We have told Lebanese this will be natural quid pro quo.

November 8:

- Direct Lebanese-Israeli talks begin. We are full partner, pushing both sides to expedite substantive discussion.

By November 19:

- We are ready to use existing MNF in Beirut, augmented by additional personnel, to deploy along Damascus-Beirut Highway in support of a simultaneous Israeli-Syrian pullback. Liaison with French and Italians is at advanced and detailed stage.
- Active U.S. diplomacy has expedited Lebanon's negotiations with Israelis, Syrians and PLO.
- U.S. has advanced final proposals on compromises between Lebanon and Israel regarding security arrangements.

-- [REDACTED]

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- Efforts to find destinations for PLO fighters are well advanced.

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
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November 19:

- You will meet with Begin. If Israeli-Lebanese talks are stalled, he must hear from you how and when we expect the Israeli occupation of Lebanon to end.
- Begin must understand we are prepared to publicly state our views of the obstacles to agreement.

By November 26:

- Syrian-Israeli disengagement should have begun.
- PLO departures should have begun.

By December 3:

- Additional MNF contributors will be needed to demonstrate to all parties that adequate international peacekeeping forces will be available. U.S. leadership, including readiness to increase size of our contingent, will be essential.
- Lebanese should have reached agreements with Israelis on practical security arrangements for southern Lebanon. We are full partners in negotiating process and must be prepared to press Israel to accept reasonable measures.
- UNIFIL will be a part of the interim security arrangements in southern Lebanon, although probably deployed to the north of its present area of operation. We will have started work with Secretariat and contributors to assure a new mandate consistent with an Israeli-Lebanese agreement.



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- Simultaneously, we will try to persuade the Arabs to go along with Lebanese concessions on security or normalization measures which may be necessary to bring about final Israeli agreement.
- Be ready to advance our final compromise proposal on normalization.
- Be prepared to publicly state our view of fair Israeli-Lebanese agreement and to lobby U.S. public and other governments for support.

By December 10

- Draper will have shuttled between Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem to establish clear framework for withdrawals.
- Once Israel makes firm withdrawal commitment, we will focus on the timing of PLO and Syrian withdrawals, using lever of Arab desire to get Israelis out on schedule.

By December 15:

- Final withdrawals of all foreign forces should begin on staged basis.
- Lebanese army and police, UNIFIL and MNF will be ready to move to mutually agreed position.

By December 31:

- Final withdrawals have taken place.
- Lebanese, backed by international peacekeeping forces, will be in control of all Lebanese territory.

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-- As I am sure you are aware, this may be the most serious moment in these many difficult days of seeking a solution to the West Beirut problem.

-- We are profoundly concerned about the recent trend of events. It is for this reason, on the instruction of the President, that I have asked you to come in.

-- Speaking frankly, the actions of the IDF around Beirut over the past 72 or so hours have made it impossible for Ambassador Habib to proceed with his negotiations. As you are aware, situations such as this are never simply stalemated; if there is no progress, deterioration sets in.

-- Recent Israeli actions regarding essential public services for West Beirut, the crossing points between West and East, and the ceasefire in place, have had an extremely deleterious effect on our hopes for progress toward objectives which we once thought were shared by Israel and the U.S.

-- We are, I believe, entirely realistic about situations such as this: a certain degree of continuing pressure is necessary to keep negotiations moving. Diplomacy must be backed by strength and an awareness that strength may be employed.

-- But the recent IDF moves around West Beirut have clearly been counterproductive. Rather than keeping the PLO focused on the need to negotiate their departure under reasonable terms, you have created a situation in which the Lebanese people have suffered and the Lebanese government leaders have been humiliated and rendered incapable of conducting negotiations.

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-- Our goal throughout has been to strengthen the government of Lebanon in order to restore an independent nation free of foreign forces and able to conceive of peace with Israel. We understood that you shared this goal.

-- Now however we face a situation in which the Lebanese government has been seriously hurt and our credibility as an honest negotiator is being compromised.

-- There is no need for me to tell you how deeply involved the U.S. is in this matter--diplomatically, morally, and now perhaps militarily. The President has asked me to tell you that he will not let America's good name be trifled with in any of these respects.

-- It troubles me greatly to say it, but the recent conduct of Israeli forces around Beirut has not seemed fully to accord with the statements and assurances we have received from Jerusalem.

-- Indeed, we are now faced with the troubling question of whether Israel continues to support this tremendous effort we are engaged in--to achieve a negotiated solution that brings about the departure of the PLO leaders and fighters from Beirut and helps the Lebanese regain control over their own capital.

-- The question has been raised whether Israeli forces may not now be seeking to undermine any hope of a negotiated solution while unilaterally pressuring the PLO to evacuate Beirut without a negotiated agreement.

-- I have been instructed to tell you that the U.S. will not have any part in such a solution. Neither our diplomacy nor our military forces will participate in, or be seen as accomplices to any such outcome.

-- We expect Israel and its forces to cooperate with Ambassador Habib's effort to achieve a negotiated outcome to the West Beirut problem.

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-- If we do not see such cooperation in the next hours we will have no choice but to consider other ways to preserve America's credibility and salvage the situation in West Beirut. I cannot specify what these will be, but I can tell you that we will have to consider steps such as withdrawing Ambassador Habib from Beirut and issuing an explanatory statement to the public, or, if the Lebanese government negotiators continue to be impeded by IDF checkpoints and other harassing measures, to instruct Ambassador Habib to undertake direct negotiations with those in West Beirut.

--I ask you to convey this to the Prime Minister and want to stress once again that I am speaking on the instructions of President Reagan.

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C. Hill - Habib, L.

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Habib -

Begin says he issued the order last night but somehow or another, I didn't realize his orders aren't carried out these days. Now we're told maybe by 5:00 this afternoon the water and electricity will be on, that there are technical difficulties. The technical difficulties are that the Israeli guys down at the end of the line don't want to do it, that's what the technical difficulties are, they just want to squeeze the people a little bit more. As far as I'm concerned those are the technical difficulties. I don't buy that in other words. Secondly. There is no way, absolutely no way in which I can move the negotiations along under the present conditions. I've got one telephone that's always busy, goes into the Prime Minister. All the other telephones are down and I can only get him on that phone once in awhile because he doesn't always stay sitting on the telephone. He can't come out. But he can go in. It's just, there is no way. They keep talking about I have to move in a hurry, they have lost two days by virtue of their refusing to do what I asked them to do. Two days of negotiation have been lost. I want them to understand that. I want you to understand it. I want the President to understand it, I want everybody in the country to understand it. I'm getting sick and tired. We get somewhere and then it all dissipates because somehow or another things go wrong. Most of the things that have gone wrong have gone wrong because of Israeli action in my opinion. I've been screaming for three weeks now about the importance of cease-fire in place. You want to know why they got into a fire fight the day before yesterday? Which set everything back another two days, that's four days? It's because the Israeli forces moved in. Under cover of a so-called cease-fire. They moved in closer and closer to the city. They kept moving. All right. Now maybe I've got them stopped once again. Meanwhile, I can't do anything because I can't talk to anybody. Now that's just the beginning. Now if you can make people begin to understand that. You understand what I'm talking about?

Hill:

Yes, I understand very clearly. We'll go get Aarons up and I'll be back to see him. I presume that somebody here has been talking to Sam in the early hours already. We'll get back on it. Over.

Habib

They've been talking. There's no question they've been talking. Well they're not getting. They're giving this line well, there's technical difficulties, but on Gary's demand you know what the latest line is? Oh, well, when they talk to / Abdu yesterday, it was Johnny

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agreed they would stay in one place, Abdu would stay in one place, and that's nonsense I want them off. Off. Out. That was my request. It wasn't that they stay in one place these days another place. I want them out of that crossroad. No ifs, ands butts. That's one thing. I haven't been able to get a hold of Abdu the last half hour or so, I don't know what his latest (static) . The other thing is that there are some other problems I want to raise with you now. Now for one thing, Wazzan (static). the question. He says the PLO will not accept our participation in the MNF. I said is that right. I said the Israelis and don't want to accept the French position (static) don't want to accept our role so there isn't going to be any MNF. I said they asked for our guarantee, we're giving them the best guarantee possible, the answer is it's not negotiable. That is the MNF. That's the MNF that the government of Lebanon asked for. And it's up to him to go back and tell them so. And if they don't like it they know what they can do. All right. In addition, of course, the work of the so-called (static) is still supposedly being conducted. It is not being conducted very efficiently. They have this problem of communication. Over.

Hill: Phil, I lost you on both those transmissions a little bit. Let me just repeat if you understand me. You said that Wazzan said the PLO won't accept US participation. You told them that maybe the Israelis wouldn't accept the French but he should go back and tell them that was what the MNF was going to be. Then you said that the military commission was not proceeding well. Did I miss something? There's been a lot of static. Over.

Habib : One of the reasons that the Military commission is proceeding well is because I can't get at people because of the closed roads and also because of the lack of electricity which affects the telephone service too. (static) approach that the Israelis are using. Now in addition. I want to make sure that Howe isn't going too far with certain things. We have got now a revised version of the Lebanese so-called plan. It's not substantially changed in any real way. The important thing is that we're still going to have to negotiate things out. For example, the Lebanese prefer to use the Ban Militaire to take them out rather than the port. And that suits me as well for a number of reasons. Over.

Hill: Could you repeat that? The Lebanese prefer what? Instead of what to take them out? Over.

Habib They prefer a place called the Ban Militaire, the military, both rather than the port, and that would mean they'd have to be lightered (?) out to the freighters. There are good reasons for that. I'm not altogether

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all along. There's going to be no cease-fire that way. There's going to be killing, there's going to be all sorts of trouble. Now. Three weeks or a month ago I told you we're going to have trouble with all the Arabs if we don't move, move, and we've gotten ourselves in this position and it's getting worse. My reading the cables, we're in, we're getting in a worse mess every day. They're introducing new things every day. All of a sudden now we gotta deal with the comprehensive peace settlement before we can deal with anything else. Three weeks ago nobody even mentioned (static). You wait another three weeks you'll have more things to think about. It is getting ridiculous. It has to end. (static)

Habib Charlie, are you still there.

static

Hill: Phil, I lost you for a minute there. Can you read me now. Over.

Habib static

Hill: Sorry, Phil, we're getting sunspots or something. I can tell you're transmitting, but I can't pick it up. Over.

Habib noise

Hill: Yes, you're a little bit clearer. Go ahead and try it. Over.

Habib We've got to look ahead a few weeks now. Even if we get this one thing done we've got to make sure we understand where we're going next. We cannot just let the Israelis sit. All over Lebanon where they are and let the Syrians stay where they are for that matter either. We have to start looking ahead. There's no way which they can stay here for the next several months and run this country. Is that understood. Over.

Hill: Yes, I think that's very well understood. Once we get the PLO out of there I think we'll be in a good position to really turn on the Israelis and make them do something. Over.

Habib Frankly, Charlie, I don't believe you. I mean, I believe you would love to, but I don't think that anybody back there has thought about it or is ready to do it. Maybe you have. But the important thing is that we don't even have them on board. So the things I have to have for the package yet. And we've been talking about that now for several days. Now if I get squared away

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and get some contact with these people in the next 24 hours, which I have not had for four or five days, and I can get the negotiations moving quickly, I can close this thing out in the next three days. That's presuming I get some decent contact if the Israelis will allow me to have it.

Hill Okay, we're having trouble with transmission again. I understand. I'll go down and talk to Larry and we'll step up the pressure to get you the things you need to day. To get the services back on, not any excuses, and to quit screwing around with the check point problem. Over.

Habib The galleries static I cannot move the way they've got me boxed in now. They've been telling me about how little time I had and I've ...4 days by virtue of the actions over the last four days. Over.

Hill Okay. Let me collar Larry and we'll talk to ~~ARCAS~~ and I'll get to Sam Lewis on this and make it very clear what you're thinking about all of this. Over.

Habib I'm going to have enough trouble with the Lebanese, the Syrians, the by the way, the Katea are going to cause us trouble. They say they don't want the French now. And the Katea are saying they don't care whether the Israelis agree to a matter of fact, they didn't even want a multilateral force. Now only did they not want the French in it, they say they don't want a multilateral force. They say the Israelis agreed to it. They don't like it. They don't want it. They want to go in and kill all those people that's what they want to do. And the other thing is, they don't want a token force here. Symbolic force. And of course the Israelis don't want it either. I said to them, I don't give a damn what you want, this is a package. I don't accept what you say. And we still got this age-old problem of the cease-fire. Every time there's a cease-fire they move in another quarter of a mile around the city. What kind of a cease-fire is that? That's why the firing started two days ago. Does anybody understand that? Over.

Hill Phil, one problem we're really going to have is that if these guys, if the Phalange, Katea, say this kind of thing publicly we're never going to get the US Navy in there. They're going to be just too frightened

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to do it. You know, they want assurances from everybody that nothing's going to happen to their boys. I just got a note here saying that we have two TV channels this morning reporting that there's going to be 1600 Marines coming in as part of an international force. And I heard on the radio a little while ago speculation that it would be a US-French force. Over.

Habib How long did you think it was going to be kept secret? What radio is this? Is it Radio Israel? Where is it coming from? Over.

Hill Phil, it sounds like it's Guli Zahal, out of Israel. the Israeli military radio. Over.

Habib We crossed Charlie, did you really think we were going to keep that secret? I mean, where's the story come from? Over.

Hill No. We were sitting around here yesterday, amazed that it still hadn't come out. That we got through the weekend on it. But it apparently comes originally leaked by IDF Radio, Guli Zahal. Over.

Habib The Israelis leak any thing they wish. Now listen. As far as and all that, don't worry. I have told everybody that when they come in nobody shoots at them. I'm not going to worry about the Katea shooting at them. The Katea aren't going to shoot at them. And neither are the Israelis. But you know, anything that happened, every kid over the age of 12 has a gun, you understand that? They better have their bullet-proof vests on. Over.

Hill Yeah, they understand that they can't control everything. But if any major faction sounds like they are opposed to it or can't be willing to hold their fire, it's going to be a real problem getting Congress or anybody else to let these guys go in. Over.

Habib static. And if we don't get all the guarantees that you need you still bring them in. Over.

Hill Phil, I don't think we're in a very productive radio time here. It's very hard to get you. I'm losing you from time to time. I think we just better use the time to go get Larry and start to go to work, unless you have something other vital we better wait for a better atmospheric condition. Over.

Habib Okay. static... You get working on it so we can see what we can clear up. Maybe we can clear it up with a different channel. Over and out.

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SUBJECT: Radio Report from Amb. Habib 10:05 EDT - Israeli Firing on West Beirut

BEGIN TEXT:

At 10:05 EDT (5 July 82), Ambassador Habib reported that Israeli tanks were firing into West Beirut, near the Galerie Semaan crossing. Habib is uncertain about the targets or the reason for the firing at this time, and will seek to verify these points. Habib recommends that the Department not make any announcement about this until this report is verified.

Addendum: At 1030 Draper called back to report that IDF tanks have undertaken another major advance into the Galerie Semaan area and are also firing from positions along the confrontation line at targets "about 1000 yards down" from Galerie Semaan. Targets are obscured in smoke. The firing has been continuing for the last 20 minutes. Habib says to tell everyone that the Israelis have no business there--this is the crossing "we have been telling them to vacate."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE *lm* IS, FPC, CDR Date 3/18/96

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Drafted by:LWG:DWelch
7/5/82 26611

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- We would expect any such US contribution to be small, perhaps a battalion (If asked: 800-1,000 personnel). We also would expect that the stay of US military personnel in Beirut would be comparatively brief. Estimates are always risky, but we anticipate they will be there no more than thirty days.
- We would not permit US personnel to be deployed to Beirut until we had received assurances concerning their safety.
- Because US forces participating in this peacekeeping effort would be equipped for combat, if this plan is implemented, we will comply with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution when they are introduced.
- Our intention is that US forces will not become involved in hostilities, and that their presence will help to avoid renewal of hostilities. All precautions will be taken before they are introduced.
- US objectives in Lebanon remain:
 - (a) the establishment of a strong central government in Lebanon;
 - (b) withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon;
 - (c) restoration of control by the Lebanese Government throughout the country and assurance that we would not return to the status quo ante when Lebanon was used as a launching pad for attacks against Israel.
 - (d) a permanent cessation of hostilities.
- We also believe that resolution of the Lebanese problem will contribute to the peace process and progress toward autonomy under Camp David.

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Q. How does deployment of such a force square with the US objective of fostering a strong central Lebanese authority exercising its own sovereign powers? Isn't this a demonstration that it is not capable of exercising such authority?

A. Not at all. It would be unreasonable to expect that the Government of Lebanon could by itself bring about the orderly departure of the PLO from West Beirut under current conditions. The purpose of the peacekeeping force is to facilitate the departure of the PLO and the strengthening of Lebanese Government authority in West Beirut.

Q. How does this relate to the further withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, to the establishment of a peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon? to next steps in the Habib mission?

A. Deployment of the peacekeeping force and the withdrawal of the PLO leadership and fighting force from Beirut are the necessary first steps in achieving a stable peace throughout Lebanon, including the withdrawal of all foreign forces. As we have indicated, the precise nature of further steps remains to be worked out between the Government of Lebanon and the other parties concerned.

Only in the general sense that this effort will contribute to overall stability in Lebanon is it related to the situation in southern Lebanon. It is not directly related, however, nor has it been determined precisely what will be required in the south.

As for Phil Habib, with the successful conclusion of this phase, he will have achieved success in his twin objectives of helping to bring the immediate fighting to an end and laying the foundation for a stable and lasting peace and strong central authority in Lebanon.

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ISRAELI TROOP WITHDRAWALS, BUFFER ZONE

- Q. Will Israeli forces pull back before, during or after the multinational force deploys? If so, how far?
- A. During the phase which has just been announced, that is the deployment of the peacekeeping force and the PLO withdrawal, (to be provided). Subsequent steps will be a matter for discussion between the Government of Lebanon and the other parties concerned.
- Q. Does this mean that there is no agreement at this point about eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces, even to the 40 kilometer zone, or of Syrian forces?
- A. An inherent part of this agreement is the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Beirut. There is no specific agreement at this point regarding the withdrawal of Israeli or Syrian forces from the rest of Lebanon or arrangements between the Government of Lebanon and other Lebanese elements. (To be rechecked)
- Q. What is our attitude toward Israeli withdrawal, Phalange units, Haddad, etc.?
- A. As I said, these are all matters to be discussed between the Government of Lebanon and the other parties concerned. As we have said on many occasions in the past, we favor the earliest possible withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the elimination of armed enclaves of forces not subject to the jurisdiction and control of the central Lebanese governmental authority.
- Q. Is a buffer zone still required in southern Lebanon with the PLO out?
- A. As we have said, we cannot allow a return to the status quo ante. Precisely what provisions are required for this are still to be

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US DEALING WITH THE PLO

- Q. In the course of this peacekeeping mission, won't American officials be in direct contact with the PLO, and won't this represent a change in our position on dealing with that organization?
- A. The Lebanese Government will be supervising the PLO departure with the help of the ICRC. However, we can't rule out the possibility of some operational contact between Americans involved and members of the PLO in order to facilitate the safe completion of this mission. This would represent no change in policy. As we have indicated in the past, we have had direct dealings with the PLO when it has involved questions of safety and security of Americans. We would regard any contacts which occur during the course of this mission as consistent with this policy. At the same time, we have not in any way changed our long-standing policy of not recognizing or negotiating with the PLO so long as the PLO does not accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognize Israel's right to exist.

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FATE OF NON-PLO ARMED FACTIONS IN BEIRUT

Q. What happens to non-PLO armed factions now in Beirut?

A. The plan envisages Syrian-backed factions in West Beirut (Saiga and the PLA) as well as Syrian forces will withdraw to Syria. This will take place during the same timeframe as the PLO departure. Other indigenous armed elements will surrender their crew-served weapons to the Lebanese army and will be subject to the authority of the central Lebanese government.
(To be rechecked.)

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MODE OF TRANSPORT FOR DEPARTING PLO

- Q. How will the PLO get to the places they are going?
- A. They will travel in chartered commercial transportation arranged for by the ICRC. (To be confirmed)
- Q. Will the US help fund the costs of this transportation?
- A. (To be provided)

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PLO DESTINATION

Q: Where are the PLO leaders and fighters, and their families, going?

A: (To be provided)

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AGREEMENT TO THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Q. Have all the parties concerned agreed to the creation of this force?

A. As the President noted in his statement, the Government of Lebanon requested our assistance. We have reason to believe the other parties will respect the mandate of the force.

Q. Who are the parties?

A. We have been talking with a number of governments and other parties who are either directly involved or who have influence on those directly involved. I do not think it would be useful to be more specific.

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TERMS OF PLO WITHDRAWAL

- Q. What are the terms of the PLO withdrawal? For example, will they take their weapons with them? What restrictions will apply to them in their new country of residence?
- A. PLO _____ weapons -- except for personal sidearms and rifles -- will be surrendered before departure and eventually destroyed or made inoperable. PLO members will take their personal weapons (rifles and weapons) with them. (NEA to provide a more detailed scenario).

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UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

Q. How does this action relate to the UN? Is it under UN sponsorship? If not, why not? Have you at least consulted with the UN?

A. This activity is not taking place under UN sponsorship. Because of the need to move quickly and of the limited duration of this operation, this structure is the most appropriate. We (and others?) have been in touch with the Secretary General. The UN is being asked to provide observers.

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THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR US FORCES

- Q. What are the terms of reference for US forces in the peace-keeping force?
- A. They will be operating under rules which apply to peacetime operations. (DOD to flesh out)
- Q. What type of agreement will cover their deployment?
- A. (To be provided)
- Q. What weapons will they have with them?
- A. (DOD to provide)
- Q. What is the command structure, including the relationship with the Government of Lebanon and other nations' forces?
- A. (DOD to provide)
- Q. How will they enter Lebanon? Plane? Ship?
- A. (To be provided)
- Q. Will the peacekeeping force perform a humanitarian role?
- A. The peacekeeping force will not have as one of its principal tasks the performance of a humanitarian relief function. At the same time, it will certainly cooperate with those organizations which will have such a mission.
- Q. How long will the peacekeeping force be in Lebanon?
- A. As the President has indicated, we anticipate that the peace-keeping force will be in Lebanon no more than 30 days.

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WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

- Q. What is the applicability of the War Powers Resolution?
Will a notification go to Congress?
- A. Since US forces equipped for combat are being introduced abroad, a report of that information will be filed. When the report is sent to Congress it will be made available publicly.
- Q. Do the provisions of the WPR concerning legislative veto or mandatory withdrawal come into play?
- A. No. The questions of legislative veto or mandatory withdrawal do not arise because those provisions apply only when US forces are to be introduced into hostilities or into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. These conditions do not apply in this case.

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PHASING OF FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND PLO WITHDRAWAL

- Q. How does the deployment relate to the PLO withdrawal in terms of phasing? Will the forces be on the ground before the PLO starts to withdraw?
- A. We anticipate that the PKF will be arriving in the next couple of days. In the meantime, we expect that PLO departure preparations will commence immediately.
- (Will need update closer to event)

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CONTACT WITH OTHER NATIONS

Q. Have you been in touch with other nations, particularly the USSR?

A. Yes, we have been in touch with several countries including the Soviet Union. We are confident that all parties understand the limited nature and scope of the peacekeeping force.

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CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Q. Have you consulted with Congress?

A. Yes, we have consulted closely with the leadership and the appropriate committees.

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NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE FORCE

Q. What other nations will participate in this force?

A. None beyond those announced by the President.

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ASSURANCES OF SAFETY FOR US FORCES

- Q. What assurances do we have that our forces will not be subject to attack, perhaps by radical elements of the PLO?
- A. We have assurances from the major parties, either directly involved or with influence over those directly involved, regarding the safety and security of the peacekeeping force. Obviously no peacekeeping force can be immune from all risk of isolated incidents. But we have taken all possible steps to limit those risks.

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For more than a generation, the Middle East has been the scene of instability, conflict, and suffering. The latest chapter in this tragedy is now unfolding in Lebanon. The United States has a special responsibility to do everything it can to help restore the peace and resolve the underlying sources of tension.

In early June, Ambassador Phil Habib returned to the Middle East at my instruction where he has been involved in intense negotiations to help resolve the immediate crisis and to lay the groundwork for lasting peace in that troubled land. The fruits of his skill, patience, and tenacity already are in evidence. The ceasefire declared more than a week ago is still holding.

Ambassador Habib now reports that the Lebanese authorities and the PLO are close to an agreement which would provide for the withdrawal from West Beirut of PLO personnel -- both leadership and fighting forces. If that agreement can be successfully concluded and implemented, it should lead to a resolution of the immediate crisis in Beirut and make a major contribution to efforts to bring peace throughout Lebanon.

The Government of Lebanon believes that deployment to Beirut of an international peacekeeping force--including a US component--to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in implementing this agreement will be indispensable to its success. I am convinced that we must take this step for peace.

In response to a request from the Government of Lebanon, and in consultation with the Congressional leadership, I therefore have decided that the United States will contribute up to one Marine battalion to an international peacekeeping force for Beirut.

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(Statement about other participants to be inserted) The peace-keeping force will assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in overseeing the safe and orderly departure of PLO personnel from Beirut, and will help in transition to Lebanese Government authority in Beirut.

Although our men will be prepared to defend themselves, their purpose will be to promote the peace. I do not intend for them to become involved in any hostilities. All appropriate precautions to ensure their safety have been taken. The mission of the international force is strictly limited and the deployment of US forces in Beirut will be comparatively brief. I anticipate it will be not more than thirty days.

This step will not, by itself, resolve the situation in Lebanon, let alone the problems which have plagued the region for more than thirty years. But I believe that it will increase the chance that we can realize our objectives in Lebanon:

- establishment of a strong central government;
- withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- restoration of control by the Lebanese Government throughout the country;
- establishment of conditions under which Lebanon no longer can be used as a launching pad for attacks against Israel; and
- a permanent cessation of hostilities.

I also believe that progress on the Lebanon problem will contribute to the overall peace process and to movement toward autonomy under Camp David.

There is no guarantee that my decision to contribute US personnel to an international peacekeeping force will ensure a lasting solution

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to the crisis in Lebanon. But I think it holds a reasonable prospect of success. Without our willingness to play such a leadership role, the simple fact is that people of the Middle East will be condemned to further suffering and the risk of containing instability and further war in the region will be high.

No one should misunderstand our purposes. This is not a step forward to large or long-term US military presence in the region. It is tangible proof that the United States is committed to peace and that we will do all in our power to achieve it.

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SHOULD NOTE THAT THESE POINTS SUPPLEMENT THE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES SENT REFTEL AND VIA WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS.

3. BEGIN TEXT BRIEFING POINTS:

OVERVIEW

O WHEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV MET LAST DECEMBER IN MALTA, THEY LAID OUT A BROAD AGENDA TO GUIDE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

O MUCH OF THAT AGENDA HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED; THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT AND CONCRETE AGREEMENTS SPANNING THE RANGE OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES.

O IN TOTAL, THE SIDES CONCLUDED 14 AGREEMENTS AND RELEASED 11 JOINT STATEMENTS. THESE REFLECT A MATURING OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AS WE PRESS FORWARD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOAL OF CHALLENGING OUR PAST HISTORY OF CONFRONTATION AND BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP OF ENDURING COOPERATION.

O BUT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN US ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. FIRST OF ALL WAS THE QUESTION OF THE BALTICS.

-- GORBACHEV EXPLAINED HIS POSITION AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MOSCOW WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH VILNIUS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT INSIST THAT THE LITHUANIANS ANNUL

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THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ONLY THAT THEY SUSPEND IT AND PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET LAW.

-- THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED OUR NON-RECOGNITION POLICY AND SUPPORT FOR THE BALTIC PEOPLES' STRIVINGS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- WE LEFT THE SOVIETS WITH NO DOUBTS AS TO OUR CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF DIALOGUE AND MOSCOW'S

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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, AND OF THEIR EFFECT ON
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

O THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE SUMMIT WERE GOOD. THE
PRESIDENTS APPROACHED PROBLEMS IN A CORDIAL AND
CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. EVEN ON ISSUES WHERE THEY
DISAGREED.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT NOTED, IT WAS A MARK OF HOW FAR
THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS COME THAT HIS
DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV ON DIFFICULT ISSUES
COULD BE CHARACTERIZED BY A SPIRIT OF CANDOR AND
OPENNESS, WITH THE SIDES SEEKING NOT ONLY TO
UNDERSTAND THE OTHER'S POSITION, BUT TO BUILD
COOPERATION.

-- INDEED, GORBACHEV AT ONE POINT OBSERVED THAT, HAD
U.S.-SOVIET WORKING RELATIONS NOT BEEN SO WELL
DEVELOPED LAST YEAR, THE RAPID PACE OF CHANGE IN

EUROPE COULD HAVE PROVOKED A REAL CLASH OF
INTERESTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, LIKE
"PUTTING A MATCH TO A BONFIRE."

O SO WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A GOOD BASIS FOR TACKLING
THOSE UNRESOLVED ISSUES THAT REMAIN ON OUR AGENDA.

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O THE LEADERS AGREED TO MEET ON A REGULAR BASIS WITH A
FOCUS ON WORKING ENCOUNTERS. GORBACHEV INVITED THE
PRESIDENT TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

GERMANY AND EUROPE

O PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD AN IN-DEPTH
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EUROPE,
WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE PROCESS OF GERMAN
UNIFICATION.

O WHILE NO BREAKTHROUGHS WERE MADE, SOME NEW IDEAS
EMERGED THAT WILL BE EXPLORED IN UPCOMING

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DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR.

O THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP WAS A MATTER FOR THE GERMANS TO DECIDE, CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. GORBACHEV DID NOT OBJECT.

O BUT SOVIET THINKING SEEMS STILL TO BE IN FLUX AND CHARACTERIZED BY MANY INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS.

O GORBACHEV REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A TRANSITION PERIOD.

O IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF CHOICE MEANS IN PRACTICE.

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O PRESIDENT BUSH REITERATED OUR APPROACH TO GERMAN UNIFICATION, STRESSING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATORY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND NO SINGULARIZATION OF A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC GERMANY.

O HE ASSURED GORBACHEV THAT NO ONE WANTED TO ISOLATE THE SOVIETS.

O HE REVIEWED THE NINE POINTS WE HAVE DEVELOPED TO ADDRESS THE SOVIETS' LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS, AND STRESSED THAT GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS A FACTOR FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

O HE ALSO NOTED THE BENEFITS TO THE USSR OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GERMANY.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED REGIONAL ISSUES DURING THE THIRD DAY OF THE SUMMIT AT CAMP DAVID.

O THE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD IN AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WAS VERY RELAXED, FREE-WHEELING AND MARKED BY

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EXTRAORDINARY CANDOR AND OPENNESS.

O MANY IDEAS WERE EXCHANGED AND A BROADER BASIS FOR COOPERATION WAS ESTABLISHED ON SOME ISSUES. ALTHOUGH NO BREAKTHROUGHS OCCURRED.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED AFGHANISTAN AND AGREED THAT THERE WAS A MEASURE OF COMMON GROUND IN THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES.

-- IN PARTICULAR, WE AGREE ON USING THE ELECTORAL

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PROCESS AS A MECHANISM FOR ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT. WE ALSO AGREE THAT A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY SHOULD PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT ELECTIONS.

O THE CRITICAL AREA OF DIFFERENCE REMAINS THE ROLE OF NAJIBULLAH IN A TRANSITION PERIOD.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT NAJIBULLAH RETAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF INCUMBENCY DURING A TRANSITION PROCESS -- A POSITION THAT MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT TO GET SUCH A PROCESS STARTED. PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF RESISTANCE VIEWS ABOUT NAJIBULLAH.

O ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE RECENT ATTEMPTED PALESTINIAN TERRORIST RAID AGAINST ISRAEL, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT YASSIR ARAFAT HAD TO CONDEMN THAT ACT, AND DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM ITS SPONSORS.

O THE SOVIETS AGREED ARAFAT SHOULD CONDEMN THAT INCIDENT.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAD A CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE EMIGRATION ISSUE AND THE QUESTION OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS SETTLING IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH PUSHED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AEROFLOT-EL AL DIRECT FLIGHTS AGREEMENT TO ASSIST THE PROCESS OF EMIGRATION AND TO ALLEVIATE

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HARDSHIPS POSED BY THE LACK OF DIRECT AIR LINKS
BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

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O PRESIDENT GORBACHEV COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF
ISRAEL ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
AND URGED THE U.S. TO DO MORE IN THAT REGARD.

-- GORBACHEV NOTED THAT THE USSR HAD BEEN BOMBARDED
WITH CRITICISM FROM ARAB COUNTRIES ON THE ISSUE
OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION AND IMPLIED DURING
HIS JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH
THAT, IF SOVIET CONCERNS ARE NOT HEEDED BY
ISRAEL, HE MAY HAVE TO GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO
ISSUING EXIT PERMITS.

-- HE STATED HIS HOPE THAT ISRAEL WOULD PROVIDE
ASSURANCES AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
U.S. ON THE ISSUE OF NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

O THE SOVIETS SAID NOTHING DURING THE PRIVATE SUMMIT
DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, TO INDICATE ANY BACKSLIDING
FROM THEIR COMMITMENT TO PERMIT OPEN SOVIET JEWISH
EMIGRATION. FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAS SUBSE-
QUENTLY CONFIRMED TO SECRETARY BAKER THAT SOVIET
EMIGRATION POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE.

O THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED THE VOLATILE SITUATION
IN KASHMIR AGREEING TO WATCH THE SITUATION CAREFULLY
AND TO URGE RESTRAINT IN CONTINUING PARALLEL
APPROACHES TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

O THE TWO LEADERS REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND CUBA. SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ALSO DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT.

O BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE
ESQUIPULAS PEACE PROCESS.

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O THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH CASTRO TO GET CUBA TO END ARMS SHIFMENTS TO THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR AND SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE SALVADORAN CONFLICT.

-- WHILE SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. MAKE DIRECT APPROACHES TO CUBA IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD PROBE THE CUBANS ON THE ISSUE OF ARMS TO THE FMLN, AND WOULD ALSO CONTINUE ECONOMIC AID TO NICARAGUA.

O ON ASIA, PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, POINTING OUT THAT THE U.S. FULLY SUPPORTS THE JAPANESE CLAIM TO THOSE ISLANDS.

-- HE URGED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE WITH JAPAN, SINCE THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO A REDUCTION OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE OFFERED ITS STANDARD REPLY ON THE ISSUE, THAT IT IS A BILATERAL PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN. GORBACHEV ALSO REFERRED TO HIS PLANNED TRIP TO JAPAN IN 1991.

O THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED CAMBODIA. THE PRESIDENT FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF JAPAN, THAILAND AND OTHER STATES TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES.

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-- THEY ALSO TOOK NOTE OF THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN THE PERM FIVE MEETINGS ON THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO DISCUSSED THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH ROK

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PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO IN SAN FRANCISCO ON JUNE 4. GORBACHEV EXPLAINED THAT THE USSR INTENDED TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNDERScoreD THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL TO BE GAINED FOR MOSCOW FROM BETTER TIES WITH SEOUL.

-- HE ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD COMPLICATE SOVIET RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA; BUT SAID THAT MOSCOW WOULD GO AHEAD WITH ITS PLANS NEVERTHELESS.

O PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM, EXPRESSING U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE DPRK TO SIGN AND IMPLEMENT AN IAEA NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

-- THE U.S. NOTED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE NORTH HAD BEEN GIVEN STANDARD NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S.

O GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT THE USSR WAS CONCERNED AS WELL ABOUT NORTH KOREAN FAILURE TO ACT ON ITS OBLIGATIONS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD APPROACHED THE NORTH ON THIS ISSUE AND SUGGESTED THE U.S. CONSIDER A DIRECT APPROACH TO FYONGYANG.

O ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WERE NOT BROUGHT UP BY EITHER SIDE.

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O THE PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN AFRICA, FOCUSING ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE PROBLEMS IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

-- THE TWO LEADERS OFFERED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR AN INTRA-ANGOLAN DIALOGUE AND THE CURRENT PROCESS UNDERWAY BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ON SOUTH AFRICA, BOTH EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT, SINCE PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND NELSON MANDELA WERE ENGAGED IN TALKS.

O AS A SYMBOL OF OUR GROWING ABILITY TO COOPERATE IN

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THE RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIA.

-- THE STATEMENT CALLS FOR A UN-LED RELIEF EFFORT THAT WOULD USE SOVIET TRANSPORT TO CARRY AMERICAN FOOD TO THOSE IN NEED IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA. THE STATEMENT ALSO EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE PEACE EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

O U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS ADVANCED CONSIDERABLY AT THE SUMMIT.

O THE KEY ITEM WAS THE SIGNING OF THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WHICH -- WHEN IT GOES INTO FORCE -- WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR

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COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. THAT AGREEMENT BREAKS MUCH NEW GROUND IN DEFINING U.S. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, PROVIDING:

-- SUBSTANTIAL GUARANTEES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY;

-- BUSINESS FACILITATION; AND

-- GUARANTEES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS.

O THE SIGNING OF THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT IS ONE STEP TOWARD THE EXTENSION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS (MFN); BUT TWO MORE STEPS ARE REQUIRED:

-- CONGRESS MUST APPROVE THE AGREEMENT; AND

-- THE PRESIDENT MUST WAIVE THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT.

O PRESIDENT BUSH MADE CLEAR THAT HE WILL NEITHER WAIVE JACKSON-VANIK NOR SUBMIT THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT TO CONGRESS FOR APPROVAL UNTIL THE SUPREME SOVIET

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PASSES THE LONG-PROMISED EMIGRATION LEGISLATION.

-- WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THIS.

O SEVERAL OTHER AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED AT THE SUMMIT WHICH SHOULD PROMOTE COOPERATION IN KEY ECONOMIC AREAS. THESE INCLUDE:

-- AN EXPANDED CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT THAT WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE AIR LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES;

-- A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT SETTING HIGHER

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BENCHMARKS FOR U.S. GRAIN SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION; AND

-- A MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT THAT NORMALIZES MARITIME AND SHIPPING RELATIONS.

O THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE BERING SEA FISHERIES TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN ABOUT UNREGULATED FISHING WHICH HAS SEVERELY DISRUPTED FISH STOCKS IN THE CENTRAL BERING SEA "DONUT," THE AREA BEYOND U.S. AND SOVIET 200-MILE ZONES.

-- THE STATEMENT SHOULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AN EFFORT TO MOUNT MULTILATERAL MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION SCHEME FOR THE CENTRAL BERING SEA.

O THE PRESIDENTS HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON PERESTROYKA AND ON THE PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION THAT PRESIDENT BUSH ADVANCED AT THE MALTA SUMMIT.

-- THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT WHICH UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS AN EXPRESSION OF U.S. AND SOVIET COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC PERESTROYKA.

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O THE PRESIDENT PRESSED GORBACHEV FOR ACTION ON THOSE UNRESOLVED REFUSENIK CASES ON THE LISTS PRESENTED AT MALTA, NOTING OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THESE HAD NOT

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BEEN "ZEROED OUT" AND ASKING FOR THE SOVIET PRESIDENT TO LOOK INTO THESE PERSONALLY.

O THE PRESIDENT ALSO NOTED OUR CONCERN ABOUT INDICATIONS OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE USSR AND URGED GORBACHEV TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY AND FORCEFULLY AGAINST IT.

END TEXT POINTS.


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ACDA-13	USIE-00	SP-01	DOEE-00	MMP-01	SNP-01	C-01	
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 APPROVED BY: EUR:JFDOBBINS
 EUR/SOV: AVERSHBOW P:KBRILL
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 NSC:W SITTMAN S/S:EMCKUNE
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 SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON WASHINGTON SUMMIT

REF: (A) ✓ STATE 178618
 (B) ✓ STATE 178619

- CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
- FOR ALL ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT ANATO POSTS, TOKYO, CANBERRA AND SEOUL WHICH ARE RECEIVING SEPTEL BRIEFING POINTS): YOU MAY DRAW ON POINTS IN PARA 3 AS APPROPRIATE TO BRIEF HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN DETAIL ON THE

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RESULTS OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. EUROPEAN POSTS AND

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MANILA SHOULD NOTE THAT THESE SUPPLEMENT THE LETTERS/
POINTS ALREADY PROVIDED REFTELS.

3. BEGIN TEXT BRIEFING POINTS:

OVERVIEW

O WHEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV MET LAST DECEMBER
IN MALTA, THEY LAID OUT A BROAD AGENDA TO GUIDE THE
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

O MUCH OF THAT AGENDA HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED; THE
WASHINGTON SUMMIT PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT AND CONCRETE
AGREEMENTS SPANNING THE RANGE OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES.

O IN TOTAL, THE SIDES CONCLUDED 14 AGREEMENTS AND
RELEASED 11 JOINT STATEMENTS. THESE REFLECT A
MATURING OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AS WE PRESS
FORWARD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S GOAL OF CHALLENGING
OUR PAST HISTORY OF CONFRONTATION AND BUILDING A
RELATIONSHIP OF ENDURING COOPERATION.

O BUT SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN US ON
IMPORTANT ISSUES. FIRST OF ALL WAS THE QUESTION OF
THE BALTICS.

-- GORBACHEV EXPLAINED HIS POSITION AND THE
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MOSCOW WOULD BE PREPARED
TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH VILNIUS. HE SAID THE

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SOVIETS DID NOT INSIST THAT THE LITHUANIANS ANNUL
THEIR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ONLY THAT THEY
SUSPEND IT AND PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET LAW.

-- THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED OUR NON-RECOGNITION
POLICY AND SUPPORT FOR THE BALTIC PEOPLES'
STRIVINGS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- WE LEFT THE SOVIETS WITH NO DOUBTS AS TO OUR

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CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF DIALOGUE AND MOSCOW'S ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, AND OF THEIR EFFECT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

O THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE SUMMIT WERE GOOD. THE PRESIDENTS APPROACHED PROBLEMS IN A CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY, EVEN ON ISSUES WHERE THEY DISAGREED.

O SO WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A GOOD BASIS FOR TACKLING THOSE UNRESOLVED ISSUES THAT REMAIN ON OUR AGENDA.

O THE LEADERS AGREED TO MEET ON A REGULAR BASIS WITH A FOCUS ON WORKING ENCOUNTERS. GORBACHEV INVITED THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

ARMS CONTROL

O THE SUMMIT RECORDED SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT AND CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL.

O THE BILATERAL CW DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENTS IS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD, PROVIDING FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE VAST BULK OF THE U.S. AND

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SOVIET CW STOCKPILES. THIS SHOULD GIVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATION OF A MULTILATERAL CW BAN.

O THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT COMMITS THE U.S. AND USSR TO REDUCE THEIR DECLARED CW STOCKS TO 5000 AGENT TONS BY THE YEAR 2002; PRODUCTION OF CW WILL END AT ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

O THE U.S. AND USSR FURTHER AGREE THEY WILL REDUCE THEIR CW STOCKS DOWN TO 500 AGENT TONS WITHIN THE FIRST EIGHT YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION. AT THE EIGHT-YEAR POINT, THE U.S. AND USSR WILL PROPOSE TO HOLD A SPECIAL CONFERENCE FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHETHER PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION IS

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SUFFICIENT FOR PROCEEDING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL REMAINING CW STOCKS OVER THE SUBSEQUENT TWO YEARS.

O THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENTS WILL ALLOW THOSE TREATIES -- CONCLUDED IN 1974 AND 1976 -- TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT AS TO RATIFICATION.

O THESE PROTOCOLS PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES -- SPECIFICALLY, ON-SITE HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT, ON-SITE INSPECTION AND IN-COUNTRY SEISMIC MEASUREMENT -- THAT WILL ALLOW THE SIDES TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE 150 KILOTON YIELD LIMIT SET IN THE TTBT AND PNET.

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O THE PRESIDENTS ISSUED TWO IMPORTANT JOINT STATEMENTS REGARDING THE STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.

O THE JOINT STATEMENT ON THE START TREATY SUMMARIZES AND REAFFIRMS THE SUBSTANTIAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS, COUNTING RULES AND VERIFICATION.

O OTHER ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT BUT NOT RESOLVED, INCLUDING BACKFIRE LIMITS, CONSTRAINTS ON HEAVY ICBM MODERNIZATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

O THE JOINT STATEMENT ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS AND FURTHER ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY CONTAINS A COMMITMENT TO PROMPT CONSULTATIONS AND START OF FOLLOW-ON TALKS AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL DATE AFTER START IS SIGNED.

O SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF THE DECLARATION INCLUDE THE SINGLING OUT OF HEAVY MISSILES AND MIRVED ICBMS FOR PARTICULAR EMPHASIS IN SUBSEQUENT START NEGOTIATIONS.

O NEGOTIATIONS ON DEFENSE AND SPACE WILL CONTINUE WITHOUT DELAY UNDER THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK. THE GOAL OF THE TALKS SHOULD BE AN AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING AN

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APPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

O THE JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE WE AND THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO PREVENTING SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES.

O THE JOINT STATEMENT REFLECTS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS HELD OVER LAST SIX MONTHS, IN WHICH EACH AREA OF

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PROLIFERATION WAS DISCUSSED AND MUTUAL CONCERNS IDENTIFIED. IT CONTAINS A COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION AND TO URGE OTHER STATES TO DO SO AS WELL.

O IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON CFE, THE PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO SIGN A CFE TREATY IN 1990 AND AGREED THAT A CFE AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE FUTURE SECURITY OF EUROPE.

O THE PRESIDENTS ALSO AGREED THAT A CSCE SUMMIT SHOULD NOT BE HELD BEFORE A CFE AGREEMENT IS READY FOR SIGNATURE AND THEY COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO INTENSIFYING THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA.

O IN WASHINGTON THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED A NUMBER OF NEW IDEAS ON PRINCIPAL ISSUES THAT REMAIN REGARDING ARMOR DEFINITIONS AND CEILINGS, DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT AND AERIAL INSPECTIONS. THERE WAS NO POSITIVE MOVEMENT ON AIRCRAFT.

O WE PRESSED ON OPEN SKIES, STRESSING ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO OPENNESS IN THE NEW EUROPE. GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE BOTH REITERATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OPEN SKIES CONCEPT AND SAID THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

O BUT ON SPECIFICS THE SOVIETS SHOWED LITTLE CONCRETE MOVEMENT FROM THEIR BUDAPEST POSITIONS. NEVERTHELESS, BOTH LEADERS AGREED TO RENEW EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AN OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO

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THIS AGREEMENT IN HIS JUNE 3 PRESS CONFERENCE.

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GERMANY AND EUROPE

O PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV HAD AN IN-DEPTH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EUROPE, WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE PROCESS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION.

O WHILE NO BREAKTHROUGHS WERE MADE, SOME NEW IDEAS EMERGED THAT WILL BE EXPLORED IN UPCOMING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND IN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR.

O THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP WAS A MATTER FOR THE GERMANS TO DECIDE, CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. GORBACHEV DID NOT OBJECT.

O BUT SOVIET THINKING SEEMS STILL TO BE IN FLUX AND CHARACTERIZED BY MANY INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS.

O GORBACHEV REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A TRANSITION PERIOD.

O IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT GORBACHEV'S IDEAS MEAN IN PRACTICE.

O PRESIDENT BUSH REITERATED THE U.S. APPROACH TO GERMAN UNIFICATION, STRESSING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATORY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND NO SINGULARIZATION OF A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC GERMANY.

O HE REVIEWED THE NINE POINTS WE HAVE DEVELOPED TO ADDRESS THE SOVIETS' LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS, AND STRESSED THAT GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS A

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FACTOR FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

O HE ALSO NOTED THE BENEFITS TO THE USSR OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GERMANY.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED REGIONAL ISSUES DURING THE THIRD DAY OF THE SUMMIT AT CAMP DAVID.

O MANY IDEAS WERE EXCHANGED AND A BROADER BASIS FOR COOPERATION WAS ESTABLISHED ON SOME ISSUES, ALTHOUGH NO BREAKTHROUGHS OCCURRED.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED AFGHANISTAN AND AGREED THAT THERE WAS A MEASURE OF COMMON GROUND IN THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES.

-- IN PARTICULAR, WE AGREE ON USING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AS A MECHANISM FOR ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT. WE ALSO AGREE THAT A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY SHOULD PREPARE FOR AND CONDUCT ELECTIONS.

