

UNCLASSIFIED

E14

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

EXCISE

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03514

FILM= D880947-0743

DATE= 25 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= WEST BANKERS WELCOME AQABA SUMMIT

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3509

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= AGREEMENT, CONFEDERATION, APPROVAL, PEACE PLAN

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, ASEC, IS, JO, EG

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE EXCISE DENY DELETE Non-Responsive Info
 FOIA Exemptions PA Exemptions

IS, FPC/COR

DECLASSIFY DECLASSIFY IN PART

NR Cases Only: _____
EO Citations: _____

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or _____

9304029

FEB 12 1997
Date.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03514 01 OF 02 251503Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----236420 251524Z/43

O 251500Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3824
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03514

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, ASEC, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: WEST BANKERS WELCOME AQABA SUMMIT

REF: JERUSALEM 3509

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. MAINSTREAM WEST-BANK POLITICAL FIGURES GENERALLY SUPPORT THE AQABA SUMMIT AS A STEP TOWARD PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN COOPERATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THE MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS HERE, REFLECTING THE PRAGMATIC AND TACTICALLY SOPHISTICATED TREND THAT HAS EMERGED SINCE THE INTIFADA BEGAN, UNDERSTAND THAT THE PALESTINIANS CANNOT MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL WITHOUT JORDAN.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03514 01 OF 02 251503Z

HOWEVER, THEY INSIST THAT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION BE ON AN EQUAL BASIS AND BELIEVE THAT KING HUSSEIN'S DISENGAGEMENT POLICY NOW MAKES THIS POSSIBLE. WE WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY THE NEXT INTIFADA LEAFLET TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COVERT LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SHARES THE VIEWS OF THE OVERT, INFORMAL
PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY.

3. WEST BANKERS GENERALLY WELCOME THE ARAFAT-
MUBARAK-HUSSEIN SUMMIT AT AQABA AND THE REPORTED
AGREEMENT ON A PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN
CONFEDERATION. PRO-FATAH NABLUS BUSINESSMAN
[REDACTED] SUMMARIZED THE PREVAILING ATTITUDE
BY CALLING THE SUMMIT THE FIRST STEP IN A LONG
JOURNEY TOWARD JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN
RECONCILIATION. THIS RECONCILIATION, HE ADDED,
WOULD FIND FINAL EXPRESSION IN JORDANIAN AND PLO
AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE TOGETHER IN A JOINT
ARAB (BUT NOT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN) DELEGATION
TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. HE TERMED THE
SUMMIT A SIGNAL OF PLO MODERATION SENT TO
PALESTINIANS, ARABS, ISRAELI VOTERS, AND THE
U.S., AND PREDICTED THAT A SENIOR PLO OFFICIAL
WOULD SHORTLY HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE TO ENDORSE
EXPLICITLY A TWO STATE SOLUTION.

4. [REDACTED] ENTHUSIASM WAS SHARED TO A LESSER
DEGREE BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WHO TERMED THE SUMMIT "VERY
POSITIVE." HE SAID THE PALESTINIANS NEEDED AND
WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS
PROVIDED THE PALESTINIANS CONDUCTED THESE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03514 01 OF 02 251503Z

RELATIONS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE
JORDANIANS. HE BELIEVES THE KING'S JULY 31
SEPARATION FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA PROVIDED
SUCH STATUS, AND THAT THE AQABA SUMMIT WAS
CONDUCTED AS A MEETING OF THREE EQUALS.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE PALESTINIANS HAVE NOTHING TO
FEAR FROM A CONFEDERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH JORDAN.

5. THE EAST JERUSALEM ARAB PRESS (REPORTED
REFTEL) WAS SUPPORTIVE, AS WELL. MODERATE
PRO-PLO AL-QUDS, WHICH TERMED THE SUMMIT A
"SUCCESS" WITH BANNER RED HEADLINES, SAID THE
MEETING DEMONSTRATED THE PLO'S "FUNDAMENTAL
ROLE" IN ARAB PEACEMAKING AND ALLOWED ARABS TO
REPLACE INFIGHTING WITH A UNIFIED ARAB POLICY
TOWARD ISRAEL. PRO-PLO AL-FAJR SAID A
PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD BE A "CORNERSTONE OF
ARAB UNITY" AND ENCOURAGED FORMATION OF A JOINT
POLICY. PRO-JORDANIAN AN-NAHAR SAID THE SUMMIT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEMONSTRATED THE NECESSARY JORDANIAN AND EGYPTIAN ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

6. OTHER WEST BANKERS CONTACTED BY THE CONGEN NOTED THAT, HAVING ACHIEVED THEIR INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD THROUGH THE INTIFADA, THE PALESTINIANS WERE READY TO SEIZE ANY AVAILABLE MEANS TO TRANSLATE THE INTIFADA INTO POLITICAL GAINS. TWO YOUTH LEADERS FROM THE NORTHERN WEST BANK REACTED VERY POSTIVELY TO THE SUMMIT AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT JORDAN MUST PLAY A ROLE IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE REGION. OTHER PALESTINIANS POINTED OUT THAT THE SUMMIT

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03514 02 OF 02 251503Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----236446 251524Z /48 43

O 251500Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3825
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03514

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, ASEC, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: WEST BANKERS WELCOME AQABA SUMMIT

FOLLOWED THE TRADITIONAL ARAB SCENARIO FOR
SETTLING DISPUTES, WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK
PLAYING THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY. OTHERS
REPEATED THE RUMOR THAT ARAFAT'S ACTIONS WERE
BASED ON AN AMERICAN GUARANTEE, PROVIDED THROUGH
THE EGYPTIANS, THAT BY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH
HUSSEIN AND ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF
CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN, THE PLO WOULD GAIN
U.S. RECOGNITION.

7. COMMENT. EXCEPT FOR A SMALL PRO-JORDANIAN
MINORITY, MOST WEST BANKERS WELCOMED KING

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03514 02 OF 02 251503Z

HUSSEIN'S JULY 31 DISENGAGEMENT ANNOUNCEMENT AND
OPPOSE A RETURN TO RULE BY JORDAN. HOWEVER,
MOST SERIOUS PRO-PLO MAINSTREAM POLITICAL
FIGURES WE KNOW, INCLUDING THOSE CLOSE TO THE
YOUNG INTIFADA LEADERSHIP, UNDERSTAND THE
PRACTICAL IMPERATIVE OF PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN
COOPERATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. MANY ALSO
ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A CONFEDERATION, PROVIDED THE
PARTNERSHIP IS BASED ON JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN
EQUALITY. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS CONTINUING
SUSPICION OF JORDAN'S MOTIVES. IN ANY CASE, THE
AQABA SUMMIT, WHICH MANY PALESTINIANS HERE HAVE
HOPED FOR SINCE THE KING'S JULY DECISIONS, IS
SEEN AS A WELCOME AND NECESSARY STEP TOWARD
COOPERATION.

8. COMMENT CONTINUED. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE
THAT THE PFLP'S GEORGE HABASH HAS PUBLICLY
ATTACKED THE AQABA SUMMIT. THE NEXT INTIFADA
LEAFLET--DUE OUT THE BY THE END OF THE WEEK--MAY
INDICATE WHETHER THE COVERT UNIFIED LEADERSHIP
OF THE UPRISING, WHICH IS FINELY BALANCED
BETWEEN THE PFLP, DFLP, AND COMMUNISTS AS WELL
AS FATAH, TAKES THE SAME POSITIVE LINE TOWARD
THE SUMMIT THAT THE OVERT WEST BANK LEADERSHIP
HAS ADOPTED. END COMMENT.
WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

137
R



Department of State

TELEGRAM

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

AN: N030002-0389

PAGE 01 STATE 068944
ORIGIN N00S-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:WTCLUVERIUS
APPROVED BY NEA:NAVELIOTES
S/S:CEMCHANAWAY
NEA:PCHABID (SUBS)
S/S-O'GUSREY

RELEASE
 EXTEND
 DENY
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

9302566

By: [Signature] Date: 3/5/96

CLASSIFY as
 DOWNGRADE TS w/ [] S of

-----040762 121559Z /41
Z 121559Z MAR 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH

~~STATE 068944~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
FOR AMBASSADOR VIETS FROM VELIOTES

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, JO, US
SUBJECT: BIN SHAKIR'S QUESTION

REF: AMMAN 01982

1. ~~SECRET~~
2. AS YOU WILL SEE FROM SEPTTEL, PHIL, NAT AND I SPENT TWO HOURS WITH PRINCE BANDAR, EVENING MARCH 10, WITH MUCH OF THAT TIME BEING SPENT MAKING CLEAR TO HIM THE NECESSARY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BASIS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS -- WHICH MUST BE COMMON TO ALL THE PARTIES -- AND THE NEGOTIATING POSITION OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. WE BELIEVE HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POINT BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE SAUDIS WILL BACK AWAY FROM THIS EFFORT TO HAVE HUSSEIN ACCEPT THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE AS THE "BASIS" OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS. TENTATIVELY, WE THINK BANDAR WILL CONVEY

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 068944

TO KING FAHD THAT THIS IS A NONSTARTER. YOU SHOULD TELL

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

BIN SHAKIR THAT WE BELIEVE, WITH KING HUSSEIN, THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS AND THAT THE AGREED BASIS FROM WHICH THAT OBJECTIVE IS TO BE ACHIEVED IS UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. IT IS OBVIOUS THE OPENING NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE WHATEVER THE PARTIES WISH. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE ARAB SIDE MIGHT WISH TO MAKE SOME REFERENCE TO THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE, THOUGH WE WONDER IF KING HUSSEIN WOULD WANT TO ADOPT IT, WHOLE CLOTH, SINCE IT WOULD COMMIT HIM TO SEEK THE PALESTINIAN STATE.

3. YOU SHOULD MAKE SURE HUSSEIN UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KING FAHD WHICH CAN BE INTERPRETED AS DISCOURAGING KING HUSSEIN FROM ANNOUNCING HIS ENTRY ON THE BASIS OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AS WELL AS UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242/338. INDEED, THIS WOULD BE IDEAL AND WE WOULD WORK HARD TO GET SAUDIS TO BE FULLY SUPPORTIVE. KING SHOULD ALSO KNOW WE MADE IT CLEAR TO BANDAR THAT SAUDIS MUST NOT USE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO TRY TO LEVER HUSSEIN AWAY FROM AGREEING WITH U.S. POLICY. FINALLY, AS YOU WILL RECALL FROM OUR LONDON MEETING WITH HIM, HUSSEIN TOLD US THAT HE HAD ARAFAT'S AGREEMENT TO HUSSEIN'S ENTRY ON THE BASIS OF 242/338 AND THE REAGAN INITIATIVE.

SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

E139

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

EXCISE

DOC_NBR= 88KUWAIT06101

FILM= D880940-0600

DATE= 22 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= KUWAIT

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
USCINCLANT

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= PNC REPORTEDLY WILL DECLARE STATE, - IMMEDIATE CONFEDERATION WIT JORDAN

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CONFEDERATION, LAWYER, PALESTINIANS, SOVEREIGNTY, RECOGNITION

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, KU, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 USE IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
 FOIA Exemptions B-1
 PA Exemptions _____

IS/FPC/CDR _____ Date: _____

MR Cases Only: _____
 EO Citations _____

TS authority _____

CLASSIFY S or
 DOWNGRADE TO S or

9304029

FEB 12 1997

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>

PAGE 01 KUWAIT 06101 01 OF 02 220841Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 PM-10
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 C-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/073 W

-----072027 221025Z /12

P 220835Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3914
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 06101

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, PLO
SUBJECT: PNC REPORTEDLY WILL DECLARE STATE,
- IMMEDIATE CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN

REF: FBIS AMMAN JN1910172488

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. A PALESTINIAN LAWYER IN KUWAIT, WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE PROVIDED LEGAL ADVICE TO THE PLO, OCTOBER 19 SAID A MAJOR AIM OF THE UPCOMING PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING WILL BE TO PRECIPITATE U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. A STATE WILL BE DECLARED, FOLLOWED BY A SECOND DECLARATION OF CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN. END SUMMARY.

3. [REDACTED] PALESTINIAN LAWYER LIVING IN KUWAIT (PLEASE PROTECT), OCTOBER 19 PROVIDED POLCHIEF WITH AN OUTLINE OF WHAT HE EXPECTS WILL BE AN "HISTORIC" UPCOMING PNC SESSION. [REDACTED] NOT A MEMBER OF THE PNC OR ASSOCIATED WITH THE PLO IN ANY OFFICIAL

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 KUWAIT 06101 01 OF 02 220841Z

CAPACITY, HAS BEEN SOUGHT OUT BY THE PLO FOR LEGAL ADVICE. HE WAS ONE OF THREE PROMINENT PALESTINIAN LAWYERS, ACCORDING TO THE PRESS HERE, CALLED ON TO FORMULATE LEGAL OPTIONS FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY IN THE WAKE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OF KING HUSSEIN'S DECISION TO CUT TIES WITH THE WEST BANK. HE WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN THE LEGAL WORK ON THE U.S. CASE CONCERNING POSSIBLE CLOSURE OF THE PLO MISSION IN NEW YORK. HE APPEARED TO SPEAK FROM A POSITION OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE STRATEGY AND AIMS OF THE UPCOMING PNC SESSION. [REDACTED]

B1

4. [REDACTED] SAID A MAJOR AIM OF THE PNC SESSION WILL BE TO PRECIPITATE U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. HE SAID THE POLITICAL THINKING OF THE LEADERSHIP HAD ADVANCED A GREAT DEAL. IN RESPONSE TO POLCHIEF'S QUESTIONS, HE SAID THE STRATEGY HE OUTLINED WAS BACKED NOT ONLY BY ARAFAT AND FATAH, BUT ALSO BY PFLP LEADER GEORGE HABASH, DFLP LEADER NAYEF HAWATMEH, POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT CHIEF SAMIR GHOSHEH, AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, HAMAS. ONLY THE PRO-SYRIAN GROUPS, NOTABLY AHMED JIBRIL'S PFLP-GC (HE DISMISSED ABU MUSA AS INSIGNIFICANT), OPPOSED THE PLAN OF ACTION. THE OTHERS WOULD PROCEED WITHOUT THEM.

5. A STATE WILL BE DECLARED AND THE JURIDICAL BASIS FOR IT WILL BE ACCEPTANCE OF U.N. RESOLUTION 181. BY DOING SO, THE PNC WILL BE ACCEPTING A RESOLUTION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO ACCEPTED, WILL BE RECOGNIZING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST -- IN TANDEM WITH ITS OWN RIGHT TO EXIST -- AND ACCEPTING A TWO-STATE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT. [REDACTED] SAID THERE WOULD BE LANGUAGE MAKING CLEAR THAT THE BOUNDARIES WOULD BE THE TERRITORIES

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 KUWAIT 06101 01 OF 02 220841Z

OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967. AS PART OF THE PACKAGE, THERE WILL BE A FORMULA FOR ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 242 AND THERE WILL BE A RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM, A LA ARAFAT'S 1986 CAIRO DECLARATION.

6. [REDACTED] SAID NO-GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE OR PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE DECLARED, ALTHOUGH AUTHORITY WOULD BE VESTED IN THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PALESTINE CENTRAL COUNCIL, TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AT SOME FUTURE POINT IF NECESSARY. MOST INTRIGUING, HOWEVER, WAS [REDACTED] STATEMENT THAT A DECLARATION OF CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN WOULD FOLLOW THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE. SINCE [REDACTED] HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. RESPONSE, POLCHIEF ASKED IF THE FIRST DECLARATION WOULD BE MADE, AND THE SECOND ONLY AFTER THE PRESUMED U.S. REACTION, OR, WHETHER THE TWO WOULD FOLLOW IN QUICK SUCCESSION, WITH THE PALESTINIAN STATE "EXISTING," SAY,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ONLY THREE MINUTES APART FROM JORDAN, AND THE U.S. RESPONSE COMING LATER. [REDACTED] SAID THE LATTER, "THREE-MINUTE" OPTION WAS THE CASE. HE SAID ARAFAT WOULD BE TRAVELING TO JORDAN SOON TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THIS VERY ISSUE. (THERE IS SOME INDIRECT EVIDENCE CORROBORATING THIS SCENARIO, FROM THOSE WHO OPPOSE IT -- THE PFLP-GC. PER REF FBIS REPORT, TALAL NAJI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PFLP-GC, IS QUOTED IN THE OCTOBER 18 ISSUE OF THE KUWAITI DAILY AL-QABAS AS FOLLOWS: "WHAT THEY ARE DISCUSSING NOW IS NOT A FREE, INDEPENDENT, AND SOVEREIGN STATE. THEY ARE TALKING ABOUT A PALESTINIAN ENTITY WHICH WILL BE FORCED IN ADVANCE TO ESTABLISH CONFEDERAL TIES WITH THIS OR THAT STATE, PARTICULARLY JORDAN. SUCH AN ENTITY WILL NOT BE FULLY FREE AND SOVEREIGN OVER ITS TERRITORY AND THOSE IN CHARGE OF IT WILL BE FORCED TO MAKE A HISTORICAL CONCESSION TO THE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 KUWAIT 06101 02 OF 02 220841Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 PM-10
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 C-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/073 W

-----072031 221026Z /12

P 220835Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3915
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 KUWAIT 06101

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: KPAL, PREL, PLO
SUBJECT: PNC REPORTEDLY WILL DECLARE STATE,

REST OF PALESTINE.")

7. POLCHIEF ASKED [REDACTED] WHAT WOULD COME AFTER THE PNC MEETING, APART FROM AWAITING THE U.S. RESPONSE. HE SAID NEXT STEPS WOULD COME WITH JORDAN, AS THE TWO SIDES WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP. SPECIFIC AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED REGARDING SEPARATION OF POWERS AND AUTHORITY. THE PALESTINIANS HAD HAD SOME VERY BITTER EXPERIENCE WITH HASHEMITE RULE. AN "ABSOLUTE RED LINE," AGREED BY ALL PALESTINIAN GROUPS, WAS THAT NO OTHER ARAB COUNTRY WOULD NEGOTIATE ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIANS FOR PALESTINIAN TERRITORY. KASSIM SAID THE INTIFADA HAD RESTORED THE HOPE OF THE PALESTINIANS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 40 YEARS THAT A SETTLEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. THERE WOULD BE NO MORE TALK OF A RETURN TO JAFFA AND HAIFA.

8. COMMENT. EVEN IF THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE SCENARIO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 KUWAIT 06101 02 OF 02 220841Z

OUTLINED BY [REDACTED] MUCH WILL HINGE ON THE OUTCOME OF AN ARAFAT-HUSSEIN MEETING, WHICH IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE AN ESSENTIAL PRELUDE TO ANY PNC MEETING. THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE PLAN IS THE IMMEDIATE MOVE TO CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN. BASED ON [REDACTED] ACCOUNT, THE PNC STRATEGY WOULD CLEARLY BE AIMED AT ALLAYING U.S. CONCERNS THAT SELF-DETERMINATION IS A CODEWORD FOR AN INDEPENDENT STATE. IF [REDACTED] IS ON THE MARK, THE PNC ENDGAME COMES INTO FOCUS: RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST BY MEANS OF 181, TOKEN INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, FOLLOWED BY IMMEDIATE CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN UNDER TERMS TO BE NEGOTIATED, AND ALL LEADING TO THE BIG PRIZE: U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO "SELF-DETERMINATION." END COMMENT. HOWELL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E130
P

EXCISE

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** NOFORN

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE341803

FILM= D880932-0023

DATE= 19 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= INR/NESA:JBIGUS

OFFICE= ORIGIN INR

TO= INTSUM COLLECTIVE
BEIRUT
TRSY
MULTIPLE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= NOFORN

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= INTSUM 203, OCTOBER 19, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT, JEWS, VOTING, PEACE PLAN, ECONOMIC PRO
POLITICAL TREND

TAGS= KPAL, PINR, EG, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE EXCISE DENY DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions PA Exemptions

DECLASSIFY D-CLASSIFY IN PART

FPC/CDR

NO Cases Only: EO Citations

Date: FEB 12 1988

TS authority: S or S or

CLASSIFY DOWNGRADE TS TO S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>
[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 STATE 341803
ORIGIN INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00
H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /072 R

DRAFTED BY: INR/NESA:JBIGUS
APPROVED BY: INR/NESA:WEWHITE
INR/NESA:DHERTZBERG

-----307466 200504Z /20

P 192334Z OCT 88 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
SECDEF WASHDC/ISA 0000
JCS WASHDC/OJCS/J-5 0000
DIA/DE4 WASHDC
NSC WASHDC 0000
USMISSION USVIENNA
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
USCENCTOM MACDILL AFB FL/POLAD
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT/INTAF/FOR POLAD KRUSE
COMSIXFLT
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
NSA FT MEADE MD
USIA WASHDC
NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD

[REDACTED] STATE 341803

NOFORN/FOR MBFR

E.O. 12356: DECL: -OADR
TAGS: EG, IS, PINR, KPAL

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 STATE 341803

INTSUM 203, OCTOBER 19, 1988

USDEL MBFR VIENNA FOR AMBASSADOR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LONDON FOR RAPHEL
PARIS FOR WINN
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN AND FOR MFO DG CONSTABLE
DOD/ISA FOR NESA
CINCEUR FOR POLAD
CINCUSNAVEUR FOR INTAF
NSC FOR RODMAN
NSA FOR CHIEF G GROUP
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

--WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

ISRAEL: LIKUD AND LABOR
WILL PROBABLY RENEW VOWS

1. [REDACTED] THE ISRAELI ELECTION IS STILL TOO CLOSE TO CALL. IF LIKUD SHOULD SCORE A TINY PLURALITY, PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR WOULD PROBABLY OPT FOR A LIKUD-DOMINATED NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT OVER A LIKUD-LED COALITION OF RIGHT-WING AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES, DESPITE PRESSURES FROM THE RIGHT IN HIS OWN PARTY. IF LABOR LEADER PERES CANNOT FORM A COALITION OF THE LEFT, HE TOO MAY SEE ANOTHER PARTNERSHIP WITH LIKUD AS THE WAY TO THWART THE TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS OF THE EXTREME RIGHT.

2. [REDACTED] STILL UNDECIDED JEWISH VOTERS (REPRESENTING UP TO FOUR KNESSET SEATS) ARE LIKELY TO DETERMINE WHICH MAJOR PARTY WILL WIN A PLURALITY. THE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STATE 341803

PLETHORA OF SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE CONTEST, AND THE VOLATILITY OF THE ISRAELI ELECTORATE, ADD TO THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING A CALL. MOREOVER, ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION POLLING ON PARTY PREFERENCES IS INHERENTLY WEAK: ISRAELI ARABS, ULTRA-ORTHODOX JEWS, KIBBUTZ MEMBERS AND SOLDIERS ON ACTIVE DUTY ARE NOT SURVEYED--AND IN THE PAST HAVE BEEN UNPREDICTABLE IN VOTING BEHAVIOR.

TACTICS AND LONG-TERM INTERESTS

3. [REDACTED] PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR HAS PLEDGED REPEATEDLY IN THE CAMPAIGN TO CRUSH THE UPRISING AND STEP UP SETTLEMENT CONSTRUCTION IN THE TERRITORIES IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE EVENT OF A LIKUD VICTORY. BUT THIS IS PROBABLY MORE AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO SHORT-TERM PUBLIC DEMANDS FOR ACTION TO QUELL THE VIOLENCE THAN A REFLECTION OF WHAT SHAMIR BELIEVES NECESSARY TO SERVE ISRAEL'S LONG-TERM DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS.

SHAMIR'S OPTIONS

4. [REDACTED] EVEN IF LIKUD WERE TO CAPTURE THE MOST KNESSET SEATS ON NOVEMBER 1, A SHAMIR-LED LIKUD PLURALITY WOULD IN THE FIRST INSTANCE SEEK ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT WITH LABOR, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS:

ECONOMIC DECISIONS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 04 STATE 341803

5. [REDACTED] SHAMIR WOULD WANT TO ENSURE LABOR'S STAKE IN THE TOUGH ECONOMIC DECISIONS FACING THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. SINCE THE START OF THE UPRISING, ISRAEL'S ECONOMY HAS UNDERGONE A MARKED DETERIORATION. GDP GROWTH THIS YEAR IS EXPECTED TO DROP TO LESS THAN TWO PERCENT, DOWN MORE THAN THREE PERCENTAGE POINTS FROM LAST YEAR, OWING TO ECONOMIC LOSSES ARISING FROM THE INTIFADAH AND A SLOWDOWN IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION. TOURISM REVENUES, WHICH ACCOUNT FOR FOUR PERCENT OF GDP, ARE DOWN DOLS. 38 MILLION A MONTH. THESE AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AND REQUIRE BROAD POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT.

REINING IN EXTREMISTS

6. [REDACTED] SHAMIR HAS AN INTEREST IN KEEPING THE RADICAL RIGHT--WHICH FAVORS MASS EXPULSION OF ARABS FROM, AND ANNEXATION OF, THE TERRITORIES--FROM DETERMINING A LIKUD GOVERNMENT'S AGENDA. YESTERDAY'S RULING BY ISRAEL'S SUPREME COURT FORBIDDING KACH PARTICIPATION IN THE PARLIAMENTARY RACE MEANS THAT, AT A MINIMUM, KAHANE'S VOTES--IF HIS SUPPORTERS IN FACT VOTE IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS--WILL BENEFIT PARTIES TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE RIGHT OF LIKUD, PUTTING ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON SHAMIR TO KEEP EXTREMISTS AT A DISTANCE.

DEFENSE MINISTER

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 05 STATE 341803

7. [REDACTED] SHAMIR WILL NOT WANT TO TURN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY OVER TO A HARD-LINER LIKE ARIEL SHARON. SHAMIR APPEARS SATISFIED WITH RABIN'S PERFORMANCE--RABIN'S LAW-AND-ORDER APPROACH COMBINED WITH ADVOCACY OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE UPRISING DO NOT DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM SHAMIR'S REFUSAL TO SPEAK WITH PLO-AFFILIATED PALESTINIANS AS VIOLENCE RAGES IN THE TERRITORIES. SHAMIR ALSO WOULD PROBABLY NOT WANT TO PROVOKE US AND ISRAELI OPINION BY NAMING A CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE--SUCH AS SHARON, WITH WHOM SHAMIR HAS DIFFERED PUBLICLY OVER ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK--TO SUCH A SENSITIVE POST.

8. [REDACTED] COALITION BUILDING. COALITION FORMATION COULD BE COMPLICATED BY THE DEMANDS OF RELIGIOUS PARTIES, AND SHAMIR MAY WANT TO ESCHEW GRANTING CONCESSIONS--IN THE FORM OF MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS, DEPUTY MINISTERIAL POSTS AND COMMITTEE CHAIRMANSHIPS IN THE KNESSET, AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A COALITION AGREEMENT--THAT WOULD AT BEST BE UNPOPULAR AMONG THE MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS. HE PROBABLY WOULD WANT TO GIVE THE MOST IMPORTANT PORTFOLIOS TO OFFICIALS WITH A DEMONSTRATED ABILITY TO WORK WELL WITH THE UNITED STATES.

PEACE-PROCESS FLEXIBILITY

9. [REDACTED] PRESERVING LONG-TERM FLEXIBILITY ON PEACE PROCESS-RELATED ISSUES MAY NOT BE SHAMIR'S HIGHEST PRIORITY, BUT UNRESTRAINED CREATION OF NEW SETTLEMENTS AND A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE USE OF LIVE AMMUNITION AGAINST PALESTINIAN PROTESTORS WOULD IMMEDIATELY RISK PROVOKING A NEW US ADMINISTRATION, AND SHAMIR IS UNLIKELY TO WANT TO DO SO. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 341803

SETTLEMENTS ARE AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION FOR ANYONE EXCEPT THE MOST IDEOLOGICALLY DRIVEN ISRAELIS, WHO ALREADY LIVE OUTSIDE THE GREEN LINE.

A LAST RESORT

10. [REDACTED] ONLY IF SHAMIR WERE UNABLE TO PUT TOGETHER ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT UNDER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS WOULD HE WANT TO TRY A LIKUD-DOMINATED RIGHTWING-RELIGIOUS COALITION WITH A NARROW MAJORITY. EVEN THEN, SHAMIR WOULD FACE ECONOMIC, SECURITY, AND PUBLIC OPINION CONSTRAINTS, AND PRESSURE FROM ALLIES. AT A MINIMUM THESE WOULD CONDITION HIS APPROACH TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENTS OR AN INTENSIFICATION OF MILITARY FORCE TO QUELL THE UPRISING.

LABOR'S INCENTIVE

11. [REDACTED] IF PERES MANAGES TO WIN A PLURALITY FOR LABOR, HE WOULD LIKE TO FORM A COALITION OF THE LEFT.

BUT HE FINDS HIS PARTY--ALWAYS AN UNEASY AMALGAM OF HAWKS AND DOVES--IN AN UNPRECEDENTEDLY AWKWARD POSITION AS A RESULT OF THE POLARIZATION OF THE ISRAELI POLITY. PERES'S CALL FOR COMPROMISE WITH THE ARABS--ENUNCIATED ON MONDAY AT A JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE WITH LONG-TIME RIVAL RABIN AT HIS SIDE--OPENS LABOR TO FIERCE CRITICISM FROM THE RIGHT. ON THE OTHER HAND,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 07 STATE 341803

THE HARD-LINE POLICIES PURSUED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BY RABIN HAVE ALIENATED MANY TRADITIONAL LEFT-WING LABOR SUPPORTERS, ESPECIALLY ISRAELI ARABS

[REDACTED] B-
12. [REDACTED] UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, PERES WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME PUTTING TOGETHER A NARROW COALITION AND MOST LIKELY WOULD CALCULATE THAT ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT--PARTNERSHIP WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LIKUD--WOULD BE THE ONLY WAY OF HELPING HIS LIKUD
RIVAL TO PUT A BRAKE ON THE DEMANDS OF RIGHT-WING
EXTREMISTS. SHULTZ

[REDACTED]

NN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** NOFORN
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ELZ

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

EXCISE

P

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03420

FILM= D880921-0219

DATE= 17 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION HA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES FOR 1988 DRAFT - HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON THE OCCUPIED - TERRITORIES

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT, PALESTINIANS, WEST BANK, ATROCITY, MARTIAL L

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive info		TS authority to:
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

FEB 12 1997

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03420 01 OF 07 171551Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 /092 W
-----067210 171555Z /46

O 171550Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3763
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECTION 01 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03420

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES FOR 1988 DRAFT
- HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON THE OCCUPIED
- TERRITORIES

REF:A) JER 03394, B) ST 269472, C) ST 269472

1

2. INTRODUCTORY NOTE: THE FOLLOWING ANNEX TO THE
1988 DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT SHOULD BE READ
TOGETHER WITH THE REPORT (REFTEL). IT CONTAINS
COMMENTS AND REFERENCES TO SOURCES FOR CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF THE REPORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S
USE. THESE ARE KEYED TO FOOTNOTES IN THE DRAFT
AND ARE LISTED UNDER THE SUBJECT HEADINGS OF THE
REPORT AS FOLLOWS: (NOTE THAT OCCASIONALLY
FOOTNOTES ARE NOT CONSECUTIVE.)

INTRODUCTION

COMMENT: FOLLOWING THE GUIDANCE IN THE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03420 01 OF 07 171551Z

DEPARTMENT'S ALERTING MESSAGE (REF B), WE HAVE
SUBSTANTIALLY REWRITTEN THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
REPORT, AS WELL AS MANY OTHER SECTIONS BECAUSE
OF THE DIFFERENT HUMAN RIGHTS ENVIRONMENT
RESULTING FROM THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING. AS IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1987, THE INTRODUCTION IS TWICE AS LONG AS THE RECOMMENDED ONE PAGE LIMIT, IN ORDER TO ACCURATELY DESCRIBE THE UNIQUE FACTORS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DISPUTE. FOOTNOTES FOLLOW.

1. THIS REFERENCE TO THE EXPECTATION OF THE U.S. THAT THE OCCUPATION SHOULD BE ENDED BY NEGOTIATION UNDER 242 AND 338 IS ADDED FOR CONTEXT TO SHOW THAT THE U.S. ANTICIPATES ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL IN RETURN FOR A SECURE PEACE.

2. THIS LANGUAGE IS PARAPHRASED FROM A DESCRIPTION OF THE GOI'S POSITION TOWARD THE FOURTH GENVA CONVENTION IN COMMENTS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, BY MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LAWYER JOEL SINGER, P. 2, (HEREAFTER "GOI COMMENTS ON 1987 REPORT")

3. GOI COMMENTS ON THE 1987 REPORT CRITICIZES THE STATEMENT THAT MILITARY ORDERS OVERRIDE SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF JORDANIAN AND MANDATE LAWS, ON THE GROUND THAT THE OCCUPYING POWER HAS THE RIGHT TO CHANGE LAWS FOR THE WELFARE OF THE INHABITANTS. WITHOUT COMMENTING IN THE TEXT ON WHETHER CHANGES IN THESE LAWS HAVE BENEFITED THE INHABITANTS, A POINT PALESTINIANS CONTEST, WE NEED TO NOTE THAT MILITARY ORDERS HAVE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03420 01 OF 07 171551Z

SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED EXISTING LAWS. MILITARY ORDERS ARE ISSUED FREQUENTLY. THE LATEST ORDER IS NUMBERED SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 1200 AND 1300.

4. THIS DESCRIPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT APPARATUS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE ABSENCE OF SELF GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN MOVED UP BECAUSE OF ITS RELEVANCE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, FOLLOWING THE GUIDELINES.

5. THIS PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN REVISED SUBSTANTIALLY. IT DESCRIBES MORE CLEARLY THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO CLEAR UNDERSTANDING.

6. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GENERAL SHAHAK, THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DIRECTOR OF ISRAELI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (TO THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY), AND ABRASHA TAMIR, DIRECTOR GENERAL, OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (TO THE PRESS IN WASHINGTON), AS WELL AS PALESTINIAN SOURCES CONFIRM POPULAR PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR THE PLO. WE DO NOT WISH TO PROMOTE THE PLO, BUT WE BELIEVE IT IS USEFUL FOR UNDERSTANDING TO NOTE ITS ROLE IN THE POLITICAL SCENE.

7. PER CAPITA INCOME FIGURES WERE OBTAINED FROM GOI STATISTICS.

8. WE HAVE ADDED MATERIAL ON INCOME AND THE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03420 02 OF 07 171552Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 /092 W
-----067227 171556Z /46

O 171550Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3764
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03420

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES FOR 1988 DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ECONOMIC SYSTEM, AS REQUESTED BY THE GUIDANCE, BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CONFLICT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ENVIRONMENT. THE GNP FIGURES ARE BASED ON CIA GNP DATA AND POPULATION DATA PROVIDED BY MERON BENEVENISTI.

9. STATISTICS AND DATA ON LAND AND SETTLEMENTS ARE FROM BENEVENISTI ET AL, WEST BANK HANDBOOK, 1985, SHEHADEH, RAJA, OCCUPIER'S LAW, INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, WASH. D.C., 1985 WHICH CONTAIN DETAILED SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THESE PROBLEMS.

10. COMPETITION FOR CONTROL OVER LAND, AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS LIE AT THE HEART OF THE ISRAELI PALESTINIAN CONFLICT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO DESCRIBE THESE FACTORS IN THE INTRODUCTION. POPULATION FIGURES ARE EXTRAPOLATED FROM 1987, DATA PROVIDED BY MERON BENEVENISTI, WEST BANK

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03420 02 OF 07 171552Z

DATA PROJECT AND THE CIA'S POPULATION GROWTH RATE.

11. THE DUAL AND UNEQUAL SYSTEM BETWEEN ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS A BASIC REASON FOR THE UPRISING. THE GOI'S COMMENTS ON THE 1987 REPORT CRITICIZED A REFERENCE TO A "DUAL SYSTEM OF LAWS". THIS YEAR'S REFERS TO A "DUAL SYSTEM" IN THE LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE. IN ANY CASE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE GOI'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE LEGAL SYSTEMS ARE NOT "DUAL" IS CONVINCING.

12. THIS PARAGRAPH SUMMARIZES THE UPRISING, AS ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND.

12. (CONT) THIS PARAGRAPH GIVES ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO THE UPRISING AND SUMMARIZES HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AS REQUESTED IN THE GUIDANCE. IT ACKNOWLEDGES THE UNIQUE SITUATION FACED BY ISRAEL.

13. THE JUDGMENT THAT ISRAEL COULD HAVE AVOIDED MANY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY DEALING WITH GRIEVANCES WHICH CREATED THE UPRISING THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT. THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UPRISING IS NOT JUST A LAW AND ORDER PROBLEM; IT IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM WHICH REQUIRES A POLITICAL SOLUTION, AS RABIN AND OTHER ISRAELI LEADERS ACKNOWLEDGE. SOME ISRAELI OFFICIALS CLAIM THE UPRISING IS A WAR, WHICH MUCH BE DEFEATED, BY WHATEVER MEANS, BEFORE ANY POLITICAL CONCESSIONS OR GESTURES CAN BE MADE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03420 02 OF 07 171552Z

SOME ALSO CLAIM THAT POLITICAL CONCESSIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL THE LARGER ISSUES OF A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PERMANENT PEACE AND A SUITABLE PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATING PARTNER ARE RESOLVED. WE DISAGREE. PRE-ELECTION POLITICS HAVE PREVENTED THE GOI FROM TAKING ANY POLITICAL STEPS TO DEAL WITH THE UPRISING AND USING CARROTS AS WELL AS STICKS. THERE ARE MEASURES ISRAEL COULD TAKE ON THE GROUND AND UNILATERALLY, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE PROCESS NEGOTIATIONS, TO EASE TENSIONS AND ADDRESS LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES. SUCH MEASURES, IN ADDITION TO NECESSARY MEANS TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER, WOULD HAVE MUTED THE VIOLENCE IN THE UPRISING, WHEREAS EXCLUSIVE USE OF FORCE AND POLITICAL REPRESSION SEEM TO HAVE INTENSIFIED THE CONFRONTATION.

SECTION 1 - RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL KILLING

1. CASUALTY FIGURES FROM IDF AND PALESTINIAN SOURCES ARE FREQUENTLY REPORTED IN THE ISREALI AND PALESTINIAN PRESS.
 2. NO FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE ON INJURIES TO ISRAELI CIVILIANS BY STONES.
 3. FREQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIAN AND FOREIGN DOCTORS AND HOSPITAL OFFICIALS.
- [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03420 03 OF 07 171552Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 /092 W
-----067247 171557Z /46

O 171550Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3765
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03420

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES FOR 1988 DRAFT

4. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR USE OF LIVE FIRE ARE FROM MOD BASELINE DOCUMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS. MANY PRESS REPORTS AND CONVERSATIONS WITH EYE WITNESSES AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL ESTABLISH FREQUENT, INDISCRIMINATE USE OF LIVE FIRE IN VIOLATION OF IDF REGULATIONS; SEE ALSO LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MARCH 10, 1988 LETTER TO PM SHAMIR.

6.7. RABIN AND IDF COS SHOMRON HAVE DESCRIBED IDF POLICY ON PLASTIC BULLETS IN VARIOUS STATEMENTS TO PRESS.

8. PRESS; LAWYERS; COMMITTEE: OP CIT. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON "EXCESSIVE FORCE: BEATINGS TO MAINTAIN ORDER," AUGUST 1988

9. INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] PRESS REPORTS
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03420 03 OF 07 171552Z

10. INTERVIEWS WITH MAYOR ELIAS FREIJ, UNRWA OFFICIALS, DR. SALT; PRESS REPORTS

11. PRESS

12,13. PRESS

14. BECAUSE OF THE DEPARTURE, IN PRACTICE, BETWEEN USE OF LIVE FIRE AND IDF GUIDELINES, FEW CASES OF DEATHS ARE CAREFULLY INVESTIGATED, AND DISCIPLINARY ACTION HAS BEEN RARE.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

1. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), JERUSALEM OFFICE, AS REPORTED IN '87 JERUSALEM 4051 (DEC. 17, 1987).

2. DISCUSSIONS WITH ICRC

3. DISCUSSIONS WITH ICRC; ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) (TEL AVIV 7019); KNESSET MEMBER DEDI TZUCKER ESTIMATES 4500 IN CUSTODY BEFORE DECEMBER, 1987 (LETTER TO DEANS OF ISRAELI LAW FACULTIES, MAY 17, 1988).

4. IDF (TEL AVIV 7019).

5. ICRC (JERUSALEM 2438) (JULY 20, 1988).

6. ICRC (TEL AVIV 10997) (JULY 30, 1988).

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 03 JERUSA 03420 03 OF 07 171552Z

7. IDF, TEL AVIV 9661; MEMCON PICKERING/ZINGER/STRASCHNOW, JUNE 8, 1988.

8. JERUSALEM POST, JANUARY 19, 1988 (JERUSALEM 187). CONTRADICTORY SIGNALS CONCERNING THE "POLICY" OF BEATINGS WERE GIVEN BY ISRAELI LEADERS. GEN. AVRAHAM MITZNA TOLD IDF RADIO THAT BEATING AND CLUBBING PROTESTERS WAS PROVING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EFFECTIVE IN RESTORING ORDER (IDF RADIO, JANUARY 20, 1988, REPORTED IN JERUSALEM 219), BUT A REPORTER TOLD CONGEN POLOFF THAT ON BACKGROUND MITZNA HAD SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE POLICY ON HIS TROOPS (JERUSALEM 219). A "TOP ISRAELI MILITARY OFFICIAL" WAS QUOTED BY THE JERUSALEM POST OF JANUARY 20 AS SAYING SOLDIERS HAD BEEN TOLD TO BEAT AND CLUB PROTESTERS TO DISPERSE THEM, AND THAT THIS POLICY WAS GOOD, THOUGH IT AFFECTED INNOCENT PERSONS AND DISTORTED THE TROOPS' HUMANITARIAN VALUES. THE MINISTER OF POLICE DENIED A NEW POLICY OF BEATINGS EXISTED, APART FROM NORMAL STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER. (ISRAEL RADIO, JANUARY 22, 1988, REPORTED IN JERUSALEM 219). IDF RESERVISTS COMPLAINED TO KNESSET MEMBERS ABOUT ORDERS BY LOCAL COMMANDERS TO BEAT PALESTINIAN PRISONERS AND ABOUT BEATINGS OF BOUND PRISONERS. (JERUSALEM POST, FEBRUARY 12, 1988, REPORTED IN JERUSALEM 503).

9. JERUSALEM POST, JANUARY 26, 1988 (JERUSALEM 271).

10. JERUSALEM 219: MANY U.S. PRESS AND U.S.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03420 04 OF 07 171554Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 /092 W
-----067304 171558Z /46

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

O 171550Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3766
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] SECTION 04 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03420

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES FOR 1988 DRAFT

C AND PALESTINIAN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS;
JERUSALEM 233: [REDACTED] ON CASE OF
DELIBERATE ARM-BREAKING; JERUSALEM 524:
INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT; JERUSALEM POST JANUARY 25, 1988 ON
BEATINGS AT "THE WALL" IN RAMALLAH. 31

11. JERUSALEM 221 AND JERUSALEM 321,
PALESTINIAN AND CONSULATE GENERAL FSN EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNTS.

12. JERUSALEM 1254, APRIL 14, 1988. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (AI), "ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES: EXCESSIVE FORCE: BEATINGS TO
MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER", AUGUST 1, 1988. IDF
RESERVISTS COMPLAINED TO RABIN IN SEPTEMBER ABOUT
"ROUTINE" BEATINGS OF DETAINEES, PLACING
DETAINEES IN A "DEHYDRATION FACILITY," SMASHING
OF WINDOWS, PREVENTION OF CARE TO WOUNDED
PALESTINIANS (JERUSALEM POST 10/17/88).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03420 04 OF 07 171554Z

13. AI, OP. CIT. CITES EIGHT SPECIFIC CASES,
AND IDF TROOPS HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH
MANSLAUGHTER IN A SEPARATE CASE IN GAZA.

14. JERUSALEM POST, APRIL 25, 1988 AND MAY 17,
1988 (JERUSALEM 1948); AI, OP. CIT., P. 12.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

15. DISCUSSIONS WITH ICRC

16. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PAPER: ADMINISTRATIVE
DETENTIONS AND DETENTION CENTERS SINCE THE ONSET
OF THE UPRISING, SEPTEMBER 2, 1988. CIVIL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ADMINISTRATION (CIVAD) (TEL AVIV 4464).

3-1

17. [REDACTED]

18. MOD PAPER ON DETENTIONS; THE JUDGMENT THAT FEW DETENTION HAVE BEEN CANCELLED, AS OPPOSED TO SHORTENED, IS BASED ON CONVERSATION WITH ICRC. THE APPEALS PROCESS IS BACKED UP, AND MODIFICATIONS OF ORDERS OFTEN OCCUR MANY MONTHS AFTER INDIVIDUALS ARE DETAINED.

19. IT IS USEFUL TO DESCRIBE U.S. AND FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION POSITIONS, SINCE THEY CONTRAST.

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03420 04 OF 07 171554Z

20. MOD PAPER ON DETENTIONS

21. THE JUDGMENT THAT MANY DETENTIONS ARE FOR POLITICAL REASONS IS BASED ON MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI JOURNALISTS, ICRC REPRESENTATIVES, LAWYERS, HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES, FORMER DETAINEES AND FAMILIES OF DETAINEES. IT CANNOT BE PROVED, BUT THE EVIDENCE IS VERY STRONG THAT MANY DETENTIONS ARE ESSENTIALLY FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE WIDESPREAD USE OF UNTESTED SECRET EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THIS THESIS. THE DETENTION OF THE FIELD WORKERS FOR AL HAQ, AN ORGANIZATION WHICH AVOIDS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, REINFORCES IT. IDF ADVOCATE GENERAL STRASCHNOW HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IN SOME INSTANCES EVIDENCE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO OBTAIN CONVICTION IN A TRIAL (TEL AVIV 8096). SOME DETAINEES ARE NEVER TOLD THE REASONS FOR THEIR DETENTION. YITZHAK RABIN AND THE CIVAD'S RON KRUMER PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED CONDITIONING SOME RELEASES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETAINEES ON THE GOOD BEHAVIOR OF THEIR HOME TOWNS, FBIS TA2406061488 JUNE (JUNE 27, 1988); TEL AVIV 9254. THIS INDICATES THAT THE BEHAVIOR OF OTHERS, AS OPPOSED TO THE DETAINEE'S CAPABILITY OR POTENTIAL FOR HARM, DETERMINES THE SEVERITY OF THE TERM OF DETENTION. IN ADDITION TO ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION FOR POLITICAL REASONS INDIVIDUALS CAN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BE CONVICTED UNDER MILITARY ORDERS FOR CRIMES
WHICH WOULD BE REGARDED AS POLITICAL OFFENSES
UNDER WESTERN JURISPRUDANCE, E.G. MEMBERSHIP IN

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03420 05 OF 07 171557Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 /092 W
-----067442 171601Z /46

O 171550Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3767
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] SECTION 05 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03420

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES FOR 1988 DRAFT

A PROSECUTED ORGANIZATION, POSSESSION OF
INTIFADA LEAFLETS, DISPLAY OF THE PLO FLAG.

22. ICRC
23. PRESS REPORTS; FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH
UNRWA, RESIDENTS OF VILLAGES SUBJECTED TO
CURFEWS. CIVAD OFFICIALS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
CURFEWS ARE USED TO PUNISH VILLAGES, RATHER THAN
STRICTLY AS MEASURES TO RESTORE ORDER. SHMUEL
GOREN (TEL AVIV 13214) AND FREDDY ZACH (TEL AVIV

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

10828).

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

1. PROF. DAVID KRETMER, HEBREW UNIVERSITY STATES THAT 95 PERCENT OF ALL CONVICTIONS ARE BASED ON CONFESSIONS. ATTORNEY JONATHAN KUTTAB SAYS OVER 90 PERCENT; ICRC REPS SAY CONFESSIONS ARE "THE RULE," AND THAT DETAINEES NORMALLY SIGN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03420 05 OF 07 171557Z

CONFESSIONS AS A MEANS OF ENDING INTERROGATION.

2. LANDAU REPORT, PRESS REPORTS, CONVERSATIONS WITH AL HAQ

3. MOD PAPER ON DETENTION

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME OR CORRESPONDENCE

1. PRESS, INTERVIEWS WITH ICRC, UNRWA, AL HAQ, PALESTINIANS

2. PRESS

3. INTERVIEWS WITH ICRC, UNRWA, AL HAQ, PLESTINIANS

4. AL HAQ, PRESS

5. PRESS; ICRC

4B. CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS WHO RECOUNT QUESTIONING BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES BASED ON TAPPED TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AND EXPERIENCE IN CENSORSHIP OR CONFISCATION OF MAILED MATERIAL

6. CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS, AL HAQ, PRESS

SECTION 2: RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03420 05 OF 07 171557Z

1,2,3,4. CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELI JOURNALISTS
JACK KHAZMO, HANNA SINIORA, ZIAD ABU ZIAD,
IBRAHIM KARAE'EN; ISRAELI CENSORS CENSORED
MATERIAL FROM THE DEPARTMENT'S 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT

5. PRESS, CONVERSATIONS

6. PRESS; A DOMESTIC EMPLOYEE OF A CONGEN
OFFICER WAS ARRESTED FOR POSSESSING A LEAFLET

7. LOCAL AND FOREIGN JOURNALISTS HAVE DESCRIBED
INCREASING STRICT IDF POLICIES CLOSING AREAS OF
THE TERRITORIES TO JOURNALISTS IN ORDER TO
PREVENT COVERAGE. CONGEN OFFICERS' CARS HAVE
BEEN STOPPED IN THE WEST BANK IN PLACES WHICH
THERE WAS NO VIOLENCE AT THE TIME, AND ALLOWED
TO PROCEED ONLY AFTER CONFIRMING THAT NO
JOURNALISTS WERE ON BOARD. SOLDIERS CARRY BLANK
ORDERS WHICH THEY CAN SIGN ON THE SPOT, IF
JOURNALISTS DEMAND A SOURCE OF AUTHORITY,
ACCORDING TO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS.

8. PRESS REPORTS CONCERNING WASHINGTON POST AND
LOS ANGELES TIMES CORRESPONDENTS

9. PRESS REPORTS; EMBASSY REPORTS

10. PRESS REPORTS; CONVERSATIONS WITH ORGANIZERS
OF ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES IN NABLUS,
BETHLEHEM

[REDACTED]

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03420 06 OF 07 171559Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 /092 W
-----067513 171602Z /46

O 171550Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3768
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] SECTION 06 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03420

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES FOR 1988 DRAFT

11. THE MAJORITY OF STUDENTS, EVEN AT THE HEIGHT OF THE LARGE DEMONSTRATIONS, HAVE NOT PARTICIPATED IN VIOLENT ACTS. THE GOI ARGUES THAT SCHOOL CLOSURES HAVE REDUCED VIOLENCE; THIS CANNOT BE PROVED, AND VIOLENCE HAS CONTINUED AT A HIGH LEVEL NOTWITHSTANDING SCHOOL CLOSURES. YOUTHS WHO ARE NOT IN SCHOOL ARE MORE READILY AVAILABLE FOR PROTEST ACTIVITIES. SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY CLOSURES ARE VERY COSTLY AND A MAJOR GRIEVANCE OF PALESTINIANS. WE CONCLUDE THAT PUNISHMENT IS A MOTIVE BEHIND THE POLICY OF PROLONGING SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY CLOSURES LONG AFTER VIOLENCE OF OR NEAR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS HAS STOPPED. PALESTINIANS CLAIM THAT IDF AND POLICE FREQUENTLY PROVOKED VIOLENCE AT OR NEAR SCHOOLS.

12. DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SHAHAK AND MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL TAMIR HAVE STATED PUBLICLY
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03420 06 OF 07 171559Z

THAT MOST PALESTINIANS SUPPORT THE PLO IN SPEECHES TO AMERICAN AUDIENCES.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

13. MEETINGS OF THE PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SOCIETY FOR STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND A MEETING OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GROUP WERE BANNED JUST BEFORE THEY COMMENCED . THE COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION WAS ALSO PROHIBITED FROM MEETING.