O THE CRITICAL AREA OF DIFFERENCE REMAINS THE ROLE OF NAJIBULLAH IN A TRANSITION PERIOD.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT NAJIBULLAH RETAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF INCUMBENCY DURING A TRANSITION PROCESS -- A POSITION THAT MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT TO GET SUCH

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A PROCESS STARTED, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF RESISTANCE VIEWS ABOUT NAJIBULLAH.

O ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE RECENT ATTEMPTED PALESTINIAN TERRORIST RAID AGAINST ISRAEL, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT YASSIR ARAFAT HAD TO CONDEMN THAT ACT AND DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM ITS SPONSORS.

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O THE SOVIETS AGREED ARAFAT SHOULD CONDEMN THAT INCIDENT.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAD A CANDID EXCHANGE ON THE EMIGRATION ISSUE AND THE QUESTION OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS SETTLING IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

-- PRESIDENT BUSH PUSHED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AEROFLOT-EL AL DIRECT FLIGHTS AGREEMENT TO ASSIST THE PROCESS OF EMIGRATION AND TO ALLEVIATE HARDSHIPS POSED BY THE LACK OF DIRECT AIR LINKS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

O PRESIDENT GORBACHEV COMPLAINED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND URGED THE U.S. TO DO MORE IN THAT REGARD.

-- GORBACHEV NOTED THAT THE USSR HAD BEEN BOMBARDED WITH CRITICISM FROM ARAB COUNTRIES ON THE ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION, AND IMPLIED DURING HIS JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH THAT, IF SOVIET CONCERNS ARE NOT HEEDDED BY ISRAEL, HE MAY HAVE TO GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO ISSUING EXIT PERMITS.

-- HE STATED HIS HOPE THAT ISRAEL WOULD PROVIDE ASSURANCES AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE

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U.S. ON THE ISSUE OF NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

O THE SOVIETS SAID NOTHING DURING THE PRIVATE SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, TO INDICATE ANY BACKSLIDING FROM THEIR COMMITMENT TO PERMIT OPEN SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION. FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED TO SECRETARY BAKER THAT SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE.

O THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED THE VOLATILE SITUATION IN KASHMIR AGREEING TO WATCH THE SITUATION CAREFULLY AND TO URGE RESTRAINT IN CONTINUING PARALLEL APPROACHES TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

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O THE TWO LEADERS REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA. SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ALSO DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT.

O BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE ESQUIPULAS PEACE PROCESS.

O THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH CASTRO TO GET CUBA TO END ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR AND SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE SALVADORAN CONFLICT.

-- WHILE SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. MAKE DIRECT APPROACHES TO CUBA IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WOULD PROBE THE CUBANS ON THE ISSUE OF ARMS TO THE FMLN, AND WOULD ALSO CONTINUE ECONOMIC AID TO

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NICARAGUA.

O ON ASIA, PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, POINTING OUT THAT THE U.S. FULLY SUPPORTS THE JAPANESE CLAIM TO THOSE ISLANDS.

-- HE URGED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE WITH JAPAN, SINCE THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO A REDUCTION OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE OFFERED ITS STANDARD REPLY ON THE ISSUE, THAT IT IS A BILATERAL PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN. GORBACHEV ALSO REFERRED TO HIS PLANNED TRIP TO JAPAN IN 1991.

O THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED CAMBODIA. THE PRESIDENT FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF JAPAN, THAILAND AND OTHER STATES TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES.

-- THEY ALSO TOOK NOTE OF THE PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN THE PERM FIVE MEETINGS ON THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS

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OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

O THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO DISCUSSED THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH ROK PRESIDENT ROH TAE WOO IN SAN FRANCISCO ON JUNE 4, GORBACHEV EXPLAINED THAT THE USSR INTENDED TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNDERScoreD THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL TO BE GAINED FOR MOSCOW FROM BETTER TIES WITH SEOUL.

-- HE ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD COMPLICATE SOVIET

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RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA, BUT SAID THAT MOSCOW WOULD GO AHEAD WITH ITS PLANS NEVERTHELESS.

O PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM, EXPRESSING U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE DPRK TO SIGN AND IMPLEMENT AN IAEA NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

-- THE U.S. NOTED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE NORTH HAD BEEN GIVEN STANDARD NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S.

O GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT THE USSR WAS CONCERNED AS WELL ABOUT NORTH KOREAN FAILURE TO ACT ON ITS OBLIGATIONS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD APPROACHED THE NORTH ON THIS ISSUE AND SUGGESTED THE U.S. CONSIDER A DIRECT APPROACH TO PYONGYANG.

O ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WERE NOT BROUGHT UP BY EITHER SIDE.

O THE PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN AFRICA, FOCUSING ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE PROBLEMS IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA.

-- THE TWO LEADERS OFFERED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR AN INTRA-ANGOLAN DIALOGUE AND THE CURRENT PROCESS UNDERWAY BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

-- ON SOUTH AFRICA, BOTH EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT

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THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT, SINCE
PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND NELSON MANDELA WERE
ENGAGED IN TALKS.

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O AS A SYMBOL OF OUR GROWING ABILITY TO COOPERATE IN
THE RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE TWO
PRESIDENTS ALSO ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIA.

-- THE STATEMENT CALLS FOR A UN-LED RELIEF EFFORT
THAT WOULD USE SOVIET TRANSPORT TO CARRY AMERICAN
FOOD TO THOSE IN NEED IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA. THE
STATEMENT ALSO EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE PEACE
EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

O U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS ADVANCED CONSIDERABLY
AT THE SUMMIT.

O THE KEY ITEM WAS THE SIGNING OF THE COMMERCIAL
AGREEMENT WHICH -- WHEN IT GOES INTO FORCE -- WILL
PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR
COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP.

O THE SIGNING OF THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT IS ONE STEP
TOWARD THE EXTENSION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS
(MFN); BUT TWO MORE STEPS ARE REQUIRED:

-- CONGRESS MUST APPROVE THE AGREEMENT; AND

-- THE PRESIDENT MUST WAIVE THE JACKSON-VANIK
AMENDMENT.

O PRESIDENT BUSH MADE CLEAR THAT HE WILL NEITHER WAIVE
JACKSON-VANIK NOR SUBMIT THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT TO
CONGRESS FOR APPROVAL UNTIL THE SUPREME SOVIET
PASSES THE LONG-PROMISED EMIGRATION LEGISLATION.

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O WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THIS.

O SEVERAL OTHER AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED AT THE SUMMIT WHICH SHOULD PROMOTE COOPERATION IN KEY ECONOMIC AREAS, INCLUDING:

-

- LONG TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT;
- CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT;
- MARITIME TRANSPORT AGREEMENT; AND
- CUSTOMS AGREEMENT.

O THE PRESIDENTS HAD A LONG DISCUSSION ON PERESTROYKA AND ON THE PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION THAT PRESIDENT BUSH ADVANCED AT THE MALTA SUMMIT.

-- THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT WHICH UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS AN EXPRESSION OF U.S. AND SOVIET COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER IN SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC PERESTROYKA.

HUMAN RIGHTS

O THE PRESIDENT PRESSED GORBACHEV FOR ACTION ON THOSE UNRESOLVED REFUSENIK CASES ON THE LISTS PRESENTED AT MALTA, NOTING OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THESE HAD NOT

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BEEN "ZEROED OUT" AND ASKING FOR THE SOVIET PRESIDENT TO LOOK INTO THESE PERSONALLY.

O THE PRESIDENT ALSO NOTED OUR CONCERN ABOUT INDICATIONS OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE USSR AND URGED GORBACHEV TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY AND FORCEFULLY AGAINST IT.

END TEXT POINTS.

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GORBACHEV'S SUMMIT AGENDA: LOOKING AHEAD

If the Moscow ministerial demonstrated one thing, it is that Gorbachev is in control of foreign policy and prepared to bargain. Despite signs of bureaucratic disarray around him, Gorbachev still has a clear vision of what he must accomplish. He views this summit both as a mark of how far US-Soviet relations have come--the START framework, trade agreement, chemical weapons agreement, nuclear testing protocols, and ever expanding bilateral agreements--and as an opportunity to chart the future course of bilateral relations during a period of dramatic international change. Moreover, it enables him to set the stage for the 28th Party Congress in July and claim a foreign policy success. He will continue to demonstrate political savvy, particularly the ability to anticipate problems down the road as well as confront those at hand.

Domestic Context. Gorbachev sees the summit as a means of easing domestic pressures; he hopes to use it as leverage to shift resources from defense spending to such critical areas as agriculture, housing, and medical care. By all appearances, he has decided to cut the military budget even more than the 14.2 percent already announced, and needs both the substance and the atmospherics of a successful summit in political support of such cuts, especially in the face of likely strong opposition from the large and influential military-industrial complex within the Council of Ministers.

Although there are signs of military unease and concern, Gorbachev is less constrained by military opposition to his foreign and arms control policies than he is by the USSR's need to reassess its security interests in light of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, German unification, and prospects for Baltic independence. The uncertainty surrounding the implication of these events has raised Soviet anxieties and produced disarray in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, Gorbachev remains in charge and Soviet policies are beginning to crystalize--and change--as Moscow adapts to the new alignments.

A successful summit also will reinforce Gorbachev's stature at home as he prepares the country for a new stage of economic reform, to be debated at the July Party Congress. In this context, he hopes to show that any "losses" resulting from his foreign policy in Eastern Europe will be offset by the gains in strategic arms control and increased western economic cooperation.

Gorbachev probably expects Lithuania and the other Baltic republics to be high on the American agenda, and will be prepared to address criticisms head on with the President as well as in meetings with members of Congress and the public. He appears confident in his approach and will argue he

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cannot go further until Lithuania suspends its independence declaration.

Anxiety Over German Unification. More than at Malta, the German question will occupy Gorbachev's mind. His attitude to a unified Germany in NATO continues to be resoundingly negative, and there is no sign of willingness or ability to back down. Instead, he is likely to continue to seek alternatives or, at a minimum, to delay a decision. The urgency of the German question appears to be such that Moscow is prepared to put other policies at risk. The Soviets now appear prepared to make a CFE agreement dependent on the outcome of the two-plus-four talks, thereby imperiling a set of important objectives such as a 1990 CSCE summit and negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. They also seem prepared to obstruct unification over the NATO membership issue, e.g. refusing to relinquish four-power rights, insisting on a peace treaty, or maintaining Soviet troops in the GDR, moves which would complicate Soviet efforts to improve relations with West Germany as well as other NATO member countries.

While Gorbachev recognizes that the US and USSR cannot resolve the political-military status of Germany at the summit, he will be looking for understanding on the depth of Soviet concerns and support for alternate approaches, including an expanded role for CSCE.

But while Gorbachev will be open to using CSCE to guarantee pan-European security and diminish the need for military alliances or Germany's membership in NATO, he is likely to insist on establishing parameters for Germany itself. Gorbachev will insist that any alternative must place limits on the size of the Bundeswehr, ban nuclear weapons on German soil, commit the new Germany to fulfill the GDR's agreements with the USSR, and allow for the deployment of Soviet forces on German territory during a transition period. It is clear the Soviets are looking to the two-plus-four talks to produce a legally binding document that will ensure these objectives.

Arms Control: The Centerpiece of Relations. While the initialing of a framework START agreement is a major goal, Gorbachev will be satisfied even if the chemical weapons agreement and the nuclear testing protocols are the only arms control texts signed at the summit. Whether a START framework is initialed or not, Gorbachev will press for a US commitment to follow-on strategic negotiations despite the possibility that he will stall on conventional reductions. He probably wants to be able to point to a productive dialogue on short-range nuclear missiles, and may even hope to get the US

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to broaden talks on confidence-building measures at sea in order to show movement toward naval arms control, but neither of these issues will be central to his summit arms control agenda.

START. Willingness, in the end, to close a deal on ALCMs and SLCMs in Moscow demonstrates that the Soviets consider completing a "framework" START agreement one of the keys to a successful summit, and they will try to reach agreement on those issues that the US maintains are necessarily part of a framework. Nevertheless, the Soviets can be expected to resist strongly any proposal that appears to be a unilateral concession, such as further limits on heavy missiles, or limits on MIRVed mobiles.

Mobile Missiles--Soviets Want to Keep it Simple. On mobile missiles, the Soviets would probably require a ceiling of around 550 launchers and 950-1,050 weapons to meet their needs. To gain US acquiescence in this, they would probably accept a verification regime involving notifications of movements, although they are likely to insist that these be held to a minimum. The Soviets will also be wary of types of movement restrictions that they fear might lead to inadvertent treaty violations, particularly since, until the US deploys mobile missiles, these restrictions will apply only to them.

Backfire. They also are unlikely to accept new limits that would compel them to alter their deployment plans. The Intelligence Community, for example, projects that, by 1999, the Soviets will have deployed some 500 Backfire bombers. Of these, approximately 210 will belong to naval forces. Although it may be possible to persuade the Soviets to accept a global limit on Backfires, if that were the price of a framework agreement, the limit would have to be comfortably above 500.

Throwweight--Progress Unlikely. The Soviets will probably wish to leave the question of throwweight vague in a framework agreement. The gap between the US desire to account for "potential" throwweight and the Soviet position of counting only "demonstrated" throwweight is wide. Moreover, the Soviets perceive that throwweight restrictions, and any possible attendant ambiguities and unforeseen consequences, are likely to apply only to them.

Linkage--A Last-Minute Stick in the Spokes? Despite the evident Soviet desire to announce a framework agreement at the summit, we cannot exclude the possibility the Soviets will attempt to revive their efforts to link a START agreement to the ABM Treaty. While claiming that linkage has been dissolved, the Soviets continue to remind us of the importance of agreeing on activities permitted and prohibited under the

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ABM Treaty, and on conditions for leaving the START Treaty because of ABM compliance problems. If they are unsatisfied on this issue at START, they can be expected to pursue it during any follow-on negotiations.

Looking to the Future. The Soviets have given ample proof of their interest in follow-on negotiations to START that would lead to further reductions in strategic arms. They are far more likely to propose a START-like additional 50 percent reduction than to favor extreme cuts to the level of several hundred warheads.

The Soviets have indicated on various occasions that they would consider further reductions in heavy missiles as part of follow-on negotiations. They have also signaled an interest in de-MIRVing. We believe, however, that the Soviets are interested in these issues mainly as levers to bring about further restrictions in US forces. Until the Soviets fundamentally change their strategic nuclear doctrine--and we see no evidence that this has occurred--they will be dependent on MIRVs. The attraction of de-MIRVing proposals for the Soviets is limited to the possibility of putting restrictions on US forces--notably the Trident SSBN force. Similarly, further cuts in heavy missiles will be tolerable for the Soviets as newer, lighter, and more accurate missiles replace the SS-18. Offering up further cuts in--or even a ban on--heavy missiles could be seen by the Soviets as sacrificing something of waning value in order to extract a high price from Washington--such as limitations on the US Trident force.

Last, the Soviets may suggest that other types of arms be included in follow-on negotiations. Anti-satellite weapons, which they have said they wish to ban, are one possibility. They also might argue that, if deeper cuts than those of START are contemplated, it will be necessary to begin reducing French and British nuclear forces at the same time.

CEE. With the wrap up of START, attention should shift to CFE, but Moscow's overriding concern about the security implications of a united Germany is apparently forcing the Soviets to rethink the issue, which has resulted in considerable Soviet foot-dragging in Vienna.

The Soviets are anxious to limit the Bundeswehr, and can be expected to press this issue either in CFE or two-plus-four. Gorbachev is likely to repeat the Soviet CFE proposal that each alliance be limited to 750,000 troops in the central zone. To support this, Gorbachev could argue that since the scheme is not specifically directed at Germany, it should not run afoul of Bonn's sensitivities regarding "singularity." He also may

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point out that because the proposed central zone limits are alliance wide, NATO will have to reach intra-alliance agreement on troop levels, thereby enhancing NATO's political role--an important US objective.

Bilateral Issues: Enlarging the Agenda. Though largely symbolic, Gorbachev views completion of the trade agreement, and the other bilateral agreements, as well as progress on various transnational issues such as ecology and counter-terrorism, as key to improving the long term prospects for stable US-Soviet relations and, most importantly, securing economic benefits. He can be expected to play up these agreements--especially those expanding people-to-people contacts--in his public comments as indicators of growing cooperation and trust between the two countries and as examples of where future relations should go.

Economic Issues. Gorbachev will press the President for greater US economic assistance, which is probably one of his highest priorities. He will likely call into question the sincerity as well as the depth of US support for perestroika, as he did at the Moscow ministerial, and urge direct US government credit as well as greater efforts by the Administration to encourage and support joint ventures and private investment by US business. He will also ask for political support for a number of government-to-government and private business projects, such as the American trade consortium, the Medical consortium and an agreement on technical assistance for the Soviet food industry.

A Possible Surprise: Request for Food Aid. Should the continued downward economic slide threaten social disturbances, Gorbachev could request emergency food assistance, including direct airborne emergency food shipments and short-term credits. In early February, the Soviets requested emergency food assistance from the FRG in an effort to forestall riots in remote parts of the USSR.

Human Rights. Passage of the Soviet emigration bill promised for May 31 is still uncertain. Apparently the Supreme Soviet still has not decided on how to respond to demands--from departing emigres and other travellers--for an increase in the amount of foreign exchange which can be taken out of the USSR. Gorbachev will be expecting criticism over direct flights to Israel and will likely restate Shevardnadze's earlier call for the US to increase its refugee and immigration quotas for Soviet Jews, seeing this as a way to answer both US arguments and Arab criticism.

Regional Issues. Gorbachev probably sees little danger that regional issues will threaten summit atmospherics or, for

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that matter, overall relations. Given the press of other business--and barring any major changes on the ground--he is not likely to give these issues priority. Moreover, he probably views the various regional issues as either on track, not susceptible to US-Soviet action at this time, or, in the case of Afghanistan, as tending to favor Moscow.

Afghanistan. The ministerial and working group discussions identified the one issue blocking US-Soviet agreement on an Afghan settlement: "incumbency"--whether power is to be transferred from Najib to a new organ of power before elections. Soviet intransigence on this issue and Shevardnadze's reference to Nicaragua, where the US did not require Ortega to step down before elections, gives little basis for expecting the Soviets to change their position. Nor does Soviet handling of recent developments in the region: they have continued to supply Najib and publicize his political reforms; they have also been playing up rivalries within the AIG, the AIG's extremist elements, and alleged involvement in narcotics and excursions across the USSR border. At least in the short term, the Soviets seem to feel time is on their side.

Nonetheless, the Soviets are still interested in a settlement. A recent article in an influential Soviet foreign policy journal stressed the need to abandon burdensome, unsavory Third World regimes, and in a specific reference to Afghanistan, stated that reconciliation efforts require a "transitional, neutral status" which cannot be obtained by "maintaining in power one of the belligerents." While it is unclear whether this statement represents more than a minority view, Moscow warmly welcomed former king Zahir Shah's offer to participate in a settlement. At the summit, the Soviets are sure to return to "negative symmetry" and again call for an international conference on Afghanistan and a larger UN role. They may also argue that the situation in Kashmir makes a settlement all the more important.

Kashmir. The Soviets are likely to emphasize common US-USSR interests in seeing the Kashmir situation defused. They can claim with some justification that they have counseled restraint and dialogue on India and Pakistan. Criticism of Pakistan is nothing new; in an unusual recent flurry of articles, however, the Soviet press has criticized India for inept administration of Kashmir, for an excessive military budget, and for failure to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Soviets have told the Indians they will continue to fill orders for military equipment, but the Indians complain about delays and unsatisfactory performance and seem uneasy about the depth of the Soviet commitment.

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... distinguished this, however, from international involvement in the Kashmir settlement issue, which the Soviets prefer to leave to the Indians and Pakistanis bilaterally, under the Simla agreement. Gorbachev is likely to support any means of bringing pressure on the two sides which does not challenge Indian sovereignty in Kashmir or injure Soviet-Indian relations.

Central America. The Nicaraguan elections took some of the pressure off US-Soviet relations, and Central America currently has little claim on Gorbachev's time. Moscow is, nevertheless, interested in continuing the dialogue as a low-cost way of staking out a claim to a role in the region, and in Latin America in general. Moreover, Moscow wants an improvement in US-Cuban relations to relieve the pressure on Havana--and the financial burden for itself of keeping the Castro regime afloat. The Soviets are likely to resist any efforts by the US to get the USSR to pressure Castro, arguing that Washington should address its concerns to Havana, not Moscow, and that the best way to ensure Castro's good behavior is to alleviate his sense of isolation.

While they are not pushing the issue as actively as before, the Soviets may raise the need for a region-wide approach to area problems and, as part of this, movement on a settlement in El Salvador. They would like to see Cuban participation in settling the El Salvador conflict and in solidifying a region-wide peace accord as a way of diffusing US-Cuban tensions and relieving remaining Central American anxieties, but they still insist the US deal with the Cubans directly on a regional arms embargo. However, as in the Middle East, they may argue for multilateral talks on cutting arms transfers.

Middle East. The Soviets see the Arab-Israeli peace process stalemated and are reluctant to discuss the Gulf. Nonetheless, Soviet media sharply criticized the killings in the Occupied Territories, and Moscow is concerned Shamir will lead Israel's next government. At a minimum, the Soviets are likely to criticize Israel for obstructing the peace process and the Administration for failing to move Israel, while pushing the US to take a second look at Soviet ideas--namely bringing the UN Perm Five into the game--to get Israel to be more flexible. As at the ministerial, the Soviets will deflect any calls for improved USSR-Israel ties, including direct flights, claiming Israeli actions, such as new settlements, and violence, make it politically impossible for Moscow to do anything now. Gorbachev will probably ask us to open the doors to increased Soviet Jewish immigration.

Gorbachev is likely to seek a joint statement condemning recent Israeli actions and calling on Israel to move the peace process forward. The USSR will also be watching the upcoming Arab summit; if criticism in that forum of Soviet Jewish emigration policy is particularly harsh, Moscow may push for a condemnation of Israeli settlement policy in the Occupied Territories.

Questions of regional proliferation, the Gulf situation, and Lebanon are likely to get short shrift. The Soviets may welcome a statement supporting the Taif accords in Lebanon, but probably see little reason to focus on the issue now. They are likely to justify their recently renewed offer to mediate talks between Iran and Iraq as in keeping with UN efforts, but will try to avoid detailed discussions on their bilateral relations with Tehran.

Cambodia. Barring real progress at the Perm Five meeting in New York on May 25-26, the Soviets at the summit will again press for a total arms moratorium, and endorse the current Thai cease-fire proposal. The Soviets may cite recent hints of flexibility from the Chinese and stress the importance of the US and USSR working with Beijing at the Perm Five. They are, however, hesitant about becoming deeply involved in a peace process that still appears to have little chance of success.

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Africa. The Soviets seem convinced that Angola is moving in the right direction, and that there is little the two superpowers can or need to do at this juncture. Moscow probably hopes the MPLA's pullout from Mavinga is seen as a gesture of conciliation and not a sign of weakness, and thus will pave the way for effective negotiations. The key, from Moscow's perspective, is to convince both UNITA and the MPLA hardliners the time is at hand to talk. At the summit, the Soviets will probably argue for a mutual arms cutoff and cease-fire.

The Soviets seem ready to cut their losses in Ethiopia but for the moment are prepared to let events take their course.

Military supplies continue to trickle down, but it is unclear if they are the result of new deliveries or deals. There seems to be little Soviet enthusiasm for famine relief generally; even if there were, Moscow may not be in a position to render much help. Three Soviet transport planes in Ethiopia were recently bombed, according to Ambassador Dubinin.

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Although concerned about North Korea's nuclear programs and refusal to sign IAEA safeguards agreements, the Soviets probably calculate that further pressure on Pyongyang will bear little fruit without significant change in the military situation on the peninsula, and could even be counterproductive, given warming USSR-ROK ties. The Soviets may try to address the issue in the larger context of the need for a North/South dialogue on regional security, including the creation of a nuclear free zone or zone of peace, and reductions in US military presence, especially naval.

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THEME PAPER: U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL DIALOGUE

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BACKGROUND

The U.S.-Soviet dialogue on regional issues has played an important role in moving us away from rivalry in the developing world and toward cooperation in promoting political settlements. Concrete results, however, have been limited to Namibia, Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. As we try to reach common understandings on areas of less critical concern to the USSR, it will become increasingly difficult to resolve problems involving traditional friends of the USSR such as Cuba, Afghanistan, North Korea, Vietnam, Syria and Ethiopia. The Soviets will want to maintain the appearance of a reliable partner, even as they reduce their military and economic aid to Third World clients and turn their attention to domestic political and economic issues.

Central America: With the successful transfer of power in Nicaragua, the main obstacle to peace and stability in the region remains Cuba. Havana continues to supply arms and training to the FMLN in El Salvador, which undermines UN and regional efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. Cuba's refusal to support the Central American peace process embodied in the Esquipulas and Tela Accords destabilizes the region. Soviet provision of sophisticated arms (MIG-29s) and over \$4.3 billion last year in economic assistance to Castro gives them major leverage to modify Cuban behavior, a point we should drive home at the summit.

Afghanistan: Since the Wyoming ministerial last September, we have made some progress on Afghanistan. The U.S. and USSR agree on the need for a political settlement, a transition period and elections (or some other act of self-determination) to establish a new permanent government acceptable to a majority of the Afghan people and at peace with its neighbors. In April we expressed willingness to allow Najibullah to run as a candidate, provided he first transfers power to an interim authority. At the Moscow ministerial, the Soviets offered nothing new and may have even retreated from earlier positions. The ball is now clearly in their court: if the Soviets want a political solution, they need to offer something on the role of Najibullah. The way out of Afghanistan for both of us is evident -- the transfer of power to a transition authority that will prepare for and conduct elections.

Asia: There are three key concerns in the Asia/Pacific region that need to be raised. The first concerns the Northern Territories seized by the USSR from Japan at the end of World War II. After the Malta meeting, you called Prime Minister

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Kaifu to explain why the reduced schedule prevented you from raising the Northern Territories issue. Since we have brought this point up twice with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the February and April ministerials, your raising it with Gorbachev in the context of his planned visit to Tokyo in 1991 and in the context of improved East-West relations would underscore our commitment to Japan on the islands.

The second issue is North Korean failure to sign and implement an International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards agreement. Despite U.S. provision to the North of its standard security assurances regarding non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, Pyongyang continues to insist on the unacceptable demands of a specific U.S. guarantee and removal of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. The North Koreans even have threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an act which could undermine the effectiveness of the treaty and our global non-proliferation efforts.

The third issue is Cambodia. You should reaffirm the need for the Cambodian parties to work out a settlement with the help of the UN Perm Five, Japan and the ASEAN states and that the USSR should engage the Chinese in a moratorium on arms shipments to the factions as part of a comprehensive settlement.

Africa: The Soviets are reticent about moving ahead on our proposed Quadripartite talks on Angola at this time, since the MPLA and UNITA have begun to talk directly. In Ethiopia, however, we have proposed using Soviet air transport to carry U.S. humanitarian aid to those facing starvation in the Eritrean capital of Asmara. At the Moscow ministerial Secretary Baker urged that the USSR press the Mengistu regime to cooperate. Shevardnadze said he would take up the matter with Addis, but noted that the Eritreans had threatened the safety of Soviet aircraft.

Kashmir: At the last two ministerials, we have pressed the Soviets to make parallel approaches to India and Pakistan to address the deteriorating situation in Kashmir. Bob Gates went to the area directly from the Moscow ministerial to urge both parties to exercise restraint and to pursue a peaceful bilateral solution. Shevardnadze said that the Soviets have done the same with the two parties, although we are convinced they have not pressed the Indians very hard. He rejected a joint U.S.-Soviet statement saying it would "internationalize" the conflict. A call for restraint by both you and President Gorbachev, nevertheless, would have a salutary effect on both India and Pakistan.

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Middle East: If Gorbachev raises the peace process or other Middle East issues, you may want to first underscore our hope that a new Israeli government will be ready to move ahead quickly to an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, which we continue to support. You may want to point out that the U.S. has been admitting record numbers of Soviet Jewish emigrés this year (nearly double the number in 1989), contrary to Soviet claims that U.S. restrictions forced Soviet Jews to go to Israel.

POINTS TO MAKE

(General)

- o In our regional dialogue we can point to successes in Namibia and Nicaragua as well as U.S.-Soviet planning to cooperate on famine relief in Ethiopia.
 - Our ability to work together to promote political solutions to regional conflicts is a sign that we are moving beyond containment -- from competition to cooperation.
- o But on many critical regional problems -- Cuba, Afghanistan, North Korea, Kashmir -- we have not yet been able to move significantly forward.
- o We still have concerns about your support for regimes that are responsible for instability and tensions.
 - It would be difficult for the United States to consider economic assistance to the Soviet Union while the USSR continues to export scarce resources to such countries.

(Central America and Cuba)

- o We have accomplished much in Central America by cooperating this past year in support of the Esquipulas Treaty.
 - Our joint efforts helped ensure successful elections in Nicaragua and a peaceful transfer of power to the Chamorro government. I appreciate your efforts to help resolve this longstanding regional conflict.
- o The Central American presidents now hope to end the war in El Salvador. If they succeed, this entire region can democratize, demilitarize and develop.

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- The mediation of the UN Secretary General in the current peace talks between the government and the FMLN makes a real settlement possible. Our support for this effort will make an important difference.
 - o Unfortunately, Cuba continues to oppose the Esquipulas and San Isidro Agreements.
 - The Central American presidents have called on Cuba to stop supplying arms to the FMLN in violation of the peace accords. Cuba continues to supply these weapons, thus undermining chances for peace.
 - o You said in Havana the USSR opposes export of violent revolution.
 - Cuba could not export violent revolution to El Salvador without your massive military and economic assistance.
 - Your recent decision to supply Cuba with MIG-29s only encourages Cuba to destabilize Central America.
 - o Cuba remains a major irritant in our relations. You have the means to influence Cuba to help end the war in El Salvador and stop destabilizing Central America.
 - o If Cuba ends the supply of arms to the FMLN and helps end the war through negotiations, we would be prepared to discuss other bilateral issues with Cuba.
 - o As Jim Baker told Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow, we have proposed to form a G-24 group with the EC, Japan and Latin America to promote regional economic development for Central America.
 - o We would be prepared to include the USSR in this effort if you continue your economic assistance to Nicaragua -- and thus qualify as a donor -- and if you convince Cuba to stop arming the FMLN and to support a negotiated end to the war.
- (Afghanistan)
- o Another area where the Soviet Union expends great resources is in support of the Kabul regime in Afghanistan.
 - o Since the Wyoming ministerial last September, our two sides have made some progress and agreed on a number of basic principles.

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- We agree on the need for a political settlement leading to an Afghanistan that is independent, non-aligned and at peace with all its neighbors.
- We also agree on the need for a transition period and an electoral process to establish a credible, legitimate permanent government acceptable to a majority of the Afghan people.
- We have discussed the role of the United Nations and other international organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Conference to work with Afghans to establish an appropriate transitional authority.
- We both recognize the considerable humanitarian needs that will need to be addressed when a settlement permits the safe return of millions of refugees and reconstruction gets underway.
- o But there is one major issue on which we do not agree: the role of Najibullah in a transition.
 - We proposed the idea of a transition period for a transfer of power and we proposed elections as a mechanism for establishing a permanent government.
 - We even suggested that Najibullah could remain in Afghanistan and run as a candidate in such elections.
- o In response to each new idea, the Soviet position has remained the same. Najibullah retains power. This is both unrealistic and unresponsive.
 - The Resistance will never agree to elections or any traditional Afghan method for choosing leaders that give the advantage of incumbency to Najibullah.
 - His control of the Afghan Army and organs of internal security would make any organizational effort to establish a permanent government subject to fear and subversion.
- o It would be a major breakthrough in our relationship if we could issue a joint statement on Afghanistan incorporating the principles that Jim Baker provided to Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow.

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- The key point would be a mutual agreement on the goal of establishing a neutral transitional authority that would be the sole repository of power in the period leading up to elections.
 - o If we were able to achieve such an understanding, we would be prepared to include a statement that our two sides also agreed to foster a ceasefire and negative symmetry once a transition process were underway.
 - o After eleven years, it is time that we get this issue behind us.
- (Asia-Japan)
- o An additional step that would contribute greatly to a reduction of East-West tensions would be a Soviet decision to resolve the Northern Territories issue with Japan.
 - Let me be clear. The United States fully supports the Japanese claim to those islands.
 - o An improved relationship with Japan will require a significant Soviet gesture on the Northern Territories.
 - Despite Soviet internal considerations, there are a number of creative possibilities available.
 - o It is not in your interest to defer a better relationship. Japan has much to offer the Soviet Union.
 - Your trip to Tokyo in 1991 offers a unique opportunity to deal decisively with the Northern Territories question.

(Asia-North Korea)

- o An issue that has been causing growing concern for several years is the failure of North Korea to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement under the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- It was over five years ago that North Korea announced its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it still has not met its obligations under the accord.
- o We have provided in several channels our standard negative security assurances concerning the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state.
- We were told that would be enough to get them to sign.

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-- Now the North says that is not enough. It wants a specific guarantee as well as the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. It has even threatened to withdraw from the NPT, an act that could undermine our joint non-proliferation efforts over the last quarter century.

- o North Korean preconditions, linkages and threats are totally unacceptable. Pyongyang must meet its obligations, otherwise a dangerous arms race could develop on the Korean peninsula that would affect the stability of all East Asia.

(Asia - Cambodia)

- o We need to move ahead more rapidly toward a comprehensive settlement on Cambodia. After the Paris, Jakarta, Bangkok and Perm Five meetings, the key issues and areas of disagreement are clear.

-- The Cambodian parties as well as the international community involved in the search for a solution need to focus on these for resolution.

- o We would support your efforts to achieve an arms moratorium with China and other outside parties in conjunction with progress toward a comprehensive settlement.

(Ethiopia)

- o In Africa, an international relief effort is supporting more than two million people in northern Ethiopia who would otherwise face starvation.

-- As we work to find a political solution to the country's internal conflicts, we must continue to place priority on famine relief.

- o The USSR has great influence in Addis. We urge you to use it to gain the Ethiopian government's cooperation, especially in reopening the port of Massawa.

- o In Washington and again in Moscow, Jim Baker raised the idea of using Soviet aircraft to carry U.S. food to Asmara and other affected areas.

-- Are you ready to make a commitment to participate in a joint relief effort?

(Kashmir)

- o Joint U.S.-Soviet efforts can make a difference. Another place where we could work together is the Indian subcontinent.

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- o The situation in Kashmir has grown critical. There may well be a war. I just sent my Deputy National Security Advisor, Robert Gates, to the region to encourage the parties to act with restraint, respect human rights and to seek a peaceful resolution of the issue.
- o Minister Shevardnadze told us in Moscow that the USSR has also made an effort. Frankly, I think you could lean a little harder on the Indians.
- o We need to keep taking steps that urge the parties to act responsibly and to prevent events from spinning out of control.

(Middle East -- If Raised)

- o We hope the next Israeli government is willing and able to move ahead quickly with a trilateral and a dialogue which we still believe offers the best hope for early progress.
- o On Soviet emigration, it is troubling when we hear Soviet officials saying that the U.S. is refusing entry to most Soviet Jews to force them to Israel.

-- We are now admitting record numbers of Soviet Jewish emigrés, almost double the number admitted in 1989.

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BACKGROUND

Human Rights and Rule of Law. The USSR is taking initial steps toward replacing the arbitrary exercise of power with the Rule of Law. The process must overcome bureaucratic resistance at middle and low levels and long-established habits of repression in Soviet institutions. For the most part, improvements in human rights practices have been accomplished by administrative fiat and not by legislation. Many Soviet citizens are now prepared to assert their rights, invoking the pronouncements of the leadership, but on many occasions they run into opposition from the bureaucracy. What is missing in the USSR is a set of institutions to protect the rights of the individual, particularly an independent judiciary and a system under which the judiciary can enjoin the illegal acts of government officials.

Changes have nonetheless been significant. All prisoners convicted solely under the overtly political and religious articles of the criminal statutes have been released, emigration has risen to an all-time high (and is still increasing), freedom of expression has greatly improved, and religious believers have much greater latitude to practice their faith. The centrally-directed, widespread abuse of psychiatry for political purposes has apparently been stopped, although reports of local cases of abuse still persist. Critics of past Soviet psychiatric practices, both within and outside the Soviet Union, have expressed concern that psychiatrists associated with psychiatric abuse have remained in positions of professional leadership. An improvement in the situation for the largest body of unregistered believers in the USSR occurred last December when Ukrainian authorities began to permit some Ukrainian Catholic parishes to register, thus ending their long-standing illegal status.

To encourage the implementation of reform, we have indicated our willingness to provide technical assistance on establishment of the Rule of Law. The Attorney General's October 1989 visit gave new momentum to this effort. Cooperative projects this year have included training Soviet judges in the U.S. and a legal seminar in Moscow featuring American experts.

Jewish Cultural Life and Anti-Semitism. Gorbachev's restructuring of Soviet society has had liberating effects on the country's many nationalities, and the Jewish community is no exception. Synagogues have been reopened, Hebrew schools established, Jewish publications permitted, and religious materials imported. Moreover, many Jewish cultural and social organizations have been allowed to form and even legally register. Glasnost' can be credited with allowing greater Jewish cultural expression, but it has also given rise to more frequent and troubling anti-Semitic statements made publicly, in

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print, and on state-controlled television. While anti-Semitic rhetoric has so far exceeded actions, the effect has been to increase the climate of fear and foreboding among Soviet Jews.

The Soviets have indicated to us that they, too, are concerned and recognize that national enmities, especially anti-Semitism, are harmful to the goals of perestroyka. Yet the Soviet leadership has not spoken out publicly against anti-Semitic groups or statements. You may want to press Gorbachev to do so. Among inducements to the Soviet leadership to combat anti-Semitism are the preservation of law and order, retention of the support of the intelligentsia, and improvement of the USSR's human rights record.

Jewish Emigration. Gorbachev may note the U.S. program for processing all Soviet refugees in Moscow by pointing to our inability to absorb all emigrants. He may urge that we open our door wider in order to divert more Soviet Jews from Israel and thereby help Moscow to mend fences with the Arab world. You may wish to point out that the number of Soviet citizens we are admitting to the U.S. for permanent residence is an all-time record high this year.

Gorbachev may reiterate Soviet objections that we characterize as "refugees" persons Moscow says are emigrating for family reunification. You will want to reaffirm our readiness to maintain a generous admissions policy for Soviet citizens and candidly explain why we believe that many Soviet citizens continue to qualify as refugees, notwithstanding improved political conditions in the USSR, because of a continuing "well-founded fear of persecution." Finally, as a mark of our continued concern for those who have been long denied the right to join relatives abroad, you may wish to press Gorbachev to "zero out" the remaining twelve cases of refuseniks from the list of twenty you presented at Malta, if he has not already done so.

POINTS TO MAKE

- o I want you to know that one of the most impressive achievements of perestroyka is the break that you have made with the past in the area of human rights.
- o What you have done to open up the political process, permit freedom of speech and religion, and release political prisoners as well as removing laws against so-called "political offenses" shows that you have committed your country to full observance of the standards agreed to in the Helsinki Final Act.

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- o One recent step that was very well received here was your decision to permit Ukrainian Catholic parishes to officially register their churches. We hope that eventually this will lead to complete normalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church's status.
- o Because the American public views human rights to be of fundamental importance for the continued improvement in the atmosphere between our two countries, we look forward to areas where we can cooperate in this area.
- o We have started a number of cooperative programs dealing with the broad problem of the Rule of Law. We gather there is an interest in the Soviet Union in continuing these programs. We share that interest.
- o Human rights issues are wide-ranging and our dialogue is expanding into new areas, including exchanges on improving quality of life from a humanitarian point of view for the aged and disabled.
 - We welcome the depth and breadth of this dialogue, as well as the calm, constructive atmosphere we have established for solving problems.
- o I hope we can now close out some matters so that the dialogue can move forward.
- o You indicated some time ago in your UN speech that there would be a solution to the refusenik problem. Hundreds of cases have been resolved by your efforts, but scores still remain by your own count.

(If emigration law has passed)

- We welcome the passage of the new emigration law, which should help prevent refusenik problems in the future.
- We hope that its faithful implementation will quickly resolve the remaining cases of those denied exit permission on the basis of access to classified information more than five years ago.

(If long-term refusenik cases not yet resolved)

- At Malta, I gave you a list of cases of special interest. Most were persons who have been denied permission to join relatives abroad for more than a decade.
- I am pleased that eight of the 20 cases have been resolved. The time has come to settle all cases. Sad to say, one of the people has died while still in refusal.

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- The resolution of long-term refugee cases is closely watched by Congress and the public, and is seen as markers of how far the reform process has come.
- o I understand that tensions arise as individuals and groups express their political views in the atmosphere of glasnost'.
 - We see this as normal and healthy -- provided it is conducted peacefully and the rights of others are not violated.
 - The rule of democratic laws is important in protecting individuals and ideas from the threat of force.
- o We have problems of bigotry in our country and try to combat them. Though we have a distance to go, we have come a long way. Progress has been achieved because the country's political, religious and civic leadership has spoken out vigorously against all forms of hatred and discrimination.
 - We are not calling for censorship of views. However, the absence of high-level official condemnation of anti-Semitic statements leaves the impression that the government's top leadership is unconcerned about anti-Semitism.
- o I hope you will take steps to promote respect for Jewish culture and to overcome bureaucratic resistance to the formation and registration of Jewish cultural organizations.
 - If combined with greater opportunities for Soviet Jews to express their traditions, this would enrich their lives and the cultural diversity of the USSR.

(If asked about U.S. "restrictions" on admissions of Soviet emigrants)

- The U.S. expects to continue its liberal admission of Soviet citizens. We expect to take in twice as many Soviets this fiscal year (FY-1990) as in the last fiscal year (FY-1989).
- More people may wish to come here in any given year than we can accommodate. We have established a system which gives priority to those with close relatives in the United States or who otherwise are of special concern to us. Others may have to wait or might not be accepted at all.
- It is an internationally accepted principle that freedom to emigrate does not convey the automatic right to immigrate to another country. All countries -- the USSR and U.S. included -- reserve the right to determine who may resettle within their borders.

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- This does not justify restrictions on emigration or travel. The U.S. does not limit movement of its citizens because other countries might not accept them for resettlement.
 - The new Soviet emigration law is an important step toward meeting international norms. We must build on that basis and move forward.

(If Gorbachev objects to conferring refugee status on some Soviet citizens)

- Until two years ago the U.S. almost automatically determined that Soviet citizens were eligible for refugee status. The fact that this is no longer so is a testament to the far-reaching changes you have introduced.
- The UN Convention and U.S. refugee law define a refugee as "a person ... who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
- UNHCR standards provide that, while discrimination is not persecution, patterns of discrimination may be seen as persecution.
- I must state frankly that certain religious and ethnic groups in USSR have experienced actual persecution or are subject to discrimination which affects their entire lives.
- Such persons qualify as refugees under U.S. law.
- The U.S. Refugee Act also permits the U.S. to process refugees in their homeland under certain conditions, especially where it is seen as more humane to do so.

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THEME PAPER: HUMAN RIGHTS

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DRAFT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT

George Bush, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, met in Washington on May 30-June 3, 1990.

Attending the discussions on the U.S. side were ... (to be provided).

Attending the discussions on the Soviet side were ... (to be provided).

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev expressed deep satisfaction that U.S.-Soviet and East-West relations are increasingly characterized by constructive dialogue and cooperation rather than misunderstanding and confrontation. It is clear that the world is moving beyond the Cold War era. While important differences remain between the United States and Soviet Union, the two Presidents are convinced that, with candid dialogue, creative thinking and a continuing search for practical and concrete solutions that produce mutual advantage, their countries can build on what has been accomplished to date in shaping more stable, cooperative and sustainable U.S.-Soviet and East-West relationships.

During the course of President Gorbachev's state visit, the two leaders reviewed the full range of issues on the expanding U.S.-Soviet agenda, including: arms control and disarmament, developments in Europe, regional problems, human rights and humanitarian affairs, transnational issues, bilateral questions and economic relations. The sides concluded a number of important agreements that advance specific objectives consistent with their mutual desire to build a more stable, cooperative and sustainable relationship. They also discussed the situation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and agreed on the need for dialogue to resolve the disputes in a manner that addresses the interests, rights and concerns of all parties.

I. Arms Control and Disarmament

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and Soviet Union to achieving equitable and verifiable arms control agreements that reduce the risk of war, enhance stability and security, and increase predictability and transparency. They recorded concrete and important achievements on several arms control questions and noted the possibilities for further, significant progress. They expressed the mutual hope that these possibilities will be realized in the coming months.

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Nuclear and Space Talks. The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction that all major issues have been resolved in the negotiations on reductions of strategic offensive arms (START), including the key elements of an effective verification regime. The understandings reached by the sides on these issues are set forth in a separate joint statement. The leaders instructed their negotiators in Geneva to use that statement as the basis for preparing the final joint text of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and its associated documents, which they hope to sign by the end of 1990.

(Separate section on NST follow-on talks to be provided)

The Presidents took note of the negotiations in Geneva on issues related to defense and space and of the possibility of concluding a separate agreement on predictability measures in this field. They directed their negotiators to prepare a joint draft text of this agreement for signature at an early date.

Conventional Forces in Europe. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reaffirmed their mutual belief that conclusion of a CFE agreement will significantly enhance stability and security in Europe, and noted that rapidly changing events in Europe have made such an accord all the more necessary. They expressed their satisfaction that all major substantive issues have been resolved and directed their negotiators in Vienna to accelerate their efforts to complete an agreement at the earliest possible date, in any case no later than this year's CSCE summit.

Chemical Weapons. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to work to conclude and bring into force as early as possible a multilateral, effectively verifiable Chemical Weapons Convention banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis. Recognizing their special responsibility in the area of chemical weapons disarmament and desiring to give an impulse to the conclusion of such a multilateral convention, the Presidents signed a bilateral chemical weapons destruction agreement. Under the provisions of this agreement, the United States and Soviet Union will cooperate regarding technology and procedures for the safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons; reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels; and cooperate in developing, testing and carrying out procedures for appropriate inspections.

Nuclear Testing. The leaders signed verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which will allow those agreements to be submitted for ratification by their respective legislative bodies. They reaffirmed their adherence to the agreement reached in September 1987 on a step-by-step approach to the negotiations on nuclear testing.

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Non-proliferation. The Presidents issued a joint statement on non-proliferation that outlines areas of common concern regarding proliferation of chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, missiles and missile technology, and biological weapons. It also highlights specific steps the sides have taken and will take to promote effective cooperation to stem such proliferation.

Open Skies. The leaders agreed that Open Skies would make an important contribution to transparency and confidence-building in Europe. They agreed on the need to intensify efforts toward conclusion of an agreement and noted the complementary value that an Open Skies regime would have for other arms control arrangements.

II. Developments in Europe

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev held wide-ranging discussions on developments in Europe. They agreed that determined East-West efforts at reducing tensions through arms control and confidence-building -- including the special efforts by the United States and Soviet Union -- and increasing adherence to and respect for common democratic values have contributed to breaking down the long-standing division of the continent and moving toward a Europe that is whole and free. They agreed on the importance of taking into account the security interests of all parties during this crucial period of transition. They noted that enduring solutions to new concerns should be built on consensus and dialogue, and that democratic processes should be subjected neither to artificial constraints nor forced preconditions.

The Presidents reviewed the discussions in the Two-plus-Four talks on the external aspects of the establishment of German unity. They expressed support for the ongoing efforts of the German people, consistent with their right of self-determination, to unify the two German states within existing borders. They further expressed their support for the completion of a final settlement in an orderly fashion and without delay that will terminate the rights of the Four Powers and open the way for a sovereign, unified Germany to play a positive and constructive role in European affairs. The two leaders agreed that this act of reconciliation should proceed in a manner that takes account of and protects the interests of other members of the community of European states.

The leaders agreed that existing political and military institutions will have to adapt in order to meet new challenges of the transformed Europe of the 1990s. Reiterating their support for the CSCE process, the Presidents underscored their commitment to fulfilling the Helsinki Final Act and follow-on CSCE conferences. They also confirmed their mutual desire to give a new impetus to the CSCE process. In particular, they reaffirmed their support for a CSCE summit meeting this year, noting that such a meeting should be the occasion for signing a CFE accord and for seeking measured progress across the three CSCE baskets. They also voiced support for a CSCE preparatory conference to be held this summer in Vienna and a CSCE preparatory ministerial to be held in September in New York.

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III. Regional Problems

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev exchanged views on a broad range of regional issues. They agreed on the need for comprehensive political settlements based on democratic pluralism, free elections and respect for human rights. These are essential to creating stable conditions for peaceful resolution of conflicts, establishing credible and legitimate governments, and promoting economic development and cooperation. The leaders shared the view that, over the longer term, they should seek to eliminate the competitive East-West dynamic as a factor in regional conflicts, so that the two countries can concentrate on helping to address the social and economic problems of the developing countries.

The Presidents agreed to continue working to facilitate settlements in those conflict areas where they have differences. Their goal is to narrow and eliminate points of disagreement. They further underscored the special role of the United Nations, when appropriate, in assisting with the implementation of accords that recently settled several long-standing international conflicts and pointed to the need for further international efforts in that regard.

Afghanistan. The two Presidents expressed their support for a peaceful, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan. They called upon the Afghan parties to consider a framework for a political settlement that would establish a permanent broad-based government. They agreed to ask the United Nations and Organization of Islamic Conference to work cooperatively with the Afghan parties to establish an appropriate transitional authority, whose main purpose would be to prepare for and monitor elections leading to the establishment of a permanent government. They agreed that, upon transfer of power to a transitional authority, the sides would work toward a ceasefire and termination of arms shipments to the parties. The transitional authority would prepare for and conduct elections with assistance from the international community. The Presidents underscored the need for continued humanitarian aid to help in the resettlement and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Central America. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and Soviet Union to support the continuing efforts of the Central American nations to implement fully the Esquipulas and successor agreements throughout Central America. They expressed satisfaction with the peaceful transfer of power in Nicaragua; pledged to continue to facilitate final demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance; and called for the full transfer of that country's armed forces to the authority of the new civilian government.

The two leaders agreed to support the process of negotiation begun under the good offices of the UN Secretary General between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN aimed at achieving a cessation of hostilities and a definitive end to the conflict.

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They supported the call of the Central American Presidents for a cessation of attacks on civilians and good-faith bargaining by both sides to achieve peaceful integration of the FMLN into the democratic process and a permanent political settlement of the conflict in El Salvador. They called for a halt of all arms flows to irregular forces in El Salvador and the rest of the Central American region.

Africa. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev noted that the emergence of the new sovereign state of Namibia in the conditions of peace and stability has created a qualitatively new situation in Southern Africa, conducive to settling the remaining conflicts in the region by peaceful political means. They emphasized the need for a process of national reconciliation in Angola; took note of the positive initial talks between the MPLA and UNITA; and offered to facilitate mediation efforts between the two parties in any way possible. They also supported the efforts of the Government of Mozambique to normalize conditions in the country and to enter into negotiations with the opposition. The leaders welcomed the beginning of talks between the African National Congress and the Government of South Africa, and reaffirmed their mutual belief that only through negotiations can authentic and irreversible change come to South Africa.

The Presidents urged the conflicting sides in Ethiopia to engage in negotiations to work out mutually acceptable conditions for achieving national reconciliation and to address the already serious famine problem. Talks are essential to reach agreement on methods of delivering food supplies provided by the international community. The leaders agreed to cooperate wherever possible in advancing the peace process and in delivering relief supplies to the victims of famine.

Middle East. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reaffirmed the need for an active Middle East peace process, expressing the hope that a new Israeli government will be ready to move ahead quickly with an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Such a dialogue offers a practical mechanism for creating conditions for sustainable negotiations leading to a comprehensive political settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The two sides discussed the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration; they expressed their support for the right of Jews to emigrate to Israel while recalling their views that Israel should not settle Soviet emigrés or other citizens in the territories occupied since 1967. On Lebanon, the leaders expressed their support for President Hrawi and implementation of the Taif accords and called for withdrawal of all foreign troops.

Asia and the Pacific. The Presidents recognize that the main sources of tension in Northeast Asia are on the Korean peninsula and the unresolved issues in Soviet-Japanese relations. The Presidents called upon the Korean parties to engage in a dialogue aimed at building mutual trust and confidence, leading to lessened tensions and increased cooperation on the peninsula.

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They also urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to sign and implement immediately the nuclear safeguards agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an important first step in that process. The leaders called for an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, including resolution of the issue of the Northern Territories.

The Presidents noted that progress has been made toward a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. They agreed to intensify efforts to find ways of overcoming differences among the Cambodian parties and making the United Nations approach successful.

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reviewed the situation in Kashmir. They urged India and Pakistan to exercise caution and restraint, and expressed deep concern at the increased tensions in the area. They agreed to consult with India and Pakistan on measures to reduce tensions and called upon the international community to assist in this effort.

IV. Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev continued the high-level U.S.-Soviet dialogue on the full range of human rights and humanitarian issues. They agreed that the most effective guarantee of individual liberties and human rights is a genuinely democratic state based upon the rule of law. President Gorbachev reviewed the steps taken by the Soviet Union, including legislative proposals passed or under consideration by the Supreme Soviet, which are intended to implement the rights guaranteed to Soviet citizens under the Helsinki Final Act and other agreements to which the USSR is party. The leaders condemned all forms of discrimination, including anti-Semitism. They agreed that exchanges between the United States and Soviet Union intended to promote understanding of one another's legal systems and to enhance the rule of law deserve full support.

The leaders noted with approval passage of emigration legislation by the USSR Supreme Soviet, as well as progress on Supreme Soviet legislation regarding freedom of conscience, ethnic and minority rights, and freedom of the press. The American side welcomed the progress made by the Soviet side in resolving the cases of concern to the United States, including those of persons previously denied permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union, and expressed its hope that the outstanding cases would be resolved in the near future.

The Presidents noted with approval the beginnings of promising cooperative exchanges on human rights and humanitarian issues, and reviewed programs planned or underway which promote a better understanding of each country's institutions, legislation and practices in the field of human rights and humanitarian affairs.

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The sides reemphasized their commitment to implement in practice international agreements and standards on human rights observance, and underscored their continued support for multi-lateral as well as bilateral cooperation to this end. They further emphasized their support for the CSCE process, for substantial progress at the Copenhagen Human Dimension Meeting of the CSCE, and for efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations system and other international bodies in the field of human rights and humanitarian affairs.

V. Bilateral Questions

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev issued a joint statement concerning the establishment of Consulates General in Kiev and New York. They welcomed the realization of long-held plans to expand mutual contacts by opening such posts, and agreed to begin discussions on the opening of consulates in other U.S. and Soviet cities.

The Presidents announced an agreement on the establishment of cultural centers in each other's capitals and announced negotiations for significantly expanding university exchanges at the undergraduate level. In scientific and technical fields, they signed a renewed cooperation agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy -- noting cooperation on civilian nuclear reactor operational safety -- and signed a new agreement on Ocean Studies. The Presidents welcomed these concrete steps toward expanding people-to-people contacts, academic interchange and broader, intensified cooperative research.

VI. Economic Relations

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev noted with satisfaction the development of the U.S.-Soviet bilateral economic relationship pursuant to their decisions at Malta. They signed a trade agreement, which should provide the basis for the further evolution of commercial ties between the two countries. The Presidents also signed a Long-Term Grains Agreement, and noted with satisfaction the conclusion of a Maritime Transportation Agreement(?) and an expanded Civil Aviation Agreement(?). These agreements will strengthen commercial interaction between the two countries in their respective areas.

The sides also noted the exchange of letters which will open the way for Soviet nickel exports to the U.S. They reviewed the status of the on-going negotiations on a Tax Treaty and a Bilateral Investment Treaty.

The Presidents reviewed the status of the technical cooperation initiatives advanced at Malta, which are designed to introduce and facilitate the application of market principles within the Soviet Union and the U.S.-Soviet bilateral economic relationship. They noted with satisfaction the projects underway in various areas from financial structures, to small business development, to exchanges on statistics and the formation of a stock exchange.

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The Presidents also considered the steps taken toward the integration of the Soviet Union into the world economic system. An important step forward was taken when the United States and Soviet Union joined 33 other states in assenting to the Final Document of the CSCE Bonn Economic Conference. Another step was the participation of the Soviet Union in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. President Bush reiterated his support for Soviet observer status in the GATT.

The leaders had a long exchange on the reform program in the Soviet Union. President Bush reiterated his strong support for perestroika. The American side observed that the success of perestroika in introducing market concepts into the Soviet economy would greatly facilitate the development of bilateral commercial ties and full Soviet participation in the world economy.

VII. Transnational Issues

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reviewed the broad agenda of transnational issues, including environment, nuclear energy, space, counterterrorism, and narcotics trafficking.

Environment. The Presidents noted the persistent challenge of environmental issues confronting individual nations and the world community. They cited the importance of work underway in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the efforts in preparation for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, which will be called on to assess the state of the environment and identify further areas for action. The sides reaffirmed their desire to see the Conference adopt meaningful recommendations and decisions. They also noted with satisfaction cooperation in natural hazards prediction and experts' consultations on disaster management and relief. Noting the importance of expanding environmental conservation and cultural preservation, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev approved a joint statement announcing their intention to establish a U.S.-USSR International Park in the Beringian region. They also announced implementation of an initiative in expanded, long-term environmental monitoring cooperation.

The sides reaffirmed their commitment to the effective operation of the Antarctic Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty system. They noted that both had signed the Antarctic Minerals Convention and view it as an important contribution to the comprehensive system of environmental protection. They also noted the need for compliance by all states with the principles and norms of international law as reflected in the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea governing traditional uses of the oceans, and expressed their support for the goal of achieving a universally acceptable Convention.

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Nuclear Energy and Environment. President Bush and President Gorbachev approved joint statements reflecting the importance they attach to nuclear safety cooperation, including, research on human health and environmental effects of radiation exposure, and management of radioactive waste; and the prospects of further multilateral cooperation in advanced fusion energy research.

Space. The Presidents agreed to examine closely the prospects for expanding cooperation under the agreement on exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

Counterterrorism. The leaders expressed satisfaction with the progress made in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on counterterrorism cooperation. They agreed on basic principles of counterterrorism policy: 1) the goal is to bring terrorists to justice based on the assumption that there is no justification whatsoever for terrorism; 2) no concessions should be granted to terrorists; and 3) state sponsorship of terrorism must be ended. The leaders agreed on future discussions to explore the opportunities for combatting terrorism, including achieving their agreed goal of ending state support for terrorism.

Narcotics Control. The sides agreed on the importance of cooperation in bilateral and multilateral efforts at combatting narcotics abuse and trafficking. The leaders noted with satisfaction the signature of the agreement regarding Mutual Assistance between Customs Services, which represents an important step in this direction. The sides cited the role of the UN in this field and the importance of the resolutions adopted by the 17th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on international cooperation in combating drug abuse.

United Nations. Expressing their satisfaction with the growing positive role played by the UN, the leaders reaffirmed the intention of their countries to encourage the UN to assume a more effective role in maintaining a system of peace, security and cooperation under its Charter.

* * * * *

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reaffirmed the value of high-level dialogue for advancing U.S.-Soviet relations. They agreed that their Foreign Ministers will remain in regular contact and hope to be able to meet next at a summit of the 35 participating CSCE states this year in connection with the signing of a CFE agreement.

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SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO INDIA: BRIEFING MATERIAL

1. HERewith MATERIAL PREPARED FOR THE JANUARY 2 AFTERNOON BRIEFING FOR THE PRESS COVERING THE VISIT TO INDIA OF PRESIDENT CARTER. THE MATERIAL WAS PREPARED JOINTLY BY THE U.S. AND INDIAN SIDES.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE FIRST ROUND OF THE OFFICIAL TALKS BETWEEN
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THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA WAS HELD THIS MORNING FROM 9:00 A.M. TO 11:10 A.M. AT THE RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN. PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER MORARJI DESAI WERE ALONE FOR 35 MINUTES AFTER WHICH THEY JOINED THE TWO DELEGATIONS WHICH HAD ALREADY ASSEMBLED IN THE PANEL ROOM OF RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN. THE PRESIDENT WAS ASSISTED BY SECRETARY VANCE, MR. BRZEZINSKI, AMBASSADOR GOHEEN, MR. THORNTON, MR. ATHERTON AND MR. ANTHONY LAKE. THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY INCLUDED THE HOME MINISTER, THE DEFENSE MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE FINANCE MINISTER, THE COMMERCE MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES AND THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO PM, FOREIGN SECRETARY, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS SECRETARY AND JOINT SECRETARY (AMS), MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DURING THE SESSION THE TWO LEADERS HAD A WIDE RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN AS WELL AS BILATERAL COOPERATION. THE TALKS WERE HELD IN A WARM AND CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE REFLECTING THE DEEP RAPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING THAT HAS COME TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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MIDDLE EAST

PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED HIS "GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE COURAGE OF PRESIDENT SADAT". HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ALWAYS MADE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE VARIOUS PARTIES CONCERNED TO NEGOTIATE. THAT IS WHY THE DRAMATIC VISIT OF PRESIDENT SADAT TO ISRAEL WAS SUCH WELCOME NEWS TO THE US GOVERNMENT. THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PRESIDENT CONFIRMED THAT HE WILL BE GOING TO ASWAN TO "REASSURE PRESIDENT SADAT OF OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT TO THESE EFFORTS" FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE REGION. PRIME MINISTER DESAI STRESSED THAT A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POSSIBLE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GREAT POWERS CONCERNED WOULD ALSO WORK TOWARDS IT.

HORN OF AFRICA

BOTH PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER DESAI EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN AND REGRET AT THE CONTINUING CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONFLICT WILL SOON COME TO AN END AND WHATEVER THE PROBLEMS WOULD BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY. IN THIS CONNECTION PRESIDENT CARTER EXPLAINED THE US GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF NOT SUPPLYING ARMS TO ANY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT CONTRARY TO CERTAIN REPORTS THAT HAD APPEARED IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA ALSO DENIED RUMORS OF INDIA HAVING SUPPLIED WEAPONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO EITHER OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

CHINA

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THE TWO LEADERS INFORMED EACH OTHER OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE RELATIONS OF THEIR TWO COUNTRIES WITH CHINA AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE OF THEIR IMPROVEMENT IN THE FUTURE WITHOUT AFFECTING THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

SALT, CTB AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

PRESIDENT CARTER INFORMED THE INDIAN PRIME
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MINISTER THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL OF AN AGREEMENT ON SALT-II TO BE CONCLUDED WITH USSR IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE ALSO SAID THAT UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED WITH USSR AND UK FOR THE PROHIBITION OF ALL NUCLEAR TESTS, INCLUDING PEACEFUL EXPLOSIONS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT FRANCE AND CHINA WOULD BE ABLE TO JOIN IN THIS UNDERSTANDING EVENTUALLY.

PRIME MINISTER DESAI REMARKED THAT IF THE TWO GREAT POWERS, USA AND USSR, WERE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE VITAL QUESTIONS, THIS WOULD GO A LONG WAY IN POSITIVELY INFLUENCING AND PROMOTING THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT.

PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED HIS GREAT CONCERN AT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING CONSISTENCE EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSION CAPACITY ROUND THE WORLD.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S "EARNESTNESS" IN THIS REGARD.

INDIAN OCEAN

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMED THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA OF THE EFFORTS HIS ADMINISTRATION

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WAS MAKING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MAKING THE INDIAN OCEAN MORE PEACEFUL AND FREE OF TENSIONS. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN "VERY GOOD PROGRESS AT THE 3 SESSIONS THAT HAD BEEN HELD BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET SIDES ON THIS QUESTION AND ALSO THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL OF FURTHER PROGRESS AT THE 4TH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS TO BE HELD NEXT MONTH. THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA WELCOMED THIS DEVELOPMENT

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AND SAID THAT INDI'S HELP IN PROMOTING THE PROCESS OF PEACE AND RELAXATION OF TENSIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE. THE PRESIDENT REMARKED "YOUR INFLUENCE HAS BEEN VERY HELPFUL."

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NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

PRESIDENT CARTER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS AND SPECIFICALLY UNDERLINEE THE ROLE THAT INDIA HAE PLAYED IN IT. THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF PEOPLE ON THIS PLANET. AT THE AAME TIME, HE STRESSED THAT IN THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE DEVELOPING UNCLASSIFIED

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COUNTRIES HAVE TO MAKE THEIR OWN EFFORTS FOR SELF-RELIANCE

AND FOR "MUTUALLY HELPING EACH OTHER". HE SAID THAT HE

WANTED THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION TO EXTEND TO BOTH THE DEVELOPED AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. BUT IN AN INTER-DEPENDENT WORLD, THE FEELING AMONG THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF BEING NEGLECTED SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ACCUMULATE.

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PRESIDENT CARTER ASSURED THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE EFFORTS

TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE DEVELOPING WORLD. THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND SAID THAT INDIA'S APPROACH

TO THE WHOLE QUESTION WAS BASED ON MODERATION, RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION. HE PARTICULARLY EMPHASISED THAT INDIA DID NOT BELIEVE IN CONFRONTATION ON THIS OR ANY OTHER QUESTION. PM RECALLED THAT WE HAD EXTENDED OUR FULL COOPERATION TO THE PARIS CONFERENCE. HE REMARKED THAT IT WAS ONLY THROUGH DISARMAMENT THAT RESOURCES COULD BE RELEASED FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

THE FINANCE MINISTER OF INDIA REFERRED TO THE GROWTH OF PROTECTIONISM IN THE WESTERN WORLD AND SAID THAT THE PROTECTIONIST FORCES HAD TO BE CURBED. THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED THAT THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTION OF TRADE RELATIONS MUST BE THE ULTIMATE CESSATION OF AID. HE WAS AGAINST A BLOCK APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION, BUT RECOGNIZED THAT NO COUNTRY COULD REALLY AFFORD TO BE ALONE IN THIS.

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THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE STATED THAT THE GENERALISED SCHEME OF PREFERENCES NEEDED TO BE EXTENDED TO COVER THE WHOLE RANGE OF COTTAGE AND SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES WHICH

ALONE COULD PROMOTE THE RAPID GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES.

PRESIDENT CARTER SAID THAT THE ROLE OF US BUSINESS

AND INDUSTRIAL CIRCLES IN THIS RESPECT WAS IMPORTANT.

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HE RECOGNISED THAT THE PROBLEMS OF INVESTMENT ETC. IN INDIA HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATED IN THE US, BUT LOOKED FORWARD TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING ANE INTER-CHANGE AMONG THE CONCERNED ORGANISATIONS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE FINANCE MINISTER EXPLAINED THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S POLICY ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT. HE SAID WE WELCOMED FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INEEED WERE GOING OUT TO SEEK FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AREAS THAT FITTED INTO OUR PLAN PRIORITIES.

PANAMA CANAL

PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT CONGRESS

APPROVAL OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIRES WILL BE FORTHCOMING SOON.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

REFERRING TO THE PROBLEMS OF ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA, PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER EESAI AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FIND A SOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH THE INDICATED ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE.

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SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

BOTH LEADERS RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS IN ORDER THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE FRUITFUL.

BILATERAL

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THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA THAT HE HAD AUTHORISED THE RELEASE OF THE NEXT CONSIGNMENT OF ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL FOR TARAPUR.

SPACE

PRESIDENT CARTER INFORMED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS WILLING TO EXPAND THE ALREADY EXISTING COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA AND THE

USA IN SATELLITE PROGRAMMES FOR GEODESIC, GEOLOGICAL AND METEOROLOGICAL SURVEYS AS WELL AS IN PROVIDING GROUND

STATIONS AND FACILITIES. "WE RECOGNISE THE BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT" OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY AND THE US WAS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER COLLABORATION WITH INDIA IN THIS FIELD.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT WE HAD ALREADY BENEFITTED FROM THE TREMENDOUS ADVANCES MADE BY THE UNITED STATES AND LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD.

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BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED SUPPORT TO THE INDO-US JOINT COMMISSION FOR IDENTIFYING AND ENLARGING THE AREAS OF COOPERATION IN DIVERSE SPHERES. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WERE A HELPFUL INSTITUTION IN

PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND SHOULD BE HELD AT MORE FREQUENT INTERVALS IN THE FUTURE.

PRESIDENT CARTER EXTENDED A WARM AND CORDIAL INVITATION

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TO PRIME MINISTER MORARJI DESAI TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES.
THE INVITATION WAS GRATEFULLY ACCEPTED.

END TEXT.
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MAY 24, 1983

WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON

Q: What are the prospects for achieving a complete withdrawal of foreign forces in light of recent statements by Israeli officials that they will not withdraw their forces unless Syria and the PLO agree to do the same?

A: Israel has made clear for some time that it will withdraw its forces from Lebanon only in the context of Syrian and PLO withdrawal. With the conclusion of the Lebanon-Israeli agreement, a mechanism exists for Israeli withdrawal. It is now incumbent upon the Syrians to do their part so that the Government of Lebanon can get on with the urgent task of rebuilding the country.

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APR 24, 1983

SYRIA: PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON WITHDRAWAL

Q: When did the Syrians last state publicly their willingness to withdraw from Lebanon?

A: -- President Assad to 20th Congress of the Syrian General Federation of Trade Unions in Damascus on November 20, 1983:

"We repeatedly announced our readiness to leave Lebanon whenever our brothers there feel they no longer need out help. Today we assert that as soon as the Israeli invading forces withdraw from Lebanon, there will be no problem about our forces."

-- Foreign Minister Khaddam to French Foreign Minister Cheysson in Damascus, February 14-15, 1983:

Syria would withdraw its forces from Lebanon if the Israelis withdraw their troops. (As reported in the French and Syrian press.)

-- Foreign Minister Khaddam to American journalist in Damascus, February 26, 1983:

Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon is no problem once Israel departs.

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-- Syrian Minister of Information, Ahmad Iskandar, in
Lebanese magazine, As-Sayyad, March 9, 1983:

Syria does not object to synchronized withdrawal of the
Syrian and Israeli forces in Lebanon.

-- I would note these the public statements made by the
Syrian leadership have also been reflected in our private
dealings with Syrian officials.

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LEBANON THEMES

-- The recent breakthrough in the Lebanon negotiations has firmed our resolve to proceed toward the attainment of our mutual goals for Lebanon:

-- The withdrawal of all foreign forces -- Israeli, PLO, Syrian and others. All armed elements remaining in the country must be subject to the control of the central Government of Lebanon.

-- The extension of Lebanese sovereignty throughout its territory.

-- A strong, stable Lebanese Central Government.

-- Security on Israel's northern border.

-- Lebanon has decided as a sovereign state to conclude an agreement with Israel that results in the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. The international community should support Lebanon and its right to make a decision it considers to be in its own best interest.

-- The Agreement is the essential first step in the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Lebanon.

-- We urge that negotiations take place as soon as possible between Lebanon and Syria to advance the process of withdrawal of all external forces.

-- While we are disappointed that the Syrians have been initially negative about the Israel-Lebanon agreement, we are hopeful that they will take a constructive and responsible approach to move their negotiations with the Lebanese forward quickly. Only through complete foreign troop withdrawal can the security of Lebanon and its neighbors be assured.

-- Increased tension in the area resulting from Syrian military exercises, PLO re-infiltration into Lebanon and consequent Israeli re-inforcement underscore the importance of moving resolutely to the full restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty. So long as foreign troops remain, Lebanon will be fraught with instability and open to renewed hostilities.

-- Our Marines continue to play a vital role in support of the Lebanese Government. Their contribution complements our diplomatic efforts in a very important way.

-- The recent tragic bombing of our Embassy in Beirut cannot be allowed to deflect us from our goal of resolving the conflict. We cannot be pressured or blackmailed into abandoning our

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-- Lebanon must never again be the victim of external intervention, warfare and human tragedy.

-- We support President Amin Gemayel as Lebanon's constitutionally elected leader, and encourage his efforts to achieve a sovereign, united, independent state in which all of Lebanon's communities can live in security and harmony.

-- Restoration of Lebanon's independence and well-being will be a positive step toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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CAIRO FOR SECDEL AND AMBASSADORS PAGANELLI AND HABIB E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, IS SUBJ: SYRIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON LEBANON - APRIL 26

Preil Habib

cc Syria PREL Phase II


1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CHARGE WAS SUMMONED TO SYRIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 1930 HOURS LOCAL APRIL 26 AND RECEIVED BY MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FARUQ SHAR'A, WHO SAID HE HAD AN OFFICIAL SYRIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON LEBANON. READING FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTES IN ARABIC, SHAR'A GAVE CHARGE ORALLY THE ARABIC TEXT AND THEN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WHICH FOLLOWS.

3. (BEGIN TEXT) "WE DO NOT WANT TO HAVE ANY AMBIGUITY ABOUT OUR POSITION, AND WE WOULD LIKE ALWAYS TO SPEAK FRANKLY WITH YOU. DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE IN THE PAST STRESSED OUR POSITION TOWARDS LEBANON, WE ARE KEEN NOT TO HAVE OUR ATTITUDE ON IT MISUNDERSTOOD, AS IT SEEMS TO BE SOMETIMES IN SOME STATEMENTS. THEREFORE WE ARE GOING TO CLARIFY IT ONCE AGAIN.

"WE CONSIDER THAT ANY GAINS ACHIEVED THROUGH THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON CONSTITUTE A DANGER TO OUR NATIONAL (WATANI) AND ARAB SECURITY, WHICH WOULD OBLIGE US TO STAY IN LEBANON AS LONG AS THESE GAINS REMAIN.

"IT IS NATURAL THAT WE CARE A GREAT DEAL ABOUT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, ESPECIALLY WHEN ISRAEL SEEKS, AND REPEATEDLY PLANS, TO TAKE EXPANSIONIST ACTIONS FROM TIME TO TIME." (END TEXT)



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AGREEMENT BETWEEN

The Government of the State of Israel and
The Government of the Republic of Lebanon

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Lebanon:

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights;

Reaffirming their faith in the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries;

Having agreed to declare the termination of the state of war between them;

Desiring to ensure lasting security for both their States and to avoid threats and the use of force between them;

Desiring to establish their mutual relations in the manner provided for in this Agreement;

Having delegated their undersigned representative plenipotentiaries, provided with full powers, in order to sign, in the presence of the representative of the United States of America, this Agreement;

Have agreed to the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

1. The Parties agree and undertake to respect the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of each other. They consider the existing international boundary between Israel and Lebanon inviolable.
2. The Parties confirm that the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated and no longer exists.

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3. Taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, Israel undertakes to withdraw all its armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with the Annex of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties, being guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner as to promote international peace and security, and justice.

ARTICLE 3

In order to provide maximum security for Israel and Lebanon, the Parties agree to establish and implement security arrangements, including the creation of a security region, as provided for in the Annex of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

1. The territory of each Party will not be used as a base for hostile or terrorist activity against the other Party, its territory, or its people.
2. Each Party will prevent the existence or organization of irregular forces, armed bands, organizations, bases, offices or infrastructure, the aims and purposes of which include incursions or any act of terrorism into the territory of the other Party, or any other activity aimed at threatening or endangering the security of the other Party and safety of its people. To this end all agreements and arrangements enabling the presence and functioning on the territory of either Party of elements hostile to the other Party are null and void.
3. Without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defence in accordance with international law, each Party will refrain:
 - a. from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in threats or acts of belligerency, subversion, or incitement or any aggression directed against the other Party, its population or property, both within its territory and originating therefrom, and in the territory of the other Party.

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- b. from using the territory of the other Party for conducting a military attack against the territory of a third state.
 - c. from intervening in the internal or external affairs of the other Party.
4. Each party undertakes to ensure that preventive action and due proceedings will be taken against persons or organizations perpetrating acts in violation of this Article.

ARTICLE 5

Consistent with the termination of the state of war and within the framework of their constitutional provisions, the Parties will abstain from any form of hostile propaganda against each other.

ARTICLE 6

Each Party will prevent entry into, deployment in or passage through its territory, its air space and, subject to the right of innocent passage in accordance with international law, its territorial sea, by military forces, armament or military equipment of any state hostile to the other Party.


ARTICLE 7

Except as provided in the present Agreement, nothing will preclude the deployment on Lebanese territory of international forces requested and accepted by the Government of Lebanon to assist in maintaining its authority. New contributors to such forces shall be selected from among states having diplomatic relations with both Parties to the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 8

1. a. Upon entry into force of the present Agreement, a Joint Liaison Committee will be established by the Parties, in which the United States of America will be a participant, and will commence its functions. This Committee will be entrusted with the supervision of the implementation of all areas covered by the present Agreement. In matters involving security arrangements, it will deal with unresolved problems referred to it by the Security Arrangements Committee established in

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- b. The Joint Liaison Committee will address itself on a continuing basis to the development of mutual relations between Israel and Lebanon, inter alia the regulation of the movement of goods, products and persons, communications, etc.
- c. Within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee, there will be a Security Arrangements Committee whose composition and functions are defined in the Annex of the present Agreement.
- d. Subcommittees of the Joint Liaison Committee may be established as the need arises.
- e. The Joint Liaison Committee will meet in Israel and Lebanon, alternately.
- f. Each Party, if it so desires and unless there is an agreed change of status, may maintain a liaison office on the territory of the other Party in order to carry out the above-mentioned functions within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee and to assist in the implementation of the present Agreement.
- g. The members of the Joint Liaison Committee from each of the Parties will be headed by a senior government official.
- h. All other matters relating to these liaison offices, their personnel, and the personnel of each Party present in the territory of the other Party in connection with the implementation of the present Agreement will be the subject of a protocol to be concluded between the Parties in the Joint Liaison Committee. Pending the conclusion of this protocol, the liaison offices and the above-mentioned personnel will be treated in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Convention on Special Missions of December 8, 1969, including those provisions concerning privileges and immunities. The foregoing is without prejudice to the positions of the Parties concerning that convention.

2. During the six-month period after the withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with Article 1 of the present Agreement and the simultaneous withdrawal of

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termination of the state of war, the Parties shall initiate, within the Joint Liaison Committee, bona fide negotiations in order to conclude agreements on the movement of goods, products and persons and their implementation on a non-discriminatory basis.

ARTICLE 9

1. Each of the two Parties will take, within a time limit of one year as of entry into force of the present Agreement, all measures necessary for the abrogation of treaties, laws and regulations deemed in conflict with the present Agreement, subject to and in conformity with its constitutional procedures.
2. The Parties undertake not to apply existing obligations, enter into any obligations, or adopt laws or regulations in conflict with the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 10

1. The present Agreement shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall supersede the previous agreements between Israel and Lebanon.
2. The Annex, the Appendix and the map attached thereto, and the Agreed Minutes to the present Agreement shall be considered integral parts thereof.
3. The present Agreement may be modified, amended, or superseded by mutual agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE 11

1. Disputes between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or application of the present Agreement will be settled by negotiation in the Joint Liaison Committee. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall be submitted to ~~conciliation and, if unresolved, thereafter to an agreed procedure for a definitive resolution.~~
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the present Agreement shall be resolved in the framework of the Security

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- 6 -

ARTICLE 12

The present Agreement shall be communicated to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration in conformity with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Khaldeh and Kiryat Shmona this seventeenth day of May, 1983, in triplicate, in four authentic texts in the Arabic, English, French and Hebrew languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English and French texts will be equally authoritative.

For the Government of the
State of Israel

For the Government of the
Republic of Lebanon

Witnessed by:

For the Government of the
United States of America

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DECLASSIFIED 6/26/96

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STATUS OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

EXCISE

There has been considerable progress in the direct talks between Lebanon and Israel. A few key issues remain, so the President decided that a visit by Secretary Shultz to the area might serve to move the parties toward final agreement.

On security arrangements for southern Lebanon, there is basic agreement on the principles of:

A security zone in the south;

Limitation of arms within that zone;

[REDACTED]

Integration of the Haddad forces into a territorial brigade;

A supervisory committee on the agreement; and,

Verification teams to "check" implementation in the south.

However, Israel and Lebanon are still divided over the role of Haddad and the nature of Israeli participation in the mechanisms to verify the agreement in the south. The Lebanese aver that their sovereignty is at stake and that Syrian forces would never withdraw under the conditions proposed by Israel. The Israelis state that Lebanese forces alone cannot be relied upon to assure security in the south. The parties are on clearly divergent tracks on this issue.

Substantial progress has been made in the direct talks between Israel and Lebanon on "mutual relations", i.e. normalization. They have agreed on a compromise formula that would put many of the contentious issues into interim de facto arrangements pending negotiation of a final agreement on the movement of goods and people.

On the use of international forces in southern Lebanon, Israel continues to reject our proposal for a limited UNIFIL deployment in Tyre and Sidon in conjunction with an LAF

April 26, 1983

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DECL. OADR

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presence to protect Palestinian refugee camps there. Israel also rejects a Multinational Force presence in the security zone. We have stressed to Israel that a UNIFIL presence is necessary to gain PLO agreement to withdraw. It would have no responsibility for Israeli security, and the Lebanese authorities would have control of the camps with full military, police and intelligence access.

Talking Points:

-- Secretary of State Shultz has arrived in the Middle East at a critical juncture in the negotiations for the withdrawal from Lebanon of all external forces.

-- The Secretary's primary focus will be on the talks between Israel and Lebanon, the vital cornerstone in the process of achieving the complete withdrawal of the forces of Israel, Syria and the PLO and the restoration of full Lebanese sovereignty and control over all its national territory.

-- Ambassador Habib, through great skill, sensitivity, and creative diplomacy, has succeeded in narrowing the differences between the Lebanese and Israeli governments to a point where three or four key issues remain.

-- The time therefore appeared propitious for the Secretary at President Reagan's request, to travel to the Middle East and engage the leaders of the two countries in an intensified effort to resolve the remaining differences without further delay and to try to frame a workable agreement. As the Secretary said on the plane to Cairo, he is at least a fresh face.

-- With an agreement with Israel in hand, the Government of Lebanon will be able to shift its attention to arranging for the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces as well.

-- As I said, the Secretary's focus will be on reaching an agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Such an agreement, however, and the withdrawals of foreign forces which we expect to ensue from it, will also have a positive influence on other developments of importance to us in the Middle East.

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Drafted: NEA/ARN--CDWelch *CD*
x21018 4/26/83 #3654C

Cleared: NEA/ARN--AEJones *AE*

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Logged to EA 4/29 (for AS Wolfowitz)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

12/26/96

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STATUS OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

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EXCISE

Background:

There has been considerable progress in the direct talks between Lebanon and Israel. A few key issues remain, so the President decided that a visit by Secretary Shultz to the area might serve to move the parties toward final agreement.

On security arrangements for southern Lebanon, there is basic agreement on the principles of:

A security zone in the south;

Limitation of arms within that zone;

[REDACTED]

Integration of the Haddad forces into a territorial brigade;

A supervisory committee on the agreement; and,

Verification teams to "check" implementation in the south.

However, Israel and Lebanon are still divided over the role of Haddad and the nature of Israeli participation in the mechanisms to verify the agreement in the south. The Lebanese aver that their sovereignty is at stake and that Syrian forces would never withdraw under the conditions proposed by Israel. The Israelis state that Lebanese forces alone cannot be relied upon to assure security in the south. The parties are on clearly divergent tracks on this issue.

Substantial progress has been made in the direct talks between Israel and Lebanon on "mutual relations", i.e. normalization. They have agreed on a compromise formula that would put some of the contentious issues into interim de facto arrangements pending negotiation of a final agreement on the movement of goods and people.

On the use of international forces in southern Lebanon, Israel continues to reject our proposal for a limited UNIFIL deployment in Tyre and Sidon in conjunction with an LAF presence to protect Palestinian refugee camps there. Israel also rejects a Multinational Force presence in the security

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zone. We have stressed to Israel that a UNIFIL presence is necessary to gain PLC agreement to withdraw. It would have no responsibility for Israeli security, and the Lebanese authorities would have control of the camps with full military, police and intelligence access.

Talking Points:

-- After nearly four months of direct talks, only a few issues, albeit tough ones, remain to be resolved in the Israel-Lebanon negotiations.

-- There is basic agreement between Lebanon and Israel on security arrangements in the southern part of Lebanon, which would establish a security zone in the area. In the zone, there would be certain agreed limitations on forces and a mechanism for the verification of the agreement.

-- The agreed mechanism for verification would permit Israel a role in the supervision of the security arrangements without a residual presence. It is our view that a residual Israeli presence would undermine Lebanon's fragile internal consensus and jeopardize the Syrian commitment to withdraw.

-- But some key problems remain unresolved. Israel and Lebanon are still divided over the role of Haddad and the nature of Israeli participation in the mechanisms to verify the agreement in the south. The Lebanese aver that their sovereignty is at stake and that Syrian forces would never withdraw under the conditions proposed by Israel. The Israelis state that Lebanese forces alone cannot be relied upon to assure security in the south.

-- Substantial progress has been made in the direct talks between Israel and Lebanon on "mutual relations", i.e. normalization. Agreement is closer in this particular area, but there is still work to be done.

-- To move the parties to final agreement the President decided that Secretary Shultz should visit the area, with the objective of bridging the remaining issues through talks with the Lebanese and Israelis.

-- The Secretary's primary focus will be on the talks between Israel and Lebanon, the vital cornerstone in the process of achieving the complete withdrawal of the forces of Israel, Syria and the PLO and the restoration of full Lebanese sovereignty and control over all its national territory.

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- 3 -

-- Ambassador Habib, through great skill, sensitivity, and creative diplomacy, has succeeded in narrowing the differences between the Lebanese and Israeli governments to a point where three or four key issues remain.

-- The time therefore appeared propitious for the Secretary at President Reagan's request, to travel to the Middle East and engage the leaders of the two countries in an intensified effort to resolve the remaining differences without further delay and to try to frame a workable agreement. As the Secretary said on the plane to Cairo, he is at least a fresh face.

-- With an agreement with Israel in hand, the Government of Lebanon will be able to shift its attention to arranging for the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces as well.

-- As I said, the Secretary's focus will be on reaching an agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Such an agreement, however, and the withdrawals of foreign forces which we expect to ensue from it, will also have a positive influence on other developments of importance to us in the Middle East.

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Drafted: NEA/ARN--CDWelch
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Cleared: NEA/ARN--AEJones

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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NEA:RHPELLETREAU:CF
04/21/83 EXT. 29464
S:THE SECRETARY

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E.O. 12065: ~~DECL:OADR~~

TAGS: OVIP XF

SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF STATE VISIT

1. ~~EST~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY PLANS TO VISIT EGYPT, LEBANON AND ISRAEL WITHIN THE COMING FEW DAYS. HIS PRIMARY PURPOSE WILL BE TO ACCELERATE THE ISRAEL-LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A RAPID RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND CLEARING THE PATH FOR AN ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE SECRETARY PROPOSES TO HOLD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE THREE GOVERNMENTS AND IN CAIRO CONSULT WITH U.S. AMBASSADORS IN THE REGION {SEPTEL}.

3. THE SECRETARY'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY WILL BE TO DEPART WASHINGTON APRIL 24, ARRIVING IN CAIRO THE FOLLOWING DAY. HE WOULD PLAN TO ARRIVE IN ISRAEL ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 27, VISITING BEIRUT EARLIER IN THE DAY, EN ROUTE FROM CAIRO. IF A SHUTTLE IS THEN DEEMED NECESSARY, THE SECRETARY WOULD PLAN TO OPERATE FROM JERUSALEM WITHOUT OVERNIGHTING IN BEIRUT. THIS WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LACK OF SUPPORT FACILITIES IN BEIRUT BECAUSE OF THE BOMBING OF THE EMBASSY.

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4. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD SEEK HOST GOVERNMENTS' CONCURRENCE TO THE SECRETARY'S VISIT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. INFO ADDRESSEES SHOULD BE POSITIONED TO ADVISE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS SOON AS CONCURRENCE TO THE VISIT IS OBTAINED. WE HOPE TO ANNOUNCE THE VISIT PUBLICLY FRIDAY NOON, APRIL 22, WASHINGTON TIME. YYY

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PLEASE ADD TO INFO ADDRESSEES

JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE *Wm* IS/FPC/CDR 9200109 Date: 6/26/96

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NEA:RHPelletreau:CF
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S:THE SECRETARY

NEA:DTSCHNEIDER
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IMMEDIATE JERUSALEM

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~~NO DIS/STADIS~~
~~EYES ONLY~~ FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: ~~DECL:OADR~~

TAGS: PEPR

SUBJECT: LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 50001

1. ~~EST~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOUR MESSAGES OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY USEFUL IN FOCUSING OUR ATTENTION ON THE REMAINING POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND THE ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES. I COMPLETELY SHARE YOUR ASSESSMENT REGARDING THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THROUGH PERSEVERANCE, SENSITIVITY, AND SUPERLATIVE CREATIVE DIPLOMACY YOU HAVE BROUGHT THE PARTIES TO THE POINT WHERE AN AGREEMENT IS CLEARLY VISIBLE. I FIND PERSUASIVE YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR ME TO VISIT THE AREA AND AM CURRENTLY SEEKING PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR EYES ONLY COMMUNICATION AND GREATLY APPRECIATE THESE INSIGHTS. WHILE THE TASK AHEAD IS NO EASY ONE, I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THAT -- I AM

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REASSURED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE ENTERING THIS FINAL
ROUND TOGETHER. WE WILL BE ABLE TO PUT THE FINISHING
TOUCHES ON OUR APPROACH IN CAIRO EARLY NEXT WEEK.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, SINCERELY.

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WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

KEY REMAINING ISSUES

Security Arrangements:

- The concept of a security zone with agreed limits.
- Limitation of arms and forces within that zone. *-size 2 Brig.*
- Basic elements of intelligence exchange, *extensive*
- Integration of the Haddad forces into a territorial brigade. *ten to (low level) intel function*
- Lebanese agreement to assign "the right" officers to the territorial brigade.
- Military supervisory committee, with associated offices, to verify and implement the agreement.
- Joint verification teams to check implementation of the arrangements in the south, allowing for an Israeli role. *(critique)*
- Israeli reconnaissance overflights will continue.

Mutual Relations:

- Termination of the state of war.
- Signed agreement, with agreement in principle to negotiate a peace treaty.
- Interim arrangements providing for movement of goods thus regulating trade.
- Access across the border for people.
- Joint liaison committee with associated offices in respective countries.

Security Arrangements:

- How to handle the issue of Saad Haddad's person.
- Israel's opposition to any international forces, especially UNIFIL, in the security zone.
- Israeli liaison officers in the south.
- The number and location of joint supervisory centers.

Mutual Relations:

- Explicit recognition of Israel by Lebanon.
- Specifying which goods can move from Israel to Lebanon during the interim period.
- Resolving Israeli demand for Lebanese commitment now to explicitly abrogate the Arab boycott in agreement following interim period.



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IS/FPC/CDR 9200109 Date: 6/26/96

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separate agreement to train LAF general counter force / Army CIA - flying squads.

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Drafted: ^{mw} NEA/ARN:CDWelch:blm
4/22/83 x 2]0]8 0523A & 0526A

Cleared: NEA/ARN:AEJones ^{mw}
NEA/IAI:EAbingdon ^{mw}
NEA:RHPelletreau ^{CSM}

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IS/FPC/CDR 9200109 Date 6/26/96

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NAV

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR

SUBJECT: LEBANON

REF: OUR TELCON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AS PROMISED, FOLLOWING ARE MY PERSONAL THOUGHTS TO YOU CONCERNING CONSIDERATIONS WHICH IMPACT ON YOUR PROPOSED NEXT STEPS IN THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU KNOW, SECRETARY HAS JUST RETURNED FROM MEXICO, WE HAVE HAD ONE MEETING WITH HIM, AND ARE MEETING WITH HIM AGAIN IN 45 MINUTES AFTER WHICH WE WILL COMMUNICATE AGAIN EITHER IN THIS CHANNEL OR BY PHONE.

3. IT APPEARS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT SECRETARY WILL BE VISITING MIDDLE EAST NEXT WEEK. THERE IS GROWING PRESSURE FROM SENIOR ADMINISTRATION SOURCES IN CONTEXT OF PRESS CRITICISM OF OUR HANDLING OF LEBANON (DIRECTED AT US NOT REPEAT NOT YOU) AND PEACE PROCESS ISSUES. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, SECRETARY BELIEVES AND WHITE HOUSE WILL PROBABLY INSIST ON VISIT BY SECRETARY TO ENGAGE WITH YOU IN LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. FINAL DECISION WILL PROBABLY BE TAKEN TOMORROW IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT.

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4. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WE ALL WISH TO ENSURE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL PARTICIPATION WILL BE AS PRODUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE. DRAWING ON HIS OWN EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE HE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WISH TO BE INJECTED INTO A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS AN ALREADY STRUCTURED AND HIGHLY VISIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL. HENCE OUR INSTRUCTIONS NOT REPEAT NOT TO MOVE AHEAD ON YOUR SCENARIO AS YOU PROPOSED. SPECIFICALLY, WE AGREE THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD TABLE A DRAFT {SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS} BUT WE WOULD NOT COME OUT PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY IN ALL-OUT SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE POSITIONS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MIGHT RESULT IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT LEBANESE DRAFT, AT LEAST IN SOME RESPECTS, THAN OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE. SAM TELLS US THE ISRAELIS WANT AND EXPECT A LEBANESE DRAFT. IF ONE IS PUT ON THE TABLE TOMORROW, THE ISRAELIS COULD START PROCESS OF CONSIDERATION AND RESPONDING TO IT AND WE WOULD ENVISAGE YOU CONTINUING TO DISCUSS AND PRESS YOUR POINTS WITH BOTH SIDES.

5. A PROBABLE SCENARIO FOR A SECRETARIAL VISIT WOULD BE THE FOLLOWING:

-- ANNOUNCEMENT MADE BY WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY. THIS WOULD SPECIFY THE SECRETARY'S PURPOSE WOULD BE TO WORK WITH YOU TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESOLUTION OF ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AT SAME TIME SECRETARY WOULD BE GOING TO CAIRO ON WAY TO ISRAEL AND LEBANON AND WOULD HAVE CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING, PROBABLY ON WEDNESDAY.

-- SECRETARY WOULD PLAN TO STAY IN AREA FOR ABOUT TEN DAYS. WE WOULD NOT SUGGEST ANY OTHER VISITS BUT DEPENDING UPON TIME AVAILABLE AND RESULTS OF LEBANESE ENDEAVORS SUCH VISITS WOULD OF COURSE BE POSSIBLE.

6. WE HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF RISKS AND ADANTAGES OF SECRETARY'S INVOLVEMENT.

7. YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND WE AGREE FULLY WITH YOU THAT THE ISSUE IS HOW RPT HOW BEST TO RESOLVE LEBANON IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE AGREE WITH THE URGENCY. WE ARE REALLY TALKING ABOUT TACTICS WITHIN THE SAME TIME FRAME THAT YOU PROPOSED AND ALLOWING THE SECRETARY INITIALLY AT LEAST TO COME INTO THE GAME AS A MEADIATOR. OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE NO GUARANTEES THAT CONFRONTATION WILL NOT RESULT. OBIOUSLY WE WOULD SEEK TO AVOID THIS AND ACHIEVE AGREEMENT WITHOUT IT, IF POSSIBLE.

8. I REGRET WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO BE AS RESPONSIVE TO

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YOU AS QUICKLY AS WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN. BEAR WITH US. WE
WILL COME BACK TO YOU QUICKLY.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 6/26/96

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 DOWNGRADE TS to (1) Sec 1983

~~SECRET~~

TO: S/S - Charles Hill
 FROM: NEA - David T. Schneider
 SUBJECT: Phil Habib's Recommendation that the Secretary
 Visit Beirut before Israel

Phil Habib would like the Secretary to be aware of his strong recommendation that the Secretary visit Beirut en route from Cairo to Israel, not after his visit to Israel. Phil's arguments are that what the Secretary will have to do in Israel will depend on what he hears in Lebanon. It would be best for him to come to Israel with a firsthand appreciation of the situation in Lebanon and the views of its leaders.

Second, Phil believes that the bombing of the Embassy makes it appropriate for the Secretary to visit Beirut first. He points out that the Israelis would understand this reason for giving priority to Beirut.

There are, of course, arguments to be made the other way, including the fact that the GOI already sees us as too solicitous of Lebanon and it is Israel we must move in order to make a deal. I understand you are obtaining Sam's views.

To facilitate handling, I have attached cables both ways.