14. PRESS REPORTS; CONGEN REPORTS ON CLOSURE OF INASH AL USNRA, A WOMEN'S CHARITABLE SOCIETY; DISCUSSION WITH MRS. FARAH ARRAJ, WIFE OF MAYOR OF BEIT JALA AND OFFICIAL OF JERUSALEM UNION OF CHARITABLE SOCIETY, WHOSE DIRECTOR WAS DETAINED

15. CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS, [REDACTED]

16. ASSOCIATION FOR DEFENSE OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL (JERUSALEM POST, AUGUST 19, 1988).

17. PRESS REPORTS, CONVERSATION WITH FEDERATION DIRECTOR ANIS AL QAQ

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

1.2 PRESS INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03420 06 OF 07 171559Z

D. FREEDOM OF TRAVEL WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, IMMIGRATION AND REPATRIATION

1. PRESS REPORTS, CONVERSATIONS WITH RESIDENTS OF AREAS UNDER CURFEW, UNRWA

2. PRESS, CONVERSATION WITH RESIDENTS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

3. CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS# PRESS; CONGEN AND EMBASSY OFFICER OBSERVATIONS DURING TRAVEL IN WEST BANK, GAZA

4. CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS UNDER TRAVEL BANS, [REDACTED]

5. CONVERSATIONS OF CONSULAR OFFICERS WITH PALESTINIANS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6. CASE OF MUBARAK AWAD

7. CONVERSATIONS WITH MAYOR OF BETHLEHEM AND OTHERS

8. EMBASSY CONVERSATIONS WITH CIVAD OFFICIALS

9. GOI COMMENTS ON 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

SECTION 3: RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03420 07 OF 07 171600Z
ACTION HA-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 /092 W
-----067567 171605Z /46

O 171550Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3769
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] SECTION 07 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03420

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: COMMENTS, FOOTNOTES FOR 1988 DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1. BENVENISTI, WEST BANK HANDBOOK
2. PRESS; CONVERSATION WITH MAYORS, OTHER PALESTINIANS
3. PRESS; BENVENISTI, WEST BANK HANDBOOK
4. INTERVIEW WITH JERUSALEM MUNICIPALITY OFFICIALS

SECTION 4: GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE TOWARD INTERNATIONAL AND NON GOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1.1 CONVERSATIONS WITH ICRC, AL HAQ, ARAB-AMERICAN ANTI DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE

2. AL HAQ

SECTION 5: DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX,

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03420 07 OF 07 171600Z

RELIGION, LANGUAGE OR SOCIAL STATUS

1. ANALYSIS IS BASED ON OBSERVATION OF U.S. OFFICIALS; TREATMENT OF SETTLERS COMMITTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE DURING THE UPRISING HAS BEEN LENIENT, COMPARED TO TREATMENT OF PALESTINIAN VIOLATORS; EMBASSY HAS EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY IN PERSUADING GOI TO INVESTIGATE CRIMINAL OFFENSES AGAINST PALESTINIAN AMERICANS; E.G. A RECENT MURDER IN RAMALLAH.

2. MUBARAK AWAD CASE

3. DISCRIMINATION IN USE OF LAND IS A CENTRAL PROBLEM, WHICH SHOULD TO BE MENTIONED IN THIS SECTION AS WELL AS IN THE INTRODUCTION. AN EXHAUSTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS BY WHICH ISRAELI AUTHORITIES OBTAIN CONTROL AND USE OF LAND BY DECLARING IT STATE LAND IS CONTAINED IN SHEHADAH, RAJA: OCCUPIER'S LAW, INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINIAN STUDIES, 1985; SEE ALSO BENVENISTI, WEST BANK HANDBOOK; CONGEN REPORTING AND CIA STUDIES ON SETTLEMENTS.

5. CONVERSATIONS WITH MAYORS

6.7. CONVERSATIONS WITH WEST BANK HOSPITAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DIRECTORS, DOCTORS, CIVAD OFFICIALS

8. FREQUENT COMPLAINTS TO EMBASSY, CON GEN FROM
AMCITS

9. SAME; CONVERSATIONS WITH CIVAD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03420 07 OF 07 171600Z

SECTION 6: WORKER RIGHTS

1. FAYEZ JABER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EAST JERUSALEM
HISTADRUT INTERVIEW

2. AL HAQ, TESTIMONY TO GSPSUBCOMMITTEE; FAYEZ
JABER INTERVIEW

3. JABER

4. JABER; AL HAQ, OP CIT; PRESS

5. BENVENISTI: WEST BANK HANDBOOK

6. BENEVENISTI: OP CIT

7. JABER

WILCOX

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EIF

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

EXCISE

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03351

FILM= D880904-0463

DATE= 11 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= APPEAL FROM MUFTI OF JERUSALEM FOR REOPENING OF PALESTINIAN SCH AND UNIVERSITIES

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY, STATUS, OPERATIONS, INTERNAL CONTROL, POLITICAL INITIATIVE, HUMAN RIGHTS

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, IS, US

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ID: FPC/CDR

FEB 12 1997
Date

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions b2-1
PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority to:
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03351 01 OF 02 111549Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 ED-04
INRE-00 /034 W

-----116254 112047Z /72

R 111513Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3688

SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03351

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL
SUBJECT: APPEAL FROM MUFTI OF JERUSALEM FOR
REOPENING OF PALESTINIAN SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES

1. INTRODUCTION AND COMMENT: THE MUFTI OF
JERUSALEM, ON BEHALF OF THE SUPREME ISLAMIC
COUNCIL, ISSUED A PETITION DATED OCT 4 URGING
THE REOPENING OF PALESTINIAN UNIVERSITIES WHICH
HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR THE PAST YEAR, AND SCHOOLS,
WHICH HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR MUCH OF THE YEAR.
THE PETITION, ADDRESSED TO THE ISRAELI MINISTER
OF DEFENSE AND "TO THE WHOLE WORLD," REFLECTS
THE GROWING DESPAIR OF PALESTINIAN ACADEMICS,
PARENTS AND STUDENTS OVER THE ENFORCED SCHOOL
CLOSURES AND THE SEARCH FOR SOME WAY TO BRING
PUBLIC OPINION TO BEAR ON THE ISSUE. SEPTTEL
REPORTS THAT A RECENT LEAFLET BY THE MILITANT
ISLAMIC HAMAS GROUP TAKES UP THE ISSUE OF SCHOOL
CLOSURES. WE UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT THE LATEST
LEAFLET OF THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP (NO. 27)
URGES REOPENING OF SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES.
PALESTINIAN CONTACTS TELL US THEY ARE LOOKING
FOR WAYS TO RAISE THE ISSUE IN THE UN. BIR ZEIT
PROFESSOR [REDACTED] IS PLUGGING THE IDEA
OF A "NON-POLITICAL" UNSC RESOLUTION THAT WOULD

B1

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03351 01 OF 02 111549Z

FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON THE SCHOOL ISSUE AND AVOID
OTHER CRITICISM OF ISRAEL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
UNANIMOUS SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL. WE TOLD HIM
THAT SINCE SCHOOL CLOSURES ARE NOT A "MATTER
AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" IT

UNCLASSIFIED

MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO GET THE UNSC TO END INTRODUCTION AND
SUCH AN INITIATIVE. END INTRODUCTION AND
COMMENT.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT:
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE
COMPASSIONATE
SUPREME ISLAMIC COUNCIL, JERUSALEM
DATE: OCTOBER 4, 1988

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE SUPREME ISLAMIC COUNCIL,
ADDRESSED TO THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND
TO THE WHOLE WORLD, INCLUDING ALL ORGANIZATIONS,
SOCIETIES AND AGENCIES.

THE SUPREME ISLAMIC COUNCIL MET ON SEPTEMBER 29,
1988 IN JERUSALEM AND REVIEWED THE PAINFUL
SITUATION PREVAILING IN THE COUNTRY. THE
COUNCIL DISCUSSED SEVERAL CATASTROPHIC INCIDENTS
TO WHICH RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO BY THE OCCUPATION
AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING THE AUTHORITIES'
INSISTANCE ON CLOSING DOWN SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIC
INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRY. ALSO DISCUSSED
WERE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES
WHICH IGNORED ALL REQUESTS AND PROTESTS
SUBMITTED BY RESIDENTS, SOCIETIES AND AGENCIES
TO PERMIT THE REOPENING OF EDUCATIONAL

██████████
██████████
PAGE 03 JERUSA 03351 01 OF 02 111549Z

INSTITUTIONS, IN ACCORDANCE TO THE SIMPLIST
HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH GRANTS CITIZENS THE RIGHT TO
EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE.

WE RAISE OUR VOICE AND DEMAND YOU TO STOP THIS
INTENTIONAL POLICY TO KEEP THE PEOPLE IGNORANT,
ACCORDING TO A WELL ORGANIZED PLAN PREPARED BY
YOUR ADMINISTRATION, CONTRARY TO ALL CIVIL LAWS
AND REGULATIONS, AS WELL AS HUMAN AND CIVIL
CODES. UNIVERSITIES HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR MORE
THAN ONE YEAR DURING WHICH STUDENTS WERE UNABLE
TO REACH THE CAMPUS.

THE SUPREME ISLAMIC COUNCIL WISHES TO ANNOUNCE
CLEARLY THAT THE WHOLE WORLD IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
THIS INJUSTICE FROM WHICH THE RESIDENTS OF THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARE SUFFERING. WHERE IS
THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL ITS STATEMENTS ON

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PROTECTION OF THE FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE? WHERE ARE ALL THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE UNESCO AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS? WHERE IS THE WORLD FEDERATION OF UNIVERSITIES AND WHERE ARE ALL THE OTHER CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL SOCIETIES? WHERE IS THE FEDERATION OF ARAB UNIVERSITIES? HAVE THEY NOT HEARD THAT THERE IS A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO ARE DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO ELEMENTARY, SECONDARY AND HIGHER EDUCATION? PEOPLE ARE DEPRIVED FROM EDUCATION AT HOME. ANY ONE CAUGHT TEACHING STUDENTS AT HOME IS SEVERELY PUNISHED.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03351 02 OF 02 111549Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 ED-04
INRE-00 /034 W

-----116261 112047Z /72

R 111513Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3689

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03351

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL
SUBJECT: APPEAL FROM MUFTI OF JERUSALEM FOR


THE SUPREME ISLAMIC COUNCIL PRESENTS THIS
HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM TO THE PUBLIC OPINION IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE COUNTRY AND TO THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND TO ALL ITS SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS, DEMANDING THEM TO INTERVENE AND LIFT OFF THIS POLICY OF KEEPING THE PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IGNORANT. THE COUNCIL HOPES THAT ALL THE BENEVOLENT FORCES EVERYWHERE WILL POOL THEIR EFFORTS AND LIFT OFF THIS GREAT INJUSTICE. WE PLACE ALL THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS HUMANITARIAN DUTY ON THE WHOLE WORLD. HISTORY WILL REORD THIS AND WOE TO THOSE WHO WILL NOT ACT. WOE TO THE UNJUST FROM THE JUDGEMENT OF HISTORY AND THE CURSE OF THE GENERATIONS.

SIGNED BY SHEIKH SAAD EDDIN EL ALAMI
PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME ISLAMIC COUNCIL
END TEXT.
WILCOX



NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** 

UNCLASSIFIED

E10

UNCLASSIFIED
EXCISE

P

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03242

FILM= D880875-0677

DATE= 30 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= VISIT TO TEL: THE VIEW FROM A "LIBERATED" VILLAGE

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3123

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= WEST BANK, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, EXPORT, FOOD, POLICE FORCE

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MN Cases Only:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	IN PART	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	_____ B-1	TS authority to	
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TO	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

FEB 12 1997

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03242 01 OF 04 301245Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /086 W
-----243562 301253Z /44

O 301240Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3620
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03242

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: VISIT TO TEL: THE VIEW FROM A
"LIBERATED" VILLAGE ✓

REFS: JERUSALEM 3123 AND PREVIOUS

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. CONGENOFF VISITED TEL VILLAGE,
NEAR NABLUS, SEPTEMBER 28 TO OBTAIN A CLEARER
PICTURE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT 33-DAY IDF
BLOCKADE ON ITS ECONOMY AND POLITICS. WHILE THE
ECONOMY OF THE VILLAGE HAS BEEN SEVERELY
DAMAGED, THE MOOD OF THE PEOPLE--PARTICULARLY
THE YOUNG--REMAINS DEFIANT. THE IDF DOES NOT
ENTER TEL, AND THE PEOPLE CONSIDER IT A
"LIBERATED" VILLAGE. THE TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP
IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE UPCOMING OLIVE HARVEST
AND, DESPITE THE SWAGGER, ALL ARE UNEASY ABOUT
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03242 01 OF 04 301245Z

THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS AFTER THE PNC, THE
ISRAELI ELECTIONS, AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION. WE OFFER THIS VIGNETTE SIMPLY AS A
VIEW OF WEST BANK LIFE UNDER THE OCCUPATION.
END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

↳ A TYPICAL WEST BANK VILLAGE

3. ON SEPTEMBER 28 CONGENOFF, ACCOMPANIED BY PROMINENT NABLUS BUSINESSMAN [REDACTED] VISITED TEL, A VILLAGE OF APPROXIMATELY 3500 PEOPLE LOCATED 3 KM SOUTHWEST OF NABLUS. TEL IS AN AGRICULTURAL VILLAGE WHICH DEPENDS FOR ITS LIVELIHOOD ON FIGS, OLIVES, AND DAIRY PRODUCTS. FROM AUGUST 13 TO SEPTEMBER 16, IT WAS SUBJECT TO AN IDF BLOCKADE WHICH PREVENTED MARKETING OF ITS FIG CROP AND DAIRY PRODUCTION (REF). ALTHOUGH TEL HAD BEEN THE SCENE OF CLASHES PRIOR TO THE ISRAELI ACTION, IT HAD NOT BEEN SINGLED OUT AS MORE RADICAL THAN OTHER VILLAGES IN THIS STRONGLY ANTI-OCCUPATION REGION. SINCE THE LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE, IT HAS CONSIDERED ITSELF A "LIBERATED" VILLAGE.

4. THERE WERE NO IDF CHECKPOINTS ON THE ROAD BETWEEN NABLUS AND TEL. HOWEVER, JUST BEFORE THE ENTRANCE TO TEL, THERE WAS A CHECKPOINT MANNED BY VILLAGERS WHICH CONFIRMED THE VISITORS' BONA FIDES AND ESCORTED THEM INTO THE VILLAGE. PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED AT THE ENTRANCE TO TEL WAS A HANDWRITTEN SIGN SIGNED ISLAMIC JIHAD URGING STEADFASTNESS IN THE STRUGGLE.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03242 01 OF 04 301245Z

(WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF ISLAMIC JIHAD IN THE VILLAGE, THE VILLAGERS CLAIMED THAT, WHILE THERE WERE ONLY ONE OR TWO SUPPORTERS, ALL NATIONALIST VIEWPOINTS WERE WELCOME.) PALESTINIAN FLAGS WERE HUNG PROMINENTLY FROM THE POWER LINES.

5. THE MEETING, HELD IN THE TOWN HALL, WAS ATTENDED BY A CROSS SECTION OF INFLUENTIAL VILLAGERS: THE MUKHTAR, AN AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY BIOLOGY PROFESSOR, AFFLUENT VILLAGERS, AND BETWEEN FOUR AND EIGHT YOUTHS. THESE LATTER KEPT NMTERING, CONFERRING AMONG THEMSELVES, AND DEPARTING. THEY WERE ACCORDED CONSIDERABLE RESPECT BY THEIR ELDERS AND WERE OBVIOUSLY ACCUSTOMED TO WIELDING INFLUENCE. IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLAINED BY THE NABLUS BUSINESSMAN THAT THESE YOUNG MEN REPRESENTED THE COMPONENTS OF THE VILLAGE'S POPULAR COMMITTEE: FATAH, THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMUNISTS, PFLP, AND DFLP. A HAMAS REPRESENTATIVE WAS ALSO PRESENT FOR MOST OF THE MEETING. THOUGH NOT PART OF THE COMMITTEE, HAMAS APPARENTLY COOPERATES WITH THE SECULAR NATIONALISTS ON MAJOR ISSUES. TO DATE, THERE HAS BEEN NO HAMAS-UNLU FRICTION, ACCORDING TO THE VILLAGERS.

LIFE UNDER THE IDF BLOCKADE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03242 02 OF 04 301247Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /086 W
-----243645 301253Z /44

O 301240Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3621
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03242

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: VISIT TO TEL: THE VIEW FROM A

6. ACCORDING TO THE VILLAGERS, TEL HAD BEEN A REPRESENTATIVE NORTHERN WEST BANK VILLAGE BEFORE THE BLOCKADE WAS IMPOSED. THERE WERE OCCASIONAL INCIDENTS WITH IDF PATROLS, THE VILLAGERS HAD FORCED OUT THE ISRAELI-APPOINTED MUKHTAR EARLY IN THE INTIFADA, AND ALMOST HALF THE YOUNG MEN HAD BEEN ARRESTED. THE RESIDENTS BELIEVE THE VILLAGE WAS SINGLED OUT FOR THE BLOCKADE BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIVE ISOLATION AND DEPENDENCE ON A SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL CROP. THE ONE ROAD INTO THE TOWN COULD EASILY BE CUT, AND PREVENTING THE MARKETING OF FIGS AND DAIRY PRODUCTS WOULD PARALYZE THE VILLAGE'S ECONOMY. (COMMENT: WHILE THE VILLAGE'S VULNERABILITY MAY HAVE MADE THE IMPOSITION OF A BLOCKADE FEASIBLE, THE ACTUAL IMPETUS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03242 02 OF 04 301247Z

SPECIFIC INCIDENT OR SERIES OF INCIDENTS. END COMMENT.)

7. AFTER AN AUGUST 12 CLASH WITH THE IDF INVOLVING STONE THROWING AND SOME ARRESTS, BUT NO SERIOUS INJURIES, THE VILLAGERS AWOKE AUGUST 13 TO FIND TEL SEALED OFF AND THE VILLAGE UNDER CURFEW. ALTHOUGH THE CURFEW, WHICH RESTRICTS RESIDENTS TO THEIR HOUSES, WAS LIFTED SHORTLY AFTER, THE TOWN REMAINED SUBJECT TO A TOTAL BLOCKADE. NO PEOPLE, FOOD, OR PRODUCTS WERE ALLOWED INTO OR OUT OF THE VILLAGE. IN ADDITION TO A SERIES OF CHECKPOINTS ON THE NABLUS-TEL ROAD, IDF PATROLS AIDED BY HELICOPTERS COMBED THE SURROUNDING ORCHARDS FOR VIOLATORS. (COMMENT: THIS OPERATION OCCURED BEFORE THE QALQILYA SEARCH-AND-ARREST OPERATION WHICH BROUGHT THIS TECHNIQUE TO PUBLIC ATTENTION. END COMMENT.) VILLAGERS REPORTED BEATINGS, ARRESTS, AND TWO DEATHS: A VILLAGER SHOT IN THE HEAD, AND A YOUNG CHILD WHO DIED OF DEHYDRATION BECAUSE OF THE WATER SHORTAGE.

8. THE PERIOD OF TOTAL BLOCKADE LASTED ONE WEEK, UNTIL ICRC REPRESENTATIONS INTERVENED WITH THE IDF TO ALLOW FOODSTUFFS AND WATER INTO THE VILLAGE. FROM THAT POINT UNTIL THE LIFTING OF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE BLOCKADE, VILLAGERS WERE ALLOWED TO LIVE FAIRLY NORMAL LIVES WITHIN THE VILLAGE ITSELF. SOLDIERS REMAINED OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE, EXCEPT FOR OCCASIONAL PATROLS WHICH WERE INEVITABLY MET BY STONES. THE VILLAGERS WERE ALLOWED TO PICK THEIR FIG CROP. HOWEVER, NO VILLAGERS, FIGS, OR

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03242 02 OF 04 301247Z

DAIRY PRODUCTS WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE VILLAGE, AND NO ANIMAL FEED WAS ALLOWED IN. VILLAGERS CAUGHT VIOLATING THE ORDER BY TRANSPORTING THEIR GOODS ON DONKEYS THROUGH THE FIELDS HAD THEIR GOODS AND ANIMALS CONFISCATED. (THE DONKEYS WERE KEPT IN THE VILLAGE SCHOOL UNTIL LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS LED THE SOLDIERS TO RETURN THEM TO THEIR OWNERS.) FIGS OR DAIRY PRODUCTS FROM TEL WERE ALSO CONFISCATED IN NABLUS. ON OCCASION, PATROLS IN THE VILLAGE DESTROYED FIGS AND DAIRY PRODUCTS IN PEOPLE'S HOMES. BY THE END OF THE THIRD WEEK, VILLAGERS STARTED LIQUIDATING THEIR HERDS FOR LACK OF FEED.

9. VILLAGERS ATTRIBUTE THE LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE TO TWO FACTORS: THE END OF FIG SEASON, AND INTERVENTION BY THE U.S. EMBASSY. HOWEVER, THEY REMAIN BITTER THAT OVER TWO-THIRDS OF THE FIG CROP WAS LOST, DAIRY PRODUCTION FOR OVER ONE MONTH WAS LOST, AND HERDS WERE REDUCED. THEY HAVE NO PLANS TO REPLACE THE LOST ANIMALS UNTIL THE SITUATION BECOMES MORE STABLE. ACCORDING TO THE AN-NAJAH PROFESSOR, THE LOSS OF ANIMALS IS THE BIGGEST ECONOMIC LOSS SUFFERED BY TEL.

A "LIBERATED" VILLAGE

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03242 03 OF 04 301247Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /086 W
-----243670 301253Z /44

O 301240Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3622
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03242

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: VISIT TO TEL: THE VIEW FROM A

10. CURRENTLY, SECURITY FORCES DO NOT ENTER
TEL. OCCASIONAL PATROLS APPROACH THE ENTRANCE
TO THE VILLAGE, SETTING OFF WARNINGS FROM
LOOKOUTS AND THE CHECKPOINT POSTED ALONG THE
ROUTE, BUT THEY DO NOT ENTER. HELICOPTERS
REGULARLY FLY OVER THE AREA. DURING THE
SEPTEMBER 28 MEETING, TWO IDF JEEPS--PRECEDED
BY SHOUTS FROM THE LOOKOUTS--DROVE UP TO THE
LAST BEND IN THE ROAD BEFORE THE VILLAGE, THEN
TURNED AND DROVE AWAY. A GROUP OF YOUNG MEN HAD
POSTED THEMSELVES WITH STONES AT THE ENTRANCE OF
THE VILLAGE, BUT THE JEEPS TURNED BACK WHILE
STILL OUT OF RANGE. ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS
DURING THE TWO-HOUR MEETING, TWO HELICOPTERS
HOVERED OVERHEAD. SINCE THE IDF DOES NOT ENTER,
TEL VILLAGE NOW CONSIDERS ITSELF A "LIBERATED"
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03242 03 OF 04 301247Z

VILLAGE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF A POPULAR COMMITTEE LOYAL TO THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING.

11. THE MOOD AMONG THE YOUNG PEOPLE IS DEFIANT. THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE WON A GREAT VICTORY, AND THEY PROMISE TO MEET EVERY ISRAELI CHALLENGE WITH STONES. THE ELDERS SEEMED SOMEWHAT UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THESE SENTIMENTS, BUT DID NOT GAIN SAY THE YOUNGER GENERATION. ALL PUBLICLY SUPPORTED THE PLO (ALTHOUGH THE HAMAS PERSON WAS NOT IN THE ROOM AT THE TIME). WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE APPARENT DIFFICULTIES ABOUT CONVENING THE PNC, THEY RESPONDED WITH THE STANDARD EXPLANATION THAT THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE ONLY PART OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO RECONCILE THE NEEDS OF ALL PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE DIASPORA. IN AN ASIDE, THE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR CLAIMED TO BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT LEFTIST INROADS ON FATAH'S POWER THAN ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTALIST THREAT. HE EXPLAINED THAT, IN THE CASE OF DISILLUSION FOLLOWING A FAILED PNC AND INCREASED IDF FORCE AGAINST THE VILLAGE, IT WAS POSSIBLE THE LEFTIST ELEMENTS WOULD REJECT THE FATAH LINE AND RETURN TO AN UNCOMPROMISING STANCE. ALL CLAIMED NOT TO CARE ABOUT EITHER THE ISRAELI OR THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. THEY ASSERTED THAT LABOR AND LIKUD WERE THE SAME, POINTING OUT THAT RABIN WAS LABOR, AND SAID THAT WHOEVER WAS ELECTED, THEY WANTED THE ISRAELIS OUT. WHILE EXPRESSING HOPE THAT EITHER BUSH OR DUKAKIS WOULD BE MORE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03242 03 OF 04 301247Z

SUPPORTIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS AND NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO, THEY ARGUED THAT THE U.S. WAS AND WOULD REMAIN BIASED TOWARD ISRAEL. CONGENOFF RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. WAS AND WOULD CONTINUE WORKING TO FACILITATE A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM THAT WOULD ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF BOTH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS.

FUTURE VULNERABILITY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

12. THE OLIVE HARVEST BEGINS IN TWO WEEKS, AND THE VILLAGERS OF TEL WERE CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT THE IDF WOULD REIMPOSE ITS BLOCKADE TO PREVENT HARVEST OR MARKETING OF THE OLIVE CROP. (THE SEPTEMBER 22 JERUSALEM POST HAS PUBLISHED A REPORT OF A THREAT BY IDF OFFICERS IN THE REGION TO DO SO.) STILL, WHILE FEARING THAT TEL WOULD ONCE AGAIN BE MADE AN EXAMPLE, THE YOUTH EXPRESSED THEIR CONFIDENCE, EVEN BRAVADO, THAT THE VILLAGE WOULD ONCE AGAIN HOLD OUT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE MUKHTAR EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE USG WOULD INTERVENE WITH THE GOI TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF THE FIG BLOCKADE.

COMMENT

13. WE OFFER THIS SNAPSHOT OF A WEST BANK VILLAGE SIMPLY AS A VIEW INTO THE CURRENT MOOD



NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03242 04 OF 04 301248Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /086 W

-----243701 301253Z /44

O 301240Z SEP 88

UNCLASSIFIED

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3623
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] SECTION 04 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03242

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: VISIT TO TEL: THE VIEW FROM A

OF RURAL PALESTINIANS. WE FOUND MANY ELEMENTS
IN COMMON WITH OTHER PALESTINIANS BOTH RURAL AND
URBAN: PUBLIC UNITY IN SUPPORT OF THE INTIFADA,
NEAR UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF THE PLO AND, DESPITE
THE SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT, A LINGERING
UNCERTAINTY OF WHAT THE UPCOMING POLITICAL
EVENTS--THE PNC, THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS, AND THE
AMERICAN ELECTIONS--WILL BRING.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCISE

P

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** NOFORN

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE316460

FILM= D880866-0268

DATE= 28 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= INR/NESA:MLDUROCHER

OFFICE= ORIGIN INR

TO= INTSUM COLLECTIVE
BEIRUT
TRSY
MULTIPLE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= NOFORN

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAEL: THE INTIFADA AND THE MOOD FO THE ELECTORATE

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, VOTING, ELECTION, CAMPAIGN, VIOLENCE, SECL
COALITION GOVERNMENT, WEST BANK, PEACE PLAN

TAGS= KPAL, PINR, EG, IS, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	<input type="checkbox"/> FPC/CDR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D-CLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY _____
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE IS _____

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>

PAGE 01 STATE 316460
ORIGIN INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 AF-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 MMO-01
IO-19 NEA-06 ARA-00 PM-10 EAP-00 INRE-00 DS-01
/047 R

DRAFTED BY: INR/NESA:MLDUROCHER
APPROVED BY: INR/NESA:WEWHITE
INR/NESA:DAHERTZBERG

-----032541 280043Z /66

P 280016Z SEP 88 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
SECDEF WASHDC/ISA 0000
JCS WASHDC/OJCS/J-5 0000
DIA/DE4 WASHDC
NSC WASHDC 0000
USMISSION USVIENNA
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
USCENCTOM MACDILL AFB FL/POLAD
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT/INTAF/FOR POLAD KRUSE
COMSIXFLT
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
NSA FT MEADE MD
USIA WASHDC
NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD

STATE 316460

FOR MBFR/NOFORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EG, IS, PINR, KPAL

INTSUM 188, SEPTEMBER 27, 1988

PAGE 02 STATE 316460

USDEL MBFR VIENNA FOR AMBASSADOR
LONDON FOR RAPHEL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PARIS FOR WINN
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN AND FOR MFO CLOVERIUS
DOD/ISA FOR NESA
CINCEUR FOR POLAD
CINCUSNAVEUR FOR INTAF
NSC FOR RODMAN
NSA FOR CHIEF G GROUP
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

-WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

ISRAEL: THE INTIFADA AND
THE MOOD OF THE ELECTORATE

1. [REDACTED] LABOR AND LIKUD APPEAR TO HAVE ABOUT EQUAL SUPPORT AMONG ISRAELI VOTERS, AND ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT IS POSSIBLE AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET, BUT ISRAELI POLITICS ARE VOLATILE, AND WITH SECURITY AND PEACE--IN THAT ORDER--DOMINATING VOTERS' THOUGHTS, DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN EVENTS COULD STILL INFLUENCE THE UNDECIDED--AND THE OUTCOME IN NOVEMBER.

DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT

2. [REDACTED] THE NINE-MONTH-OLD UPRISING HAS PRODUCED OPPOSITE LABOR AND LIKUD APPROACHES TO THE TERRITORIES'
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STATE 316460

FUTURE, WHICH EACH PARTY HOPES WILL APPEAL TO ISRAEL'S UNDECIDED VOTERS. LIKUD POINTS TO PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE AS EVIDENCE OF THE INTOLERABLE SECURITY THREAT ISRAEL WOULD FACE IF IT WERE TO PULL BACK FROM THE TERRITORIES.

3. [REDACTED] FOR LABOR, THE VIOLENCE HIGHLIGHTS THE DEMOGRAPHIC TIME BOMB FACING ISRAEL IF IT DOES NOT DISENGAGE FROM THE TERRITORIES, THOUGH MOST LABOR LEADERS SUPPORT TOUGH MEASURES IF NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN ORDER UNTIL PEACE IS ACHIEVED. BOTH PARTIES HAVE REACTED HARSHLY TO PLO DECLARATIONS REGARDING A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE, WHICH HAS SERVED TO HEIGHTEN THE URGENCY OF SECURITY AND PUSH THE PEACE PROCESS INTO THE BACKGROUND.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IMPACT ON THE ELECTORATE

4. [REDACTED] THE REVOLT HAS HARDENED ISRAELI ATTITUDES ON BOTH ENDS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. PERHAPS WITH GREATER ZEAL THAN BEFORE, SOME ISRAELI ACADEMICS AND POLITICIANS ARE ARGUING THAT CONTINUED RETENTION OF THE TERRITORIES CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO THE JEWISHNESS OF ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH LITTLE SUGGESTS THAT THE CYCLE OF PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE AND RETALIATORY JEWISH RESPONSE HAS STRENGTHENED THE APPEAL OF DRACONIAN SOLUTIONS, ANNEXATION AND MASS EXPULSION ARE BECOMING MORE POPULAR AMONG SOME FRINGE EXTREMISTS.

WHAT THE POLLS SAY

5. [REDACTED] THE INTIFADA HAS RESULTED IN GREATER PESSIMISM ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF PEACE, THE LOWEST RATING

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 STATE 316460

IN YEARS ON ISRAEL'S INTERNAL SECURITY, AND AN INCREASE IN PATRIOTISM AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ARMY'S ABILITY TO IMPOSE ORDER, ACCORDING TO PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH. THE WILLINGNESS OF ISRAELIS TO RELINQUISH SOME PARTS OF THE WEST BANK IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE HAS GRADUALLY INCREASED, BUT MOST JEWISH VOTERS CONTINUE TO FAVOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES.

TALKING TO THE PLO

6. [REDACTED] HALF THE PUBLIC BELIEVES ISRAEL SHOULD AGREE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO IF IT RECOGNIZES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND ACCEPTS RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. AT THE SAME TIME, A MAJORITY (56 PERCENT AGAINST 29 PERCENT) THINKS IT UNLIKELY THAT THE PLO WILL MEET THOSE TERMS WITHIN THE NEXT TWO YEARS. JEWISH ISRAELIS BY A TWO-TO-ONE MARGIN (54 PERCENT AGAINST 28 PERCENT) CONTINUE TO REJECT CREATION OF A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE IN PART OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA--EVEN IF THAT WERE NECESSARY FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT.

ANOTHER UNITY GOVERNMENT?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7. [REDACTED] VARIOUS POLLS SHOW LABOR AND LIKUD CAPTURING APPROXIMATELY THE SAME NUMBER OF KNESSET SEATS. WHEN EXTREME RIGHT AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES ARE ADDED TO LIKUD, AND LIBERAL AND LEFT-WING PARTIES TO LABOR, THE COMBINED TOTALS DO NOT ADD UP TO THE 61 SEATS NEEDED TO FORM A GOVERNING COALITION.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 05 STATE 316460

8. [REDACTED] THE PARTIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED NEARLY EQUAL ELECTORAL STRENGTH IN THE PAST TWO NATIONAL ELECTIONS, AND SOME ANALYSTS PREDICT ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. BUT SHIFTS IN THE TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES MAY YET OCCUR THAT WOULD ALLOW FORMATION OF A NARROW COALITION LED BY ONE OR THE OTHER PARTY.

WHAT COULD UPSET THE BALANCE?

9. [REDACTED] THE DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN LABOR AND LIKUD COULD BE ALTERED BY A SHIFT ON THE PART OF THE COUNTRY'S [REDACTED] UNDECIDED VOTERS. ISRAELIS WILL BE LOOKING INTENTLY TO THE PLO'S PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL SESSION, WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS THE SECOND WEEK OF OCTOBER, FOR SIGNS OF PLO MODERATION AND OPENNESS TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. (b-

10. [REDACTED] A PLO FAILURE TO MOVE SUBSTANTIVELY WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ARGUMENTS OF HARD-LINERS WHO MAINTAIN THAT THE ORGANIZATION IS AN UNACCEPTABLE NEGOTIATING PARTNER. PRE-ELECTION TERRORISM INSIDE THE COUNTRY OR AGAINST ISRAELI INTERESTS ABROAD WOULD SHIFT OPINION DECIDEDLY RIGHTWARD.

11. [REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THE ARMY APPEARS TO BE HOLDING DOWN THE VIOLENCE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AN UPSURGE OF ANTI-ISRAELI ACTIVITY--INCLUDING STONINGS AND FIRE-BOMBINGS THAT RESULT IN INJURIES OR DEATHS TO JEWISH SETTLERS IN THE TERRITORIES--COULD INFLAME OPINION IN FAVOR OF HARSHER MEASURES.

12. [REDACTED] FINALLY, A DECISION IN FAVOR OF EGYPT ON THE TABA BORDER DISPUTE (WHICH WILL BE ANNOUNCED FORMALLY ON [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THURSDAY) WILL BE GREETED UNFAVORABLY IN ISRAEL.
LIKUD--WHICH IN 1984 OPPOSED SENDING THE DISPUTE TO
ARBITRATION BUT EVENTUALLY GAVE IN UNDER STRONG ALIGNMENT
PRESSURE-"IS CERTAIN TO MAKE THE TURNOVER OF TERRITORY AN
ELECTION ISSUE, DESPITE REPORTS THAT A TACIT
ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED TO TRY TO
KEEP THE ISSUE QUIET. WHITEHEAD



NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

E85

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCISE

P

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV13685

FILM= D880850-0566

DATE= 22 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION OES

TO= STATE
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAELI SATELLITE

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 13550

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE. ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SATELLITE. POSTPONEMENT. OUTER SPACE

TAGS= KSCA. TSPA. PREL. MNUC. MCAP. PINR. US. IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
IN PART

IS/FPC/CDR

Date. FEB 12 1997

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority to:
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>

PAGE 01 TEL AV 13685 01 OF 03 221724Z
ACTION OES-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DINT-05 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSF-01 ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 NASA-01 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 EAP-00 CIP-08
ITC-01 AIT-02 PA-01 NAS-01 OMB-01 STR-17 HHS-04
INRE-00 AGRE-00 ACDA-12 TST-02 USIE-00 SP-02 DOEE-00
M-01 SNP-01 FAIM-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01
/137 W

-----123402 221739Z /46 38

O 221710Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0907
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB. IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 13685

DEPT ALSO FOR OES/SAT. OES/SCT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: TSPA, PREL, MNUC, MCAP, PINR, IS, KSCA

SUBJECT: ISRAELI SATELLITE

REF: TEL AVIV 13550 (NOTAL)

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 13685 01 OF 03 221724Z

2. SUMMARY: SCIATT AND POL/MIL OFFICER MET TODAY
(9/22) WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WE WILL MEET

UNCLASSIFIED

B-1

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] ISA CHAIRMAN NEEMAN, TOMORROW, [REDACTED] WAS ELATED WITH THE WEEK'S EVENTS. THE SATELLITE ("OFFEQ" - HORIZON) IS PERFORMING FLAWLESSLY, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE ONLY ANOMALY DURING THE LAUNCH WAS THE FAILURE OF A TRANSISTOR CONTROLLING ELECTRICAL SWITCHING DURING COUNTDOWN WHICH FORCED A 24-HOUR POSTPONEMENT OF THE LAUNCH. [REDACTED] DENIED ANY MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE LAUNCH. HE INDICATED THAT THE USE OF U.S. EQUIPMENT IN THE LAUNCHER AND SATELLITE HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY AVOIDED. [REDACTED] DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF A SEPARATE MILITARY SATELLITE PROGRAM. HE PROVIDED EXTENSIVE DETAILS ABOUT THE LAUNCHER AND SATELLITE. END SUMMARY.

3 WE QUESTIONED [REDACTED] ABOUT THE DECISION-MAKING WHICH LED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SATELLITE AND LAUNCHER. [REDACTED] REVIEWED SEVERAL POINTS REPORTED IN THE ISRAELI MEDIA IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. ABOUT DOLLARS 45 MILLION WAS SPENT BY ISA FROM 1985 TO 1988 (1985-DOLLARS 5M, 1986-DOLLARS 15M, 1987-DOLLARS 16M, 1988-DOLLARS 8M) THESE FIGURES ONLY REPRESENT THE COST OF THE SATELLITE, TEST FACILITIES AND INSTRUMENTS, AND RESEARCH. THE LAUNCH VEHICLE AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE CAME OUT OF THE BUDGET OF ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES (IAI) AND [REDACTED] WOULD ONLY CONFIRM PRESS REPORTS THAT TOTAL COSTS FOR THE PROJECT WERE ABOUT 190 MILLION DOLLARS. HE DID NOT SPECIFY IAI'S DOLLAR COMMITMENT.

4 [REDACTED] SAID THAT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, PRIME MINISTER [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 13685 01 OF 03 221724Z

BEGIN MADE THE FORMAL DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH AN INDEPENDENT ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM. [REDACTED] WHO WAS PRESENT WHEN THE DECISION WAS MADE, SAID BEGIN WAS CONVINCED BY ARGUMENTS THAT THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD INVESTED IN SPACE SCIENCE NOW WOULD GAIN AN ADVANTAGE BY THE YEAR 2000 SIMILAR TO THAT ENJOYED BY COUNTRIES THAT INVESTED IN ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. THESE BENEFITS ARE IN THE FORM OF ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY OF SPACE EXPLORING NATIONS, COMMERCIAL SPIN-OFF OPPORTUNITIES AND NATIONAL PRESTIGE. AS EARLY AS 1968, PM GOLDA MEIR HAD APPROVED THE CONCEPT OF CONDUCTING SPACE RESEARCH, THOUGH BEGIN WAS THE FIRST TO FUND THE PROGRAM.

5 [REDACTED] NOTED THAT THE IAI PRESIDENT MOSHE KEVET

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

STATED TODAY THAT ISRAEL ANTICIPATED REVENUES OF DOLLARS 100 MILLION PER YEAR FROM THE SALE OF LAUNCH SERVICES AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. [REDACTED] WAS UNWILLING TO SPECULATE WHEN ISRAEL MIGHT ACHIEVE SUCH LEVELS OF REVENUE. HE WAS CERTAIN ABOUT ISA'S MORE IMMEDIATE PLANS. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE NEXT SATELLITE WILL BE LAUNCHED IN ABOUT A YEAR AND WILL CARRY ABOUT 35KG OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS. THESE WILL BE SELECTED FROM ABOUT TEN PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BY THE ISRAELI SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY. [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT A THIRD SATELLITE IS ALSO PLANNED, BUT SAID ISA WOULD ALSO BE CONCENTRATING ON THE PLANNED 1993 LAUNCH OF AN ISRAELI COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ABOARD ARIANE. THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD AFFECT THE RATE OF LAUNCH OF THE INDIGENOUS SATELLITE PROGRAM.

6. [REDACTED] DEFENDED THE DECISION NOT TO NOTIFY THE USG OF THE LAUNCH. HE SAID THE QUESTION OF "WHEN TO CALL (AMBASSADOR) PICKERING" WAS CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. IT WAS DECIDED NOT TO INFORM ANYONE OTHER

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 13685 02 OF 03 221725Z
ACTION OES-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DINT-05 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSF-01 ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 NASA-01 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 EAP-00 CIP-08
ITC-01 AIT-02 PA-01 NAS-01 OMB-01 STR-17 HHS-04
INRE-00 AGRE-00 ACDA-12 TST-02 USIE-00 SP-02 DOEE-00
M-01 SNP-01 FAIM-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01
/137 W

-----123425 221740Z /40 38

O 221710Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0908
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO. IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 13685

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPT ALSO FOR OES/SAT. OES/SCT

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356. DECL. OADR
TAGS. TSPA. PREL. MNUC. MCAP. PINR. IS. KSCA

SUBJECT ISRAELI SATELLITE

THAN THE CABINET PRIOR TO THE LAUNCH. HE NOTED THAT NO GOVERNMENT, AGENCY OR INDIVIDUAL RECEIVED PRIOR NOTIFICATION, ASIDE FROM CABINET MEMBERS AND THE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 13685 02 OF 03 221725Z

LAUNCH TEAM ITSELF. THE DECISION WAS MADE IN ADVANCE TO PHONE THE U.S. EMBASSY THIRTY MINUTES AFTER THE LAUNCH (COMMENT: THE CALL WAS ACTUALLY MADE NINETY MINUTES AFTER LAUNCH. END COMMENT.) [REDACTED] EMPHASIZED THAT THE INTENTION OF THE DECISION NOT TO TELL THE USG WAS TO ENSURE SECURITY. THOUGH HE NOTED THAT THE ARTICLE IN "TIME" MAGAZINE PRIOR TO THE LAUNCH (WHICH INDICATED SUCH AN EVENT WAS IMMINENT) WAS PUBLISHED SHORTLY AFTER THE CABINET WAS FIRST INFORMED OF THE PLAN ("AND WE HAVE AN IDEA WHO LEAKED IT." [REDACTED] SAID).

7. QUESTIONED ABOUT THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAUNCH [REDACTED] SAID THE GOI WAS TAKING PAINS TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT CIVILIAN SPACE CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD BE A PROFIT-MAKING ENTERPRISE. HE SAID THAT SOME COUNTRIES ARE UNABLE TO USE U.S. LAUNCH VEHICLES DUE TO OUR CONSTRAINTS ON THE TYPES OF HARDWARE WE WILL LAUNCH. HE CITED SWEDEN'S DESIRE TO LAUNCH A POLAR-ORBITING COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE AS AN EXAMPLE. THE SWEDES, HE SAID, WANT TO COMMUNICATE BETWEEN THEIR EMBASSIES WORLDWIDE AND STOCKHOLM USING A DEDICATED SATELLITE THAT THEY ALONE CONTROL. THE U.S. WILL NOT LAUNCH SUCH A SATELLITE AS A MATTER OF POLICY, AND OTHER LAUNCHERS (E.G., ARIANE) HAVE LONG WAITING LISTS. ISRAEL, HE SAID, WOULD NOT IMPOSE SUCH RESTRICTIONS ON THE PAYLOAD OF PROSPECTIVE USERS. [REDACTED] DENIED, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A LAUNCH WAS PLANNED OR UNDER NEGOTIATION)

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION [REDACTED] DID NOT DENY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE MIGHT ONE DAY CONDUCT ITS OWN LAUNCHES, PURCHASE A BOOSTER
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 13685 02 OF 03 221725Z

DIRECTLY FROM IAI WITHOUT INVOLVING ISA, OR LAUNCH A PURELY MILITARY SATELLITE. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY PLANS FOR SUCH ACTIVITY.

9. THE DECISION TO LAUNCH FROM EAST TO WEST IMPOSES ABOUT A 15 PENALTY ON THE PAYLOAD TO ORBIT. THIS DECISION WAS MADE [REDACTED] SAID, TO ENSURE THAT NO DEBRIS FELL IN THE ARAB STATES TO THE EAST. THIS POLICY WOULD CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE. HE DID NOTE HOWEVER THAT "THERE ARE MANY COUNTRIES BETWEEN 36 DEGREES NORTH AND 36 DEGREES SOUTH LATITUDE WHERE ONE COULD BUILD A LAUNCH COMPLEX THAT WOULD PERMIT MORE EFFICIENT WEST TO EAST, OR NORTH-SOUTH LAUNCHES (COMMENT: USEFUL FOR INTELLIGENCE SATELLITES. END COMMENT). ASKED IF ISRAEL WAS PLANNING SUCH A COMPLEX OR NEGOTIATING WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY TO THAT END, [REDACTED] INDICATED HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH PLANS (I.E. HE DID NOT CONFIRM NOR DENY).

10. ALTHOUGH HE HAD LITTLE INFORMATION TO OFFER ABOUT THE LAUNCH VEHICLE, LAUNCH COMPLEX OR RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE, [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT HE FELT SURE HE COULD OBTAIN AN INVITATION FOR THE AMBASSADOR, OR ANOTHER SENIOR USG OFFICIAL TO VISIT THE LAUNCH SITE AND INSPECT THE LAUNCH VEHICLE. (COMMENT: THIS SUGGESTS THAT ANOTHER BOOSTER HAS ALREADY BEEN FABRICATED. END COMMENT) WE INDICATED WE WOULD PASS THIS INVITATION ALONG.

11. ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY U.S. TECHNOLOGY IN THE LAUNCH VEHICLE OR SATELLITE, [REDACTED] WAS EMPHATIC THAT THERE WAS NOT. HE SAID PARTS OF THE SATELLITE HAD BEEN PROCURED FROM FRENCH, FRG, AND CANADIAN FIRMS. THE SOLAR PANELS WERE MANUFACTURED BY DORNIER OF GERMANY. HE "THOUGHT". DUE TO THE STRICT CONTROLS THE USG PLACES ON ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY HOWEVER, [REDACTED] SAID THE GOI HAD DECIDED TO AVOID USING ANY U.S.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 13685 02 OF 03 221725Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 13685 03 OF 03 221726Z
ACTION OES-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DINT-05 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSF-01 ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 NASA-01 SSO-00

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 EAP-00 CIP-08
ITC-01 AIT-02 PA-01 NAS-01 OMB-01 STR-17 HHS-04
INRE-00 AGRE-00 ACDA-12 TST-02 USIE-00 SP-02 DOEE-00
M-01 SNP-01 FAIM-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01
/137 W

-----123446 221740Z /40 38

O 221710Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0909
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO. IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 13685

DEPT ALSO FOR OES/SAT. OES/SCT

E.O. 12356: DECL. OADR
TAGS: TSPA, PREL, MNUC, MCAP, PINR, IS, KSCA

SUBJECT: ISRAELI SATELLITE

EQUIPMENT. HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ISRAELI
SCIENTISTS HAD GAINED IMPORTANT INFORMATION IN VISITS
TO THE U.S., SPECIFICALLY CITING A VISIT TO THE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 13685 03 OF 03 221726Z

GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER.

12. [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT THE BOOSTER WAS A
THREE-STAGE ROCKET. THE FIRST TWO STAGES WERE 20
METERS IN HEIGHT AND SOLID-FUELED. HE CLAIMED (NOT
VERY CREDIBLY) THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE THIRD
STAGE WAS LIQUID-FUELED OR SOLID. THRUST WAS 9 TONS
FOR EACH OF THE FIRST TWO STAGES, AND 2 TONS FOR THE
THIRD STAGE. THE PAYLOAD TO ORBIT WAS 156 KG.

13. [REDACTED] HANDED US A PRESS RELEASE WHICH PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING TECHNICAL DATA:

WEIGHT-156 KG; STRUCTURE-33KG. POWER SUPPLY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SYSTEM-58KG. COMPUTER-7KG. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM-12KG,
THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM-5KG. WIRING-9KG.
INSTRUMENTATION AND BALANCING WEIGHTS-32KG.

SHAPE-OCTAGONAL (A COLOR PHOTO IS BEING HAND-CARRIED
BY SCIATT TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR DELIVERY OOB 9/26),
HEIGHT 2.3 METERS, LOWER BASE DIAMETER 1.2 METERS,
UPPER BASE DIAMETER 0.7 METERS.

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM: POWER SUPPLIED BY SOLAR PANELS
246 WATTS, AVG. POWER CONSUMPTION 53 WATTS, BATTERY
CAPACITY 7 AMPERE-HOUR, VOLTAGE-UNREGULATED 25-42
VOLTS.

COMMUNICATIONS: S BAND, TELEMETRY TRANSMISSION RATE
2.4 KBITS/SEC. ON-BOARD MEMORY 128 KBYTES.

HUGHES

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED EXCISE

P (E1)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02536

FILM= D880665-0168

DATE= 01 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

930 4029

FEB 12 1997

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= INITIAL WEST BANK REACTION TO JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT: SHOCK, UNCERTAINTY

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= WEST BANK, GOVERNMENT REACTION, KING, SPEECH, OCCUPIED AREA, DEVELOPMENT LOAN, SELF DETERMINATION

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PBTS, IS, JO, PLO, (HUSSEIN I)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	NR Cases Only:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			TS authority to:
FOIA Exemptions <u>B-1</u>		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[[[]]]]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 02536 01 OF 03 011612Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 DSE-00 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /091 W
-----304412 011633Z /40

O 011609Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3064
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

[[[]]] SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02536

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: INITIAL WEST BANK REACTION TO JORDANIAN
DISENGAGEMENT: SHOCK, UNCERTAINTY

1. [[[]]]

2. SUMMARY. JORDAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT JULY 28 AND KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH JULY 31 CUTTING MANY LINKS WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAVE LEFT MANY WEST BANK LEADERS APPREHENSIVE AND UNCERTAIN. PLO SUPPORTERS GENERALLY WELCOME THE ANNOUNCEMENTS AS CONFIRMATION OF PLO PRIMACY IN THE TERRITORIES, BUT THEIR ENTHUSIASM IS TEMPERED BY CONCERN ABOUT THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES. PRO-JORDAN FIGURES SAY THE DECISION IS A "TRAGEDY" AND FEAR ENDURING POLITICAL GRIDLOCK, WITH THE WEST BANKERS UNABLE TO REPRESENT THEMSELVES, THE PLO UNABLE TO REPRESENT THEM WITH ISRAEL, AND THE SITUATION ON

[[[]]]
[[[]]]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 02536 01 OF 03 011612Z

THE GROUND WORSENING. NEARLY ALL SAY THEY HOPE THE U.S. WILL CHANNEL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS INTO A DIRECT WEST BANK/GAZA PROGRAM. MANY FEAR THE GOJ WILL MOVE TO RESTRICT TRAVEL BY LIMITING

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BRIDGE CROSSINGS OR PASSPORT FACILITIES. MOST ADMIT THERE IS MUCH UNCERTAINTY AND SAY MORE TIME IS NEEDED TO FULLY ASSESS THE NEW SITUATION. ARAFAT'S VISIT TO AMMAN IS SEEN AS A CRITICAL NEXT STEP. END SUMMARY.