Attachments:
 as stated

Drafted: NEA:RHPelletreau:cf
 4/21/83 ext 29464

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR9200109 Date: 6/26/96

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NEA:RHPELLETREAU:CF
 04/21/83 EXT. 29464
 S:THE SECRETARY

NEA:DTSCHNEIDER
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S/S

NIACT IMMEDIATE CAIRO, TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE, BEIRUT NIACT
 IMMEDIATE
 IMMEDIATE AMANN, JIDDA IMMEDIATE, RIYADH IMMEDIATE, DAMASCUS
 IMMEDIATE, RABAT IMMEDIATE, TUNIS IMMEDIATE, ALGIERS IMMEDIATE,
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E.O. 12065: DECLASSIFIED

TAGS: OVIP XF

SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF STATE VISIT

1. ~~EST~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY PLANS
 TO VISIT EGYPT, ISRAEL AND LEBANON WITHIN THE COMING FEW
 DAYS. HIS PRIMARY PURPOSE WILL BE TO ACCELERATE THE
 ISRAEL-LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A
 RAPID RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND CLEARING THE
 PATH FOR AN ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE
 SECRETARY PROPOSES TO HOLD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
 THREE GOVERNMENTS AND IN CAIRO CONSULT WITH U.S.
 AMBASSADORS IN THE REGION {SEPTEL}.

3. THE SECRETARY'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY WILL BE TO DEPART
 WASHINGTON APRIL 24, ARRIVING IN CAIRO THE FOLLOWING
 DAY. HE WOULD PLAN TO ARRIVE IN ISRAEL ON APRIL 27 AND
 VISIT BEIRUT ON APRIL 28 OR 29. IF A SHUTTLE IS THEN
 DEEMED NECESSARY, THE SECRETARY WOULD PLAN TO OPERATE
 FROM JERUSALEM WITHOUT OVERNIGHTING IN BEIRUT. THIS WILL
 TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LACK OF SUPPORT FACILITIES IN
 BEIRUT BECAUSE OF THE BOMBING OF THE EMBASSY.

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4. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD SEEK HOST GOVERNMENTS' CONCURRENCE TO THE SECRETARY'S VISIT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. INFO ADDRESSEES SHOULD BE POSITIONED TO ADVISE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS SOON AS CONCURRENCE TO THE VISIT IS OBTAINED. WE HOPE TO ANNOUNCE THE VISIT PUBLICLY FRIDAY NOON, APRIL 22, WASHINGTON TIME. 444

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April 21, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *GPS*

Subject: Accelerating the Negotiations on Lebanon

Phil Habib has concluded that we have reached a basic decision point in the Israel-Lebanon negotiations. We can either push forward to bring them to an early conclusion, or accept the prospect of an impasse followed by protracted negotiations. I believe it is vitally important to our interests in the region that we not allow these negotiations to drag on. Both sides, however, have frozen their positions on the major outstanding issues; some new impetus will be required to force the pace of decision. Both Phil and Sam Lewis recommend that I come to the area for this purpose.

Consequently, I would like your authorization to visit the Middle East within the coming few days for the purpose of pushing to conclusion the agreement between Israel and Lebanon.

Trip Strategy

Phil was particularly concerned, when we talked to him Wednesday, that the situation and atmosphere in Lebanon were in danger of deteriorating. He believes a trip by me would inject new urgency into the process. Habib believes it would be useful to inform the Lebanese and Israeli governments of my proposed visit on Saturday, before the Israeli Cabinet meeting Sunday. We would then announce the visit from the White House. I would plan, first to stop over in Cairo to see Mubarak and meet briefly with our Ambassadors in the area to keep them up-to-date with respect to both the peace process and Lebanon.



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would then travel to Israel and, following a clear declaration of purpose to Prime Minister Begin, begin a shuttle between Lebanon and Israel to push through the agreement. At an appropriate stage, I might also visit Damascus.

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
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Outstanding Issues in Lebanon

The major unresolved issues in the Lebanon negotiations include the role of Saad Haddad, UNIFIL, mutual recognition, Israeli liaison officers with Lebanese forces in the south, and trade relations (particularly Lebanon's agreement to end its participation in the Arab boycott of Israel). I believe I can propose reasonable solutions to these problems, but the Israelis will have to show greater flexibility on Haddad.



I would also like a reaffirmation of your previous approval to offer both Israel and Lebanon an additional contingent of U.S. troops to participate in peacekeeping activities in connection with the withdrawal of Israeli and other foreign forces from Lebanon, but not in the South. In connection with approving the additional \$251 million we have requested for Lebanon, the Congress is now requiring that we obtain its authorization for any troop increases. We have worked hard to ensure that this does not mean prior approval. It seems clear, however, that additional U.S. forces, along with additional European contingents, will be needed to ensure successful withdrawals.

The U.S.-Israeli Relationship

As we recently discussed, I would also plan to use the occasion of my visit to Israel to have a serious in-depth discussion with Prime Minister Begin about putting our relationship on a more cooperative long-term

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
basis. Recognizing that some of our differences may be unbridgeable, I would like your authorization to engage the Prime Minister in such a discussion. The objective would be to reestablish the basic sense that we share fundamental common interests; this would relegate differences to a lower plane and provide a positive framework and atmosphere for their resolution. In this respect, I would like your confirmation that I may inform Prime Minister Begin that, if Israel agrees to the new relationship which we are proposing, the U.S. would (a) welcome visits by Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Arens to Washington as soon as mutually convenient times can be arranged, and (b) be prepared to transmit the F-16 package to Congress as soon as an agreement between Lebanon and Israel had been reached. (We would not, in other words, hold up the F-16 package until Syrian and PLO concurrence on withdrawal had also been obtained).

I will also plan to discuss frankly with Prime Minister Begin and his associates:

- a) the new opportunities that our failure to reach rapid agreement on Lebanon is opening for the Soviet Union in the region;
- b) the importance of resolving potentially corrosive differences in Egyptian-Israeli relations, such as Taba; and
- c) the possibility of Israel agreeing to some confidence-building measures on the West Bank and Gaza (improvements in health and education conditions, for example) in order to restimulate the interest of Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories in the peace process. Inter alia, Israel should see it in its interest to bolster Jordan's supporters, as opposed to the PLO's, on the West Bank and Gaza.

The Peace Process

The focus of my trip will be almost exclusively Lebanon.



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Therefore, I will gather our Ambassadors to the key Arab states in Cairo at the start of my trip, make certain they understand where we are headed, and send each back to convey to his host government our determination to complete the Lebanon negotiations very quickly and, thereafter, to turn our full attention to implementing your initiative.

We will let the Arabs know that while we tackle the Lebanon issue we expect them to be actively preparing to support King Hussein's entry into the peace negotiations, or risk being seen to be unhelpful. Delivering the PLO to this course is their problem and they should understand that your substantive position will not be changed in order to entice Arafat.

If time permits, I may visit some other Arab capitals, but only to reinforce this message that the next move in the peace process is theirs. With Israel, also, we will stress your determination to pursue the September initiative. We may want to strengthen our messages to key Arabs, particularly the Saudis, by casting them as messages or letters from you. I will suggest language once we are agreed on the general approach.

Conclusion

I look forward to meeting with you privately in the next day or so, hopefully at a time when Cap could be available, to go over the contents of this memorandum and how we handle any public announcements with respect to it.



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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IS/FPC/CDR 4200109

Date: 6/26/96

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EO Citations April 19, 1983

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MEMORANDUM

TO: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
 FROM: NEA/ARN - Beth Jones
 SUBJECT: Phone Call from Philip Habib

Phil called the Lebanon Working Group at 7:20 a.m. to insure that we had received a cable from him from Tel Aviv. Habib is leaving shortly from Beirut for Jerusalem and needs to have an answer in Jerusalem by C.O.B. Israel time tomorrow. If we cannot get him an answer by that time, we will probably have to answer him by secure phone in Beirut.

Tel Aviv 5212 - Nadis
 Just came in. NEA is on distib

DRAFTED: NEA/ARN: BJones/cs
 4/19/83 Ext. 21019

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TO: The Acting Secretary
FROM: NEA -- Nicholas *Q* Veliotis
SUBJECT: U.S. Strategy in the Israel-Lebanon
Negotiations

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to authorize transmittal of a cable (Tab 1) to Phil Habib, approving his proposal to set forward U.S. views on reasonable solutions to the remaining problems in the Israel-Lebanon negotiations.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Habib believes we have reached a basic decision point in the negotiations. We can either push forward to bring them to an early conclusion or accept the prospect of an impasse followed by protracted negotiations. To move the talks along, Phil has suggested (Tab 2) that it is time we indicated our views on reasonable solutions to the key problems--Haddad, UNIFIL, mutual recognition, Israeli liaison officers, trade relations, joint supervisory centers--and have the Lebanese table a package agreement, which the U.S. would support, at the tripartite talks on April 21. I agree that Habib's proposals offer a realistic course, even though they will demand more give by the Israelis than the Lebanese.

You should be aware that Phil has asked for authority to agree to the elimination of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, should that be necessary. While we are endorsing Phil's substantive recommendation, there is a danger that giving up UNIFIL could jeopardize PLO withdrawal, which may depend on an international presence at the camps in order to ensure the safety of civilians after Israeli withdrawal--an issue which will be of widespread attention. I have discussed this with Phil and he is clearly aware of the issues involved.

With regard to the proposition that the Secretary visit the area for direct involvement in the talks, I believe it would be better to decide this once the results of Phil's strategy above

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are clear and in the context of considering other steps to escalate the level of persuasion. A U.S.-backed agreement would then have been tabled and we would have the benefit of the Israeli reaction.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmittal of the attached cable (Tab 1) supporting the course of action recommended by Habib to offer reasonable solutions to the outstanding problems in the Israel-Lebanon negotiations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Drafted: ^{mw} NEA/ARN--CDWelch
x21018 4/19/83 #3561C

Cleared: NEA/IAI:MSPendleton ^{mf}
NEA/ARN:DLMack ^{mf}

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IS/FPC/CDR 9200109 Date: 6/26/96

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FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: DECL: ~~ADR~~

TAGS: PREL, MARR, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ISRAEL-LEBANON
NEGOTIATIONS

REF: TEL AVIV 05212

1. ~~SECRET~~--ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE AGREE WITH THE BASIC COURSE OF ACTION YOU OUTLINED IN YOUR MESSAGE (REFTEL) FOR THE NEXT STAGE IN THE ISRAEL-LEBANON TALKS AND SUPPORT THE U.S. POSITIONS THAT YOU HAVE PROPOSED. AN IMPASSE, FOLLOWED BY MORE PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS, IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST, AND WE SHOULD DO THE UTMOST TO AVOID THIS OUTCOME, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THERE MAY WELL BE CONTINUED DIFFERENCES WITH ISRAEL OVER SOME OF THE KEY PROBLEMS IN THE TALKS.

3. WE ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, OVER PLO AND BROADER ARAB BACKING FOR THE RETENTION OF UNIFIL AS PART OF ARRANGEMENTS WITH LEBANON TO ASSURE PROTECTION FOR THE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH, IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. ACCORDINGLY, YOU SHOULD HOLD ON TO THE

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LIMITED UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT ROLE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, AS WE ASSUME YOU WOULD DO.

4. WITH REGARD TO A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY TO THE AREA TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DECIDE THIS ONCE THE RESULTS OF OUR STRATEGY ARE CLEAR AND IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSIDERING OTHER STEPS TO ESCALATE THE LEVEL OF PERSUASION. A U.S.-BACKED AGREEMENT WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN TABLED AND WE WOULD HAVE THE FULL BENEFIT OF THE ISRAELI REACTION. 4444

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TO: The Secretary
 FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis *RM/for*
 SUBJECT: Accelerating the Israel-Lebanon Negotiations

EXCISE

The attached memorandum to the President describes the decision point we have now reached in the Lebanon negotiations and seeks the President's approval for you to visit the area next week in order to push through an agreement.

The memorandum proposes that you arrive in Cairo within the coming few days, meet with Mubarak and our Ambassadors in the region, and then travel to Israel to orchestrate the final phase of the Lebanon negotiations.

[REDACTED]

Presidential approval is also requested to offer additional U.S. troops for the peacekeeping force in Lebanon and also for you to engage Prime Minister Begin in an in-depth discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve 4 Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Memorandum to the President

Drafted: NEA: RHPelletreau: cf *RM*
 4/20/83 ext 29464
 Clearances: S/SN: RFairbanks } *RM/for*
 S/P: P Rodman
 NEA: W Cluverius

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DECL: OADR
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EXCISE

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STATUS OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

Background: Habib's latest consultations reveal that Israel and Lebanon are on clearly divergent tracks. Haddad and the Israeli role in the south continue to be the sticking points; Israel and Lebanon are both holding fast to established positions, despite Habib's ideas for compromise solutions. The Israeli Cabinet will consider the package agreement, many points of which are still under negotiation, when it meets next Tuesday. There is, however, a unanimous view that the Lebanese positions are unsatisfactory to Israel and a change in the Israeli approach is unlikely before the Cabinet meeting.

Talking Points:

-- There is basic agreement between Lebanon and Israel on the principles of:

A security zone in the south;

Limitation of arms within that zone;

[REDACTED]

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Integration of the Haddad forces into a territorial brigade;

A supervisory committee on the agreement; and,

Verification teams to "check" implementation in the south.

-- Israel and Lebanon are still divided over the role of Haddad and the nature of Israeli participation in the mechanisms to verify the agreement in the south. The Lebanese aver that their sovereignty is at stake and that Syrian forces would never withdraw under the conditions proposed by Israel. The Israelis state that Lebanese forces alone cannot be relied upon to assure security in the south.

-- Substantial progress has been made in the direct talks between Israel and Lebanon on "mutual relations", i.e. normalization. They have agreed on a compromise formula that would put many of the contentious issues into interim de facto

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arrangements pending negotiation of a final agreement on the movement of goods and people.

-- On the use of international forces in southern Lebanon, Israel continues to reject our proposal to station two reliable UNIFIL battalions in Tyre and Sidon in conjunction with an LAF presence to protect Palestinian refugee camps there. Israel also rejects a Multinational Force presence in the security zone. We have stressed to Israel that a UNIFIL presence is necessary to gain PLO agreement to withdraw. It would have no responsibility for Israeli security, and the Lebanese authorities would have control of the camps with full military, police and intelligence access.

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Drafted: ^{mw} NEA/ARN--CDWelch
x21018 4/15/83 #3538C

Cleared: NEA/ARN--AEJones ^{mw}
NEA--RPelletreau
NEA/IAI--EAbington ^{mw}

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April 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Lewis-Pendleton Telecon April 15: Habib's Meetings with Begin and Israeli Ministers

Sam Lewis reports by secure phone that Phil Habib met at length April 15, first with Foreign Minister Shamir, Deputy Foreign Minister Ben-Meir, David Kimche and others from the Foreign and Defense ministries. He then had an hour long meeting with Prime Minister Begin, who was accompanied by Arens, Shamir and several others. Haddad's role remains the central problem.

Lewis says that in both meetings Habib was eloquent, particularly regarding the Haddad issue. He talked at great length about the readiness in Lebanon to have a new era in relations with Israel, as well as why Lebanon does not believe it can go further on the remaining sticking points. Habib provided a fairly full reading on Gemayel's mood but softened the picture somewhat.

The Israelis were very disappointed with Habib's report. In the Begin meeting, all three ministers insisted that the only acceptable thing for Israel would be to have Haddad remain as Commander. Begin told Phil that the package would have to be considered by the Cabinet, which is next scheduled to meet on Tuesday. (There will be no Cabinet meeting on Sunday since it is Memorial Day. Monday is Israeli Independence Day.) There was a unanimous view that the Lebanese positions Habib reviewed were unsatisfactory, and Lewis has no illusions that the Israelis will change their approach prior to the Cabinet meeting.

Arens had gone to Lebanon on April 14 and had had lunch with Haddad. Arens had returned to Israel with the impression that Haddad was doing a good job of running a quiet little area in southern Lebanon and should be permitted to carry on. This is an argument that Arens has been hearing from his military advisors. His visit with Haddad only reenforced this view.

Habib's discussion also touched on UNIFIL, an issue which Lewis believes will prove to be manageable. Habib put forward Lebanese views regarding a modified UNIFIL presence centered in Sidon with patrols going on occasion to Tyre.

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Habib will be meeting informally with David Kimche on Saturday evening after his return from Cairo. Ambassador Draper arrives in Jerusalem from Washington on Saturday afternoon. There will be a working meeting Sunday morning at which all items in dispute will be reviewed. Habib plans to go to Beirut Sunday after this meeting and return to Israel prior to the next trilateral negotiating session in Netanya on Tuesday, April 19.

cc: NEA -NAveliotes
MDraper
DTSchneider
RPelletreau
WTCluverius
WAKirby
DMack
S/SN- RFairbanks
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D- NWalker
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Drafted:NEA/IAI:MSPendleton/gp
x23672 4/15/83 #4465B

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

X282
Date: 1/21/82

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STATUS OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

U.S. policy in Lebanon has the following objectives:

- The withdrawal of all foreign forces--Israeli, Syrian and PLO. All armed elements remaining in Lebanon must be subject to the control of the central government.
- Arrangements to assure the security of Israel's northern border.
- The restoration of a stable central government in Lebanon.
- The extension of Lebanese sovereignty throughout its territory.

Our efforts are focussed on speeding up the negotiations on troop withdrawals, where direct talks have been underway between Lebanon and Israel for some time. Although the issues are difficult and complex, there has been progress in these negotiations. The remaining areas of disagreement primarily concern the security arrangements to be established in southern Lebanon following Israeli withdrawal. We have concentrated on developing ideas to meet Israeli concerns for the security of their northern border, consistent with our bottom-line position of no residual Israeli military presence in Lebanon. Agreement between Israel and Lebanon is much closer on "mutual relations", i.e. normalization, where substantial progress has been made in the direct talks.

We have made clear that a residual Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon would jeopardize agreement for withdrawal of all foreign forces (Syrian and PLO) and therefore, this was not a position that we could support. A residual presence would also damage the delicate Lebanese internal consensus. Exactly how Lebanon and Israel work out a method to implement and verify agreed security arrangements is currently under discussion. The net result must be the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

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Insofar as the ability of the Lebanese army to maintain security in the south is concerned, it is our assessment that the Lebanese Army is able and eager to meet its security responsibilities and to implement agreed security arrangements in southern Lebanon. There is growing popular support for the Lebanese army which will, of course, make the army's tasks easier as it continues to increase its capabilities. It is also important to note that growing Lebanese national consensus exists to support the government and will help block the return of external forces to Lebanon. In addition, the threat to northern Israel has dramatically diminished as a result of the PLO's resounding military defeat in Lebanon and its removal from the south and Beirut. The threat will diminish even further when the Syrians and remaining PLO withdraw from the Bekaa and northern Lebanon.

In addition to the negotiations with Israel, Lebanon has also initiated contacts with Syria and the PLO on the withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon. The U.S. is not a direct participant in these talks. We have noted the recent public statements reflecting Syrian and PLO intentions to withdraw from Lebanon if Israel does. This bears out our previous understanding of their positions and is a welcome development.

Once an agreement has been reached for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, it will be clear to what extent an international presence is needed to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces. The U.S. continues to see an important role for the 6,000 UNIFIL troops currently in Lebanon. We will have to see whether there is a need for a Multinational Force (MNF) as well. If so, its objectives would be to facilitate the withdrawal process and to assist the Lebanese central government in re-establishing its control throughout Lebanon, in the same way the MNF has functioned in the Beirut area in the last few months.

We eventually hope to see full peace and normal relations between Israel and each of her neighbors, including Lebanon. In the context of an overall peace, along the lines outlined by the President on September 1, we believe this is an achievable goal. But for the moment we must deal with what is possible in practical terms in Lebanon, a country riven by eight years of internal strife and outside occupation.

The security of Israel's northern border is a hallmark of U.S. policy and will have to be an essential element in any agreement that is reached between Lebanon and Israel. The U.S.

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will do all that it can to assure that an agreement is reached which will preclude a return to a situation in which Israel is threatened by armed attacks from Lebanon.

A stable, secure and free Lebanon would be an historic achievement for the area, for Lebanon, for Israel, and for the world. A Lebanon beset by strife and living under occupation serves the interest of none of us. While there is no direct linkage between progress in the Lebanon negotiations and progress on the broader peace front, there can be no doubt that progress in achieving withdrawal and stability in Lebanon would serve the interests of those who truly seek a peaceful Middle East.

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Drafted: NEA/ARN:CDWelch
4/13/83 x 21018 3505C
Cleared: NEA/ARN:AEJones
NEA:RHPelletreau

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IS/FPG/CDR 9200109 Date 6/26/96

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EXCISE

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STATUS OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

I spoke with Phil Habib on the phone in Beirut. Phil's latest consultations reveal that Israel and Lebanon are on clearly divergent tracks over the key remaining issues in the Lebanon negotiations. The Lebanese insist that they have gone to their limits on a role for Sa'ad Haddad and on the Israeli role in the south. The Israelis insist on a command position for Haddad and have turned down a Lebanese offer to give him a staff position in the southern brigade. Israel also insists on an operational role in southern Lebanon, which could be seen as involving a residual Israeli presence. Habib's compromise ideas on Haddad have been unacceptable to both parties.

There are other points of disagreement in the negotiations, but these can be resolved if the key issues are overcome. Continued impasse is straining seriously Lebanon's internal consensus, while Syria and the USSR may be exploiting the situation. Soviet advisers have been sighted in Lebanon behind Syrian lines,

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Habib is traveling to Israel tomorrow to present as complete a package agreement to Begin and his colleagues as possible, based on two days of talks with Gemayel. He will attempt to persuade the Israelis that the agreement meets all of Israel's requirements and should be accepted without further delay. On Saturday he plans to go to Cairo to brief Mubarak.

Drafted: ^{new} NEA/ARN--CDWelch
x21018 4/14/83 #3520C

Cleared: NEA/ARN--DLMack ^M
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Q: Why is Phil Habib returning? Is it because of another deadlock in the talks?

A: The U.S. has sought a rapid withdrawal of all three occupying forces from Lebanon through negotiations that would restore Lebanon to the Lebanese while protecting northern Israel from attacks originating in Lebanon.

Some of the positions put forward in the Israel-Lebanon negotiations would compromise Lebanese sovereignty and limit the scope of withdrawals. As the negotiations continue, we believe it is possible to resolve these problems in such a way as to meet the objectives stated above.

Q: Why is the U.S. still pressing Israel for more concessions? Isn't Israel pressing proposals that would involve it directly in southern Lebanon simply to protect its security?

A: It is our position that any negotiated agreement between Lebanon and Israel must fulfill the basic principles of full withdrawal of all foreign forces, Lebanese sovereignty, and the security of northern Israel.

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Residual Israeli presence in southern Lebanon would put in serious jeopardy the internal Lebanese consensus and Syrian and PLO withdrawal.

Q: What about Sa'ad Haddad?

A: The subject of Sa'ad Haddad is best dealt with basically between the Government of Lebanon and Sa'ad Haddad. We believe that in this manner the interests of all concerned can best be met.

Q: What is the U.S. view of joint Israeli-Lebanese patrols in southern Lebanon?

A: Exactly how Lebanon and Israel work out a method to jointly implement and verify agreed security arrangements is currently under discussion. The net result must be the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q: Are the Lebanese capable of maintaining security in the south?

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A: It is our assessment that the Lebanese Army is able and eager to meet its security responsibilities and to implement agreed security arrangements in southern Lebanon. There is growing popular support for the Lebanese army which will, of course, make the army's tasks easier as it continues to increase its capabilities.

It is also important to note that a Lebanese national consensus exists to support the government and prevent the return of external forces to Lebanon.

In addition, the threat to northern Israel has dramatically diminished as a result of the PLO's resounding military defeat in Lebanon and its removal from the south and Beirut. The threat will diminish even further when the Syrians and remaining PLO withdraw from the Bekaa and northern Lebanon.

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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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SUBJECT: Habib/Lewis-Veliotes Telecon, April 11, 1983

Ambassadors Habib and Lewis called Assistant Secretary Veliotes secure on the morning of April 11, in particular to report on Lewis' meetings earlier in the day with Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Arens. The peace process was not the item most on their minds. Lewis said the thing that has struck him most was that the combination of the President's statement on F-16s and the press spokesman's comments on settlements last Friday has produced a great deal of anger and annoyance in Israel.

Lewis' meeting with Begin:

Lewis spent an hour and a half with Begin this morning. He described the conversation as a good one, both quiet and frank. Lewis used the guidance he received yesterday in the Sierra cable and gave a "good but careful" reading on how we got where we are on the peace process. Lewis stressed the President's determination to persevere and said we remain convinced that Jordan is the only viable partner for Israel in the process.

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With regard to the peace process, Lewis notes that Arens' view of the Reagan initiative has not changed; even if Hussein joined, there is no prospect that anything useful would come out of the negotiations.

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Habib's Plans:

Habib and Draper will be meeting with Kimche and others later today to review the bidding on Lebanon. Habib will meet with Arens and Shamir on Tuesday, and a meeting with Prime Minister Begin is scheduled for 8:30 a.m. Jerusalem time on Wednesday. Phil tentatively plans to leave for Beirut either Wednesday afternoon or Thursday morning. He hopes that if we have suggestions for him on the negotiations, they will be transmitted to him Tuesday night prior to his meeting with Begin on Wednesday morning. Barring further guidance, he will plan to persevere along the track we have been following.

With regard to the proposals on assurances to Israel that Eli Rubinstein had floated last Thursday, Habib said it was his tentative belief that we should be prepared to give the Israelis a letter indicating our willingness to do our best regarding implementation of the final agreement. He promised Veliotes that he and Sam Lewis would send in a preliminary draft within the next 24 hours. With regard to the proposal that Haddad become Deputy Brigade Commander for G-2, Habib said that Draper has been told that this proposal is being modified. It apparently was not an approved Lebanese position. Lewis observed that the Israeli Cabinet has not formally decided about the proposal, although the idea came in for a good deal of ridicule at the Sunday Cabinet session. The upshot is that it is still on the table, but that the Israeli reaction has been quite negative. Draper is telling the Lebanese not to see the proposal as rejected as of yet.

cc: NEA:Amb. Veliotes
NEA:RPelletreau
WAKirby
DMack
S/S:CHill

Drafted:NEA/IAI:MSPendleton/gp
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TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotos
SUBJECT: Ideas for Handling the Haddad Problem

The following is our best effort to be creative on the Haddad problem, in response to your request. You probably should discuss these ideas with Phil when he returns late this week.

The future of Saad Haddad has become a serious obstacle to progress in the Lebanon negotiations. For Israel, he represents part of the answer to ensuring security over the next year or two in southern Lebanon which the Lebanese Army is perceived as incapable of doing. Moreover, Begin is fully supportive of the present Israeli negotiating position and emotionally committed to Haddad personally as a "true friend of Israel," who must not be humiliated or summarily dismissed. For Lebanon, the retention of Haddad is seen as a condition which would destroy Amin Gemayel's political consensus while inviting Syrian refusal to withdraw.

Lebanon's promise that an honorable future will be found for Haddad has not been sufficient for the Israelis. Similarly, Israel's proposals regarding Haddad's role are inconsistent with strengthening the central government of Lebanon and getting the Syrians and PLO out. Ideas for solving this problem fall into three categories.

Defining the "Honorable Future": One problem is that Lebanon has not yet clearly expressed to the Israelis--or to Haddad--what Haddad's future could be under a scheme for his departure with grace and dignity. From what we know of President Gemayel's thinking, this could entail appointment abroad as an Ambassador or Defense Attache, possibly in Australia where his sister lives. Another possibility would be to "retire" Haddad at home in Marjayoun for a year or so followed by appointment to some public post, or possibly a seat in the Parliament and a hefty sweetener in the form of a

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retirement bonus. It is possible that Haddad could be attracted to such proposals, but the Lebanese have apparently not yet had an opportunity to explore them privately with Haddad, away from his ever-present Israeli advisers. The U.S. would have to push the Lebanese, and probably obtain Israeli agreement as well, for Haddad and the Lebanese to talk. Despite the reservations they would have, it would be difficult for the Israelis to refuse such a meeting or for that matter a private meeting between Ambassador Habib and Haddad, if you were to ask for it. However, they would probably insist on attending.

Keeping Haddad On: An alternative approach to explore further with President Gemayel and his advisers would be to find a face-saving way to keep Haddad on in some active capacity in Lebanon, while shedding his militia role. Haddad, as a civilian, might be emplaced as governor of the South Lebanon administrative district; he might serve in some fashion as titular head of the Israeli-orchestrated "Organization of the South", a collection of village leaders; or, he might receive a position in a party represented in the Lebanese Forces, such as the Chamunist National Liberal Party. Another idea might be to arrange Haddad's participation, perhaps after completion of his participation in arrangements for Israeli withdrawal, in a "National Reconciliation Conference" designed to bring together confessional and political leaders, even estranged ones such as Haddad and Syrian protege Suleiman Franjiyah, to discuss the political structure of Lebanon's future.

Using the Negotiations: Although the alternatives within the context of the talks appear close to exhaustion, we could press the Lebanese further on accepting Haddad as one of several commanders in the south, perhaps as second in command of the two brigades for the south instead of as commander of the southern-most "territorial brigade." A more radical possibility would be to press Lebanon to "trade" Haddad for greater Israeli operational latitude, including a more substantial Israeli presence if not intervention rights, in southern Lebanon, which is probably what Israel seeks in any event. Both carry the dual risks of provoking internal opposition to the Gemayel government and raising the likelihood of a Syrian refusal to withdraw.

In summary, our best bet may be to bring Haddad and the Lebanese together to discuss his future with the object of enticing Haddad to begin if not announce a commitment to a dignified transition away from Israeli control to an agreed

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future. We might supplement a Lebanese approach to Haddad by urging Israel to acquiesce, while simultaneously letting Haddad know through a protected UNTSO channel that Lebanon, with U.S. support, is prepared to talk in concrete terms about his future options. The first step would be for Phil or Morrie to discuss these possibilities frankly with President Gemayel.

Finally, we should be conscious of the fact that there are no clear signs that Haddad is willing to leave now while there is every public and private sign that the Israelis are determined to keep him where he is. While General Tamir has said that the GOI could not object if Haddad wanted to leave, Shamir has stated that if Haddad wanted to leave the GOI would convince him to stay. A further informal discussion of the Haddad issue with Tamir may also be in order.

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APPROVED BY P: L. SEAGLEBURGER

L - M. KOZAK
NEA - D- T. SCHNEIDER
NEA/IAI - E. ABINGTON
S/S - CEMCMANAWAY
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FOR HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: ~~DECL: OADR~~
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARK, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ISRAEL INTEREST IN A U.S.-
ISRAEL UNDERSTANDING ON FUTURE CONTINGENCIES IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 3191

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. WE CONCUR FULLY IN WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ARENS--THAT WE CANNOT AGREE TO ANY UNDERSTANDING PROVIDING FOR ISRAELI MILITARY REENTRY. WE ALSO ARE CONFIDENT THAT LEBANESE ARE NOT LIKELY LET MATTERS RETURN TO A POINT WHERE CONDITIONS WOULD JUSTIFY SUCH A STEP.
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3. WE ALSO SUPPORT POSITION YOU HAVE ALREADY TAKEN IN
OPPOSITION TO RETENTION OF HAOUAD. SHULTZ

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Evolution of Lebanese Positions
in the Negotiations

Relations* (Normalization)

Free movement of people and goods:

ing Position

Lebanon acknowledged need for a process for the evolutionary development of relations, but was negative on explicit mention of any normalization and specifically of any steps toward free movement of people and goods. It preferred to keep the negotiation limited to security arrangements and withdrawal.

tion Now

Lebanon proposes interim de facto arrangements in side understandings on people and goods until the conclusion of an agreement on mutual relations to be negotiated six months after Israeli withdrawal.

Abrogation of the economic boycott:

ng Position

Lebanon would have to maintain its Arab League obligations.

ion Now

Lebanon has proposed language for the agreement dealing with abrogation of measures in conflict with the agreement.

Termination of state of war:

ng Position

Lebanon accepted in essence from the outset.

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Position Now

Same.

Security Arrangements

-- Security zone:

Opening Position

Lebanon accepted the concept early on, although size and limitations were at issue.

Position Now

Inclusion of Jabal Baruk is a "red line" but concept of a zone is accepted.

-- "Observation Posts":

Opening Position

Acceptable only if run by Lebanese or U.S. and directed at infiltration, not at Syria.

Position Now

Israel's demand for 5 stations manned by Israelis is unacceptable. GOL is willing to undertake regular "supervision" arrangements with Israelis present to verify security arrangements.

-- Only Lebanese forces in zone:

Opening Position

Israel should not have a veto over use of UNIFIL or the MNF in the zone.

Position Now

GOL is willing to go along with a proposal to use UNIFIL only at certain refugee camp areas.

-- Haddad's militia:

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Opening Position

Reintegration possible, but under Lebanese terms consistent with Lebanese sovereignty.

Position Now

GOL now agrees to a reintegration into Lebanese forces in the south with Haddad's personal future to be decided by the GOL.

-- Force limitations in the zone:

Opening Position

Lebanon must have "sufficient" capability in south.

Position Now

GOL agrees to a limit of 2 LAF brigades in south, to include Haddad's militia and accepts limits on artillery and other weaponry.

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STATUS OF THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS

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BACKGROUND

Phil Habib is pressing ahead in his talks in Israel and Lebanon despite the earlier Israeli reluctance to deal with security issues until Moshe Arens is in place. Habib has had several productive meetings with the Israeli negotiating team, aiming at narrowing the disagreements over the key security issues and steps in the area of mutual relations. Habib and Draper have focussed the discussion on mutual relations on draft articles that build upon the Lebanese compromise suggestion offering interim "practical" arrangements on the movement of people and goods until a final agreement is reached. The Israeli team has not rejected the suggestion that negotiations on this subject could begin not later than six months after the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon. On security arrangements, Habib is exploring ways to get around the problem of a residual IDF presence in Lebanon as well as the issue of Haddad and his militia. We must find a way to supplant the Israeli position on observation posts in Lebanon if progress is to be made. Meanwhile, direct negotiations continue between Lebanon and Israel, with incremental and steady advances in the less controversial areas. The talks are slow, but not immobile. In general, there is limited but important flexibility so far in the Israeli attitude. Habib is now in Beirut to explore Lebanese reactions. Phil has considered when he should make a trip to Damascus to begin work on the difficult Syrian angle and has decided that for now he will let the Lebanese take the lead with the Syrians; indeed, another visit of Jean Obeid to Damascus may now be underway.

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TALKING POINTS:

- We are trying to make progress in the negotiations despite the Israeli reluctance to tackle security issues until Arens returns to take his new job.
- Phil Habib and Morris Draper have had private sessions with the Israeli negotiating team to begin the tough job of working out language on mutual relations and concepts for security arrangements. We are pressing ahead on all of the issues, and Phil is using his presence as a mechanism to deal with the most troublesome issues, security and mutual relations.

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- Progress is very slow. In the area of security arrangements, Israel is still insisting on observation posts in southern Lebanon and a prominent role for Haddad. Lebanon cannot agree to these proposals, so we are looking for ways around them.

- On mutual relations, there have been advances in developing language for an agreement. The basis will be a Lebanese compromise suggestion on the movement of people and goods offering interim "practical" arrangements until a final agreement is reached. The Israeli team has not rejected the Lebanese suggestion that negotiations on this subject begin not later than six months after the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon.

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TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: H - Powell A. Moore *pm.*

SUBJECT: Congressional Contact Scenario on an Expanded MNF

ISSUE FOR DECISION

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Whether to approve the following Congressional contact scenario if we decide to offer Israel an expanded MNF in Lebanon.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

In the event that Israel rejects the idea of a fresh UNIFIL force to provide security in southern Lebanon, it may be decided to offer Israel an expanded MNF as a means of ensuring security. In this case it would be appropriate to brief selected members of Congress immediately before putting the proposal to the Israelis. The timing would be chosen to provide prior notification while limiting to the extent possible the likelihood of leaks.

A suggested contact scenario is included at Tab 1. Dick Fairbanks will brief Senator Baker in Tennessee tonight. In event that we are informed that the remaining contacts are appropriate, I would ask that you meet with the House Bipartisan Leadership. We would deal with the remaining five Senators, who will probably not be in town at the time, by phone calls from my office to their administrative assistants. The calls would request face-to-face meetings with the Senators for Fairbanks and me to discuss a matter too sensitive to mention on the phone. If we are then unable to reach the Senators, we will be on record as having made a good faith attempt.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the contact scenario contained at Tab 1.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

- Tab 1 - Contact Scenario
- Tab 2 - Bio of House Members

Drafted: H: S Escudero: jvm
2/8/83: x22197
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CONTACT SCENARIO

For Acting Secretary Dam

Speaker O'Neill
Congressman Wright
Congressman Michel
Congressman Zablocki
Congressman Broomfield
Congressman Dickinson
Congressman Price

For Ambassador Fairbanks

Senator Baker

For Ambassador Fairbanks and Assistant Secretary Moore

Senator Byrd
Senator Percy
Senator Pell
Senator Tower
Senator Jackson

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Talking Points

-- There is a serious impasse in the Lebanon negotiations over the kind of arrangements in south Lebanon which Israel will accept as giving it maximum security along its northern border.

-- We have favored the use of a combination of Lebanese and the 7,500 UNIFIL forces already on the ground as being equal to the task.

-- The Israelis continue to reject this approach so, while Ambassador Habib is still pressing the issue, the President is prepared if absolutely necessary, to offer Israel an expanded MNF with U.S. participation for security duties in south Lebanon.

-- This offer might have to be made over the next few days. We wished to consult in this way in order to give you our views on why this is necessary and to seek your support.

-- The internal situation in Lebanon is deteriorating as a result of prolonged negotiations. Various extreme groups, some allied with Israel, others with Syrian and PLO support, seek to use their patrons to enhance their own positions.

-- The longer this goes on, the more difficult it is for President Gemayel and his colleagues, Christian and Muslim alike, to maintain the fragile internal consensus which alone holds the hope for a free, independent Lebanon.

-- We must break through this impasse and achieve quickly an agreement for the early withdrawal of all foreign forces. Israel's security must be assured and while we believe our approach, Lebanese and UN forces, would do it, we are prepared to use a MNF with U.S. forces if that is what it takes to get Israel to withdraw.

-- Without early withdrawal from Lebanon, not only does Lebanon's future as a nation become problematic, the chances of a wider Arab-Israel peace will begin to dwindle.

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-- If we must use the MNF fallback, we do not intend that it be open-ended. Our preliminary thought is that we would use the time the MNF is there to train and introduce Lebanese forces as fast as possible, drawing down the MNF as Lebanese forces prove able to handle the task.

-- Exact numbers of forces needed are hard to project now but we estimate that a MNF of, say, 9,000 would be adequate. We would seek French, Italian and other participation and limit our numbers to 3,000.

-- We would make clear to the Israelis that any commitment for U.S. forces to participate in an expanded MNF will be subject to further consultation with and review by the Congress. We are not asking you at this time to commit the Legislative Branch to this idea. However, we did not want to indicate the acceptability of this option in our discussions with the Israelis without first talking to you, and a very limited number of your colleagues.

-- Let me repeat that this is a last resort proposal. The President would not consider it if he did not believe that it is essential to break the Lebanon impasse and that breaking that impasse is of highest importance to broader U.S. foreign policy objectives.

-- Finally, because the MNF idea is a last resort, any hint that we are considering it would force our hand prematurely and defeat whatever chance Phil Habib still has of getting Israel to agree to our preferred approach. The President asked me to enjoin you to strict secrecy, and I know you will respect this request.

Contingency Points (if asked)

-- This call is not intended to constitute consultation with the Congress under the War Powers Resolution. We are not about to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities, or a situation where hostilities are imminent.

-- Legislation to authorize U.S. participation in an expanded MNF in south Lebanon may be desirable. We will want to discuss this with you in the context of further negotiations about the size, composition, duration and mission of such a force. Legislation in advance of deliberations on these issues would impose inflexible constraints on U.S. negotiators and, therefore, would not seem feasible.

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Talking Points
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-- Legislation to authorize U.S. participation in an expanded MNF in south Lebanon may be desirable. We will want to discuss this with you in the context of further negotiations about the size, composition, duration and mission of such a force. Legislation in advance of deliberations on these issues would impose inflexible constraints on U.S. negotiators and, therefore, would not seem feasible.

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LEBANON, VELIOTES SAID, HAS TO BE PRACTICAL AND REASONABLE. IT IS CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING JUDGMENTS ABOUT WHAT IT CAN SUSTAIN--WITHOUT GOING TOO FAR. IF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WERE TO UPSET EVEN THE CURRENT DEGREE OF STABILITY, IT WOULD ALSO "NOT BE IN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ISRAEL."
VELIOTES WAS INDIRECTLY AIDED IN REBUTTING SHARON'S ACCUSATIONS BY DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN SOLARZ OF NEW YORK, ONE OF ISRAEL'S BEST FRIENDS.

SOLARZ, OF COURSE, HAD FORCEFULLY PRESSED ISRAEL'S CASE FOR STRONG SECURITY GUARANTEES IN SOUTH LEBANON. THUS, IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO HIS PROBING QUESTIONS THAT VELIOTES DISCLOSED THAT THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY EVEN ALLOW MAJOR CAJAL BARON'S FORCES TO PLAY A PEACE-KEEPING ROLE IN SOUTH LEBANON, A MOVE THAT IS FAVORED BY ISRAEL.

THE CONGRESSMAN, HOWEVER, RECALLED HIS OWN CONVERSATION WITH LEBANON'S LATE PRESIDENT-ELECT BASHIR GEMAYEL IN BEIRUT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, NINE DAYS BEFORE BASHIR'S ASSASSINATION.

UNLIKE AMIN GEMAYEL, BASHIR WAS A CLOSE ALLY AND FRIEND OF ISRAEL. PERSONALLY, HE WAS CLOSE TO SEVERAL KEY ISRAELI OFFICIALS, INCLUDING SHARON AND FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR-GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE. FOR ISRAEL, BASHIR'S CREDENTIALS WERE SOLID.

BUT SOLARZ POINTED OUT THAT EVEN BASHIR, DURING THAT MEETING, HAD ARGUED AGAINST LEBANON ENTERING INTO ANY IMMEDIATE FORMAL PEACE ARRANGEMENT WITH ISRAEL. SUCH A BOLD STEP WOULD SIMPLY WRECK ANY CHANCES OF ESTABLISHING A SEMBLANCE OF STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY, BASHIR TOLD SOLARZ. LEBANON DID NOT HAVE THE LUXURY THAT EGYPT HAD IN MOVING SO QUICKLY.

WHAT WAS POSSIBLE, SOLARZ QUOTED BASHIR AS HAVING SAID, WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DE FACTO PEACE WITH ISRAEL. IT WAS CRUCIAL THAT ISRAELI LEADERS NOT PRESS LEBANON AGAINST THE WALL TO DO WHAT MIGHT BE PLEASING TO A DOMESTIC ISRAELI AUDIENCE BUT WHAT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO EVERYONE'S BEST INTERESTS IN THE LONG RUN.

IN DISRUPTING THE DELICATE BALANCE IN LEBANON, PEACE WITH ISRAEL WOULD BECOME EVEN MORE UNLIKELY.

VELIOTES PICKED UP ON SOLARZ'S COMMENTS, INDICATING THAT EVEN AMIN GEMAYEL--WHILE CLEARLY NOT AS PRO-ISRAEL AS

BASHIR--WAS STILL PREPARED TODAY TO DO WHAT THE ASSASSINATED PHALANGE LEADER HAD WANTED TO DO: MAKE REAL PEACE IN ALL BUT NAME.
"THAT'S A JUDGMENT LEFT TO THE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON," VELIOTES SAID.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, BY THE WAY, DID NOT AGREE WITH SOLARZ THAT THE UNIFIL FORCES IN LEBANON SHOULD NECESSARILY BE DISQUALIFIED AS POTENTIAL PEACE-KEEPERS IN THE SOUTH. YES, VELIOTES SAID, THE UNIFIL TROOPS HAD OFTEN FAILED TO PROTECT ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER AFTER THEY ARRIVED IN THE WAKE OF THE 1978 LITANI OPERATION. BUT EVEN SOME OF UNIFIL'S MOST VOCAL CRITICS IN ISRAEL, HE SAID WITHOUT MENTIONING NAMES, HAD RECOGNIZED THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE UNIFIL UNITS WERE FIRST-RATE IN CARRYING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, OFTEN IN CONDITIONS OF GREAT DANGER.

IN ANY CASE, HE ADDED, THE SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON TODAY IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT. THE PLO NO LONGER HAS ANY MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AREA, AS IT DID BEFORE THE WAR. THERE IS NO MORE OF A PLO "STATE WITHIN A STATE" IN LEBANON. "THAT'S A VERY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE," SAID VELIOTES, AND UNDER THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES, HE CONCLUDED, UNIFIL MAY ACTUALLY BE ABLE TO DO AN ADEQUATE JOB IN MAINTAINING THE PEACE.

REGARDING THE PROSPECTS OF JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN JOINING THE U.S.-SPONSORED ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS, VELIOTES SAID FLATLY: "I'M OPTIMISTIC." THE PLO STILL HAD TO GIVE THE FINAL GREEN LIGHT, WHICH COULD COME DURING THE NEXT MEETING

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OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 14 IN ALGIERS. AT THE SAME TIME, VELIOTES--LIKE REAGAN EARLIER IN THE DAY DURING A WHITE HOUSE MEETING WITH AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS--APPEALED FOR A PERMANENT FREEZE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. TOGETHER WITH SOME REAL PROGRESS IN THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS, SUCH A HALT TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY COULD PROVE TO BE THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS IN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACEMAKING RIGHT NOW.

FOR THE U.S., VELIOTES SAID, THERE WERE SOME SERIOUS CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS IN THE ARAB WORLD AT PRESENT. MANY INFLUENTIAL ARABS SIMPLY BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL AND SYRIA, SOMEHOW, HAVE CONSPIRED TO STALL THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO CARVE UP THE COUNTRY FOR THEMSELVES. THERE HAVE EVEN BEEN PRESS REPORTS, HE SAID, THAT ISRAEL AND SYRIA MAY HAVE HAD SOME "CLAUDESTINE MEETINGS."

"WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF THIS," SAID VELIOTES. "WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY SUCH COLLUSION."

ANOTHER CREDIBILITY PROBLEM FACING WASHINGTON, HE SAID, WAS THE SUSPICION IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT THE U.S. WAS ACTUALLY BEHIND THE ISRAELI MOVES IN LEBANON IN THE FIRST PLACE.

A GREAT BOON TO THE PEACE PROCESS, HE SAID, HAD BEEN ISRAEL'S 1981 WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS PART OF THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT. MANY ARABS WERE FLABBERGASTED THAT ISRAEL HAD ACTUALLY LEFT SINAI. THEY THOUGHT ISRAEL WOULD FIND AN EXCUSE NOT TO DO SO. BUT SINCE THEN, HE SAID, THE ARABS HAVE COME TO DOUBT THAT ISRAEL WILL EVER FOLLOW SUIT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA--AND THAT HAS BEEN A SERIOUS OBSTACLE STANDING IN THE WAY OF BROADENING THE PEACE PROCESS.

VELIOTES PINNED MUCH OF THE BLAME ON THE CURRENT STALEMATE IN THE CAMP DAVID PEACE NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTLY ON JORDAN, THE PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS. AS AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN IN 1978, HE HAD STRONGLY APPEALED TO THEM--FOR THEIR OWN GOOD--TO ACCEPT THE FRAMEWORK ACCORDS AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. IF THEY HAD ACTUALLY READ THE CAMP DAVID DOCUMENT, HE SAID, "THIS (ARAB-ISRAELI) PROBLEM MAY HAVE BEEN BEHIND US BY NOW."

WHILE VELIOTES WAS TESTIFYING, DEFENSE SECRETARY CASPAR WEINBERGER TOOK THE OCCASION OF THE LATEST CONFRONTATION BETWEEN U.S. MARINES AND ISRAELI

SOLDIERS IN LEBANON TO LASH OUT BITTERLY AGAINST ISRAELI POLICY IN GENERAL.

IN A "WHOLE SET OF PROBLEMS," HE SAID, IT WAS "VERY DISTURBING," "UNNECESSARY" AND "BASICALLY DAMAGING TO THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORT TO SECURE PEACE IN THAT WHOLE AREA."