VIEWS OF PLO SUPPORTERS

////////////////////

3. MOST PRO-PLO/FATAH FIGURES HERE (THIS GROUP REPRESENTS THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM), HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED TO CONGEN OFFICERS OVER THE YEARS THAT JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED BY FAMILY AND ECONOMIC TIES, AND THAT, ULTIMATELY, JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS WILL HAVE TO WORK TOGETHER TO DEFINE THEIR RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. WHAT THEY HAVE OBJECTED TO IN THE PAST WAS THE IMPLICATION THAT PALESTINIANS WERE A SUBORDINATE PARTY TO AN ISRAELI-JORDANIAN NEGOTIATION AND THAT THE PLO WOULD BE EXCLUDED ALTOGETHER. THEIR INSISTANCE ON SELF-DETERMINATION, A PALESTINIAN STATE, AND A PALESTINIAN FLAG IS BASED MORE ON THE PSYCHIC NEED FOR RECOGNITION AND IDENTITY THAN ON THE EXPECTATION THAT THEY COULD EXIST WITHOUT STRONG TIES TO JORDAN AND ISRAEL; HENCE THE PREFERENCE OF THE MAINSTREAM PRO-PLO ELEMENTS FOR

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02536 01 OF 03 011612Z

ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT STATE, AFTER WHICH THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY DECLARE CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN. SPECIFIC REACTIONS FROM PRO/PLO FIGURES FOLLOW.

4. [REDACTED] TOLD US HUSSEIN HAS BOWED TO THE INEVITABLE; HOWEVER, HE WOULD TRY TO PRESSURE PALESTINIANS TO CRAWL BACK TO HIM, BUT THEY WOULD NEVER DO THIS. [REDACTED] SPECULATED THAT THE PLO MIGHT NOW ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AND CHALLENGE ISRAEL FOR PEACE. [REDACTED] AGREED THAT THIS WAS A PROMISING OPTION.

B-1: d)

5. [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HE WELCOMED ABANDONMENT OF THE JORDAN WEST BANK/GAZA DEVELOPMENT PLAN, SEEN BY HIM AND OTHER PLO ADHERENTS AS AN GOJ EFFORT TO BUY POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE TERRITORIES.

6. [REDACTED] CALLED JORDAN'S DECISION "COURAGEOUS," AND A "HISTORIC STEP FOR PALESTINIANS." HE SEES THE GOJ MOVES NOT AS A CHALLENGE TO THE PLO, BUT A JOINT UNDERSTANDING THAT JORDAN CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE TERRITORIES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT THINGS WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PALESTINIANS, AND THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE SOME HARD DECISIONS. AL FAJR EDITOR HANNA SINIORA ALSO WELCOMED THE JORDANIAN MOVES AND HOPED THEY WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR A FRESH START IN REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02536 02 OF 03 011613Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 DSE-00 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /091 W
-----304446 011634Z /40

O 011609Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3065
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02536

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: INITIAL WEST BANK REACTION TO JORDANIAN

7. OTHER PRO-PLO CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT WHILE THEY SUPPORT THE KING'S NEW DEFINITION OF JORDANIAN -PALESTINIAN RELATIONS AS A STEP FORWARD, IN PRINCIPLE, THEY WONDER WHETHER JORDAN WILL TRY TO USE ITS LEVERAGE TO BRING THE PALESTINIANS AND PLO TO HEEL. JOURNALIST IBRAHIM KARA'EEN FEARED THAT IF THE KING WAS MOTIVATED BY BITTERNESS, HE COULD HURT THE PALESTINIANS, AND HE HOPED ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN WOULD REACH AN UNDERSTANDING.

8. SOME OF OUR PRO-PLO CONTACTS HOPE THAT THE JORDANIAN WITHDRAWAL WILL FORCE ISRAEL TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THE PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES AND PERSUADE THE GOI AND THE U.S. TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PLO.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02536 02 OF 03 011613Z

PRO-JORDANIANS DEEPLY CONCERNED

////////////////////////////////////

9. PRO-JORDANIAN LEADERS ARE SHOCKED AND DESPONDENT ABOUT THE GOJ MOVE. MAYOR ELIAS FREIJ OF BETHLEHEM SAID WEST BANKERS WILL NOW BECOME "STATELESS, LIKE GAZANS" AND ARE IN FOR TOUGH TIMES. AN-NAHAR EDITOR OTHMAN HALLAQ, IN AN EDITORIAL, HEWED TO THE KING'S ARGUMENT THAT JORDAN HAS NO INTENTION OF COMPETING WITH THE PLO IN LEADING OR REPRESENTING PALESTINIANS. "IF THE PLO IS THE LEGITIMATE WIFE OF PALESTINIANS, THEN JORDAN IS THEIR LOVING AND DEVOTED SISTER"... "NOW IT IS UP TO THE PLO TO TAKE OVER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CARING FOR PALESTINIANS UNDER OCCUPATION." HALLAQ PRIVATELY IS DEPLY CONCERNED AND FEARS JORDAN WILL NOW LIFT PASSPORTS AND CUT OFF SALARIES. HE WARNED THAT THE PLO IS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH ITS INDEPENDENT STATE ALONE, SINCE THE GOI WILL REFUSE TO DEAL WITH IT. IT WILL HAVE TO WORK WITH JORDAN IN SOME WAY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

10. [REDACTED] WAS MORE BLUNT.
"ALL PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA
WILL REPEAT LIKE PARROTS THAT THE PLO IS THEIR
SOLE REPRESENTATIVE. ISRAEL WON'T TALK TO THE
PLO, BUT PALESTINIANS WON'T TALK WITHOUT THE
PLO." DEADLOCK WILL RESULT WITHOUT JORDANIAN
INVOLVEMENT. [REDACTED] SAID THE KING'S
DECISION WAS A "TRAGEDY" AND DISSOLUTION OF
CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02536 02 OF 03 011613Z

PARLIAMENT A TERRIBLE, UNEXPECTED STEP. [REDACTED]
WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE 1948 JERICHO CONFERENCE
THAT "BEGGED" KING ABDULLAH TO UNITE THE EAST
AND WEST BANKS, DOUBTED HUSSEIN WOULD CLOSE THE
BRIDGES OR RESCIND PASSPORTS, BUT SAID THE JOINT
COMMITTEE WILL BE DISSOLVED AND THE PLO WILL
FIND ITSELF INCAPABLE OF TRANSFERRING MONEY INTO
THE TERRITORIES OR MAINTAINING PROGRAMS NOW
ADMINISTERED BY THE GOJ. HE SAID IF THE LIKUD
TAKES POWER AFTER NOVEMBER, THERE WILL BE A
STALEMATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, A CONTINUING
INTIFADA, AND HARSHER ISRAELI
COUNTERMEASURES--INCREASED SHOOTINGS, SETTLER
VIGILANTISM, DEPORTATIONS. JORDAN'S WITHDRAWAL,
IF KING HUSSEIN REALLY INTENDS THIS, LEAVES THE
WEST BANK ADRIFT. [REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED] SAID
PRO-JORDANIANS IN THE TERRITORIES WILL NOW BE
RIDICULED. PROMINENT PRO-JORDANIAN PHYSICIAN
[REDACTED] TOLD US IF JORDAN INTENDS TO
WITHDRAW FROM ITS ADMINISTRATIVE
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE WEST BANK THIS WILL BE
EXTREMELY DISRUPTIVE. HE IS GOING TO AMMAN TO
SEEK CLARIFICATION OF JORDAN'S INTENTIONS.

12. NABLUS BUSINESSMAN [REDACTED] FAULTED
JORDAN FOR IGNORING THE PEOPLE IN THE WEST BANK
FOR 15 YEARS, THEN TRYING AND FAILING TO
SUPPLANT THE PLO RATHER THAN WORKING IN
PARTNERSHIP WITH IT. [REDACTED] SAID THE KING HAD LOST ALL HOPE OF

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 02536 03 OF 03 011614Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 DSE-00 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /091 W
-----304466 011634Z /40

O 011609Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3066
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02536

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: INITIAL WEST BANK REACTION TO JORDANIAN

REGAINING THE TERRITORIES FROM ISRAEL, WAS
"DESPERATE", AND HAD DECIDED TO HAND THE PROBLEM
TO THE PLO.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

////////////////////

13. NEARLY EVERYONE WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH SAID
THEY HOPED THE U.S. WOULD USE ITS JORDAN
DEVELOPMENT PLAN MONEY TO INCREASE DIRECT AID TO
THE TERRITORIES NATCHÉ REPEATED OLD ARGUMENTS
ABOUT DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE SUBSIDIZING THE
OCCUPATION BY RELIEVING ISRAEL FROM
RESPONSIBILITIES IT SHOULD UNDERTAKE, BUT
ADMITTED THE NEED FOR CONTINUED OUTSIDE HELP FOR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02536 03 OF 03 011614Z

LEGITIMATE PROJECTS.

14. DR. BASEM ATALLAH TOUMA, A BEIT SAHOUR PHYSICIAN, SAID UNEMPLOYMENT AND SUFFERING WILL INCREASE IN THE ABSENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AID, AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ALLEVIATE THIS SUFFERING BY TAKING OVER THE JORDAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DIRECTLY. DR. KAMAL, OF THE BETHLEHEM DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, ASKED POINTEDLY IF THE U.S. WOULD NOW ASK JORDAN TO REFUND THE SEVEN MILLION DOLLARS THE U.S. HAS JUST COMMITTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

15. COMMENT: ALL PALESTINIANS HERE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF JORDAN'S NEW POLICY ON THEIR LIVES, AND WONDER ANXIOUSLY HOW JORDAN WILL IMPLEMENT ITS DECISIONS. UPPERMOST IN PEOPLES' MINDS ARE CONCERNS OVER CITIZENSHIP, TRAVEL, TRADE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURTS AND SCHOOLS, SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC WAQF, AND A HOST OF OTHER FUNCTIONS THAT JORDAN HAS CONTINUED TO PERFORM IN THE WEST BANK. THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN, ALTHOUGH DISMISSED BY MANY AS POLITICAL BRIBERY WITH NO SUBSTANCE, HAS HELPED MANY COMMUNITIES, AND MANY WONDER WHAT WILL TAKE ITS PLACE. AS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, WHILE SOME THINK ISRAEL WILL NOW HAVE TO TAKE THE PLO SERIOUSLY, OTHERS HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS THIS WILL HAPPEN. ARAFAT'S VISIT TO AMMAN IS SEEN BY MANY AS THE KEY TO CLARIFYING THESE UNCERTAINTIES. ALL WEST BANKERS, PRO-PLO AND PRO-JORDANIAN, HOPE ARAFAT'S VISIT WILL CLEAR THE AIR AND SOMEHOW LEAD TO A

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02536 03 OF 03 011614Z

RATIONALIZATION OF THE JORDANIAN-PLO RELATIONSHIP AND AN END TO THEIR ON-AGAIN OFF-AGAIN ADVERSARY STRUGGLE AND RESOLVE AT LEAST THIS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. END COMMENT.
WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E49

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV12864

FILM= D880780-0692

DATE= 02 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

USIA

ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAEL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 12493

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CAMPAIGN, REVIEW, ELECTION, PARTY STRENGTH

TAGS= PGOV, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY

EXCISE DECLASSIFY

DENY DECLASSIFY

DELETE Non-Responsive Info IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

IS/FPC/CDR _____ Date: _____

MR Cases Only: _____

EO Citations _____

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority to: _____

DOWNGRADE TS to S or S or _____

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

██████████
PAGE 01 TEL AV 12864 01 OF 03 021631Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /056 W
-----070133 021715Z /44 38

O 021624Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0543
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5052
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

██████████ SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 12864

USIA FOR R/NA AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2

REF: TEL AVIV 12493

1. ██████████
2. SUMMARY: LABOR'S PRIVATE LATE AUGUST POLL SUGGESTED LABOR RETAINS A HEALTHY LEAD OVER LIKUD AND IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD NOW, LABOR WOULD LEAD THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. SOME OF OUR WELL-PLACED LABOR CAMPAIGN CONTACTS NONETHELESS BELIEVE LABOR AND LIKUD ARE RUNNING NECK AND NECK. SOME SMALL PARTY CONTACTS WHO WOULD PREFER A LABOR WIN ASSESS LIKUD IN A BETTER POSITION TODAY TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. LIKUD, HOWEVER, APPEARS UNCERTAIN AS TO CAMPAIGN STRATEGY. LIKUD SEEMS UNCERTAIN WHETHER TO CONDUCT ITS CAMPAIGN AS A PARTY OF THE RIGHT AND THE LEADER OF THE "NATIONAL CAMP" OR TO WAGE A LOWER-KEY AND "MODERATE"

██████████
██████████
PAGE 02 TEL AV 12864 01 OF 03 021631Z

EFFORT FOCUSED ON THE FLOATING VOTER. LABOR, FOR ITS PART, IS CONCENTRATING ITS ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES ON FOLLOWING UP THE FLOATING AND UNDECIDED VOTERS LOCATED BY ITS MASSIVE TELEPHONE PROJECT. END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ASSESSMENTS

3. LABOR: CAMPAIGN HQ SPOKESMAN AVRUM BURG ASSESSED THE ISRAELI ELECTORATE AS ALMOST EVENLY DIVIDED, WITH LABOR HAVING A SLIGHT EDGE. HE BELIEVED THE ELECTION HINGED ON WHICH MAJOR PARTY WOULD GARNER THE FLOATING VOTERS.

4. LIKUD: CAMPAIGN HQ ORGANIZATION CO-DIRECTOR MK MICHA REISER TOLD US THE ELECTION WAS NOT IN LIKUD'S POCKET, ALTHOUGH LIKUD'S PROSPECTS WERE GOOD. HE BELIEVED LIKUD RETAINED THE CONSTITUENCY WHICH ENABLED IT TO EMERGE AS THE LARGEST PARTY IN THE 1981 ELECTIONS. BUT TO SUCCEED LIKUD HAD TO CONDUCT A CAMPAIGN AS A PARTY OF THE RIGHT AND THE LEADER OF THE "NATIONAL CAMP." LIKUD'S PROSPECTS RESTED ON ITS CONDUCTING AN AGGRESSIVE (NOT VIOLENT) CAMPAIGN. A WRONG CAMPAIGN CONCEPT COULD LOSE LIKUD THE ELECTION, HE STRESSED. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THOSE IN LIKUD WHO ADVOCATED FOCUSING ON THE FLOATING VOTER, TINKERING WITH THE PARTY'S FIRM POSITIONS, AND A QUIET CAMPAIGN. HE SPECIFICALLY CRITICIZED ARENS' STATEMENTS ON HOLDING ELECTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES AND UNILATERAL AUTONOMY AND UNNECESSARILY DEPARTING FROM THE LIKUD LINE. HE ALSO THOUGHT SHAMIR'S PUBLIC DESCRIPTION OF LIKUD AS A PARTY OF THE CENTER WAS A SERIOUS MISTAKE.

5. HADASH: UM AL FAHOUM MAYOR MAHMUD HASHIMI, NO. 5 ON THE LIST, EXPECTS HIS PARTY TO WIN 6 SEATS, WITH

PAGE 03 TEL AV 12864 01 OF 03 021631Z

THE PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE WINNING ONLY ONE SEAT. HE PREDICTED LABOR WOULD LOSE HEAVILY AMONG ISRAELI ARABS, THE CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT WOULD WIN UP TO A SEAT FROM ISRAELI ARABS, AND DAROUSHA'S ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY WOULD FAIL TO MAKE IT PAST THE MINIMUM ELECTORAL THRESHOLD.

6. SHAS: CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR RABBI YAIR LEVY BELIEVES SHAS WILL REPEAT ITS ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF 1984, WHEN IT WON 4 SEATS. HE THOUGHT LIKUD WOULD EMERGE AS THE LEADING PARTY AFTER THE ELECTIONS AND WOULD BE ABLE TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, DESPITE HIS PREFERENCE FOR SHAS PARTICIPATION IN A LABOR-LED NARROW GOVERNMENT.

7. CENTER-SHINUI: PARTY LEADER MK AMNON RUBENSTEIN ASSESSED LIKUD WOULD BE ABLE TO PUT TOGETHER A RIGHT-RELIGIOUS COALITION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. THE LEAST

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BAD OUTCOME FROM THE CENTER-LEFT'S PERSPECTIVE, HE BELIEVED, WOULD BE A LIKUD-LED NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. (HE HOPED HIS PREDICTIONS WERE WRONG.) RUBENSTEIN THOUGHT HIS PARTY WOULD WIN 3 SEATS, RATHER THAN THE TWO SUGGESTED BY THE POLLS.
8. MAPAM: CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR HANAN EREZ GAVE US AN OPTIMISTIC FORECAST FOR HIS PARTY, PREDICTING A WIN OF 3-4 SEATS.

LIKUD: INTERNAL

9. MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO HURWITZ IS THREATENING TO TAKE HIS OMETZ MOVEMENT OUT OF LIKUD IF ZALMAN SHOVAL (AN OMETZ COLLEAGUE) IS NOT GIVEN A SAFE PLACE BEFORE THE 30TH SLOT ON THE LIKUD LIST. HURWITZ'

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 12864 02 OF 03 021706Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /056 W
-----071052 021716Z /40 38

O 021624Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0544
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5053
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED]

SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 12864

USIA FOR R/NA AND NEA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2

DEAL WITH LIKUD HAD BEEN FOR HIM TO RECEIVE THE 6TH PLACE ON THE LIKUD LIST AND FOR SHOVAL TO RECEIVE A SAFE PLACE BETWEEN 20-30. LIKUD DECIDED TO IGNORE THE DEAL AND HAS BEEN SEEKING TO PLACE SHOVAL IN AN UNREALISTIC PLACE IN THE LIST'S HIGH 40S. OMETZ IS TO MEET ON SEPT. 5 TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO. (THE OMETZ PROBLEM HAS BEEN ONE OF THE FACTORS DELAYING FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE LIKUD LIST.)

LIKUD: STRATEGY

10. LIKUD LEADERS MOVED QUICKLY TO TERMINATE FURTHER STATEMENTS BY CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR ARENS IN FAVOR OF UNILATERAL AUTONOMY AND THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES. ARENS' EFFORT TO DEVELOP A MORE FLEXIBLE LIKUD IMAGE (TO APPEAL TO FLOATING VOTERS)

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 12864 02 OF 03 021706Z

RAN AGAINST THOSE IN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP CONVINCED IT IS MORE IN LIKUD'S ELECTORAL INTEREST TO HEW TO A CLEAR AND FIRM LINE. COMMENT: AS REISER SUGGESTED IN PARA. 4 ABOVE, LIKUD FACES A DILEMMA IN WHETHER TO CONDUCT A HOT, AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN WHICH WILL INSPIRE ITS ACTIVISTS OR A LOW-KEY CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO WIN OVER THE FLOATING VOTER. THIS IS LIKUD'S BASIC CAMPAIGN PROBLEM AT THIS STAGE.

LABOR: INTERNAL

11. WEIZMAN REMOVED BG EPHRAIM SNEH FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ISRAELI ARAB SECTOR IN THE CAMPAIGN, REPORTEDLY BECAUSE WEIZMAN WAS DISSATISFIED WITH THE APPARENT TREND OF ISRAELI ARAB LOSSES FROM LABOR. (CONCERN IN THE PARTY WAS EXACERBATED BY THE UNWANTED RELEASE OF AN ASSESSMENT BY KNESSET CANDIDATE RAANAN COHEN, A FORMER HEAD OF THE MINORITIES DEPARTMENT IN THE PARTY, SUGGESTING LABOR WOULD LOSE HALF OF THE VOTES IT WON FROM ISRAELI ARABS IN 1984.) WEIZMAN HAD CONSIDERED HANDLING THE ISRAELI ARAB CAMPAIGN HIMSELF, BUT DECIDED TO HAND RESPONSIBILITY OVER TO A TEAM HEADED BY ARAB KNESSET CANDIDATE AND HISTADRUT OFFICIAL NAWAF MASALHA.

12. SNEH SHIFTED OVER TO HEAD PERES' PERSONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CAMPAIGN TEAM, WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZING PERES AS ONE OF LABOR'S MAJOR ELECTORAL ASSETS IN PARALLEL TO THE BROADER EFFORT OF THE PARTY CAMPAIGN HQ.

POLLS

13. LABOR CONTACTS PROVIDED US WITH RESULTS FROM
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 12864 02 OF 03 021706Z

THEIR LATE AUGUST DECIMA SURVEY, WHICH SUGGESTED LABOR WOULD CLEARLY EMERGE AS THE LARGEST PARTY, WITH A "BLOCKING MAJORITY" AGAINST A NARROW LIKUD-LED COALITION. LABOR, LED BY PERES, WOULD BE POSITIONED TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO THE RESULTS. (SEE SEPTTEL).

14. LABOR SOURCES ALSO GAVE LABOR MINISTERS AND THE MEDIA SELECTED DATA FROM THE DECIMA SURVEY. PERES WAS PREFERRED OVER SHAMIR AS PRIME MINISTER (48 PERCENT TO 34 PERCENT). EIGHTY PERCENT OF JEWISH ISRAELIS CONSIDERED TERRITORIES, PEACE AND SECURITY (IN THAT ORDER) AS THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS 71 PERCENT (SIMILAR TO THE MAY LEVEL OF 73 PERCENT AND MARCH LEVEL OF 67 PERCENT). SUPPORT FOR PLO PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS (IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE) IF IT ACCEPTED UNSC RES. 242 AND 338, RECOGNIZED ISRAEL AND RENOUNCED TERRORISM, WENT UP TO A RECORD 60 PERCENT (FROM 49 PERCENT IN MAY AND 43 PERCENT IN MARCH). SUPPORT FOR TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE IN THE TERRITORIES REMAINED STABLE AT 57 PERCENT. OPPOSITION TO TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE REMAINED STABLE AT 42 PERCENT. OPPOSITION TO A PALESTINIAN STATE REMAINED STABLE AT 60 PERCENT.

15. SHAMIR CALLED THE RESULTS OF LABOR'S DECIMA POLL "LIES" AND "FABRICATIONS," AND SUGGESTED THE CENTRAL ELECTIONS BOARD "ESTABLISH ORDER" AND SUPERVISION OVER THE USE OF SURVEYS.

16. MOD'IN EZRAHI REPORTED THAT A LATE JULY SURVEY FOUND A SLIGHT EDGE FOR PERES OVER SHAMIR (33.8 PERCENT TO 31.8 PERCENT) ON THE QUESTION OF WHO WAS

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 12864 03 OF 03 021705Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /056 W
-----070777 021715Z /40 38

O 021624Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0545
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5054
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 12864

USIA FOR R/NA AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 2

MORE SUITABLE AS PRIME MINISTER, BUT PERES' RATING
HAS BEEN DROPPING OVER RECENT MONTHS WHILE SHAMIR'S
HAS BEEN RISING SLOWLY.

- JULY JUNE MAY APRIL

PERES 33.8 35.4 38.2 36.2
SHAMIR 31.8 31.8 30.2 29.5


17. THE MOD'I'IN EZRAHI SURVEY ALSO REPORTED RABIN AS
THE PUBLIC'S CHOICE FOR DEFENSE MINISTER, ALTHOUGH
HIS RATING HAS DROPPED OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS .

- JULY JUNE MAY APRIL

RABIN 40.9 50.8 51.4 45.6
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


PAGE 02 TEL AV 12864 03 OF 03 021705Z

SHARON 27.4 23.3 19.5 25.7

UPCOMING

18. LABOR WILL BE HAVING A SECOND CAMPAIGN KICKOFF ON SEPT. 5, WHILE LIKUD WILL KICKOFF ITS CAMPAIGN ON SEPT. 6. AFTER THIS BURST OF ENTHUSIASM, THE CAMPAIGN WILL EBB AGAIN WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE JEWISH HOLIDAYS THE EVENING OF SEPT. 11.

HUGHES



NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E46

R

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88AMMAN10413

FILM= D880776-0391

DATE= 01 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= AMMAN

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= MORE ON THE PNC

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, BORDER CONTROL, NEGOTIATION, RECOGNITION, POLITICAL INITIATIVE, OCCUPIED AREA, UNSC RES 181

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, JO, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART	_____ TS _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____			

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

██████████
PAGE 01 AMMAN 10413 01 OF 02 011513Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/088 W

-----372263 011539Z /47

R 011449Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1506
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

██████████ SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 10413

NEA FOR ARN

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, JO, PLO
SUBJECT: MORE ON THE PNC

1. ██████████

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE PLO,
THE PNC WILL NOT BE CONVENED UNTIL INTERNAL PLO
DIFFERENCES ARE RESOLVED, EVEN IF THIS RESULTS IN A
DELAY BEYOND OCTOBER. THE LIKELY VENUE STILL APPEARS
TO BE ALGIERS. THE PNC WILL CALL FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE BASED ON
RESOLUTION 181, WITH BORDERS TO BE NEGOTIATED ON THE
BASIS OF 242 AND 338. AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE PLO'S
STRATEGY FOR GAINING ACCEPTANCE AND RECOGNITION OF A
"PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT" WILL BE BASED ON SECURING
EUROPEAN SUPPORT. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN
PARLIAMENT MAY BE APPOINTED TO THE PNC. THE SOURCE

██████████
██████████
PAGE 02 AMMAN 10413 01 OF 02 011513Z

EMPHASIZED THAT THERE IS CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN
THE PLO AND THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE
UPRISING (UNLU). END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. DURING THE VISIT OF NEA/ARN PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS OFFICER PAUL BERG, A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE PLO TOLD US THAT THE PNC IS UNLIKELY TO BE CONVENED UNTIL INTERNAL DIFFERENCES ARE RESOLVED. THIS COULD RESULT IN A DELAY EVEN BEYOND OCTOBER. THE PLO RECOGNIZES THAT THIS IS A HISTORIC MOMENT AND 'ARAFAT WILL NOT CONVENE THE PNC UNTIL HE IS CERTAIN OF THE OUTCOME. WITH ALGERIANS HAVING A GOOD REPUTATION AMONG THE PALESTINIANS, THE LIKELY VENUE STILL APPEARS TO BE ALGIERS. THE PLO RULED OUT BAGHDAD AS A SITE SINCE IT DOUBTED THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO FULLY BACK THE RESULTS OF THE PNC.

4. IN ORDER TO SOLIDIFY SUPPORT, PRIOR TO THE PNC 'ARAFAT WILL BE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-ARAB DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. THE SOURCE CONFIRMED THAT 'ARAFAT WILL TRAVEL TO STRASBOURG AND TO THE UN. ADDITIONALLY, 'ARAFAT PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NICOSIA TO MEET WITH THE NAM FOREIGN MINISTERS IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. THE NAM IS AN IMPORTANT PLO CONSTITUENCY, AND 'ARAFAT DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS TAKING ITS SUPPORT FOR GRANTED.

5. OUR SOURCE ALSO COMMENTED ON THE MEETING OF PLO AND SYRIAN-SUPPORTED PALESTINIAN GROUPS CURRENTLY

PAGE 03 AMMAN 10413 01 OF 02 011513Z

UNDERWAY IN TRIPOLI. THIS MEETING REPRESENTS AN EFFORT AT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE SYRIAN-SUPPORTED SPLINTER GROUPS (PFLP-GC, PSF, AND SAIQA) PFLP, DFLP, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (EXCEPT REPRESENTATIVES FROM PRO-IRAQ ALF). ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, ABU MUSA AND AHMED JIBRIL REFUSED TO MEET WITH 'ARAFAT. THE MEETING IS A LIBYAN EFFORT TO OVERCOME FACTIONAL DIFFERENCES.

WHAT WILL THE PNC DO?

6. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, 'ARAFAT WANTS TO MAKE A BOLD DEPARTURE FROM EXISTING POLICY, HINTS OF WHICH MAY APPEAR IN HIS STRASBOURG SPEECH. THE BASIC THINKING IS TO CALL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE BASED ON RESOLUTION 181. THIS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RESOLUTION GIVES LEGITIMACY TO THE TWO STATES IDEA, BUT THE PLO IS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT DELINEATION OF BORDERS WILL HAVE TO BE BASED ON 242 AND 338. IN OTHER WORDS, THE PLO WILL SETTLE FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. AN MFA OFFICIAL HAD EARLIER TOLD US THAT ENDORSEMENT OF 181 WOULD REPRESENT OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THE PLO'S ACCEPTANCE OF POLITICAL (OVER MILITARY) MEANS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE.

7. WE WERE TOLD THAT ABU IYAD'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT THE PROPOSED "PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT" OR "GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE" MIGHT RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST IS A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT, COMING FROM SUCH A PROMINENT FATAH HARDLINER. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT ABU IYAD'S UNEXPECTEDLY CONCILIATORY STATEMENT HAS REMAINED UNCRITICIZED BY

[REDACTED]

*

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 AMMAN 10413 02 OF 02 011513Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/088 W

-----372247 011539Z /47

R 011449Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1507
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

[REDACTED]

SECTION 02 OF 02 AMMAN 10413

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NEA FOR ARN

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, JO, PLO
SUBJECT: MORE ON THE PNC

OTHER FACTIONS.

INTERNAL DIFFERENCES

8. THE PLO LEADERSHIP IS WELL AWARE OF SYRIAN OPPOSITION TO ITS PROPOSED NEW "GOVERNMENT" AND IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE EMERGENCE OF GROUPS LIKE HAMAS WITHIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THESE GROUPS DO NOT FAVOR ANY COMPROMISE WITH ISRAEL AND CONSEQUENTLY MAKE THE PLO'S TASK MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. THE PNC ACTIONS MUST BE SO DESIGNED THAT THESE GROUPS ARE EXPOSED FOR BEING "MARGINALISTS" AND

██████████
██████████
PAGE 02 AMMAN 10413 02 OF 02 011513Z

INCONSEQUENTIAL. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOURCE CONFIRMED THAT 'ARAFAT WAS NEGOTIATING WITH FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS OVER REPRESENTATION ON THE PLO'S EXECUTIVE AND CENTRAL COMMITTEES. IN FACT, ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM A PALESTINIAN FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP WAS PRESENT DURING EC DELIBERATIONS IN BAGHDAD AT 'ARAFAT'S REQUEST. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, THE REPRESENTATIVE'S OBSTRUCTIONIST POINT OF VIEW WAS DEALT WITH BY ALLOWING HIM TO SPEAK TO EVERY ISSUE AS LONG AS HE WANTED, SO THAT WHEN DECISIONS WERE MADE WITH WHICH HE DISAGREED, HE COULD NOT MAINTAIN THAT HIS VIEWS HAD NOT BEEN HEARD.

PLO AND INTIFADA LEADERSHIP

8. THERE IS CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING. THE SOURCE CLAIMED THAT THE TWO GROUPS NEED EACH OTHER AND CONSEQUENTLY LOOK TO EACH OTHER FOR SUPPORT. PAST PALESTINIAN INSURRECTIONS WERE STYMIED BECAUSE THEIR LEADERSHIP WAS CONFINED TO THE REGION, UNABLE TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH FOREIGN POWERS OUTSIDE THE REGION. DESPITE REPORTS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNLU AND THE PLO, UNLU

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CANNOT ALIENATE THE PLO SINCE ONLY THE PLO CAN PROVIDE THE DIPLOMATIC CONTACT THE UPRISING MUST HAVE IF ITS DEMANDS ARE TO BE ADDRESSED. THE PLO PROVIDES THE INTIFADA A VEHICLE WITH WHICH THE FOREIGN POWERS CAN IDENTIFY AND DEAL.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 AMMAN 10413 02 OF 02 011513Z

WEST BANK PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THE PNC

9. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT SOME FORMER WEST BANK MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT MAY BE APPOINTED TO THE PNC. THIS WOULD ALLAY THE MPS CONCERN THAT THEY HAVE NO PLACE TO GO IN VIEW OF RECENT JORDANIAN MEASURES. THE SOURCE SPECULATED THAT THE RECENTLY RETIRED SENATOR HIKMAT AL MASRI WILL BE A GOOD CANDIDATE FOR THE PNC. HE IS A LOYAL HASHEMITE AND HIS APPOINTMENT WOULD SIGNAL THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR EVERYONE WITHIN THE PLO RUBRIC.

10. THIS CABLE WAS CLEARED BY BERG. THEROS

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E44

R

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02935

FILM= D880770-0690

DATE= 31 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
AMMAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= REOPENING OF SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES - SUGGESTED DEMARCHE TO GO

REFERENCE= 88 AMMAN 10093

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY, DEMARCHE, VIOLENCE, WEST BANK,
OPPOSITION, EXTREMIST, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions _____
 PA Exemptions _____

(S) FPC/CDR Date: FEB 12 1988

MR Case Only:
 EO Citations _____

TS authority _____

CLASSIFY on IS of
 DOWNGRADE ES to IS of

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02935 01 OF 02 311111Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 SCL-01 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 PA-01 ED-04
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
/048 W

-----264727 311255Z /47

P 311108Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3346
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02935

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, IS
SUBJECT: REOPENING OF SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES -
SUGGESTED DEMARCHE TO GOI

REF: AMMAN 10093

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. WE RECOMMEND A HIGH-LEVEL DEMARCHE TO THE GOI URGING THAT SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES BE REOPENED THIS FALL, IN VIEW OF THE IMMENSE COST CONTINUED CLOSURE POSES ON PALESTINIANS AND THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT CONTINUED CLOSURE IS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PREVENTING VIOLENCE. END SUMMARY.
3. AS A RESULT OF THE GOI'S CLOSURE OF WEST BANK SCHOOLS AND WEST BANK AND GAZA UNIVERSITIES AS A MEANS OF HALTING THE INTIFADA, PALESTINIAN STUDENTS HAVE LOST BETWEEN HALF AND THE ENTIRETY

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02935 01 OF 02 311111Z

OF THE 1987-88 SCHOOL YEAR. SCHOOLS HAVE SUFFERED THROUGH A SERIES OF OPENINGS AND CLOSURES WHICH, WHILE FINISHING THE SCHOOL YEAR, HAVE SEVERELY AFFECTED THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION RECEIVED. UNIVERSITIES HAVE BEEN CLOSED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

COMPLETELY SINCE MID-DECEMBER AND IN SOME CASES LONGER (BETHLEHEM UNIVERSITY HAS BEEN CLOSED SINCE LATE OCTOBER), THUS CANCELLING THE ENTIRE ACADEMIC YEAR. THE CIVAD HAS ANNOUNCED THAT REOPENING OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS WILL BE DELAYED AT LEAST UNTIL OCTOBER THIS FALL. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT UNIVERSITIES WILL BE ALLOWED TO REOPEN.

4. THE OSTENSIBLE REASON FOR CLOSURES OF UNIVERSITIES AND SCHOOLS IS THAT THEY SERVE AS CENTERS FOR VIOLENT INTIFADA PROTEST ACTIVITIES. THERE IS NO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT THE CLOSURES HAVE HAD ANY EFFECT ON VIOLENT PROTEST ACTIVITIES, WHICH HAVE CONTINUED AT MORE OR LESS THE SAME RATE, NOTWITHSTANDING SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY CLOSURES. INDEED, ONE CAN MAKE THE CASE THAT THE ENFORCED IDLENESS OF THOUSANDS OF YOUNG PEOPLE HAS MADE THEM MORE AVAILABLE FOR STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND DISORDERLY ACTIVITIES AND THAT THE CLOSURE HAS NOT PREVENTED YOUNG PEOPLE FROM GATHERING IN OTHER LOCATIONS. THE CLOSURE OF SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES HAS MANIFESTLY FAILED TO DAMPEN POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION. IT HAS PROBABLY ENLARGED THIS OPPOSITION SINCE YOUNG PEOPLE ARE NOT OCCUPIED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ACADEMIC WORK WHEN SCHOOLS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02935 01 OF 02 311111Z

ARE CLOSED. IT IS ARGUABLE, THEREFORE, THAT SCHOOL CLOSURES ARE MORE OF A FORM OF COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT THAN A LEGITIMATE SECURITY MEASURE, SINCE NOT ALL STUDENTS PARTICIPATE IN VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS.

5. IN ANY CASE, THE COST OF SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY CLOSURES HAS BEEN VERY HIGH IN TERMS OF EDUCATION FORFEITED AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LOSS THAT THIS MUST INEVITABLY IMPOSE. IF THE ENFORCED IDLENESS OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS CONTINUED THIS FALL, IT IS LIKELY TO ADD FURTHER TO THE ALIENATION AND POLITICAL RADICALIZATION OF THE YOUNG, STRENGTHEN ATAVISTIC, IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS SUCH AS RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS, AND MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. THE STRENGTHENING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OF THESE NEGATIVE TRENDS WILL FURTHER EXACERBATE THE GENERATION GAP BETWEEN YOUNG PALESTINIANS AND THEIR MORE MODERATE ELDERS.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: BECAUSE OF THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CLOSURES ON PALESTINIAN SOCIETY AND THE LACK OF SOLID EVIDENCE THAT IT IS AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT MAKE A HIGH-LEVEL DEMARCHE TO THE ISRAELI EMBASSY AND THAT EMBASSY TEL AVIV MAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH URGING STRONGLY THAT BOTH SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES BE ALLOWED TO REOPEN THIS FALL, DRAWING ON THE RATIONALE ABOVE AND STRESSING THAT THE ENTIRE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM NOT BE

[REDACTED]

YNNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02935 02 OF 02 311112Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 SCL-01 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 NSAE-00 HA-09 PA-01 ED-04 INRE-00
USIE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /045 W
-----265002 311256Z /47

P 311108Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3347
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02935

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, IS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: REOPENING OF SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES -

PENALIZED FOR VIOLENT ACTS COMMITTED BY SOME
INDIVIDUAL STUDENTS.

WILCOX

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(E42)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

R

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02927

FILM= D880766-0466

DATE= 30 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION IO

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAELI COMPLAINT THAT UNRWA SEEKS PROTECTIVE ROLE BEYOND ITS MAN IN CAMPS

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 282000

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= COMPLAINT, ORGANIZATION, MONITORING, REFUGEE CAMP, PALESTINIANS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, PLO, UN

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	TS authority: _____
FOIA Exemptions _____	PA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY <input type="checkbox"/> IS or <input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE <input type="checkbox"/> IS or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[[[>>>]]]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 02927 301530Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06
PRS-01 /102 W

-----211563 301535Z /46

O 301528Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3336
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USVIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

[[[REDACTED]]] JERUSALEM 02927

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS, PLO, UN, PREL
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COMPLAINT THAT UNRWA SEEKS
PROTECTIVE ROLE BEYOND ITS MANDATE IN CAMPS

REF: STATE 282000

1. [[[REDACTED]]]

2. UNRWA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BOB DILLON
TOLD US AUG 22 THAT HE WAS IN ISRAEL TO DISCUSS
WITH GOI OFFICIALS UNRWA'S DRAFT ANNUAL REPORT,
AS IS CUSTOMARY EACH YEAR, AND OTHER UNRWA
ACTIVITIES. DILLON GAVE US WHAT APPEARED TO BE
A COMPLETE RUNDOWN ON HIS MEETING AND ISRAEL
CONCERNS (SEE PARA 4). HE DID NOT SAY THE
ISRAELIS HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT UNRWA PERSONNEL
ATTEMPTING TO ACT AS POLICEMEN IN THE CAMPS. HE
MET WITH THE MFA'S DIRECTOR OF IO AFFAIRS, A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CIVAD, AND A LAWYER FROM
[[[REDACTED]]]
[[[REDACTED]]]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02927 301530Z

MOD.

3. UNRWA IS DEEPLY AWARE OF OUR CONCERN THAT
UNRWA AVOID POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, AND WE
BELIEVE IT HAS ADHERED TO THIS PRINCIPLE OVER

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE YEARS. UNRWA'S WEST BANK DIRECTOR, BOB HOPKINS, IS A COMPETENT, LOW-KEY INDIVIDUAL WHO UNDERSTANDS THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH UNRWA WORKS AND THE NEED TO AVOID POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, UNRWA STAFFERS OPERATE IN A DIFFICULT, POLITICALLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE. IT IS NOT UNUSUAL THAT THEY HAVE A POINT OF VIEW ABOUT ISRAELI PRACTICES IN THE CAMPS, WHICH SOMETIMES INVOLVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE. THE U.S. HAS COMPLAINED TO THE GOI ABOUT THESE PRACTICES. WE ARE NOT SURPRISED THAT UNRWA OFFICIALS IN THE CAMPS HAVE ALSO TRIED, INFORMALLY, TO MODERATE IDF PRACTICES, ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, FROM TIME TO TIME. WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE UNRWA HAS ACTUALLY SOUGHT A NEW, PROTECTIVE ROLE OF THE KIND MENTIONED IN REFTTEL AS AN EXTENSION OF ITS MANDATE. UNRWA IS DOING AN EFFECTIVE JOB IN THE WEST BANK, AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT IT AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST. A CERTAIN LEVEL OF TENSION BETWEEN THE GOI AND UNRWA IS CHRONIC. IT HAS INCREASED DURING THE INTIFADA, BUT WE BELIEVE IT IS SOMETHING BOTH SIDES CAN MANAGE.

4. IN DILLON'S MEETING WITH THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS AUG 22, THEY RAISED THE FOLLOWING

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02927 301530Z

OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING UNRWA ACTIVITIES. THEY COMPLAINED ABOUT UNRWA'S PROVIDING RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO SOME NEEDY PEOPLE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHO ARE NOT REFUGEES, AS A RESULT OF SPECIAL HARDSHIPS CAUSED BY THE INTIFADA. DILLON SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REPRESENT A LARGE NEW PART OF UNRWA'S PROGRAM, UNRWA BELIEVES IT IS NECESSARY FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND SEES NO REASON FOR GOI OBJECTIONS. HE SAID AMONG THOSE ASSISTED ARE RELATIVES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED, ALTHOUGH UNRWA HAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED DESIGNATING SUCH PEOPLE AS A CATEGORY FOR ASSISTANCE. DILLON SAID THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS SEEM TO OBJECT MORE TO THE REFERENCE TO ASSISTANCE TO NON-REFUGEES IN THE DRAFT REPORT THAN TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS TAKING PLACE. HE SAID THAT, IN ANY CASE, UNRWA WOULD ADHERE TO A CLEAR DIRECTIVE FROM THE GOI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TO REFRAIN FROM THIS ACTIVITY IF THIS WERE
ISSUED, SINCE UNRWA REALIZES THAT, LIKE ALL
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
IT IS ULTIMATELY SUBJECT TO RULES ISSUED BY THE
OCCUPYING POWER.

WILCOX

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

R. (E43)

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02933

FILM= D880770-0514

DATE= 31 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP, AUGUST 23-29, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, WEST BANK, BOUNDARY, CASUALTY, BOYCOTT, WOMEN, INJ
REFUGEE, WORK FORCE, DEMONSTRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		TS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	NR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____			

9304029

<<<<.>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02933 01 OF 03 311103Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 STR-17
SIL-01 INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 /104 W

-----264354 311132Z /12

O 311059Z AUG 88

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3342

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02933

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, AUGUST 23-29, 1988

1. SUMMARY: IN A WEEK OF ESCALATING VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK, THE IDF SHOT AND KILLED 11 PALESTINIANS AND WOUNDED AT LEAST SEVEN OTHERS. IN ADDITION, ISRAELI SETTLERS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS, AND TWO SUSPECTED PALESTINIAN COLLABORATORS FROM YATTA, NEAR HEBRON, WERE MURDERED. SEVEN LOCATIONS IN THE WEST BANK WERE PLACED UNDER CURFEW. GENERAL STRIKES WERE OBSERVED AUGUST 24 AND 25. THIS REPORT WAS COMPILED MAINLY FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS. END SUMMARY.

11 KILLED AND 7 INJURED

////////////////////

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02933 01 OF 03 311103Z

2. -- ONE ISRAELI WOMAN PASSENGER WAS LIGHTLY INJURED ON AUGUST 22 WHEN STONES WERE THROWN AT AN ISRAELI BUS TRAVELLING THROUGH EAST JERUSALEM.

-- IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND SERIOUSLY WOUNDED A

17-YEAR-OLD PALESTINIAN GIRL DURING CLASHES IN NABLUS ON AUGUST 24. IN NEARBY BALATA REFUGEE CAMP, SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A YOUTH WHO APPARENTLY WAS ABOUT TO THROW A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL. IDF SHOT AND INJURED NINE PALESTINIANS IN CLASHES IN NABLUS AND NEIGHBORING REFUGEE CAMPS. FOUR LABORERS WHO TRIED TO GO TO WORK IN ISRAEL WERE INJURED WHEN THEIR BUS WAS STONED.

-- AN ISRAELI BOY WAS INJURED AUGUST 24 WHEN ROCKS THROWN AT A BUS NEAR ARROUB REFUGEE CAMP, NORTH OF HEBRON, SHATTERED THE VEHICLE'S WINDOWS.

-- ON AUGUST 25, MASKED MEN THREW TWO MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AT AN ISRAELI BUS THAT ARRIVED IN AZARIYEH, BETHANY, TO PICK UP PALESTINIANS WORKING IN ISRAEL. THE BUS WAS BURNED AND ONE LABORER WAS INJURED.

-- IN BETHLEHEM, THREE PALESTINIAN WORKERS ON THEIR WAY TO ISRAEL WERE INJURED AUGUST 25 WHEN STONES WERE THROWN AT THEIR CAR.

-- THE BODY OF A PALESTINIAN, JALAL SHUQAIR, WAS FOUND AUGUST 25, NEAR AZ-ZAWIYEH, CLOSE TO ELKANA SETTLEMENT, SOUTH OF QALQILIYA. PALESTINIAN SOURCES CLAIMED SHUQAIR WAS KILLED BY SETTLERS, WHILE THE IDF SAID HE WAS KILLED WHILE HANDLING A UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02933 01 OF 03 311103Z

BOMB. SHUQAIR HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM JAIL IN THE 1985 PRISON EXCHANGE WITH AHMAD JIBRIL.

-- AYMAN IZZAT ABDUL AZIZ RAMADAN, 14, OF TIL VILLAGE, NEAR NABLUS, DIED AUGUST 26 OF HEAD WOUNDS SUSTAINED DURING A CLASH WITH THE IDF ON AUGUST 12.

-- ON AUGUST 26, A 12-YEAR-OLD GIRL AND A 15-YEAR-OLD BOY WERE WOUNDED BY IDF GUNFIRE DURING DEMONSTRATIONS IN JENIN REFUGEE CAMP.

-- ON AUGUST 26, IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED A NINE-YEAR-OLD GIRL AND A 23-YEAR-OLD MAN DURING CURFEW HOURS IN NABLUS.

-- ON AUGUST 27, IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED A

17-YEAR-OLD YOUTH IN NABLUS DURING CURFEW HOURS.

-- ON AUGUST 28, AN ISRAELI MOTORIST WHOSE WINDSHIELD WAS SMASHED BY STONES IN QALQILYA SHOT AND WOUNDED A 50-YEAR-OLD MAN IN THE BACK AND A 20-YEAR-OLD IN THE LEG.

-- ON AUGUST 29, IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED A 42-YEAR-OLD MAN OUTSIDE HIS HOME IN NABLUS DURING CURFEW HOURS.

-- ON AUGUST 29, IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED A 23-YEAR-OLD MAN WHEN SOLDIERS BROKE UP A DEMONSTRATION IN BAL'A, NEAR TULKAREM. CURFEW WAS IMPOSED FOR SEVERAL HOURS.

-- AN ISRAELI WOMAN WAS WOUNDED AUGUST 29 WHEN

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02933 02 OF 03 311106Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 STR-17
SIL-01 INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 /104 W

-----264511 311132Z /12

O 311059Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3343
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02933

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, AUGUST 23-29, 1988

YOUTHS STONED HER CAR IN HEBRON.

-- ON AUGUST 29, CURFEW WAS CLAMPED ON TARQUMIA, NEAR HEBRON, AFTER TWO MOLOTOV COCKTAILS WERE THROWN AT A CAR WITH ISRAELI LICENSE PLATES, DRIVEN BY AN ARAB. THE VEHICLE BURNED, BUT THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES.

TWO MORE ALLEGED PALESTINIAN COLLABORATORS KILLED

////////////////////////////////////

3. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL RECORDED ATTACKS ON PALESTINIANS SUSPECTED OF COLLABORATING WITH UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02933 02 OF 03 311106Z

ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. WITH TWO KILLINGS THIS WEEK, A TOTAL OF FOUR COLLABORATORS HAVE BEEN KILLED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA:

-- MASKED ASSAILANTS HACKED TO DEATH SAADI HAZAZA EL HAMROUSH, 34, IN YATTA, SOUTH OF HEBRON, AUGUST 25, IN A KILLING VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED BY PALESTINIANS AS AN ATTACK ON A SUSPECTED COLLABORATOR, AND BY THE IDF AS THE RESULT OF A FAMILY FEUD. EL HAMROUSH HAD BEEN STABBED A MONTH AGO IN HEBRON AND ONLY RECENTLY HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM THE HOSPITAL.

-- ON AUGUST 25, VILLAGERS AT AZZOUN, NEAR QALQILYA STONED A CAR CARRYING TWO PALESTINIAN BROTHERS, TAHSIN AND BASSAM MANSOUR, SUSPECTED OF COOPERATING WITH ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. TAHSIN OPENED FIRE, WOUNDING A 20-YEAR-OLD IN THE CROWD.

-- A SIMILAR INCIDENT TOOK PLACE IN RAMALLAH, ON AUGUST 25, WHEN A SUSPECTED COLLABORATOR WAS ASSAULTED AND OPENED FIRE AT THE GROUP, WOUNDING A 14-YEAR-OLD BOY.

-- ON AUGUST 27, THREE PALESTINIAN YOUTHS WERE WOUNDED IN ILLAR, NEAR TULKAREM, WHEN A VILLAGER

FIRED HIS GUN AT A GROUP OF YOUTHS WHO TRIED TO ATTACK HIM. HE WAS JOINED BY ANOTHER VILLAGER WHO SHOT AND INJURED AN ELDERLY PALESTINIAN WOMAN.

-- THE BATTERED AND BLOODIED BODY OF SAMEH YOUSEF DABABSEH, 22, OF YATTA, NEAR HEBRON, WAS FOUND ON AUGUST 28 BOUND TO AN ELECTRICITY POLE IN HEBRON.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02933 02 OF 03 311106Z

AUTHORITIES DENIED THAT DABABSEH WAS KILLED FOR COLLABORATION AND SAID THAT HE WAS A KNOWN CRIMINAL. LOCAL RESIDENTS CLAIMED THAT HE WAS AN INFORMER.

70 ARAB HOMES DEMOLISHED DURING THE INTIFADA
////////////////////////////////////

4. ON AUGUST 23, AUTHORITIES DEMOLISHED THREE HOMES IN JALAZON REFUGEE CAMP. THESE BELONGED TO PALESTINIANS SUSPECTED OF MEMBERSHIP IN A LOCAL "STRIKE FORCE" CHARGED WITH ENFORCING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE UPRISING LEADERSHIP WHO ALLEGEDLY HAD BEATEN A SUSPECTED COLLABORATOR. MORE THAN 70 HOMES HAVE BEEN DEMOLISHED BY THE IDF SINCE THE START OF THE UPRISING.

GENERAL STRIKES
////////////////////////////////////

5. -- PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OBSERVED A GENERAL STRIKE ON AUGUST 24 AND 25, IN RESPONSE TO THE CALL MADE BY THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING, IN MEMORY OF FOUR PALESTINIAN PRISONERS KILLED LAST WEEK IN ISRAELI PRISONS. PALESTINIAN ACTIVISTS TRIED TO BLOCK LABORERS FROM TRAVELLING TO WORK AND THREW STONES AND EMPTY BOTTLES AT A BUS CARRYING WORKERS IN TULKAREM, INJURING SEVERAL.

-- THERE WERE SEVERAL ATTACKS ON VEHICLES CARRYING PALESTINIAN LABORERS TO WORK IN ISRAEL ON AUGUST 25, THE SECOND DAY OF A GENERAL STRIKE OBSERVED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. FEW LABORERS WENT TO WORK IN ISRAEL.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02933 03 OF 03 311108Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 STR-17
SIL-01 INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 /104 W

-----264604 311131Z /12

O 311059Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3344
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02933

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, AUGUST 23-29, 1988

-- PALESTINIANS ARE TO OBSERVE A GENERAL STRIKE ON
AUGUST 30 AND 31 IN SOLIDARITY WITH DEPORTED
PALESTINIANS AND TO PROTEST THE ARSON DEATHS OF
ARAB LABORERS IN ISRAEL.