HIS COMMENTS CONTRASTED SHARPLY WITH THOSE MADE BY VELIOTES AS WELL AS THOSE MADE BY REAGAN DURING HIS MEETING WITH JEWISH LEADERS EARLIER IN THE DAY. IN MUCH LESS STRIDENT WORDS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT ALSO HAD PUBLICLY COMPLAINED ABOUT THE LATEST INCIDENT, CONSIDERED BY WASHINGTON TO BE THE MOST SERIOUS YET IN RECENT WEEKS. ACTING U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE KENNETH DAM LATER CALLED IN THE ISRAELI EMBASSY MINISTER, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, FOR AN EXPLANATION. THAT MEETING WAS DESCRIBED AS "FRIENDLY" AND "UNDERSTANDING" BY THE EMBASSY, WHICH PUBLICLY DENIED THAT ISRAEL HAD VIOLATED THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT REACHED LAST WEEK DURING DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING U.S. AND ISRAELI MILITARY OFFICIALS IN LEBANON.

STILL, THE INCIDENT QUICKLY CAME TO DOMINATE U.S. MEDIA ATTENTION. ONE MARINE ACTUALLY INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT WAS INTERVIEWED BY CBS NEWS. HE SAID AN AMERICAN CAPTAIN AT ONE TENSE POINT HAD EVEN "UNHOLSTERED HIS 45-CALIBRE PISTOL, LOVERED A MAGAZINE INTO IT AND PUT IT AT A 45-DEGREE ANGLE IN THE AIR." THE ISRAELI TANK COMMANDER THEN THREATENED TO DRIVE RIGHT OVER HIM, HE SAID, BUT THE MARINES, AFTER JUMPING ON TOP OF ONE OF THE

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ISRAELI TANKS, PERSISTED AND EVENTUALLY THE ISRAELI SOLDIERS DROVE AWAY AFTER RECEIVING FRESH RADIO INSTRUCTIONS.

CLEARLY, WEINBERGER AND THE PENTAGON WERE ANXIOUS TO PRESS THE ISSUE AND TO WEAKEN ISRAEL IN THE U. S. THE STATE DEPARTMENT, ONCE A GREATER NEMESIS FOR ISRAEL IN WASHINGTON THAT THE PENTAGON, WAS MORE UNDERSTANDING.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: , Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary

SUBJECT: Lebanon Negotiations: Next Steps

Where We Stand

The gap between the Lebanese and Israeli positions remains wide, but we have not yet done all that we could do to close that gap. Indeed, although Israeli demands, at the behest of Sharon, have steadily escalated, there is evidence of flexibility on both sides, and on both key issues -- normalization and security -- that we can exploit.

Granted, Israel (and specifically Sharon) may see delay in Lebanon as a way of forestalling your September 1 initiative. Nevertheless, pressure is building in Israel, and within the Israeli Cabinet, to show progress on Lebanon.

The Kahan Commission Report, which may damage Sharon, is due out shortly. Plus, over the last two weeks, Lebanese assertions of sovereignty have proved that Sharon was wrong in predicting that Lebanon would accede to the Israeli draft agreement.

Consequently, now is an opportune time for us to push our diplomacy to its limits and seek accommodation, not confrontation.

How to Proceed - The Next Round:

We have had a thorough review of the situation with Phil, and have agreed upon the following immediate scenario:

- Phil will meet with Begin next Wednesday to seek agreement on the basis of an updated version of the U.S. proposal that Phil presented, and the Israelis dismissed, on his last trip.
- If Begin is receptive, Phil would remain to seek agreement involving the maximum realistic normalization and security arrangements. He then will get Gemayel, and his Muslim colleagues, on board.

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- If Begin is unresponsive, Phil would seek agreement with Gemayel on a draft which Lebanon would then table with our public support. Phil would press Gemayel to make his best offer on both normalization and security.
- In either case, Phil would go to Syria and Saudi Arabia to assure firm support for whatever Gemayel intends to accept.

Key Issues

The key issues are: a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces, security arrangements, and normalization arrangements.

The key on withdrawal is for Lebanon to receive, and publicly announce that it has received, firm assurances of Syrian and PLO willingness to withdraw.

On security, we still prefer a role for UNIFIL in the South. If Israel objects, however, we should be ready to offer as a fallback the MNF with U.S. participation in the security zone. (Previously we have only discussed an expanded MNF along the highway east of Beirut.) Although such an offer entails high risks with Congress and the public, it will demonstrate the extent of our commitment to Israeli security, may yield trade-offs on normalization, and may attract Begin while isolating Sharon.

On normalization, the Israelis must understand that the Lebanese might provide some de facto normalization, but not de jure -- and still maintain internal consensus and wide Arab support. But with our urging, and Saudi support, the Lebanese may be able to go farther than they have offered thus far.

During Phil's Mission

We hope that Israel will now agree to work with us toward common goals. However, while Phil is in the area, we should consider what steps we might take if agreement is not reached. In particular, if our diplomatic efforts fail, we may want to consider shifting the focus to the Peace Process (specifically, West Bank settlements), where our hand may be stronger, and the rewards greater, than in Lebanon.

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Offering Israel an Expanded MNF: Briefing Members of Congress

We face two dilemmas in deciding how best to handle briefings on the Hill should we decide we have to offer an expanded MNF to meet Israeli security concerns in Lebanon and thus break a logjam that could threaten our entire Middle East policy. Both dilemmas are related to the need to avoid premature leaks, while meeting most effectively the Congressional opposition to U.S. participation in an expanded MNF that Senator Baker flagged to Phil Habib this past week.

First, we would of course like to explain our rationale in advance to as many members as possible in order to acquire maximum support. However, the larger the group made knowledgeable the greater the likelihood of a leak. We view an expanded MNF as the last resort fallback position, but if it leaked we would not have a chance of getting Israel to agree to our preference for UNIFIL, which we now believe just might be possible.

Second, we must determine the optimum time to brief the members. To avoid the charge of confronting Congress with a fait accompli, we normally would like to do the briefing as soon as Phil and we decide that the MNF offer might be necessary. Too much advance notice, however, again increases the chance of a leak. This argues in favor of waiting until we are absolutely sure it will be needed to get the job done. To this end, we will be in close touch with Phil throughout in order to pin-point the best time to begin our briefings. He does not see any Israelis until next Wednesday, when he will meet with Begin, and it is unlikely he would reach the point of deciding on the MNF fallback then; early the following week is more likely.

Attached are two lists--one showing the members we would brief if leakage were not an issue and the other a smaller list containing the minimum number we could brief and still make a valid claim to prior consultation.

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Congressional Lists cleared by H:ADrischler

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A further complication is presented by the Congressional recess. Those members still in town at the time can be briefed one-on-one by appropriate senior officials, which we believe should be White House aides where possible. Others will have to be contacted by telephone.

On balance, we would recommend that, should Phil decide that the MNF offer must be brought into play, we brief the smallest number of members at the last possible moment. Suggested talking points for use with the members also are attached.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. List of Members
2. Talking Points

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Lebanon: Update on Negotiations

Plenary and subcommittee meetings of the Lebanese-Israeli talks took place yesterday. In the military subcommittee, Israel presented proposals that appear to represent another significant hardening of the Israeli October positions, by calling for significant limitations on the Lebanese army in the security zone. The Israelis may be using these tough ideas as pressure on the Lebanese to alter their opposition to a "partial withdrawal," as proposed January 25 by Arens to Ken Dam. Some progress was made in the other subcommittees on mutual relations and guarantees. A full round of meetings is scheduled for next week.

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Talking Points

- Direct talks between Israel and Lebanon are continuing, but progress has been very limited and slow.
- We are keeping the pressure on to urge quicker results, but the differences between the parties are substantial.
- The Lebanese objective, which we share, remains that all external forces should leave Lebanon.
- Israeli proposals for a residual military presence, in the south or at proposed "early warning stations," would severely complicate the negotiations to get the Syrians and PLO out, as well as impinge upon Lebanese sovereignty.

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LEBANON: STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

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Q: Why are the Lebanon negotiations dragging on for so long?

A: -- The issues involved are extremely complex and of vital concern to both parties. Beyond that, Israel is understandably trying to maximize the gains from its military success of last summer. Lebanon, while sympathetic to Israel's legitimate security concerns, is concerned lest too rapid a change in its relationship with Israel destroy the still fragile political consensus within the country and undermine its relations with key Arab countries.

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LEBANON: NORMALIZATION

Q: Why can't Lebanon agree to arrangements for normalization with Israel?

A: -- Lebanon has made clear that there is a limit to how much of relations with Israel it can accept yet continue to maintain Lebanon's internal consensus and its relations with the Arabs. It is a reality that Lebanon must protect those economic relations with the key Arab states, which are vital to the functioning of the Lebanese economy. It is essential that each party to this negotiation recognize the reasonable requirements for the security and political stability of the other.

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LEBANON: EARLY WARNING STATIONS

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Q: What is the U.S. view of the Israeli desire to maintain several early warning stations in Lebanon after Israel withdraws?

A: -- Our position is clear that all foreign forces should leave Lebanon. No residual presence should remain.

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Q: Are sanctions on Israel under consideration to force Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon?

A: -- There has been no change in U.S. policy on assistance to Israel.

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LEBANON: EXPANDING MNF

Q: Is the U.S. going to send more Marines to Lebanon?

A: -- The Government of Lebanon has asked the U.S., France and Italy to consider expanding the size of their contingents to the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon to help Lebanon in meeting all its security responsibilities after all foreign forces leave. We understand that France and Italy are prepared to send more forces to Lebanon in the context of a need for such troops. We have not made a decision on this matter because there has not been enough progress in the negotiations for the withdrawal of external forces from Lebanon.

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LEBANON: IDF - USMC INCIDENTS

Q: What are we doing to prevent further confrontations between Israeli troops and the Marines?

A: -- We have been in touch with the Government of Israel to work out these problems in a practical manner. We expect no recurrence of these regrettable incidents.

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ISRAELI SHARON INTERVIEWED ON TALKS WITH LEBANON

(DEFENSE MINISTER ARI 'EL SHARON INTERVIEWED BY DOV GOLDSTEIN;
DATE AND PLACE NOT GIVEN)

(TEXT) QUESTION: Mr. Defense Minister, about a month ago you granted me an interview full of news about a breakthrough on an agreement with Lebanon. You reported this to the Cabinet ministers and to Ambassador Philip Habib that same week and you even showed them the agreed-upon document with Lebanon. What happened? Why is the gap between Israel and Lebanon so wide?

ANSWER: The agreement I informed the Cabinet and Philip Habib of was a working paper. Look here, this is the working paper. That is also its name; working paper. It is built on the plan for security arrangements and normalization that the Israeli cabinet adopted on 10 October 1982 and which was simultaneously presented on 12 October to Secretary of State Shultz in Washington and to President Al-Jumayyil in Beirut. The plan included all the security arrangements that Israel saw then and sees now as necessary for its security and...

QUESTION: I beg your pardon, did it also include the Israeli early warning stations on Lebanese territory?

ANSWER: Yes indeed, everything was specified: the terms for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, a general

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security arrangement applicable to all of Lebanon, the expulsion of terrorist forces or any other Arab forces--with the exception of the Lebanese army--of any military forces from countries that do not have relations with Israel from the entire Lebanese territory. It also included all the security arrangements in the security zone, in a 45-km strip. Incidentally, I am surprised anew each time that commentators do not understand that this distance should be measured from Israel's northernmost point, namely Netulla.

In the specific arrangements for Israel's security the plan also included the Israeli early warning stations. We also regarded the normalization as a vital component, and not for economic reasons. Israel's economy is more acutely threatened by Lebanese activity than the Lebanese economy is endangered by Israeli businessmen. Lebanese businessmen are simply faster...

The plan was presented and welcomed. Although there were reservations about certain items, the plan was acceptable in principle to both Mr. Shultz and President Al-Jumayyil. Therefore, it was possible to complete the agreed-upon working paper with the Lebanese authorities on 14 December 1982. The debates were lengthy and difficult.

Now you are asking what has happened to this agreed-upon paper. What has changed? Has anything changed? Are the terms

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now different? No, nothing has changed. Even today the Cabinet's decision must and can be the basis for a rapid arrangement between Israel and Lebanon with the participation of the United States. However, what is happening here--and I am saying this out of profound friendship toward the United States; I would not at all suggest that we grade people in Israel according to their friendliness toward the United States--is that the United States wants to link the Lebanese issue to comprehensive arrangements in the region and, as part of this attempt and as its first step, is seeking to pave the way for Husayn to join negotiations over the future of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza not based on the Camp David Accords. Undoubtedly, that was the factor, with a capital F, that led to a hardening of the Lebanese positions. It is inconceivable that the Lebanese should be ready for arrangements and normalization that go beyond what the Americans suggest that they accept or agree to.

Why did the Americans see the need to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon without assuring its necessary security needs on the northern border and how does this fit in with the attempt to seduce Husayn to join the negotiations? That is the basic question that calls for a truthful answer in order to understand the argument and dispute with the United States.

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There may be some Congressional concern about recent incidents between the U.S. contingent to the MNF and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). We have been trying to work these problems out on the ground but Morris Draper has not yet been successful in arranging a meeting with IDF Major General Drori, who apparently seeks direct meetings with the Marine officer-in-charge. We expect a meeting soon, where Draper will have USMC personnel present and will suggest specific steps to reduce the likelihood of further incidents.

TALKING POINTS

- We want to prevent a recurrence of incidents between the IDF and U.S. Marines in Beirut.
- Morris Draper, our negotiator on the scene, is prepared to meet with senior IDF officers to find ways to reduce the likelihood of further incidents.
- Since the Marines' mission is to bolster the authority of the GOL and not to provide internal security, we want to avoid contacts with the IDF that could be misunderstood.
- At the same time, there are practical ways to work out arrangements between the MNF and the IDF which will enhance communication and understanding. Draper is pursuing these possibilities on an urgent basis.

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Drafted: ^{nj} NEA/ARN:CDWelch:jvw
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Cleared: NEA/ARN:DLMack ^m
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Everybody is asking: what does the United States want to prove to Husayn?

Why do they repeatedly announce through official and unofficial channels that Israel is being urged to evacuate its forces by mid-February? What is it about this date assigned by the Americans for the IDF's evacuation from Lebanon?

This date is related to the general activity that the United States has been conducting in the region: the attempt to include Husayn in the negotiations according to the Reagan plan: the meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers next month, Husayn's tours of the Arab countries; Arafat's shuttles--the entire area is in turmoil and an "eve of agreement" atmosphere is hovering over it. Everything is seething and moving, there is general action; Mubarak is flying to Washington, Morocco's King Hassan has already been there.

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Maariv Article, Part II

(Answer continues) The Americans are wrong, and when friends are wrong they should be told so, particularly on issues that might be fateful to Israel and, in my opinion, also to the United States. They are wrong because they want to prove that Israel can be made to give in under pressure on its obvious security needs. "We will twist Israel's Arm," the Americans tell Husayn and other Arab leaders.

We explained most of our claims regarding Judea and Samaria, mainly about security considerations. It may be our mistake that we did not say that Judea and Samaria are part of our historic motherland when we confined our explanations to security. In Lebanon we demand security and security arrangements also. In other words, today there is a parallel between the arguments both regarding Lebanon and Judea and Samaria. The Americans are entertaining the illusion that they will tell Husayn: "Look here, Israel had security requirements in Lebanon and it paid a heavy price to attain them. However, under our heavy pressure it was forced to give up in spite of the heavy price and all the declarations of its Cabinet that it will insist on security arrangements. Therefore, we will act the same way in Judea and Samaria. The Israelis speak the same words there regarding security. Trust us -- we will also exert the necessary pressure there."

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Hence, Lebanon is the test, and we are currently going through a trial period. We must hold out through this dispute with the United States, as the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister and I and the entire Cabinet are doing.

It must be understood that time is an important factor here. If Hussein realizes that Israel's will cannot be bent and there are no chances for its withdrawing from Lebanon without assuring Israel its necessary security terms, he will obviously realize that it cannot be done in Judea and Samaria either. Then all this daydreaming about political solutions deviating from the Israeli governments' autonomy plan will have no reason to exist.

I want coordination with the United States no less than others. However, this does not mean that coordination implies that Israel must go back on its positions all the time. That is not coordination. In spite of our desire to avoid differences of opinion with our only friend, there is no other choice but to see it through if we want to reject imposed solutions on other borders.

Question: I want to understand this clearly. Are you saying that the United States is to blame for the freeze in the talks with Lebanon?

Answer: I am saying that even what we have achieved so far

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is based entirely on the working paper agreed upon with the Lebanese. This holds true regarding the establishment of the various committees, the venues of the debates, the agreement on the agenda, deliberations about ending the state of war and the clauses about normalizing (Hasdrrat) relations, even if it is not called that. All that was included in the agreed upon working paper. What is true is that today in many respects we are faced with the same situation that existed prior to the agreement on the working paper -- and the United States is largely responsible for it. I say this without detracting from the difficulties of the Lebanese to go from secret and confidential negotiations to overt negotiations.

Question: Did the agreed upon working paper speak about a definite time during which Israel would maintain early warning stations in Lebanon?

Answer: The plan Israel submitted to the United States and Lebanon stated that the stations would remain in Lebanon until a peace treaty is achieved between Israel and Lebanon. However, it was agreed in the working paper that the early warning stations would be maintained for as long as decided by the governments in the negotiations. That is the exact wording.

Question: How relevant is the claim that if Lebanon agrees

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to Israeli warning stations on its territory, the Syrians will also demand stations on Lebanese soil and will refuse to withdraw if such a promise is not made to them?

Answer: First of all, Israel and Syria are not in the same situation. Israel and its citizens were plagued for many years with terrorist attacks and bloody raids from Lebanese territory. Such activities were never perpetrated against Syria and its citizens from Lebanese territory. In contrast, the Syrian forces in Lebanon were a central factor that enabled the terrorists to entrench themselves in Lebanon and operate from there against Israel and its citizens. Therefore, there are no grounds to the claim that there is some kind of symmetry between Israel and Syria on this issue.

Nevertheless, if the problem arises that the existence of Israeli early warning stations also calls for a number of Syrian stations on Lebanese soil, that arrangement would be better than the absence of an Israeli presence for a certain period of time in the southern Lebanon security zone.

Question: Would Israel agree to that?

Answer: There is no room for such symmetry, it is not justified, and Israel would be opposed to it. Nevertheless, Israeli and Syrian stations -- are better than not having any

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Israeli stations.

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Question: Regardless of the Syrian demand for symmetry, what right has Israel to demand early warning stations on Lebanese territory? After all, we are talking about restoring Lebanon's sovereignty. Which sovereign country would agree to have foreign army forces on its territory?

Answer: This does not constitute any infringement or harm of Lebanon's sovereignty. It is a question of a very limited military presence for a predetermined period of time, according to an agreement between the two countries. There is no resemblance between such a presence and the current Syrian occupation which comprises almost half of Lebanon's territory; the Syrians maintain over 1,100 tanks and about 30,000 to 40,000 troops there. There is no resemblance between the Israeli early warning stations and the current situation whereby there are several thousand terrorists in northern and eastern Lebanon.

Does such a situation in the slightest resemble a situation whereby very limited IDF forces are stationed in definite points for definite periods of time? There are precedents. Is the sovereignty of the European countries infringed by the presence of U.S. troops there? Is Panama's sovereignty infringed by its agreement to have U.S. troops stationed there until 2001? Look, even the Egyptians agreed to restrict their sovereignty over the Sinai desert indefinitely because that

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area was used to deploy against Israel.

Question: What should be the physical character of the Israeli stations?

Answer: Using the term early warning stations is misleading. We are accustomed to using it in the agreements with Egypt. The stations in Lebanon would be of an entirely different character. We call them: "Antiterror supervisory stations," this is the right definition. The Sinai is not populated, whereas Lebanon is densely populated. The purpose of the stations in Lebanon is to give Israel early warning about the resumption of terrorist intentions to attack Israel. If Israel learns such information it would immediately report it to Lebanon through the joint Israeli-Lebanese supervisory committee, which must be established according to the agreement. The intention is to prevent a recurrence of a situation where the terrorists may resume their activities in Lebanon. It is not a question of electronic devices which may be operated by U.S. soldiers. In this case, our men -- who are irreplaceable -- must operate them. They must be familiar with the Lebanese picture, they must know the area and the population structure.

Question: Will the mission of the IDF soldiers in the

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stations also be able to restrain hostile moves against Israel?

Answer: No, that is the duty of the Lebanese army and police forces, and of Major Haddad's forces, which must be awarded a special status. The stations will be necessary until the Lebanese security forces are capable of undertaking this Mission.

Question: Although the IDF fully controls the area today, a Katyusha shell fell near Zar'it this week and the "Lebanon Beach Hotel" in Khaldah was fired upon. If such phenomena cannot be prevented today, how will they be prevented after the withdrawal even if several Israeli early warning stations remain in Lebanon?

Answer: That is exactly the reason we demand security arrangements in all of Lebanon, and that the terrorists be driven out of the entire Lebanese territory. That is exactly the reason why UNIFIL -- from whose area Zar'it fired upon -- and a Multinational Force -- from whose area the "Lebanon Beach Hotel" was fired upon -- cannot guarantee Israel's interests after the withdrawal. Until the Peace for Gaililee War, several -- not all -- UNIFIL units cooperated with the terrorists. Terrorists set out from the areas currently controlled by the U.S. Marines and went through their lines to

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perpetrate attacks against Israel. It is absolutely clear to me that the Marines do not want the terrorists to cross through their lines. However, the fact is that they do cross through their lines in the Beirut area. When the IDF withdraws from Lebanon this problem will become much more serious. For many years Israel paid a very dear price for Lebanon's willingness to allow the terrorists to operate against Israel from its territory. Only in the last few years did the Lebanese government lose (as published, line apparently dropped in the original -- FBIS) it earlier signed on the "Cairo Agreement" which provided for terrorist operations against Israel from Lebanese territory. It is impossible that Israel should not have the moral right to demand security arrangements in the security zone.

Question: Where does Israel demand to establish its stations?

Answer: In the Sidon area and near An-Nabatiyah, which were terrorist centers until the peace for Galilee operation.

Question: Were Lebanon to agree to sign a full peace treaty with Israel, would Israel even then demand special security arrangements and a military presence in southern Lebanon.

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Answer: Even in a situation of peace the Israeli demand to maintain antiterror supervisory stations is morally valid and justified. When it agreed to completely demilitarize an area of 150 kms, Egypt was also forced to pay a price due to the fact that the Sinai had been a springboard against Israel. Nevertheless, we distinguish between two situations: if there is full peace between Israel and Lebanon there would be no need for a special status in southern Lebanon. In the absence of a peace treaty, there must be a temporary special status in southern Lebanon of which the Israeli supervisory stations and the special status of Haddad's forces are central components. It may be easier to sign a full peace treaty...that is a better idea.

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Question: The possibility of a violent confrontation between IDF soldiers and U.S. Marines scares not only the U.S. Secretary of Defense and others in the United States but also Israeli citizens. Can this danger not be averted by issuing explicit orders to IDF commanders?

Answer: We are making every possible effort to prevent any clashes between Israeli and U.S. soldiers. It is our uppermost wish to avert this. The orders I issued on this subject are strict and unambiguous. They explicitly state that even if our forces detect terrorists who, after attempting to attack our forces, retreat through the U.S. Marines positions, our forces should categorically and under no circumstances whatsoever cross the railroad line which was decided on September 25, 1982 as a boundary separating our forces and the U.S. Marines.

Question: According to reports, the Americans claim that no boundary was set and that no such agreement exists.

Answer: This boundary was set in a lengthy meeting held in my home on Saturday, September 25, 1982 with the participation of Habib, Lewis, Draper, the IDF Chief of Staff, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and other senior officials of the Israeli security services. It was then explained to the Americans that the boundary of our forces

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would be the railroad, and they agreed to this.

Question: Then why do they caution about a clash between IDF forces and the Marines, and why should they do that?

Answer: For two reasons: to increase pressure on Israel to withdraw and to tarnish its reputation in the United States. For many months the terrorists did not cross through the U.S. lines. Indeed, they have increasingly begun to organize recently in the terrorist neighborhoods in West Beirut, albeit in small numbers; they are protected by the Multinational Force. The measures we have taken in coordination with the Marine commanders guarantee that clashes do not occur between IDF soldiers and U.S. Marines.

Question: With the order not to cross the railroad, we are in effect supplying the terrorists with a safe haven, protected by the U.S. Marines...

Answer: This is another and decisively important reason why we do not agree that a multinational force or UNIFIL separate the IDF forces and the terrorists. However, as long as the Marines and other forces separate the IDF and the terrorist neighborhoods, we must avert a confrontation between Israeli soldiers and U.S. Marines, even if this carries a

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certain price.

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Question: The fact that the Soviet Union kept a low profile during the Lebanese war was interpreted as impotence. How do you interpret the stationing of SAM-5's in Syria? Is it clear that henceforth Israel will have to take into consideration a more likely possibility of Soviet intervention in the event of a new flare-up?

Answer: I do not think that there should be a new flare-up. As far as we are concerned, there is no reason for it and we have no interest in a conflagration. We did not want any conflagration with the Syrians, not even during the peace for Galilee war.

Also in the past we concluded - and it seems to me that we were not mistaken - that there is a difference between warlike activities on Lebanese soil and belligerent action on Syrian territory, since there was and still is a Soviet commitment toward Syria's security. This is also one of the reasons why we made every possible effort not to extend the war beyond what was necessary in Lebanon proper.

It should be understood that the Syrians were dealt a very severe blow due to their intervention in the war. The war and

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ITS CONSEQUENCES WERE ALSO A Severe blow to the prestige of the Soviets, whose weapons were destroyed and deastated. The Soviet Union had no other choice but to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense system in the wake of what happened.

The stationing of the SAM-5's is not a Soviet reaction to the stationing of U.S. forces in Beirut, but is mainly the result of the severe blow dalt by the Israeli Air Force to the Syrian millile deployment and air force.

Question: Due to their long range, about 300 kms, the Soviet missiles are also threatening the aircraft of the U.S. 6th fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. May it be assumed that if Israel destroyed these missiles the United States would not be sorry?

Answer: Israel has no reason to attack the missiles. I read the report in Newsweek alleging that I recommended to the Cabinet to launch an attack on the missiles before the arrival of 1,200 Soviet troops. The opposite is true. I recommended that the missiles not be touched. We have lived with the threat of missiles in the past and we knmew how to come up with the appropriate answers without changing our daily routine. Today, too, no Isfraeli aircraft will change its route. No daily security activities will change as a result of the

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stationing of the missiles. We have a problem here and the most appropriate answer must be supplied; alertness is called for. Surface-to-surface "scud" missiles are stationed in Syria covering all the population centers in Israel. We also have an answer to that. I would prefer it if instead of sending missiles the Soviets talked with us.

Question: Do you see any reasonable chances that other African countries will follow in Zaire's footsteps and resume relations with us soon?

Answer: When I said over a year ago during my first visit there that the establishment of security ties with Zaire would pave the way for a wide spectrum of relations, people thought little of it or sneered. Over a year has passed and Israel and Zaire have reestablished diplomatic relations. There is an Israeli Ambassador in Kinshasa and Israeli flags are flying all over the place, from the shores of Lake Tanganyika to the mouth of the Congo River. Israeli activity is expanding in all fields. It is impossible for other African countries not to see the blessing inherent in cooperation with Israel. It is impossible for them not to notice the benefit that would come out of such a relationship. It is impossible for them not to envy President Mobutu's independent stance.

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Therefore, even if it takes time, our activities in Zaire and expanding economic and agricultural cooperation will lead to a resumption of relations with other African states.

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TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: NEA - Nicholas *X* Veliotis

SUBJECT: Israeli Proposal for Exploring Possibility of Agreement on Interim Withdrawal in Lebanon

cc: 1A137

ISSUE FOR DECISION

How to respond to Arens' proposal to you that our efforts in the Lebanon negotiations now should be concentrated on achieving an agreement for an interim withdrawal of foreign forces rather than our current approach.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

As you recall, we previously explored the concept of seeking an interim troop withdrawal and concluded that it is not feasible for several reasons. First, the Lebanese are opposed to the concept and are concerned that any interim withdrawal will reduce the urgency of full withdrawal and could, in effect, divide Lebanon into permanent zones of occupation with Israel in the south and Syria in the Bekaa. Secondly, we concluded that an interim withdrawal, with the linkage to political concessions, would be just as difficult to negotiate with the Israelis as a full package. Most importantly, the complexity of negotiating first an interim and then a final withdrawal would prolong the occupation of Lebanon by external forces.

Phil Habib believes strongly that we should not entertain the Israeli proposal that we explore the interim arrangement concept. Contrary to what Arens said, the assurances that we have received from the Lebanese and the Saudis regarding Syrian and PLO intentions are sufficiently firm for the time being. During Phil's most recent discussion of the subject with Gemayel, the Lebanese rejected trying to reach an interim withdrawal agreement, and Phil conveyed this position clearly to the Israelis, stating that this was not a workable concept.

The positions of the various parties on an interim withdrawal are as follows:

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THE ISRAELI POSITION

The most recent and authoritative Israeli description of their position on an interim withdrawal was put forth in the January 24 session of the Subcommittee on Security Arrangements and Withdrawal. According to the Israeli representative, Israel would withdraw to a line stretching east from Damur (except in the Bekaa) if:

- the PLO withdraws completely from Lebanese territory;
- all Israeli POW's, MIA's and KIA's are returned; and,
- the Syrians agree to a simultaneous and equivalent withdrawal.

The Syrian withdrawal, according to the Israeli position, should be from the Metn into the Bekaa with all Syrian troops ending up east of a line running between Shtura to Zahleh. There would be no Israeli withdrawal in the Bekaa since units there were already at the 45-50 km. security zone line. The Israeli representative suggested that under this concept, the MNF would deploy into areas evacuated by the Israelis and Syria and along the Beirut-Damascus highway.

LEBANESE POSITION

Ambassador Habib discussed the interim withdrawal concept with Gemayel and his advisors January 21. The Lebanese took a strong position with Phil that the Israeli idea of a partial pullback with the conditions Israel wants is unworkable. They did not believe that the PLO would withdraw completely from Lebanon in exchange for a slight readjustment in IDF dispositions. They also felt that the Syrians would not agree to the concept since it was unrealistic from a military viewpoint in terms of the Syrian position in the Bekaa. Finally, the basic Lebanese objection was that partial withdrawal would remove the incentive and the pressure on both Israel and Syria to negotiate full withdrawal from Lebanon. At least one of Gemayel's advisors, however, indicated that partial withdrawal might have merit if the Israelis were to withdraw as far south as Sidon, which we believe unlikely.

SYRIAN POSITION

During the early stages of the conflict in Lebanon, Syria had pressed for disengagement between Syrian and Israeli forces. As the fighting continued, however, Israel

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pushed Syrian forces into the Bekaa and the incentive for disengagement became less for Assad. Based on the Israeli position as it has been described to us, the Syrians would have little interest in an interim withdrawal, since Syrian military units in the Bekaa would be required to concede important terrain there, as well as in central Lebanon. In addition, Syria would argue that Israeli withdrawal under this concept, while leaving Israel with important positions in the mountains, would place all Syrian troops on the floor of the Bekaa valley and, therefore, under Israeli guns.

PLO POSITION

Basically, the PLO is being asked to withdraw now from Lebanon without an undertaking of eventual Israeli total withdrawal. This could only be achieved if Arab parties enjoying strong influence with the PLO saw the arrangement as being advantageous. In any event, it would be a process requiring some time to negotiate.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call in Arens as soon as possible and at a time when Phil Habib can attend the meeting so as to give our views on why this proposal is not workable.

Approve FLD JAN 27 1983 Disapprove _____
Time 1/28/83 9:30-10:15 A.M.

Drafted:NEA/IAI:EAbington *et*

1/25/83 Ext. 23672
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REGION OF UNAUTHORIZED ARMED ELEMENTS, (CONCENTRATING
PRIMARILY IN THE NORTHERNMOST 18 KMS OF THE SECURITY
REGION) (IN MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY, AND IN ENSURING
THE RESTORATION OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON, THROUGHOUT LEBANON, IN SUCH MANNER AS MAY BE
AGREED).

B. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE SECURITY
REGION. PERSONNEL OF THE LOCAL FORCES IN THE SECURITY
REGION WILL BE OFFERED INTEGRATION OR REINTEGRATION INTO
SOME KIND OF NATIONAL MILITARY OR POLICE STRUCTURE, AND
WILL BE UNDER THE CONTROL AND AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT. TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE, PERSONNEL SO INTE-
GRATED WILL BE STATIONED WITH LEBANESE UNITS IN THE
SECURITY REGION.

C. EARLY WARNING STATIONS MAY BE MAINTAINED BY ISRAEL
ONLY DURING THE PERIOD IN WHICH WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL
FORCES IS TAKING PLACE TO ENSURE THAT NO UNAUTHORIZED
ELEMENTS ENTER THE SECURITY REGION AND TO MONITOR THE
WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES. SURVEILLANCE WILL BE
CONDUCTED IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH ISRAEL AND
LEBANON.

D. WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION, THERE WILL BE NO SURFACE-
TO-AIR OR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, NO ROCKETS, AND
NO NEW MILITARY FORTIFICATIONS.

E. A JOINT MILITARY ISRAELI-LEBANESE SUPERVISORY SYSTEM
IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THESE
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND TO COORDINATE THE WITHDRAWAL
PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. IT WILL MEET CONTINUOUSLY
IN BEIRUT DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. FOLLOWING THE
COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL, AN ISRAELI MILITARY LIAISON
OFFICE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT (IN ISRAEL); A LEBANESE
MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED (IN LEBANON).

- THERE SHALL BE DIRECT TELEPHONIC LINKS BETWEEN THE
OFFICES. MEETINGS OF THE LIAISON OFFICES WILL BE HELD
AT LEAST ONCE A MONTH, OR AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER
PARTY AND WILL ALTERNATE BETWEEN THE LIAISON OFFICES.
THE FIRST MEETING WILL BE HELD AT THE ISRAELI LIAISON
OFFICE, NO LATER THAN TWO WEEKS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION
OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES.

F. VIOLATIONS OF ANY OF THE ABOVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
WILL BE RECTIFIED IMMEDIATELY. (IN THE EVENT OF AN
ALLEGED VIOLATION, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONSULT WITH
THE PARTIES, AS APPROPRIATE, TO DETERMINE COMPLIANCE WITH
THIS AGREEMENT.)

FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RELATIONS

3. THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON
WILL BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE TWO OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE WHICH
NEGOTIATED THIS AGREEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MEET IN A
SPECIAL COMMITTEE (HEREAFTER "THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE")
AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES, IN ORDER TO
SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND TO
MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
THE UNITED STATES WILL BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

B. PEOPLE AND GOODS WILL MOVE ACROSS THE BORDER BETWEEN
THE TWO COUNTRIES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE
REGULATIONS AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION. ACCESS ACROSS
THE BORDER SHALL ONLY BE PERMITTED THROUGH ENTRY POINTS
DESIGNATED BY EACH COUNTRY. (IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT UNTSO
WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN
ITS CURRENT AREA OF OPERATIONS.)

C. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE,
ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A STAFF IN
THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER. THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE WILL
MEET IN THE BEIRUT AREA, OR SUCH OTHER LOCATIONS AS IT
MAY DECIDE. OFFICIALS OF ONE COUNTRY AUTHORIZED TO ENTER
THE OTHER WILL BE EXTENDED IMMUNITY FROM LOCAL LAWS FOR
OFFICIAL ACTS.

D. ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY INTERFERENCE
IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER. BEARING IN MIND
THE FREE PRESS IN EACH COUNTRY, ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL
REFRAIN FROM PROMOTING HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE

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TALKING POINTS ON LEBANON

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-- President Reagan is impatient over the slow pace of negotiations to remove all foreign forces from Lebanon. To inject a greater sense of urgency into the talks and to stress his personal commitment, President Reagan asked Phil Habib to return to the area to expedite the process.

-- The procedural issues in the talks between Israel and Lebanon have been resolved. Talks on substantive questions are now underway, but differences are wide and the negotiations will be very tough.

-- The key issues are Israeli withdrawal, security arrangements to protect northern Israel, and a framework for the evolution of relations between Lebanon and Israel. Each is complex and difficult.

-- Perhaps the most troublesome issue is the nature of the relationship between Lebanon and Israel. Israel is pressing hard for normalization of relations with Lebanon, but Lebanon is deeply concerned about the effect on its internal consensus and relations with the Arabs. Our view is that Lebanon will have to be the judge of how far it is capable of going in the area of normalization.

-- The Lebanese have also begun discussions with Syria and the PLO on the withdrawal of their forces.

-- Our effort is to create a process whereby U.S. diplomacy could combine the results of these concurrent negotiations to produce an agreed context for the departure of Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces.

-- We have also worked to maintain UNIFIL and are considering an expanded Multinational Force (MNF) as ways to provide confidence in the security arrangements following withdrawal.

-- However, it is too early in the negotiations to reach any decisions on the participation of U.S. forces in an expanded MNF. In the interim, we have embarked on a major assistance program to the Lebanese army.

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TALKING POINTS ON LEBANON

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It has been agreed by the parties to the conference--in the light of their interrelationship--to address concurrently the following agenda items:

- Termination of the state of war.
- Security arrangements.
- Framework for mutual relations, including such issues as: liaison; ending of hostile propaganda; the movement of goods, products and persons; communications, etc.
- Program of complete withdrawals; conditions for Israeli withdrawal, within the context of the evacuation of all foreign forces.
- Possible guarantees.

Note: The agenda has incorporated the subjects proposed by the delegations of Israel and Lebanon. All agree to address all the items open mindedly, without prejudice or commitment as to the final outcome of the negotiations. Each delegation may of course raise subjects additional to those on the agenda.

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Text as agreed by GOL 1/

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EVENING READING ITEM

Habib Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin
 and the Lebanon Negotiations

We will not know conclusively until we have Israel's reaction in hand tomorrow, but Phil Habib's meeting with Begin today appears to have gone relatively well, at least insofar as Begin appeared to warm to the concept Phil put forward. Sam Lewis found Begin's reaction to your letter remarkably mature given the rampant press speculation in advance about a postponement of his visit. The Prime Minister clearly resented the press stories but understands that his visit will take place only after a Lebanese agreement has been achieved. Agreement today on the agenda for the Khaldah/Kiryat Shemona talks is encouraging. Nevertheless, the three weeks taken to achieve what we hoped would take a day only reinforces my view that we have been correct in pressing ahead with our parallel effort. We should know by tomorrow morning how strong Sharon's opposition is. If Begin can respond positively, Phil will go immediately to Beirut to present the concept to Gemayal.

Drafted:NEA/IAI:MSPendleton/gp *MS*
 1/13/83 x23672 Wang # 3354B

Cleared:NEA:NAVeliotos
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EVENING READING ITEM

Prime Minister Begin Agrees to Proposals on Lebanon Negotiations

After consulting with his Cabinet colleagues, Prime Minister Begin informed Phil Habib today of Israel's agreement on proceeding with the concept Phil put forward January 13. Begin stated that Israel wants the direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations to proceed at the same time that discussions with Phil are taking place. Habib has now gone to Beirut to present Gemayel with the concept and to gain his approval for our approach. Phil will then return to Israel for intensive negotiations beginning Sunday with Begin's team, which includes among its members Defense Minister Sharon and Foreign Minister Shamir. Phil hopes to have a draft agreement worked out for Begin's review by next Friday.

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 Drafted:NEA/IAI:EAbington
 1/14/83 x23672 Wang #3371B

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**Schedule for Departure
of All External Forces from Lebanon**

D-20

Discussion begins between GOL and local militia in southern Lebanon regarding their integration into LAF and/or disbanding. Identify MNF units to be deployed to Lebanon.

D-5

POWs, soldiers missing-in-action and the bodies of fallen soldiers will be exchanged through the ICRC prior to implementation of the plan. Custody of prisoners in Lebanon not having a place to return will be turned over to the government (GOL) under the auspices of the ICRC.

D-4

Expanded MNF elements begin assembly in Beirut in preparation for movement to take positions on Beirut-Damascus highway.

LAF prepares for movement into Tripoli area, along Beirut-Damascus highway, and into southern Lebanon.

D-3

LAF and MNF liaison team moves to Sofar.

D-2

Integration of local militias in southern Lebanon into LAF proceeds.

D-1

All Palestinian forces in Lebanon assemble in designated areas for departure by prearranged routes.

Other external forces (not party to any arrangements) depart Lebanon.

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D-Day

Palestinian forces in the north begin departure by prearranged routes, with LAF already in the area taking over positions vacated by Palestinian forces.

Palestinian forces and all equipment begin departure from Bekaa Valley, with LAF already in the area taking over positions vacated by Palestinian forces.

D+1 to D+3

Syrian forces disengage from the Sofar area, through the Baydar Pass, and off of the Sannin ridgeline to an area east of Shtawrah. All Syrian forces in the southern Bekaa Valley move to a line immediately south of the Beirut-Damascus highway.*

Israeli forces disengage from the Beirut-Damascus highway to a line south of the Zahrani River running south of Jazzin to Rashayya in the southern Bekaa Valley. Israel will retain control of the coastal highway to a point immediately south of Sidon.**

Palestinian forces in northern Lebanon and in Bekaa Valley complete their departure.

LAF and MNF begin deployment into disengagement zone.

LAF unit deploys to provide security for refugee camps in Sidon area.

D+4

LAF and MNF complete deployment into disengagement zone.

LAF and international force units deploy to the Sidon area to provide security for Palestinian refugee camps.

* References to Syrian withdrawal will not necessarily appear in Israeli document.

** References to Israeli withdrawal will not necessarily appear in Syrian document.

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D+5 to D+25

All external forces depart Lebanon with their equipment.

UNIFIL assembles and deploys to predetermined areas.

LAF with MNF contingent begins deployment to north and links up with existing garrisons.

LAF begins deployment into southern Lebanon; existing garrisons there and in southern Bekaa establish presence on roads.

LAF with MNF support assumes security for Palestinian refugee camp areas in northern Lebanon.

LAF with MNF support unit deploys to assume security for Palestinian refugee camps in Bekaa Valley.

D+25 to D+29

Final departure of all external forces proceeds.

MNF prepares to deploy from disengagement zone to central Bekaa Valley and to eastern border.

LAF prepares to deploy throughout southern Lebanon and takes over control of all Palestinian camps in the south.

One MNF unit deploys to northern Lebanon in the Tripoli area to supplement LAF security for the Palestinian refugee camps.

D+30

No external forces remain in Lebanon.

MNF fully deploys along Beirut-Damascus highway and in central Bekaa.

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ALAN KUMARS 6/22/86
WOLAN 6/22/86
RICH TAYLOR 6/22/86

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PRESS BRIEFING
 BY
 AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB

January 10, 1983

The Briefing Room

2:38 P.M. EST

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Hi, how are you all today?

Q You got news?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Well, I don't know what you call news, Jim, but let me just -- why don't I say something briefly. As you all know, I just met with the President, Secretary and the other members who were in the meeting, and I'm leaving this afternoon. I'll leave this afternoon to return to the Middle East.

The President has asked me to return, as we continue our efforts aimed at restoring peace and stability to that troubled area.

Q What about the fact that Lebanon today --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Wait, let me finish, sweetheart.

The President emphasized the importance he attaches to achieving the prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. It is a disappointment to all of us that more headway has not been made. The President believes, and I will be stressing with the parties involved, that the withdrawal of external forces from Lebanon is essential and remains a top priority as we move ahead on the broader front to achieve a workable peace in the area.

Progress in Lebanon can add momentum as we continue our efforts for a just and lasting peace along the lines put forth by the President on September 1st. There's an urgent need to put the problems of Lebanon behind us so that other concerns can be vigorously addressed. And we will be seeking the full cooperation of all the other parties involved.

Jim?

Q Does that mean that the United States puts a low priority on the establishment or approach of normalization of relations between Lebanon and Israel and the emphasis on withdrawal first of all?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Not by any means. I think what it means is the United States believes that the various problems that have to be discussed and have to be treated in the current situation in Lebanon can be done on an urgent basis and should be done and must be done on an urgent basis so that the withdrawal of all the external forces can proceed. That means Syrian forces, PLO combattants and Israeli forces in Lebanon.

Q Mr. Ambassador --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: That's the emphasis. The emphasis is on the necessity to achieve early withdrawal.

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Q Mr. Ambassador, where are you going first --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I'm going to Israel first.

Q Would you be sitting on the next meeting?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: No, I will not. I'll be going to Israel and see what I can do about impressing upon and soliciting the cooperation of all with this sense of urgency that the President brings to the situation.

Q Do we understand from this that you see more problems from the Israeli side?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: No, I wouldn't draw any such conclusions.

Q Mr. Ambassador, can you --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I will be going to both places. It's just a question of how I choose to -- in what order I choose to go.

Q Can't we draw from this that the President at least feels that Israel's insistence upon the broader agenda is slowing things down?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: What I'm saying is very simple -- is that the problems that are involved in the agenda or in the issues that have to be discussed in order to produce the result need to be dealt with on an urgent basis and they can be dealt with on an urgent basis. What the President's -- if you want to talk about -- I wouldn't use the word, "dissatisfaction" -- the word I use is that we all believe that more headway could have been made. It's just taking too long.

Q Who's fault is it?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Well, I -- we don't want to lay any blame. Let's just simply say that the United States believes that the matter can be dealt with with the greatest sense of urgency, and that's one of the things I'm going to attempt to do, is to move the process along at an accelerated pace.

Q How long do you think it might take to --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Oh, I don't want to judge that yet. When I come back, I might be able to have a better answer to that.

Q Mr. Ambassador, there've been reports that there is some dissatisfaction on the part of either the President or members of the administration with certain members of -- Mr. Veliotis, Mr. Draper --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: You know, I don't get that impression whatsoever. I think the President has demonstrated to me a degree of confidence in the people who are working with this problem. I know I have a great deal of confidence in the two people that you mentioned.

Q When are our soldiers coming home, Mr. Ambassador?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: That's not a decision that I have anything to say about at this time. The President will make the decision at the right time. I -- that didn't come up, very frankly, in our discussions today. In our discussions today, what we concentrated on was the means of accelerating the pace of negotiations so that the withdrawal can take place.

Q You don't have any leverage at all to use with the Israelis?

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AMBASSADOR HABIB: Let's call it persuasion and common sense and good arguments and good rationalization and a common objective, I hope with all the parties concerned.

Q Is there a need to expand the multinational force --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Right at this point, not at this point, no.

MR. ALLIN: The Ambassador's leaving shortly. That's going to be it.

AMBASSADOR HABIB: As a matter of fact, I haven't got that much time --

Q Where else are you going other than Israel?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I'll be going to Lebanon also. And I'll go anywhere else that I think will serve the purpose of accelerating the pace --

Q -- a letter from the President to Mr. Begin?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: You know, we don't talk about that before I get there.

Q How long --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Pardon?

Q How long do you anticipate this --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Oh, I haven't got any idea -- as long as it takes. Whatever I decide in terms of time is usual. But we'll see. You'll know.

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Q What of the optimistic reports earlier today and then a dampening of those?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Yes. I think what happened is out of the morning meeting -- Now, I do not have a full report as yet as to what went on in that morning meeting -- but, out of the morning meeting there have been sort of conflicting reports. I will wait until I get the Refort1 cable before I can really properly answer the question. But there were some conflicting reports from Khalde itself. I don't want to misinterpret them and I don't want to mislead you until I get the full report myself, so --

Q Do you have a feeling for it at all?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: There was some discussion of alternatives of how to deal with the problems they've been dealing with, but I would just as soon wait until we get the full report.

MR. ALLIN: Thank you.

Q Could you clarify your earlier --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I'm off.

Q Bon voyage.

Q Can you clarify an earlier answer? The meeting you said you weren't going to be attending, you --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I don't intend to -- What I said is I don't intend to attend the plenary sessions that are going on alternately -- That was the question, if I recall. That is the --

Q Could you tell us what the President meant when he called Maggie Thatcher the "best man in England"?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: He was quoting somebody, as I -- But you'd better get that from Mort. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

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Departure of External Forces and Security Arrangements

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1. Basic Concept. All unauthorized external forces will withdraw from Lebanon in accordance with the attached schedule of departure. This is consistent with the objective of the Government of Lebanon that all external military forces withdraw from Lebanon.

2. Cease-fire. A cease-fire in place will be scrupulously observed by all in Lebanon prior to and during the withdrawal of forces.

3. Liaison and Coordination. The Lebanese Armed Forces will be the primary point of contact for all external forces and will provide necessary information concerning the withdrawal. The Lebanese Armed Forces will keep all concerned currently informed regarding the implementation of the plan, including any revisions to the departure schedule as may be necessary because of logistical requirements.

4. Security Arrangements for Lebanon and Israel. A state of war does not exist between Lebanon and Israel. Belligerency has been terminated, and a state of non-belligerency exists. To preclude any hostile acts between them, Israel and Lebanon shall implement the following security arrangements.

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a. General Security Commitments. Israel and Lebanon agree to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other, whether by land, sea or air, including by non-regular forces.

Israel and Lebanon agree that no hostile act shall be conducted from the territory of one against the other. Each shall prohibit the unauthorized entry from its territory into the territory of the other of armed individuals or military equipment. Neither will assist, or acquiesce in, any armed activities within its territory directed against the other.

Neither will permit the stationing of foreign forces on its territory which are hostile to the other. In the event that there is a disagreement between Israel and Lebanon as to whether a particular force is "hostile", the judgement of the United States shall be accepted by Israel and Lebanon.

Israel and Lebanon shall refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the other. Taking into account the free press in both countries, each government will refrain from officially-inspired hostile propaganda against the other.

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Israeli naval patrols shall be conducted outside the territorial waters of Lebanon, and shall not interfere with freedom of navigation. High altitude reconnaissance flights over Lebanon shall not be considered by Lebanon to constitute a material breach of this plan.

b. Security Zone. A security zone shall be created in the area indicated in the attached map [approximately a 40 km. line from the Israeli border]. No rockets or surface-to-air or surface-to-surface missiles shall be permitted in this zone, and no new fortifications shall be established in it. No artillery or heavy mortars other than those in the possession of the Lebanese Army, the MNF or UNIFIL, shall be permitted in the zone.

The Government of Lebanon shall exercise its sovereignty fully throughout the security zone. Local militia currently operating in the zone shall be incorporated into authorized official Lebanese organizations, or disbanded. It is understood that the forces currently under the command of Major Haddad will be given the opportunity to be re-integrated in the LAF, or to join an about-to-be-created Border Police force.

c. Movement of People and Goods. People and goods shall move across the Israel/Lebanon border in accordance with the national legislation of each country. Practical measures in this regard will be the subject of continuing consultations.

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d. Framework of Future Relations. Security is best promoted through normal relations. This agreement constitutes a step toward that goal. Appropriate representatives of Israel and Lebanon shall meet at least once a month following Israeli withdrawal to discuss and carry out ways to facilitate the achievement of normal, peaceful relations. Offices with staffs not to exceed people in number will be established in Lebanon and Israel to support such meetings and consultations, whose members will enjoy necessary immunities from local law.

e. Verification of the Security Zone. The Government of Lebanon shall be responsible for the implementation of arrangements in the security zone. The following arrangements will assist in this regard:

[i] It is understood that UNTSO will continue its responsibilities within its current area of operations.

[ii] The Government of Lebanon will request the United Nations Security Council to authorize UNIFIL to assist the LAF in preventing the infiltration of unauthorized armed elements, concentrating primarily in the northernmost ten kilometers of the security zone, but not to exclude their deployment throughout the zone.

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[iii] In addition to the offices described above, Israeli and Lebanese military liaison offices will be established, in order to coordinate matters related to the withdrawal of Israeli forces and to the implementation of the security arrangements. The Lebanese office shall be established at [in Lebanon]; the Israeli office shall be established at [in Israel]. There shall be direct telephonic links between the offices. Meetings of the liaison offices shall be held at least once a month, or at the request of either party, and shall alternate between the liaison offices. The first meeting shall be held at _____ on _____.

[If needed: [iv] The Government of Lebanon shall request the United States to conduct regular, periodic aerial surveillance at least once a week to verify compliance with the security arrangements and to provide its findings to the military liaison offices.]

[v] Violations shall be rectified immediately.

5. Arrangements between the PLO and Lebanon. Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants in Lebanon, including the families of those who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. This supercedes the understandings in the Cairo and Melkart Accords which granted certain extra-territorial

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rights to the PLO. The Government of Lebanon will ensure the physical safety of Palestinians in Lebanon. [Optional: The Government of Lebanon will request that the MNF and UNIFIL by their presence continue to assist the LAF in providing for the security of Palestinian population concentrations.]

6. Arrangements between Lebanon and Syria. The arrangements concerning the withdrawal of Syrian forces have been made at the request of the Government of Lebanon and in light of the arrangements concerning the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

7. MNF. A temporary Multinational Force will assist the Government of Lebanon in the restoration of its sovereignty and authority by serving as an interposition force on key terrain and on certain communication routes during the disengagement of foreign forces and thereafter by undertaking other duties as agreed between the GOL and the contributors to the MNF.

8. U.S. Role. The United States will promote the fulfillment of the undertakings included in this plan. In the event of a violation, the United States will consult with the parties concerned, as appropriate, with respect thereto, and will take such action as it may deem helpful and appropriate to obtain compliance with this plan.

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EVENING READING ITEM

When Israeli Ambassador Arens came in to see me today about Lebanon, I stressed the continued sense of urgency about the talks felt at the very highest levels of the USG. I told him that despite what we are hearing from some in Israel, we have every intention of being active participants in the neogitations and withdrawal process. Arens assured me that Israel shares the US sense of urgency and understands our perception of the US role. However, he argued that the normalization aspects of the negotiations are an integral part of what is needed to secure the withdrawal of foreign forces. He hoped we would stand with Israel on this and make our position known to the Lebanese. I told him that while I understood his point and while we are making a special point of communicating our views clearly to the Lebanese, the essential thing is to see foreign forces out of Lebanon as soon as possible

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Lebanon

January 1983

Background: The Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967 brought thousands of embittered Palestinian refugees into Lebanon, severely straining that country's resources. In 1970-71, these refugees were joined by large numbers of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters who had been expelled from Jordan. This influx exacerbated age-old rivalries among Lebanon's religious and ethnic communities. Lebanon became an armed camp, and civil war broke out in 1975 among PLO, Christian, and Muslim forces. The Lebanese Government invited Syrian troops to enter the country in 1976 to help restore order; they remained under an Arab League mandate. However, PLO fighters continued to harass northern Israel and Israeli defense forces retaliated periodically against positions in Lebanon. A resurgence of fighting between Syrian and Christian forces and the Israeli downing of a Syrian helicopter over Lebanon in April 1981 led to the deployment of Syrian surface-to-air missiles in the Bekaa Valley. In May, President Reagan sent Ambassador Philip Habib to negotiate a resolution of the missile crisis and, when PLO-Israeli fighting erupted shortly thereafter, the President asked Ambassador Habib to remain to negotiate a cessation of hostilities across the Lebanon-Israel border. Through sustained US effort, the cease-fire lasted until June 1982 when Israel invaded southern Lebanon to eliminate the PLO threat. The Israelis quickly advanced north toward Beirut and Ambassador Habib again was called upon to negotiate an end to the fighting and to the siege of Beirut by Israeli forces. On August 20, 1982, Ambassador Habib's plan for the evacuation of PLO and Syrian forces from West Beirut was announced. The evacuation was completed without incident by September 1. A multinational force of US, French, and Italian troops was deployed to assist the Lebanese during the evacuation. In October, following the assassination of the newly elected Lebanese president and the massacre of Palestinian civilians in their Beirut refugee camps, President Reagan again sent American troops to join a multinational force to help as the new Lebanese Government began efforts to restore its authority throughout the country.

US objectives in Lebanon: The US has a moral, diplomatic, and strategic interest in restoring peace to Lebanon. Our objective is to restore Lebanese sovereignty and assure Israeli security. The threat to Israel does not come from the Lebanese people, but from external forces that have usurped Lebanese sovereignty and are still camped on Lebanese soil. Once free of all external forces and sovereign over all its territory, Lebanon can again make a major contribution to regional stability. To achieve this goal, we support the following objectives:

- The speedy withdrawal of all external forces;
- A sovereign Lebanon under a strong central authority able to exercise control throughout its territory; and
- Reconstruction of the Lebanese economy and reestablishment of a national consensus.

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Withdrawal of external forces: US diplomatic efforts are concentrated now on the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces from Lebanon. Three sets of negotiations are involved--between Lebanon and Israel, between Lebanon and Syria, and between Lebanon and the PLO. The US is participating directly in the first set of talks, which are negotiating full Israeli troop withdrawals, security arrangements, and a framework for future relations. The Lebanese Government must have full control over all of its territory and be able to assume that Lebanese soil never again will be used to launch assaults on Israel.

Negotiations between Lebanon and Syria are intended to achieve Syrian troop withdrawal. The Syrians have said they will not withdraw unless Israeli forces are also withdrawn. These talks will be conducted directly between the two governments; the US will assist only if requested to do so.

The US will not be involved directly in the Lebanese-PLO negotiations, as it is US policy to recognize or negotiate with the PLO only when it recognizes Israel's right to exist and accepts UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. These negotiations also are aimed at securing withdrawal of all remaining PLO forces.

Restoring Lebanese sovereignty and authority: Troop withdrawals must be accompanied by restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and strengthening of the armed forces. The US has offered to help provide equipment and training for four brigades by February 1983, and for seven brigades later on. The multinational force deployed in Beirut complements the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) whose mandate was extended by the UN until July 1983. As the effectiveness of the Lebanese forces increases, the necessity for any expanded multinational force will decrease.

Economic reconstruction and national reconciliation: Lebanon's economy has been shattered. A period of political tranquility is necessary for progress in rebuilding the roads, water system, and schools. The US Government is cooperating with Lebanon and the international community, and, since mid-1982, we have made available \$82 million in emergency relief and rehabilitation funds. We plan to authorize another \$30 million to guarantee housing and services for the poorest communities, and are seeking additional reconstruction funds from Congress. Further aid will come from Arab and Western donors, including the World Bank.

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ISRAEL-LEBANON TALKS OPEN

Talks between Israel and Lebanon began today with a six-hour session in a suburb of Beirut. Ambassador Morris Draper, head of the U.S. delegation, reports the discussion was friendly and both sides appear disposed to compromise.

Despite ad referendum agreement between the delegations on an agenda for the talks, this question was not resolved and was deferred until the next session, scheduled for Thursday in Israel. The basic problem was how to reconcile the Lebanese desire to show Israeli withdrawal as the highest priority, avoiding obvious mention of "normalization of relations", with the Israeli stress on normalization. Defense Minister Sharon was particularly adamant on including normalization as an agenda item; he also objected to any mention of a U.S. role. The agenda question will be the first order of business at the next session. The Israelis also stated that at some point they may raise the "Working Paper" developed in secret talks with the Lebanese.

There was agreement in principle to accelerate the meeting schedules, but this has yet to be worked out. Despite an agreement to issue agreed press remarks only along very general lines, there are already leaks from the conference site.

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Lebanon Negotiations

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-- Talks between Lebanon and Israel have now formally begun, so for the near future much of our efforts will be concentrated in Lebanon and Israel to achieve rapid progress in these critical negotiations.

-- Ambassador Morris Draper, who heads the U.S. delegation to the talks, reports that the mood in the first day was friendly and constructive; both sides are disposed to work for reasonable compromises.

-- The discussion, which lasted nearly seven hours, concentrated on the agenda for the talks and their pace. The Israelis alluded to earlier secret talks with Lebanese representatives and their suggested agenda reflected these discussions, but they did not press the point at this time.

-- Israel's suggested agenda stressed "normalization of relations" with Lebanon. Lebanon proposed a much more limited agenda, focussed on arrangements for the departure of Israeli forces. Ad referendum agreement was reached on an agenda which treats all topics as equal in importance, but the Israeli leadership balked at the lack of mention of normalization and at the mention of a U.S. role.

-- The agenda will be the priority item for discussion at the next session in Israel on Thursday. Israel can be expected to press hard throughout the talks to include a focus on steps toward normalization of relations.

-- The U.S. believes there is room for compromise. We will support as full a discussion of relations between Lebanon and Israel as Lebanon feels it can bear. As a practical matter, however, it will be necessary in the talks to deal with the sensitive questions of steps toward normalization of the bilateral relationship, which are the key political considerations for Israel.

-- We are also pressing for a more rapid pace in the talks. The physical arrangements at the conference site in Lebanon are rather spartan, limiting the ability to support the

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Israeli delegation overnight, which we would prefer in order to force a quick pace in the talks. Ambassador Draper will be attempting to move the process along more quickly, both in Israel and in Lebanon.

-- Meanwhile, Lebanon has initiated a more active dialogue with Syria and the PLO. A high level Lebanese emissary has now met with President Assad in Damascus and with the PLO leadership in Tunis.

-- The results of these talks are ambiguous, but the important point is that channels of communication have been established to enable the discussions to proceed in earnest in tandem with the Lebanon-Israel talks.

-- (SENATOR PERCY CO-SIGNED A LETTER WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SFRC ASKING THE PRESIDENT TO CONSULT WITH CONGRESS ON AN EXPANDED MNF AND TO CONSIDER AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION.) Although the Lebanese government has requested an expansion of the MNF and the U.S. contingent, we have responded that it is not possible or necessary to make a decision in this matter in the absence of progress in the negotiations for the departure of all external forces from Lebanon.

-- While it is too early to foresee the final outcome of these complex negotiations, the Lebanese Armed Forces will surely be called upon to assume a much heavier burden in providing security in the wake of a withdrawal of external forces. To bolster the confidence of the parties in these arrangements, it may be necessary to consider the participation of international forces, in addition to the UNIFIL troops already in Lebanon, in keeping the peace in Lebanon.

-- As the discussions between Lebanon and Israel proceed, we look forward to continued consultations with you regarding the use of U.S. forces in Lebanon. Since the Lebanon negotiations are still at any early stage, a decision on the nature of any U.S. participation in any future security arrangements in Lebanon cannot be made until the arrangements themselves are more clear. It is conceivable that a U.S. decision on this subject may be required very rapidly depending on the Lebanon-Israel negotiations. We will, of course, consult with the Congress on an urgent basis in that event.

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 Meetings with Lebanese Foreign Minister Salim

Elie Salim, Foreign Minister of Lebanon, met today with Acting Secretary Dam. He also had sessions with Cap Weinberger and the SFRC.

Salim pressed hard for details on our proposals for the departure of all external forces from Lebanon. Since it is essential that we discuss our approach first with Begin and immediately afterwards with Gemayel, we described our ideas to Salim only in very general terms. He will return to Beirut on Friday to join Gemayel for the discussions with Habib and Draper, when our full proposal will be presented.

In all his conversations, Salim has stressed the profound importance of the U.S. relationship with Lebanon, arguing that only with U.S. help can Lebanon and Israel arrive at a tolerable and durable compromise. He also mentioned the growing violence in Lebanon to stress the urgent need for progress in the talks--external forces must leave very soon for the government to retain any authority or credibility. Salim publicly asked for agreement in principle for an increase in the number of U.S. troops in the MNF, but did not press the matter in private.

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TO: The Acting Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotos
PA - John Hughes
SUBJECT: ABC Television Special Report

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U.S. Assurances in Lebanon
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AS/EPC/CDR 9200109 Date: 6/26/96

ISSUE FOR DECISION:

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Whether John Hughes should do an on-camera interview for the ABC Special Report. The report is to be aired on January 7.

BACKGROUND

You will recall that some weeks ago we brought to your attention a request from ABC television to do an on-the-record interview with a senior U.S. official on the nature of the U.S. assurances given in Lebanon to the PLO in the context of the Habib negotiations, and on the relationship between those assurances and the subsequent refugee camp massacres and Israeli entry into West Beirut. As you know, Nick spoke on deep background with Bill Sherman of ABC on this subject. We denied an ABC request for an on-camera interview. We have since learned that the ABC show will contain much that could be damaging to the U.S. position with regard to the assurances given on our behalf to the PLO concerning the safety of civilians.

Regarding your interest in what ABC will use which would be damaging to the U.S., Steve Singer, the producer of the program for ABC, informs us it will contain interviews with -- among others -- Yassir Arafat, the French and Italian Ambassadors in Beirut, Lebanese Prime Minister Wazzan, and Muslim leader Sa'ab Salaam. He believes the overall impact of these interviews will be to strongly suggest that the U.S. did not adequately discharge its commitments under the "Habib plan" to protect the safety of Palestinian civilians.

Asked if we could obtain questions in advance, Singer said the following "define the general parameters" of the queries he expects would be addressed to our on-camera spokesman:

- What was the nature of the American guarantees of safety under the Habib plan and were they intended to apply only to the safety of PLO personnel or to that of Palestinian civilians in general?
- Why did the U.S. force leave on the 10th of September, when its mandate ran for 30 days?

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- Did the Government of Lebanon ask us to remain longer than we did?
- Why was the role of the American troops in Beirut more circumscribed than those of the French and Italians?

John's responses to these questions would be, essentially, along the following lines:

-- Nature of American guarantees of safety: The United States conveyed to the Government of Lebanon the assurance we had received from the Government of Israel that it would not interfere with implementation of the Plan, including its provision with respect to persons left behind in Beirut. We also stated that we would do our utmost to ensure that those assurances would be scrupulously observed. The U.S. also conveyed to the Government of Lebanon assurances regarding the safety of Palestinians and other inhabitants of West Beirut received from the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which the U.S. had been in touch.

-- Extent of guarantees to Palestinian civilians: The guarantees extended to the safety of "law-abiding Palestinian non-combatants left behind in Beirut" as well as to the "safe, secure, and timely departure of the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants".

-- Sept. 10 departure of U.S. force: The U.S. force left Beirut when it did because the PLO forces had withdrawn, the Lebanese Army and Police were successfully asserting their authority, and a new Lebanese President had been elected. In general, the situation in the area was quiet at that time and did not appear to threaten the safety of civilians or otherwise warrant the continued presence of American troops.

-- Request from GOL that U.S. force remain longer: We did not receive such a request. (FYI: The Government of Lebanon indicated its preference we stay, but never made a request to that effect.)

-- "Circumscribed" role of U.S. force: It was agreed among the 3 MNF contributors and the Government of Lebanon where the forces of each could best be deployed to assure a safe and orderly departure of PLO personnel and the safety of the remaining non-combatants. The PLO departed from the port; U.S. MNF forces were deployed in the port area.

In addition to the above, John would be prepared to answer the following question as indicated:

Q. Beyond conveying guarantees, what did the U.S. do to protect the safety of Palestinian civilians, especially when we learned there was trouble in the refugee camps?

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- A. -- After the conveyance of these guarantees, as before, we were in frequent contact with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon concerning the issue of civilian safety, including that of the Palestinians. In this connection, we carefully monitored reports of possible threats to civilians.
- With the serious turn of events in Beirut on Sept. 14 -- President-elect Bashir Gemayel's assassination and the first Israeli troop movements into the city -- our Embassy undertook extraordinary measures to do everything possible to prevent any worsening of the situation. The Embassy's activities were, of course, severely constrained by renewed fighting.
- On Sept. 17, we began to receive fragmentary and conflicting indications from several quarters that something was wrong in certain Palestinian refugee camps in the Beirut area. We got in touch with Israeli authorities and Lebanese leaders who we believed might have some influence over the situation. Among other steps, one Embassy officer went to the camps to check personally on the situation there, but he was not able to get close enough to observe any unusual activity.
- The next morning -- on Sept. 18 -- an Embassy officer was finally able to enter the Shatila camp unimpeded and saw the evidence of the massacre. This was the first eyewitness confirmation by an Embassy official. This was followed by extraordinary efforts by U.S. officials to calm the situation and to ensure no repetition of or revenge for this terrible event.

Phil Habib now recommends that a senior Department official do an on-camera interview to set the record straight. Sam Lewis does not believe Israel would view our participation on-the-record as interference in its domestic affairs, despite the fact that the program would air before the conclusion of the Israeli judicial inquiry into the massacre. He concurs in Phil's recommendation that we make an on-camera statement. Bob Dillon also recommends that we go on-the-record.

John has agreed to go before ABC's cameras once he has personally reviewed the record to assure he is totally familiar with it and comfortable with the above scenario. He has gone to Florida and will not be back until January 2. He would therefore be unable to do the interview until that week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That John be authorized to appear on camera to set the

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8. Q: Recently, the primary effort has been directed toward arranging a format for Israeli-Lebanese discussions. Even if Israeli-Lebanese differences on format are resolved, how are Syrian and Palestinian views going to be brought into the discussions?

A: -- The government of Lebanon has initiated a dialogue with Syria and with the PLO aimed at withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon. We would expect these talks to proceed along with the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.

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Q.: The Israelis are asking for reasonable security arrangements for their northern border. What will these arrangements entail? How long might it take to work them out?

A.: The Israeli Government has spoken publicly of certain requirements which it believes necessary to ensure the security of Israel's northern border. Among these requirements are:

-- Lebanese agreement to prevent acts of hostility from its territory;

-- withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon;

-- a security zone in southern Lebanon with limitations on types of arms permitted in the zone;

-- incorporation of militias in southern Lebanon into the Lebanese army;

-- continuing Lebanese-Israeli contacts on security.

At this point, we cannot predict whether the Lebanese Government would accept the Israeli proposals or how long it would take to implement security arrangements. This has to be determined through negotiations.

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TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis

SUBJECT: Your Meeting and Luncheon with Foreign Minister Elie Salim of Lebanon, 11:00 a.m., Tuesday, December 14

I. YOUR OBJECTIVES

1. Convince Salim that U.S. commitment and involvement in the negotiations for the departure of all external forces from Lebanon will be enduring and forceful, at the President's personal direction.
2. Apprise Salim in general terms of the next steps we envision in the effort to break the deadlock in the talks. (Talking Points attached)
3. Press Salim on the necessity for Lebanon immediately to begin negotiations with Syria and the PLO on the withdrawal of their forces. (Talking Points attached)
4. Update Salim on our plans for U.S. assistance to Lebanon. (Talking Points attached)

II. SETTING

President Gemayel probably believes that Elie Salim's visit to the U.S. and meetings with you and the Secretary are necessary to maintain Lebanon's high priority on our agenda. Salim will want to hear fresh U.S. ideas to break the deadlock in the Lebanon-Israel talks, but the game plan for the presentation of our proposed course of action in the negotiations is for Phil Habib and Morris Draper to meet with

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the Israelis first. You must, therefore, be careful to properly reassure Salim of the U.S. interest and commitment while avoiding precise details of any new American ideas. (Draper a week ago in great confidence informed Gemayel and Salim that we would probably try out a "plan" similar to last summer's evacuation exercise. They were pleased.)

Another crucial part of the strategy is to move the Lebanese to open substantive talks with Syria and the PLO. It is absolutely imperative that all three negotiating tracks--Israeli, Syrian and PLO--be exploited to the maximum for us to gain full diplomatic advantage from our new ideas. Draper will reinforce this point with Gemayel on Wednesday, before he and Habib meet with Begin.

The euphoric mood in Lebanon after President Gemayel's visit to the U.S. in October has changed to one of worry and concern. In a recent letter to President Reagan, Gemayel asked for the President's "personal intervention....to avoid a crisis that will impair the U.S. investment in peace..." Morris Draper's final round of conversations with key Lebanese, including Salim and Prime Minister Wazzan, revealed a common theme of the need for rapid results in December - before the end of the year - through firm U.S. action.

At the bottom of the Lebanese concern is their feeling that Lebanon has been reasonable and accommodating in the negotiations so far without gaining similar understanding from Israel, which can only be persuaded by the U.S. While willing to compromise on a heavy political contest in the talks, with a civilian delegation head, Lebanon was not prepared to meet Israel's demand for a Jerusalem venue. Gemayel and Salim believe that on this issue Lebanon has reached the limits imposed by its national consensus and relations with the Arabs. Lebanon now expects the U.S. either to apply real pressure to get the Israelis to agree to a compromise on venue or to present new ideas.

Elie Salim will certainly raise this matter. There have also been hints that Lebanon will explore other alternatives--the United Nations or unspecified unilateral declarations--if the U.S. does not come through with useful proposals. We need to leave Salim with the impression that we intend to exhaust all possible means to get serious negotiations on substance started, leaving behind us the ticklish procedural obstacles.

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III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Acting Secretary Dam
NEA Assistant Secretary
Veliotes
PM Director Howe
AID Administrator
McPherson
NSC Howard Teicher
NEA/ARN, C. David Welch
(Notetaker)

LEBANON

Foreign Minister Dr. Elie
SALIM (SAH-LEM)
Ambassador Khalil Itani
Counselor Sleiman Younes
Executive Secretary
Itamar Diab (Notetaker)

IV. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

There will be a photo opportunity at the beginning of the session. There will also be an opportunity for Foreign Minister Salim briefly to address the press in the diplomatic entrance lobby.

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NEA--MDraper^{rw}

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V. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES

Apprise Salim in general terms of the next steps we envision in the effort to break the deadlock in the talks, including Phil Habib's and Morris Draper's return to the area.

The Lebanese expectation is that the return of Phil Habib and Morris Draper to the area must mean that the U.S. has decided upon new approaches to resolve the deadlock, perhaps through some sort of "American plan." Our preferred timing is, of course, to present the plan first to Prime Minister Begin on Thursday. Draper meets with President Gemayel on Wednesday, but he will not reveal precise details on our plan until a return visit. The best way to handle Salim may be to ask his views of the key political and security issues involved and then to turn the conversation toward what we need from Lebanon--an opening of talks with the Syrians and the PLO as soon as possible.

-- With the benefit of consultations with Ambassadors Habib and Draper, we now have a better understanding of Lebanon's positions on both the procedure and substance of the negotiations.

-- President Reagan fully understands and appreciates your willingness to enter into direct talks with Israel on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon.

-- While we regret that talks have not begun, we also understand Lebanon's reasons for hesitation on the venue of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the President is deeply committed to moving beyond these procedural problems to tackling the issues of substance in the negotiation. For this reason, he has instructed Ambassadors Habib and Draper to return to the area to explore all possible means to get the talks moving.

-- I can assure you that the President's objective has not changed. The U.S. is committed to seeking the earliest possible departure of all external forces from Lebanon. We will not be deterred from pushing ahead with this task.

-- We want to focus on the problems and the opportunities as we look for reasonable security arrangements to assure a neutral and strong Lebanon after the departure of all external forces. We may try out with Begin the concept of a U.S.-arranged "plan" in lieu of direct, face-to-face negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.

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It would be useful to hear your views of the key political and security issues involved, particularly those that pose special difficulty or interest for Lebanon.

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Press Salim on the necessity for Lebanon immediately to begin negotiations with Syria and the PLO on the withdrawal of their forces.

A key consideration in our scenario is to urge the Lebanese to begin a fuller and more substantive dialogue with the Syrians and the PLO. So far, Gemayel has been reluctant to go beyond keeping open his confidential and informal channels to the Syrians and the PLO and we doubt that his emissaries have had any in-depth talks. Gemayel does not want to pay a visit to Damascus, because of concern over his "Lebanese Forces" constituency, although the Syrians are pressing him. If he went to Damascus, the Israelis might insist again that negotiations be held at a more senior level. Another reason for reluctance in negotiations with Syria and the PLO is the absence of any meaningful exchange with Israel that could provide the grist for dealing with the Syrians and PLO. For our part, it is essential that full efforts be made to open all three tracks in the negotiation.

-- One key problem we see in the negotiations is the rapid establishment of a full dialogue between Lebanon and the Syrians and PLO.

-- I realize that your diplomatic strategy would be strengthened if negotiations with Israel were underway, but we believe that to ensure rapid progress the basic framework for the talks must be laid out now.

-- The framework we envision would be one that has visibility while protecting Lebanon's interests both diplomatically and politically. Since we are not direct partners in the talks with Syria and the PLO, our ability to bring influence to bear from other interested parties depends on the existence of a dialogue.

-- We want to move ahead in this respect quickly. It is important that Israel not be able to say that there has been no progress with the other parties.

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Update Salim on our plans for U.S. assistance to Lebanon.

The U.S. bilateral assistance program for Lebanon, during U.S. fiscal years 1983 and 1984, will primarily consist of both Foreign Military Sales (FMS) guaranteed credits and Economic Support Fund (ESF) grants. FMS will be used to equip additional battalions of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), as the LAF is expanded to extend central government control throughout Lebanon. ESF will be used to help the Government of Lebanon in its efforts to manage and facilitate economic recovery and reconstruction. The Administration is developing legislative strategy for a supplemental request to the Congress for funding of a special assistance package for Lebanon. Several members of Congress from the appropriations committees in the Senate and House will be at your luncheon, so it will be worthwhile briefly to cover these points with Salim.

-- We are working now to develop legislative strategy aimed at obtaining an appropriate funding level for Lebanon in the shortest time possible.

-- Delivery of military equipment will be paced according to the LAF's ability to absorb it, but we want it to be as fast as possible.

-- We are also encouraging others to provide military equipment, training, or economic assistance to Lebanon.

-- In addition to direct economic assistance to the GOL, the USG is encouraging private sector redevelopment of Lebanon. Examples of this are:

Reestablishment of commercial air service between Lebanon and the U.S.

Encouragement of the U.S Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the U.S. Department of Commerce to restore normal services to U.S. firms wishing to do business with Lebanon.

Establishment of the American-Lebanon Private Sector Cooperation, Inc., supported by the U.S. corporate community, which will provide managerial and technical expertise gratis to Lebanese firms. Another U.S. corporate group will encourage direct U.S. private investment in Lebanon.

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-- U.S. economic assistance will emphasize projects which are vital to the total reconstruction of Lebanon, and should act as seed money, which will attract larger funds from other donors and stimulate private investment.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR HABIB MISSION

In order to mesh with our tactical game plan, our public affairs approach in support of Phil Habib's return to the area should be considered in two phases. The first phase will encompass the week preceding Phil's meeting with Begin and the Cabinet's anticipated consideration of Phil's message on December 19. The themes we should be stressing during this period are relatively easy to describe. The second phase will begin when the Israelis have decided how they prefer to proceed and our public posture at that time will be largely conditioned by their decision.

Pre-December 19 Phase

During this phase, we will want to emphasize a renewed sense of urgency without addressing the substance of Phil's mission. The following themes would be appropriate:

-- After thorough consultations with President Reagan, Ambassadors Habib and Draper are returning to the Middle East at the President's direction to step up our efforts to bring about the early withdrawal of foreign forces.

-- The President's policy remains to promote a prompt resolution of the Lebanon situation in a manner which accomplishes the following objectives:

- 1) Security for Israel from threats emanating from Lebanese territory; at the same time,
- 2) A sovereign Lebanon under a strong central authority able to exercise control throughout its territory; therefore,
- 3) The speedy withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon.

-- The accomplishment of these objectives will enhance the prospects for broadening the negotiations for a broader peace in the region in keeping with the President's September 1 initiative.

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-- We are not discouraged by the seemingly slow pace of events. The issues are complex and important to the interests of all parties involved.

-- Nevertheless, the process is taking longer than expected. Accordingly, Ambassadors Habib and Draper are returning to the area with a fresh appreciation of the urgency with which the Lebanon situation is viewed by the President and his administration.

Post-December 19 Phase

The possible reactions of the Israeli government cover such a wide spectrum that it is premature at this point to try to map out a public affairs strategy beyond December 19. If Habib and Draper are successful in moving the process forward, our task is obviously much easier than otherwise. In either case we will want Phil's own recommendations for our most effective posture in light of his experience on the ground and his discussions with Sam Lewis. We can best set the stage for any second-phase strategy by stressing now the President's commitment to Israeli security, his sense of concern about the prevailing situation in Lebanon and his continued desire for the prompt withdrawal of all external forces.

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TESTIMONY BY DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE DECEMBER 1, 1982

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Mr. Chairman:

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It is an honor for me to appear before this committee today to discuss our efforts to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. As you know, these efforts involve a resolution of the conflict in Lebanon and the search for comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Our government is approaching these two problems on separate tracks but there is an obvious relationship between them. That relationship is symbolized by the President's appointment of Ambassador Philip Habib as his Special Representative with a new mandate involving both Lebanon and the broader peace process.

These endeavors are a matter of high national priority. In the absence of substantial progress toward peace in Lebanon and in the region as a whole, we can anticipate continued unrest in the Middle East threatening U.S. and Western interests and endangering the security of Israel.

The task is complicated, and our responsibility is great. Of all the powers external to the region, only the United States has the credibility to deal with the issues in a fair

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and equitable manner. Our reputation for dealing honestly and pragmatically with regional conflicts is an asset of great importance; we cannot afford to squander it.

Let me now turn to a more detailed discussion of the current status of our efforts first in Lebanon and then with regard to the Middle East peace process.

Lebanon

A critical test for American diplomacy is in Lebanon. Our objective is straightforward. We seek to restore Lebanese sovereignty and to ensure Israeli security. These are not separate objectives. A stable, sovereign Lebanon and a secure Israel are two sides of the same coin. The threat to Israel does not come from the Lebanese people, but from foreign forces that have usurped Lebanese sovereignty and are still camped on Lebanese soil. It follows that a peaceful Lebanon, free of all foreign forces and sovereign over all its territory, will make a major contribution to Israeli security. To achieve this objective, we and the responsible international community support a three-part strategy in Lebanon:

First: withdrawal forthwith of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

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Second: restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

And, third: reestablishment of a Lebanese national consensus and reconstruction of the Lebanese economy.

This strategy in support of the Lebanese Government is designed to achieve peace and security for both Lebanon and Israel. The withdrawal of all foreign forces will remove a threat to Israel's border. Restoring Lebanon's sovereignty and strength, and rebuilding its economy, will prevent that threat from returning. The United States is moving now to implement all three parts of this strategy.

America's diplomatic energy is focused on bringing about the immediate withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces -- Israeli, Syrian and PLO. To succeed, we must meet the legitimate interests of each of the parties through practical security arrangements. Three sets of negotiations will be involved: negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, between Lebanon and Syria, and between Lebanon and the PLO.

It is a fact that none of these talks has begun. The Israeli-Lebanese negotiations could provide a stimulus for the others, but they have been stalled by debate over the level and

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location of the talks. Last week President Gemayel proposed a compromise solution on the diplomatic level of these negotiations. The Israeli Cabinet recently adopted that solution, but it remained firm in its insistence that talks take place in Beirut and Jerusalem.

The current Israeli position is unacceptable to the Lebanese Government. The success and stability of that government depends on the support of those within Lebanon and throughout the Arab world for whom the status of Jerusalem remains a critical issue. The United States acknowledges the importance of Jerusalem to Israel and to all Arab states. But insistence on a Jerusalem venue should not be made an obstacle to the start of talks on the withdrawal of external forces from Lebanon.

The present situation is clearly intolerable. Syrian, PLO, and Israeli forces remain poised in the field. The continued occupation of Lebanon by foreign forces -- forces that imperil Lebanese sovereignty and threaten Israeli security -- is dangerous and should be unacceptable to the parties. President Reagan is determined to see the parties get the dispute out of the trenches and onto the table. Wrangling over procedures must end, and substantive negotiations must begin.

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Once the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon begins, a vacuum may be left that could endanger Lebanese sovereignty and Israeli security. The Lebanese Armed Forces will not be able immediately to fill that vacuum, although we and our allies will be working to rebuild those forces. Consequently, it may be necessary for the U.S. to consider joining with other nations in an expanded Multinational Force (MNF). Indeed, the Lebanese Government has recently made such a request. An expanded MNF would bolster the parties' confidence in security arrangements that will facilitate the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

We will, of course, consult closely with the members of this Committee in addressing the question of U.S. participation in an expanded MNF. It is too early at this time to specify the details of any international peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

A fully sovereign Lebanon and a secure Israel, however, cannot be achieved through military measures alone. The once dynamic economy of Lebanon must be restored. Therefore, we may have to return to the new Congress with a supplemental request for the funds necessary to enable the United States to play an appropriate role in the reconstruction of Lebanon. Only a healthy Lebanese economy and a thriving private sector can

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provide the prosperity that is an essential adjunct to our security and economic assistance.

Using available military credits and Lebanon's own funds, we have started a crash military assistance program to help the Lebanese Army assert its authority throughout the country and thereby enable the MNF to depart. We envisage the need for some additional funding and, as our estimates are developed, may wish to seek Foreign Military Sales and International Military Educational Training funds in a supplemental request.

Middle East Peace Process

Let me now turn to the status of the Middle East peace process. The President's historic initiative of September 1 is designed to bring about a just and lasting peace that will satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and, at the same time, assure the security of Israel. To achieve these ends, the initiative seeks to broaden the circle of peace through the participation of Jordan and Palestinian representation consistent with the Camp David Framework.

Before reviewing the current status of the President's initiative, I should like to comment on two key aspects.

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First, the September 1 initiative is not a "plan" or blueprint to be imposed on the parties. Rather the President has put forward a balanced set of positions that the U.S. is prepared to support in the course of negotiations. We have pointed out that we cannot guarantee the outcome of the negotiating process on any specific issue. The negotiations, if they are to be successful, must be free to move in productive directions that cannot be foreseen in advance. It has been made clear to all parties involved that these are our positions and that we stand firmly behind them. Should the parties agree on positions at variance with our proposals, however, we will not blindly stand our ground.

Second, the President's positions regarding the final status of the West Bank and Gaza have generated much interest and commentary. This is understandable since the future of those territories is of keen interest to Palestinians and Israelis alike. It is for this reason that the President felt it necessary to state that the United States would support neither an independent Palestinian state nor Israeli sovereignty or control over the West Bank and Gaza.

It is important to note, however, that when negotiations resume the next item on the agenda will not be the ultimate status of the territories, but the transitional arrangements to

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be established in the West Bank and Gaza for a five-year period. Only after that transitional period has begun, can negotiations be undertaken on the final status of the territories.

What, then, is the status of the President's initiative? We have had a highly constructive visit by a delegation representing the Arab League, and we have seen positive movement in the direction the President has outlined. King Hussein has publicly stated his willingness to discuss the proposals, and a serious dialogue between Jordan and the PLO is continuing. We remain hopeful that this activity will lead to an early move to the negotiating table by Jordan with the support of other key Arab parties.

Egypt has been publicly supportive of the President's initiative. The Israeli Government, as you are aware, has been and remains highly critical of some aspects of the President's proposals. Those proposals, however, continue to receive intense attention in Israel by the government and the public alike. And if King Hussein comes to the table, we are confident that the Israeli Government will not refuse to negotiate.

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I am optimistic that the President's initiative will soon lead to a resumption of negotiations with broadened participation. My optimism is based on my conviction that the President's initiative provides the best means to move toward a peace that will meet the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and at the same time assure the security which Israel so avidly seeks and so richly deserves.

I should like to conclude my remarks by mentioning the problem of Israel's relations with Egypt. There is important unfinished business with regard to the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. The Taba border area between Israel and Egypt remains contested. It is now time to resolve this issue according to the provisions of the Treaty, just as it is now time to place the various elements of the broader peace process on a firm foundation.

Mr. Chairman, Americans can take pride in our policy toward the Middle East. It is a policy which has been developed in consultation with this Committee and other members of Congress. We welcome this continuing consultation; it strengthens our policy and contributes to an American consensus.

Thank you.

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STATUS OF LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

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Phil Habib and Morris Draper have completed a round of talks in Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem. Prime Minister Begin was very negative about Phil's proposals for starting direct Lebanese-Israeli talks. He insists the negotiations be at ministerial level with alternate sessions in Jerusalem. Although Begin agreed to submit Phil's proposals to Sunday's cabinet meeting, the outlook is for continued stalemate.

In the course of wide-ranging discussions in Beirut, Phil found Lebanese leaders eager for discussions with Israel and ready for far-reaching compromises intended to satisfy Israel's interest in the security of its northern border. To get talks started, Gemayel would be willing to seek his government's approval for starting substantive negotiations on political and military matters with a delegation headed by a senior Lebanese civilian. The Lebanese feel unable to meet Israel's other procedural demands.

Phil also urged the Lebanese to accelerate their contacts with the PLO and Syria. Gemayel assured him that he would but stressed that it would greatly strengthen his hand if he could begin negotiations with Israel.

Phil's talks in Damascus were less encouraging. President Assad made himself unavailable, and Foreign Minister Khaddam did not reveal any new positions. Khaddam confirmed Syrian readiness to begin negotiations with Lebanon on Syrian withdrawal, making clear that Syria would only leave after Israel.

During his meeting with Foreign Minister Shamir, Phil advanced a compromise calling for an initial Lebanese-Israeli meeting at the sub-ministerial political level which would proceed right away to substance. The venue of the negotiations would alternate between Israel and Lebanon but would be outside the two capitals. Subsequently, Defense Minister Sharon alleged we were preventing Gemayel from improving relations with Israel and asserted that Israel had created strategic opportunities for the U.S. which we were neglecting.

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Sharon and Shamir were both present when Phil met with Begin, but Sharon seemed to have the upper hand. Sharon made the point that Israel was in no hurry to withdraw, stating, "If we wait, Lebanon will agree to our position." Habib urged the Israelis to enter negotiations and then raise their desires directly. He emphasized that the mood in Lebanon is now as favorable as possible but that the situation can only deteriorate in the absence of negotiations. The Israelis contended that procedure and substance cannot be divorced, and it appears they are trying to win substantial political concessions from the Lebanese as the price for talks. Although Begin agreed to present the issue to the Cabinet, Phil fears that Sharon's hard line view prevailed with the Prime Minister.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *ups*
Subject: Stalemate Over Lebanon

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Following a round of talks by Phil Habib and Morris Draper in Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem, the Israeli Cabinet finally agreed to start talks below the ministerial level but insisted that Jerusalem and Beirut be the alternate negotiating sites. The Lebanese could not accept this without grave jeopardy to their relations with the other Arabs. The outlook is for continued stalemate.

In the course of wide-ranging discussions in Beirut, Phil found Lebanese leaders eager for discussions with Israel and ready for far-reaching compromises intended to satisfy Israel's interest in the security of its northern border. To get talks started, Gemayel would be willing to seek his government's approval for starting substantive negotiations on political and military matters with a delegation headed by a senior Lebanese civilian. The Lebanese felt unable to meet Israel's other procedural demands.

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Planning for Next Steps in Lebanon

I. Major Objectives of U.S. Policy for Lebanon: The Next Steps

A. Ambassador Habib agrees with the formulation that we should seek a two-stage disengagement and withdrawal of all foreign forces. We would want to avoid a "Sinai-type phased disengagement," in pressing instead for a rapid and full withdrawal. However, if we could negotiate a single stage full withdrawal that already would be preferable.

B. We agree that an essential part of any agreement will be a workable plan to relocate the Palestinian fighters still in Lebanon. However, we would add that the possibility should be left to the Lebanese that some fighters may disarm and return to live in peace with their families in Lebanon, subject to Lebanese laws and authority.

C. The welfare and physical security of Palestinians in Lebanon is properly a responsibility of the government of Lebanon (GOL) and we will encourage the GOL to fully assume its obligations in this regard.

D. We cannot describe the mission or deployment areas of the MNF with any precision at this time. Specific MNF requirements will become better defined as the negotiations proceed. It seems unlikely, however, that MNF will have any responsibilities for internal security. We also believe that a role for UNIFIL should be maintained.

E. An ambitious program to re-equip and retrain the LAF is in progress. Although the U.S. contingent now in Beirut is prepared to conduct limited training of LAF units, we do not envisage any substantial training responsibilities for the MNF. We will endeavor to use every opportunity for MNF to bolster the LAF but recognize that training will be more difficult with an expanded Phase II mission. At the same time, the LAF will benefit from close association with MNF deployments. We expect the effort to rebuild and train the LAF to proceed in parallel with but separate from the MNF.

F. We are encouraging others to support our efforts for the reconstruction of the Lebanese economy.

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II. A Strategy for Progress Toward Our Objectives

A. We agree that a disengagement from the Beirut-Damascus highway is a first step toward full withdrawal of all foreign forces. An area between the separated forces could be secured by an MNF. The timing of the initial disengagement will depend on the progress of the negotiations.

B. We agree that relocation of Palestinian combatants is primarily an Arab problem, but our experience is that an active U.S. role is essential.

C. The GOL has previously rejected proposals that UN forces should secure the Palestinian camps. The GOL must offer its own protection and guarantees in the context of its negotiations with the PLO. Moreover, we believe UNIFIL can play a very important role in peacekeeping operations following the withdrawal of foreign forces; we prefer, therefore, to retain UNIFIL as an option for the latter role.

- D. (1) Early responses to our appeal for additional contributors to the MNF have been mostly negative, especially from the UK and other Commonwealth countries. We are exploring other possibilities. One problem is the financial assistance new participants will expect.
- (2) As far as we are aware, no decisions have been taken on the possible size of a U.S. contingent for an expanded MNF. In any event, we will want to conform this to the anticipated mission of the MNF and its duration. The ongoing planning for a substantial increase should continue.
- (3) See Section I.D. above.
- (4) We would prefer to reserve the primary peacekeeping role in southern Lebanon for the LAF, perhaps in conjunction with UNIFIL. We should not reject a role for UNIFIL in the 40 km zone Israel has proposed for southern Lebanon. An MNF role along the Syrian border would require substantially greater numbers, which may not be available and may not be needed if the Syrians agree to prevent infiltration as part of the withdrawal arrangements. The specific deployment

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areas for the respective MNF contingents will need to be worked out as the negotiations proceed and requirements for the MNF become better defined. There is no reason a priori to place U.S. forces in southern Lebanon, although such a role should not be excluded.

(5) We agree, but anticipate that less force will be needed for this task.

E. An effort to rebuild the LAF is underway. See Section I.E. The UK may be a good candidate for providing training and other assistance to the ISF.

F. We believe the U.S. should make every possible effort to internationalize the reconstruction effort in Lebanon. We do not believe the French government should be encouraged to take the lead. On the contrary, we would prefer to give the IBRD a leading role and to draw as much as possible on Arab sources of funding.

III. Ambassador Habib arrives in Beirut on November 19. As his initial consultations in the area proceed, we will have a better idea of appropriate timing for U.S. diplomatic efforts, with the objective of the expeditious withdrawal of all foreign forces.

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TALKING POINTS ON LEBANON

STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

--WE ARE IN A VERY DELICATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

--ALL PARTIES AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF AN EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. WE ARE NOW WORKING TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK AND AGENDA FOR DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, WHILE SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE EFFORT TO ESTABLISH PARALLEL TRACKS WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO.

--MORRIS DRAPER HAS BEEN SHUTTLING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WITH THE OBJECT OF BRINGING THE TWO TO THE TABLE. ISRAEL WANTS TO BROADEN THE AGENDA FOR THE TALKS TO INCLUDE AMBITIOUS STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION. LEBANON UNDERSTANDS THE NECESSITY FOR TALKS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BUT IS VERY CONCERNED TO PRESERVE INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS, WHICH IT FEELS WOULD BE DAMAGED SEVERELY BY TOO CLOSE AN EMBRACE WITH ISRAEL.

--WE BELIEVE THAT FOR THESE DIFFERENCES TO BE RESOLVED IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. THE U.S. WILL BE A FULL PARTNER. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT PREDICT THE EXACT FORMULATION FOR THE TALKS, WE BELIEVE AGREEMENT TO CONVENE WILL SOON BE FORTHCOMING.

OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES

--ISRAEL HAS PROPOSED A DISENGAGEMENT FOLLOWED BY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, GIVEN THE SATISFACTION OF CERTAIN AMBITIOUS PRECONDITIONS. A PEACE TREATY IS NOT A PRECONDITION, BUT MANY OF ISRAEL'S PROPOSALS INVOLVE ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS, WHICH LEBANON CANNOT UNDERTAKE NOW.

--ISRAEL IS, OF COURSE, ALSO KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE PROGRESS OF TALKS FOR THE REMOVAL OF SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN FORCES, AND FOR THE SECURITY OF LEBANON IN THE POST-WITHDRAWAL PHASE.

--ANOTHER KEY PART OF THE DISCUSSION WILL BE ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON AND PARTICULARLY A 40-50 KILOMETER SECURITY ZONE.

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--LEBANON IS WILLING TO TALK WITH ALL THE PARTIES, SYRIAN, PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI, BUT IS CONCERNED THAT ALONE IT IS INCAPABLE FOR THE NEAR FUTURE OF ASSURING SECURITY IN THE VACUUM PRODUCED BY ANY DISENGAGEMENT AND THE EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL BELIEVES THE LEBANESE ARMY IS NOT CURRENTLY UP TO THE TASK, AND OUR EXPERTS AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT.

--FOR THESE REASONS, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UN, SUCCESSFULLY ARRANGED FOR UNIFIL'S MANDATE TO BE EXTENDED. HE HAS ALSO ASKED FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN EXPANDED MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) TO BOLSTER THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES (LAF) FOR A PERIOD FOLLOWING THE DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES.