CURFEWS

//////

6. CURFEW WAS IMPOSED AUGUST 25 ON NABLUS AND
SURROUNDING REFUGEE CAMPS FOLLOWING CLASHES THE
PREVIOUS DAY. THE CURFEW WAS LIFTED ON AUGUST 30.

-- CURFEW WAS IMPOSED AUGUST 25 ON THE TULKAREM,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02933 03 OF 03 311108Z

KALANDIA AND AM'ARI REFUGEE CAMPS AND THE VILLAGE
OF BANI NAIM, NEAR HEBRON, AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS.
THE CURFEW CONTINUED FOR THE FOURTH DAY, ON AUGUST
29.

-- ON AUGUST 27, AUTHORITIES IMPOSED CURFEW ON
BEIT SAHOUR AND BEIT JALA, TO PREVENT
DEMONSTRATIONS MARKING 40 DAYS SINCE THE KILLING

OF A BEIT SAHOUR YOUTH AND A BEIT JALA MAN.

IDF UNCOVERS SUSPECTED TERRORIST CELL

////////////////////////////////////

7. ON AUGUST 23, SECURITY FORCES ANNOUNCED THAT THEY HAD UNCOVERED A SUSPECTED TERROR CELL IN JENIN DISTRICT. MEMBERS OF THE CELL WERE ACCUSED OF POSSESSING AND THROWING MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND EXPLOSIVE CHARGES.

DETENTION OF 5,000 PRISONERS COSTS SIX MILLION NIS

////////////////////////////////////

8. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE COST OF MAINTAINING ONE PRISONER FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES COSTS THE GOI ABOUT 40 NEW SHEKELS PER DAY. THE 5,000 DETAINED IN ISRAELI PRISONS DURING THE INTIFADA COST APPROXIMATELY 200,000 SHEKELS PER DAY, ABOUT SIX MILLION SHEKELS PER MONTH (USD 1 NIS 1.7).

PALESTINIAN RETURNS FROM EXILE

////////////////////////////////////

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02933 03 OF 03 311108Z

9. ON AUGUST 28, KHALIL ABU ZAYAD, 43, WHO HAD BEEN EXPELLED IN AUGUST 1985 FOR ALLEGED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AS A SENIOR FATAH LEADER, WAS ALLOWED TO RETURN WITH HIS WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN FROM JORDAN AFTER A THREE-YEAR STAY IN WHICH HE UNDERTOOK TO AVOID ANY ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAELI SECURITY. AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN 1985 WHEREBY ABU ZAYAD WOULD LEAVE FOR THREE YEARS IN RETURN FOR CANCELLATION OF A DEPORTATION ORDER PASSED AGAINST HIM.

WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

R. (E41)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02906

FILM= D880765-0346

DATE= 30 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= LETTER FROM PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (PASSIA) PRAISING U.S. OPPOSITION TO DEPORTATIONS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, RESEARCH, FOREIGN RELATIONS, OPPOSITION, DEPORTATIC LIBERATION FRONT

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PHUM, IS, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS, FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	TS authority sp.
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304629

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

████████████████████
PAGE 01 JERUSA 02906 300831Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 L-03 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01 SCT-02
P-02 /041 W

-----167246 300843Z /12

R 300829Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3317
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

████████████████████ JERUSALEM 02906

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(PASSIA) PRAISING U.S. OPPOSITION TO DEPORTATIONS

1. THE CONSUL GENERAL RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING
LETTER DATED AUGUST 27, 1988 FROM DR. MAHDI
ABDUL-HADI, PRESIDENT, PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(PASSIA).

2. BEGIN TEXT: I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY
SUPPORT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CLEAR OPPOSITION TO
THE ISRAEL PLANS TO EXPEL TWENTY-FIVE MORE
PALESTINIANS FROM THEIR HOMELAND. SUCH FIRM
AMERICAN STANDS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE
NORMALIZATION PROCESS PRESENTLY GOING ON BETWEEN
THE AMERICAN AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLES AND OUR
HISTORICAL, LEGITIMATE LEADERSHIP, THE PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. THEY WILL ALSO OPEN
THE EYES AND MINDS OF AMERICANS TO THE EFFECTS
OF ISRAEL'S "IRON FIST" POLICY AGAINST
████████████████████
████████████████████

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02906 300831Z

PALESTINIANS.

FOR THE PAST NINE MONTHS, PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN
PURSUING AN UNARMED POPULAR INTIFADA AIMED AT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONVINCING ISRAEL TO ACCEPT A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AND URGING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN ARBITRATING THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT. AS PALESTINIANS, WE FEEL THAT THE WORLD WHICH LEGITIMIZED THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN 1947 HAS BEEN NEGLIGENT IN ENFORCING THE SECOND HALF OF THE PARTITION PLAN AND HELPING TO ESTABLISH THE PALESTINIAN STATE.

I AM HOPEFUL THAT THE WINDS OF CHANGE WHICH THE INTIFADA HAS BROUGHT TO THE REGION WILL CONTINUE TO POLITICIZE THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT, AND WILL NOT SHIFT TOWARD VIOLENCE AS THE ISRAELI POLICIES AND PRACTICES ESCALATE AGAINST PALESTINIAN INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS.

I ASK YOU TO CONVEY TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MY APPRECIATION FOR THE HONORABLE STAND IT HAS TAKEN AGAINST THE ILLEGAL DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIANS. I HOPE THAT A NEW LEAF IN PALESTINIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS CAN BE TURNED OVER AND WILL LEAD TO A JUST AND DURABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE. END TEXT.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

NN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R E39

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV12493

FILM= D880756-0158

DATE= 26 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAEL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 26

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 12172

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CAMPAIGN, REVIEW, ELECTION, POLITICAL PARTY, POLL

TAGS= PGOV, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority to.	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____			

9304029

FEB 12 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>

PAGE 01 TEL AV 12493 01 OF 03 261542Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /056 W
-----011430 261615Z /48 38

P 261531Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0384
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 4993

SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 12493

USIA FOR NEA AND R/NA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 26

REF: TEL AVIV 12172

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: ELECTION SURVEYS SUGGEST A STALEMATE BETWEEN LABOR AND LIKUD IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD NOW. MANY OF OUR POLITICAL SOURCES CONTINUE TO EXPECT ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. BUT WE BELIEVE THERE ARE TOO MANY WILD CARDS TO MAKE SURE FORECASTS ABOUT WHAT MAY HAPPEN AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

POLLS

3. SURVEYS CONDUCTED BY DAHAF (LIKUD'S POLLSTER) AND DECIMA (LABOR'S POLLSTER) DURING THE FIRST HALF OF
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 12493 01 OF 03 261542Z

AUGUST REPORTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A STALEMATE IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD AT THIS POINT. BOTH POLLS SAID LABOR WOULD WIN SEVERAL MORE SEATS THAN LIKUD AND THE CENTER-LEFT BLOC WOULD BE LARGER THAN THE RIGHT BLOC. DECIMA RESULTS SUGGESTED THE THEORETICAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBILITY OF A LABOR-RELIGIOUS MAJORITY, WHILE DAHAF RESULTS DID NOT GIVE LIKUD A MAJORITY WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES (EXCLUDING KAHANE). SHOULD THERE BE A STALEMATE, AS THESE TWO POLLS SUGGEST, THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES' COULD PLAY THE DECIDING ROLE IN THE COALITION FORMATION. KACH'S POSITION WOULD ALSO BECOME OF MAJOR IMPORTANT TO LIKUD SHOULD KACH BE PERMITTED TO RUN IN THE ELECTION AND WIN THREE SEATS AS REPORTED BY THE POLLS. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT BOTH POLLS WERE BASED ON A SAMPLE OF JEWISH ISRAELIS, WITH ESTIMATES FOR THE ISRAEL ARAB VOTE.)

4. THE FULL SURVEY RESULTS WERE:

PARTY	DAHAF POLL	DECIMA POLL	1984 RESULTS	
LABOR	42	43	43	
CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT		5	8	3
MAPAM	3	2	-	
CENTER-SHINUI PARTY		2	2	3

CENTER/LEFT SUBTOTAL		52	55	49
HADASH (COMMUNISTS)		-	6	4
PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE		-	2	2
██████████				
██████████				

PAGE 03 TEL AV 12493 01 OF 03 261542Z

NON-ZIONIST LEFT SUBTOTAL 7 8 6

LIKUD	40	38	41	
TEHIYA	6	7	5	
TZOMET	2	1	-	

RIGHT, SUBTOTAL		48	46	46

KACH 3 3 1

NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY		4	4	6
AGUDAT ISRAEL		2	1	2
SHAS	4	2	4	
MEMAD	-	1	-	

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RELIGIOUS SUBTOTAL 10

8 12

5. A MODI'IN EZRAHI POLL (FBIS TA 2408131288) CONDUCTED AT THE END OF JULY REPORTED THAT OVER HALF THOSE SURVEYED HAD NOT CHANGED THEIR OPINIONS AS A RESULT OF THE SITUATION IN THE TERRITORIES. BUT AMONG THOSE WHO HAD CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDES AS A RESULT OF THE INTIFADA, MORE SHIFTED TO THE RIGHT (33 PERCENT) THAN TO THE LEFT (14 PERCENT). PERSONS WHO PREVIOUSLY HAD VOTED FOR THE LEFT TENDED TO BECOME MORE DOVISH, WHILE THOSE WHO HAD VOTED FOR THE RIGHT TENDED TO BECOME MORE HAWKISH. THOSE TOO YOUNG TO VOTE IN 1984 SAID THEY HAD BECOME MORE RIGHTWING (73 PERCENT) THAN LEFTWING (27 PERCENT).

6. A DECIMA POLL CONDUCTED IN EARLY AUGUST REPORTED THAT 57 PERCENT OF THE PUBLIC THOUGHT A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT A RECIPE FOR NATIONAL PARALYSIS,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 12493 01 OF 03 261542Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 12493 02 OF 03 261542Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /056 W

-----011476 261615Z /48 38

P 261531Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0385
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 4994

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 12493

USIA FOR NEA AND R/NA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 26

WHILE 38 PERCENT THOUGHT OTHERWISE. LABOR VOTERS
(63 PERCENT) WERE MORE NEGATIVE ON A NUG THAN LIKUD
VOTERS (45 PERCENT).

ASSESSMENTS

7. LIKUD: CAMPAIGN HQ DEPUTY CO-DIRECTOR SHARIR TOLD
US LIKUD WAS IN A BETTER POSITION THAN LABOR AT THIS
POINT. HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE ANOTHER NATIONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITY GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH HE PREFERRED A NARROW LIKUD-LED GOVERNMENT. KNESSET CANDIDATE TZAHI HANEGBI, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND NOW PLAYING A SIMILAR ROLE FOR SHAMIR IN THE CAMPAIGN, EXPECTS ANOTHER NUG WITH SHAMIR AT ITS HEAD. BOTH SHARIR AND HANEGBI, HOWEVER, TOLD US THEY WERE CONCERNED BY LIKUD OVER-OPTIMISM.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 12493 02 OF 03 261542Z

8. LABOR: KNESSET CANDIDATE MICKY BAR-ZOHAR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF LABOR'S CAMPAIGN IN THE KEY CENTER (TEL AVIV) AREA, "REALISTICALLY" ASSESSED LABOR'S DRAW AT THIS TIME AT ABOUT 37 SEATS. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, HE EXPECTED ANOTHER NUG, WITH A TWO OR SO SEAT DIFFERENCE DETERMINING WHO WOULD BE PRIME MINISTER. LABOR KNESSET CANDIDATE PIMA FEINBLUM, HEAD OF THE BEERSHEBA PARTY BRANCH AND ONE OF LABOR'S CAMPAIGN HEADS IN THE SOUTH, REFUSED TO BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT LABOR'S PROSPECTS IN HIS REGION. HE TOLD US HE FELT LABOR HAD REAL OPPORTUNITIES IN THE SOUTH. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS TO LABOR'S FOUR NEW CANDIDATES FROM THE REGION AND THE DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION THERE. AN IMMIGRANT FROM THE SOVIET UNION, FEINBLUM HOPED TO ATTRACT VOTES FROM OTHER FORMER SOVIET JEWS, WHO HAVE TENDED TO VOTE LIKUD.

9. CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT: CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR MK DEDI TZUKER BELIEVED CRM HAD A SOLID 5 SEATS AT THIS TIME, WITH GOOD PROSPECTS TO PICK UP MORE SEATS FROM WAVERING PAST LABOR VOTERS AND ISRAELI ARABS.

10. AGUDAT ISRAEL: MK RABBI PORUSH TOLD US HE EXPECTED HIS PARTY TO WIN 2-3 SEATS, AND WITH SHAS TO WIN A TOTAL OF 7 SEATS. HE EXPECTED SHAMIR TO LEAD THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH HE PERSONALLY PREFERRED A NARROW LABOR-LED GOVERNMENT LED BY PERES.

11. ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY: MK DAROUSHA HOPES FOR 3-4 SEATS. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT FORMAL ISLAMIC SUPPORT -- WHICH IS CRITICAL TO HIS PROSPECTS -- MAY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 12493 02 OF 03 261542Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NOT BE GAINED BY HIM (OR ANY OTHER PARTY). (NOTE: WITHOUT CLEAR ISLAMIC SUPPORT, DAROUSHA WILL HAVE A HARD TIME WINNING EVEN ONE SEAT.)

LIKUD: INTERNAL

12. THE CEREMONY UNITING HERUT AND THE LIBERAL PARTY IN "LIKUD - THE NATIONAL LIBERAL MOVEMENT" WAS HELD ON AUG. 25. SHAMIR WAS ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF THE MOVEMENT. NRP LIST LEADER SHAKI, IN A POLITICALLY FRIENDLY NOD TO LIKUD, WAS THE ONLY NON-LIKUD PARTY LEADER PRESENT AS A GUEST.

13. MINISTERS KATZAV (HERUT) AND MODAI (LIBERAL), DRAFTERS OF THE MERGER COVENANT, DISAGREED OVER THE TEXT UNTIL THE DAY OF THE CEREMONY. MODAI SOUGHT TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE UPHOLDING AGREEMENTS REACHED PREVIOUSLY IN THE SEPARATE PARTY INSTITUTIONS, I.E., THE LIBERAL COUNCIL DECISION WHICH NAMED MODAI, NISSIM AND SHARIR AS ITS CANDIDATES FOR MINISTERS IN THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. MODAI FAILED TO GET HIS WAY AND HAD TO BE CONTENT WITH A LETTER TO SHAMIR NOTING THE LIBERALS' DECISION.

14. LIKUD MINISTERS ESCALATED ATTACKS ON RABIN OVER THE INTIFADA. SHARON MADE A POINT OF CALLING ON SHAMIR TO FIRE RABIN. (RABIN HIT BACK AT SHARON BY SAYING HIS CALL FOR ANNEXING AREAS OF A "EXTENDED ALON PLAN" SHOWED SHARON DID NOT ACCEPT LIKUD'S POSITION ON HOLDING ALL THE TERRITORIES. RATHER, HE ASSERTED SHARON ACCEPTED LABOR'S VIEW THAT ISRAEL SHOULD ONLY HOLD ON TO SOME OF THE TERRITORIES.)
LABOR: INTERNAL

[REDACTED]

*NNNN

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 12493 03 OF 03 261543Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /056 W

-----011536 261615Z /48 38

P 261531Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0386
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 4995

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 12493

USIA FOR NEA AND R/NA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 26

15. LABOR DRAFTED A GENERAL PLANK ON "RELIGION AND THE STATE" WITH AN EYE TO CHANGING ITS "ANTI-RELIGIOUS" IMAGE AMONG THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES. PARTY SPOKESMEN MADE CLEAR THE GOAL WAS TO IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR BRINGING THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES INTO A LABOR-LED COALITION AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

16. IN ADDITION, PERES IS PERSONALLY MAKING INCREASED EFFORTS TO REACH OUT TO THE RELIGIOUS PUBLIC. PERES AND MGEN (RES.) BEN-GAL CALLED ON THE LEADER OF THE BELZ ULTRA-ORTHODOX HASIDIM TO EXPLAIN LABOR'S POSITION ON PEACE AND SECURITY. PERES ALSO MADE A TRIP TO NETIVOT TO VISIT THE GRAVE OF THE BABI ŠALI, A RABBI REVERED BY ISRAEL'S MOROCCAN COMMUNITY.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 12493 03 OF 03 261543Z

17. PARTY HAWKS ORGANIZED A TRIP TO THE JORDAN VALLEY WITH DOVISH MINISTERS AND MK CANDIDATES ALONG TO DEMONSTRATE LABOR'S COMMITMENT TO THE JORDAN RIVER AS ISRAEL'S SECURITY BORDER AND TO THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE AREA.

18. CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR SHOCHAT ANNOUNCED THE PARTY'S TELEPHONE PROJECT TO REACH OUT TO VOTING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

VOTERS HAD MADE OVER 350,000 CALLS. RESPONDENTS IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS 30 PERCENT FOR LABOR; 20 PERCENT AGAINST LABOR; 30 PERCENT UNDECIDED; AND 20 PERCENT REFUSED TO RESPOND. SHOHAT COMPLAINED, HOWEVER, THAT LIKUD SPOILERS WERE MAKING CALLS WHICH THEY WERE DESCRIBING AS COMING FROM LABOR.

MEMAD

19. YITZHAK RAFAEL, A FORMER NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY MINISTER AND MK, SAID HE PLANNED TO SUPPORT THE NEW MODERATE RELIGIOUS LIST MEMAD AS THE AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE OF RELIGIOUS ZIONISM.

NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY

20. MEANWHILE, THE NRP WAS FURTHER EMBARRASSED BY THE RESIGNATION OF FORMER NRP MK YEHUDA BEN-MEIR FROM HIS PLACE ON THE NRP LIST. (BEN-MEIR WAS NO. 7, WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE WON HIM A PLACE IN THE KNESSET.) BEN-MEIR DEPARTED WITH A BLAST AIMED AT NRP HAWKS SHAKI, PORAT AND SHAPIRA, AND TOLD REPORTERS THAT HE WOULD VOTE FOR MEMAD.

21. APPARENTLY STUNG BY CRITICISM THAT IT HAS GONE

PAGE 03 TEL AV 12493 03 OF 03 261543Z

"EXTREMIST," THE NRP INTRODUCED A NUMBER OF MODERATE CLAUSES INTO ITS PLATFORM. WHILE AFFIRMING ITS COMMITMENT TO SETTLING THE LAND OF ISRAEL, THE PARTY PLEDGED TO "EXAMINE ANY POLITICAL INITIATIVE ON THE AGENDA IN THE ATTEMPT TO FIND EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO PEACE."

CHALLENGES AGAINST VARIOUS PARTIES

22. SHAMIR AND PERES HAVE VOICED SUPPORT FOR NOT ALLOWING "RACIST" PARTIES TO RUN IN THE ELECTIONS. SEVERAL LEFTIST PARTIES HAVE ALREADY STATED THEY WANT TO BLOCK KAHANE'S KACH PARTY FROM RUNNING ON THE LEGAL GROUNDS OF RACISM. THE CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT HAS ALSO ATTACKED ZE'EVY'S MOLEDET PARTY, WHICH ADVOCATES "TRANSFER," AND CALLED FOR IT TO BE BANNED FROM RUNNING AND FOR LEGAL ACTION TO BE TAKEN AGAINST ZE'EVY FOR VIOLATING THE LAW ON INCITEMENT. THE RIGHTWING TEHIYA PARTY ALSO CALLED FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION OF THE NON-ZIONIST PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT REJECTS THE STATE OF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ISRAEL. IN TURN, THE PLP APPEARS LIKELY TO DEMAND THE DISQUALIFICATION OF TEHIYA AND TZOMET ON THE GROUNDS OF RACISM. (NOTE: THE CENTRAL ELECTIONS BOARD IS NOT LIKELY TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES UNTIL LATE SEPTEMBER.)

HUGHES

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E38)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE278206

FILM= D880751-0727

DATE= 25 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= O:M.TAUBER

OFFICE= ORIGIN SS

TO= SECRETARY

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= DRAFT STATEMENT BY UNSC PRESIDENT ON OCCUPIED - TERRITORIES

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 276676, 88 STATE 271420

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= TOSEC 160231

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= TOSEC, PRESIDENT, SPECIALIZED AGENCY, POLICY, OCCUPIED AREA

TAGS= PREL, IS, UNSC

<<<>>>

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 278206 TOSEC 160231
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 AMAD-01 CCO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: S/S:-O:M.TAUBER

APPROVED BY: S/S-O:JFELT

-----313311 251257Z /40 38

Z 251251Z AUG 88 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH

 STATE 278206 TOSEC 160231

FOLLOWING SENT SECSTATE WASHDC, AMMAN, CAIRO, JERUSALEM,
PORT MORESBY, TEL AVIV, UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE DATED
AUGUST 24, 1988 BEING RPTD TO YOU FOR ACTION:
QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 02536

PORT MORESBY FOR AMBASSADOR BYRNE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IS

SUBJECT: DRAFT STATEMENT BY UNSC PRESIDENT ON OCCUPIED
- TERRITORIES

REF: (A) STATE 276676, (B) STATE 271420,
- (C) USUN 2497, (D) STATE 270587

1. (C) AMBASSADOR OKUN, PER INSTRUCTIONS IN REF(A),
MET WITH UNSC PRESIDENT (PRC PERMREP) LI AND PROVIDED
HIM WITH PROPOSED U.S. CHANGES TO DRAFT UNSC
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CONTAINED IN REF(C). WE
SUGGESTED, IN ADDITION TO INSTRUCTIONS REF(C),
MODIFICATION OF THE FIFTH (FINAL) PARAGRAPH, WHICH
CONTAINED LANGUAGE MORE APPROPRIATE TO A UNSC
RESOLUTION THAN TO A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT.



PAGE 02 STATE 278206 TOSEC 160231

AMBASSADOR OKUN ALSO EXPRESSED OUR STRONG DESIRE THAT,
IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A STATEMENT, THE SC
PRESIDENT SHOULD ISSUE IT TO THE MEDIA RATHER THAN
SEEK ADOPTION OF IT IN A FORMAL SC MEETING.

2. (C) SUBSEQUENTLY, ZAMBIAN DEPUTY PERM REP, ON
BEHALF OF NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS, INDICATED THAT HE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PREFERRED TO NEGOTIATE REMAINING DIFFERENCES DIRECTLY WITH USUN RATHER THAN TO WORK THROUGH CHINESE PRESIDENT. IN RETURN FOR OUR ACCEPTANCE OF STYLISTIC CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE UK AND OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS AND OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE WORD "CONSEQUENCES" IN PARAGRAPH 3 (AUTHORIZED BY IO/KIRBY-USUN/IMMERMAN AUGUST 24 TELCON), ZAMBIAN OBTAINED NON-ALIGNED AGREEMENT TO ALL OTHER U.S. SUGGESTIONS. TEXT OF AGREED DRAFT STATEMENT FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 4.

3. (U) SECURITY COUNCIL WILL APPROVE DRAFT STATEMENT IN CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE MORNING AUGUST 25 AND SC PRESIDENT WILL THEN CONVEY IT DIRECTLY TO THE MEDIA. THERE WILL BE NO FORMAL SC MEETING ON THE SUBJECT. ISRAELI MISSION HAS BEEN KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF SC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:

THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED BY THE CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND ESPECIALLY BY THE CURRENT GRAVE AND SERIOUS SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE CLOSING-OFF OF AREAS, THE IMPOSITION OF

████████████████████
████████████████████

PAGE 03 STATE 278206 TOSEC 160231

CURFEWS, AND THE CONSEQUENT INCREASE IN THE NUMBERS OF INJURIES AND DEATHS THAT HAVE OCCURRED.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED BY THE PERSISTENCE OF ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, IN CONTINUING ITS POLICY OF DEPORTING PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN CONTRAVENTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, AS DEMONSTRATED ON 17 AUGUST 1988 BY ITS EXPULSION OF FOUR PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS TO LEBANON AND ITS DECISION TO EXPEL 40 MORE. THE MEMBERS REQUEST ISRAEL IMMEDIATELY TO DESIST FROM DEPORTING ANY PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS AND IMMEDIATELY TO ENSURE THE SAFE RETURN OF THOSE ALREADY DEPORTED.

THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL CONSIDER THAT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, HAS GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ENDEAVOURS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THEY REAFFIRM THAT THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, OF 12 AUGUST 1949, IS APPLICABLE TO THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND REQUEST THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE CONVENTION.

RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, UNDER REVIEW.

END TEXT.

WALTERS UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 STATE 278206 TOSEC 160231

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E316

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** ONLY

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02870

FILM= D880752-0122

DATE= 25 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= ONLY

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= JERUSALEM OFFICIAL-INFORMAL NO. 92: COMPLAINT RE UNRWA

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 277148

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= n/a

TAGS= AMGT

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Criteria _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			
FOIA Exemptions _____		TS authority for	
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304629

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 02870 01 OF 02 251516Z
ACTION NEA-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 AMAD-01 ONY-00 /004 W
-----321577 251520Z /38
O 251332Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3294
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02870

NEA/IAI JOHN HIRSCH FROM WILCOX

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: JERUSALEM OFFICIAL-INFORMAL NO. 92:
COMPLAINT RE UNRWA

REF: STATE 277148

1. [REDACTED]
2. BOB DILLON TOLD ME AUG 22 THAT HE HAD COME TO ISRAEL TO DISCUSS WITH GOI OFFICIALS UNRWA'S DRAFT ANNUAL REPORT, AS IS CUSTOMARY EACH YEAR. HE SAID THAT IN A MEETING WITH THE MFA'S DIRECTOR OF IO AFFAIRS, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CIVAD, AND A LAWYER FROM MOD, THE ISRAELIS COMPLAINED ABOUT UNRWA'S PROVIDING RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO SOME NEEDY PEOPLE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHO ARE NOT REFUGEES, AS A RESULT OF SPECIAL HARDSHIPS CAUSED BY THE INTIFADA. DILLON SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT REPRESENT A LARGE NEW PART OF UNRWA'S PROGRAM, UNRWA BELIEVES IT IS NECESSARY FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND SEES NO REASON FOR GOI OBJECTIONS. HE SAID AMONG THOSE ASSISTED ARE RELATIVES OF
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02870 01 OF 02 251516Z

INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED, ALTHOUGH UNRWA HAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED DESIGNATING SUCH PEOPLE AS A CATEGORY FOR ASSISTANCE. DILLON SAID THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS SEEM TO OBJECT MORE TO THE REFERENCE TO ASSISTANCE TO NON-REFUGEES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IN THE DRAFT REPORT THAN TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS TAKING PLACE. HE SAID THAT, IN ANY CASE, UNRWA WOULD ADHERE TO A CLEAR DIRECTIVE FROM THE GOI TO REFRAIN FROM THIS ACTIVITY IF THIS WERE ISSUED, SINCE UNRWA REALIZES THAT, LIKE ALL OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, IT IS ULTIMATELY SUBJECT TO RULES ISSUED BY THE OCCUPYING POWER. DILLON SAID HE WAS ACCOMPANIED AT THE MEETING BY AN UNRWA LAWYER, AN INDIAN, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A VERY SKILLED NEGOTIATOR AND DIPLOMAT.

3. DILLON SAID THE ISRAELIS ALSO OBJECTED TO UNRWA'S PRACTICE OF COLLECTING STATISTICS ON PALESTINIANS KILLED AND WOUNDED DURING THE INTIFADA ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WAS NOT A REFUGEE-RELATED ISSUE THAT FALLS WITHIN UNRWA'S MANDATE.

4. DILLON SAID NOTHING ABOUT OTHER COMPLAINTS AGAINST OFFICERS ADDED TO UNRWA'S STAFF GETTING INTO POLITICS.

5. DILLON DID NOT EXPRESS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THESE DIFFERENCES WITH THE GOI, AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THEY COULD BE MANAGED AS OTHER DIFFERENCES HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02870 01 OF 02 251516Z

6. I SEE NO REASON TO SEND A MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY ABOUT THESE UNRWA-GOI DIFFERENCES, AND DO NOT BELIEVE ANY U.S. INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY. A CERTAIN LEVEL OF TENSION BETWEEN UNRWA AND THE GOI IS CHRONIC. IT HAS INCREASED DURING THE INTIFADA, BUT IT IS NOT SOMETHING BOTH SIDES CANNOT MANAGE.

7. UNRWA IS DEEPLY AWARE OF OUR CONCERN THAT UNRWA AVOID POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, AND WE BELIEVE IT HAS WORKED HARD TO ADHERE TO THIS PRINCIPLE OVER THE YEARS. UNRWA'S WEST BANK DIRECTOR, BOB HOPKINS, IS A VERY COMPETENT, LOW-KEY INDIVIDUAL WHO UNDERSTANDS THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH UNRWA WORKS AND THE NEED TO AVOID POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, UNRWA STAFFERS OPERATE IN AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, POLITICALLY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CHARGED ATMOSPHERE. IT IS NOT UNUSUAL THAT THEY
HAVE A POINT OF VIEW ABOUT ISRAELI PRACTICES IN

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02870 02 OF 02 251515Z
ACTION NEA-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 AMAD-01 ONY-00 /004 W
-----321534 251519Z /38

O 251332Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3295
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02870

NEA/IAI JOHN HIRSCH FROM WILCOX

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: JERUSALEM OFFICIAL-INFORMAL NO. 92:

COMPLAINT RE UNRWA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE CAMPS. UNRWA IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN THE WEST BANK, AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT IT AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST.

8. TOM PICKERING WILL BE IN WASHINGTON SHORTLY AND CAN PROVIDE HIS VIEWS ON UNRWA-GOI RELATIONS AND UNRWA ACTIVITIES IN GAZA.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** ONLY

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

E33

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02845

FILM= D880746-0524

DATE= 24 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEEKLY WRAP-UP, AUGUST 16-22

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 12074, 88 JERUSALEM 2799

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CASUALTY, PALESTINIANS, DETENTION, RIOT, PRISON, VIOLENCE, OCCUPIE AREA

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS; FPC/CDR	Date: SEP 12 1988
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DLCLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			
FOIA Exemptions _____		TS authority is:	
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304039

<<<<>>>>
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02845 01 OF 03 241215Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /083 W

-----225055 241225Z /47

O 241212Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3277
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02845

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP / AUGUST 16-22

REF: (A) JERUSALEM 012074, (B) JERUSALEM 002799

1. SUMMARY: WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE, SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES, AND HEAVY USE OF FIREARMS BY IDF PERSONNEL CONTINUED ACCOMPANIED BY INCREASINGLY TOUGH ISRAELI MEASURES DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. FOUR PALESTINIANS WERE KILLED AND FORTY-FOUR WERE WOUNDED. A PRISON RIOT ERUPTED AT THE CONTROVERSIAL ANSAR III DETENTION CENTER IN THE NEGEV; TWO PALESTINIANS WERE KILLED BY IDF GUNFIRE, ONE OF WHOM WAS FROM THE WEST BANK. A SECOND PALESTINIAN DIED IN POLICE DETENTION IN A SPAN OF TWO DAYS. HAMAS, AN ISLAMIC GROUP, SUCCEEDED IN ENFORCING A "WILDCAT" STRIKE IN THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02845 01 OF 03 241215Z

WEST BANK AND GAZA ON AUGUST 17. END SUMMARY.

KILLED AND INJURED

//////////

2. A RIOT BROKE OUT AT THE KETZIOT DETENTION CAMP (ANSAR III) IN THE NEGEV ON AUGUST 16 IN PROTEST AGAINST SEVERE CONDITIONS. IDF GUARDS SHOT AND KILLED IBRAHIM SAMOUDI, 27, FROM AL-YAMOUN, NEAR JENIN. ANOTHER PALESTINIAN FROM GAZA WAS KILLED AND ONE WAS INJURED IN THE INCIDENT.

-- ON AUGUST 16, SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED ONE PALESTINIAN DURING DEMONSTRATIONS IN TIL VILLAGE, NEAR NABLUS.

-- ON AUGUST 17, IDF TROOPS SHOT AND KILLED RASHA ARQAWI, A NINE-YEAR-OLD GIRL, IN JENIN. SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED ONE PALESTINIAN IN AZZOUN, NEAR QALQILYA, THREE IN NABLUS AND FIVE IN EIN BET ILMA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS, DURING DEMONSTRATIONS.

-- ON AUGUST 18, IDF TROOPS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS IN TAMMOUN, FOUR IN AL-AMARI REFUGEE CAMP NEAR RAMALLAH, AND ONE IN BALATA REFUGEE CAMP NEAR NABLUS, DURING DEMONSTRATIONS. AN ISRAEL BUS DRIVER WAS SLIGHTLY INJURED BY STONES IN HEBRON.

-- ON AUGUST 19, SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED FIVE PALESTINIANS IN ORTAS, NEAR BETHLEHEM AND TWO IN AL-AMARI REFUGEE CAMP NEAR RAMALLAH, DURING CLASHES.

-- ON AUGUST 20, MAS'OD HASSAN SALIM ABDULLAH, UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02845 01 OF 03 241215Z

22, FROM TAMMOUN, NEAR NABLUS, DIED OF GUNSHOT WOUNDS SUSTAINED DURING A CLASH WITH SOLDIERS, ON AUGUST 18. IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED ONE PALESTINIAN, DURING DEMONSTRATIONS IN JENIN REFUGEE CAMP

-- ON AUGUST 21, IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED RAJA

HAMDAN MUHAMMAD SAWAFTAH, 17, DURING DEMONSTRATIONS IN TUBAS, NEAR NABLUS. ANOTHER PALESTINIAN, AHMAD SHAGHNUBI, 22, WAS SHOT IN THE BACK AND KILLED BY IDF SOLDIERS IN ASKAR REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS AND FIVE OTHERS WERE WOUNDED WHEN THREE ARMED ISRAELI CIVILIANS WALKED INTO THE CAMP AND OPENED FIRE, "WITHOUT PROVOCATION." IN ANOTHER INCIDENT, IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND INJURED SIX PALESTINIANS DURING A DEMONSTRATION IN NABLUS, ONE OTHER WAS BEATEN. IN TULKAREM, SOLDIERS FIRED

RUBBER BULLETS AT A GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS AND INJURED TWO PALESTINIANS. THREE PASSENGERS, INCLUDING A PALESTINIAN, WERE LIGHTLY INJURED WHEN A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL, THROWN AT AN ISRAELI BUS IN EAST JERUSALEM, FAILED TO IGNITE. AN UNEXPLODED "PIPE BOMB" THROWN AT A TOURIST BUS ON THE JERUSALEM-BETHLEHEM ROAD, SLIGHTLY INJURED ONE PASSENGER.

-- ON AUGUST 22, DURING SEVERAL CLASHES, IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED ONE PALESTINIAN IN QALQILYA, ONE IN NUR SHAMS REFUGEE CAMP NEAR TULKAREM, ONE IN TULKAREM, AND ANOTHER IN AZZAWIYA.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02845 02 OF 03 241217Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /083 W

-----225116 241225Z /47

O 241212Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3278
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02845

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP, AUGUST 16-22

SECURITY FORCES ARREST TERROR RING SUSPECTS

////////////////////////////////////

3. ON AUGUST 16, SECURITY FORCES ARRESTED PALESTINIANS IN THE HEBRON AND BETHLEHEM AREA SUSPECTED OF BELONGING TO TERROR RINGS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVERAL INCIDENTS AND THE MURDER OF AN ARAB POLICEMAN, BEFORE THE INTIFADA.

PALESTINIAN DIES IN POLICE DETENTION

////////////////////////////////////

4. ON AUGUST 16, NABIL MUSTAFA JAMIL IBDAH, 20, OF BEIT HANINA, AN EAST JERUSALEM SUBURB, DIED IN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02845 02 OF 03 241217Z

PRISON IN WEST JERUSALEM, AFTER BEING ARRESTED ON AUGUST 10. HE WAS THE SECOND PALESTINIAN TO DIE IN PRISON IN TWO DAYS. ON AUGUST 14, ATTA YOUSSEF ARTOUFI, 21, OF KALANDIA CAMP DIED IN AZ-ZAHIRIYEH PRISON, NEAR HEBRON.

DEMOLISHED HOUSES

////////////////////////////////////

5. JERUSALEM MUNICIPALITY BULLDOZERS DEMOLISHED FOUR HOUSES, ON AUGUST 16, ALLEGEDLY BUILT WITHOUT PERMITS IN SILWAN, EAST JERUSALEM.

BRIGADE COMMANDER SUSPENDED FOR KILLING PALESTINIAN

////////////////////////////////////

6. ON AUGUST 16, AN IDF BRIGADE COMMANDER WAS RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND FOR KILLING A PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATOR AFTER A HELICOPTER CHASE IN BANI NAIM, LAST MONTH.

GENERAL STRIKE OBSERVED

////////////////////////////////////

7. A GENERAL STRIKE CALLED FOR BY LEAFLET NO. 23 WAS OBSERVED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ON AUGUST

17, DESIGNATED "JERUSALEM DAY" IN SUPPORT OF SACRIFICES MADE BY EAST JERUSALEMITES ANOTHER GENERAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED ON AUGUST 22, TO PROTEST TAX RAIDS ON ARAB MERCHANTS.

ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS LEAD GENERAL STRIKE ON AUGUST 21

////////////////////////////////////

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02845 02 OF 03 241217Z

8. ON AUGUST 21, THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, "HAMAS", ENFORCED A GENERAL STRIKE MARKING THE 19TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATTEMPTED BURNING OF AL-AQSA MOSQUE. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS HAVE CARRIED OUT A STRIKE IN THE WEST BANK THAT CONFLICTED WITH ORDERS IN THE LEAFLET OF THE INTIFADA'S UNITED LEADERSHIP.

IDF TO EXPEL 15 WEST BANKERS, BANS POPULAR COMMITTEES

////////////////////////////////////

9. ON AUGUST 17, FOLLOWING THE DEPORTATION OF FOUR GAZANS, THE IDF ISSUED 25 EXPLUSION ORDERS, INCLUDING 15 PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK (REF A).

-- ON AUGUST 18, THE ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTRY FORMALLY OUTLAWED THE "POPULAR COMMITTEES". PAVING THE WAY FOR POSSIBLE MASS ARRESTS AND MORE DEPORTATIONS (REF B).

ISRAELI WOMAN MURDERED IN WEST BANK

////////////////////////////////////

10. ON AUGUST 17, ISRAELI POLICE IDENTIFIED A MURDERED ISRAELI WOMAN AS ZIVA GOLDOVSKY, 18, OF HOLON, WHO WAS FOUND DEAD IN A FIELD NEAR THE WEST BANK TOWN OF EL-BIREH. GOLDOVSKY WAS KNOWN TO HAVE HAD A PALESTINIAN BOYFRIEND AND ACQUAINTANCES IN THE WEST BANK, AND WAS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02845 03 OF 03 241217Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /083 W

-----225150 241226Z /47

O 241212Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3279
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02845

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP, AUGUST 16-22

WEST BANK SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES TO REMAIN CLOSED

////////////////////////////////////

11. ON AUGUST 18, THE CIVAD ANNOUNCED THAT WEST BANK PUBLIC SCHOOLS WOULD NOT OPEN IN SEPTEMBER AND THAT PRIVATE AND UNRWA SCHOOLS WOULD OPEN ON OCTOBER 1. THE SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED IN LATE JULY ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE CENTERS OF DEMONSTRATIONS. UNIVERSITIES WILL REMAIN CLOSED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

1024 MOLOTOV COCKTAILS THROWN IN INTIFADA

////////////////////////////////////

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02845 03 OF 03 241217Z

12. THE IDF SPOKESMAN SAID AUGUST 18, THAT 1024 MOLOTOV COCKTAILS WERE THROWN IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA TO AUGUST 8. 258 MOLOTOV COCKTAILS WERE THROWN IN GAZA STRIP AND 766 IN THE WEST BANK. A 50 PERCENT DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF MOLOTOV COCKTAILS THROWN IN JULY, COMPARED WITH JUNE.

-- ON AUGUST 22, IT WAS REPORTED IN AL-FAJR THAT THE NUMBER OF MOLOTOV COCKTAILS THROWN IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ROSE FROM 10, AUGUST 7-13, TO 18, AUGUST 14-21.

IDF INTRODUCES PLASTIC BULLETS

////////////////////////////////////

13. ON AUGUST 20, IT WAS REPORTED THAT ISRAELI TROOPS HAVE BEGUN TO USE PLASTIC BULLETS SHOT FROM M-85S THAT LEAVE INDELIBLE INK MARKS ON VICTIMS FOR SEVEN DAYS.

29 DAY CURFEW ON QABATIYA LIFTED AUGUST 20

////////////////////////////////////

14. ON AUGUST 20, THE IDF LIFTED THE CURFEW ON QABATIYA, NEAR JENIN, AFTER THE 29TH DAY.

ISRAELI AGRICULTURAL MINISTER THREATENS TO STOP PALESTINIAN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS

////////////////////////////////////

15. IN AL-QUDS, AUGUST 23, IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE THREATENED TO STOP THE EXPORT OF PALESTINIAN AGRICULTURAL UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02845 03 OF 03 241217Z

PRODUCTS TO JORDAN AND THE EEC IF ISRAEL DISCOVERED THAT ANTI-ISRAEL ELEMENTS SUPERVISED PALESTINIAN AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS; IN THIS CASE, THE MINISTER SAID ISRAEL WOULD NOT HONOR ITS AGREEMENT WITH THE EEC.

WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E2)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE271505

FILM= D880732-0718

DATE= 19 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= JFCOLLINS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS (RPC) CDR Date.

OFFICE= ORIGIN SS

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

for cases only:
EO Citations _____
TS authority _____
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to B or

TO= SECRETARY

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= SECURITY COUNCIL: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REFERENCE= 88 USUN NEW YORK 2464

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= OCCUPIED AREA, AMBASSADOR, APPOINTMENT REQUEST, PALESTINIANS, INCIDENT, VIOLENCE

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, UNSC, (OKUN, HERBERT S)

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 STATE 271505 TOSEC 160145
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /000 R

66011
DRAFTED BY S/S:JFCOLLINS
APPROVED BY S/S:JFCOLLINS
S/S-O:JPFELT

-----365176 192142Z /38
O 192135Z AUG 88 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] STATE 271505 TOSEC 160145

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO TEL AVIV JERUSALEM
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE CAIRO AMMAN AUGUST 19
QUOTE

[REDACTED] USUN NEW YORK 02497

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IS
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF.: (A) USUN 2464 (B) IO DATAFAX 616 OF 8/18/88

1. (U) SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO ALL SC MEMBERS AFTERNOON AUGUST 18 TEXT OF DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON LATEST ISRAELI ACTIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PREPARED BY SC NON-ALIGNED CAUCUS (TEXT IN PARA 4). PRESIDENT HAS CALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE FOR AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 19 TO CONSIDER ADOPTION OF STATEMENT AND HAS ASKED THOSE MEMBERS WHO HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH IT TO CONVEY THEIR OBJECTIONS TO HIM MORNING OF AUGUST 19.

2. (C) AMBASSADOR OKUN WILL SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH SC
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 STATE 271505 TOSEC 160145

PRESIDENT MORNING AUGUST 19 AND, BASED ON TALKING POINTS TRANSMITTED REF. B, WILL TELL HIM THAT U.S. DOES NOT FAVOR ANY SC ACTION OF ANY KIND ON THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME. WE ANTICIPATE THAT SC PRESIDENT WILL REPLY THAT ALL OTHER SC MEMBERS FAVOR A STATEMENT IN ORDER TO AVOID A FORMAL MEETING AND A CONTENTIOUS DEBATE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. (C) WHEN USUN POLMINCOUNS PASSED COPY OF DRAFT STATEMENT TO ISRAELI ACTING PERMREP BEIN, LATTER INDICATED THAT, IDEALLY, ISRAEL ALSO WOULD PREFER NO ACTION ON THE MATTER. HE SPECULATED, HOWEVER, THAT IF CHOICE BOILED DOWN TO EITHER A STATEMENT ADOPTED WITHOUT DEBATE OR A CONTENTIOUS DEBATE LEADING TO A RESOLUTION, GOI WOULD PROBABLY OPT FOR A STATEMENT. THE PRESENT TEXT, HOWEVER, CONTAINED CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US AGAIN MORNING OF AUGUST 19.

4. (U) DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL--BEGIN TEXT:

THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED AND ALARMED BY THE CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, ESPECIALLY THE CURRENT GRAVE AND SERIOUS SITUATION OF CLOSING-OFF AREAS, IMPOSING CURFEWS, AND THE INCREASING NUMBER OF PALESTINIANS BEATEN, INJURED AND KILLED BY THE ISRAELI FORCES OF OCCUPATION.

THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED BY THE INSISTENCE OF ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STATE 271505 TOSEC 160145

POWER, TO CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF DEPORTING PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN DEFIANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, AS DEMONSTRATED ON 17 AUGUST 1988 BY ITS EXPULSION OF FOUR PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS AND ITS DECISION TO EXPEL 25 MORE. THE MEMBERS REQUEST ISRAEL TO IMMEDIATELY DESIST FROM DEPORTING ANY PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS AND TO IMMEDIATELY ENSURE THE SAFE RETURN OF THOSE ALREADY DEPORTED.

THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDER THAT THE CURRENT REGRETTABLE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF ISRAEL, THE OCCUPYING POWER, AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENDEAVOURS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY THEREFORE STRONGLY DEPLORE THOSE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF ISRAEL.

THEY REAFFIRM THAT THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, OF 12

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AUGUST 1949, IS APPLICABLE TO THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND REQUEST THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE CONVENTION.

RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 605, 607 AND 608, THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDE TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, UNDER REVIEW AND REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT PERIODICALLY ON THE CURRENT SITUATION.

END TEXT.

OKUN

UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

R (E29)

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88CAIRO19840

FILM= D880735-0411

DATE= 22 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= CAIRO

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
COM

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988 - THIS REVIEW COVERS
THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= REVIEW, POLITICAL STABILITY, LEGISLATURE, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US

158 12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		S/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY			TS authority to.
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions			

9304029

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 19840 01 OF 06 220716Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----036577 220717Z /38

O 220704Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8638
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9486
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 CAIRO 19840

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

-
THIS REVIEW COVERS THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 19840 01 OF 06 220716Z

(GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED, AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION)
AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEEKLIES). BOTH
CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE

EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-60,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD), BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

- MUBARAK STATES THAT ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS UPHELD ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO EGYPT AND EXPRESSES THE BELIEF THAT ISRAEL WILL COMPLY WITH THE TABA ARBITRATION JUDGMENT.
- ARAFAT'S POLITICAL ADVISOR HANI AL-HASSAN SAYS PALESTINIAN PLANNING WILL CAUSE A "PRACTICAL COLLAPSE" OF ZIONIST IDEOLOGY.
- JIMMY CARTER MEETS HANI AL-HASSAN IN CAIRO.
- USAID TO PROVIDE CAIRO AIRPORT WITH SECURITY EQUIPMENT.
- OPPOSITION AL-WAFD REPORTS EGYPT AND SOME GULF COUNTRIES MIGHT GRANT THE US MILITARY FACILITIES IN RETURN FOR AID AND ARMS.
- AL-WAFD REPORTS MUBARAK INSTRUCTED PRIME MINISTER SEDKY NOT TO RAISE PRICES OF COMMODITIES AND SERVICES.-

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 19840 01 OF 06 220716Z

ESTABLISHMENT PRESS: INTERNATIONAL NEWS

1. STATEMENTS BY MUBARAK. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 19 HIGHLIGHT MUBARAK'S STATEMENTS TO REPORTERS AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE NDP YOUTH MOVEMENT. ALL PAPERS QUOTE MUBARAK AS SAYING "I DON'T THINK THAT ISRAEL WOULD STALL ABOUT COMPLYING WITH THE TABA VERDICT IF IT IS IN FAVOR OF EGYPT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT ISRAEL WILL OBSERVE ITS OBLIGATIONS; IT HAS NEVER BREACHED ITS TREATIES." MUBARAK STRESSED THAT PEACE IS THE GUARANTEE OF STABILITY IN THE REGION, ADDING THAT IF THE ISRAELI PEOPLE WANT TO RAISE THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING THEY SHOULD ABANDON WARS, DIVISION, AND TERRORISM. ANSWERING A QUESTION ABOUT

SHARON'S STATEMENTS REGARDING THE ANNEXATION OF PARTS OF THE WEST BANK, MUBARAK SAID, "SHARON HAS ALWAYS BEEN LIKE THIS; LET HIM THINK THE WAY HE WANTS. THERE ARE ALSO SOME WHO CALL FOR A COUNTRY (GREATER ISRAEL) FROM THE NILE TO THE EUPHRATES. I BELIEVE THERE ARE PEACE-LOVING FORCES IN ISRAEL; PEACE FOR ISRAEL IS BETTER THAN WAR, AND I SUPPORT ALL THE FORCES IN ISRAEL THAT ADVOCATE PEACE." MUBARAK AFFIRMED THAT THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV HAD EXTENDED ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIANS UNDER THE OCCUPATION, FOR EXAMPLE BY BUILDING HOSPITALS. MUBARAK CALLED UPON THE PLO TO ISSUE A BALANCED POLITICAL STATEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. MUBARAK EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT AT A STATEMENT BY AN ARAB OFFICIAL IN WHICH THE LATTER REJECTED ISRAEL AND THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AND CALLED FOR AN ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL. ON EGYPT'S FOREIGN RELATIONS, MUBARAK EMPHASIZED THAT EGYPT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 19840 02 OF 06 220717Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W

-----036606 220718Z /38

O 220704Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8639
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9487
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 CAIRO 19840

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

DOES NOT HAVE SECRET AGREEMENTS OR TREATIES WITH ANY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 19840 02 OF 06 220717Z

FOREIGN COUNTRY, ADDING THAT EGYPT REJECTS THAT ITS
TERRITORIES BE USED FOR AGGRESSION ON ANOTHER COUNTRY.
"WE HAVE BALANCED RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES. OUR
RELATIONS WITH THE US ARE SPECIAL WITHOUT THE IMPOSITION
OF ANY DEMANDS ON OUR SOVEREIGNTY OR WILL. WE ALSO HAVE
GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USSR."

2. STATEMENTS BY ARAFAT. AHRAM AUGUST 20 QUOTES ARAFAT
AS SAYING THAT EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE ARAB FOLD HAS PUT AN
END TO SYRIA'S CONTROL OVER THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION.
ARAFAT ADDED THAT THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE IDEA OF
FORMING A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE WAS AIMED AT
COVERING UP THE SUSPICIOUS DEALS CONCLUDED BETWEEN SYRIA
AND THE US IN LEBANON AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ARAB NATION.
ARAFAT FURTHER ATTACKED SYRIA'S CAMP MASSACRES AND ITS
STAND ON THE GULF WAR. ARAFAT ADDRESSED THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE BY SAYING THAT ESTABLISHING A PALESTINIAN STATE
WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH US INTERESTS.

3. INTERVIEW WITH ARAFAT'S ADVISOR. IN AN INTERVIEW TO

AHRAM AUGUST 19, ARAFAT'S POLITICAL ADVISOR HANI AL-HASSAN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ANNEX THE WEST BANK AND GAZA NOT ONLY BECAUSE THERE ARE RACISTS IN ISRAEL WHO WANT THIS AREA TO BE PURELY JEWISH BUT ALSO BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE EGYPT THE RIGHT TO RENOUNCE SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY. THE US WANTS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED AT THE CURRENT STAGE ONE WAY OR ANOTHER BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY ANNEXATION OR BY IMPOSITION OF A POLITICAL FORMULA ON THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. AL-HASSAN ADDED THAT CAREFULNESS AND PLANNING ON THE PART OF THE PALESTINIANS WOULD ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY OVER ISRAEL AND WOULD CAUSE A "PRACTICAL COLLAPSE" OF ZIONIST IDEOLOGY.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 19840 02 OF 06 220717Z

PAPERS AUGUST 21 REPORT THAT FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER MET WITH HANI AL-HASSAN DURING HIS TWO-DAY VISIT TO CAIRO. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN CAIRO SAID KAMAL.