--THE SYRIAN POSITION IS SIMPLE BUT TOUGH: ISRAEL MUST LEAVE LEBANON WITHOUT AGREEMENTS WITH THE LEBANESE THAT HARM LEBANON'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND THUS IMPINGE UPON SYRIAN INTERESTS. SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. MEANWHILE, SYRIA IS PREPARED NOW TO BEGIN TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE, BUT REFUSES TO LINK ITS PRESENCE IN LEBANON TO THAT OF ISRAEL.

--THE PLO HAS NOT SET A PUBLIC POSITION. PARTICULARLY AS THEIR POSITION AFTER SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE VULNERABLE, THE PLO SEEMS READY TO OFFER WITHDRAWAL IN RETURN FOR GUARANTEES FOR PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS.

THE U.S. VIEW

--IN CONJUNCTION WITH THESE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, WE ARE ACTING TO STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND ITS ABILITY TO CONTROL, ADMINISTER, AND DEFEND ITS SOVEREIGN TERRITORY.

--A KEY PART OF OUR EFFORT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE ARMY.

--WE INTEND TO BEGIN AN IMMEDIATE EFFORT TO PROVIDE EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO A SUBSTANTIAL CADRE OF THE LAF WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF PREPARING THESE FORCES FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL.

--AS ISRAELI, SYRIAN, AND PALESTINIAN FORCES WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL HELP FROM INTERNATIONAL FORCES WHILE EXTENDING ITS AUTHORITY INTO THOSE AREAS AND THROUGHOUT THE

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COUNTRY. EVEN WITH OUR PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE LAF WILL NOT BE ABLE FOR SOME TIME TO SHOULDER THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING CONDITIONS OF SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

--THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE STILL IN AN EARLY STAGE AND WE CANNOT NOW FORESEE THE MAGNITUDE OF ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL FORCES. THE U.S., FRANCE AND ITALY, CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF IN BEIRUT, HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY THE GOL FOR PARTICIPATION IN AN EXPANDED MNF. WE WILL CONSIDER POSITIVELY PARTICIPATION IN AN EXPANDED MNF TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN THE ABILITY OF THE GOL TO CONTACT, ADMINISTER, AND DEFEND ITS SOVEREIGN TERRITORY.

--THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN MNF CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED BY THE PACE AND CONTENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND BY THE ABILITY OF THE LAF GRADUALLY TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. FURTHERMORE, UNIFIL WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN INDISPENSABLE PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING EFFORT IN LEBANON, ALTHOUGH THE PRECISE MANNER OF ITS EMPLOYMENT REMAINS TO BE DECIDED. THESE QUESTIONS SIMPLY CANNOT BE ANSWERED NOW.

--IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US NOT TO FORSAKE THE CHANCE WE HAVE NOW TO BRING PEACE TO LEBANON. THE STAKES ARE HIGH, BUT DECISIVE ACTION IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM AND IN THE INTEREST OF OUR BROADER EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO THE REGION.

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Dear Senator Pell:

This is in response to your letter co-signed by Chairman Percy of September 20 to the Secretary concerning agreements or commitments by various parties to the negotiations conducted by Ambassador Habib for the departure of Palestinian leaders, offices and combatants from Beirut.

In appreciation of the pace of events of Lebanon and Congressional interest in the matter, we provided informally to the Committee and interested members copies of the agreement entered into between the United States and Lebanon, immediately following the conclusion of that agreement. We have since formally transmitted the agreement in accordance with the Case-Zablocki Act, as well as the related assurances given by the United States.

As regards assurances from other parties, the substance of those assurances has not, to the best of our knowledge, been reduced to any specific authoritative text, but is incorporated in the documents which have been provided to the Congress. The assurances provided to the United States by Israel were based on exchanges between Ambassador Habib and officials of the Israeli Government. The Government of Israel was aware that the assurances would be transmitted to the Government of Lebanon. In this connection, I draw your attention to the enclosed Israeli Cabinet Communique, in which the Government of Israel indicated its formal approval of the Lebanese Government's evacuation plan negotiated by Ambassador Habib. With respect to assurances provided by the Government of Lebanon concerning the behavior of armed elements not under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, those assurances were provided on the basis of discussions between Lebanese Government officials and officials in charge of the various elements.

The Honorable
 Claiborne Pell,
 United States Senate,
 Washington, D.C.

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
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We are unaware of any written agreements between the Government of Lebanon and these elements.

You have also requested agreements and assurances which have been concluded since the Beirut evacuation. As you are aware, the exchange of notes between the United States and Lebanon concerning the participation of the United States in the Multinational Force are currently being negotiated. We will, of course, transmit them to the Congress in accordance with the Case-Zablocki Act. We will also provide copies of the final texts to the Committee on an informal basis as soon as they are available.

Sincerely,



Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:
Israeli Cabinet Communique

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

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The Honorable
Charles H. Percy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.


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Sincerely,



Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:
Israeli Cabinet Communique

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E.O. 12356: DECL: ~~OADR~~
TAGS: MOPS, MILI, IS, LE, CY
SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF PLO VEHICLES IN CYPRUS

REF: A) NICOSIA 3357; B) NICOSIA 3279; C) NICOSIA 3225;
D) NICOSIA 3109

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PER REF A, AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ROLANDIS SEPTEMBER 6 POSSIBLE MEANS TO RESOLVE MATTER OF PLO-OWNED VEHICLES PRESENTLY IN LIMASSOL IN BONDED WAREHOUSE UNDER GOC CUSTODY.
3. AS A RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDER PROCEEDING AS FOLLOWS. FIRST, WE SHOULD CHECK WITH THE ISRAELIS TO SEE WHETHER, NOW THAT PLO DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT HAS BEEN COMPLETED, THEY WOULD CONSIDER ALLOWING VEHICLES TO BE SHPPED TO PLO IN TUNISIA. IN SUPPORT OF SUCH A SIMPLE, STRAIGHT-FORWARD SOLUTION IN COULD BE POINTED OUT TO THE GOI THAT IN VIEW OF THE FACTS A) THAT THE PRINCIPLE ABOUT WHICH THEY WERE CONCERNED HAS CLEARLY BEEN UPHELD AND B) VEHICLES HAVE BEEN IN CYPRUS FOR TWO

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WEEKS, IT IS NOT TIME TO FIND SOME PRACTICAL DEVICE TO DISPOSE OF THE PROBLEM. THE VEHICLES WOULD SEEM TO BE OF ONLY MARGINAL VALUE TO THE PLO. POTENTIAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE WOULD BE INCONSEQUENTIAL NOW THAT PLO CONTINGENT WHICH OWNS VEHICLES IS IN TUNISIA, 1,000 OR MORE MILES FROM BEIRUT AND ISRAEL. IF ISRAEL WERE TO REJECT SUCH A SOLUTION, FALLBACK MIGHT BE FOR PLO TO IDENTIFY ANOTHER DESTINATION FOR VEHICLES. ALTERNATIVELY, VEHICLES COULD BE SHIPPED

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BE FOR PLO TO IDENTIFY ANOTHER DESTINATION FOR VEHICLES. ALTERNATIVELY, VEHICLES COULD BE SHIPPED BACK TO BEIRUT AND HANDED OVER TO LAF, BUT BASED ON CONVERSATION WITH ROLANDIS, IT IS CLEAR THAT GOC WILL TAKE NO ACTION TO RESOLVING VEHICLE PROBLEM UNLESS IT IS SURE THAT PLO IS AGREEABLE.

4. IF ISRAELIS WILL GO ALONG WITH TUNISIA DESTINATION AS OUTLINED PARA 3 ABOVE, WE COULD SO INDICATE TO GOC WHICH WOULD IN TURN THEN WANT TO RECONFIRM PLO WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SHIPMENT TO TUNISIA. BY SAME TOKEN, SHOULD ISRAELIS INSIST ON SOME OTHER SOLUTION, GOC WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE THAT WITH PLO. ROLANDIS WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR CONTACTING PLO MORE DIRECTLY, PRESUMABLY THROUGH GOVERNMENT OF TUNISIA, BUT GOC WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO RECONFIRM WITH PLO ANY ARRANGEMENT PRESENTED TO IT.

5. IF DEPARTMENT IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE THIS MATTER UP WITH ISRAELIS, I MIGHT BE ABLE T PERSUADE ROLANDIS TO DO SO WITH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN NICOSIA, BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY PREFER TO AVOID THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

6. AS INDICATED REF A, FROM OUR NARROW PERSPECTIVE THERE IS NO PRESSING NEED TO RESOLVE PLO

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VEHICLE PROBLEM QUICKLY. HOWEVER, IF MATTER DRAGS ON FOR MONTHS, GOC MIGHT BECOME RESTIVE AND THERE MIGHT BE CHARGES FROM TURKISH CYPRIOTS THAT VEHICLES HAVE BEEN SWALLOWED UP BY (GREEK) CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD. THUS, WE WOULD PREFER TO SEE MATTER RESOLVED AS SOON AS FEASIBLE.

7. IF DECISION IS MADE TO SHIP VEHICLES TO PLO IN TUNISIA, WE ASSUME THAT SIMPLEST DEVICE TO ARRANGE SHIPMENT AND PAYMENT WOULD BE TO HAVE SOLOMONIDES MAKE ALL ARRANGEMENTS AND INCLUDE CHARGES IN HIS BILLING ALONG WITH CHARTER FEES FOR VESSELS, STORAGE FEES, ETC.

8. PLEASE ADVISE ON WHAT FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BY EMBASSY NICOSIA.

9. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO OTHER ADDRESSEES AS DESIRED. EWING

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Date: *6/26/96* **X2B**

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NEXT STEPS IN LEBANON

U.S. POLICY GOALS

- Departure of all foreign military forces--Palestinian, Israeli and Syrian--coupled with arrangements to assure the security of Israel's northern border.
- Establishment of strong central institutions, including a revitalized army and police, to extend the authority of the Lebanese government throughout the country.
- Restoration of security to help Lebanon's free market economy mobilize local capital and attract foreign investment.
- Rebuilding of life-supporting infrastructure damaged in the war.
- Provision of urgent, humanitarian relief to Lebanese and Palestinian victims of the war.

Work toward all goals must proceed together to the extent possible. Economic reconstruction, for example, cannot wait until conditions of total political stability prevail. Our goals are mutually reinforcing; progress on one will encourage progress on others. The task immediately before us is how to maintain the momentum established by the PLO evacuation from Beirut and the election of a new president. We stress the effort to internationalize responsibility for Lebanon. The USG will continue to play a major role, but other parties must assume a greater share of the burdens of peacemaking, political reconciliation and economic reconstruction.

The Problems of Withdrawal

Israel will not withdraw from Lebanon except as part of a plan involving Syrian withdrawal, the withdrawal or disarming of PLO fighters in the north and convincing arrangements for the security of Israel's northern border. We have begun consideration of the feasibility of a mutual disengagement and "synchronized" withdrawal. The presence of PLO military units in the Bekaa Valley and in north Lebanon is another urgent and thorny problem, although these groups may not be viable following a withdrawal of Syrian troops.

An Israeli redeployment away from the city of Beirut would have a major immediate psychological impact. It could be especially helpful to Bashir Gemayel in the formation of a

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government with Sunni Muslim support if he could point to such evidence of Israeli good faith and his influence and dedication to Lebanese goals. Israeli redeployment prior to the Arab League Summit would give Bashir strong cards to play in seeking summit endorsement of eventual ADF (Syrian) withdrawal from Lebanon.

Peace Keeping

We believe some kind of international force will be necessary to bridge the gap between an IDF withdrawal and the restoration of full GOL authority in southern Lebanon. Israel probably prefers to rely on local militias under its control, but we anticipate this would be an unacceptable compromise of Lebanese sovereignty. Posts have been asked to comment on a proposal for an expanded UNIFIL prior to beginning discussions with the UN Secretariat. Any further peacekeeping deployment of U.S. troops in Lebanon is not an option. Ultimately, we envisage a total takeover of security responsibility in southern Lebanon by the GOL.

Lebanese Armed Forces

Visible and timely U.S. support could be crucial to the ability and the determination of the LAF to function effectively.

--DOD is planning for a defense survey team to visit Lebanon to assess the LAF's needs for equipment and training.

--We have expedited shipments of several defense items purchased by the GOL.

--GOL has asked formally for 33 M48A5 tanks; this would require approval here to divert tanks from inventory, possibly by Presidential decision.

--We should consider discussing Lebanese defense needs with other appropriate foreign governments.

The Political Agenda

The task of political reconciliation is largely one for the President-elect and the leaders of other groups, but we are using our influence to enhance the international prestige of the GOL and to encourage both Lebanese factions and other Arab governments to support the central government. The President-elect's initial moves have been promising.

Economic Reconstruction

We are rapidly moving ahead on the task of reconstruction,

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with a particular focus on involving the World Bank as a key to our strategy of involving a wider group of potential donors.

UNRWA and the Israelis appear to be reaching interim solutions to the urgent needs of Palestinian refugees in the south. We need to evaluate how the GOL intends to approach the delicate issues of shelter and other services for Palestinians remaining in the South.

The vitality of the Lebanese private sector is a very important asset for the country's economic reconstruction. Jim McPherson has proposed that we form a consortium of U.S. business leaders, including Lebanese-Americans, to stimulate private sector involvement from abroad.

Peace Between Lebanon and Israel

Israel is working to gain support for a quick peace treaty with Lebanon. We are concerned the Israelis will press Bashir hard for treaty and make this a precondition for Israeli withdrawal. We assume that other Arabs at the League Summit will press Bashir to promise no quick move towards a treaty. This seems a likely minimum price for Arab recognition of his election as well as Arab political and financial support for his efforts to rebuild Lebanon.

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ON THE OCCASION OF AGREEMENT
ON PLAN FOR RESOLUTION OF WEST BEIRUT CRISIS

AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS INFORMED ME THAT A PLAN TO RESOLVE THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED. AS PART OF THIS PLAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAS REQUESTED, AND I HAVE APPROVED, THE DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. FORCES TO BEIRUT AS PART OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DEVELOP THIS PLAN HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE MOST ARDUOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. AT TIMES, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE HOW AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, AND YET IT HAS BEEN REACHED.

THE STATESMANSHIP AND COURAGE OF PRESIDENT SARKIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DESERVE SPECIAL RECOGNITION, AS DOES THE MAGNIFICENT WORK OF AMBASSADOR HABIB. PHIL NEVER LOST HOPE, AND IN THE END HIS SPIRIT AND DETERMINATION CARRIED THE DAY. WE ALL OWE HIM A DEEP DEBT OF GRATITUDE.

THE PARTIES WHO MADE THIS PLAN POSSIBLE HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION. I EXPECT ITS TERMS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN GOOD FAITH AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED TIMETABLE. THIS WILL REQUIRE METICULOUS ADHERENCE TO THE CEASEFIRE. VIOLATIONS BY ANY PARTY WOULD IMPERIL THE PLAN AND BRING RENEWED BLOODSHED AND TRAGEDY TO THE PEOPLE OF BEIRUT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MUST THAT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.

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AS YOU KNOW, MY AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE U. S. FORCES IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS ESSENTIAL TO OUR SUCCESS. IN THE DAYS AHEAD, THEY AND FORCES FROM FRANCE AND ITALY WILL BE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT BUT CAREFULLY LIMITED NON-COMBATANT ROLE. THE PARTIES TO THE PLAN HAVE AGREED TO THIS ROLE AND HAVE PROVIDED ASSURANCES ON THE SAFETY OF OUR FORCES. OUR PURPOSE WILL BE TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN CARRYING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE DEPARTURES OF PLO LEADERS, OFFICES, AND COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY UNDER SAFE AND ORDERLY CONDITIONS. THE PRESENCE OF U. S. FORCES ALSO WILL FACILITATE THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OVER THE BEIRUT AREA. IN NO CASE WILL OUR TROOPS STAY LONGER THAN 30 DAYS.

THE PARTICIPATION OF FRANCE AND ITALY IN THIS EFFORT IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THESE GOOD FRIENDS OF THE U. S.

SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS BY RESPONSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN NOW AGREED WILL SET THE STAGE FOR THE URGENT INTERNATIONAL ACTION REQUIRED TO RESTORE LEBANON'S FULL SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, OBTAIN THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY, AND HELP ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL. WE MUST ALSO MOVE QUICKLY IN THE CONTEXT OF CAMP DAVID TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, AS WELL AS THE OTHER UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. ONLY WHEN ALL THESE STEPS ARE ACCOMPLISHED CAN TRUE AND LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY BE ACHIEVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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() CHARLES DRAPER'S MISSION

U.S. NON-PAPER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH LEBANON

1. CONCEPT: THE BASIC IDEA REMAINS TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK OF ARRANGEMENTS AND MEASURES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WHICH WILL FORESTALL ANY RESUMPTION OF SUBVERSIVE, TERRORIST, MILITARY, OR PARA-MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WHETHER DIRECTED AT LEBANON OR ISRAEL, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO ASSERT FULL CONTROL THROUGHOUT ITS SOVEREIGN TERRITORY. THE IDEAS DESCRIBED BELOW REPRESENT A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE CONCEPTS WHILE ALSO STRENGTHENING AND REINFORCING THE PACKAGE OF ALREADY ACCEPTABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH NEW MEASURES.

2. KEY ELEMENTS ACCEPTED BY LEBANESE: THE FOLLOWING LISTS SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS IN THE SECURITY PACKAGE WHICH HAVE GENERALLY BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE LEBANESE (OUR REINFORCING MEASURES WOULD BUILD ON THESE):

-- A SUBSTANTIAL SECURITY REGION.

-- AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE MILITARY COMMITTEE, WITH U.S. PARTICIPATION IF AGREED, TO OVERSEE ARRANGEMENTS AND TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES.

-- JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS UNDER THIS COMMITTEE, OPERATING REGULARLY (DAILY) FOR VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION. SECURITY FOR THE TEAMS TO BE PROVIDED BY THE LEBANESE.

[REDACTED]

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-- RAPID AND PRACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS LINKS, INCLUDING DIRECT RADIO AND TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE IMMEDIATE BORDER REGION.

-- DIRECT CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ISRAELI AND LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS

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MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETINGS, JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, AND "AN OFFICE" TO HOST MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND OTHER FUNCTIONS.

-- A LEBANESE COMMITMENT TO ACT QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY IN RESPONSE TO UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES POTENTIALLY THREATENING TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, INCLUDING ON THE BASIS OF ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ALERTS.

-- REASONABLE EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE TWO LEBANESE ARMY BRIGADES WHICH ORDINARILY WOULD BE STATIONED IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

-- THE BRIGADE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE SOUTHERNMOST AREA WOULD BE A "TERRITORIAL BRIGADE." MEN FROM HADDAD'S "LOCAL FORCES AND MILITIAS," WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THIS BRIGADE OR INTO THE POLICE, INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, OR CIVIL OR BORDER FORCES.

-- THE USE OF TWO UNIFIL BATTALIONS -- ONE EACH IN THE VICINITY OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMP AREAS IN TYRE AND SIDON -- TO LEND A "PRESENCE" TO LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL AND WITH NO AREA RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SECURITY ZONE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

3. REINFORCING AND STRENGTHENING MEASURES: THE IDEAS AND MEASURES OUTLINED BELOW ARE AIMED AT FURTHER REINFORCEMENT OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY ACCEPTED BY THE LEBANESE WHILE ALSO TRYING TO DEAL WITH THE SPECIFIC POINTS MADE BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS DELEGATION DURING THE MOST RECENT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON:

{A} REGARDING THE ISRAELI POSITION ON HADDAD AND HIS FORCES:

-- EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION FROM THE LEBANESE THAT THE BRIGADE TO BE ESTABLISHED AND DEPLOYED IN THE SOUTHERNMOST REGION WILL BE A "TERRITORIAL BRIGADE." THE LEBANESE WOULD CONFIRM THAT THE BRIGADE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AREA BELOW THE ZAHRANI RIVER, AND ONCE FORMED WOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

-- THE LEBANESE WOULD PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT THE HADDAD FORCES WILL BE THE NUCLEUS OF THIS TERRITORIAL BRIGADE.

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
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-- REGULAR MILITARY COMMITTEE REVIEW OF LAF STANDING ORDERS ON HOW TO HANDLE TERRORISTS AND INSURGENTS.

-- SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE FOR EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS, IN ADDITION TO HAVING THE ALREADY AGREED DIRECT RADIO AND TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS ACROSS THE BORDER. THIS MIGHT ENTAIL PRACTICAL TRAINING EXERCISES IN ANTICIPATION OF INCIDENTS, IN WHICH SELECTED UNITS OF THE IDF AND LAF WILL COORDINATE ARRANGEMENTS, WITH EACH PARTY STAYING ON ITS OWN SIDE OF THE BORDER. THERE MAY BE WAYS WHEREBY THE ISRAELIS COULD LINK THE APPROPRIATE LEBANESE MILITARY AUTHORITY TO THE SENSOR AND EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM THEY HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED ALONG THE BORDER. THE U.S. WILL PROMOTE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND ELSEWHERE.

{C} REGARDING THE ISRAELI POSITION ON ACTIVITIES OF ISRAELI SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICES IN THE SECURITY ZONE, AND COOPERATION WITH THE LEBANESE:



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-- KEY ELEMENTS OF THE G-2 STRIKE FORCE -- AND POSSIBLY ONE OF THE TWO AIR MOBILE LAF COMPANIES NOW IN TRAINING -- WOULD BE "DEDICATED" FOR USE IN THE SECURITY ZONE TO PROVIDE THE RESOURCES FOR THE FASTEST POSSIBLE REACTION TO SECURITY-RELATED THREATS.

-- THE U.S. WOULD CONSIDER SENDING SPECIAL FORCES ADVISORS TO HELP TRAIN THE LEBANESE WHO WOULD BE SERVING IN THE SECURITY ZONE BRIGADES IN VARIOUS STRIKE AND COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

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THERE COULD BE ASSURANCE THAT, ONCE IT IS FORMED, THE BRIGADE WILL DRAW UPON INHABITANTS OF THE BORDER AREA FOR NEW RECRUITS.

-- WHATEVER MAY BE THE "HONORABLE SOLUTION" THE LEBANESE ARRANGE WITH MAJOR HADDAD, HE WOULD STAY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON DURING THE 3-10 WEEK ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. DURING THAT PERIOD, HE WOULD ACT IN EFFECT AS AN ADVISOR OR CONSULTANT TO ASSIST IN THE INTEGRATION OF MEMBERS OF HADDAD'S MILITIAS INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE BEING FORMED.

{B} REGARDING THE ISRAELI POSITION ON COOPERATION AND PRE-COORDINATION AGAINST TERRORISM, ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS, ISRAELI CONCURRENCE IN APPOINTMENTS, ETC.:



-- ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN WHICH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD MEET REGULARLY, WITH AN ATTACHED "OPERATIONS CENTER." NECESSARY IDF COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL NEEDED FOR THE OPERATIONS CENTER ACTIVITIES WOULD BE ROTATED IN AND OUT UNDER THE MOST PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS POSSIBLE. (THERE COULD BE A SECOND "OFFICE.")

-- THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE GENERAL TANNOUS IN HIS EFFORTS TO ASSIGN OFFICERS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WHO ARE EQUIPPED BY TEMPERAMENT, ATTITUDE, AND EXPERIENCE TO BEST CARRY OUT THE ARRANGEMENTS AGREED UPON.

-- REGULAR DIRECT FACE-TO-FACE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE LAF SOUTHERN COMMANDER AND THE COMMANDER OF THE IDF NORTHERN COMMAND.

-- PERIODIC CONFERENCES BETWEEN THE IDF AND LAF COMMANDERS (TANNOUS AND LEVY) AND THEIR STAFFS TO REVIEW ARRANGEMENTS.

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(D) REGARDING THE ISRAELI POSITION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN THE SECURITY ZONE:

-- UNDER A CHANGED SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE, UNIFIL UNITS WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE VICINITY OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND PALESTINIAN CONCENTRATIONS, INCLUDING IN SUCH PLACES AS BEIRUT, TRIPOLI, BAALBEK. FOUR OF THE SIX OR SO UNIFIL BATTALIONS WOULD BE USED OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE. TWO BATTALIONS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE USED IN THE VICINITY OF TYRE AND SIDON. THEY WOULD LEND A "PRESENCE" -- AS A FORM OF ASSURANCE TO THE PALESTINIANS -- BUT THEY WOULD IN NO WAY INTERFERE WITH THE CONTROL AND ACCESS BY THE LAF AND OTHER LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. UNIFIL BATTALIONS WOULD HAVE NO AREA RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SECURITY ZONE -- DIRECT OR INDIRECT -- FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

-- THE TWO UNIFIL BATTALIONS IN THE SECURITY ZONE WILL BE FROM EITHER NORWAY, THE NETHERLANDS, OR FIJI.

(E) REGARDING THE ISRAELI POSITION ON JOINT PATROLS, ETC.:

-- THERE WILL BE THREE TO FIVE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. EACH TEAM COULD INCLUDE UP TO FOUR OFFICERS FROM EACH SIDE. THESE TEAMS WOULD CARRY OUT VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT ALSO WOULD HAVE A MISSION OF "CHECKING" AND INVESTIGATING WHAT MIGHT BE HAPPENING THROUGHOUT THE SECURITY ZONE. WHILE IN THE SECURITY ZONE, THEY WILL TRAVEL ONLY IN LEBANESE TRANSPORT. IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE TEAMS WOULD CARRY OUT DAILY INSPECTIONS, AND BY DAILY IS MEANT DAY-AND-NIGHT. ISRAELI MEMBERS OF THESE TEAMS WOULD BE STATIONED IN ISRAEL WHEN NOT ENGAGED IN THE INSPECTION AND OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THE SECURITY ZONE DIRECTED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

-- A THOROUGH REVIEW PROCESS UNDER THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER SIGNIFICANT LEBANESE MILITARY, PARA-MILITARY, POLICE, OR COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS TO DETERMINE WHERE MISTAKES WERE MADE AND HOW METHODS CAN BE IMPROVED. THE U.S. WOULD BE AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE REVIEW.

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-- THREE MONTHS AFTER IDF WITHDRAWAL, THERE WOULD BE A FULL-SCALE REVIEW IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE SECURITY MEASURES AND CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE ADDED MEASURES. THE U.S. WOULD BE AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT.

{F} REGARDING THE ISRAELI POSITION ON FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS, COOPERATION WITH LOCAL ORGANS, PREVENTING REINFILTRATION, ETC.:

-- THE U.S. WILL CONSIDER PROPOSING THAT MNF UNITS BE POSITIONED AS INTER-POSITION FORCES AT SOME PLACES ALONG THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE SECURITY ZONE AS WELL AS ON THE MAIN HIGHWAY FROM SIDON NORTH TO BEIRUT AND ON TO TRIPOLI. A STRONG MNF PRESENCE MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED IN THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS IN THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN BAKAA AREA JUST NORTH OF THE SECURITY ZONE. THIS WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO A POSSIBLE MNF PRESENCE ALONG THE MAIN DAMASCUS-BEIRUT HIGHWAY, AND OTHER KEY ROAD ARTERIES AND JUNCTIONS IN NORTHERN AND EASTERN LEBANON.

-- THE U.S. WOULD PROVIDE THE LAF WITH SOPHISTICATED SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE ABILITIES IN DETECTING INFILTRATORS, ETC.

-- CONSULTATIONS ARE ALREADY UNDER WAY BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT, WITH U.S. SUPPORT, FOR GERMAN TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE FOR A FRONTIER FORCE WHICH WOULD DRAW UPON THE LOCAL POPULATION FOR RECRUITS. THE LEBANESE MAY WISH TO ESTABLISH SUCH A FORCE NOT ONLY IN SOUTH LEBANON BUT ALONG THE BORDERS IN SYRIA. THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT.

{G} GENERAL U.S. COOPERATION:



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
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: The Middle East: Lebanon, the Peace Process and U.S.-Israel Relations

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Our meeting Friday on the Middle East takes place in the context of the Lebanon negotiations coming to a head and the King Hussein-PLO talks also reaching a critical point. Begin promised Habib a considered response to our proposals following Thursday's meeting of the Steering Committee.



Lebanon

Phil Habib has now presented to both sides a series of proposals which he believes meet Israel's legitimate concerns without endangering Lebanon's internal consensus or its place in the Arab world. There remain a number of serious sticking points, however, and by week's end Phil will make the judgment whether it is most useful for him to remain in the area and press for completion of agreement, or to return to consult with me and, perhaps, with you. The major sticking points concern the interim arrangements on the movement of goods, the future of Haddad and his militia, residual Israeli presence, the use of UN or other international forces in the south and inclusion of a mountain, Jebel Baruk, in the security zone. How we handle ourselves as Phil's negotiations come down to the last few tough points will be important.

President Gemayel is very close to being fully on board, but the sticking points with the Israelis will be tough to resolve. Always a key question in negotiating with Israel is whether they will give the last concession to the negotiator or

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
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hold it in order to give it to a more senior official, such as the Secretary of State or even the President, usually also asking for some bilateral quid pro quo. Our judgment at the moment is that we should press for an agreement through Phil, holding my intervention or yours to messages or perhaps phone calls. If absolutely necessary, of course, I could consider a trip. Past negotiating experience indicates that as we get closer to the finish of the negotiations with Israel, the tone becomes shriller and the prospects for success usually look darkest just before it is achieved. In any event, we should remain firm and consistent.

The Peace Process



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
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Progress in the Lebanon negotiations has been made by a painstaking combination of Phil Habib's separate discussions and the direct Israel-Lebanon-U.S. talks. Habib has concentrated on moving Israel and Lebanon closer together on the central problem areas in the negotiation--security arrangements and mutual relations--while in the direct Israel-Lebanon talks the actual language of the less contentious elements of an agreement is being hammered out.

While we must bear in mind that the most senior political levels in Israel and, to a lesser extent in Lebanon, must still agree, the negotiators have accepted a number of provisions concerning less contentious issues: creation of a tripartite committee to oversee implementation of the agreement and development of further negotiations; establishment of an Israeli office in Lebanon; prevention of cross-border terrorist attacks; and inviolability of the border.

In the more difficult area of mutual relations, the codewords for "normalization," Habib is attempting to broker a consensus that builds on a Lebanese offer of interim "practical" arrangements on the movement of people and goods until a final agreement is reached.



Negotiations to formalize these arrangements would only begin six months after the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon. Israeli negotiators are working with this concept, though Israel wants greater specificity and elaboration of "practical" arrangements on movement of people and goods during the interim period. The Lebanese have now proposed specific ideas on the movement of persons, and Habib is working on ideas for movement of goods.

On security arrangements, there is basic agreement on the concept of a security zone in southern Lebanon, within which there would be force and weapons limitations. Dispute remains on the extent of these limitations and the northern boundary of the zone. Formally, Israel still seeks five Israeli-manned "observation posts" in Lebanon, but Habib feels that



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
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~~_____~~ he might get the Israelis to drop their request for a residual presence. Habib is also proposing joint Lebanese/Israeli patrols to verify compliance as a further bridging idea. With regard to Haddad and his militia, Israel continues to insist that Haddad should be given a command position in southern Lebanon, and that his forces should be integrated into the Lebanese security forces in the area. Lebanon is prepared to deal fairly with Haddad personally and to integrate the Haddad militias, but wants to reserve its sovereign right to determine their ultimate deployment, as well as Haddad's personal future. While it may bite on Habib's idea of using UNIFIL to protect Palestinian refugee camps throughout Lebanon, Israel remains formally opposed to any UNIFIL presence in the security zone.

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Concerning the Syrian and PLO angles, Phil's judgment is that it would be best to have an Israeli-Lebanon agreement in place before he turns to the task of trying to nail down Syrian and PLO withdrawal; the Lebanese are continuing their discussions with both parties on this subject.



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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Status of the Lebanon Negotiations

In recent days the Lebanon negotiations have taken an upward turn. Progress has been made by a painstaking but productive combination of Phil Habib's separate discussions and the direct Israel-Lebanon talks in which Morris Draper and his team have participated. Habib has concentrated on moving Israel and Lebanon closer together on the central problem areas in the negotiation--security arrangements and mutual relations--while in the direct Israel-Lebanon talks the actual language of the less contentious elements of an agreement is being hammered out.

Agreement has been reached (ad referendum) on a number of provisions concerning less contentious issues: creation of a tripartite committee to oversee implementation of the agreement and development of further negotiations; establishment of an Israeli office in Lebanon; and prevention of cross-border terrorist attacks and inviolability of the border. In an important development this week, Lebanon finally fielded technicians to participate in bilateral "experts meetings" on economic affairs and narcotics matters.

Habib has pressed ahead despite the earlier Israeli reluctance to deal with security issues until Moshe Arens is in place. In the area of mutual relations, Habib and Draper are attempting to broker a consensus that builds on a Lebanese offer of interim "practical" arrangements on the movement of people and goods until a final agreement is reached. The political damage for Lebanon of the interim arrangements would be finessed by describing the details only in a "verbal understanding", not as part of the formal, public agreement. The Israeli team now does not reject (ad referendum) the suggestion that negotiations on a final agreement could begin not later than six months after the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon. Israel wants greater specificity and elaboration of "practical" arrangements on movement of people and goods during the interim period until a final agreement is reached. The Lebanese have proposed specific ideas on the movement of persons, and Habib and Draper are working on ideas for movement of goods.

On security arrangements, there is basic agreement on the concept of a security zone in southern Lebanon, within which there would be force and weapons limitations. Dispute remains

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on the extent of these limitations and the northern boundary of the zone. Israel still seeks five Israeli-manned "observation posts" in Lebanon.

[REDACTED] Habib is also proposing joint Lebanese/Israeli patrols to verify compliance as a further bridging idea. With regard to Haddad and his militia, Israel continues to insist that Haddad should be given a command position in southern Lebanon, and that his forces should be integrated into the Lebanese security forces in the area. Lebanon is prepared to integrate the Haddad militias but wants to reserve its sovereign right to determine their ultimate deployment, as well as Haddad's personal future. The Lebanese are, however, prepared to seek an "honorable" solution for Haddad, possibly by posting him abroad as Defense Attache or Ambassador. A further Habib bridging idea is the use of UNIFIL to protect Palestinian refugee camps throughout Lebanon; Israel remains opposed to any UNIFIL presence in the security zone.

Habib is now in Beirut to explore Lebanese reactions. Phil considered a trip to Damascus to begin work on the difficult Syrian angle and has decided that for now the Lebanese should take the lead with the Syrians. Indeed, another visit to Damascus by Lebanese emissary Jean Obeid is underway. Phil's judgment is that it would be best to have an Israeli-Lebanon agreement in place before he turns to the task of trying to nail down Syrian and PLO withdrawal, although the Lebanese are continuing their discussions with both parties on this subject.

[REDACTED]

Once the Lebanese-Israeli agreement is closer to final shape we will need to ensure that it is packaged carefully for Arab consumption and then [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] obtain moderate Arab support.

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L. Paul Premer, III
Executive Secretary

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ABLE. I FINALLY GOT FROM SHAMIR A PROMISE TO DEEM --
IN TOMORROW'S MEETING OF THE CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE --
AUTHORITY TO PROCEED FREELY WITH KIMCHE THE SPECIFIC
BRIDGING IDEAS WE HAVE IN MIND TO RESOLVE THE REMAIN-
ING ISSUES.

4. NEXT STEPS:

-- (A) DRAPER AND I WILL PRESS AHEAD HARD IN
"PARALLEL" NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO TO THREE DAYS
IN ISRAEL TO DEVELOP BRIDGING SOLUTIONS. WE HAVE
DEVELOPED A NEW DRAFT AGREEMENT AND A MILITARY ANNEX.
WE WILL IN ANY EVENT PUSH PARTS OF EACH FORWARD PIECE
BY PIECE AND, IF WE BELIEVE IT WILL NOT BE COUNTERPRO-
DUCTIVE IN THE POLITICAL SCENE HERE, WE WILL PRESENT
THE DRAFT IN FULL.

-- (B) WHEN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATING SESSIONS AT NETAN-
YA END ON FRIDAY, DRAPER WILL GO TO BEIRUT TO GAIN THE
ACCEPTANCE OF GEMAYEL AND OTHERS TO WHATEVER WE HAVE
EXTRACTED IN THE MEANTIME, WHILE I WILL STAY HERE TO
PUSH THE ISRAELIS.

-- (C) IN THE MEANTIME, THE SECRETARY SHOULD CALL IN
ARENS TO WORK HIM OVER HARD ON THE NEED FOR QUICK AGREE-
MENT, PARTICULARLY ON THE TWO MAIN ISSUES. ABOVE ALL,
ARENS MUST BE TOLD FIRMLY: (1) THAT A RESIDUAL IDF
PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS A NON-STARTER; AND (2) THAT THE
ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT PRESS THE LEBANESE TOO HARD FOR
NORMALIZATION.

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-- (D) AS SOON AS WE CAN COME WITHIN SHOUTING DIS-
TANCE OF A RESOLUTION OF THE TWO MAIN ISSUES, WE WILL
REINVIGORATE LEBANESE-SYRIAN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SPE-

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TO: The Deputy Secretary
FROM: NEA - David T. Schneider, Acting *WJZ*
SUBJECT: Your White House Briefing on the Middle East,
Friday, February 25 at 10:00 a.m.

SUMMARY

The NSC has asked you to brief the President and members of the NSC Friday morning in the White House Situation Room. They want to hear our analysis of where we stand in the peace process following the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Algiers and King Hussein's meeting today in London with Nick Veliotes and Dick Viets. In the Lebanon negotiations, there has been progress in recent days, indicated in two major ways:

-- in the direct Israel-Lebanon talks, the actual language of the less contentious elements of an agreement is being hammered out.

-- in bilateral talks with the Lebanese and Israel and in small meetings among the heads of delegation, possible compromises are emerging on the critical security issues and on mutual relations. The key test will be whether the Israeli political leadership is willing to adopt the emerging compromise formulas on the critical issues.

I. OBJECTIVES

1. Describe recent softening of Lebanese and Israeli negotiating positions and our efforts to chip away at remaining stumbling blocks, while cautioning that Israeli political leadership has yet to buy off on the compromises on the key issues which appear to be emerging.

2. Brief on latest developments in peace process.

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II. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES

Describe recent softening of Lebanese and Israeli negotiating positions and our efforts to chip away at remaining stumbling blocks, while cautioning that Israeli political leadership has yet to buy off on the compromises on the key issues which appear to be emerging.

Over the past two weeks there has been progress on the Israel/Lebanon negotiations, demonstrated primarily in two ways:


-- First, within the formal sessions, agreed provisions have been produced on several of the less contentious issues, (e.g. establishment of liaison offices, termination of hostile propaganda; prevention of cross-border terrorist attacks; prohibition on deployment of hostile foreign forces):

--Second, in off-the-record discussions among the heads of the three delegations, and in Habib's bilateral talks with the Israelis and Lebanese negotiators, possible compromises are emerging on mutual relations and some of the critical security issues.

-- However, it remains to be seen whether the Israeli political leadership will accept these emerging compromises, or whether they will even give them serious consideration until Arens is in place.

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TALKING POINTS

I. Less Contentious Issues

-- Agreement (ad referendum) has been reached in the Israel/Lebanon/U.S. negotiations on a number of provisions concerning the less contentious issues.

-- There is an important, agreed text on the creation of a committee (consisting of the U.S., Israel and Lebanon) to oversee the implementation of the agreement and the development of Israel/Lebanon negotiations'

-- There is agreement on the establishment of an Israeli office in Lebanon;

-- There is agreement on texts concerning the prevention of terrorist and other hostile attacks across the border, on reciprocal respect and recognition for the territorial integrity and political independence of the other, and for the inviolability of the border;

-- There is agreement in a formula which will prohibit the deployment of hostile foreign forces on the territory of either.

-- Initial "experts" meetings between Lebanon and Israel on economic issues and narcotics were finally held this week.

-- In the development of these texts, both Lebanon and Israel have backed away from original formulas, which were overly-rhetorical or tendentious.

II. Critical Issues

A. Mutual Relations.

-- The original Israeli position was that the agreement should include a detailed annex on normalization which would provide for the full range of mutual relations (trade, tourism, transportation, communication) and which would be implementable as soon as Israeli troops withdrew.

-- However, the Israeli negotiating team is now working on the basis of a Lebanese proposal, which would defer the negotiation of formal mutual relations until six months following completion of Israeli withdrawal. Israeli/Lebanese negotiators have now reached ad referendum agreement on a possible text.



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-- Key to Israeli acceptance of this approach is the Lebanese assurance that in the interim period there will be de facto movement of persons and goods. Significantly, the Israelis have for the first time suggested that these interim arrangements would not have to be formalized, but might be the subject of "verbal understandings". The Lebanese have put forward some specific ideas on the interim movement of persons and Habib and Draper are working to develop ideas on the movement of goods.

-- The purpose of this approach is to avoid adverse Arab reaction -- and possible Syrian refusal to withdraw -- if Lebanon goes too far in normalization, but also to provide Israel some basis for believing that its relations with Lebanon will develop over time, as President Gemayel has said.

B. Security Arrangements.

-- The Israel-Lebanon-U.S. talks have made some progress in resolving the less sensitive security issues, such as the need for a security zone with specific weapons limitations; territorial waters (Israel has dropped its insistence that it patrol Lebanese waters); and the integration of Haddad's forces into the Lebanese Army.

-- However, the major security issues remain.

-- Israel continues to seek five Israeli-manned observation posts in Lebanon, while Lebanon, with strong U.S. support, has resisted any residual Israeli presence.

-- Israel still objects to the presence of any international forces in southern Lebanon, whether UN or MNF. Lebanon has argued that it needs some assistance until the Lebanese Army becomes self-sufficient.

-- Israel continues to insist that Haddad should be given a command position in southern Lebanon, and that his forces should be integrated into the Lebanese security forces to be posted permanently in the area. Lebanon is prepared to integrate the Haddad militias but wants to reserve its sovereign right to determine their ultimate deployment, as well as Haddad's personal future. The Lebanese are, however, prepared to seek an "honorable" solution for Haddad, possibly by posting him abroad as defense attache or ambassador.

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-- Immediately after Sharon's resignation and pending the installation of Amb. Arens, there was an initial Israeli reluctance to deal seriously with the core security issues.

-- However, the Israeli negotiators have recently suggested confidentially to us that it was time for the United States to come forward with bridging ideas on the major security issues.

-- On the basis of discussions among the heads of the three delegations, and in direct talks with the Israelis and Lebanese, Habib and Draper have been exploring a compromise formula which incorporates the following concepts:

- (a) as a substitute for Israeli early warning stations, close intelligence cooperation between Israel and Lebanon and joint Israeli/Lebanon patrols to verify compliance with the agreement. Lebanon accepts both concepts.
- (b) utilization of UNIFIL for an interim period to provide protection for the Palestinian camps throughout Lebanon, including one UNIFIL battalion each at Sidon and Tyre;
- (c) integration of Haddad's forces into a Lebanese Army brigade which would be stationed in southern Lebanon, but with an "honorable" solution for Haddad himself, such as a posting abroad.
- (d) a definition of the security region based on topographical features.

--While these ideas have emerged from the negotiations as possible compromises, they have not been fully accepted by either the Israeli or Lebanese negotiators.

--More importantly, the key test will be whether the Israeli political leadership is willing to give serious consideration to the compromise areas -- in security arrangements and mutual relations -- which Habib and Draper are developing with the negotiators.

III. The Other Arabs

-- Habib considered when he should make a trip to Damascus to begin work on the difficult Syrian angle and has decided that for now he will let the Lebanese take the lead with the Syrians. Indeed, another visit to Damascus by Lebanese emissary Jean Obeid is underway.

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-- Once the Lebanese-Israeli agreement is closer to final shape we will need to ensure that it is packaged carefully for Arab consumption.

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-- Phil's judgement is that it would be best to have an Israeli-Lebanon agreement in place before he turns to the task of trying to nail down Syrian and PLO withdrawal, although the Lebanese are continuing their discussions with both parties on this subject.

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
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U.S. efforts in Lebanon are focussed now on negotiations to achieve the rapid withdrawal of all external forces--Israeli, Syrian and Palestinian--from Lebanon. We have the following policy objectives:

- The speedy withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon;
- A sovereign Lebanon under a strong central authority able to exercise control throughout its territory; and,
- Security for Israel from threats emanating from Lebanese territory.

After considerable wrangling over procedure, formal and direct talks are now underway between Lebanon and Israel. While substantive issues are being discussed, progress has been quite slow. In particular, there are wide differences over a framework for future relations between Lebanon and Israel. Israel is pressing hard for normalization of relations with Lebanon; concerned for its internal consensus and relations with the Arabs, Lebanon is resisting. Already, the question has generated considerable pressure on President Gemayel from Lebanon's Muslim community.

The continued presence of foreign troops in Lebanon threatens to hold up progress in the broader peace process, as well as to exacerbate confessional tensions inside Lebanon, where considerable fighting has been occurring. To inject greater urgency and to stress his personal concern for rapid progress in removing external forces from Lebanon, the President asked Ambassador Philip Habib to return to the region to help expedite the negotiations as we move forward in our broader efforts to achieve a workable peace in the area.

We envisage a negotiated solution which will ultimately treat as a package the key issues of Israeli withdrawal, security arrangements to protect northern Israel, and a framework for the evolution of relations between Lebanon and Israel. We believe that the negotiations should focus primarily on withdrawal and security arrangements, and that

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
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Lebanon will have to be the judge of how far it is capable of going in the area of normalization. We understand the political requirements of a still weak Lebanese government and the necessity to maintain the support of moderate Arabs. However, we must also recognize that it will be necessary to begin an evolutionary process in relations between Lebanon and Israel in order to achieve Israeli withdrawal. A balance will have to be struck between reasonable Israeli demands and what Lebanon is capable of bearing.

The Lebanese have also begun discussions with Syria and the PLO on the withdrawal of their forces. However, it is difficult to move far in these negotiations without progress in the talks with Israel. Our effort is to create a process whereby U.S. diplomacy could combine results in these concurrent negotiations to produce an agreed context for the departure of Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces.



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After the departure of external forces from Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces will no doubt require international assistance in meeting their security responsibilities. The Lebanese government has requested an expansion of the Multinational Force (MNF), and the U.S., supported by France and Italy, is seeking contributions of troops and funds to meet this request. The British have already pledged a 120-man unit. We do not, however, view an expanded MNF as a substitute for UNIFIL, which we hope will continue to provide a sizable peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. The U.S. will consider the Lebanese request positively, but we do not believe there is sufficient progress yet in the negotiations to require a decision on expanded U.S. participation in an MNF.

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TAGS: PEPR, LE, SA
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MESSAGE TO FAHD ON LEBANON
DISCUSSIONS AND BRIEFING ON HUSSEIN VISIT

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT)
2. GIVEN BELOW FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER DATED DECEMBER 22, 1982 FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB TO KING FAHD SUMMARIZING THE STATE OF PLAY WITH RESPECT TO LEBANON. THE LETTER IS BEING HAND CARRIED TO THE KING BY PRINCE BANDAR FOR DELIVERY DECEMBER 24.

3. BEGIN TEXT:
YOUR MAJESTY:

HAVING RETURNED TO WASHINGTON TO CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN ON OUR EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON REGAIN ITS FULL

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
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SOVEREIGNTY, I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU THE RESULTS OF MY RECENT TALKS IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE BANDAR, WITH WHOM I HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT DURING THESE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, HAS GRACIOUSLY AGREED TO

CONVEY THIS LETTER URGENTLY TO YOUR MAJESTY.



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OUR IMMEDIATE GOAL IS TO BRING ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS TO THE TABLE WITH LEBANESE COUNTERPARTS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME FOR SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE TALKS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. ISRAEL IS NO LONGER INSISTING UPON HOLDING TALKS IN JERUSALEM, AND WE ARE ASSISTING THE TWO SIDES IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON A VENUE, EITHER ALTERNATING BETWEEN SITES IN ISRAEL AND LEBANON OR IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE THIRD COUNTRY. TODAY I RECEIVED SOME ASSURANCES THAT THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS ARE ABOUT TO ANNOUNCE THEIR AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PRESENT DURING THE COMING MEETINGS, AND WE WILL WORK TO ENCOURAGE THEIR EARLY AND FAVORABLE CONCLUSION.