PAPERS AUGUST 19 REPORT THAT MEMBER OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ABU MAZIN STATED THAT EGYPT HAD REJECTED A SEPARATE SOLUTION TO THE GAZA ISSUE BECAUSE SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. ABU MAZIN ADDED THAT MUBARAK TOLD HIM THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A MEETING BETWEEN MURPHY AND PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES AND THAT AMBASSADOR WISNER HAD INFORMED MUBARAK THAT MURPHY WOULD MEET WITH A PALESTINIAN DELEGATION BUT MURPHY RETRACTED HIS DECISION. IN THE SAME ITEM, GUMHOURIYYA QUOTES FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID AS STATING THAT EGYPT REJECTS ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS A PALESTINIAN TERRITORY BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE IMPOSITION OF SOLUTIONS BY FORCE WOULD NOT LEAD TO RESOLVING THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

4. EGYPT/JORDAN. AKHBAR EL-YOM AUGUST 20 REPORTS KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN WILL VISIT EGYPT IN SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF ISSUES WITH MUBARAK.

5. EGYPT/MOROCCO. GUMHOURIYYA AUGUST 21 REPORTS KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO WILL VISIT EGYPT IN NOVEMBER AS A RETURN VISIT FOR MUBARAK'S VISIT TO MOROCCO EARLY THIS YEAR.

6. EGYPT/ISRAEL. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 19 REPORTS STATE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI ANNOUNCED EGYPT'S CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL'S CONTINUED POLICY OF REPRESSION, EXPULSION, AND DETENTION AGAINST THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 19840 03 OF 06 220718Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----036615 220719Z /38

O 220704Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8640
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9488
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 06 CAIRO 19840

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. GHALI DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI PRACTICES
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 19840 03 OF 06 220718Z

AS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND AN OBSTACLE TO
THE PEACE PROCESS.

7. EGYPT/US. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 20 REPORT MFA FIRST
UNDERSECRETARY OSAMA AL-BAZ RECEIVED SECRETARY SHULTZ AT
CAIRO AIRPORT. IN A VERBAL MESSAGE DELIVERED BY SHULTZ TO
MUBARAK, PRESIDENT REAGAN EMPHASIZED THE US COMMITMENT TO
GIVING IMPETUS TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND BOOSTING EGYPT'S
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS.

ALL PAPERS AUGUST 19 REPORT AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITH
AID TO PROVIDE CAIRO AIRPORT WITH SECURITY EQUIPMENT
THROUGH A GRANT OF DOLLARS 5.2 MILLION. PAPERS NOTE THAT
AMBASSADOR WISNER AND AID DIRECTOR BROWN DISCUSSED WITH
TOURISM MINISTER FOUAD SULTAN THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING
EQUIPMENT FOR A HOSPITAL IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH FOR DIVERS.
SEPARATELY, AKHBAR AUGUST 19 REPORTS THE PRESIDENT OF
AL-AZHAR UNIVERSITY LEFT FOR THE US FOR TEN-DAY VISIT.
AHRAM AUGUST 20 REPORTS USAID AGREED TO EARMARK DOLLARS 20
MILLION AS A GRANT TO DEVELOP AND MODERNIZE IRRIGATION IN
15,000 FEDDANS IN ASWAN. SEPARATELY, AHRAM REPORTS THAT
THE US AND JAPAN WILL PROVIDE LE 44 MILLION TO RENEW WATER
NETWORKS IN 11 GOVERNORATES. AKHBAR EL-YOM AUGUST 20
REPORTS THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT USAID WILL EXTEND
A GRANT OF DOLLARS 50 MILLION TO FINANCE ELECTRICITY
NETWORKS IN ALEXANDRIA.

AKHBAR EL-YOM'S EDITOR IN CHIEF IBRAHIM SA'DA WRITES FROM
PARIS AUGUST 20 ABOUT THE EUROPEAN CONCERN OVER THE US
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. SA'DA NOTES THAT EUROPEAN PUBLIC
OPINION SUPPORTS DUKAKIS OVER BUSH BECAUSE OF A SENSE THAT
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT PAID SUFFICIENT
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 19840 03 OF 06 220718Z

ATTENTION TO EUROPEAN CONCERNS. THE ARTICLE FURTHER NOTES THAT THROUGHOUT THE PAST WEEKS, THE US ELECTION CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN QUIET AND BORING AND DUKAKIS HAS TAKEN A SOLID LEAD. HOWEVER, WHEN BUSH ANNOUNCED HIS CHOICE OF DAN QUAYLE AS VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, INTEREST IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN GREW BECAUSE QUAYLE GIVES THE BUSH CAMPAIGN SOME OF THE SAME STRENGTHS AS DUKAKIS, I.E. YOUTH AND IMPULSIVENESS.

8. EGYPT/USSR. AKHBAR AUGUST 19 REPORTS FM ABDEL MEGUID CONFERRED WITH THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN CAIRO ON BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

GUMHOURIYYA'S EDITORIALIST HASSAN SHUKRY AUGUST 19 WRITES THAT THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE REGION COULD PAVE THE WAY FOR A GREATER ROLE BY THE SOVIETS. THE EDITORIALIST EXPRESSES THE BELIEF THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES EXPECT THE USSR TO CHANGE ITS PRESENT ROLE AND BE A PRINCIPAL PARTNER IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI "EQUATION" IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AND GUARANTEE JUSTICE AND PEACE.

9. EGYPT/BULGARIA. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 20 REPORT AN EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION HEADED BY DEPUTY SPEAKER AHMAD MUSA WILL VISIT SOFIA SEPTEMBER 10 FOR ONE WEEK.

10. EGYPT/POLAND. AHRAM AUGUST 20 REPORTS EGYPT AND POLAND SIGNED A PROTOCOL FOR ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL, AND TRADE COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE, ELECTRICITY, HOUSING, CONSTRUCTION, RAILWAY, AND MARITIME TRANSPORT. THE PROTOCOL INCLUDES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

PAGE 01 CAIRO 19840 04 OF 06 220718Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----036624 220719Z /38

O 220704Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8641
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9489
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 06 CAIRO 19840

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US
SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

INCREASING "UNCONVENTIONAL" EXPORTS TO POLAND.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 19840 04 OF 06 220718Z

11. EC ASSISTANCE. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 20 REPORT THE EC AGREED TO EXTEND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OF 3 MILLION EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNITS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES WORKING IN THE FIELD OF INDUSTRY.
12. EGYPT/NORTH KOREA. AKHBAR EL-YOM AUGUST 20 REPORTS

AN ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROTOCOL WILL BE SIGNED NEXT WEEK IN CAIRO DURING THE MEETINGS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE TO START AUGUST 25 FOR FIVE DAYS. NORTH KOREA WILL BE REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE.

13. EGYPT/PAKISTAN. ALL PAPERS AUGUST 19 REPORT AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION HEADED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID LEFT FOR ISLAMABAD TO ATTEND THE STATE FUNERAL FOR PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZIA.

14. EGYPT/SAUDI ARABIA. GUMHOURIYYA AUGUST 20 QUOTES A SAUDI OFFICIAL AS STATING THAT KING FAHD'S VISIT TO EGYPT IS DEFINITE AND THAT THE DATE WILL BE ANNOUNCED AFTER IT IS SET.

15. PETROLEUM PRICES. AL-AHRAM REPORTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN PETROLEUM AUTHORITY ANNOUNCED THAT THE EXPORT PRICE OF PETROLEUM INCREASED BY DOLLARS 1.40 PER BARREL STARTING TODAY AND FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS.

DOMESTIC NEWS

16. CRITICISM OF THE OPPOSITION. AHRAM'S EDITOR IN CHIEF IBRAHIM NAFEI AUGUST 19 CRITICIZES THE OPPOSITION PARTIES FOR THEIR OBJECTION TO THE EXTENSION OF THE EMERGENCY LAW
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 19840 04 OF 06 220718Z

ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE APPLICATION OF DEMOCRACY. NAFEI REFERS TO THE RECENT JAILBREAK OF JIHAD MEMBERS AND THEIR PLANS TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND WRITES THAT EGYPT'S SECURITY AND STABILITY WOULD NOT BE MAINTAINED IF ORDINARY LAWS WERE APPLIED.

17. RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS. AKHBAR AUGUST 19 REPORTS THE MINISTER OF AWQAF AND THE MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC ANNOUNCED THEIR READINESS FOR A PUBLIC DEBATE WITH LEADERS OF AL-JIHAD ORGANIZATION ABOUT RELIGIOUS MATTERS. THEY NOTED THAT AL-JIHAD HAD ASKED THEM TO RESIGN WITHOUT ANY DIALOGUE OR DISCUSSION. THE MUFTI ASSERTED THAT EGYPT HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO A FEROCIOUS CAMPAIGN AIMED AT DESTROYING THE YOUTH.

18. ECONOMIC POLICY. WEEKEND PAPERS REPORT PRIME MINISTER SEDKY WILL HOLD A MEETING WITH THE ECONOMIC GROUP

TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE PROPOSAL TO RAISE THE INTEREST RATE ON SAVINGS BY 2-3 PER CENT. (AL-WAFD AUGUST 20 NOTES THAT THERE IS A DIVISION INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT OVER THIS PROPOSAL). SEPARATELY, PAPERS REPORT THAT REMITTANCES OF EGYPTIAN EXPATRIATES ARE EXPECTED TO REACH DOLLARS 7.15 BILLION THIS YEAR. IN A SEPARATE ITEM, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO ALLOCATE 60 PER CENT OF BANK DEPOSITS FOR LOANS TO PRODUCTIVE PROJECTS BY THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS. IN ANOTHER SEPARATE ITEM, AKHBAR EL-YOM AUGUST 20 REPORTS THAT A NEW SYSTEM WILL BE APPLIED ALLOWING WORKERS AT PRIVATE SECTOR AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES TO OWN SHARES IN THE COMPANIES' CAPITAL. THE GOVERNMENT HAS EARMARKED LE 100 MILLION AS LOANS TO THE COMPANIES WISHING TO APPLY THIS SYSTEM.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 19840 05 OF 06 220719Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----036634 220720Z /38

O 220704Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8642
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9490
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 CAIRO 19840

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

REPORTEDLY, EIGHT COMPANIES HAVE ALREADY SUBMITTED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 19840 05 OF 06 220719Z

REQUESTS TO OBTAIN LOANS.

19. AGRICULTURAL POLICY. PAPERS AUGUST 20 REPORT AGRICULTURE MINISTER WALLY ISSUED A DECREE ALLOWING FARMERS TO DELIVER CORN OPTIONALLY AND RAISING THE PRICE OF CORN DELIVERY TO LE 45 PER BUSHEL. AS FOR WHEAT, PRODUCTION THIS YEAR IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE TO 30.3 MILLION TONS, WHICH IS 700,000 TONS MORE THAN LAST YEAR. AN ADDITIONAL 100,000 FEDDANS WILL BE PLANTED WITH WHEAT NEXT YEAR IN ORDER TO STEP UP PRODUCTIVITY TO 30.5 MILLION TONS.

20. MUBARAK/NDP YOUTH. IN HIS MEETING WITH THE NDP YOUTH, MUBARAK ANNOUNCED THAT 35,000 FEDDANS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE YOUTH IN OCTOBER FOR CULTIVATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SMALL PROJECTS. MUBARAK AFFIRMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING "UNCONVENTIONAL" SOLUTIONS TO THE ISSUES OF PRICE INCREASES AND HOUSING. MUBARAK SPOKE ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY THE GOVERNMENT IS FACING IN APPOINTING GRADUATES AND CALLED UPON THE YOUTH NOT TO WAIT FOR A GOVERNMENT JOB BECAUSE IT PAYS VERY LITTLE. MUBARAK EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES' CALL FOR FORMING A COALITION GOVERNMENT, ADDING THAT "THEY FORGET

ABOUT THE DEMOCRACY THE COUNTRY IS ENJOYING." ALL PAPERS
AUGUST 21 HIGHLIGHT THAT MUBARAK WILL DISTRIBUTE 90,000
LAND TITLE DEEDS IN SEPTEMBER TO FARMERS.

21. OBJECTION TO FORMATION OF A NEW PARTY. ALL PAPERS
AUGUST 21 REPORT THE POLITICAL PARTIES COMMITTEE ISSUED A
DECREE OBJECTING TO THE FORMATION OF A NEW PARTY CALLED
"YOUNG EGYPT."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 19840 05 OF 06 220719Z

22. ISLAMIC INVESTMENT COMPANIES EXECUTIVE REGULATION.
AL AKHBAR REPORTED THAT PRIME MINISTER ATEF SEDKY WILL
HOLD A MEETING TOMORROW WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY YOUSSEF
MOUSTAFA TO DISCUSS THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE LAW.

23. TV NEWS. NEWS ITEMS ON TV AUGUST 20 WERE AS FOLLOWS:
ABDEL MEGUID HEADS DELEGATION TO ATTEND PAKISTANI
PRESIDENT'S FUNERAL; IRAN-IRAQ CEASE-FIRE IN EFFECT;
DEMONSTRATIONS IN GHAZA; PNC MEETING IN TUNIS; KING
HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO ABU DHABI; CHOLERA CASES IN SUDAN; US
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

24. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FOR AUGUST 21: USD 1 EQUALS PT
230.0 (BUYING) AND PT 230.6 (SELLING).

OPPOSITION NEWS

25. MILITARY FACILITIES TO THE US. AL-WAFD AUGUST 19
REPORTS THAT THE US IS CURRENTLY CONTACTING EGYPT AND SOME
GULF COUNTRIES TO REACH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS GRANTING THE
US MILITARY FACILITIES AS A MEANS OF GIVING THE US
ADMINISTRATION THE ABILITY TO CONFRONT ANY CONGRESSIONAL
OBJECTION TO INCREASING MILITARY AID AND PROVIDING ARAB
COUNTRIES WITH CERTAIN KINDS OF ARMS. EGYPTIAN-GULF
CONTACTS ARE BEING HELD TO ASSESS THE US REQUEST AND ADOPT
A UNIFIED STAND TOWARDS IT.

26. INSTRUCTIONS BY MUBARAK. AL-WAFD AUGUST 20 REPORTS
MUBARAK HAS RECENTLY GIVEN STRICT INSTRUCTIONS TO PRIME

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 1984 06 OF 06 220719Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----036640 220720Z /38

O 220704Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8643
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9491
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 CAIRO 19840

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, US

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, AUGUST 19-21, 1988

MINISTER SEDKY TO FREEZE THE GOVERNMENT PLAN FOR RAISING
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 19840 06 OF 06 220719Z

PRICES OF COMMODITIES AND SERVICES AND ABOLISHING
SUBSIDIES DUE TO THE CURRENT SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND
SECURITY CIRCUMSTANCES. MUBARAK UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY
OF REJECTING THE IMF DEMANDS FOR INCREASING THE PRICES OF
BREAD, WATER, ELECTRICITY, AND TRANSPORT.

27. EGYPT/ISRAEL. SAWT AL-ARAB AUGUST 21 REPORTS THE MFA
SUMMONED THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO AND INFORMED HIM
THAT AN ISRAELI DIPLOMAT AND HIS WIFE WERE ACCUSED OF
SHOP-LIFTING AUGUST 16 AT A SUPERMARKET IN GIZA. THE
ISRAELI SUPPOSEDLY INSULTED THE POLICE AFTER THEY ARRESTED
HIM.

28. EGYPT/US. SAWT AL-ARAB NOTES THAT A US EMBASSY
REPORT INDICATED THAT EGYPT IS SUFFERING A TRADE DEFICIT
WITH THE US AMOUNTING TO 1.7 BILLION DOLLARS.

29. ISLAMIC GROUP WARNING. AL-WAFD AUGUST 21 REPORTS THE
ISLAMIC GAMAAT IN THE AREA OF AIN SHAMS, WHERE THE RECENT
POLICE-ISLAMIC GAMAAT DISTURBANCES TOOK PLACE, ADDRESSED A
WARNING TO THE INTERIOR MINISTER AGAINST HIS USING
REPRESSION AND THREATENED TO ESCALATE TENSIONS
NATIONWIDE.
COVEY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02799

FILM= D880731-0651

DATE= 19 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= GOI CRACKDOWN ON "POPULAR COMMITTEES"

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, COMMITTEE, OCCUPIED AREA, DEPORTATION, ALLEGATION, ORGANIZATION, INFLUENCE, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, JO, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority, etc	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____			

[Handwritten initials]

FEB 12

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>
PAGE 01 JERUSA 02799 01 OF 02 191549Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /079 W

-----347153 191601Z /47

O 191548Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3255
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02799

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: GOI CRACKDOWN ON "POPULAR COMMITTEES"

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: THE GOI'S OUTLAWING OF "POPULAR COMMITTEES" IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, WHICH COINCIDED WITH DEPORTIONS OF ALLEGED COMMITTEE MEMBERS, PROVIDES THE IDF WIDE AUTHORITY TO ARREST AND PROSECUTE MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF INDIGENOUS PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IT WILL LEAD TO PRESSURES ON WEST BANKERS AND ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES. THE NEW MOVES REFLECT HEIGHTENED GOI CONCERN, IN THE WAKE OF JORDAN'S DISENGAGEMENT, THAT THE INTIFADA IS ESTABLISHING AN ALTERNATE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE THAT THREATENS ISRAELI CONTROL AND
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02799 01 OF 02 191549Z

PROMOTES PLO INFLUENCE. WE BELIEVE THIS CONCERN IS EXAGGERATED. SUPPORT FOR THE PLO IS ALREADY PERVASIVE, BUT THIS DOES NOT THREATEN ISRAEL'S PHYSICAL CONTROL. WE DOUBT THE NEW MOVES WILL SUPPRESS THE INTIFADA.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. THE GOI'S CRACKDOWN ON "POPULAR COMMITTEES" IN THE TERRITORIES, WITH THE ISSUING OF DEPORTATION ORDERS AGAINST AS MANY AS 40 PALESTINIANS IN THE PAST TWO DAYS AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF STRICT MEASURES AGAINST MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE COMMITTEES, RAISES FEARS HERE OF LARGE SCALE ARRESTS AND FURTHER DEPORTATIONS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT SEEN THE NEW ORDER, PRESS ACCOUNTS INDICATE THE DEFENSE MINISTRY'S BAN GOES BEYOND MEMBERSHIP IN A POPULAR COMMITTEE TO ENCOMPASS ANYONE PROVIDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OR SERVICE TO A COMMITTEE, ATTENDING A COMMITTEE MEETING, OR POSSESSING COMMITTEE LITERATURE. IN THE CONTEXT OF TODAY'S BROAD-BASED SUPPORT FOR THE INTIFADA AND THE ALMOST UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO THE UNIFIED NATIONAL COMMAND/PLO'S CALLS FOR STRIKE DAYS AND OTHER ACTIONS, THIS ORDER COULD POTENTIALLY BE APPLIED IN A SWEEPING MANNER.

4. THE NEW ORDERS ALSO APPARENTLY BROADEN THE SCOPE OF WHAT MAY BE CONSIDERED A "POPULAR COMMITTEE" AND FURTHER SHIFT THE FOCUS TOWARD SUPPRESSION OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES THAT THE GOI INTERPRETS AS HOSTILE TO ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION. ISRAEL'S FEAR THAT THE PLO WILL FILL THE "VACUUM" CREATED BY WITHDRAWAL OF

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02799 01 OF 02 191549Z

JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR SOME PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THE CATALYST FOR THIS MOVE. A BROAD ARRAY OF INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS, NOT JUST THOSE FORMERLY SUPPORTED BY JORDAN, ARE NOW VULNERABLE TO PRESSURE AND/OR SUPPRESSION AND PUNISHMENT BY THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES.

5. DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN UNDERLINED THE NEW POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FOCUS OF THE GOI'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COMMITTEES WHEN HE SAID THE COMMITTEES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE "INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE UPRISING." FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT THE GOI CONSIDERS THE POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDIGENOUS, ANTI-OCCUPATION PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP AND ALTERNATIVE PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS A SUBVERSIVE THREAT NO LESS SERIOUS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THAN VIOLENCE.

6. COMMENT. WE BELIEVE THE GOI EXAGGERATES THE Pervasiveness of popular committees and their role in sustaining the Intifada. While some social and community institutions have sprung up which identify themselves as instruments of the Intifada, the Palestinians are not on the verge of establishing the kind of alternative infrastructure the GOI fears as the vehicle for PLO control of the territories. We are concerned that the new order will be used as a means of intimidation and punishment of

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02799 02 OF 02 191549Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 .SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /079 W

-----347147 191601Z /47

O 191548Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3256
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02799

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: GOI CRACKDOWN ON "POPULAR COMMITTEES"

INDIVIDUALS WHO OPPOSE THE OCCUPATION BUT WHO ARE NOT INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES THAT THREATEN SECURITY OR PUBLIC ORDER. WE DOUBT THAT THIS FURTHER EFFORT TO CONTROL POLITICAL EXPRESSION AND ACTIVITY WILL SUCCEED IN DAMPENING THE INTIFADA. AS LONG AS THE INTIFADA COMMANDS SUCH WIDESPREAD COMMUNITY SUPPORT, REPRESSIVE MEASURES AIMED AT SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE UNABLE TO QUELL IT. END COMMENT.

WILCOX

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

F24

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02779

FILM= D880727-0070

DATE= 18 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= PALESTINIAN PEACE OFFENSIVE IN UNCHARTED WATERS

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 2314

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, PEACE, LIBERATION FRONT, EXILE, INDEPENDENCE,
RECOGNITION, BOUNDARY, TERRITORIAL WATERS

TAGS= KPAL, PBTS, PREL, IS, US, JO, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date: FEE 12 2007
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	IN PART		TS authority
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions			

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02779 01 OF 05 181045Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----244040 181105Z /23

O 181043Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3237
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

SECTION 01 OF 05 JERUSALEM 02779

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS, US, JO, PLO, PREL
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PEACE OFFENSIVE IN
UNCHARTED WATERS

REF: A) JERUSALEM 2314, B) FBIS TA 0708115288,
C) DAMASCUS 4554, D) JERUSALEM 2662

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY THE PALESTINIAN PEACE OFFENSIVE,
LAUNCHED WITH BASAM ABU SHARIF'S OFFER OF PEACE
THROUGH MUTUAL RECOGNITION, IS HEADING INTO
TROUBLED WATERS. A CONTROVERSIAL NEW MOVE IS
THE SURFACING OF THE CONCEPT OF A DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. THE IDEA
WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE SEPTEMBER PNC, AND HAS
BEEN ENDORSED EVEN BY PLO HARD-LINER ABU IYAD.
IT EMBODIES THE TWO STATE MUTUAL RECOGNITION

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02779 01 OF 05 181045Z

APPROACH, AND WOULD PUT ASIDE THE PALESTINIAN
COVENANT. IT IS DESIGNED TO CHALLENGE ISRAEL
AND THE WORLD TO SUPPORT NEGOTIATIONS TO DEFINE
BORDERS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AN
ALREADY DECLARED PALESTINIAN STATE. THE IDEA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THAT PALESTINIANS SHOULD DECLARE SELF DETERMINATION UNILATERALLY IS AUDACIOUS, BUT PROBLEMATIC, TO SAY THE LEAST. AS NOW DEFINED, IT IS PROBABLY FATALLY FLAWED BY TAKING RESOLUTION 181 AND THE 1947 UN PARTITION LINE, RATHER THAN 242 AND THE 1949 BOUNDARIES, AS THE BASELINE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS ALREADY BEING DENOUNCED IN ISRAEL. IF ADOPTED IN THIS FORM, IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ISRAELI RIGHT AND WEAKEN ISRAELI DOVES, AND IT WOULD NOT COMMAND WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. UNLESS THE PLO CAN OVERCOME ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND RESHAPE THIS INITIATIVE AS A COMPELLING CHALLENGE TO ISRAEL, FOR EXAMPLE BY SQUARELY ACCEPTING ISRAEL, 242, 338, AND ENDING VIOLENCE AND THE INTIFADA, SUCH A SYMBOLIC DECLARATION OF PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE AND A DISEMBODIED GOVERNMENT IN EXILE COULD BE AN OBSTACLE, NOT STIMULUS TO THE PEACE PROCESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE NEW POLITICAL FERMENT IN THE PLO, SPURRED BY THE INTIFADA AND HUSSEIN'S DISENGAGEMENT, AND THE INCREASED WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE AND NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL, IS A GOOD THING. THE SITUATION IS STILL FLUID, AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE POSITIVE TRENDS IN PALESTINIAN THINKING, WHICH ARE MOVING TOWARD RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, WHILE INSISTING ON GREATER REALISM. END SUMMARY.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02779 01 OF 05 181045Z

THE PEACEFUL SIDE OF THE INTIFADA

////////////////////

3. WEST BANK AND GAZANS HAVE BEEN GROPING FOR A WAY TO TRANSLATE THE UNITY AND CONFIDENCE CREATED BY THE INTIFADA INTO AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL PROGRAM. THE DOMINANT PRO-FATAH LEADERSHIP HERE EAGERLY GRASPED THE ABU SHARIF INITIATIVE AS A LONG OVERDUE ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT BOTH ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS NEED SECURITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY. BUT BECAUSE THE HARD-LINE PFLP AND DFLP COULD NOT ENDORSE ABU SHARIF'S STATEMENT, IT WAS NOT EMBRACED IN INTIFADA LEAFLETS, AND AN EFFORT FOR A GROUP PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT BY LOCAL LEADERS FELL THROUGH (REF A). NEVERTHELESS, THE PRO-FATAH PEACE CAMP HERE CONTINUES TO PROMOTE MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN TWO STATES. FEISAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HUSSEINI ARTICULATED THIS VIEW WHEN HE TOLD A PEACE NOW RALLY IN JULY THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD ABANDON THEIR TERRITORIAL "DREAMS" IN FAVOR OF A REALISTIC TWO STATE PEACE AND THAT THE PALESTINIAN COVENANT HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE/GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IDEA SURFACES

////////////////////////////////////

4. THE NEXT PHASE IN THE PALESTINIAN PEACE STRATEGY, THE IDEA OF A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, HAD BEEN DISCUSSED FOR MANY YEARS AND WAS GIVEN NEW LIFE BY THE INTIFADA. AS EARLY AS JANUARY, PALESTINIANS HERE BEGAN TO DISCUSS THIS AS THE

[REDACTED]

,NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02779 02 OF 05 181047Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----244104 181105Z /23

O 181043Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3238
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 05 JERUSALEM 02779

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS, US, JO, PLO, PREL
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PEACE OFFENSIVE IN

CULMINATION OF THE INTIFADA'S STRUGGLE FOR "UNILATERAL AUTONOMY" THROUGH CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND CREATION OF AN ALTERNATE ADMINISTRATION OF "POPULAR COMMITTEES." THE IDEA GOT A FURTHER BOOST FROM AMERICAN PEACE ACTIVIST, JEROME SEGAL. BIR ZEIT PROFESSOR SARI NUSSEIBEH, WHO SUPPORTS THE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE AND IS RUMORED TO HAVE WRITTEN THE DRAFT DECLARATION SEIZED FROM FEISAL HUSSEINI'S OFFICE, TOLD US THAT EXPOSURE OF THE PLAN WAS UNFORTUNATE SINCE THE TIME IS NOT RIPE. NEVERTHELESS, THE LEAK HAS PERSUADED PALESTINIANS HERE TO TREAT THE DECLARATION AS A CONCRETE INITIATIVE. THE PLO, APPARENTLY BELIEVING HE COULD NOT RESIST THIS INITIATIVE FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, HAS ALSO ACCEPTED IT, IN PRINCIPLE. ARAFAT ANNOUNCED THAT THE PLO

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02779 02 OF 05 181047Z

IS WEIGHING THE DECLARATION/EXILE STATE CONCEPT AND WILL SUBMIT IT TO THE PNC NEXT MONTH, AND THERE ARE REPORTS THAT HE WILL FIRST ANNOUNCE IT AT AN EC MEETING IN STRASBOURG. SUPPORT FROM PFLP LEADER GEORGE HABASH, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY OPPOSED A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE BECAUSE IT OPTS FOR A POLITICAL PROCESS INSTEAD OF ARMED STRUGGLE, GAVE FURTHER IMPETUS TO THE CONCEPT. A STATEMENT BY THE PLO'S UN REPRESENTATIVE TERZI THAT THE NEW PLO GOVERNMENT WOULD SEEK ENTRY TO THE UN HAS ADDED TO THE EXCITEMENT AND CONFUSION.

ABU IYAD HINTS AT DROPPING PLO COVENANT

////////////////////////////////////

5. DEBATE ABOUT A PALESTINIAN PEACE STRATEGY HAS BEEN FURTHER ENLIVENED BY ABU IYAD'S CALL FOR MUTUAL ISRAEL-PLO RECOGNITION AND A PALESTINIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT BASED UPON A POLITICAL PROGRAM "WHOLLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PLO'S NATIONAL COVENANT." SPEAKING IN TUNIS TO THE FRENCH JOURNAL DIMANCHE AUGUST 15, ABU IYAD REPORTEDLY SAID "I AM READY TO START THE DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL...IT'S BIZARRE, FOR 25 YEARS, THE ARABS HAVE REFUSED TO TALK ABOUT PEACE WITH ISRAEL, AND NOW IT IS ISRAEL WHICH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SAYS 'NO!.' HE CONTINUED "MY SOLUTION FOR PEACE IS A PALESTINIAN STATE, A DISCUSSION TO ESTABLISH THE BORDERS OF THAT STATE, AND THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND PALESTINE." ABU IYAD'S COMMENTS ARE EXTROARDINARY, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF HIS PREVIOUS HARD LINE VIEWS AND HIS RECENT CRITICISM OF THE ABU SHARIF

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02779 02 OF 05 181047Z

STATEMENT.

ELEMENTS OF THE "FEISAL HUSSEINI" DRAFT DECLARATION

////////////////////////////////////

6. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE DRFT DECLARATION SEIZED FROM FEISAL HUSSEINI'S ARAB STUDIES CENTER (SEE REF B FOR FULL TEXT) ARE:

- ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE WITHIN THE 1947 PARTITION BOUNDARIES SET BY UNSC RESOLUTION 181;
- AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT LED BY ARAFAT, WITH KHADDOUMI AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND INCLUDING THE PFLP'S HABASH AND THE DFLP'S HAWATMEH; A PARLIAMENT WOULD BE FORMED, 50 PERCENT OF WHOSE MEMBERS WOULD BE FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES;
- AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE BODY TO GOVERN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BASED ON AUTONOMOUS PALESTINIAN STRUCTURES CREATED DURING THE INTIFADA;
- AN AGGRESSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEW STATE;
- APPOINTMENT OF A DELEGATION FROM THE INSIDE AND THE DIASPORA TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "THE FINAL BORDERS BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND ISRAEL," AND, INTER ALIA, OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, WATER, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEST

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02779 03 OF 05 181049Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----244151 181109Z /23

O 181043Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3239
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 05 JERUSALEM 02779

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS, US, JO, PLO, PREL
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PEACE OFFENSIVE IN

BANK AND GAZA AND THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO
RETURN OR TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION.

WEST BANK VIEWS: CHALLENGE TO THE PLO, DOUBTS
ABOUT TIMING

////////////////////////////////////

7. PRO FATAH WEST BANKERS SUPPORT THIS
APPROACH, IN PRINCIPLE, AS A UNILATERAL ACT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION TO ESTABLISH A STATE, WHICH
RECOGNIZES ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AND CALLS FOR A
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO ALL OTHER ISSUES,
INCLUDING BOUNDARIES. THEY BELIEVE JORDAN'S
DISENGAGEMENT MEANS THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE IS
NOW THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUED ISRAELI
OCCUPATION. THEY HOPE A UNILATERAL DECLARATION

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02779 03 OF 05 181049Z

WOULD BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE, GALVANIZE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, AND EVENTUALLY CONVINCED ISRAEL TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS PREMISED ON THE TWO-STATE APPROACH. THEY VIEW THIS INITIATIVE, AS EXPRESSED IN THE DRAFT DOCUMENT, AS A WAY OF "MOVING FROM THE PHASE OF CLASHES ON THE BATTLEFRONT TO THE STAGE OF POLITICAL INITIATIVE" AND TO PROVE THAT PALESTINIANS "DO NOT DESIRE THE ANNIHILATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. RAJHER THAY WISH TO LIVE PEACEFULLY AS ITS NEIGHBOR."

8. WEST BANKERS ALSO SEE THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE/EXILE GOVERNMENT AS A WAY OF PRESSING THE PLO TO HEAL ITS DIVISIONS AND ACT DECISIVELY. AL-FAJR EDITOR HANNA SINIORA TOLD US THE INITIATIVE PROVES THAT THE INTIFADA HAS STRENGTHENED THE INFLUENCE OF PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES AND THAT THE DECLARATION WILL FORCE THE PLO TO REACT POSITIVELY. SARI NUSSEIBEH AGREES THAT THE INITIATIVE WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE PLO TO PERFORM. HE TOLD AL-FAJR ON AUGUST 14 THAT HE "DISTRUSTED THE THESIS THAT PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAVE IN GENERAL PLAYED THE ROLE OF OBEDIENT SOLDIERS TO THE PLO LEADERSHIP." ACADEMICIAN MAHDI ABDEL-HADI HAS DESCRIBED TO US THE CHALLENGE TO THE PLO EVEN MORE SHARPLY. WHEN WE ASKED HIM IF PEOPLE ON THE INSIDE THOUGHT ARAFAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD PERFORM EFFECTIVELY AS LEADERS OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, HE SAID THE "CREAM WILL RISE TO THE TOP AND WILL THEN BE SKIMMED OFF," SUGGESTING THAT IF THE PLO LEADERSHIP

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02779 03 OF 05 181049Z

FAILS THIS TEST, IT WOULD BE REPLACED.

9. NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR SUPPORT, IN PRINCIPLE, FOR THE CONCEPT, NUSSEIBEH AND SOME OTHERS HERE ARE WORRIED THAT THE WHOLE CONCEPT IS PREMATURE. NUSSEIBEH ACKNOWLEDGED TO US THAT WHATEVER THE THEORY, PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES WOULD PLAY NO ROLE IN SUCH A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

GOVERNMENT, SINCE THE INTIFADA HAS NOT YET PRODUCED THE ALTERNATE ADMINISTRATION IT ASPIRES TO. IN HIS AL-FAJR INTERVIEW AUGUST 14, HE SAID, "WE DO NOT WANT A GOVERNMENT FLOATING IN A SPACESHIP...WE WANT TO CONNECT OURSELVES INSTITUTIONALLY TO OUR LEADERSHIP." IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS KIND OF REALISM WILL PERSUADE PALESTINIANS HERE TO URGE THE PNC NOT TO GO ALL THE WAY IN DECLARING A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT, WHETHER IT IS CALLED A "GOVERNMENT IN EXILE," OR A "PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT," AS SOME ADVOCATE. THEY MUST ALSO REALIZE THAT IF SUCH A GOVERNMENT WERE ESTABLISHED, LOCAL PALESTINIANS WHO ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES WITH IT WOULD FACE A HEIGHTENED THREAT OF DEPORTATION OR DETENTION.

10. CONSERVATIVE WEST BANK POLITICIANS ARE DEEPLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE ENTIRE CONCEPT OF UNILATERAL ACTION, GIVEN PALESTINIAN DIVISIONS AND THE CONTINUED CONTROL OF THE ISRAELIS ON THE GROUND IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BETHLEHEM MAYOR ELIAS FREIJ BELIEVES THE CONCEPT IS MERE POSTURING. HE TOLD US HE IS SENDING ARAFAT A MESSAGE URGING HIM TO "APPEAR BEFORE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, ACCEPT ALL THE AMERICAN CONDITIONS, AND PROPOSE A NEW UNSC PEACE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02779 04 OF 05 181052Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W

-----244236 181106Z /23

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

O 181043Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3240
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 04 OF 05 JERUSALEM 02779

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS, US, JO, PLO, PREL
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PEACE OFFENSIVE IN

RESOLUTION THAT VERNON WALTERS WILL NOT VETO."

A RADICAL LEAP

//////////

11. THE U.S. AND MOST WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALWAYS APPROACHED THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AS A MATTER WHOSE OUTCOME CANNOT BE ORDAINED UNILATERALLY IN ADVANCE BY PALESTINIANS OR ISRAEL, BUT DECIDED BY ALL THE PARTIES THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. TO ENDORSE A PALESTINIAN STATE, EVEN IF THE CONCEPT WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S., AND EVEN IF THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN A BENIGN AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY, WHICH THE CURRENT CONCEPT IS NOT, BEFORE THE PALESTINIANS REACH AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, WOULD BE A RADICAL LEAP FOR THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. IT

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 02779 04 OF 05 181052Z

WOULD PROBABLY ALSO VIOLATE OUR CAMP DAVID TREATY UNDERTAKINGS.

12. A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND GOVERNMENT IN EXILE WOULD BE REJECTED BY MOST ISRAELIS, GIVEN THEIR DEEP FEAR OF A PALESTINIAN STATE, NOT TO MENTION OPPOSITION ON THE RIGHT TO ANY TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. WORSE YET, USING OF THE 1947 PARTITION BOUNDARIES BY THE PALESTINIANS AS A BASELINE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THEREBY DISMISSING RESOLUTION 242 AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE, WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR EVEN THE MOST DOVISH ISRAELIS TO TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY. BRIG. GEN. (RET) BAR-ON, A LEADING PEACE NOW ACTIVIST, HAS TOLD US THAT MANY ISRAELI DOVES ARE DESOLATE THAT THE DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLARATION CALLS FOR THE 1947 BASELINE, EVEN
THOUGH IT ALSO CALLS FOR NEGOTIATING THE
ULTIMATE BOUNDARIES.

13. OUR PALESTINIAN CONTACTS ARGUE THAT THE
OPENING ISRAELI NEGOTIATING POSITION OFFER WILL
BE NO LAND OR ONLY PART OF THE TERRITORIES, A LA
THE ALLON PLAN. THUS, THEY SAY PALESTINIANS
MUST START WITH THE '47 BOUNDARIES FOR
NEGOTIATING PURPOSES, KNOWING WELL THAT THE
ULTIMATE LINE WILL BE DRAWN FAR TO THE EAST.
THEY ALSO ARGUE THAT 181, NOT 242, MUST BE THEIR
POINT OF DEPARTURE SINCE IT ADOPTS A TWO-STATE
SOLUTION AND 242 TREATS PALESTINIANS ONLY AS
REFUGEES. THESE ARGUMENTS IGNORE THE POWERFUL
EMOTIONAL OPPOSITION THIS EVOKES IN ISRAEL, AND
THE BEDROCK U.S. AND WESTERN COMMITMENT TO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02779 04 OF 05 181052Z

RESOLUTION 242.

14. THE USE OF THE 1947 BASELINE IN THE CURRENT
CONCEPT IS BASED, NOT JUST ON BARGAINING
CONSIDERATIONS, BUT ON THE NEED TO DRAW IN THE
PLO HARDLINER, INCLUDING ABU IYAD, HABASH AND
HAWATMEH. IN ANY CASE, RESURRECTING THE 1947
PARTITION PLAN, WHICH THE ARABS ORIGINALLY
REJECTED, AND STAKING A CLAIM TO THE GALILEE AND
JAFFA, PROBABLY FATALLY CRIPPLES AN INITIATIVE
WHICH IS ALREADY HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC. EVEN
JEROME SEGAL, WHO WILL VISIT ISRAEL NEXT WEEK,
HAS TOLD THE PRESS THAT USING THE 1947 PARTITION
AS A BASELINE WAS A TACTICAL ERROR THAT WOULD
UNDERMINE THE PALESTINIAN POSITION.

PROGNOSIS: DOUBTFUL

////////////////////

15. IN ITS CURRENT STATE, THE PALESTINIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE/GOVERNMENT IN EXILE
INITIATIVE WOULD SERIOUSLY MUDDY THE WATERS. IT
WOULD BE A STEP BACK IN THE PEACE PROCESS, SINCE
IT CONFRONTS THE APPROACH LONG PURSUED BY THE
U.S., ISRAELI MODERATES AND THE EUROPEANS OF
NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON 242 LEADING, VIA
TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS, TO A FINAL STATUS TO BE
DETERMINED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. IN ITS CURRENT
FORM, IT WOULD ALSO FURTHER HARDEN ISRAELI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OPINION AND, PERHAPS, INCREASE SUPPORT FOR SCHEMES SUCH AS SHARON'S CALL FOR ANNEXING THE ALLON PLAN AREAS. FOR THESE REASONS, SOME ANALYSTS, SUCH AS HEBREW UNIVERSITY'S MATTI STEINBERG, THINK THAT IF THE PNC ACTS ON THIS

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02779 05 OF 05 181054Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----244302 181107Z /23

O 181043Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3241
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 05 OF 05 JERUSALEM 02779

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, IS, US, JO, PLO, PREL
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PEACE OFFENSIVE IN

INITIATIVE AT ALL, IT WILL DROP REFERENCES TO THE 1947 BOUNDARIES.

16. IF THE PALESTINIANS RESHAPED THIS PROPOSAL IN A WAY THAT CLEARLY ABOLISHES THE PALESTINIAN CONVENANT, ACCEPTS ISRAEL AND 242 AS THE BASELINE, FORESWEARS VIOLENCE, PROMISES TO END

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE INTIFADA, AND MAKES CLEAR THAT EVERYTHING IS NEGOTIABLE, THE INITIATIVE MIGHT PUT A NEW FACE ON THE PEACE PROCESS BY CLEARLY BREAKING THE MOLD OF PLO REJECTION AND PROVIDING A CATHARSIS FOR ISRAELIS. IT WILL BE VERY HARD FOR THE PLO TO DO THIS, BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE. INDEED, EVEN PLO SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, WHICH IS EMBODIED IN THE CURRENT INITIATIVE, IS HARDLY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02779 05 OF 05 181054Z

ASSURED. (GEORGE HABASH, ALTHOUGH HE SUPPORTS A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, HAS REPORTEDLY CRITICIZED ABU IYAD'S OFFER TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AND TO DROP THE PALESTINIAN COVENANT AS GIVING CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL "FOR FREE.")

17. EVEN THOUGH THE DECLARATION/EXILE STATE CONCEPT, IN ITS CURRENT FORM, IS GRAVELY FLAWED AND THE ENTIRE PROCESS IS PROBLEMATIC, THE DEBATE OVER IT REPRESENTS A GREATER WILLINGNESS IN PLO THINKING TO ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AND THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE WITH IT. IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT THE PLO, UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE MORE PRAGMATIC PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, IS THINKING MORE CREATIVELY ABOUT A POLITICAL AGENDA DESIGNED TO CHALLENGE ISRAEL AND MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, AND TO QUESTION THE ORTHODOXY OF THE PAST. AS YOEL MARCUS OF HA'ARETZ SAID IN HIS AUGUST 9 COLUMN, "THIS CHICKEN IS NOT YET HATCHED; IT LIES IN INCUBATION IN SOME DRAWER, AND SERVES AS AN INDICATION THAT THE GAME INVOLVES NUMEROUS PLAYERS EACH OF WHOM HAS PUT ALL HIS EGGS IN ONE BASKET" ... "YET THE ENTIRE 'BASKET' POINTS TO THE AGONIZED BIRTH PANGS OF A PROCESS THAT WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD UP TO SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT AND COMPROMISE WITH ISRAEL. ONLY A BLIND MAN COULD FAIL TO SEE THAT THINGS ARE ON THE MOVE."

WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO?

////////////////////

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02779 05 OF 05 181054Z

18. GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SEPTEMBER PNC COULD BE A WATERSHED IN PLO POLICY, WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO INFLUENCE IT. AS THE MEETING APPROACHES, WE CAN DO SO BY ACKNOWLEDGING AND ENCOURAGING POSITIVE TRENDS IN PALESTINIAN THINKING AND INSISTING ON REALISM.
WILCOX



NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E23

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02778

FILM= D880727-0561

DATE= 18 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV
AMMAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= HEBREW UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE ON THE INTIFADA

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= UNIVERSITY, OCCUPIED AREA, CONFERENCE, VIOLENCE, DEMONSTRATION

TAGS= KPAL, PBTS, PREL, SCUL, IS, HEBREW UNIV

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to:
FOIA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02778 181039Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 SCL-01 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 L-03 PM-10 PA-01 INRE-00
RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02
/066 W

-----255214 181437Z /46

R 181037Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3236
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

JERUSALEM 02778

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: HEBREW UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE ON THE
INTIFADA

1. SUMMARY. A CONFERENCE ON THE UPRISING IN THE TERRITORIES SPONSORED BY HEBREW UNIVERSITY'S TRUMAN INSTITUTE AND THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH AUGUST 17 FEATURED AN ADDRESS BY DEFMIN RABIN WHO SAID THE INTIFADA WAS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DESTROY ISRAEL AND PROMISED TO CRACK DOWN ON PALESTINIAN POPULAR COMMITTEES. THERE WERE ALSO PANELISTS FROM ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. EXCEPT FOR BETHLEHEM MAYOR FREIJ, NO PALESTINIANS WERE EVIDENT IN THE AUDIENCE. END SUMMARY.

2. RABIN ASSERTED THAT THE INTIFADA REPRESENTS THE THIRD MEANS, AFTER WAR AND TERRORISM, BY WHICH THE ARABS HAVE SOUGHT ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION. HE ADDED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02778 181039Z

SOLUTION TO THE INTIFADA MUST BE POLITICAL, PENDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION THE IDF WOULD MEET VIOLENCE WITH FORCE, WITHIN LEGAL LIMITS. FINALLY, HE PROMISED A CAMPAIGN TO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE THE LEADERS OF THE PALESTINIAN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

POPULAR COMMITTEES ACTIVE IN MOST WEST BANK TOWNS AND VILLAGES.

3. THE PRECEDING PANEL DISCUSSION FEATURED PANELISTS FROM ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, FROM ISRAELI-ARAB SCHOLAR SHUKRI ABED TO LIKUD MP DAN MERIDOR. OF INTEREST WERE REMARKS BY YONAH ALEXANDER, OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, WHO CALLED THE INTIFADA A FORM OF LOW LEVEL TERRORISM. YEHUDA BLUM, OF HEBREW UNIVERSITY, CLAIMED THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW ISRAEL HAS A MORE VALID CLAIM THAN EITHER JORDAN OR A PLO "GOVERNMENT IN EXILE" TO THE WEST BANK. GENERAL EPHRAIM SNEH, FORMER CIVAD HEAD, BLAMED LIKUD'S OPPOSITION TO THE LAND FOR PEACE FORMULA FOR THE FEELINGS OF DESPERATION THAT TRIGGERED THE INTIFADA; HE ALSO SAID THE PLO HAD NOT YET PROVED THAT IT HAD CHANGED ITS POLICY TOWARD THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL.

4. THE ONLY PALESTINIAN WE NOTED IN THE AUDIENCE OF APPROXIMATELY 300 WAS BETHLEHEM MAYOR ELIAS FREIJ. WE UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER PALESTINIAN INVITEES BOYCOTTED THE CONFERENCE BECAUSE OF RABIN'S PRESENCE. THE CONFERENCE WAS ALSO HELD ON A STRIKE DAY, WHICH WOULD HAVE DISCOURAGED ATTENDANCE BY ARABS FROM THE WEST BANK.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02778 181039Z

5. COMMENT. RABIN'S THREAT TO ROOT OUT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE POPULAR COMMITTEES COINCIDED WITH THE DEPORTATION OF FOUR GAZANS AND EXPULSION ORDERS FOR 25 MORE PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. RABIN WAS CLEAR THAT, ABSENT A POLITICAL ACCOMODATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS, THE IDF WOULD CONTINUE ITS CURRENT POLICY OF MEETING VIOLENCE WITH FORCE. THIS MESSAGE SEEMED WELL RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE, WHICH CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF YOUNG, ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLE AND OTHER JEWS OF WESTERN--PRIMARILY U.S.--ORIGIN. END COMMENT. WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E22)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88USUNN02464

FILM= D880719-0413

DATE= 17 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= USUN NEW YORK

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION IO

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= GAZA STRIP : SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PERMREP, LETTER, PALESTINIANS, LIBERATION FRONT, OCCUPIED AREA, RESOLUTION

TAGS= PREL, GZ, IS, UNSC, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	FFP 12
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			
FOIA Exemptions		TS authority	
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 USUN N 02464 01 OF 02 170120Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 AF-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 NEA-06 NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 EAP-00 PA-01
OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /083 W
-----132324 170201Z /60

O 170116Z AUG 88
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7213
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 02464

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, UNSC
SUBJECT: GAZA STRIP : SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

1 [REDACTED] THIS IS AN ACTION
TELEGRAM.

2. SUMMARY: UN SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) PRESIDENT LI
(CHINA) AUGUST 16 INFORMED THE FOUR OTHER PERMANENT
MEMBERS THAT HE HAD MET WITH AND RECEIVED A LETTER FROM
THE PLO OBSERVER PROTESTING LATEST ISRAELI MEASURES IN
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. LI URGED IMMEDIATE UNSC
ACTION, IN THE FORM OF A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, DRAWING
ATTENTION TO ISRAELI "PRACTICES" AND CALLING ON ISRAEL TO
ABIDE BY THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. END SUMMARY

3. PLO COMMUNICATION: DURING CONSULTATIONS CONVENED TO
CONSIDER A CHEMICAL WARFARE RESOLUTION, SECURITY COUNCIL
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 USUN N 02464 01 OF 02 170120Z

PRESIDENT LI (CHINESE PERMREP) INFORMED REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE FOUR OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED
A LETTER FROM PLO OBSERVER TERZI. TERZI, WHO ALSO MET

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WITH LI, REQUESTED UNSC ACTION CALLING ATTENTION TO RECENT ISRAELI MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND URGING ISRAEL TO RESPECT THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. TERZI HAD NOT INDICATED WHETHER THE PLO WOULD INSIST ON A RESOLUTION OR WOULD BE SATISFIED BY A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. TEXT OF THE LETTER IS IN PARA 8.

4. PRESIDENT'S VIEW: LI CHARACTERIZED THE PLO REQUEST AS "REALISTIC", GIVEN THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. LI SAID THAT GAZA HAD BEEN COMPLETELY SEALED OFF AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD KILLED THREE PALESTINIANS AND INJURED 28. LI ALSO SAID THAT WHEN HE DISCUSSED THE LETTER WITH THE SYG, THE SYG LATER HAD ASKED HIM TO CONSULT WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. LI INDICATED THAT CHINA FAVORED A UNSC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT WHICH WOULD CONTAIN TWO POINTS: (A) DRAWING THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND (B) URGING ISRAEL, AS THE OCCUPYING POWER, TO ABIDE BY THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. LI WAS OF THE OPINION THAT IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A STATEMENT, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO CALL FOR A UNSC MEETING TO CONSIDER THE MATTER.

5. UK REP INDICATED THAT A STATEMENT SEEMED APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. AMBASSADOR OKUN CAUTIONED LI THAT USUN WOULD NEED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON BEFORE PROVIDING A U.S. REACTION TO HIS SUGGESTION. ALTHOUGH NEITHER THE FRENCH NOR RUSSIANS SPOKE, WE ASSUME THEY ALSO ARE AGREEABLE TO A STATEMENT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 . USUN N 02464 01 OF 02 170120Z

6. AMBASSADOR OKUN BRIEFED ISRAELI ACTING PERMREP BEIN ON THESE CONSULTATIONS. BEIN WILL MEET SC PRESIDENT AUGUST 17.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: MISSION WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING DEPARTMENT VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. TEXT OF PLO LETTER:

15 AUGUST 1988

H.E. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCELLENCY,

I AM INSTRUCTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION TO BRING THE FOLLOWING TO YOUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES IS EXTREMELY GRAVE AND CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS REPRESENTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE PRESS HAS BEEN BANNED FROM ENTERING THE GAZA AREA. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF COLD-BLOODED KILLING OF UNARMED PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES. THE ISRAELI MILITARY HAS SEALED OFF SEVERAL AREAS, AND IMPOSED CURFEWS ON QABATIAH (NEAR NABLUS) AND DHEISHEH PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP (NEAR BETHLEHEM), AND OTHER PALESTINIAN TOWNS AND VILLAGES. THE CURFEWS HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT FOR MANY DAYS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN NO ACCESS TO WATER WELLS AND SPRINGS, ELECTRICITY CUTS, AND THE ISRAELI ARMY IS CARRYING OUT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 USUN N 02464 01 OF 02 170120Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 USUN N 02464 02 OF 02 170120Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 AF-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 NEA-06 NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 EAP-00 PA-01
OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /083 W
-----132331 170201Z /60

O 170116Z AUG 88
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7214
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 02464

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, UNSC
SUBJECT: GAZA STRIP : SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

FREQUENT NIGHT RAIDS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CALLS UPON THE UNITED NATIONS TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITY BY ADDRESSING THE UNDER-LYING CAUSES, NAMELY, ISRAELI OCCUPATION, BUT IN THE INTERIM TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE UNDER OCCUPATION, AND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION.

ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

ZUHDI LABIB TERZI
PERMANENT OBSERVER

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 USUN N 02464 02 OF 02 170120Z

END TEXT
OKUN

UNCLASSIFIED

E21

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02744

FILM= D880717-0651

DATE= 16 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION DS

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEEKLY WRAP-UP, AUGUST 9-15

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= INCIDENT, PALESTINIANS, VIOLENCE

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date. FEB 12 1997
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> Delete Non-Responsive info			
FOIA Exemptions _____		TS authority to:	
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or	
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or	

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02744 01 OF 02 161438Z
ACTION DS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OPR-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 NEA-04 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 CTME-00 PM-10 PA-02 CCO-00 OMB-01 INRE-00
OCS-06 CA-02 FBOE-06 A-00 USSS-00 USIE-00 SP-02
OC-02 M-01 SR-06 PRS-01 SCT-02 /069 W
-----102534 161442Z /43

O 161435Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3216
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02744

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP, AUGUST 9-15

1. SUMMARY: A HIGH LEVEL OF VIOLENCE CONTINUED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED FOUR PALESTINIANS AND WOUNDED FORTY-THREE OTHERS IN THE WEST BANK. ONE IDF SOLDIER WAS INJURED, A TOURIST WAS WOUNDED BY IDF GUNFIRE IN THE OLD CITY, AND A PALESTINIAN CIVILIAN WAS INJURED BY A PALESTINIAN FIREBOMB. ONE PALESTINIAN DIED IN AN ISRAELI DETENTION CENTER AND THREE AMERICAN TOURISTS WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED WHEN THEIR BUS WAS STONED. THE TOWN OF QABATIYA REMAINS UNDER MILITARY CURFEW FOR THE 23RD DAY. A BEITA WOMAN WAS SENTENCED TO SERVE FOUR ADDITIONAL MONTHS IN PRISON FOR SERIOUSLY INJURING AN ISRAELI SETTLER AFTER HE KILLED HER BROTHER. AN ISRAELI SETTLER WAS CHARGED WITH UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02744 01 OF 02 161438Z

MANSLAUGHTER IN THE KILLING OF A PALESTINIAN YOUTH. ISRAEL LAUNCHES NEW MEASURES IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE INFLOW OF MONEY INTO THE TERRITORIES, ERADICATE THE POPULAR COMMITTEES AND INCREASE ITS ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE TERRITORIES.

KILLED AND INJURED

////////////////////

2. ON AUGUST 9, ONE PALESTINIAN, HUSSEIN ABDUL RAHIM SUBHI NAZZAL, 14, WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY IDF SOLDIERS IN QALQILYA AND 22 PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK. A CURFEW WAS PLACED ON QALIQILYA. ONE PALESTINIAN AND ONE TOURIST WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED WHEN SHOT BY AN ISRAELI BORDER POLICEMAN IN THE OLD CITY.

-- ON AUGUST 10, A PALESTINIAN TEENAGER, AHMED FALEH ALI DARAGHMEH, WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY AN IDF SOLDIER IN TABUS, NEAR NABLUS, DURING CLASHES. IN YA'ABAD, NEAR JENIN, ONE PALESTINIAN, 10, WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED DURING CLASHES. IN RAMALLAH, TWO PETROL BOMBS INJURED AN IDF SOLDIER AND A PALESTINIAN PASSERBY. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME AN IDF SOLDIER HAD BEEN INJURED BY A PETROL BOMB SINCE JUNE 15. RAMALLAH WAS DECLARED A CLOSED MILITARY ZONE.

-- ON AUGUST 11, ONE PALESTINIAN TEENAGER WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED BY IDF SOLDIERS IN YA'ABAD, NEAR JENIN.

-- ON AUGUST 12, THREE PALESTINIAN WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED BY IDF SOLDIERS DURING CLASHES IN IMATIN, UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02744 01 OF 02 161438Z

NEAR NABLUS. AT TULKAREM REFUGEE CAMP, ONE PALESTINIAN WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED; CURFEW WAS IMPOSED. IN DEIR LAGHSUN, NEAR TULKAREM, TWO PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED BY IDF TROOPS.

-- ON AUGUST 13, A PALESTINIAN BOY, 12, YOUSEF DAMAJ WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY IDF SOLDIERS IN THE JENIN REFUGEE CAMP DURING A DEMONSTRATION.

-- ON AUGUST 14, TWO PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND INJURED BY IDF TROOPS IN THE BALATA REFUGEE CAMP NEAR NABLUS. TWO OTHER PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND INJURED IN JALAZONE REFUGEE CAMP NEAR RAMALLAH AND ANOTHER PALESTINIANS WAS WOUNDED IN CLASHES NEAR AL-BIREH.

-- ON AUGUST 14, ONE PALESTINIAN, ATA YUSSUF AYYAD, 21, DIED IN ISRAEL'S DHAHRIYEH DETENTION CENTER IN THE WEST BANK.

-- ON AUGUST 15, A PALESTINIAN, JAMAL MUHAMMAD MUSA ODEH, 22, WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY IDF SOLDIERS IN THE TULKAREM REFUGEE CAMP. THREE PALESTINIANS IN NABLUS, TWO PALESTINIANS IN AL-AMARI REFUGEE CAMP NEAR RAMALLAH, AND TWO PALESTINIANS IN JALAZONE REFUGEE CAMP, WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED BY IDF TROOPS. IN EAST JERUSALEM, THREE AMERICAN TOURISTS WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED AFTER STONES WERE THROWN AT THEIR EGGED BUS.

CURFEW ON QABATIYA FOR 23RD DAY

////////////////////////////////////

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02744 02 OF 02 161439Z
ACTION DS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OPR-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 NEA-04 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 CTME-00 PM-10 PA-02 CCO-00 OMB-01 INRE-00
OCS-06 CA-02 FBOE-06 A-00 USSS-00 USIE-00 SP-02
OC-02 M-01 SR-06 PRS-01 SCT-02 /069 W

-----102561 161442Z /43

O 161435Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3217
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02744

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP, AUGUST 9-15

3. AUGUST 15 IS THE 23RD DAY OF A CURFEW ON THE TOWN OF QABATIYA, POPULATION 17,000, NEAR NABLUS. THE TOWN HAS BEEN UNDER CURFEW SINCE JULY 24 WHEN YASSER SABA'NEH, 18, WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY IDF TROOPS. AL-FAJR REPORTS SEVERE SHORTAGES OF FOOD, WATER, MILK AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN THE TOWN. ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE LINES HAVE BEEN CUT. ACCORDING TO AL-FAJR, FARMERS HAVE BEEN PREVENTED FROM TENDING THEIR FIELDS AND QABATIYA'S 20 STONE-CUTTING FACTORIES AND 40 QUARRIES HAVE BEEN SHUT-DOWN, PREVENTING ITS EXPORT OF CONSTRUCTION STONE TO JORDAN.

BEITA WOMEN TO PRISON

////////////////////

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02744 02 OF 02 161439Z

4. ON AUGUST 11, A WOMAN FROM THE WEST BANK VILLAGE OF BEITA, MUNIRA DAOUD, WAS SENTENCED FOR FOUR ADDITIONAL MONTHS IN PRISON AFTER BEING FOUND GUILTY OF WOUNDING ROMAM ALDUBI, THE ARMED JEWISH SETTLER WHO KILLED HER BROTHER AND ANOTHER PALESTINIAN IN BEITA ON APRIL 6. DAOUD HAS BEEN IN PRISON SINCE THE INCIDENT. (SEPTTEL)

SETTLER CHARGED WITH MANSLAUGHTER

////////////////////

5. ON AUGUST 11, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BINYAMIN REGIONAL COUNCIL, PINHAS WALLERSTEIN, WAS CHARGED WITH MANSLAUGHTER AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IN THE KILLING OF A PALESTINIAN AND THE WOUNDING OF ANOTHER. HE IS THE FIRST SETTLER LEADER TO BE CHARGED WITH KILLING A PALESTINIAN SINCE THE START OF THE UPRISING. (SEPTTEL)

RABIN PROMISES TOUGHER MEASURES FOR WEST BANK;
WEST BANK VEHICLES TO BE RELICENSED

////////////////////

6. THE JERUSALEM POST, AUGUST 16, REPORTED THAT DEFENCE MINISTER RABIN SAID WHILE VISITING GAZA AUGUST 15 THAT TOUGHER MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN

AGAINST THE INTIFADA IN THE WEST BANK IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. AUTHORITIES ARE PLANNING TO RELICENSE ALL VEHICLES IN THE WEST BANK, AS WAS DONE IN THE GAZA STRIP EARLIER THIS YEAR, IN ORDER TO TIGHTEN CONTROLS AND SECURITY OFFICIALS SAY THAT THERE WILL BE FURTHER ARRESTS OF MEMBERS OF "POPULAR UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02744 02 OF 02 161439Z

COMMITTEES" AND INTIFADA ENFORCING "STRIKE FORCES".

WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E20

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV11792

FILM= D880708-0155

DATE= 12 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 12

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 11407

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ELECTION, CAMPAIGN, REVIEW, POLITICAL PARTY, POLL

TAGS= PGOV, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority	
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

FEB 12 1988

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

██████████
PAGE 01 TEL AV 11792 01 OF 03 121639Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /091 W

-----314112 121653Z /40 38

O 121633Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0060
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 4906

██████████ SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 11792

USIA FOR NEA AND R/NA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 12

REF: TEL AVIV 11407

1. ██████████
2. SUMMARY: TWO AND A HALF MONTHS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, LIKUD AND LABOR SOURCES TELL US THEY FEEL THEY ARE RUNNING NECK AND NECK. BUT LIKUD CONTINUES TO REFLECT OPTIMISM THAT IT IS A WINNER RIDING A POSITIVE TREND, WHILE LABOR IS DISPIRITED. THE SMALLER PARTIES ARE STEPPING UP THEIR PUBLICITY EFFORTS, BUT THE CAMPAIGN WILL NOT REALLY GO INTO HIGH GEAR UNTIL LATE SEPTEMBER AFTER THE JEWISH HOLIDAYS, WHICH IS WHEN TELEVISION ADVERTISING BEGINS. THE LATEST ROUND OF PERSONAL POPULARITY POLLS ARE CONTRADICTIONARY. END SUMMARY.

██████████

██████████

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11792 01 OF 03 121639Z

ASSESSMENTS

3. LIKUD CAMPAIGN INFORMATION DIRECTOR RONI MILO AND
LABOR CAMPAIGN RESEARCH DIRECTOR YOSSI BEILIN BOTH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TOLD US THIS WEEK THEY SENSED LIKUD AND LABOR WERE RUNNING NECK AND NECK AT THIS POINT, WITH THE ELECTION TO BE DECIDED BY THE "FLOATING VOTERS."

4. BUT MILO FELT LIKUD WAS RIDING A POSITIVE TREND, WHICH HE BELIEVED COULD GIVE IT THE OPTIONS OF ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT LED BY SHAMIR (HIS PREFERENCE) OR EVEN A NARROW RIGHT/RELIGIOUS COALITION. BEILIN'S GOAL, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS MORE LIMITED. HE HOPED FOR A "BLOCKING MAJORITY" (OF LABOR, THE LEFT, AND THE NON-ZIONIST PARTIES) WHICH WOULD PREVENT BOTH A NARROW LIKUD-LED COALITION AND LIKUD HAVING THE EDGE IN THE FORMATION OF ANOTHER NUG ON ITS TERMS. UNDER THIS SCENARIO, LABOR WOULD SEEK TO FORM ITS OWN NARROW COALITION WITH THE SMALL LEFT ZIONIST PARTIES, SHAS AND AGUDAT YISRAEL. (HE DOUBTED LABOR COULD BRING THE NRP INTO A COALITION.) BEILIN BASED HIS ANALYSIS ON A HIGH ISRAELI ARAB VOTER TURNOUT (DUE TO THE "INTIFADA") WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE "BLOCKING MAJORITY" AGAINST LIKUD.

5. BUT HISTADRUT WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION "NAAMAT" SEC GEN MASHA LUBELSKY, A SENIOR LABOR PARTY FIGURE, DID NOT BUY THE POLL RESULTS SHOWING LABOR AND LIKUD TIED. SHE WAS CONCERNED LIKUD HAD THE EDGE AND LABOR MIGHT BE UNABLE TO CATCH UP. SHE WAS DISTURBED THAT LABOR LACKED FIGHTING SPIRIT AND SEEMED "TIRED."

████████████████████
████████████████████
PAGE 03 TEL AV 11792 01 OF 03 121639Z

ISSUES

6. SHAMIR IS USING HUSSEIN'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE TERRITORIES AND THE LEAKED FAISAL HUSSEINI DRAFT PALESTINIAN "DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE" TO UNDERCUT LABOR'S LINE THAT THERE IS A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN PARTNER FOR NEGOTIATIONS. RATHER, ACCORDING TO SHAMIR, THE HUSSEINI DOCUMENT DEMONSTRATES THE ARAB THREAT TO ELIMINATE ISRAEL.

7. PERES, MEANWHILE, HAS SHIFTED HIS PITCH AND IS STARTING TO PUT EMPHASIS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH A PALESTINIAN AS WELL AS JORDANIAN DELEGATION, SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER. LABOR PLANS TO PUT THIS NEW LINE INTO ITS PLATFORM.

PUBLICITY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

8. LABOR AND LIKUD HAVE AGREED TO LIMIT PRESS CAMPAIGN PUBLICITY AT LEAST UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1. THE SMALL PARTIES, HOWEVER, ARE GOING ON THE OFFENSIVE. TEHIYA ADS MAKE CLEAR IT WOULD KNOW HOW TO PUT DOWN THE "INTIFADA." THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY IS PLAYING UP JEWISH EDUCATION AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS. MAPAM IS TRYING TO CONVINCING VOTERS TO OPT FOR IT "THIS TIME." (MAPAM IS RUNNING INDEPENDENTLY FROM LABOR FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS.)

9. THE PARTIES ARE ALSO TRYING OUT THEIR SLOGANS. LIKUD, FOR EXAMPLE, IS USING "THE HOPE OF THE LABOR PARTY AND PERES IS TO BE A NATION FREE OF OUR COUNTRY (I.E., THE WEST BANK AND GAZA). THE CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT IS USING "THE FACTS POINT TO CRM."

LIKUD INFORMATION LINE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 11792 02 OF 03 121639Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /091 W

-----314124 121653Z /40 38

O 121633Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0061
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 4907

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 11792

USIA FOR NEA AND R/NA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 12

10. AT AN AUGUST 11 TRAINING DAY FOR ACTIVISTS, CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR ARENS FOCUSED ON LIKUD AS THE PARTY OF PEACE, WITH ITS PROGRAM THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. HE POINTED TO HUSSEIN'S ACTIONS AS SHOWING THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A JORDANIAN OPTION. HE ATTACKED LABOR FOR "LOSING" TABA, SUGGESTED LIKUD WOULD BRING BACK THE LAVI PROJECT, CALLED FOR RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMY, AND DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF A DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM. DEPUTY CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR KATZAV SAID THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST 21 YEARS SHOWED LIKUD HAD BEEN RIGHT ALL ALONG; THAT TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE WAS NEVER AN OPTION; AND THAT LABOR HAD TURNED RADICAL-DOVISH. HE ALSO SOUGHT TO BUCK UP LIKUD ACTIVISTS TO REBUT LABOR ARGUMENTS THAT LIKUD OPPOSED WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11792 02 OF 03 121639Z

THAT PERES -- RATHER THAN MODAI AND NISSIM -- HAD ACHIEVED THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY, AND THAT SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT TOWNS.

LIKUD: INTERNAL

11. DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN LIBERAL PARTY LEADERS MODAI AND SHARIR VERSUS NISSIM AND PATT OVER THE NAMING OF LIBERAL CANDIDATES TO THE NEW COMBINED LIKUD (HERUT AND LIBERAL) SECRETARIAT FORCED SHAMIR TO CANCEL THE FIRST SCHEDULED MEETING (THIS WEEK). NISSIM AND PATT REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETING SINCE THE LIBERAL CANDIDATES WERE NAMED SOLELY BY MODAI AND SHARIR, NISSIM AND PATT FEAR THAT IF MODAI AND SHARIR SUCCEED THIS TIME, THE RESULT WOULD BE ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE FOR THEIR CANDIDATES FOR THE LIKUD CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IF THIS INTERNAL LIBERAL DISPUTE IS NOT SETTLED, THERE WOULD BE NO AGREED LIBERAL CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS, AND LIKUD WILL HAVE TO DELAY A KEY LIKUD CAMPAIGN EVENT -- THE PLANNED AUG. 25 MEETING OF THE NEWLY COMPOSED LIKUD CENTRAL COMMITTEE.
NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY

12. INTERNAL DIFFERENCES ON KEY ISSUES CONTINUE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LIST LEADER SHAKI'S REPORTED ADVOCACY OF EXTENDING ISRAELI LAW TO ISRAELI SETTLEMENT AREAS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY MORE MODERATE FIGURES IN THE PARTY LIKE TIBERIAS MAYOR YIGAL BIBI (NO. 4 ON THE LIST).

KACH



PAGE 03 TEL AV 11792 02 OF 03 121639Z

13. KACH ANNOUNCED ITS LIST ON AUGUST 9: MEIR KAHANE; MOSHE NEIMANN (A TEACHER AND ADMINISTRATOR FROM THE SETTLEMENT OF MIZPE JERICHO, AND A GUSH EMUNIM FOUNDER); RAHAMIM COHEN (ATTORNEY); RABBI AVRAHAM TOLEDANO OF KIRYAT ARBA; AND DAVID BEN-DAVID (AN ECONOMIST AND IRGUN VETERAN).

DAROUSHA

14. DAROUSHA'S ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY ELECTED HIM ITS LIST LEADER ON AUG. 9. THE OTHER CANDIDATES ON THE LIST WILL BE ELECTED ON AUGUST 26.


TEHIYA WANTS PLP BANNED

15. TEHIYA IS PLANNING TO REQUEST THE CENTRAL ELECTIONS BOARD TO BAN THE PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE FROM RUNNING IN THE ELECTIONS, BECAUSE IT IS OPPOSED TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL. (EXISTING LAW STATES THAT "RACIST" PARTIES AND PARTIES OPPOSED TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL ARE INELIGIBLE TO RUN IN ELECTIONS; KACH AND PLP WILL BE CHALLENGED.)

SURPLUS VOTE AGREEMENTS

16. LIKUD AND TEHIYA, AS WELL AS CENTER-SHINUI AND MAPAM, HAVE SIGNED SURPLUS VOTE AGREEMENTS. (PARTIES WHICH WIN MORE THAN ONE PERCENT OF THE VOTE CAN SHARE "SURPLUS VOTES" TO MAKE AN ADDITIONAL SEAT.)

POLLS

17. A PORI POLL (FBIS TA 0808141288) SUGGESTED


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 11792 03 OF 03 121640Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /091 W

-----314134 121654Z /40 38

O 121633Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0062
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 4908

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 11792

USIA FOR NEA AND R/NA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, AUGUST 12

FLOATING VOTERS -- WHICH THIS SURVEY ASSERTED WERE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE -- LARGELY RESEMBLED THE LIKUD VOTER FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OCCUPATION, INCOME AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. PORI ASSERTED UNDECIDED VOTERS OR THOSE WHO REFUSE TO REVEAL FOR WHOM THEY WILL VOTE, TEND TO PREFER LIKUD OVER LABOR.

18. LIKUD POLLSTER "DAHAF" SURVEY RESULTS STATED THE PUBLIC PREFERS SHAMIR (47 PERCENT) TO PERES (43 PERCENT) AS PRIME MINISTER. SHAMIR INSPIRED MORE TRUST (49 PERCENT) THAN PERES (42 PERCENT) AS THE MAN TO LEAD ISRAEL INTO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. DAHAF ALSO SAID THE LIKUD LEADERSHIP TEAM ENJOYED GREATER PUBLIC SUPPORT THAN THAT OF LABOR. REFERRING TO ISSUES, DAHAF NOTED THE PUBLIC WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11792 03 OF 03 121640Z

DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM AND THAT SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HAD DROPPED. DAHAF ALSO FOUND THAT THE JEWISH PUBLIC WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1967 BORDERS THAN THE DANGERS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM.

19. BUT OTHER POPULARITY POLLS CAME UP WITH DIFFERENT RESULTS. A PORI POLL (FBIS TA 0908115488) NOTED THE FOLLOWING SATISFACTION RATINGS: RABIN AS DEFENSE MINISTER (50.2 PERCENT DOWN FROM 55.7 PERCENT IN JUNE); PERES AS FOREIGN MINISTER (38.2 PERCENT UP FROM 36.8 PERCENT); SHAMIR AS PRIME MINISTER (32.9 PERCENT UNCHANGED); LEVY AS HOUSING MINISTER (25.6 PERCENT DOWN FROM 35.6 PERCENT); NISSIM AS FINANCE MINISTER (41 PERCENT DOWN FROM 45.2 PERCENT); AND SHARON AS TRADE MINISTER (23 PERCENT DOWN FROM 29.8 PERCENT).

20. IN ADDITION, THE "TELESEKER" TELEPHONE POLL RELEASED THE FOLLOWING SATISFACTION RATINGS: RABIN (61.4 PERCENT); PERES (56 PERCENT); NISSIM (52.3 PERCENT); AND SHAMIR (40.8 PERCENT).

21. A PORI POLL ALSO NOTED THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE CAMPAIGN. A SEMI-ANNUAL SURVEY SHOWED 70.2 PERCENT OF THOSE INTERVIEWED COMPLAINED ABOUT THE RISE IN PRICES, AND 48.2 PERCENT SAID THEIR SALARIES WERE INSUFFICIENT TO COVER THE MONTH. ONLY 6.6 PERCENT SAID THEIR WAGES WENT UP MORE THAN PRICES AND 4.2 PERCENT SAID THEIR WAGES WERE BETTER ABLE TO LAST THE MONTH (COMPARED TO SIX MONTHS AGO). IN PORI'S SURVEY EARLIER THIS YEAR, 63.4 COMPLAINED ABOUT THE RISE IN PRICES AND 40.2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11792 03 OF 03 121640Z

PERCENT SAID WAGES WERE INSUFFICIENT TO COVER THE MONTH. AT THAT TIME, 15 PERCENT SAID THEIR WAGES HAD RISEN FASTER THAN PRICES AND 38 PERCENT SAID THEIR WAGES WERE SUFFICIENT TO COVER THE MONTH.

22. AN INSTITUTE OF APPLIED SOCIAL WORK SURVEY REPORTED THAT ALMOST HALF ITS SAMPLE SUPPORTED "TRANSFER" OF ARABS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THESE TERRITORIES REMAINED UNDER ISRAELI RULE. WHEN ASKED TO REPLY TO THE QUESTION "IF THE TERRITORIES REMAIN UNDER ISRAELI RULE, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO PRESERVE THE DEMOCRATIC (THE JEWISH) CHARACTER OF THE STATE, ALMOST HALF THOSE ASKED CHOSE THE REPLY "CAUSE THE ARABS TO LEAVE."

23. A POLL TAKEN BY THE UNKNOWN "NATIONWIDE INSTITUTE FOR SURVEYS" REPORTED THAT PARTY PREFERENCES IN THE ELECTIONS AMONG ISRAELI ARABS WERE: HADASH (COMMUNISTS) - 50 PERCENT; PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE - 20 PERCENT; LABOR - 15 PERCENT; DAROUSA - 10 PERCENT; AND THE REMAINDER SPLIT AMONG THE OTHER PARTIES.

PICKERING

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E18

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA02714

FILM= D880709-0400

DATE= 12 AUG 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

AMMAN

TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= CONFLICTING VIEWS ON NEW ISRAELI FINANCIAL CONTROLS IMPOSED ON CA JDP ACCOUNTS FROZEN

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 2648, 88 TEL AVIV 11556

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, PUBLIC OPINION, WEST BANK, FINANCE, RESTRICTION, OCCUPIED AREA, BOUNDARY, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BANK, POLICY, LEGISLATION

TAGS= KPAL, ECIN, EAID, PBTS, IS, JO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IA/FPC/CDR	Date. FEB 12
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	ME/Case Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS author:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	FOIA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[[[>>>]]]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 02714 01 OF 03 121423Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 SS-00 EB-00 EXIM-06 NSCE-00
COME-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 OPIC-07
CEA-01 OMB-01 FRB-03 USIE-00 SP-02 E-01 /055 W
-----331177 122340Z /65 38

R 121421Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3196
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02714

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IAI

DEPARTMENT FOR AID ANE/MENA AND ANE/PD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: ECIN, EAID, PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: CONFLICTING VIEWS ON NEW ISRAELI
FINANCIAL CONTROLS IMPOSED ON CAB; JDP ACCOUNTS
FROZEN

REF: (A) JERUSALEM 2648, (B) TEL AVIV 11556

1 [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: WEST BANK CAIRO-AMMAN BANK (CAB)
DIRECTOR MEDHAT KANAAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE
NEWEST FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE CAB
DIFFERS FROM THAT OF THE GOI'S OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES COORDINATOR SHMUEL GOREN. ACCORDING
TO KANAAN, GOREN ONLY THREATENED BUT DID NOT
IMPOSE A BIMONTHLY RESTRICTION OF JD 400/PERSON
ON WEST BANKERS RECEIVING FUNDS FROM OUTSIDE.
KANAAN DID NOT UNDERSTAND GOREN TO SAY THAT

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 02714 01 OF 03 121423Z

INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS BELOW THE JD 400 LIMIT
WOULD BE PROHIBITED. HOWEVER, KANAAN BELIEVES
THAT GOREN IS NOW REQUIRING THAT NO OUTSIDE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION TRANSFER MORE THAN JD 400/MONTH INTO THE WEST BANK REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF INTENDED RECIPIENTS. KANAAN ALSO SAID THAT CAB MUST NOW INFORM ITS CUSTOMERS THAT ANY INDIVIDUAL RECEIVING FUNDS FROM ABROAD IN ANY AMOUNT MUST FILE A FINANCIAL DECLARATION IF THOSE FUNDS BELONG TO OR ARE INTENDED FOR ANOTHER PERSON. KANAAN IS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE NEED ONLY SUBMIT MONTHLY LISTS OF ISSUED LOANS TO THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES AND NOT THAT THE CIVAD WILL NEED TO APPROVE LOANS PRIOR TO DISBURSAL. SHA'SHA' HAS BEEN TOLD BY THE HEAD OF JORDAN'S CENTRAL BANK THAT RECENT CHANGES IN JORDANIAN POLICY WILL NOT AFFECT CAB OPERATION SO LONG AS ISRAEL RESPECTS THE AGREEMENT IT SIGNED TO REESTABLISH WEST BANK BRANCHES. ON AUGUST 1, MOTA INSTRUCTED CAB TO FREEZE WEST BANK DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AND SALARY SUPPORT ACCOUNTS. END SUMMARY.

3. ON AUGUST 10 WEST BANK CAIRO-AMMAN BANK DIRECTOR MEDHAT KANAAN DESCRIBED THE AUGUST 8 MEETING HE ATTENDED WITH GOI OCCUPIED TERRITORIES COORDINATOR SHMUEL GOREN, ISRAELI EXAMINER OF BANKS GAD MARX AND CAB CHAIRMAN JAWDAT SHA'SHA' AS WORSE THAN HE HAD IMAGINED. HE SAID THAT GOREN AGAIN COMPLAINED THAT THE CAB WAS A CONDUIT FOR FUNDS FINANCING THE INTIFADA. ACCORDING TO KANAAN, GOREN EXERTED EXTREME PRESSURE ON THE CAB OFFICIALS TO SERVE "AS THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02714 01 OF 03 121423Z

CIVAD'S WATCHDOG". KANAAN'S RENDITION OF THE FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS TO BE IMPOSED ON CAB DIFFERS FROM GOREN'S.

TRANSFER LIMIT

//////////

4. ACCORDING TO KANAAN, GOREN INFORMED THE CAB OFFICIALS THAT HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ISRAELI CABINET TO CLOSE THE CAB AND, BARRING THAT, HE MIGHT HAVE TO LIMIT TRANSFERS TO ONLY JD 400/PERSON EVERY TWO MONTHS. IT IS KANAAN'S UNDERSTANDING THAT GOREN THREATENED TO RESTRICT TRANSFERS TO JD 400/PERSON EVERY TWO MONTHS, NOT THAT SUCH A MEASURE HAD ACTUALLY BEEN IMPOSED.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTION ON INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS

////////////////////////////////////

5. WHILE KANAAN DID NOT MENTION ANY RESTRICTION ON INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS PER SE, THE RESTRICTION HE DESCRIBED WILL HAVE MUCH THE SAME EFFECT. ACCORDING TO KANAAN, THOSE TRANSFERRING FUNDS WILL NOW BE RESTRICTED IN THE SAME WAY AS THOSE RECEIVING FUNDS: I.E. EACH INDIVIDUAL/INSTITUTION CAN ONLY TRANSFER JD 400/MONTH INTO THE WEST BANK. THIS, OF COURSE, DOES NOT ELIMINATE INSITUTIONAL TRANSFERS, IT ONLY MAKES THEM MORE COMPLICATED. KANAAN POINTED OUT TO US THAT JUST AS A TRANSFERRED SUM CAN BE DISBURSED IN JD 400 TRANCHES TO MANY INDIVIDUALS FOR COLLECTION LATER BY THE INTENDED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02714 02 OF 03 121424Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 SS-00 EB-00 EXIM-06 NSCE-00
COME-00 HA-09. L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 OPIC-07
CEA-01 OMB-01 FRB-03 USIE-00 SP-02 E-01 /055 W
-----331251 122341Z /65 38

R 121421Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3197
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02714

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IAI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT FOR AID ANE/MENA AND ANE/PD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: ECIN, EAID, PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: CONFLICTING VIEWS ON NEW ISRAELI

RECIPIENT, SO TOO CAN A SUM BE DISAGGREGATED BY AN INSTITUTION OR INDIVIDUAL PRIOR TO TRANSFER AND THEN TRANSFERRED IN JD 400 TRANCHES BY MANY DIFFERENT INDIVIDUAL AGENTS. KANAAN SAID HE TOLD GOREN THAT THIS NEW RESTRICTION WOULD SERVE ONLY TO MAKE MORE WORK FOR CAB.

6. KANAAN TOLD US THAT GOREN HAD INFORMED THE CAB AUTHORITIES OF A NEW REGULATION DESIGNED TO PROHIBIT INDIVIDUALS FROM SENDING OR RECEIVING TRANSFERRED FUNDS ON BEHALF OF SOMEONE ELSE. THE CIVAD IS NOW REQUIRING ALL CAB BRANCHES TO POST AN ARABIC TRANSLATION OF THE FOLLOWING NOTICE: "SECURITY LEGISLATION REQUIRES THAT ANY PERSON RECEIVING MONIES FROM ABROAD IN ANY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02714 02 OF 03 121424Z

AMOUNT MUST SIGN A DECLARATION IF THOSE MONIES BELONG TO OR ARE INTENDED FOR ANOTHER PERSON." KANAAN BELIEVES THAT PALESTINIANS WILL DISREGARD THIS NOTICE, HOWEVER. THEREFORE, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER GOREN IS CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT ONLY INDIVIDUALS ACTING IN THEIR OWN NAMES CAN BRING MONEY IN WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL. (REF B)

RESTRICTING LOANS

//////////

7. ACCORDING TO KANAAN, GOREN TOLD THE CAB OFFICIALS THAT FAMILIES WERE USING THEIR BUSINESSES TO FINANCE THE INTIFADA. KANAAN THOUGHT THIS WAS A REFERENCE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF BASSAM SHAKA (FORMER NABLUS MAYOR AND SOAP FACTORY OWNER). EXPLAINING TO GOREN THAT CAB IS VERY CAREFUL AND RESTRAINED IN ITS LENDING, KANAAN NOTED BY EXAMPLE THAT THE HEBRON BRANCH HAS ONLY GRANTED 25 LOANS/OVERDRAFTS SINCE IT OPENED IN FEBRUARY. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION, KANAAN WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT GOREN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WOULD NOT PLACE A LIMIT ON THE LOANS CAB COULD GIVE (REF A) AND THAT MARX HAD CONVINCED GOREN THAT THE CIVAD COULD SUFFICIENTLY MONITOR CAB LOANS BY REVIEWING THE MONTHLY LOAN REPORT ALREADY PROVIDED BY CAB TO THE EXAMINER OF BANKS. CONTRARY TO GOREN'S COMMENTS REF B, KANAAN DOES NOT CURRENTLY INTEND TO PROVIDE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPROVE OR REJECT LOANS PRIOR TO DISBURSAL.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 02714 02 OF 03 121424Z

JORDANIAN POLICY MEASURES

////////////////////

8. ACCORDING TO KANAAN, CAB AMMAN RECEIVED WORD FROM MOTA ON AUG 1 AT 1:00 PM THAT CAB SHOULD STOP TRANSACTIONS ON ALL PROGRAM ACCOUNTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THAT AUTHORIZED SIGNATURES ON THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD NO LONGER BE VALID. IN THIS MESSAGE MOTA REQUESTED BALANCES ON ACCOUNTS FOR THE NINE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES AND FOR THE SALARY SUPPORT ACCOUNTS. SHA'SHA' AND KANAAN ARE AWARE THAT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE HEADS HAVE OUTSTANDING BILLS TO PAY, BUT SHA'SHA' TOLD KANAAN THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHO IN THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO QUESTION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE FROZEN FUNDS NOW THAT MOTA IS DISSOLVED AND IT IS UNCLEAR WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE NEWLY FORMED DEPARTMENT.

9. ACCORDING TO KANAAN, THE HEAD OF JORDAN'S CENTRAL BANK TOLD SHA'SHA' THAT RECENT CHANGES IN JORDANIAN POLICY WILL NOT AFFECT CAB'S OWN OPERATION SO LONG AS ISRAEL RESPECTS THE AGREEMENT SIGNED TWO YEARS AGO TO REESTABLISH WEST BANK CAB BRANCHES, AND THAT JORDAN WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT CAB'S WEST BANK ACTIVITIES UNLESS ISRAEL TRIES TO ANNEX THE WEST BANK.

10. SHA'SHA' TOLD KANAAN THAT AID'S CAIRO-AMMAN BANK LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM WILL PROCEED WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT EXCEPT THAT FUNDS WILL FLOW THROUGH THE CENTRAL BANK TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02714 03 OF 03 121426Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 SS-00 EB-00 EXIM-06 NSCE-00
COME-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 OPIC-07
CEA-01 OMB-01 FRB-03 USIE-00 SP-02 E-01 /055 W
-----331261 122342Z /65 38

R 121421Z AUG 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3198
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02714

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IAI

DEPARTMENT FOR AID ANE/MENA AND ANE/PD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: ECIN, EAID, PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: CONFLICTING VIEWS ON NEW ISRAELI

CAB

11. COMMENT: WHILE WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASING ISRAELI INTERFERENCE IN CAB OPERATIONS, WE FORESEE THAT NEW FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON CAB WILL ONLY SLOW THE FLOW OF FUNDS TO THE WEST BANK UNTIL WEST BANKERS INEVITABLY FIND A WAY AROUND THOSE RESTRICTIONS OR RELY INCREASINGLY ON THE MANY OTHER AVAILABLE CHANNELS FOR FUNDS.

12. KING HUSSEIN HAS ANNOUNCED THAT JORDANIAN EMPLOYEES WILL BE PAID THROUGH AUGUST 16, AND IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT JORDAN INTENDS TO FUND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE COMPLETION OF JDP PROJECTS ALREADY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02714 03 OF 03 121426Z

UNDERWAY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION
AMEMBASSY AMMAN COULD PROVIDE ON WHAT JORDAN
INTENDS TO DO WITH THE FROZEN DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE AND SALARY SUPPORT ACCOUNTS. END
COMMENT.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

ES

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03167

FILM= D880853-0895

DATE= 23 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP, SEPTEMBER 12-19, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= WEST BANK, OCCUPIED AREA, ANNIVERSARY, PALESTINIANS, ALLEGATION, CASUALTY

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to:	
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03167 01 OF 03 231431Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /100 W

-----202601 231441Z /45

O 231428Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3545
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03167

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, SEPTEMBER 12-19, 1988

1. SUMMARY: THERE WERE NUMEROUS VIOLENT
CONFRONTATIONS IN THE WEST BANK AS PALESTINIAN
GROUPS UNITED TO OBSERVE A GENERAL STRIKE
SEPTEMBER 17 TO MARK THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF
SABRA AND SHATILA. A PALESTINIAN SUSPECTED OF
COLLABORATING WITH THE ISRAELIS WAS KILLED IN
NABLUS. TWO PALESTINIANS WERE REPORTED KILLED AND
76 WOUNDED IN CLASHES WITH THE IDF. THIS REPORT
WAS COMPILED MAINLY FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS. END
SUMMARY.

WEEKLY WRAP UP

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03167 01 OF 03 231431Z

- PALESTINIANS KILL SUSPECTED COLLABORATOR
- -----

SEPTEMBER 13

THE BODY OF A NABLUS MAN, BEARING MARKS OF BLOWS TO THE HEAD AND SEVERAL STAB WOUNDS IN THE NECK, WAS FOUND IN NABLUS' OLD CITY. LOCAL RESIDENTS SAID THE VICTIM HAD BEEN INVOLVD IN THE SALE OF ARAB-OWNED LAND TO ISRAELIS. THIS WAS THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF ATTACKS ON PERSONS SUSPECTED OF COLLABORATING WITH ISRAEL.

A MAN FROM HUWWARA, NEAR NABLUS, WHO WAS CONSIDERED A COLLABORATOR WITH ISRAELI AUTHORITIES, WAS INJURED SEPTEMBER 18 WHILE RIDING HIS MOTORBIKE WHEN HE WAS HIT BY THE DRIVER OF A STOLEN TRUCK. THE MAN'S HOME WAS LATER SET ON FIRE.

- GENERAL STRIKE RESULTS IN DEATH OF TWO
- -----

SEPTEMBER 17

PALESTINIANS OBSERVED A GENERAL STRIKE MARKING THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE KILLINGS AT SABRA AND SHATILA. THE STRIKE WAS CALLED BY BOTH THE PLO-BACKED UNIFIED LEADERSHIP AND THE ISLAMIC GROUP HAMAS. DEMONSTRATIONS ERUPTED THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK DURING THE STRIKE. ONE MAN WAS KILLED BY IDF FIRE IN TULKAREM; A SECOND WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY THE IDF AT LUBBAN SHAQIEH, NORTH OF UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03167 01 OF 03 231431Z

RAMALLAH.

- 76 INJURED
- -----

SEPTEMBER 14

THREE PALESTINIANS WERE WOUNDED BY GUNFIRE WHEN SOLDIERS RAIDED BEIT LID, NEAR TULKAREM.

ONE PERSON WAS WOUNDED BY THE IDF AT BURQIN, NEAR JENIN.

SEPTEMBER 15

IDF SHOT AND SERIOUSLY WOUNDED FIVE PALESTINIAN YOUTHS DURING CLASHES IN NABLUS.

SEPTEMBER 16

AN ISRAELI SETTLER SUFFERED A FRACTURED SKULL WHEN SHE WAS HIT BY A STONE THROWN AT HER CAR NEAR AZZAHIRIYEH, SOUTH OF HEBRON.

SEPTEMBER 17

TROUBLE BEGAN IN QALQILYA WHEN SOLDIERS INTERVENED TO STOP MASKED YOUTHS WHO HAD ATTACKED AND WOUNDED A MAN SUSPECTED OF COLLABORATING WITH ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. PALESTINIAN SOURCES SAID NINE PERSONS WERE WOUNDED IN THE SUBSEQUENT CLASHES.

AT EIN BEIT ILMA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS, IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED SIX PERSONS.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03167 02 OF 03 231432Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 .SR-06 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /100 W

-----202626 231441Z/41

O 231428Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3546
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03167

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, SEPTEMBER 12-19, 1988

IDF CLASHED WITH RESIDENTS AT BALATA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS. 20 PERSONS WERE HOSPITALIZED WITH INJURIES FROM BEATING AND RUBBER BULLETS.

IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED FOUR PALESTINIANS AT QALANDIA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR RAMALLAH. CURFEW WAS IMPOSED AND THE CAMP DECLARED A CLOSED MILITARY ZONE.

IDF SHOT AND INJURED THREE PALESTINIANS AT THE AMARI REFUGEE CAMP NEAR RAMALLAH. SOLDIERS CLOSED THE AREA TO JOURNALISTS.

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED THREE PALESTINIANS AT SHWEIKEH, NEAR TULKAREM; ONE AT NEARBY ZEITA
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03167 02 OF 03 231432Z

VILLAGE; AND ANOTHER AT QUFFIN, NEAR NABLUS.

CLASHES WERE REPORTED IN THE EAST JERUSALEM NEIGHBORHOODS OF SILWAN, ABU TOR AND ISSAWIYEH, WHERE POLICE FIRED TEARGAS CANNISTERS AND USED RUBBER BULLETS AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS.

SEPTEMBER 18

DURING AN IDF SWEEP IN VILLAGES NEAR TULKAREM, SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A YOUTH IN ILLAR VILLAGE AFTER HE ALLEGEDLY ATTACKED AN OFFICER WITH A HATCHET.

IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED FIVE PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES IN JENIN. TWO OTHERS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED IN NABLUS, A THIRD IN BURQIN, AND A FOURTH IN QALQILYA.

SEPTEMBER 19

IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED FOUR PALESTINIANS IN NABLUS. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED IN JENIN. ANOTHER YOUTH WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED IN QALQILYA, WHERE SOLDIERS IMPOSED CURFEW FOLLOWING CLASHES.

- DEMOLITION AND SEALING OF ARAB-OWNED HOMES

SEPTEMBER 14

ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES DESTROYED A TOTAL OF
13 HOMES IN THE VILLAGES OF SHUYOUKH AND SA'IR,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03167 02 OF 03 231432Z

NEAR HEBRON, AND AT EIN YABROUD AND JABA' NEAR
RAMALLAH, CLAIMING THAT THE HOUSES HAD BEEN BUILT
WITHOUT A LICENSE.

SEPTEMBER 15

ISRAELI AUTHORITIES SEALED THE HOME OF A QALQILYA
RESIDENT FOR TWO YEARS AFTER THEY DISCOVERED A
NUMBER OF IRON NAILS INSIDE THE HOUSE.

SEPTEMBER 18

AUTHORITIES DEMOLISHED SIX HOMES IN AZZAHIRIYEH,
SOUTH-WEST OF HEBRON, CLAIMING THAT THE HOUSES HAD
BEEN BUILT WITHOUT PERMITS.

- AUTHORITIES UPROOT TREES IN ARAB VILLAGES

SEPTEMBER 15

ISRAELI BULLDOZERS GUARDED BY A CONTINGENT OF IDF
SOLDIERS UPROOTED 25 OLIVE TREES ALONG THE ROAD
LEADING FROM TURMUS AYYA AND SINJEL, RAMALLAH
DISTRICT, TO NEARBY SHILO SETTLEMENT.

SEPTEMBER 19

ISRAELI MILITARY BULLDOZERS UPROOTED OLIVE AND
CAROB TREES PLANTED ALONG THE MAIN ROAD BETWEEN
AZZOUN AND QALQILYA.

- CURFEWS

SEPTEMBER 16
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03167 03 OF 03 231432Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /100 W

-----202633 231441Z /41 38

O 231428Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3547
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03167

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, SEPTEMBER 12-19, 1988

AUTHORITIES LIFTED THE SIEGE ON THE VILLAGE OF TEL
AFTER 33 DAYS (SEPTTEL).

SEPTEMBER 17

CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON QALQIYA FOLLOWING VIOLENT
CLASHES BETWEEN THE IDF AND VILLAGERS.

IDF IMPOSED CURFEW ON QALANDIA AND AM'ARI REFUGEE
CAMPS, NEAR RAMALLAH, AZZAHIRIYEH, SOUTH OF HEBRON
AND ARRABEH, NEAR JENIN. THE CURFEW REMAINED AS
OF ON SEPTEMBER 19.

SEPTEMBER 19
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03167 03 OF 03 231432Z

THE VILLAGES OF KUFR MALIK AND BEIT RIMA, NEAR
RAMALLAH AND BURQA, NEAR NABLUS WERE CLOSED OFF BY
THE IDF, FOLLOWING CLASHES.
WILCOX

EE

UNCLASSIFIED

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TUNIS09857

FILM= D880848-0080

DATE= 22 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TUNIS

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ALGIERS

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ARAB LEAGUE DEMARCHE ON U.S.-IRAQI DISPUTE - AND ISRAELI SATELLITE

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 299492

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DEMARCHE, SATELLITE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATION, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= PREL, US, XF, TS, IS, IR, AL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS FPC/ODR	Date: 11/12
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			TS authority to.
FOIA exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>
[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TUNIS 09857 01 OF 02 220821Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /054 W
-----072534 220827Z /25

R 220819Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7879
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 09857

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, XF, TS
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE DEMARCHE ON U.S.-IRAQI DISPUTE
- AND ISRAELI SATELLITE

REF: STATE 299492

1. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY

2. ARAB LEAGUE SYG KLIBI IS CRITICAL OF U.S. TACTICS
IN CONFRONTING IRAQ OVER CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) AND
SUGGESTS THAT THE USG SHOULD ENLIST GULF STATES AND
ARAB LEAGUE TO PURSUE SUCH ISSUES. HE IS FEARFUL
THAT IRAN WILL BE PERMITTED TO RE-ARM AND SWITCH FROM
NEGOTIATIONS TO ARMED CONFRONTATION AFTER A BREATHING
SPELL. ISRAEL'S SATELLITE HAS ALSO TOUCHED A NERVE.
ON LEBANON, THE SYG FAVORS EITHER ELECTION OF RAYMOND
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TUNIS 09857 01 OF 02 220821Z

EDDE OR CONTINUATION OF THE AL HOSS GOVERNMENT. END
SUMMARY.



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY POLCOUSELOR, CALLED ON ARAB LEAGUE SYG KLIBI AT HIS REQUEST SEPT. 21 TO DISCUSS THE GULF AND OTHER REGIONAL QUESTIONS. KLIBI WAS JOINED BY HIS DIRECTOR FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AHMED EL HERGUEM.

4. THE FOCAL POINT OF THE MEETING WAS A LOW-KEY DEMARCHE ON U.S. HANDLING OF IRAQI CW. NOTING RECENT STORMY RELATIONS, KLIBI QUESTIONED THE WAY IN WHICH THE U.S. RAISED THE ISSUE. IF U.S. OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN POLITICAL -- I.E. TO HUMILIATE OR EMBARRASS IRAQ -- IT SUCCEEDED. HOWEVER, IF U.S. OBJECTIVE WAS HUMANITARIAN, THEN U.S. TACTICS WERE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. OVERALL, IRAQI POLICY HAS EVOLVED IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION IN RECENT YEARS TO THE POINT THAT IRAQ NOW CONTRIBUTES TO THE MODERATE ARAB CONSENSUS RATHER THAN CHALLENGING IT. THE U.S. APPROACH RISKS RADICALIZING IRAQ AND OFFENDING AMERICA'S FRIENDS IN THE GULF. A FAR BETTER APPROACH, KLIBI SUGGESTED, WOULD HAVE BEEN TO WORK THROUGH MODERATE GULF STATES OR EVEN THE ARAB LEAGUE.

5. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT U.S. GOAL WAS INDEED HUMANITARIAN, BUT BROADLY CONCEIVED. RECENTLY, THE WORLD HAS WITNESSED SIGNIFICANT EROSION IN THE PROHIBITION OF CW. THE U.S. BELIEVES THE WORLD COMMUNITY MUST RETURN TO THE POST-WWI CONSENSUS IN THIS REGARD. IN GENERAL, THE U.S. VALUES ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAQ WHICH HAS COME OUT OF THE WAR AS A REGIONAL POWER. THE U.S. IS NOW TRYING TO



PAGE 03 TUNIS 09857 01 OF 02 220821Z

DE-EMOTIONALIZE THE ISSUE AND RETURN IT TO THE REALM OF CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ' AND THE USG RESPONSE SHOULD FACILITATE THAT EFFORT.

6. RAISING A NEW ISSUE, KLIBI THEN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RE-ARMING OF IRAN. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP, NOTABLY RAFSANJANI, MAY APPEAR RELATIVELY MODERATE, BUT IT MAY BE DISSEMBLING. NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE STRETCHED OUT FOR SIX MONTH OR SO TO ALLOW IRAN "TO CATCH ITS BREATH" THEN FIGHTING RESUMED. ALTERNATELY, RAFSANJANI MIGHT BE THRUST ASIDE BY MILITANTS. HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD MAINTAIN ITS EFFORTS TO DISSUADE OTHERS, SUCH AS CHINA, NORTH KOREA, EVEN EUROPEANS, FROM RE-ARMING IRAN.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7. AMBASSADOR AGREED. ONE SHOULD NOT PRESUME THAT THE CURRENT CEASE FIRE WILL ENDURE INDEFINITELY. IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT IRAQI AND IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL CONFER WITH UN SYG IN NEW YORK IN EARLY OCTOBER, THEN NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESUME SUBSEQUENTLY IN GENEVA. KLIBI VOLUNTEERED THAT THE GULF STATES WOULD BE URGING IRAQ TO TAKE FLEXIBLE POSITIONS.

8. KLIBI THEN NOTED NEWS OF ISRAEL'S LAUNCH OF A "MILITARY" SATELLITE. THE ARAB STATES, KLIBI SAID, HAD HOPED THAT AN END TO GULF FIGHTING MIGHT PERMIT ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION TO RE-ORIENT THEMSELVES IN PEACEFUL DIRECTIONS. WITH THE HELP OF THE GERMANS, FRENCH, BRITISH AND AMERICANS, ISRAEL HAD NOW SHARPLY ESCALATED TENSIONS. HE RECOMMENDED THE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TUNIS 09857 02 OF 02 220822Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /054 W

072555 220828Z /25

R 220819Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7880
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 TUNIS 09857

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XF, TS

SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE DEMARCHE ON U.S.-IRAQI DISPUTE
U.S. CAREFULLY STUDY RECENT STATEMENTS CARRIED BY THE
ALGERIAN NEWS AGENCY TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THE
EVOLVING ARAB POSITION.

9. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT ISRAEL FOR YEARS HAD REQUESTED UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO U.S. SATELLITES, WHICH U.S. CONSISTENTLY HAD DENIED. NO DOUBT THIS WAS ONE FACTOR IN ISRAEL'S DECISION TO GO IT ALONE. AS FOR LAUNCH AND SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY, THERE WERE NUMEROUS SOURCES, INCLUDING THIRD-WORLD COUNTRIES LIKE INDIA AND CHINA. IT WAS ESSENTIALLY A QUESTION OF A COUNTRY'S TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL. KLIBI WONDERED WHAT THE U.S. AND ISRAELI REACTION WOULD BE IF AN ARAB STATE WERE TO LAUNCH A MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE.