WE BELIEVE THERE IS A BASIS FOR A RAPID AND WORKABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: 1) THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES

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FROM LEBANON IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEPARTURE OF SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN FORCES; 2) PRACTICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL TO ASSURE THAT THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON DOES NOT OFFER ANY CAUSE FOR HOSTILITIES TO RECUR; AND 3) MEASURES GOVERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE PEACEABLE RELATIONS BUT WHICH WOULD NOT BE A PEACE TREATY. THE LEBANESE POSITION IS THAT ISSUES INVOLVING SECURITY AND RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL REMAIN OPEN TO NEGOTIATION.

I REGRET THAT THE NEED FOR ME TO BE IN WASHINGTON MADE A MEETING IMPOSSIBLE LAST WEEK BUT LOOK FORWARD TO RESUMING OUR DIRECT CONSULTATIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. I VALUE YOUR ADVICE IN ALL RESPECTS AND APPRECIATE ALL YOU HAVE DONE IN SUPPORT OF MY EFFORTS. IN THE MEANTIME, I HOPE YOU WILL AVAIL YOURSELF OF EITHER PRINCE BANDAR OR AMBASSADOR MURPHY TO INFORM ME OF ANY FURTHER VIEWS YOU BELIEVE WOULD BE HELPFUL.

END TEXT.

[REDACTED]


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Washington, D. C. 20520

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EXCISE

TO : The Secretary
FROM : NEA - Nicholas A. Veljotes
SUBJECT: Lebanon: How to Force the Pace

It is now a month since the President decided to force the pace of Lebanese negotiations by sending Phil Habib to the area with an American draft agreement, yet the Israeli and Lebanese negotiating teams have not yet even agreed on an agenda. Our primary policy objective of bringing about the prompt withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon with security arrangements in the south to protect northern Israel remains far from being reached. We once again are in danger of appearing to be unable to shape the course of events in the Middle East in order to implement our declared policies. At a time when Hussein is seeking support for his entry into the peace process based largely on our ability to deliver on our stated objectives, this is a posture which we must seek to avoid.

The Problem.

The continued slow pace of events in Lebanon is the result of several factors:

-- The format of the negotiations is extremely complex. We are after the withdrawal of Israeli forces on the one hand and PLO and Syrian forces on the other. Both sides are understandably uneasy to commit themselves to withdraw in the absence of a clear commitment from the other, and yet they do not sit at a common table. While negotiating a broad range of issues with the Israelis, the Lebanese are, on separate tracks, discussing withdrawal separately with the PLO and the Syrians.

-- Israeli and Lebanese negotiating objectives are in conflict. The Lebanese place priority on the withdrawal of foreign forces. The Israelis, in part for reasons of domestic politics, are not only insistent upon adequate security arrangements in the south but are also determined to extract political concessions which go well beyond their legitimate

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security requirements. They show no willingness to withdraw, and may even be unwilling to discuss withdrawal seriously, until their political desires are met. In the absence of a clear indication of Syrian readiness to withdraw, the Israelis have an excuse to avoid discussing the withdrawal of their own forces.

-- Syrian intentions remain a mystery. We have received completely conflicting signals from Damascus, [REDACTED] which leave us in doubt as to under exactly what conditions the Syrians will be prepared to agree to withdraw. (The PLO does seem prepared to withdraw, but there is no incentive for them to do so in the absence of a clear Syrian decision.)

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-- The Lebanese political dynamic requires a consensus among the top leadership to sustain Lebanese positions on key issues. We have already had one example of the Lebanese delegation attempting to be accommodating, achieving Israeli agreement, and then having to withdraw their own formulation when the Prime Minister threatened to resign.

-- Israel's ultimate objective remains unclear. Beyond the Israeli desire for adequate security arrangements and a new relationship with Lebanon, there is the understanding that protracted negotiations on Lebanon could doom the President's September initiative to which Israel remains opposed. There is thus no inherent reason for the Israelis to push the Lebanese negotiations forward at a rapid pace.

Dealing with The Problem.

It is our conclusion that we will have to become much more active than we have thus far been if we are to achieve the withdrawal of external forces from Lebanon in the near term. Realistically, our actions will have to be focussed on two distinct elements of the situation -- The PLO/Syrian withdrawal and the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon.

The PLO and Syria.

We inevitably have less influence on the Syrians than on either the Lebanese or the Israelis, and we have even less on the PLO. The Lebanese have established their own channel with the PLO leadership in Tunis and have asked that we make Ambassador Cutler available to be in contact with the Lebanese negotiators there. We are prepared to send Chris Ross to Tunis to support Cutler when the talks reach a level of detail requiring on-site expertise. Ross has been working closely with Phil and Morrie Draper in the negotiations thus far and speaks both French and Arabic fluently. He would provide Phil

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and Morrie as well as Washington an indispensable window on the progress being made between Lebanon with the PLO.

Israel-Lebanon Negotiations.

It is apparent that we will soon have to put into play an American draft agreement similar to that which Phil took out with him last month. The Israelis and Lebanese, through the secret channel, had arrived at a strikingly similar document, with the major difference that their "working paper" lacked a schedule for the withdrawal of external forces, which ours contained. More importantly, the status of the "working paper" has remained in dispute since it first surfaced; the use of our own draft would thus avoid another procedural dispute and would provide us greater control over events. The Lebanese should also find it easier to accept some aspects of normalization if presented in the context of a U.S. package proposal. We have attached our previous draft at Tab A. We are in the process of revising it with a view toward incorporating certain elements of the Lebanese-Israeli "working paper" in order to maximize its utility as a forcing mechanism.

Timing.

The Israelis and Lebanese may still be able to agree on an agenda before the week is out. If not, we will want to end this procedural dispute as quickly as possible. If they do agree on an agenda, they should at least be allowed to begin their discussion of substantive issues in order to create the context in which the tabling of our draft would be most effective. In either case, early next week is probably the appropriate point at which to bring Phil Habib into play once again. He could go out with our draft, carrying messages from the President to Begin, Gemayel and other leaders as appropriate. Before tabling a draft, Habib proposes to discuss it thoroughly with the Israelis, reach an agreed version if possible and then take it to Gemayel. To the extent that an agreed draft is achieved, the task of the plenary negotiating sessions will be simplified and the time-frame shortened. If this formula does not produce results within two weeks we would need to give careful thought to whether a public address by the Secretary would be appropriate to lay the domestic political groundwork for what could be a rough period, especially with the Israelis.

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Even while we are waiting for the Israeli-Lebanese negotiation to reach the point where our draft can be tabled, we will be doing what we can to prod the Lebanese-PLO discussions in Tunis and to continue working on the Syrians through the Saudis. Indeed, to the extent that we can make headway with the Syrians and the PLO, our subsequent task with the Israelis and Lebanese will be that much easier.

Attachment:

Tab A - Previous Draft

Drafter: NEA:WAKirby:jl
1-5-83 Wang:31818

Cleared: NEA/IAI:MPendleton
NEA/ARN:DMack
NEA:NAVeliotos
Amb. Habib

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12/17 to Ned Walker
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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

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TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, PLO, US, IS, LE () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE POSITION
ON SHARON'S "WORKING PAPER"

REF: JERUSALEM 3815 (NOTAL)

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT OUR MEETING TODAY, DECEMBER 17, WITH GEMAYEL, TUENI AND HADDAD, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WORKING PAPER ON THE "BASIC ELEMENTS AND GUIDELINES" FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SHARON HAD OUTLINED TO US ON TUESDAY NIGHT (REFTEL).
3. GEMAYEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MEETINGS HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE LEBANESE CONFIDANT (WHOM HE HAD MENTIONED TO DRAPER SOME TIME AGO), AND THE DECEMBER 14 DRAFT WAS MERELY THE LATEST -- IN FACT THE FIFTH DRAFT -- OF PAPERS WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PROVIDING AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISORS REGARDED THE LATEST WORKING PAPER AS MERELY AN AGENDA AND NOT AS A GUIDELINES PAPER POINTING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE DESIRED OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WERE SOME POINTS IN THE WORKING PAPER WHICH COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE ACCEPTED BY LEBANON.
4. AS A RESULT OF THIS EXCHANGE, WE WORKED OUT A POSSIBLE LEBANESE POSITION WHICH MIGHT BE CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELIS. THE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THIS POSITION IS THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD ACCEPT THE WORKING PAPER AS THE BASIS FOR AN AGENDA, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD WANT TO RAISE OTHER AGENDA ISSUES. CAST THIS WAY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ISRAELI/LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECIPITATING A CRISIS IN LEBANON AND WITHOUT DOING UNDUE DAMAGE TO ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, SHARON TRIED TO OVERSELL HIS COLLEAGUES AS WELL AS US ON WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE SEPARATE CHANNEL DISCUSSION.

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
... OF SEEING BEGIN
ON SATURDAY NIGHT TO REVIEW OUR RESPECTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS
OF THE SITUATION AND TO SET THE STAGE FOR MOVING AHEAD
ON ISRAELI/LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY
I JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DIEGN, DRAPER AND I MET WITH
WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FOR MORE THAN TWO HOURS. TEL
AFTERNOON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 17. GEMAYEL WAS JOINED
BY PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELORS TUENI AND WADIA HADPAD.

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7. I SAID THAT DRAPER AND I HAD HAD GOOD DISCUSSIONS
IN WASHINGTON. WE HAD RETURNED TO THE AREA WITH IN-
STRUCTIONS TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND
BRING ABOUT THE SPEEDIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
FOREIGN FORCES. THE TWO BASIC ELEMENTS IN OUR POLICY
CONTINUE TO BE: 1) WITHDRAWAL; AND 2) SUPPORT FOR
A UNITED, INTEGRAL, AND FULLY SOVEREIGN LEBANON.

8. I SAID THAT I HAD GONE TO ISRAEL FIRST TO TRY TO
SET UP A "COURSE OF ACTION" ALONG THE LINES DRAPER HAD
DISCUSSED PRIVATELY WITH GEMAYEL; BUT THE ISRAELIS
HAD INFORMED US OF THEIR EXCHANGES WITH THE LEBANESE IN A
SEPARATE CHANNEL THROUGH ANOTHER INTERMEDIARY. SHARON
HAD DESCRIBED TO US A WORKING PAPER, CONTAINING "BASIC
ELEMENTS AND GUIDELINES" FOR ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS.
I MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAD NO FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WITH THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE WORKING PAPER, IF IT WERE ACCEPTABLE
TO THE LEBANESE, BUT WE HAD TO KNOW PRECISELY WHERE
MATTERS STOOD.

9. GEMAYEL WENT INTO A LONG EXPLANATION



HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT REAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE ISRAELIS HAD TO INVOLVE THE US, AND THAT HE WOULD
NOT WANT TO DEAL OFFICIALLY WITH THE ISRAELIS WITHOUT
HAVING THE US AS A FULL PARTNER. THE ISRAELIS, ON
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
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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

THE OTHER HAND, HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIM PERSONALLY AND DIRECT BILATERAL CONTACTS GENERALLY WITH HIS GOVERNMENT; THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT LIKE US INVOLVEMENT AND HAD OFFERED "MANY THINGS" IF HE, GEMAYEL, WOULD ENTER INTO DIRECT TALKS WITH THEM.



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11. GEMAYEL WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PROVIDING WORKING PAPERS THROUGH THIS INTERMEDIARY FOR SOME WEEKS AND THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LEBANESE FORCES HAD ALSO BEEN INVOLVED FROM TIME TO TIME. THE DECEMBER 14 DRAFT WAS ACTUALLY THE FIFTH IN A SERIES. THE ISRAELIS HAD WITHDRAWN SOME OF THEIR EARLIER PAPERS BUT RECENTLY HAD INDICATED THEY WERE UNDER TERRIFIC PRESSURE FROM THE US TO MOVE FORWARD ON NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAD PRESSED FAIRLY HARD RECENTLY. IN FACT, HE SAID, THE ISRAELIS HAD UNDERTAKEN THEIR LATEST INITIATIVE -- WITH THE DEC. 14 WORKING PAPER -- FOLLOWING A NEW YORK SPEECH BY SHARON IN WHICH HE HAD PORTRAYED HIM, GEMAYEL, AS AN OBSTACLE. GEMAYEL MADE IT CLEAR IN RESPONSE THAT HE "WAS READY TO LISTEN." IT WAS IMPORTANT, HE SAID, TO LOOK EVEN THROUGH "PARALLEL CHANNELS" FOR WAYS TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWALS OF FOREIGN FORCES.

12. AS REGARDS THE LAST FORMULATION OF DECEMBER 14, GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE HAD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE HAD NO MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO IT BUT THAT HE NEEDED TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE ISRAELIS "THROUGH THE US." IN FACT, HE SAID, HE HAD BEEN LED TO UNDERSTAND THAT I HAD BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF THE PAPER SOMEWHAT EARLIER THAN LAST NIGHT.

13. GEMAYEL SAID THERE WERE SOME SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WORKING PAPER, INCLUDING THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR WARNING STATIONS, FOR ENVOYS IN THE BEIRUT AREA, AS REGARDS THE HADDAD FORCES, AND AS REGARDS THEIR OBJECTION TO UN OBSERVERS IN THE BORDER AREA.

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12. I MADE IT CLEAR REPEATEDLY TO GEMAYEL THAT I HAD NO PROBLEM WITH A WORKING PAPER AS SUCH, PARTICULARLY IF IT HELPED GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. I HAD TO UNDERSTAND FULLY WHETHER HE HAD APPROVED THE PAPER AS A BASIC GUIDELINE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I STRESS THAT THE WORKING PAPER WAS PROBABLY GOING TO BE DRESSSED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET ON SUNDAY, AND THAT -- IF AGREED THERE -- IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A DIRECTION IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO HEAD.

15. TUENI AND HADDAD BROKE IN TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THE ISRAELI DOCUMENT TO BE SO FORMAL. IN FACT, HADDAD SAID THAT HE HAD DRAFTED INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE IN RESPONDING TO THE ISRAELI WORKING PAPER. AFTER A GREAT DEAL OF GIVE AND TAKE, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT GEMAYEL AND HIS COLLEAGUES CONSIDERED THE WORKING PAPER AS GUIDELINES FOR THE ISRAELI DELEGATION ONLY, AND THAT IT COULD NOT BE BINDING ON THE LEBANESE SIDE. AS HADDAD PUT IT, THE PAPER HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN "DUE PROCESS" ON THE LEBANESE SIDE.

16. IT BECAME EQUALLY CLEAR THAT GEMAYEL HAD BEEN THINKING IN TERMS OF THE FRENCH INTERPRETATION OF A "WORKING PAPER," WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY THE EQUIVALENT OF AN AGENDA.

17. AT ABOUT THIS JUNCTURE, I SAID THAT THERE WAS NOW THE MAKINGS OF A TRULY SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. DESPITE ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THE WORKING PAPER WOULD NOT BE LEAKED, AND DESPITE MY OWN EFFORTS TO KEEP REPORTS OF MY MEETINGS IN ISRAEL ON A CLOSELY HELD BASIS, A GOOD DEAL WAS NOW COMING OUT IN THE ISRAELI PRESS ABOUT SHARON'S PERSONAL EFFORTS TO SCORE A "BREAKTHROUGH." AS THEY LOOKED OVER WHAT HAD ALREADY COME OUT IN THE PRESS, GEMAYEL BECAME VERY UPSET. HE ASKED DILLON AND ME TO HAVE A TALK WITH PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN LATER IN THE DAY; AND WE AGREED TO DO THIS. I ASKED GEMAYEL WHETHER HE HAD HEARD ANYTHING FROM THE ISRAELIS ABOUT A NEW VENUE IN A EUROPEAN CITY. HE ANSWERED THAT HE HAD NOT BUT WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH MEETINGS IN SUCH PLACES AS ROME OR GENEVA. AS REGARDS SHARON'S COMMENTS THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD START WITHIN A FEW DAYS, GEMAYEL PROFESSED SOME SURPRISE. HE SUDDENLY SEEMED TO BECOME AWARE THAT EVENTS WERE MOVING RAPIDLY.

18. WE DISCUSSED WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT GET THINGS BACK ON TRACK TOWARDS A REAL NEGOTIATION, AND WITHOUT IT

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

CONFRONTING THE ISRAELIS IN A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WAY. I STRESSED THAT THE LEBANESE IN EFFECT HAD ACCEPTED THE WORKING PAPER AS A BASIC AGENDA, AND THAT THIS COULD BE A DEFENSIBLE POSITION, INCLUDING IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC LEBANESE POLITICS. THE PAPER, I STRESSED AGAIN, WAS "NOT BAD," ALTHOUGH HADDAD AND TUENI BOTH STRESSED THE DEMANDS THE PLO EVACUATE FULLY BEFORE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT BE TERMINATED WERE IMPOSSIBLE PRECONDITIONS.

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

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TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN, DECEMBER 16

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: AT OUR MEETING TONIGHT, THURSDAY, DEC. 16, WITH BEGIN, SHARON, AND THEIR COLLEAGUES, I OUTLINED IN DETAIL WHAT I CONSIDERED A REASONABLE POSITION ON THE ISRAELI OCTOBER PROPOSAL, POINT BY POINT, COVERING WITHDRAWAL, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, NORMALIZATION, ETC. I MADE THIS PRESENTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN APPROACH CALLING FOR THE WIDEST POSSIBLE COMMON UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS RELEVANT TO A SOLUTION FOR THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR URGENCY AND SET THE STAGE TO GO INTO DETAIL ON A "COURSE OF ACTION" ALONG THE LINES WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON.
3. BEFORE MOVING TO SPECIFICS, HOWEVER, I ASKED FOR THE ISRAELI REACTION. AT THIS POINT SHARON -- ENJOYING THE DRAMA OF THE SITUATION -- REPORTED THAT THROUGH SECRET DISCUSSIONS, ISRAEL AND LEBANON HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON A "WORKING PAPER" WHICH CONSISTED OF GUIDE-

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LINES FOR DIRECT ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GUIDELINES COVERED ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF PLO, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM. ACCORDING TO SHARON, THESE GUIDELINES HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CLARIFICATIONS, ALTHOUGH NOT SHARED WITH HIS CABINET. THE WORKING PAPER IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE ISRAELI CABINET ON DECEMBER 19, AFTER WHICH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FORMAL AGREEMENT COULD THEORETICALLY BEGIN WITHIN A FEW DAYS. THE WORKING PAPER REFLECTS KEY POSITIONS WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD PUT FORTH IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS AND THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE APPROVED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET.

4. DESPITE THE ASSERTION THAT GEMAYEL HAD APPROVED THE PAPER, WE WILL NEED TO CONFIRM THIS OURSELVES BY GOING TO BEIRUT TOMORROW. IF GEMAYEL IS ON BOARD, A BREAK-THROUGH OF SORTS WILL HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. EVEN SO THERE WILL BE DIFFICULTIES. GEMAYEL WILL NEED CABINET APPROVAL. THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEME CALLS FOR PLO DEPARTURE TO BE COMPLETE BEFORE ISRAEL BEGINS WITHDRAWING. FURTHERMORE, THERE WILL REMAIN THE NEED TO CONVINCE THE SYRIANS TO AGREE TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH THE ISRAELIS. OTHER COMPLICATIONS COULD ARISE BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT GEMAYEL MAY HAVE AGREED TO CERTAIN ISRAELI DEMANDS THE SYRIANS (AND PERHAPS OTHER ARABS) WILL FIND DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. THUS, UNTIL WE HAVE MET WITH GEMAYEL WE SHOULD RESERVE JUDGEMENT AS TO THE EXTENT OF PROGRESS. IT IS ALSO OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THIS REPORT BE ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS; PARTICULARLY PENDING ISRAELI CABINET CONSIDERATION.

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5. PLEASE NOTE THAT AT THE END OF THE MEETING, I MET ALONE WITH BEGIN TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND TO STRESS THE NEED FOR CLEAR AND RAPID PROGRESS. END SUMMARY.

6. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DRAPER, PLUS STAFF, I MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH BEGIN THE EVENING OF DEC. 15. BEGIN WAS JOINED BY SHARON, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER NISSIM AND A FULL PANOPLY OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISERS.

7. I SAID THAT DRAPER AND I HAD COME FROM CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE INTENTION OF RESTORING OUR DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL AND SEEKING SUBSTANTIVE UNDERSTANDING, SO THAT WE COULD ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. I SAID THAT DRAPER'S TRIP TO LEBANON HAD BEEN SOLELY TO ACCELERATE LEBANON'S TALKS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIA, AND HAD SUCCEEDED, AS DEMONSTRATED BY GEMAYEL'S PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ASSAD AND HIS SENDING OF AN EMIS-SARY (OBAYU) TO DAMASCUS YESTERDAY. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE LEBANESE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE SYRIANS AND PLO.

8. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING FORWARD RAPIDLY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND ARGUED THAT DELAY WOULD ONLY LEAD TO INCREASED DISORDER IN LEBANON AND PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. I SAID THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE ALSO KNEW EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS VERY WELL. I SAID THAT THE TIME HAD NOW COME TO TRY TO WRAP UP SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON EVERY ISSUE. WE DID NOT HAVE A US BLUEPRINT, BUT WE WANTED TO DISCUSS EACH ELEMENT TOGETHER AND SEE WHERE

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

WE ARE TOGETHER. WE WERE NOT DOING THIS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ISRAELI/LEBANON DIRECT TALKS, WHICH WE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT, BUT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THOSE TALKS BEGAN THERE WAS A SOLID BASIS OF COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THEIR RAPID CONCLUSION. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A PROTRACTED PROCESS, AND THAT I BELIEVED LEBANON AND ISRAEL AGREED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT. I THEN PROCEEDED TO TAKE EACH OF THE POINTS IN THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION OF OCTOBER 10, BEGINNING WITH THE SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL, AND PRESENTED "US IDEAS" ON EACH:
-- A) SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL: WE AGREE THAT, AS A FIRST STEP, ALL PW'S, MIA'S AND BODIES SHOULD BE RETURNED, BUT ASK WHAT HAPPENS TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOM ISRAEL HAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY FOR ACTS HOSTILE TO ITS SECURITY?
-- AS A SECOND STEP, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PLO SHOULD "BEGIN TO LEAVE LEBANON," AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE TIED TO THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI CONDITION THAT ALL THE PLO MUST LEAVE.

-- THIRD STEP -- SYRIAN/ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT, WITH MNF AS INTERPOSITION FORCE -- GIVES US NO PROBLEM. IN CONTRAST TO THE ISRAELI POSITION, WE WOULD FORESEE THE COMPLETION OF PLO WITHDRAWAL AT ABOUT THIS STAGE. THIS

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WOULD BE PART OF A PACKAGE PLAN FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL.

--FOURTH STEP -- SYRIA AND ISRAEL COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWAL WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE BEGINNING OR END OF THE INITIAL DISENGAGEMENT OPERATION (EXPECTED TO REQUIRE ONLY 3-4 DAYS). AS WITHDRAWAL OCCURS, COORDINATION AMONG THE LAF, MNF, AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY.

-- B. PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

-- PREVENTION OF ALL ACTS OF HOSTILITY FROM THE TERRITORY OF EITHER SIDE: WE AGREE, AND FEEL THIS SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS TO PROHIBIT ALL HOSTILE ACTS, THE UNAUTHORIZED CROSSING OF BORDER BY ARMED INDIVIDUALS OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, HOSTILE PROPAGANDA, AND INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE A CONFIRMATION OF THE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY.

-- PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF OR ENTRY BY ANY FOREIGN FORCES INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY UNLESS AGREED TO BY BOTH PARTIES: WE AGREE IF THIS MEANS A RECIPROCAL PROHIBITION ON THE STATIONING OF HOSTILE RPT HOSTILE FOREIGN FORCES. IT COULD NOT COVER SOMETHING LIKE THE MNF. BEYOND THIS, THERE HAS TO BE SOME WAY OF DEFINING WHAT IS HOSTILE AND WHAT IS NOT. IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE TWO PARTIES ACCEPT THE JUDGMENT OF THE U.S.

-- PREVENTION OF ACTIVITY BY PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS: YES, WE WOULD SUPPORT RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS TO REFRAIN FROM SUPPORTING OR ACQUIESCING IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. THERE WOULD BE NO EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS FOR THE PLO OR OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS, AND THERE COULD BE NO CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE.

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

-- WE AGREE THERE WILL BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEGOTIATING
FUTURE DETAILS OF NORMALIZATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
LEBANON. WE AGREE THAT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE NORMALIZA-
TION SHOULD BE STATED AS A GOAL.

-- THERE WILL BE REPRESENTATION OF EACH STATE IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE OTHER. HOW THIS IS MANAGED SHOULD BE
RESOLVED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. WE BELIEVE IN THE
NECESSITY OF CONTINUING TO DISCUSS A FULLER AND GREATER
NORMALIZATION, ENDING, WE HOPE, IN A PEACE TREATY. THE
LEBANESE TOO SEE THIS AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

-- IN LIEU OF FORMAL PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATING A
PEACE AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE A CONFORMA-
TION OF THE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY AND THE ABSENCE
OF A STATE OF WAR. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT IS TOO EARLY
TO ESTABLISH A MECHANISM FOR NEGOTIATING A PEACE TREATY.
THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
EVOLVE.

9. THE ISRAELIS HAD VERY FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT MY PRESEN-
TATION OF OUR IDEAS. WHY THIS WAS SO BECAME APPARENT
ONLY LATER. THEIR MAJOR QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON THE FOLLOW-
ING AREAS:

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-- NATURE OF TALKS WITH SYRIA AND PLO. BEGIN WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT WHO WOULD TALK TO THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. I REVIEWED OUR EFFORTS TO URGE THE LEBANESE TO INTENSIFY CONTACTS WITH BOTH PARTIES. ON THE PLO, THE LEBANESE HAD ALREADY TAKEN THE FIRST STEP. WE ENVISAGED THE SAME PROCEDURES AS THIS SUMMER, WITH THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO AND THE US BEING HELPFUL WHENEVER IT COULD, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH ISSUES AS DESTINATIONS, FINANCING OF DEPARTURES, ETC.

-- PRIORITY OF PLO DEPARTURE. -- BEGIN STRESSED THAT IT REMAINED ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT ANY MOVE BY ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD BEGIN AFTER THE PLO HAD LEFT. I PRESSED HIM TO ACCEPT OUR IDEA THAT ISRAELI FORCES COULD BEGIN TO DEPART WHEN THE PLO FORCES HAD STARTED TO LEAVE, BUT HE CAME BACK WITH A VEHEMENT "NO." WARNING THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE THAT THE TRAGEDIES AND AGGRESSIVE ACTS OF THE PAST WOULD NOT OCCUR AGAIN. I ARGUED THAT THE PLO WOULD CERTAINLY NOT STAY IN LEBANON WITHOUT SYRIAN PROTECTION AND THAT IN ANY CASE IT WAS DESIRABLE TO GIVE THE LEBANESE SOME FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM TO MANEUVER ON THIS ISSUE. BEGIN WAS UNMOVED, SO I LEFT IT THAT WE WOULD SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOPED. DRAPER LATER REMARKED THAT THE ISRAELI CONDITION LEFT THE PLO WITH A "VETO" OVER PROGRESS.

-- REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS, I REPEATED THAT THE PROCESS HAD STARTED, BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO BRING THEMSELVES TO DEMAND A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IN EXPLICIT TERMS, PERHAPS WITH A DATE CERTAIN. THIS I KNEW, FROM MY TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS, WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER ARAB STATES, AND SYRIA WOULD HAVE TO HONOR THE LEBANESE DEMAND. HOWEVER, SYRIA WAS

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A DIFFICULT PARTNER AND MIGHT WELL UPSET THE BEST OF PLANS. FOR THIS REASON, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO SPEAK OF "CONCURRENT," NOT "SIMULTANEOUS" DEPARTURES. GEMAYEL HAD CALLED ASSAD YESTERDAY THANKS TO DRAPER'S EFFORTS.

10. AFTER THE ISRAELIS HAD POSED THEIR FEW QUESTIONS, SHARON EXPRESSED HIS HAPPINESS AT MY REFERENCE TO CO-OPERATION BETWEEN US ON LEBANON, SINCE, HE SAID, ALL THREE PARTIES, INCLUDING LEBANON, HAVE THE SAME BASIC INTERESTS THERE. HE WENT ON TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES, WHERE HE RECOGNIZED THE USEFULNESS OF AMERICAN "GOOD OFFICES," AND THE NEGOTIATION OF SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION ARRANGEMENTS, WHERE HE STRESSED THAT DIRECT LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WERE THE ONLY WAY TO GO. HE THEN REVEALED POINTEDLY THAT HE HAD BEEN WORKING ON THIS FOR SOME 60 DAYS, MEETING WITH "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL," AT THE DIRECTION OF BEGIN AND SHAMIR. TWO DAYS AGO (DECEMBER 14), THE TWO PARTIES HAD MANAGED TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON WORKING PAPER INCORPORATING THE MAIN POINTS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE INITIATION OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. US PARTICIPATION WOULD BE WELCOME, AND ISRAEL WOULD BE HAPPY IF THE US WERE PREPARED TO SIGN OR PROVIDE GUARANTEES. SOME POINTS REQUIRED FURTHER CLARIFICATION, BUT BASIC AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED.

11. SHARON THEN READ THE FOLLOWING PAPER, WHICH HE AGREED TO GIVE US AT A FUTURE TIME (THE TEXT BELOW IS AN AMALGRAM OF OUR NOTES, AND THE ACTUAL PAPER MAY VARY SLIGHTLY):

BASIC ELEMENTS AND GUIDELINES

WORKING PAPER

DECEMBER 14, 1982

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

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CREATE ANY PROBLEMS CONCERNING DIRECT AGREEMENTS FREELY REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON? WE HOPED TO ASSIST THE TWO IN REACHING ACCOMMODATIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES.

13. I ASKED SHARON WHAT THE NEXT STEPS WERE. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST WAS FOR THE ISRAELI CABINET TO APPROVE THE WORKING PAPER, AND TO DECIDE ON HOW (AND WHERE) DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN. (FOLLOWING THE MEETING, KIMCHE TOLD LEWIS THAT GENEVA WAS THE LIKELY SITE, WITH ROME A SECOND CHOICE). IF THE CABINET AGREED, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN "SHORTLY", WHICH SHARON SAID COULD BE AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. AT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, ISRAEL WOULD PRESENT A DRAFT AGREEMENT ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND NORMALIZATION, WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE OCT. 10 ISRAELI CABINET DECISION AND THE AGREED WORKING PAPER.

14. I ASKED SHARON WHETHER THE WORKING PAPER HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE LEBANESE CABINET. SHARON SAID IT HAD NOT, AND SAID THAT HE EXPECTED GEMAYEL TO PUT IT TO THE CABINET SHORTLY. SAM LEWIS AND I PRESSED SHARON ON WHETHER GEMAYEL HAD IN FACT REALLY ACCEPTED THE DOCUMENT IN FULL. SHARON SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD READ THE DOCUMENT AND ACCEPTED IT, BUT WANTED CLARIFICATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, GEMAYEL HAD ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF AN ISRAELI JEEP WERE AMBUSHED ON THE WAY TO RESUPPLY ONE OF THE ISRAELI-MANNED EARLY-WARNING STATIONS. (SAM PURSUED THE EXTENT OF GEMAYEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE WORKING PAPER AGAIN FOLLOWING THE MEETING. TO PROVE THAT GEMAYEL HAD ACCEPTED THE PAPER, SHARON SHOWED LEWIS THE ORIGINAL DRAFT, WHICH HAD LINES DRAWN THROUGH A PROVISION INDICATING THAT LEBANON WOULD BECOME A NEUTRAL COUNTRY. SHARON SAID THAT THE REFERENCE TO LEBANON'S NEUTRALITY HAD BEEN INCLUDED,

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BUT THAT GEMAYEL HAD SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED HIS MIND AND ASKED FOR ITS DELETION.)

15. I SAID WE WERE PLEASED THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE HAD APPEARED TO ACCOMPLISH SO MUCH, BUT CAUTIONED THAT IT REMAINED URGENT THAT WE COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS AND BEGIN THE WITHDRAWAL. I ASKED SHARON HOW LONG HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS. SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARING A DRAFT AGREEMENT, WHICH HE EXPECTED TO REVIEW TOMORROW. HE SAID THAT THE DRAFT WOULD BE PRESENTED AT THE OPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE REFUSED TO SPECULATE ON THE LENGTH OF NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE DOCUMENT BE SOUND AND FORESTALL ANY NEED FOR ISRAEL TO ENTER LEBANON AGAIN. I ASKED SHARON HOW LONG WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE ONCE AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, AND AGAIN MENTIONED OUR IDEA OF A 30-DAY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. SHARON SAID THIS WAS A TECHNICAL MATTER WHICH DEPENDED ON LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DECLINED TO SPECULATE.

16. I ASKED SHARON WHETHER HE ENVISAGED AN INITIAL DIS-ENGAGEMENT AS PART OF THE PACKAGE, AND WHETHER HE FORESAW AN INTERPOSITION ROLE FOR THE MNF. SHARON SAID THAT AFTER THE LEBANESE HAD SIGNED THE AGREEMENT, AFTER ISRAELI POW'S AND MIAs AND FALLEN BODIES HAD BEEN RETURNED, AND AFTER THE PLO HAD COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN, A SIMULTANEOUS ISRAEL/ SYRIA DISENGAGEMENT WAS CONTEMPLATED. THE ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT LINE WOULD RUN FROM SOUTH OF DAMOUR, THROUGH BAYT-A-DIN, NORTH OF JANNIN, CROSSING JABUL BARUK, AND TO QUARIN LAKE. THE SYRIANS WOULD LEAVE THE MOUNT LEBANON RANGE TO THE BEKAA. THE MNF WOULD DEPLOY AS AN INTERPOSITION FORCE. THEREAFTER, SIMULTANEOUS ISRAEL/ LEBANON WITHDRAWAL WOULD PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ALREADY AGREED SCHEDULE. (COMMENT: THIS SEQUENCE OF

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

MOVEMENTS, WHICH IS APPARENTLY INCORPORATED IN THE
LEBANESE/ISRAELI WORKING PAPER, IS IDENTICAL TO THE
SEQUENCE OF MOVEMENTS PRESENTED IN THE ISRAELI CABINET
DECISION OF OCT. 10).

17. I THEN OUTLINED FOR BEGIN MY NEXT STEPS. I SAID THAT
I WOULD GO TO LEBANON TOMORROW AND MEET WITH GAMAYEL.
I WOULD DISCUSS THE WORKING PAPER, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT I
WOULD NOT OBJECT TO ANYTHING WHICH LEBANON HAD ACCEPTED.
I SAID THAT IT WOULD COME BACK SUNDAY TO LEARN OF THE
ISRAELI CABINET DECISION, OR EARLIER IF NECESSITATED BY
MY TALKS WITH GAMAYEL. AT THIS POINT, SHAMON INTERRUPTED
TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM IN MY GOING OVER THE
SPECIFICS OF THE DOCUMENT WITH GAMAYEL. HE STRESSED THAT
GAMAYEL DID NOT KNOW THAT ISRAEL WAS SHARING THE PAPER
WITH US, AND CAUTIONED US ABOUT GOING OVER THE DETAILS
WITH GAMAYEL SINCE GAMAYEL STILL NEEDED "CLARIFICATIONS"
ON SEVERAL POINTS.

18. I RE-EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN INTER-
FERING WITH WHAT ISRAEL HAD ACHIEVED. HOWEVER, IT WAS
IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN UNDERSTOOD FULL WHERE
THINGS STOOD. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD INDICATED PUBLICLY

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HIS SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, AND ISRAELI SECURITY. THE PRESIDENT WAS COMMITTED TO EACH OF THESE GOALS AND WANTED TO KNOW WHERE THINGS STOOD. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIMING. LEWIS ADDED THAT A QUICK ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WAS IMPORTANT SO THAT THE UNUS COULD BE PUT ON SYRIA TO ACCEPT A SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL. SHARON THEN AGREED THAT I SHOULD DISCUSS THE PAPER IN A MEETING WITH GAMAYEL ALONE.

19. FOLLOWING OUR MEETING, I MET PRIVATELY WITH BEGIN AND DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, WHICH BEGIN READ AND CHARACTERIZED AS WARM. I REPEATED THE NEED FOR CLEAR, VISIBLE AND EARLY PROGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. HE DID NOT TAKE ISSUE. BEGIN AGREED THAT WE WOULD MEET AFTER THE CABINET SESSION ON SUNDAY SO THAT I COULD HAVE A FULL READ-OUT FOR THE PRESIDENT ON WHERE WE STOOD AND WHAT NEXT STEPS WERE CONTEMPLATED.

20. WHILE I WAS MEETING PRIVATELY WITH BEGIN, TAMIR TOLD KHECZKO THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD BE ASKED TO APPROVE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE. KIMCHE SEPARATELY TOLD LEWIS THAT GENEVA WAS THE PREFERRED SITE, BUT THAT ROME WAS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. IN RESPONSE TO KHECZKO'S QUESTION, TAMIR SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT EITHER TUENI OR SALIM KNEW ABOUT THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS OR THE AGREED WORKING PAPER. (TAMIR SAID THAT HE HAD NEGOTIATED THE TEXTS; KIMCHE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT MOST OF THE SESSIONS. SHARON SAID THAT THE WORKING PAPER HAD GONE THROUGH FOUR DRAFTS.) TAMIR SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE, BUT THAT HE BELIEVED THAT FATTAL KNEW ABOUT THE TEXTS. TAMIR ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT DIRECT

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NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN WITHOUT THE WORKING PAPER BEING MADE PUBLIC. HE THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS ONLY FATTAL WOULD KNOW ABOUT ITS CONTENTS, BUT THAT IT WOULD NEVERTHELESS "GUIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS."

21. COMMENT: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT REACH ANY HASTY CONCLUSIONS. FIRST AND FOREMOST, I WILL NEED TO CONFIRM WITH GEMAYEL PERSONALLY WHETHER OR NOT GEMAYEL ACCEPTS THE WORKING PAPER, AND THE EXTENT OF THE "CLARIFICATIONS" WHICH HE MAY REQUIRE CONCERNING IT. THEN, WE WILL NEED TO SEE IF GEMAYEL CAN SELL THE DOCUMENT TO HIS OWN CABINET AND IF IT IS ACCEPTED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET. IF THIS IS POSSIBLE, THEN THERE MAY BE A BREAKTHROUGH -- SUBSTANTIAL ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES -- WITHOUT HAVING HAD TO PRESENT AN AMERICAN "PLAN."

22. THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE IS A MAJOR DIFFERENCE COMPARED TO PREVIOUS PROPOSALS, BUT THIS DOES NOT APPEAR A FATAL FLAW IF OTHER ARRANGEMENTS ARE SATISFACTORY. THE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING THE PHASING OF PLO, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED, PRIMARILY THROUGH LEBANESE NEGOTIATION WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO.

23. AN UNANSWERED QUESTION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE CONCERNS THE TIMING AND DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. WE STRESSED AT EVERY POINT THE NEED FOR RAPID AND CLEAR AGREEMENT. WHILE SHARON SPOKE OF MOVING QUICKLY TO NEGOTIATION, HE AVOIDED BEING PINNED DOWN ON THE DURATION OF NEGOTIATIONS OR A SPECIFIC TIME-TABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL. END COMMENT. GROVE

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-- THE SITUATION IN LEBANON REMAINS PRECARIOUS. AMBASSADOR HABIB'S EFFORTS HAVE MADE PROGRESS BUT SUCCESS IS BY NO MEANS ASSURED. IF FURTHER EXTENSIVE BLOODSHED IS TO BE AVOIDED, WE MUST QUICKLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF A COUNTRY OF DESTINATION FOR THE PLO LEADERS AND FIGHTERS WHO WILL LEAVE LEBANON.

--THE PLO, LEBANESE AND SYRIANS ARE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE AND WE HOPE FOR EARLY AGREEMENT. WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE LEADERS OF ISRAEL, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, EGYPT, SYRIA, AND FRANCE, AMONG OTHERS, TO SUPPORT HABIB'S MISSION.

--REPEATED BREAKDOWNS IN THE CEASEFIRE HAVE ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED PHIL'S EFFORTS MAGNIFYING THE BASIC MISTRUST WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN ALL THE COMBATANTS.

-- WE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT IF PHIL'S EFFORTS FAIL, THERE WILL BE STRONG PRESSURE IN THE ISRAELI CABINET TO PURSUE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO JUSTIFY THE LOSS OF LIFE ISRAEL HAS ALREADY SUFFERED.

-- AN ISRAELI MILITARY SOLUTION WITH SIGNIFICANT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND AN ISRAELI IMPOSED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE US THE WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAELI AND ARABS ALIKE.

-- WE ARE, THEREFORE, POISED ON THE BRINK OF MAJOR CRISES IN US-ISRAELI AND US-ARAB RELATIONS.

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-- IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, PURSUANT TO A REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO INTRODUCE U.S. FORCES INTO BEIRUT SHOULD THAT BECOME NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT ANY AGREEMENT PHIL CAN REACH. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE DISCUSSING WITH THE FRENCH THE CONCEPT OF JOINT DEPLOYMENT OF OUR TROOPS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD.

-- UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WE WILL COMPLY RIGOROUSLY WITH THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND WILL SEND AMERICAN TROOPS ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF ALL THE PARTIES, THUS MINIMIZING RISKS.

-- SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY TO COMMIT U.S. FORCES, WE ANTICIPATE THE NEED FOR ABOUT 800 TO 1000 COMBAT EQUIPPED TROOPS TO TAKE ON PEACEKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR A SHORT PERIOD, PROBABLY NO MORE THAN A MONTH WHILE THE PLO DEPARTS AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REASSERTS ITS AUTHORITY.

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EXCISE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz
Subject: Our Middle East Strategy

I share your frustration at the slow pace of events in Lebanon and your concern about the impact of the Lebanon situation on your peace initiative. The following will propose alternative courses of action which might enable us to move ahead more rapidly, but all of which entail costs. I do not believe you should make a decision until after Phil Habib's return on the evening of the 7th.

The Stakes and the Challenge:

The enormous stakes for us in Lebanon derive from the relationship between our ability to bring about the prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces and the success of your September 1 initiative. Our success in achieving the prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is increasingly being perceived by the Arabs and others as a crucial test of our credibility in the broader peace process, particularly whether we will be either willing or able to implement our stated policies if they involve a dust-up with Israel.

We face open challenges at the moment in two areas -- your call for a settlements freeze and your publicly stated determination to see the speedy withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

[REDACTED]

Our Current Approach:

We have been trying to arrange direct talks between Israel and Lebanon as a vehicle for agreement on withdrawal and security arrangements. This initial approach was necessary and appropriate, but the results speak for themselves despite our best efforts as "mediator". We now find ourselves in a situation in which Israel insists that Jerusalem must be an alternate site for negotiations. If we choose to confront them

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on this, there is a serious risk that the focus of attention will become the tremendously complex issue of the status of Jerusalem rather than withdrawal. We will be in a stronger position if our own public is focused on the gains for Israeli security already attained -- the destruction of the PLO military threat in South Lebanon and Beirut -- and the gains to be achieved in return for Israeli withdrawal -- Syrian/PLO withdrawal and the establishment of a stable and friendly state on Israel's northern border with practical security arrangements.

Alternative Approaches for the Future:

We have the following basic alternatives for proceeding:

(1) Stay essentially on course. We would continue to play the role of mediator, introducing suggestions only when necessary to break deadlocks. This has some advantages domestically and in terms of our relations with Israel. We would undoubtedly have to make a proposal through Draper or Habib to break the venue impasse.

[REDACTED] Draper has recommended we propose a neutral site, and this can be done at little cost. But the Israelis will inevitably hang tough on negotiating sessions in Jerusalem. It is too popular a position politically at a time of testing for the Begin government. This approach, therefore, would play into Israeli hands by diverting attention from our real objectives in Lebanon while producing no movement toward those objectives.

(2) Lean on Gemayel. The Israelis contend that were we to make clear to Gemayel our preferences in the negotiations he would have no alternative but to accede to our wishes.

[REDACTED] this would hardly be a basis on which to build a constructive relationship with the new Lebanese Government, and such a strategy could undermine Gemayel's position both domestically and internationally in unforeseen but serious ways. Actions on our part to persuade him to negotiate in Jerusalem would be seen by Hussein, the Saudis and the Egyptians as our giving in on an issue of

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crucial importance to them in the peace process context and would therefore be self-defeating in terms of our broader policy goals.

(3) Lean on the Israelis. We have the option of leaning hard on the Israelis to negotiate at a neutral site or, at the very least, to be content to have Jerusalem serve as the site for a signing ceremony. A range of vehicles with which to attempt this are available, from public diplomacy through sanctions. Our refusal to support this Israeli attempt to enhance the status of Jerusalem would be favorably noted in key Arab states.



(4) Take the Lead and Force the Pace. We have thus far been very much at the mercy of the regional parties as regards both the pace at which the Lebanon negotiations have unfolded and the issues on which they have focused. We can attempt to change that situation by more aggressively attempting to force the pace of events. Such a shift in our posture might contain the following illustrative elements:

-- Public statements to the press and in one of your Saturday broadcasts highlighting your frustration with the pace of events and your determination to free Lebanon of all foreign forces.

-- Messages to Begin and Gemayel, at least, alerting them to the major step that we are about to take to move the process forward.

-- An American draft agreement to serve as the basis of such negotiations. If the plan is to leap over procedure to substance, the draft must take Israeli concerns into account, including withdrawal of Syria and the PLO, security arrangements in the South, non-belligerency and the beginnings of a political relationship between Lebanon and Israel. Both sides could then be invited to Washington to discuss the

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basic concept. This has the attraction of permitting discreet side conversations between Israeli and Lebanese delegates. Alternatively, Phil Habib could shuttle.

-- Once Washington talks have permitted further refinement, we could put together a detailed document for further consideration. If the Israelis prove to be intransigent, we will have to give serious consideration to possible U.S. measures affecting our bilateral relationship, including a reassessment of whether the continuation of Israeli forces in Lebanon can be justified in terms of self-defense. We would of course inform the Israelis before moving to sanctions.

-- You may also wish to consider launching our move with a major public address, strongly urging the parties to move to substance and reiterating our objectives in Lebanon and our determination to achieve them. The statement would be designed to reinforce the public consensus behind our active involvement in Lebanon.

Such an approach would obviously engage your personal prestige in a successful outcome even more than is now the case. To that degree, the price of failure would be increased. On the other hand, a context would be established in which we would be better able to bring pressure on either or both parties, potentially a key factor.


The Israelis, particularly Sharon, are determined to extract from Lebanon an unrealistic political price in return for withdrawal.

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There is a range of positive and negative inducements which can be treated in greater detail in a separate paper if you wish; the precise way in which any inducement might be brought to bear will be dependent on how negotiations unfold. The primary point is that in reasserting leadership in the pursuit of peace, we must have a strategy which will elicit a public consensus sufficient to support what is necessary to accomplish our goals.

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
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TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, XF
SUBJECT: THE IDF IN BEIRUT: FOREIGN MINISTRY VIEWS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING CONVERSATION WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON (REPORTED SEPTTEL) IN WHICH SHARON DESCRIBED ISRAELI CAPTURE OF KEY POINTS IN BEIRUT, WE CALLED ACTING DIRGEN HANAN BAR-ON. WE TOLD BAR-ON THAT THE SCOPE OF THE IDF ACTION IN BEIRUT TODAY SEEMS INCONSISTENT WITH THE LIMITED OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO AMBASSADOR DRAPER THIS MORNING. WE NOTED THAT THIS MAY SEEM TO WASHINGTON AS DELIBERATE DECEPTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.
3. BAR-ON SAID THAT BOTH PRIVATELY DURING THE MEETING WITH DRAPER AND IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY URI PORAT AFTER THE MEETING, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DESCRIBED THE LIMITED OBJECTIVES OF ISRAEL IN BEIRUT TO BE TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION TO

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PREVENT FURTHER BLOODSHED.



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5. AMBASSADOR RAISED POINTS IN PARA 2 WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-MEIR AND CABINET SECRETARY MERIDOR LATE THIS EVENING. AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT EVENTS OF THE DAY CREATE A SERIOUS CREDIBILITY PROBLEM. MERIDOR SAID HE WAS CONVINCED DECISIONS TAKEN LAST NIGHT WERE DESIGNED ONLY FOR THE PREVENTION OF BLOODSHED AND THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND HAD CHANGED DURING THE DAY. LEWIS

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
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