10. KLIBI ALSO RAISED LEBANON. HE REGRETTED THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL IN "SELLING"
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TUNIS 09857 02 OF 02 220822Z

THE U.S.-SYRIAN COMPROMISE CANDIDATE IN LEBANON. DRAWING FROM REFTEL AND PRESS GUIDANCE, AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED BACKGROUND OF U.S. EFFORT. HE NOTED THAT A/S MURPHY HAD TWO NOTABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WHICH THE CHRISTIANS SHOULD CREDIT. FIRST, SYRIA HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF ELECTIONS FIRST THEN REFORM. SECOND, SYRIA HAD WITHDRAWN ITS PRIMARY CANDIDATE. AND, THE COMPROMISE ONE WAS AFTER ALL A MARONITE. KLIBI AGREED AND SAID DAHER HAD EVEN TAKEN POSITIONS INDEPENDENT OF SYRIA ON FOUR OR FIVE OCCASIONS IN THE PAST. OTHER POSSIBILITIES, HOWEVER, MIGHT INCLUDE RAYMOND EDDE'S ELECTION OR CONTINUATION OF THE AL HOSS GOVERNMENT. AMBASSADOR NOTED EDDE HAD BEEN AWAY FOR MANY YEARS AND QUESTIONED WHETHER HE COULD BE APPROVED BY THE CURRENT LEBANESE PARLIAMENT. HE RE-EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE U.S. ATTACHES TO SUCCESSFUL HOLDING OF ELECTION.

11. IN CLOSING, AMBASSADOR RAISED PEACE PROCESS. IN PARTICULAR, HE NOTED, THE POSITIVE REACTION OF BASSAM ABU SHARIF TO SECRETARY SHULTZ SPEECH OF SEPT. 16

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WHICH CONTRASTED MARKEDLY WITH CLOVIS MAKSOU'D'S TOTALLY NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT. KLIBI TOOK THE POINT, NOTED IN TURN FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS' POSITIVE CHARACTERIZATION OF HIS TALK WITH ARAFAT AND OBSERVED THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD BE LOOKING FOR A VEHICLE TO MAKE PROGRESS AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS.

COMMENT

PAGE 03 TUNIS 09857 02 OF 02 220822Z

11. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT MAKSOU'D CLEARS HIS REMARKS WITH TUNIS, BUT WE NEVERTHELESS FELT HIS RECENT NEGATIVISM WARRANTED MENTION. BY CONTRAST, ARAB LEAGUE HQ. HERE HAS TRIED TO ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MOST RECENTLY A NOTE PRAISING U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION (SEPTTEL).

12. ACTION FOR ALGIERS. KLIBI DEFLECTED A REQUEST FOR FURTHER SPECIFICS ON THE ALGERIAN POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE ISRAELI SATELLITE. APPRECIATE ANY CLARIFICATION YOU CAN SUPPLY.

13. BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

PELLETREAU.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E8)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE311484

FILM= D880851-0607

DATE= 22 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= INR/SFA:RHOLT

OFFICE= ORIGIN INR

TO= TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= MEETING WITH CHIEF OF ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 13594

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SPACE PROGRAM, MEETING, OUTER SPACE, SATELLITE

TAGS= KSCA, TSPA, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PINR, IS

<<<>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			TS authority to
FOIA Exemptions:		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions:		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304629

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 STATE 311484
ORIGIN INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06 NSCE-00
NSF-01 NSAE-00 NASA-01 SSO-00 L-03 PM-10 INRE-00
OES-09 ACDA-12 DOEE-00 T-01 /053 R

DRAFTED BY: INR/SFA:RHOLT
APPROVED BY: INR/SFA:RWALPOLE
NEA/IAI:MSCOBEY OES/SAT:LROSE
INR/NESA:DHERTZBERG INR/FAR:MLOWENTHAL
-----140750 222347Z /63

O 222304Z SEP 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] STATE 311484

FOR JACK SEGAL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSCA, TSPA, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PINR, IS
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CHIEF OF ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM

REFTEL: TEL AVIV 13594

1. [REDACTED] IN WASHINGTON INTEREST IS HIGH CONCERNING THE OFFEQ SATELLITE AND LAUNCHER, AND WE HAVE MANY QUESTIONS THAT WE HOPE THE DIRECTOR OF THE ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM WILL ANSWER. THE LAUNCH CAUGHT ALMOST EVERYONE BY SURPRISE, AND WE FIND WE HAVE MUCH TO LEARN ABOUT THE ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM.

2. (U) THE QUESTIONS IN THIS CABLE COME FROM A NUMBER OF INTERESTED ANALYSTS. THE QUESTIONS FALL INTO SEVERAL CATEGORIES: THE SPACE PROGRAM, THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUND LAUNCH VEHICLE, THE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE AND THE SATELLITE, AND THE ORBIT.
CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 STATE 311484

A. WHAT IS THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM? WHO ARE THE PRINCIPALS IN THE ORGANIZATION? WHAT IS THE BUDGET? WHAT IS THE CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY? WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF THE ISRAELI SPACE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PROGRAM? ARE THERE PLANS TO LAUNCH GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES? WHY WOULD ISRAEL NEED A COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE, AS THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN CALLED? WHAT IS THE SCHEDULE FOR OTHER LAUNCHES? WHAT IS THE ORDER OF SUBSEQUENT TYPES OF PAYLOADS? HAS THE ISRAELI SPACE AGENCY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH NASA; DOES IT ANTICIPATE COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS? WHAT KIND OF EARTH RESOURCES SATELLITES DOES ISRAEL PLAN TO DEVELOP? DOES ISRAEL PLAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE GLOBAL WEATHER SATELLITE NETWORK?

B. WHAT IS THE DESIGNATION OF THE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE (SLV)? WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF STAGES? WAS ONE AN ORBITAL-INSERTION BOOSTER? WHAT ARE THE MEASUREMENTS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF ALL THE PARTS? WHAT IS THE WEIGHT OF THE ENTIRE SLV AND PAYLOAD? WHAT ARE THE WEIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL STAGES? WHAT WAS THE PROPELLANT OF EACH STAGE? WHAT WAS THE PROPELLANT LOADING AND BINDER FOR EACH STAGE? WHAT WAS THE SPECIFIC IMPULSE OF THE PROPELLANT? WHAT SIGNALS WERE USED TO ACTIVATE EACH STAGE? WHAT IS THE MATERIAL OF THE ROCKET MOTOR CASING? WHERE IS THE ROCKET PRODUCED? WAS THE BOOSTER FIRED TO DEPLETION?

C. WHAT WAS THE GROUND LAUNCH VEHICLE? WHAT KIND OF MOBILITY DOES IT PROVIDE? WHAT OTHER SUPPORT VEHICLES ARE REQUIRED?

D. WHAT WAS THE GUIDANCE PACKAGE? WHERE WAS IT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STATE 311484

DEVELOPED? WHAT IS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 58KG "POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM"? WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE 32KG "INSTRUMENTATION" PACKAGE? WAS ANY FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY INCLUDED IN THE SATELLITE? IS THE SATELLITE SPIN STABILIZED; IF SO, AT WHAT SPIN RATE? DID THE PAYLOAD MONITOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLE?

E. WHAT WAS THE LAUNCH TIME (TO THE SECOND)? WHAT WAS THE LENGTH OF BURN TIME OF EACH STAGE? WHAT WAS THE THRUST OF EACH STAGE? WILL THERE BE LAUNCH NOTIFICATION OF FUTURE LAUNCHES (TO ALLOW US TO CLEAR OUR AIRCRAFT)? HOW DO THE ISRAELIS TRACK THE LAUNCH AND ORBIT? DO THEY HAVE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN TRACKING? IS THE SATELLITE ORBITING STABLY NOW? WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE ORBIT CHOSEN: ONLY POSSIBLE? HIGHEST POSSIBLE? BEST FOR GROUND ACCESSIBILITY?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. PLEASE DIRECT ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THESE QUESTIONS
TO INR/SFA FOR RUSH HOLT. SHULTZ

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

(E81)

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

DOC_NBR= 88DAMASC05478

FILM= D880845-0241

DATE= 21 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= DAMASCUS

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

TEL AVIV

MOSCOW

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= SYRIAN EDITORIAL AND CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI - SATELLITE AND MISSILE

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SATELLITE, MISSILE, NEWSPAPER, REPORT, MILITARY COOPERATION, INF

TAGS= PREL, MARR, SY, IS, UR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	TS authority
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>
[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 DAMASC 05478 211456Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 NASA-01 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 CIP-08 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 OES-09
ACDA-12 SCSC-01 USIE-00 SP-02 DOEE-00 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 SARN-01 SART-01 P-02 T-01 /087 W
-----022416 211500Z /45

O 211454Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6654
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

[REDACTED] DAMASCUS 05478

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, SY, IS, UR
SUBJECT: SYRIAN EDITORIAL AND CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI
- SATELLITE AND MISSILE

1. [REDACTED]
2. SYRIAN PRESS HAS CARRIED THE EXPECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING U.S.-ISRAEL COOPERATION IN LAUNCHING A "SPY SATELLITE," SEPTEMBER 19. HOWEVER, A SEPTEMBER 21 QUASI-EDITORIAL IN "AL-BA'TH" TOOK THE ISSUE BEYOND ARAB-ISRAELI CONCERNS BY SUGGESTING THAT THE LAUNCH MISSILE IS A U.S. ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENTS ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE DRAWDOWNS.
3. ON BOTH SEPTEMBER 20 AND 21, SYRIAN PRESS CARRIED REPORTS OF THE SEPTEMBER 19 ISRAELI LAUNCH OF A SATELLITE. REPORTS LINKED THE SATELLITE WITH U.S.-ISRAELI COOPERATION, MENTIONING IN PARTICULAR COOPERATION IN THE STAR WARS PROGRAM. MOST REPORTS FOCUSED ON THE THREAT POSED TO THE ARAB HOMELAND BY AN ISRAELI

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 DAMASC 05478 211456Z

SPY SATELLITE. A FEATURE ARTICLE OF SOME SIX COLUMNS IN "TISHRIN" ON THE 21ST SAID THE U.S. SPOKESMAN HAD TRIED TO HIDE US INVOLVEMENT IN THE LAUNCH. THE ARTICLE WENT ON TO SPECULATE ON ITS MILITARY USE.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. A QUASI-EDITORIAL IN "AL-BATH" SEPTEMBER 21, MADE THE EXPECTED ACCUSATIONS THAT THE LAUNCH DEMONSTRATED ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS FACTORS OF CURRENT STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. THE PEN-ULTIMATE PARAGRAPH SWITCHED GEARS, HOWEVER, HIGH LIGHTING THE DANGER OF THE MISSILE TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD. A ROUGH TRANSLATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN QUOTE: "ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, THE SATELLITE IS AN AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO COMPENSATE FOR ITS AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS TO DESTROY MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. IT PROVIDES, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL IN THE STAR WARS PROGRAM, AND SEVERAL MONTHS AFTER THE EXPERIMENT WITH WHAT IS CALLED THE ARIHA (?) MISSILE, A MISSILE CLEARLY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURE AND GOALS." END QUOTE.

5. COMMENT: DATT WAS VISITED BY SOVIET COUNTERPART SEPTEMBER 21 ON WHAT HE CALLED AN "URGENT MATTER" WHICH WAS, IN FACT, SUBJECT OF PARA 4. DATT WILL REPORT SEPTEL.

DJEREJIAN

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

R (EB)

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE308219

FILM= D880842-0451

DATE= 21 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= NEA/IAI:MSCOBEY

OFFICE= ORIGIN NEA

TO= TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY: ISRAEL'S SATELLITE LAUNCH -

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRIME MINISTER, CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE, TEXT, SATELLITE, TECHNICAL SPACE PROGRAM, COMMITMENT, PEACE

TAGS= TSPA, IS, US, (SHULTZ, GEORGE P)

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	W; FPC/CDR	Date. FEB 12
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority to:
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 308219
ORIGIN NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00
OES-09 /033 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI:MSCOBEY
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
NEA:RWMURPHY OES:RJSMITH INR:RCLARKE
NEA:ESWALKER S:LJOHNSON
NEA/IAI:JLHIRSCH S/S:MMLEVITSKY
PM/ISP:CDUELFER S/S-ODDTROTTER

-----367112 210315Z /72
O 210308Z SEP 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 308219

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: TSPA, IS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY: ISRAEL'S SATELLITE
LAUNCH

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, FOREIGN MINISTER PERES,
AND DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN.

2. BEGIN TEXT: CONGRATULATIONS ON ISRAEL'S SUCCESSFUL
SATELLITE LAUNCH. THIS IMPRESSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVE-
MENT REFLECTS YOUR NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO SCIENTIFIC
EXCELLENCE. ISRAEL'S SPACE PROGRAM WILL CONTRIBUTE NOT
ONLY TO SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES BUT ALSO TO THE GREAT GOAL
OF PEACE ON THE PLANET EARTH. END TEXT.
SHULTZ

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 308219

EO

JR

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88CAIRO22567

FILM= D880845-0185

DATE= 21 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= CAIRO

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
COM

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 21, 1988 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= REVIEW, NEWSPAPER, ECONOMIC REFORM, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,
SATELLITE, ANNIVERSARY, CAMP DAVID

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US, IMF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR Cases Only: _____ Date: _____

EO Citations _____

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

CLASSIFY as S or S or S or

DOWNGRADE TS to S or S or

TS authority for _____

9304029

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22567 01 OF 04 211438Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----021551 211440Z /38

O 211430Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0064
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9763
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 22567

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 21, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22567 01 OF 04 211438Z

-
THIS REVIEW COVERS THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS
(GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED; AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION)

AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEEKLIES). BOTH CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-60,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD), BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

- MUBARAK SAYS IMF PRESCRIPTIONS SHOULD NOT "KILL" THE POOR CITIZEN, AND CALLS UPON THE IMF TO CHANGE ITS POLICY AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF LOW-INCOME EARNERS.
- ARAFAT STILL EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN CAIRO TODAY.
- EDITORIALISTS WARN AGAINST ISRAEL'S LAUNCHING OF A SATELLITE.
- MINISTER OF AWQAF TO HOLD WEEKLY MEETINGS AT THE ADAM MOSQUE IN AIN SHAMS, THE SITE OF LAST MONTH'S CLASHES.
- OPPOSITION AL-AHALI ATTACKS THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT ON ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 22567 01 OF 04 211438Z

ESTABLISHMENT PRESS: INTERNATIONAL NEWS

1. STATEMENTS BY MUBARAK. THE LEAD ITEM IN ALL PAPERS REPORTS MUBARAK'S STATEMENTS AFTER HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE DIAMOND JUBILEE OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE. IN HIS STATEMENTS, MUBARAK SAID THAT HIS EUROPEAN TOUR, TO START SEPTEMBER 22 WITH A VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA, WOULD CONCENTRATE ON VARIOUS ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN EGYPT, BILATERAL COOPERATION, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE GULF WAR. WHEN ASKED IF HE WOULD VISIT THE US, MUBARAK SAID "THE US IS BUSY WITH THE ELECTIONS ... AND WE ARE FOLLOWING THEM TOO TO BENEFIT FROM THEM."

MUBARAK STATED THAT THE REFORM POLICY DEMANDED BY THE IMF MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF THE POOR CITIZEN AND NOT "KILL" HIM, AND THAT IS WHY SUBSIDIES COULD NOT BE ABOLISHED AT ONE GO ... "BUT THE FUND DOES NOT WANT TO UNDERSTAND THIS." MUBARAK POINTED OUT THAT THE ECONOMIC REFORM COURSE WOULD NEED BETWEEN TEN AND TWENTY YEARS AND WOULD BE SET ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN CIRCUMSTANCES. ON THE SCHOOL YEAR BONUS USUALLY PAID TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, MUBARAK SAID THE STATE COULD NOT PROVIDE IT THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT, ADDING THAT SUCH A BONUS WOULD HAVE LED TO MORE PRICE INCREASES. MUBARAK CALLED UPON THE MASSES TO CONFRONT GREEDY MERCHANTS FIRMLY. MUBARAK ALSO CALLED UPON THE YOUTH TO ABANDON GOVERNMENT JOBS AND THINK ABOUT OTHER FIELDS.

IN A RELATED STATEMENT, AHRAM QUOTES THE HEAD OF THE SEEDS SECTOR AT THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AS EXPRESSING THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22567 02 OF 04 211439Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----021613 211441Z /38

O 211430Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0065
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9764
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 CAIRO 22567

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 21, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22567 02 OF 04 211439Z

BELIEF THAT EGYPT WILL ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN WHEAT
WITHIN FIVE YEARS.

2. ARAFAT TO ARRIVE WITHIN HOURS. PAPERS REPORT THAT
ARAFAT WILL ARRIVE IN CAIRO WITHIN HOURS TODAY TO HOLD
TALKS WITH MUBARAK ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
PALESTINIAN ISSUE. FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID WILL
RECEIVE ARAFAT AT THE AIRPORT.

3. EGYPT/ISRAEL. AHAM REPORTS SHAMIR ANNOUNCED THAT THE
VERDICT ON TABA WOULD NOT BY ANY MEANS AFFECT THE FUTURE
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. SEPARATELY, AKHBAR
REPORTS ABDEL MEGUID CONFERRED WITH THE EGYPTIAN
AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV ON THE CONDITIONS IN ISRAEL.

AHAM'S DAILY COLUMNIST AHMAD BAHA' EL-DIN CALLS UPON THE
ARABS TO ORGANIZE A PRESS CAMPAIGN BEFORE AND AFTER THE
ISRAELI ELECTIONS TO UNMASK THE ISRAELI REPRESSION CARRIED
OUT AGAINST THE UPRISING. BAHA' EL-DIN ALSO CALLS UPON
THE PLO TO ORGANIZE A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB CAMPAIGN TO

ESCALATE WORLD PRESSURE ON THE US AND CONFRONT IT WITH THE FACT THAT IT IS ACTUALLY THE STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE WAY OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

AKHBAR'S DAILY COLUMNIST ABDEL MONEIM MURAD CALLS UPON THE ARAB COUNTRIES NOT TO MAKE LIGHT OF THE LAUNCHING OF AN ISRAELI "RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE" TO SPY ON THEM AND TO KEEP CLOSE TRACK OF THIS EVENT. AKHBAR'S DAILY COLUMNIST ABDEL SALAM DAWOUD ADDS THAT HIGH TECHNOLOGY WILL ONLY DRAIN ISRAELI RESOURCES AND WILL NEVER HELP ISRAEL HUMBLE THE ARAB NATION, SUBDUE THE PALESTINIANS, OR ESTABLISH AN EMPIRE FROM THE NILE TO THE EUPHRATES. (SEE OPPOSITION UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 22567 02 OF 04 211439Z

COMMENT)

4. EGYPT/UAE. AHAM REPORTS THAT THE ABU DHABI DEVELOPMENT FUND'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT WILL INCLUDE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TOURIST COMPANY CAPITALIZED AT LE 100 MILLION (90 PERCENT UAE, 10 PERCENT EGYPT) TO BUILD 3 INTERNATIONAL TOURIST VILLAGES AND PARTICIPATE IN FLOATING HOTELS. IN ADDITION, A FINAL AGREEMENT ON LAND RECLAMATION WILL BE SIGNED.

DOMESTIC NEWS

5. RELIGIOUS MEETINGS. AHAM REPORTS THAT THE MINISTER OF AWQAF WILL HOLD A SEMINAR EVERY TUESDAY AT THE ADAM MOSQUE IN AIN SHAMS, THE SITE OF POLICE/ISLAMIC GAM'AAT CLASHES LAST MONTH. THE MINISTER WILL CONDUCT

A DIALOGUE WITH THE YOUTH OF AIN SHAMS ON SOUND ISLAMIC CONCEPTS AND TEACHINGS. THE MINISTER NOTED THAT THE HIGHER COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC AFFAIRS WILL PUBLISH A NUMBER OF BOOKS AT COST TO PROTECT THE YOUTH FROM MISLEADING IDEOLOGIES.

6. APPOINTMENT OF GRADUATES. ALL PAPERS REPORT THAT 35,000 GRADUATES WILL APPOINTED TO GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR JOBS AS OF OCTOBER 1.

7. SYMPOSIUM ON INVESTMENT IN EGYPT. AHAM REPORTS A SYMPOSIUM IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN EARLY NOVEMBER ON THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22567 03 OF 04 211440Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W

-----021661 211443Z /38

O 211430Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0066
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9765
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 CAIRO 22567

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO

LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US

SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 21, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22567 03 OF 04 211440Z

PROMOTION OF EGYPTIAN EXPORTS AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT IN EGYPT. THE SYMPOSIUM WILL BE ORGANIZED IN AUSTRIA.

8. EGYPTIAN PHARACEUTICALS SAFE. ALL PAPERS QUOTE THE MINISTER OF HEALTH AS DENYING RUMORS ABOUT THE CONTAMINATION OF EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICINES. THE MINISTER ALSO DENIED REPORTS IN THE OPPOSITION PRESS THAT SOME INJECTIONS WERE CONTAMINATED WITH AIDS.

9. TV NEWS SEPTEMBER 20: MUBARAK PARTICIPATES IN THE CELEBRATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE; EGYPT-UAE TALKS IN CAIRO; CONFERENCE OF THE COUNCIL FOR AFRICAN MINISTERS OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION HELD IN CAIRO AND ATTENDED BY 12 AFRICAN COUNTRIES; THE END OF A SEMINAR ON THE GULF WAR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF AL-MINYA; THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER AFFIRMED THAT ARAFAT HAD RECOGNIZED THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL; THE SITUATION IN LEBANON; THE SHURA COUNCIL SPEAKER OPENS A SCHOOL IN THE GOVERNORATE OF SHARQIYYA.

10. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FOR SEPTEMBER 21: USD 1 EQUALS PT 231.0 (BUYING) AND PT 231.6 (SELLING).

OPPOSITION NEWS

11. CAMP DAVID TENTH ANNIVERSARY. AN UNSIGNED AL-AHALI EDITORIAL EXPRESSES REJECTION OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AND WRITES THAT PEACE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE ARMAMENT RACE IS STILL GOING ON BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 22567 03 OF 04 211440Z

MOREOVER, ISRAELI HOOLIGANISM HAS INCREASED, NO SOLUTION HAS BEEN REACHED TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AND THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY HAS DETERIORATED AT A TIME WHEN ISRAEL BENEFITS FROM EGYPTIAN PETROLEUM AND ENHANCES ITS MILITARY SUPERIORITY AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE LAUNCHING OF AN ESPIONAGE SATELLITE. AL-AHALI ARGUES THAT THE BUDGET ALLOCATED FOR DEFENSE HAS NEVER BEEN CHANNELLED TO DEVELOPMENT AS SADAT SAID WOULD OCCUR BECAUSE NO WISE MAN WOULD DARE DO THIS WHILE ISRAEL POSES A DANGER TO EGYPT AND WHILE SINAI IS PARTLY A DEMILITARIZED ZONE, FULL OF FOREIGN FORCES (I.E. THE MFO) THAT ARE ACTUALLY THERE TO PROTECT ISRAELI SECURITY. AL-AHALI CONCLUDES BY CALLING FOR ABOLISHING THE PALESTINIAN PART OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AND FREEZING NORMALIZATION AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD CANCELLING THE TREATY.

ON THE LAUNCHING OF AN ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE, AL-AHALI QUOTES FORMER WAR MINISTER MUHAMMAD FAWZY AS SAYING THAT IT HAS BECOME A NECESSITY TO LAUNCH AN ARAB MILITARY SATELLITE BECAUSE THE ISRAELI ONE WOULD UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL, ESPECIALLY AFTER MONITORING ALL THE MOVES OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY.

ON THE SAME ISSUE, AL-WAFD'S EDITORIALIST GAMAL BADAWY WRITES THAT FROM NOW ON ISRAEL WILL KNOW EVERY LITTLE THING ABOUT THE ARAB COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY EGYPT. ISRAEL WILL HAVE NO MORE NEED FOR THE PICTURES OF US SATELLITES; ISRAEL WANTS ITS DECISION TO BE INDEPENDENT FROM THE SUPERPOWERS SO THAT THESE COUNTRIES MAY NOT STAND IN ITS WAY ONE DAY WHEN IT DECIDES TO LAUNCH A WAR AND ANNIHILATE THE ARABS. CONCLUDING, THE EDITORIALIST CALLS UPON THE ARABS TO "WAKE UP."

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22567 04 OF 04 211440Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----021724 211444Z /38

O 211430Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0067
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9766
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 CAIRO 22567

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 21, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22567 04 OF 04 211440Z

12. "EGYPT' REVOLUTION." AL-AHALI REPORTS THAT UNDER THE
MOTTO "THE DEFENSE OF EGYPT'S REVOLUTION IS A DEFENSE OF
NATIONAL DIGNITY", THE NASSERISTS WILL ORGANIZE A
POLITICAL RALLY IN COMMEMORATION OF NASSER AT THE BAR

ASSOCIATION SEPTEMBER 29.

13. BREAD. AL-AHALI RUNS AN INTERVIEW WITH MANY PEOPLE ON THE NEW "TABAQI" FIVE PIASTER BREAD, IN WHICH THEY SAID THAT THIS STEP ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT IS MAINLY AIMED AT ABOLISHING SUBSIDIES ON BREAD AND NOT IMPROVING ITS QUALITY AS CLAIMED. LOW-INCOME EARNERS INTERVIEWED SAID THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO BUY THE NEW BREAD, AND CALLED FOR IMPOSING CONTROL OVER BAKERIES TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE CURRENT TWO PIASTER BREAD INSTEAD OF PRODUCING A NEW "TABAQI" TYPE FOR FIVE PIASTERS.

14. FOREIGN EXCHANGE. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 20 REPORTS THAT THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHORTAGE DURING THE PAST 8 MONTHS REACHED ALMOST USD 500 MILLIONS. ECONOMIC SOURCES INDICATE THAT THE SHORTAGE WILL CONTINUE IN THE NEXT MONTHS DUE TO LOW INTERNATIONAL PRICES OF PETROLEUM AND BASIC EXPORTS.
WISNER

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

E18

R

SUBJECT= ISRAEL LAUNCHES FIRST SATELLITE

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SATELLITE, SPACE PROGRAM, GUIDANCE, MILITARY CAPABILITY

TAGS= KSCA, TSPA, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PINR, IS

<<<<>>>>
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 13566 201026Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 NASA-02 SSO-00 L-03 PM-10 INRE-00 OES-09
ACDA-12 DOEE-00 T-01 /051 W
-----317475 201033Z /20

O 201020Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0847

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 13566

DEPT FOR NEA/IAI, OES/SCT, OES/SAT

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KSCA, IS, TSPA, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PINR
SUBJECT: ISRAEL LAUNCHES FIRST SATELLITE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		S/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		
FOIA Exemptions		TS authority:	
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304629

1. SCIATT HAS ARRANGED A MEETING ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23 WITH PROFESSOR YUVAL NEEMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE ISRAEL SPACE AGENCY TO DISCUSS ISRAEL'S SEPTEMBER 19 SATELLITE LAUNCH.
2. SEPTTEL LISTS PRINCIPAL ITEMS THAT SCIATT EXPECTS TO RAISE AT THE MEETING AND REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS.
3. PRESS EXCERPTS PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE SATELLITE:

QUOTE:

"OFFEQ-1" WAS LAUNCHED WESTWARDS OVER THE MEDITERRANEAN INTO A LOW, ELLIPTICAL ORBIT WITH ITS PERIGREE (POINT AT WHICH IT IS CLOSEST TO EARTH) AT 250 KMS OVER THE MIDDLE EAST AND ITS HIGH POINT AT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 13566 201026Z

1,000 KMS. THE SATELLITE ORBITS EAST TO WEST EVERY 90 MINUTES REPEATING THE FLIGHT PATH EVERY 7 REVOLUTIONS OF THE GLOBE. THE SATELLITE ROTATES ON ITS AXIS ONCE EVERY SECOND ENSURING INERTIAL STABILITY SO THAT THE BODY-MOUNTED SOLAR PANELS FACE THE SUN IN ORDER TO GENERATE ELECTRICITY REQUIRED BY ITS SYSTEM. OFFEQ-1 WILL HAVE A LIFE-SPAN OF ABOUT ONE MONTH AND WILL BURN UP AS IT RE-ENTERS THE ATMOSPHERE.

THE LAUNCH VEHICLE WAS A "SHAVIT" THREE-STAGE ROCKET. THE FIRST STAGES CRASHED INTO THE SEA.

ACCORDING TO FOREIGN SOURCES, THE SHAVIT IS BASED ON THE JERICHO-III SOLID-FUEL ROCKET, DEVELOPED BY RAFAEL, THE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.

THE DECLARED PURPOSE OF THE LAUNCH, ACCORDING TO IAI, IS TO "DEMONSTRATE A CAPABILITY TO ORBIT A SATELLITE AND TO CHECK THE FUNCTIONAL ABILITY OF ITS SUBSYSTEMS IN A SPACE ENVIRONMENT." THIS, THE COMPANY SAID, ENTAILED COLLECTING DATA ON SPACE ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS AND THE EARTH'S MAGNETIC FIELD, GENERATING SOLAR POWER, AND TESTING THE QUALITY OF TRANSMISSION FROM SPACE AND ITS ABILITY TO WITHSTAND VACUUM AND WEIGHTLESS CONDITIONS.

MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY GIDEON PATT SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE OFFEQ IS THE ONLY SATELLITE IN THE WORLD TO BE LAUNCHED WESTWARDS. THE REASON IS TO AVOID HEAVILY-POPULATED AREAS, IN CASE OF FAILURE.

ACCORDING TO IAI OFFICIALS, ABOUT 190 MILLION UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 TEL AV 13566 201026Z

DOLLARS HAVE BEEN INVESTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SATELLITE SINCE THE 1960S, WITH THE LAUNCH OF THE SHAVIT-II. THE PACE OF SPENDING, HOWEVER, THEY SAID, HAS PICKED UP IN RECENT YEARS, WITH ANNUAL INVESTMENTS ON THE ORDER OF 30 MILLION DOLLARS..

- OFFEQ-1
- SPECIFICATIONS

- SHAPE OCTAGONAL
- HEIGHT 2.3 METERS
- LOWER BASE DIAMETER 1.2 METERS
- UPPER BASE DIAMETER 0.7 METERS
- WEIGHT 156 KG
- PAYLOAD 3 KG
- SOLAR POWER SUPPLIED 246 WATTS
- AVERAGE POWER CONSUMPTION 53 WATTS
- VOLTAGE, UNREGULATED 25-42 VOLTS
- COMMUNICATION S BAND
- TELEMETRY RATE 2.5 KBITS/SECOND
- ON-BOARD MEMORY 128 KBYTES

UNQUOTE

HUGHES

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

E19

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV13594

FILM= D880840-0269

DATE= 20 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION OES

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= MEETING WITH CHIEF OF ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 13550, 88 TEL AVIV 13566

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SPACE PROGRAM, MEETING, MONITORING, TECHNOLOGY

TAGS= KSCA, TSPA, MCAF, MNUC, MOPS, PINR, IS

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY

EXCISE DECLASSIFY

DENY IN PART

DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

S/PPC/CDR _____

M/Cases Only _____

EO Citations _____

Date: FEB 12 1988

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority to:

DOWNGRADE TS to S or B or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 13594 201410Z
ACTION OES-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 NASA-01 SSO-00 L-03 PM-10 INRE-00
ACDA-12 DOEE-00 T-01 /052 W
-----331011 201414Z /40

O 201358Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0861

[REDACTED] TEL AVIV 13594

DEPT FOR OES/SAT, PM, INR, AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: KSCA, TSPA, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PINR, IS
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CHIEF OF ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 13550, (B) TEL AVIV 13566

1. [REDACTED]

2. AS NOTED REFTEL B, EMBOFF WILL MEET WITH DIRECTOR OF THE ISRAELI SPACE PROGRAM, PROF. YUVAL NE'EMAN, ON FRIDAY, SEPT. 23 TO DISCUSS THE LAUNCH OF THE "OFFEQ (HORIZON) 1" SATELLITE. WITH THE VIRTUAL SHUTDOWN OF ISRAEL FOR THE YOM KIPPUR HOLIDAY, THIS WAS EARLIEST NE'EMAN COULD MEET WITH US. WE HAVE FORMULATED A LIST OF RELATIVELY TECHNICAL QUESTIONS (OUTLINED BELOW) THAT WE WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPLORE WITH HIM. THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEW SPENT TWO YEARS IN INR/SFA MONITORING SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS AND IS FAMILIAR WITH THE TECHNOLOGY. WE WOULD WELCOME ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS FROM WASHINGTON BY CABLE OR PHONE.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 13594 201410Z

3. THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALREADY PUBLICIZED NUMEROUS TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF THE SATELLITE (REF B). A PHOTOGRAPH PUBLISHED IN THE JERUSALEM POST, REPORTEDLY PROVIDED BY IAI, SHOWS A SPACECRAFT SHAPED MUCH LIKE THE GRILL OF AN AUTOMOBILE. IT IS RELATIVELY FLAT WITH A MILD OBLIQUE ANGLE (ABOUT 200 DEGREES) TO ITS FACE. SOLAR PANELS ARE ARRANGED IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TWO HORIZONTAL ROWS OF TEN, WITH FIVE PANELS ON EACH SIDE OF THE APEX ON EACH ROW. EACH PANEL CONSISTS OF A GRID OF INDIVIDUAL COLLECTORS IN APPROXIMATELY 7 COLUMNS OF 20 COLLECTORS -- 140 COLLECTORS PER PANEL. ALONG THE PERIMETER OF THE "GRILL" IS A SINGLE ROW OF COLLECTORS (NOT SOLAR) WHICH ARE NOT IDENTIFIED. ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE SPACECRAFT IS VISIBLE, SHOWING ABOUT 20 OF THESE COLLECTORS.

4. SOME REPORTS INDICATE THAT A TWO-STAGE LAUNCH VEHICLE WAS USED; OTHERS SAY A THREE-STAGE SOLID-FUELED ROCKET (DESCRIBED AS A "JERICHO THREE"). WE WILL ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THIS AND, IF POSSIBLE, ASCERTAIN THE TYPE OF PROPELLANT USED. IF THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DETERMINED, PLEASE LET US KNOW. JUDGING FROM A STATEMENT FROM THE ISA, WE BELIEVE THE ORBITAL INCLINATION IS 36 DEGREES. WE PRESUME THIS DATA IS AVAILABLE TO YOU.

5. ONE REPORT INDICATES THE PAYLOAD WAS 3 KILOGRAMS. THE ISRAELI DATA GIVES THE "WEIGHT" AS 156 KG. WE EXPECT THE LARGER FIGURE INCLUDES THE WEIGHT OF THE STAGE USED FOR ORBITAL INSERTION, NOT THE PAYLOAD. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THIS.

6. WE EXPECT THE ISRAELIS TO BECOME INCREASINGLY

████████████████████
████████████████████
PAGE 03 TEL AV 13594 201410Z

CLOSE-MOUTHED AS THE EUPHORIA SURROUNDING THE LAUNCH WEARS OFF. THEREFORE WE DON'T WANT TO USE OUR MEETING TO DELVE INTO AREAS ALREADY WELL-UNDERSTOOD BY WASHINGTON. PLEASE SHARE WHATEVER DATA YOU ALREADY HAVE WITH US SO THAT WE DO NOT WEAR OUT OUR WELCOME ON QUESTIONS THAT ARE ALREADY ANSWERED.

HUGHES

UNCLASSIFIED

E77

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88KUWAIT05444

FILM= D880837-0565

DATE= 20 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= KUWAIT

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= ISRAELI SATELLITE MAKES "REVOLUTIONARY" - EVERY 99 MINUTES, DAILY SA

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SATELLITE, NEWSPAPER, REPORT, ARABS, ELECTION, GOVERNMENT REFC

TAGS= PREL, IS, LE, KU

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to:
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

FEB 12 1997

[Handwritten signature]

9364629

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 KUWAIT 05444 201055Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 H-01 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 L-03 PM-10 CIP-08 PA-02 INRE-00 USIE-00
SP-02 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 /044 W
-----321424 201115Z /21

R 201053Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3599
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
CJTFME
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC

UNCLAS KUWAIT 05444

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, KU
SUBJECT: ISRAELI SATELLITE MAKES "REVOLUTIONARY"
- EVERY 99 MINUTES, DAILY SAYS

1. IN A SERENDIPITOUS TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR, AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE KUWAIT DAILY SEPTEMBER 20 QUOTED A U.S. OFFICIAL AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL'S NEW SATELLITE IS "MAKING A REVOLUTIONARY EVERY 98.836 MINUTES". AT THE SAME TIME, THE DAILY AL-WATAN MADE A PARTICULARLY IMAGINATIVE LEAP OF ANALYSIS BY COMPARING ISRAEL'S LAUNCHING OF THE SATELLITE TO WHAT IT TERMED THE U.S. LAUNCHING OF A "SATELLITE MAN" IN LEBANON, AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO WIDESPREAD ARAB PRESS REPORTS OF ALLEGED U.S.-SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT THE CANDIDACY OF DEPUTY MIKHAEL DAHER FOR THE LEBANESE PRESIDENCY.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 KUWAIT 05444 201055Z

2. THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE KUWAIT TIMES, IN AN OTHERWISE STRAIGHTFORWARD WIRE-SERVICE REPORT ON THE ISRAELI SATELLITE LAUNCHING, ATTRIBUTED THE FOLLOWING QUOTE TO U.S. NAVY COMMANDER DUGALD GILLIES, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE SPACE COMMAND AT PETERSON AFB IN COLORADO

SPRINGS: "WE'RE WATCHING IT AND IT IS MAKING A REVOLUTIONARY EVERY 98.836 MINUTES."

3. AL-WATAN SAID: "ISRAEL HAS LAUNCHED ITS FIRST SATELLITE AND AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. HAS LAUNCHED ITS FIRST SATELLITE-MAN IN LEBANON. IF THE DANGER OF THE ISRAELI SATELLITE LIES IN THAT IT WILL ENABLE ISRAEL TO SPY ON THE ARAB COUNTRIES, THEN THE DANGER OF THE FIRST SATELLITE-MAN IN LEBANON LIES IN THAT HE WILL, BY VIRTUE OF HIS POST, BE INFORMED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE SECRETS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES (IF THERE ARE ANY SECRETS)."

4. IN A SARCASTIC REFERENCE TO THE RECENT VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE RICHARD MURPHY TO THE REGION, THE NEWSPAPER SAID THE LEBANESE "SATELLITE-MAN" WILL "PARALYZE THE WILL OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, BECAUSE THE MISSILE WHICH LAUNCHED HIM IS OF THE MURPHY CLASS." THE NEWSPAPER ADDED THAT "THE LAUNCHING OF THE FIRST LEBANESE SATELLITE-MAN IS FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE LAUNCHING OF THE ISRAELI SATELLITE, FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT IT IGNORES THE ROLE OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE IN SELECTING THE PRESIDENT OF THEIR REPUBLIC."

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HOWELL

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R ER

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV13550

FILM= D880834-0743

DATE= 19 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION OES

TO= STATE
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAEL LAUNCHES FIRST SATELLITE DEPT ALSO FOR OES/SAT

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= SATELLITE, SPACE PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENT, TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH,
POLITICAL INITIATIVE

TAGS= PREL, TSPA, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PINR, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IN/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	[] Cases Only	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EQ. Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		
FOIA Exemptions _____		[] CLASSIFY as [] S or	
PA Exemptions _____		[] DOWNGRADE TS to [] S or	

Uy

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

██████████
PAGE 01 TEL AV 13550 01 OF 02 191723Z
ACTION OES-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
EB-00 DINT-05 DODE-00 H-01 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSF-01
ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 NASA-01 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 EAP-00 CIP-08 ITC-01 AIT-02 PA-01
NAS-01 OMB-01 STR-17 HHS-04 INRE-00 AGRE-00 ACDA-12
TST-02 USIE-00 SP-02 DOEE-00 SNP-01 FAIM-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /113W
-----255456 191748Z/40

O 191715Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0837
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO, IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

██████████ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 13550

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, TSPA, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PINR, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL LAUNCHES FIRST SATELLITE

DEPT ALSO FOR OES/SAT

1. ██████████
2. SUMMARY: THE MFA CALLED US AT 1300 LOCAL TIME TO ANNOUNCE THAT ISRAEL HAD LAUNCHED A SATELLITE DESIGNED TO COLLECT DATA ON SPACE ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS AND THE EARTH'S MAGNETIC FIELD. ALTHOUGH TOP ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE ALREADY DOWNPLAYED THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAUNCH, THIS DEMONSTRATION OF ISRAELI TECHNOLOGICAL PROWESS IS CERTAIN TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT ISRAEL'S LONG-RANGE
██████████
██████████

PAGE 02 TEL AV 13550 01 OF 02 191723Z

BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY. END SUMMARY.

3. AT 1300 LOCAL TIME, THE MFA CALLED TO INFORM US, PRIOR TO RELEASE OF THE STORY TO THE MEDIA, THAT ISRAEL HAD LAUNCHED A SATELLITE INTO EARTH ORBIT. HE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

QUOTE

OFFEQ-I, AN EXPERIMENTAL SATELLITE, WAS SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED TODAY BY ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES (IAI) AND THE ISRAELI SPACE AGENCY (ISA). OFFEQ-I WAS PLACED IN ORBIT BY A SHAVIT SATELLITE LAUNCHER FROM ISRAEL. TODAY'S LAUNCH IS DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE A CAPABILITY TO ORBIT A SATELLITE, AND TO CHECK THE FUNCTIONAL ABILITY OF ITS SUB-SYSTEMS IN A SPACE ENVIRONMENT.

SPECIFIC ITEMS ARE: GENERATION OF SOLAR POWER, QUALITY OF TRANSMISSION RECEPTION FROM SPACE, VERY FINE SYSTEMS ABILITY TO WITHSTAND VACUUM AND WEIGHTLESS CONDITIONS. IN ADDITION, OFFEQ-I WILL COLLECT DATA ON SPACE ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS AND THE EARTH'S MAGNETIC FIELD.

OFFEQ-I ORBITS EAST TO WEST EVERY NINETY MINUTES. THE ORBIT IS LOW AND ELLIPTICAL, WITH A PERIGEE OF 250 KILOMETERS. THIS IS THE POINT AT WHICH THE SATELLITE IS CLOSEST TO EARTH.

OFFEQ-I ROTATES ABOUT ITS MAIN AXIS AT THE RATE OF ONE REVOLUTION PER SECOND. THIS CHARACTERISTIC PROVIDES INERTIAL STABILITY, THUS THE SATELLITE'S

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 13550 01 OF 02 191723Z

SOLAR PANELS FACE THE SUN AND SUPPLY THE ELECTRICAL ENERGY REQUIRED BY THE SATELLITE.

OFFEQ-1'S EXPECTED LIFE SPAN IS A FEW WEEKS. A NUMBER OF LEADING ISRAELI HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN A WIDE SPECTRUM OF BASIC RESEARCH SINCE THE EARLY 60'S. THE NATIONAL SPACE RESEARCH PROGRAM IS COORDINATED BY ISA, IAI AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED ISRAELI INDUSTRIES. BY ACCELERATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFEQ-1, ISRAEL'S FIRST SATELLITE, (ISRAEL HAS BEGUN TO ACHIEVE ITS) SPACE RESEARCH GOALS:

A. TO PLACE ISRAEL IN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS ENGAGED IN SPACE RESEARCH FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT.

B. TO ESTABLISH AN IN-DEPTH, NATIONAL CAPABILITY IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE AREA OF SPACE RESEARCH, AN ARENA THAT IS FORECASTED TO DEVELOP IN THE YEARS TO COME.

C. TO DEMONSTRATE THE MATURITY OF SPACE-RELATED EQUIPMENT BUILT BY ISRAELI INDUSTRIES.

MANY ISRAELI HIGH-TECH FIRMS PARTICIPATED IN THE SUCCESSFUL LAUNCH OF OFFEQ-I. THIS EFFORT WAS ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF MBT SYSTEMS IN THE SPACE TECHNOLOGY PLANT OF IAI'S ELECTRONIC DIVISION.

END QUOTE

4. A SUBSEQUENT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT INDICATED THAT THE LAUNCH TOOK PLACE AT 1132 HOURS LOCAL (0932 HOURS ZULU). RESPONDING TO REPORTER'S QUESTIONS, VICE PRIME MINISTER PERES SAID THE LAUNCH IS NOT PART OF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 13550 01 OF 02 191723Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 13550 02 OF 02 191735Z
ACTION OES-09

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
EB-00 DINT-05 DODE-00 H-01 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSF-01
ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 NASA-01 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 EAP-00 CIP-08 ITC-01 AIT-02 PA-01
NAS-01 OMB-01 STR-17 HHS-04 INRE-00 AGRE-00 ACDA-12
TST-02 USIE-00 SP-02 DOEE-00 SNP-01 FAIM-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /113 W

-----256162 191748Z /40

O 191715Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0838
AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO, IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 13550

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, TSPA, MCPAP, MNUC, MOPS, PINR, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL LAUNCHES FIRST SATELLITE

AN ARMS RACE. HE SAID "THE ARABS HAVE ACQUIRED AND
ARE MANUFACTURING MISSILES...THERE IS NO QUESTION
HERE OF A TYPE OF WEAPON, BUT RATHER OF A TYPE OF
TECHNOLOGY." THIS STANCE WAS ENDED BY PRIME
MINISTER SHAMIR WHO SAID THAT THE LAUNCH HAS NO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONNECTION WITH ARMS RACES...IT IS MORE A RACE OVER TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES." SHAMIR DID NOT ATTEND THE LAUNCH. HE URGED THAT THE LAUNCH NOT BEEN SEEN AS A MAJOR POLITICAL EVENT, BUT RATHER ONE OF GREAT TECHNOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE WHICH HAS INCREASED ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 13550 02 OF 02 191735Z

5. THE HEAD OF ISRAEL'S SPACE AGENCY, PROFESSOR YUVAL NE'EMAN, PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS TO REPORTERS: THE ORBIT HAS AN APOGEE OF 1000 KM.; ISRAEL PLANS TO LAUNCH ADDITIONAL PAYLOADS INCLUDING A SCIENTIFIC SATELLITE (WHICH HE DID NOT FURTHER DESCRIBE OTHER THAN TO SAY IT WOULD BE "MORE ADVANCED AND STABLE"). HE SAID ELEVEN PROPOSALS FOR SPACE-BASED EXPERIMENTS ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION AND TWO OR THREE WOULD BE CHOSEN. NE'EMAN ALSO DOWNPLAYED THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAUNCH, SAYING THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR SECURITY OFFICIALS TO DECIDE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE WORK (ON THE SATELLITE AND LAUNCH SYSTEM) HAS A SECURITY POTENTIAL, BUT SAID THE IMPORTANCE, AT THE MOMENT, IS TECHNOLOGICAL.

6. COMMENT: DESPITE THE TOP-LEVEL PROTESTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY, THE LAUNCH HAS MAJOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. BY JOINING THE HANDFUL OF NATIONS CAPABLE OF ORBITING A SATELLITE, ISRAEL HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT IT CAN ALSO LAUNCH A MILITARY PAYLOAD OVER MUCH GREATER DISTANCES THAN HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THOUGHT -- PERHAPS EVEN INTERCONTINENTAL RANGES. THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY INCREASE THE CONCERNS OF PLAYERS WELL OUTSIDE THE REGION ABOUT ISRAEL'S MISSILE AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. END COMMENT.

HUGHES

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EB

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03112

FILM= D880827-0787

DATE= 16 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= THE INTIFADA AFTER NINE MONTHS: WAITING FOR THE PNC

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 1823, 88 JERUSALEM 2367

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= LIBERATION FRONT, PALESTINIANS, PROGRESS REPORT, PEACE,
DEMONSTRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLATION, VIOLENCE

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, US, PLO, PNC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS, FPC, CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MS Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority to:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____			

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[[[
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03112 01 OF 04 161410Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----131656 161444Z /43

O 161407Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3492
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

[[[SECTION 01 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03112

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, PLO, IS, US
SUBJECT: THE INTIFADA AFTER NINE MONTHS:
WAITING FOR THE PNC

REF: A) JERUSALEM 1823, B) JERUSALEM 2367,
C) JERUSALEM 2779

1. [[[

SUMMARY ¶

2. AFTER NINE MONTHS THE INTIFADA HAS BECOME A PART OF LIFE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE UNTIL A POLITICAL PROCESS EMERGES. VIOLENCE HAS REACHED A PLATEAU, DUE TO TOUGH IDF MEASURES, BUT IT WILL CONTINUE, ALONG WITH VARIOUS FORMS OF PEACEFUL PROTEST. PALESTINIANS SEEM ABLE TO ENDURE THE SACRIFICE AND TURMOIL INDEFINITELY. ISRAEL'S "IRON FIST" POLICY HAS FAILED, AND IT HAS BROUGHT A GROSS INCREASE IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. ONLY A PROCESS IN WHICH PALESTINIANS GAIN THE RIGHT TO

[[[
[[[

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03112 01 OF 04 161410Z

EXPRESS THEMSELVES POLITICALLY WILL END THE VIOLENCE; YET ISRAELI POLICY, DRIVEN BY PRE-ELECTION POLITICS, IS DESIGNED TO CRUSH NOT ONLY VIOLENCE, BUT MOST VESTIGES OF PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTIVITY AS WELL. WHILE MOST

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PALESTINIANS HERE ARE READY FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND A TWO STATE SOLUTION. ISRAELIS, FEARFUL AND CONFUSED, STILL LAG IN CONFRONTING PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. THE PLO'S WAFLING STRENGTHENS DEEP DOUBTS ABOUT PALESTINIAN INTENTIONS AND BOLSTERS THE HARDLINE LIKUD, LABOR, STUNNED BY JORDAN'S DISENGAGEMENT, GROPE FOR A WAY TO EXPLOIT BOTH THE PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES. PALESTINIANS, FRUSTRATED BY THE PLO, DESPERATELY HOPE FOR A CONVINCING PEACE INITIATIVE AT THE PNC, BUT MANY ARE SKEPTICAL. SOME ADVOCATE FREE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AS A TRANSITIONAL PHASE TO CREATE LOCAL LEADERS WHO WOULD SUPPORT THE PLO BUT SHIFT THE CENTER OF PALESTINIAN POLITICS FROM THE DIASPORA TO THE TERRITORIES. IF THERE IS NO MOVEMENT TOWARD A POLITICAL PROCESS, THE MODERATE MAINSTREAM CONSENSUS IN THE TERRITORIES COULD ERODE, GIVING WAY TO TERRORISM AND A SPOILER ROLE FOR THE MUSLIM MILITANTS WHO ARE A SIGNIFICANT, THOUGH NOT YET POWERFUL, FORCE. END SUMMARY

INTIFADA: PERMANENT PROTEST

3. IN A RECENT INTERVIEW, DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN SAID THE IDF HAD HALTED MAJOR INTIFADA DEMONSTRATIONS, "PUSHED THE PLATEAU OF VIOLENCE

████████████████████
████████████████████

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03112 01 OF 04 161410Z

DOWN" AND WOULD PUSH IT DOWN MORE. HE CLAIMED THAT MORE FREQUENT USE OF PLASTIC BULLETS AND USD 800 SURETY BONDS FROM FATHERS OF FIRST OFFENDERS, AS WELL AS INCREASED ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION (NOW RUNNING AT 2600) AND "SELECTIVE DEPORTATION" WILL HELP STEM THE INTIFADA. RABIN IS RIGHT THAT MASS DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE STOPPED. BUT THE FACT THAT 29 PALESTINIANS DIED IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE IDF IN AUGUST, VS. 25 IN JULY, SHOWS HOW SERIOUS THE VIOLENCE STILL IS. THE IDF'S NEW TACTIC OF MASSIVE VILLAGE SWEEPS AND ARRESTS MAY REDUCE VIOLENCE, BUT STONE THROWING AGAINST THE IDF, A PRIMARY SYMBOL OF THE INTIFADA, CONTINUES. STONING OF VEHICLES, AN INCREASING PRACTICE WHICH HAS CAUSED AN ANGRY UPROAR, ESPECIALLY AMONG SETTLERS, IS VERY DIFFICULT TO HALT. ALSO, MASSIVE DETENTIONS AND DEPORTATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN A DETERRENT. THERE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ARE MANY AREAS, SUCH AS THE CASBAH IN NABLUS, WHERE THE ARMY SELDOM ENTERS AND INTIFADA INSURGENTS ARE IN CONTROL, SINCE THE IDF IS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT MORE FORCES. THE LACK OF JAILS TO HOLD MORE PRISONERS IS ALSO A CONSTRAINT.

4. STRIKES, THE OTHER HIGHLY VISIBLE INTIFADA TACTIC, ALSO CONTINUE AND THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT PUBLIC SUPPORT IS WANING. STRIKES HAVE A HEAVY ECONOMIC COST, BUT CONSTRUCTION AND RETAIL TRADE CONTINUES AT A REDUCED RATE AND SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE FUNDS STILL FLOW INTO THE TERRITORIES, NOTWITHSTANDING ISRAELI LIMITATIONS. (THE GOI CLAIMS GNP IN THE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03112 02 OF 04 161410Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----131674 161414Z /43

O 161407Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3493
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03112

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, PLO, IS, US
SUBJECT: THE INTIFADA AFTER NINE MONTHS:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TERRITORIES HAS DROPPED 29 PERCENT SINCE THE INTIFADA BEGAN.) FACTORY OWNERS AND THE INTIFADA HAVE MADE PEACE, AND MOST CONTINUE TO OPERATE AND PAY TAXES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE NOMINAL INTIFADA TAX BOYCOTT. THE GOI HAS NOT LIMITED IMPORTS INTO THE TERRITORIES. IT HAS IMPOSED SOME LIMITED BANS ON HARVESTING AND SALE OF PRODUCE AS A FORM OF COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT IN CERTAIN AREAS, BUT IT HAS NOT YET USED THIS DRACONIAN TACTIC WIDELY. HOWEVER, OLIVE SEASON IS APPROACHING, AND MANY WEST BANK VILLAGES WILL BE VULNERABLE TO THIS TACTIC. SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY CLOSURES IMPOSE A HEAVY COST TO PALESTINIANS, BUT PROBABLY HELP SUSTAIN RATHER THAN DETER THE INTIFADA.

5. THE CRACKDOWN ON PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED IN SCOPE AND SEVERITY, WITH MUCH TOUGHER CURBS ON MEETINGS, BANNING OF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03112 02 OF 04 161410Z

PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER ASSOCIATIONS AND HEAVIER SURVEILLANCE AND INTERROGATION. THESE STEPS AGAINST PEACEFUL POLITICAL AND COMMUNAL ACTIVITY REFLECT GROWING PRE-ELECTION PRESSURES ON RABIN TO FIND NEW WAYS TO HALT THE INTIFADA. THEY ARE ALSO A REACTION IN PART TO JORDAN'S DISENGAGEMENT AND THE MISCONCEPTION, ABETTED BY BOASTING FROM THE PLO, THAT THIS CREATED A POLITICAL "VACUUM" THAT THE PLO WOULD FILL. IN FACT, JORDAN'S ROLE WAS QUITE LIMITED, AND THE TIES IT DID HAVE WERE WITH INSTITUTIONS THAT WERE LARGELY INDIGENOUS. THE CRACKDOWN IS ALSO AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT AN ALTERNATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE, A GOAL OF THE INTIFADA, FROM EMERGING. THIS GOAL IS STILL MORE THEORY THAN REALITY, BUT ISRAEL UNDERSTANDS THAT ALL COLLECTIVE PALESTINIAN ACTIVITY TENDS TO BUILD INDIGENOUS STRENGTH AND NATIONALISM.

WAR AGAINST ISRAEL BY ANOTHER MEANS OR LEGITIMATE PROTEST?

.....

6. ISRAELI OFFICIALS, OUT OF CONVICTION, OR BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO MEET THE PUBLIC DEMAND TO BE TOUGH ON THE INTIFADA, HAVE AVOIDED ALL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONCILIATORY POLITICAL GESTURES. THERE IS ALMOST NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL OF ANY LEGITIMACY TO PALESTINIAN CLAIMS. ALTHOUGH RABIN HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, HIS POLICIES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO BREAK NOT ONLY THE VIOLENCE, BUT THE POLITICAL CORE OF THE INTIFADA, SAYING ISRAEL

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03112 02 OF 04 161410Z

WILL NEGOTIATE ONLY AFTER IT HAS DEFEATED THE ENEMY. SHAMIR, MORE SIMPLY, DISMISSES THE INTIFADA AS "TERRORISM".

7. ALTHOUGH RABIN ACKNOWLEDGES THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, HE ALSO LIKENS THE INTIFADA TO ALL PREVIOUS WARS BY THE ARABS AGAINST THE STATE OF ISRAEL. IN FACT, ISRAEL IS FACING A CLASSIC POPULAR UPRISING BY A SUBJECT PEOPLE TO END AN OCCUPATION THAT HAS BECOME, LIKE MOST LONG-TERM MILITARY OCCUPATIONS, EXPLOITATIVE, HUMILIATING, AND CORRUPT. IT SHOULD BE NO SUPRISE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND CHANNELS FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL EXPRESSION AND PROTEST, THERE IS VIOLENCE. ALTHOUGH OVERALL PALESTINIAN OBJECTIVES ARE UNCLEAR BECAUSE OF DIVISION AND AMBIVALENCE IN THE PLO, AND THE LACK OF ANY VISIBLE AND RECOGNIZED LEADERSHIP IN THE TERRITORIES, IT IS INCREASINGLY CERTAIN THAT THE MAINSTREAM LEADERSHIP IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, INCLUDING THE UNDERGROUND INTIFADA, ARE READY TO ACCEPT A TWO STATE SOLUTION THAT WOULD ACCOMMODATE ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS. THE INTIFADA THUS HAS A LIMITED OBJECTIVE. IT IS NOT JUST ANOTHER WAR AGAINST ISRAEL, UNLESS ONE ACCEPTS THE ZERO-SUM-GAME THESIS OF THE ISRAELI FAR RIGHT THAT THE PALESTINIANS' IMMUTABLE GOAL IS TO DESTROY ISRAEL, AND THAT ANY COMPROMISE BY PALESTINIANS IS A SMOKE SCREEN AND PART OF THE "POLICY OF PHASES" THAT WILL UNTIMATELY ACHIEVE THIS END.

8. RABIN'S THEORY THAT THERE CAN BE NO

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03112 03 OF 04 161411Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----131724 161414Z /43

O 161407Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3494
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03112

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, PLO, IS, US
SUBJECT: THE INTIFADA AFTER NINE MONTHS:

POLITICAL MOVEMENT UNTIL THE INTIFADA IS BROKEN IS PROBABLY WISHFUL THINKING. PALESTINIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO ABANDON THE INTIFADA UNTIL THEY ARE SURE THERE WILL BE A PROCESS IN WHICH THEY CAN PRESS THEIR POLITICAL GOALS, UNLESS ISRAEL RESORTS TO FAR MORE DRACONIAN MEASURES. THIS IS UNLIKELY, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND SUBSTANTIVE OPINION IN ISRAEL THAT WOULD RESIST SUCH POLICIES AS MASS TRANSFER AND MORE BRUTAL METHODS, WHICH SOME RIGHTISTS ADVOCATE.

HEAVY TOLL ON HUMAN RIGHTS

9. THE SUM OF ISRAEL'S EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS THE INTIFADA IS, NEVERTHELESS, STARTLING IN TERMS OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS IS A SYMPTOM,
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03112 03 OF 04 161411Z

NOT ONLY OF THE MISCONCEPTION THAT ISRAEL IS, INDEED, FIGHTING A WAR FOR SURVIVAL, BUT ISRAELIS' DEEP AMBIVALENCE ABOUT ARABS. ALUF HARAVEN, THE DIRECTOR OF THE VAN LEER INSTITUTE IN JERUSALEM WHICH WORKS FOR ISRAELI-ARAB RECONCILIATION, SUMMED UP THIS CONFUSION, QUOTING THE PRESCRIPTION OF A TEL AVIV TAXI DRIVER FOR DEALING WITH PALESTINIANS AND THE INTIFADA: "WE MUST BEAT THEM AND BEAT THEM AND BEAT THEM UNTIL THEY STOP HATING US."

WAITING FOR ARAFAT

10. PALESTINIANS HERE DESPERATELY HOPE THE NEXT PNC WILL RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AND PRESENT IT AND THE U.S. WITH A COMPELLING CHALLENGE THAT WILL LEAD TO RECOGNITION OF THE PLO. EARLY ENTHUSIASM ABOUT A PLO PEACE INITIATIVE HAS GIVEN WAY, HOWEVER, TO INCREASED SKEPTICISM ABOUT ARAFAT'S LEADERSHIP AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE PFLP AND THE DFLP, AS WELL AS FATAH HARDLINERS LIKE KHADDOUMI, TO COMPROMISE. AS ONE PALESTINIAN SAID, "THE PROBLEM IS NOT ONLY ISRAEL; IT IS TOO MANY ABU'S IN TUNIS."

11. OPINION IS DIVIDED HERE ON THE WISDOM OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, BUT MOST AGREE THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR THE PLO TO CHANGE ITS SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. SOME SEE A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AS A WAY TO GET OVER THE HURDLE OF RECOGNIZING ISRAEL AND SELF DETERMINATION AND TO START A HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S., EVEN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03112 03 OF 04 161411Z

THOUGH THEY KNOW WE WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE IT. OTHERS SEE IT AS A WAY OF ISOLATING SYRIA AND THE ARAB RADICALS BY GAINING RECOGNITION FROM THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. PALESTINIAN SOURCES HERE SAY THE PLO IS NOW DEBATING WHETHER TO PRESERVE THE PLO, AS WELL AS ESTABLISHING A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, OR TO ABOLISH THE PLO. THE ARGUMENTS FOR PRESERVATION ARE THAT TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ABOLISH THE PLO BUREAUCRACY AND ITS VESTED INTERESTS WOULD LEAVE A CADRE OF DISAFFECTED DISSIDENTS; BETTER TO KEEP THEM WELL PAID AND SATISFIED WHILE THE REAL ACTION TAKES PLACE ELSEWHERE. THE OPPOSING ARGUMENT IS THAT IF THE PLO SURVIVES THE CREATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, IT WOULD TRY TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS BY CONTINUING TO STRADDLE ISSUES, AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD THUS LACK CREDIBILITY.

12. FRUSTRATION HERE WITH THE PLO LEADERSHIP IS REAL AND GROWING. A FEW EVEN QUESTION WHETHER ARAFAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES CAN SURVIVE, AS LEADERS, IF THEY DO NOT MEET THE CURRENT TEST. MOST PALESTINIANS HERE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PLO, MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS LEADERS. THEY SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO IT AS THE SYMBOL OF THEIR NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND THEIR LINK TO THE DIASPORA.

AUTONOMY TALK

13. SOME PALESTINIANS, DOUBTFUL THAT THE PLO WILL BE ABLE TO BITE THE BULLET AND CHANGE,

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03112 04 OF 04 161412Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----131756 161418Z /43

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

O 161407Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3495
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 04 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03112

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, PLO, IS, US
SUBJECT: THE INTIFADA AFTER NINE MONTHS:

ADVOCATE LOCAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, THEY SEE THIS AS A CONCRETE WAY TO END THE TURMOIL OF THE INTIFADA AND CREATE A TRANSITIONAL PHASE THAT WOULD LEAD EVENTUALLY TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. THEY ARGUE THAT ELECTIONS (WHICH THE UNDERGROUND INTIFADA LEADERSHIP HAS ENDORSED) WOULD BE A DISCRETE INTERIM STEP THAT BOTH ISRAEL AND THE PLO COULD ACCEPT, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE UNREADY TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES OF TERRITORY AND SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEFUL DIALOGUE IN PLACE OF THE INTIFADA. THE THEORY IS THAT LOCAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, IF FREE, OPEN, AND GUARANTEED BY SOME EXTERNAL MONITORING, WOULD RESTORE POLITICAL LIFE TO THE TERRITORIES AND GIVE A POPULAR MANDATE TO PALESTINIAN LEADERS. ELECTED OFFICIALS WOULD REPLACE THE LOOSE NETWORK OF NOTABLES AND POLITICIANS WHO HAVE NO CLAIM TO LEGITIMACY AND THE UNDERGROUND INTIFADA LEADERSHIP, WHOSE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03112 04 OF 04 161412Z

SPECIALTY IS PROTEST, NOT SERIOUS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT. THE NEW LEADERS WOULD NOT CLAIM TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE PLO, BUT THEY WOULD IDENTIFY WITH IT. BUT EVENTUALLY, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR POPULAR MANDATE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THEIR INFLUENCE WOULD GROW; THE CENTER OF GRAVITY IN PALESTINIAN POLITICS COULD SHIFT FURTHER TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; THIS COULD ULTIMATELY TRANSFORM THE PLO AND BRING IT AND ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE WITH EACH OTHER FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE, POSSIBLY WITH CLOSE TIES TO JORDAN. THE THESIS THAT AN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT COULD NOT FACE TERRITORY AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES COULD AGREE, NEVERTHELESS, TO GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS, WHICH WOULD FEATURE PLO CANDIDATES AND VIEWS, IS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

QUESTIONABLE. STILL, THE CONGRUENCE BETWEEN LOCAL SUPPORT FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AS A TRANSITIONAL PHASE AND THE SHULTZ PLAN IS INTERESTING. THE U.S. WILL WANT TO EXPLORE THIS AS WE CONSIDER OUR NEXT STEPS AFTER ISRAEL'S ELECTION.

FEAR OF EXTREMISTS

14. MODERATE PALESTINIANS WHO PONDER THE FUTURE ARE WORRIED THAT THE PRAGMATIC CONSENSUS THAT HAS GOVERNED THE INTIFADA SO FAR IS FRAGILE AND MIGHT ERODE IF THERE IS NO POLITICAL MOVEMENT TOWARD A SOLUTION. THUS FAR THERE HAS BEEN A GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG ALL THE FACTIONS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP, WHICH DRAFTS THE LEAFLETS AND ORGANIZES STRIKES AND

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03112 04 OF 04 161412Z

OTHER PROTEST ACTIVITIES, TO THESE PRINCIPLES: OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAELIS AS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE; THE LIMITATION OF THE STRUGGLE TO THE TERRITORIES, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF AND QUICKLY-ABANDONED ADVOCACY OF ARSON IN ISRAEL; AND A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE WITH ISRAEL ON A TWO-STATE SOLUTION.

15. THERE IS FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE REALISM AND MODERATION THAT NOW PREVAILS MAY NOT BE PERMANENT. (AN UGLY PHENOMENON THAT IS GROWING AS THE INTIFADA WEARS ON IS THE MURDER OF PALESTINIANS REGARDED AS COLLABORATORS WITH ISRAEL.) GROWING FRUSTRATION WITH THE LACK OF TANGIBLE GAINS BY THE INTIFADA COULD GIVE WAY TO D SPAIR AND THE STRENGTHENING OF EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST ELEMENTS. THESE CADRES, ALTHOUGH A SMALL MINORITY, ARE PROBABLY STILL INTACT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THEIR FOREIGN PATRONS, SYRIA AND LIBYA, HAVE NOT ABANDONED THEIR REJECTIONISM. THE OTHER POSSIBILITY, INCREASINGLY DISCUSSED, IS THAT ISLAMIC MILITANTS, WHO LATELY HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE, AND WHO BY AND LARGE OPPOSE ANY COMPROMISE WITH ISRAEL, COULD SEW GREATER STRIFE AND DISUNITY. THE DOMINANT CENTER OF PALESTINIAN POLITICS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS NOW SECULAR AND PRAGMATIC BUT, AS IN ISRAEL, RADICAL GROUPS TEND TO HAVE NEGATIVE POWER BEYOND THEIR NUMBERS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT A POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH THEY ARE LIKELY
TO GROW STRONGER.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

E65
R

UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STRASB31259

FILM= D880825-0862

DATE= 15 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STRASBOURG

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE

EC COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= ARAFAT VISIT TO STRASBOURG LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REFERENCE= 88 BRUSSELS 12596, 88 STRASBOURG 30728

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= VISIT, SCHEDULE, DISCUSSION, FOREIGN RELATIONS, PALESTINIANS,
NEGOTIATION, PEACE PLAN

TAGS= PREL, PTER, IS, FR, XE, EEC, PLO, (ARAFAT, YASSER)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		TS authority
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[[[
PAGE 01 STRASB 31259 01 OF 03 160131Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03
AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 C-01
PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /071 W
-----077202 160202Z /65 38

R 152310Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3429
INFO EC COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE

[[[SECTION 01 OF 03 STRASBOURG 31259

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE PGARLAND, EUR/WE AND NEA
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR DCM AND CONGEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, FR, XE, EEC, PLO, PTER
SUBJECT: ARAFAT VISIT TO STRASBOURG

[[[
[[[
PAGE 02 STRASB 31259 01 OF 03 160131Z

REFS: A)BRUSSELS 12596, B)STRASBOURG 30728

UNCLASSIFIED

1. SUMMARY: THE YASSAR ARAFAT VISIT TO THE SOCIALIST
GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG SEPTEMBER
13,14 IS BEING TERMED HERE AS A MEDIA VICTORY FOR THE

UNCLASSIFIED

PLO. BUT NOT WITHOUT SOME COST TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE FRENCH SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT. THE FRENCH JEWISH COMMUNITY WAS DEEPLY ANGERED BY THE VISIT, AND WITH DUMAS' MEETING WITH ARAFAT. DUMAS REPORTEDLY PUSHED ARAFAT HARD TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. THE WISDOM OF THE INVITATION AND MEETING WILL BE DEBATED FOR SOME TIME. CRITICS CHARGE THAT THE VISIT PROVIDED THE PLO WITH UNDUE LEGITIMACY AND ARAFAT WITH "AN UNWARRANTED IMAGE AS MODERATE PEACE SEEKER." SUPPORTERS VIEW THE VISIT AS STRENGTHENING MODERATE GROUPS IN THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND INCREASING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO DEAL WITH THE PLO. END SUMMARY.

2. YASSAR ARAFAT ARRIVED IN STRASBOURG SEPTEMBER 13TH, COMING BY AIR FROM TUNIS. HIS TWO "MYSTERE 20" JETS LANDED AT STRASBOURG ENTZHEIM AIRPORT, OFFLOADING THEIR 46 PASSAGERS (INCLUDING 15 ARMED BODYGUARDS) AT THE MILITARY BASE TERMINAL. HE WAS MET BY IBRAHIM SOUSS, PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN FRANCE, EP SOCIALIST GROUP CHAIRMAN RUDI ARNDT AND TWO VICE CHAIRMEN, AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRENCH PREFECTURE. SECURITY FOR HIS ARRIVAL WAS PARTICULARLY TIGHT. HIS ARRIVAL TIME WAS KEPT SECRET TIL THE FINAL MOMENTS. GENDARMES LINED THE ROUTE INTO STRASBOURG AND SURROUNDED BOTH HIS HOTEL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BUILDING. SPECIALLY TRAINED MARKSMAN WATCHED FROM THE TOP OF NEIGHBORING STRUCTURES. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT EVEN PROVIDED ARAFAT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STRASB 31259 01 OF 03 160131Z

WITH A FLEET OF THREE FULLY ARMORED RENAULT 25S AND A SCORE OF ARMED POLICE GUARDS. THEY WISHED TO ASSURE HIS SAFETY DURING HIS STAY ON FRENCH SOIL.

3. A GROUP OF SOME 200 ARAFAT SUPPORTERS WERE BROUGHT TO HIS HOTEL MINUTES BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL. THIS WAS THE ONLY DEMONSTRATION ARAFAT WAS TO SEE. A PROTEST DEMONSTRATION HAD WOUND ITS WAY THROUGH STRASBOURG EARLIER IN THE DAY, BEFORE ARAFAT HAD LANDED. THE LOCAL JEWISH COMMUNITY HAD COME OUT IN FORCE TO PROTEST THE ARAFAT VISIT. THEIR MARCH WAS PEACEFUL, FULLY IN CHARACTER WITH THE JEWISH HIGH HOLIDAY SEASON. A CROSS SECTION OF LOCALLY ELECTED OFFICIALS LED THE 2000 PERSON PROTEST MARCH, INCLUDING STRASBOURG MAYOR (UDF SENATOR) MARCEL RUDLOFF, AND UDF SENATE LEADER DANIEL HOEFFEL. COE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT LOUIS JUNG, AND PIERRE PFLIMLIN, PAST PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ALSO JOINED THE PROTEST MARCHERS. THE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTED FRENCH SOCIALIST IN THE GROUP WAS STRASBOURG SUBURB MAYOR ALFRED MULLER (WHO IS CONSIDERED A CLOSE FRIEND OF MICHEL ROCARD). A NOISY COUNTERMARCH WAS HELD IN THE AFTERNOON GROUPING TOGETHER SOME 500 PRO ARAFAT DEMONSTRATORS. THEY WERE JOINED BY COMMUNIST EX MINISTER OF HEALTH JACK RALITE, AND SENATOR CHARLES LEDERMANN.

4. THE DAYS ACTIVITIES WERE CENTERED WITHIN THE PALAIS D'EUROPE: MEETINGS WITH THE SOCIALIST GROUP (165 MEMBERS), THE COMMUNIST GROUP (48 MEMBERS), THE ECOLOGISTS (20 MEMBERS), PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT LORD PLUMB, GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER CAROLOS PAPOULIAS, EC COMMISSIONER CLAUDE CHEYSSON, AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER ROLAND DUMAS. ARAFAT ALSO HAD SEVERAL SUCCESSFUL ENCOUNTERS WITH THE PRESS, INCLUDING A CONCLUDING PRESS CONFERENCE.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 STRASB 31259 01 OF 03 160131Z

5. ARAFAT MET PRIVATELY FOR 56 MINUTES WITH ROLAND DUMAS IN A SPECIAL OFFICE PROVIDED BY LORD PLUMB, 26 MINUTES LONGER THAN SCHEDULED. THE FRENCH BILLED THE MEETING AS INFORMAL AND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARAFAT'S

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 STRASB 31259 02 OF 03 160133Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03
AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 C-01
PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /071 W
-----077300 160204Z /65 38

R 152310Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3430
INFO EC COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 STRASBOURG 31259

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE PGARLAND, EUR/WE AND NEA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR DCM AND CONGEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, FR, XE, EEC, PLO, PTER
SUBJECT: ARAFAT VISIT TO STRASBOURG

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 STRASB 31259 02 OF 03 160133Z

VISIT TO THE SOCIALIST EP GROUP. DUMAS MAINTAINED THAT IT DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFICIAL RECEPTION OF ARAFAT IN FRANCE. HE REFUSED TO ANSWER PRESS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS, MAKING ONLY A BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE PRESS (SEE BELOW). DUMAS REPORTEDLY ENCOURAGED ARAFAT TO TAKE A CLEARER STAND ON ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO RECOGNIZED AND SECURE BOUNDARIES. HE TOLD ASSOCIATES THAT ARAFAT APPEARED TO HIM MORE FORTHCOMING, AND MORE REALISTIC ABOUT ISRAEL, THAN DURING HIS PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH ARAFAT. THE DUMAS ENCOUNTER OVERSHADOWED ARAFAT'S MEETING WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER CAROLOS PAPOULIAS WHO HAD FLOWN TO STRASBOURG ESPECIALLY FOR THE OCCASION. THE LATTER MEETING RECEIVED ONLY LIMITED PLAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL FRENCH AND ENGLISH PRESS.

6. DUMAS PRESS STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS FROM FRENCH): "I MET WITH MR. ARAFAT TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO DO SO BEFORE THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING. I TOLD HIM THAT FRANCE IS A FRIEND OF ISRAEL, AND THAT ISRAEL WANTS PEACE. BUT ISRAEL HAS NEITHER PEACE OR SECURITY. THE PALESTINIANS ALSO WANT PEACE, BUT THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT IS HARDENING. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. FIRST WE MUST TALK TO THE PARTIES AND CONVINCED THEM TO ACT. I TOLD HIM THAT ISRAEL HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE WITHIN SAFE AND ACKNOWLEDGED BORDERS. THE PALESTINE PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO A HOMELAND AND TO ASSURE THEIR OWN DESTINY. THIS FUTURE CAN ONLY BE BUILT BY DIALOGUE. THE FACILITATING SUCH A DIALOGUE; IN BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER, GETTING THEM TO SPEAK TO EACH OTHER, HELPING THEM CARRY OUT A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, CONFIRMING THE PRINCIPLES OF ACCORD THEY ESTABLISH, AND GUARANTEEING THEIR AGREEMENTS. THIS IS THE OBJECTIVE OF AN

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STRASB 31259 02 OF 03 160133Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BRING TOGETHER ALL THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ANY GESTURE WHICH COULD LEAD THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL, AND TO CONSTRUCT A POLITICAL PROGRAM THAT IS REALISTIC AND JUST IS DESIRABLE. FRANCE WOULD ENCOURAGE ANY SUCH ACTION. SIMILARLY, FRANCE WOULD ENCOURAGE ANY GESTURE THAT WOULD LEAD ISRAEL TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS, AND TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS THEREFROM. THIS IS WHAT I TOLD MR. ARAFAT, ASKING HIM IN TURN IF THE MOMENT HAD NOT COME TO SILENCE THE ARMED STRUGGLE AND TO GIVE THE FLOOR TO THE NEGOTIATORS." DUMAS MAINTAINED THAT FRANCE'S POLICIES VIS A VIS ISRAEL AND THE PLO HAD NOT CHANGED. IT WAS PRECISELY AS STATED BY PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IN JERUSALEM IN 1982, HE TOLD THE PRESS.

7. REACTION'S TO THE ARAFAT VISIT, AND TO THE MEETING WITH DUMAS WERE VARIED. FRENCH MEPS ALFRED COSTE-FLORET (CONSERVATIVE) AND SIMONE VEIL, PRESIDENT OF THE LIBERAL GROUP REPORTEDLY TERMED THE VISIT AS "HARMFUL TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND TOTALLY INOPPORTUNE." PAST EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT PIERRE PFLIMLIN WAS ALSO VERY CRITICAL OF LORD PLUMB FOR RECEIVING ARAFAT. "WE HAVE NOT ADVANCED ONE IOTA TOWARDS PEACE," HE SAID. CRITICS CHARGED THAT THE VISIT PROVIDED THE PLO WITH UNDUE LEGITIMACY AND ARAFAT WITH "AN UNWARRANTED IMAGE AS MODERATE PEACE SEEKER." FRENCH UDF POLITICAL LEADERS, MEETING IN PARIS, ALSO STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE ROCARD GOVERNMENT FOR AUTHORIZING DUMAS' MEETING WITH ARAFAT. THEY FOUND THE MEETING "SHOCKING" AND TERMED THE ROCARD GOVERNMENT AS "TWO FACED" WHEN IT CAME TO ISRAEL AND THE PLO. GISCARD D'ESTAING ALSO INDICATED "SUPRISE" THAT MITTERRAND AND ROCARD WOULD AUTHORIZE SUCH A MEETING AT THIS TIME. THE ALSATIAN FRENCH SOCIALISTS BROKE WITH THEIR MOTHER PARTY, CALLING THE

████████████████████

████████████████████

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 STRASB 31259 03 OF 03 160003Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
C-01 PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /071 W
-----074221 160206Z /65 38

O 152310Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3431
INFO EC COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX
AMCONSUL LYON
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 STRASBOURG 31259

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE PGARLAND, EUR/WE AND NEA
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR DCM AND CONGEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, FR, XE, EEC, PLO, PTER
SUBJECT: ARAFAT VISIT TO STRASBOURG

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 STRASB 31259 03 OF 03 160003Z

VISIT "A SERIOUS MISTAKE," AND "INOPPORTUNE."
8. FRANCE'S 700,000 MEMBER JEWISH COMMUNITY, THE LARGEST IN EUROPE, IS REPORTED TO BE "ANGRY AND UPSET" OVER THE ARAFAT VISIT. THEY ARE EVEN MORE DISTURBED BY THE POSITIVE PRESS REACTION. SOME JEWISH LEADERS HAVE WARNED THAT THE JEWISH COMMUNITY WILL NOT QUICKLY FORGET. IT WILL REFLECT ITSELF IN SEVERAL FUTURE ELECTIONS, ONE CONTACT SAID. HE ARGUED THAT THE JEWISH VOTE IN FRANCE IS A SWING VOTE AND THAT THE DUMAS MEETING MAY COST THE SOCIALISTS IN THE UPCOMING CANTONAL, MUNICIPAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. BUT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HAS ALREADY BEGUN TAKING DAMAGE CONTROL STEPS. ISRAEL AMBASSADOR SOFER HAS CONFIRMED THAT ISRAEL PRESIDENT CHAIM HERZOG WILL VISIT FRANCE BEFORE YEAR'S END.
9. THERE WAS ALSO STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE VISIT AND DUMAS-ARAFAT MEETING. ARAFAT'S TRIP TO STRASBOURG WAS INTENDED, ONE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONTACT TOLD CONGEN, TO PURPOSEFULLY HEIGHTEN HIS INTERNATIONAL IMAGE PRIOR TO THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING. THE MODERATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PLO WING, WHICH ARAFAT NOW CALLS HIS OWN, NEEDS AS MUCH STRENGTH AS IT CAN GATHER FOR THE CRUCIAL COUNCIL MEETING, HE SAID. THAT IS WHY THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER CAME, THAT IS WHY DUMAS CAME, WITH THE FULL AGREEMENT OF THE ELYSEE. LE MONDE ALSO STATED THAT THE DECISION FOR DUMAS TO MEET ARAFAT CAME FROM MITTERAND. HE WAS CONCERNED, THE ARTICLE SAID, THAT SHAMIR WAS TOO OBSTINATE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE WEST BANK. IF FRANCE WANTS TO HELP IN A SETTLEMENT, IT MUST TALK TO ALL PARTIES, THE ARTICLE SAID. THE FIGARO QUOTED GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS AS DESCRIBING ARAFAT AS "A MODERATE WHO WAS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STRASB 31259 03 OF 03 160003Z

SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS." "ONE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT FACT AND TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT," PAPOULIAS SAID. EC COMMISSIONER CLAUDE CHEYSSON REPORTEDLY CALLED THE MEETING A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY AND INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT ARAFAT HAD INDICATED A FIRM COMMITMENT TO ACCEPT, AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE PROCESS AND FIRM GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY. OTHER DEFENDERS ARGUED THAT ARAFAT HAD EXTENDED THE OLIVE BRANCH AND HAD GONE AS FAR AS HE COULD GO, PRIOR TO THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING, TO SIGNA HIS ATTENTION FOR PEACE. THE FIGARO ALSO REPORTED THAT THE ARAFAT VISIT AND THE PALESTINE 10. IF SEDUCING THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA WAS HIS OBJECTIVE, ARAFAT SUCEEDED. AND HIS AUDIENCE WAS LARGE. SOME 380 MEMBERS OF THE PRESS SIGNED UP FOR THE ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE. ONE COULD HARDLY SEE OVER THE WALL OF CAMERAS. THE DERNIERE NOUVELLE D'ALSACE CALLED HIM AN "EXCELLENT ACTOR" PORTRAYING A GENTLE, ALMOST LIKEABLE CHARACTER." OTHER PRESS LINES ALSO READ FAVORABLE: "HE DEFENDED HIS CAUSE EXCELLENTLY WITH ALMOST DIABOLIC SMOOTHNESS." "HE SPEAKS PEACE, HE OFFERS HIS HAND." "HE SEEKS AN ISRAELI DE GAULLE, WITH THE COURAGE TO MAKE PEACE." "HE WISHES ISRAELIS A HAPPY NEW YEAR AND JEWS A CHANA TOVA." BUT THE PRESS CONCLUDES ALSO THAT "HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY." "NO CLEAR ANSWERS TO ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS -- PERHAPS SOME NUANCES OPEN TO INTERPRETION."

COMRAS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E63
R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88BRUSSE12596

FILM= D880822-0490

DATE= 15 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= BRUSSELS

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC
EC POSTS COLLECTIVE
TEL AVIV
TUNIS
ALGIERS
AMMAN
BAGHDAD
CAIRO

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN -----

REFERENCE= 88 BRUSSELS 12195, 88 BRUSSELS 12512

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS / FIC / CORA	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Case Grp	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		TS =
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9354029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONCEPTS= PRESS CONFERENCE, LEGISLATION, SOCIALISM, WEST BANK, OCCUPIED A
ELECTION, CAMPAIGN, DEMONSTRATION, PALESTINIANS, FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, XE, JO, EEC, PLO

████████████████████

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 12596 01 OF 03 150725Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----021040 150731Z /25

O 150730Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5120
INFO EC POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

████████████████████ SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 12596

FROM USEC

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE GARLAND

DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, XE EEC, PLO
SUBJECT: ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT

████████████████████
████████████████████

PAGE 02 BRUSSE 12596 01 OF 03 150725Z

UNCLASSIFIED

✓ UNCLASSIFIED

REFS: (A) BRUSSELS 12195, (B) BRUSSELS 12512

1. SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION. ARAFAT'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SEPTEMBER 14 TOOK PLACE BEFORE A PACKED AUDITORIUM WITH TIGHT SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT. SURROUNDED BY A LARGE ENTOURAGE, ARAFAT TOOK QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS BUT MADE NO OPENING REMARKS. HIS SPEECH THE PREVIOUS EVENING TO A CLOSED MEETING OF THE SOCIALIST GROUP (TEXT FAXED TO EUR/RPE) HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED TO US PRIVATELY BY BOTH ISRAELI DIPLOMATS AND SOCIALIST GROUP MEMBERS AT THE EP AS "NOTHING NEW." TO SOME OBSERVERS HERE, ARAFAT APPEARED SOMEWHAT MORE

OPEN IN HIS RESPONSES AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. ARAFAT SAID THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) WOULD MEET IN OCTOBER AND CONSIDER THE OPTION OF SETTING UP A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THE PLO WOULD TAKE OVER FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EXPENSES IN THE WEST BANK FOLLOWING JORDAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE AREA. HE SAID HIS MEETING WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS THIS MORNING WAS "EXTREMELY POSITIVE" BUT HE DECLINED TO GO INTO DETAILS. (FOR HIS PART, PAPOULIAS, WE UNDERSTAND, TOLD A GROUP OF JOURNALISTS THAT ARAFAT WAS A RESPONSIBLE INTERLOCUTOR AND THAT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.) ARAFAT TOLD THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS MEETING THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 14 WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS. HE SAID THE DECISION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO HAVE DUMAS MEET WITH ARAFAT WAS "BRAVE" GIVEN THE CURRENT FRENCH LOCAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN. ARAFAT SAID HE WISHED A HAPPY NEW YEAR TO ALL ISRAELIS AND JEWS. BEFORE ARAFAT TOOK QUESTIONS, RUDI ARNDT, SOCIALIST GROUP CHAIRMAN, SAID HE

████████████████████
████████████████████
PAGE 03 BRUSSE 12596 01 OF 03 150725Z

WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE PRESS HAD FOCUSED ON THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN STRASBOURG RATHER THAN ARAFAT'S VISIT TO THE SOCIALIST GROUP AND HAD IGNORED THE DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE AIRPORT TO WELCOME ARAFAT. WE HAVE HEARD ESTIMATES OF BETWEEN 500 AND 1,000 PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEMONSTRATION AGAINST ARAFAT. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE ARE BELOW. END OF SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION.

PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL OPTIONS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. ASKED FOR THE DATE FOR THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, AND WHAT HIS PERSONAL ADVICE WOULD BE ABOUT A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, ARAFAT SAID THE PNC WOULD MEET "NEXT MONTH" AND WOULD DISCUSS OPTIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE PLO LEGAL AND POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN RESPONSE TO THE VACUUM LEFT BY KING HUSSEIN'S LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE WEST BANK. THE OPTIONS WERE: (A) AN INTERNATIONAL MANDATE BASED ON UN RESOLUTIONS FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND (B) ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. ARAFAT SAID HE WONDERED IF EUROPE WOULD RECOGNIZE SUCH A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. EUROPE'S RESPONSE WAS VERY IMPORTANT.

PLO RESPONSIBILITIES IN WEST BANK

4. ARAFAT SAID THAT FOLLOWING KING HUSSEIN'S ACTION, THE PLO HAS TAKEN THE DECISION TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 23,000 PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS WHO RECEIVED PAYMENT FROM THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THE PLO

████████████████████
████████████████████

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 12596 02 OF 03 150725Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----021047 150730Z /25

O 150730Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5121
INFO EC POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 BRUSSELS 12596

FROM USEC

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE GARLAND

DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, IS, XE EEC, PLO

SUBJECT: ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN
HAS DECIDED TO SHOULDER THE "ENTIRE FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC,
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY." HE ALSO SAID

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 BRUSSE 12596 02 OF 03 150725Z

HE HAD DECIDED TO APPLY JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN LAW IN
GAZA AND THE WEST BANK UNTIL NEW LAWS ARE PASSED.

TALKING TO ISRAEL

5. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM A.B. NATHAN OF THE
VOICE OF PEACE, ARAFAT SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO MEET
WITH ANYONE REPRESENTING ISRAEL. HE SAID, "I AM
EXTENDING THE HAND OF PEACE."

MEETING WITH PAPOULIAS

6. ARAFAT CHARACTERIZED HIS MEETING WITH GREEK FOREIGN
MINISTER PAPOULIAS AS "EXTREMELY POSITIVE." THEY HAD,
HE SAID, A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO COOPERATE
TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THEY
DISCUSSED "MORE DELICATE ISSUES" WHICH HE DID NOT
REVEAL.

QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE MEETING OF ARAFAT WITH EC
FOREIGN MINISTERS

7. A JOURNALIST ASKED WHETHER PAPOULIAS HAD GIVEN
ARAFAT ANY INDICATION WHETHER PAPOULIAS AND HIS EC
COLLEAGUES INTENDED TO INVITE HIM TO MEET WITH THE EC
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL. NO ANSWER WAS GIVEN AS RUDY
ARNDT, SOCIALIST GROUP CHAIRMAN, JUMPED IN AT THIS POINT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 BRUSSE 12596 02 OF 03 150725Z

INFERRING THAT THE QUESTION CONCERNED AN INVITATION TO SPEAK BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. HOWEVER, AN EC PERMDEL CONTACT WHO WAS PRESENT, RECALLED PRIVATELY THAT THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD MET WITH JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN NOT LONG AGO IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION AND HE SUGGESTED THE UNANSWERED QUESTION UNDOUBTEDLY REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMILAR MEETING WITH ARAFAT.

MEETING WITH DUMAS

7. ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT HIS MEETING LATER IN THE DAY WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS IN STRASBOURG, ARAFAT COMMENTED THAT ONE MUST REMEMBER THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME HE HAD MET WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS. HE SAID IT WAS A "BRAVE DECISION" BY THE FRENCH AT THE "HIGHEST LEVEL TO TAKE IN AN ELECTION PERIOD."

GETTING THE US AND BRITAIN TO RECOGNIZE A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

8. THE UK, ARAFAT SAID, HAD A MORAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT HAS AN "HISTORICAL DUTY TO CORRECT ITS MISTAKE." WITH REGARD TO THE US, ARAFAT REFERRED TO WILSONIAN PRINCIPLES. HE SAID THE US HAD RECOGNIZED ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF UN RESOLUTION 181, WHICH CALLED FOR CREATION OF BOTH A JEWISH STATE AND A PALESTINIAN STATE. HE SAID WE ASKED THE US TO "BE MORE FAIR."

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 BRUSSE 12596 03 OF 03 150726Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /055 W
-----021062 150731Z /25

O 150730Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5122
INFO EC POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 BRUSSELS 12596
FROM USEC

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPE GARLAND

DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IS, XE EEC, PLO
SUBJECT: ARAFAT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE EUROPEAN

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 BRUSSE 12596 03 OF 03 150726Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

9. ASKED WHETHER HE FAVORED BUSH OR CLINTON, ARAFAT SAID THAT IT WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE. HE SAID HE HOPED THE NEW PRESIDENT WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO SOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE ARMS RACE, ETC.

ON THE CAIRO DECLARATION

10. ASKED ABOUT THE CAIRO DECLARATION, ARAFAT ACCUSED ISRAEL OF ENGAGING IN TERRORISM. HE SAID THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WERE THE VICTIMS OF ISRAELI TERRORISM.

ISRAELI ELECTION

11. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER PERES OR SHAMIR WAS THE MORE CAPABLE OF PROMOTING PEACE, ARAFAT SAID HE WAS "LOOKING FOR A DEGAULLE OF ISRAEL."KINGON

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

Elot
R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03056

FILM= D880802-0416

DATE= 09 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
AMMAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 25, 9/6/88

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3004

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PUBLICATION, POLITICAL LEADER, ALLEGATION, PALESTINIANS, LIBERATION
FRONT, VIOLENCE, DEMONSTRATION, OCCUPIED AREA

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		\$/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority to:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____			

9304029

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03056 01 OF 05 091709Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 ED-04 OMB-01
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 M-01 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /077 W

-----062356 091740Z /40

O 091707Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3444
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03056

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 25, 9/6/88

REF: JERUSALEM 3004

1. LEAFLET NO. 25 OF "PLO/UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING" (UNLU), DATED SEPTEMBER 6, CRITICIZES THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, HAMAS, FOR ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE PARALLEL STRIKES AND ACCUSES IT OF AIDING THE ENEMY BY DIVIDING PALESTINIANS. IT ALSO CALLS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE POPULAR COMMITTEES AND ADDITIONAL ATTACKS ON SUSPECTED COLLABORATORS. UNLU URGES STUDENTS NOT TRAVEL ABROAD TO STUDY, BUT TO SEEK POPULAR EDUCATION ORGANIZED BY THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP. IT ALSO CALLS ON ARAB STATES TO MEET THEIR ALGIERS SUMMIT PLEDGES, AND CALLS AGAIN FOR THE UPCOMING PNC CONFERENCE TO TAKE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03056 01 OF 05 091709Z

"IMPORTANT AND DEFINITIVE POLITICAL RESOLUTIONS."
THE LEAFLET CALLS FOR GENERAL STRIKES ON THE 8, 17, AND 26 OF SEPTEMBER. PALESTINIANS ARE ALSO URGED TO HOLD DEMONSTRATIONS OUTSIDE EUROPEAN CONSULATES IN JERUSALEM ON SEPTEMBER 13, WHEN

ARAFAT ADDRESSES THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. END
SUMMARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE
A CALL .. A CALL .. A CALL
NO VOICE IS ABOVE THE VOICE OF THE UPRISING
NO VOICE IS ABOVE THE VOICE OF PALESTINIANS, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PLO
CALL NO. 25 - THE CALL OF THE MARTYRS OF THE
MASSACRES,
PUBLISHED BY THE PLO/THE UNIFIED NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU)

O MASSES OF OUR GREAT PEOPLE: SOON YOUR INTIFADA
WILL END THE NINTH MONTH OF ITS AGE AND INAUGURATE
ITS TENTH MONTH. IT HAS BECOME STRONGER,
DETERMINED TO ESCALATE AND CONTINUE DESPITE ALL
PROBLEMS AND FACIST METHODS OF OPPRESSION.
DESPITE COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT, STARVATION,
ECONOMIC SIEGES, DEMOLITION OF HOMES, MASSIVE
ARREST CAMPAIGNS, DEPORTATION, BURNING PEOPLE
ALIVE, ASSASINATION OF RESISTANCE FIGHTERS,
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, AND LONG CURFEWS. YOUR
GREAT POPULAR INTIFADA CONTINUES ITS DAILY
STRUGGLE WITH MORE PERSEVERENCE AND AN EXTENSIVE
MANNER, AIMING AT DISMANTLING AND DESTROYING THE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03056 01 OF 05 091709Z

MECHANISM OF THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITY. IT HOPES
TO BUILD UP THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE
POPULACE, REPRESENTED BY THE POPULAR COMMITTEES
AND THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE
INTIFADA. ON THE BEGINNING OF THE TENTH MONTH
YOUR GLORIOUS INTIFADA PRODUCED NEW ACHIEVEMENTS
TO BE ADDED TO THE COLLECTION OF POLITICAL
ACHIEVEMENTS MADE DURING THE PAST MONTHS. THE
U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS WORRIED AND HAS RETRACTED
ITS PREVIOUS DECISION TO CLOSE DOWN THE PLO
DELEGATION'S OFFICE AT THE U.N. THE UNITED
NATIONS, THROUGH ITS SECRETARY GENERAL JAVIER
PERES DE CUELLAR, WHO MET WITH THE LEADER OF THE
PLO, EMPHASIZES THE EXISTANCE OF PALESTINIANS AND
PALESTINIAN LAND. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAS
AGAIN DENOUNCED UNANIMOUSLY THE DEPORTATION OF
PALESTINIANS FROM THEIR HOMELAND. ALL THESE
ACHIEVEMENTS PRODUCED THE HEALTHY RESOLUTIONS

ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE INTIFADA IN GENEVA, PARTICULARLY THE RESOLUTION WHICH EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIANS - ONE OF THE SLOGANS AND DEMANDS OF THE INTIFADA. ANOTHER ACHIEVEMENT IS THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ZIONIST OPPRESSION MECHANISM, WHO INDICATED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE INTIFADA THROUGH MILITARY METHODS, AS IS THE STATEMENT OF THE ZIONIST ABRAHAM TAMIR, DIRECTOR OF THE ENEMY'S FOREIGN OFFICE, WHO SAID THAT ISRAELIS HAVE TO REALIZE THAT THE PLO IS THE ONLY PARTY WHICH

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03056 02 OF 05 091710Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 ED-04 OMB-01
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 M-01 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /077 W
-----062406 091740Z /40

O 091707Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3445
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03056

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 25, 9/6/88

REPRESENTS PALESTINIANS. THIS RESULTED IN THE SETTLERS' HYSTERICAL FEAR OF MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND STONES WHICH LED THEM TO ABANDON SOME SETTLEMENTS, CASTING ASIDE TALK OF APPEASEMENT BY THE TERRORIST RABIN, AND AROGANT SHAMIR, WHO PROMISED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM PROTECTION AND GAVE THEM MORE AUTHORITY TO FIRE LIVE AMUNITION AT PALESTINIANS. IT ALSO LED TO THE CRITICAL ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE ENEMY, AS PER STATISTICS PUBLISHED DAILY BY THE ZIONIST ECONOMIC AND PLANNING EXPERTS.

O MASSES OF OUR HEROIC PEOPLE: THE MALIGNANT EFFORTS OF THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES TO IMPLEMENT THE TRANSFER POLICY, THROUGH SO-CALLED TEMPORARY DEPORTATION, BY FORCING DEPORTEES TO SIGN AN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03056 02 OF 05 091710Z

UNDERTAKING NOT TO INDULGE IN ANY ANTI-ISRAEL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THEY ARE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND, ARE A CLEAR BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND ARE NO DIFFERENT THAN THE DEPORTATION POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE WHOLE WORLD.

O COURAGEOUS CHILDREN OF OUR PEOPLE: AT THIS TIME REMEMBER THE MASSACRES OF BLACK SEPTEMBER, SABRA AND SHATILA, WHEN TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OUR CHILDREN IN THE DIASPORA WERE EXTERMINATED. THESE MASSACRES CAME TO FINISH THOSE COMMITTED AT DEIR YASSIN, QIBYA, DAWAYMEH AND KUFR QASEM. ALL AIMED AT OBLITERATING THE SPECIAL NATIONALIST FEELINGS OF OUR PEOPLE. YOU CAN TELL THOSE WHO COMMITTED THESE MASSACRES THAT HISTORY AND HUMANITY WILL CURSE THEM FOR EVER. WE ARE NOW STRONGER THAN YOU, MORE THAN EVER, BECAUSE WE HAVE ALWAYS RECUPERATED FROM YOUR BLOODY MASSACRES, AND WE SHALL CONTINUE THE MARCH, STARTED BY OUR PREDECESSORS, SUCH AS SHEIKH EL-QASSAM AND ABDUL QADER AL HUSSEINI.

O MASSES OF OUR STRUGGLING PEOPLE: UNLU AND THE MASSES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PRAISE THE WISE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY PLO AND QADDAFI ON THE PAYMENT OF SALARIES TO EMPLOYEES WHOSE SERVICES

WERE TERMINATED BY JORDAN AND CALL ON ARAB LEADERS WHO MET AT THE ALGIERS SUMMIT TO FULFILL THEIR FINANCIAL, POLITICAL AND INFORMATION COMMITMENTS TO THE INTIFADA, THE PLO AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. UNLU AND THE MASSES SEND GREETINGS TO THE PNC'S EMERGENCY SESSION EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO COME UP WITH IMPORTANT AND DEFINITE POLITICAL UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03056 02 OF 05 091710Z

RESOLUTIONS ON THE BASIS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS. THEY SHOULD POOL THEIR RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE INTIFADA, AND TO ACHIEVE OUR PEOPLE'S DESIRES FOR RETURN AND SELF DETERMINATION.

O MASSES OF THE INTIFADA AND ITS STRIKE FORCES: UNLU IS PROUD OF THE MARCH OF THE 20,000 WHO ROAMED THE STREETS OF GAZA IN DEFIANCE OF THE CURFEW. IT IS PROUD OF THE MASSES IN NABLUS WHO DEFIED THE SOLDIERS, AND THE STRIKING FORCES IN YATTA WHO EXECUTED THE PEOPLES' SENTENCE AGAINST THOSE WHO SOLD THEIR SOULS TO THE OCCUPATION FORCES AND BETRAYED THEIR PEOPLE AND NATION. UNLU URGES THE MASSES TO UNDERSTAND FULLY THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND TO IMPLEMENT THEM IN THEIR DAILY STRUGGLE:

HAMAS: THIS MOVEMENT IS A BRANCH OF THE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD ORGANIZATION. ONE COULD NOT BUT NOTICE HAMAS' RECENT ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ITS AUTHORITY ON THE MAN ON THE STREET AND ON THE NATIONAL MASSES AND ENFORCE A TOTAL STRIKE ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 21. THE MASSES, WHO HAVE A SENSE OF TRUTH, CONSIDER THIS STEP CONTRARY TO THE NATIONAL PROGRAM APPROVED BY UNLU, WHICH HAS UNITED THE WILL OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN RESISTING THE ENEMY. UNLU EMPHASIZES THAT ATTEMPTS AGAINST UNITY OF THE BATTLELINES WILL ONLY SERVE THE ENEMY AND UNDERMINE THE INTIFADA. AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST, WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXTEND A HAND TO ANY FORCE WHICH WANTS TO PARTICIPATE IN NATIONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03056 03 OF 05 091712Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 ED-04 OMB-01
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 M-01 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /077 W
-----062444 091740Z /40

O 091707Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3446
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03056

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 25, 9/6/88

ACTIVITIES; WE DO NOT EXCLUDE HAMAS IN ITS EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE. HOWEVER, ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE AUTHORITY AGAINST THE MASSES BY FORCE WILL BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ENEMY AND THEIR PLANS TO STRIKE THE INTIFADA. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, WE CONDEMN AGGRESSION WITH FIRE AND DESTRUCTION AGAINST MERCHANTS' AND CITIZENS' PROPERTY BECAUSE THEY REFUSED TO RESPOND TO HAMAS' CALL FOR A STRIKE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CALL FOR STRENGTHENING UNITY OF POSITIONS, REFUSING TO VIOLATE NATIONAL CONSENSUS, AND TAKING PART IN THE GENERAL NATIONAL POSITION BY COORDINATING ACTIVITIES WITH THE OTHER PARTIES OF UNLU AND ITS EFFECTIVE FORCES. WE APPLAUD THE IMAMS OF MOSQUES WHO CONTINUE TO CALL FOR UNITY WITHIN A NATIONAL UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03056 03 OF 05 091712Z

CONSENSUS TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THE INTIFADA.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: UNLU DEMANDS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, AS WELL AS ALL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY TO STOP THE BREACHES COMMITTED BY THE AUTHORITIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAWS, PRECEPTS AND COVENANTS, AND TO PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION TO PALESTINIANS AGAINST ALL OPPRESSIVE MEASURES AND WILD CAMPAIGNS AIMED AT THEIR EXISTANCE. UNLU ASKS FOR A UN SPONSORED MANDATE ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNTIL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS HELD, WITH PARTICIPATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PLO DELEGATION ON AN EQUAL BASIS.

CLOSURE OF SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS: THE AUTHORITIES HAVE CLOSED THE SOCIETIES, INSTITUTIONS AND UNIVERSITIES, IN AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP OUR PEOPLE IGNORANT, PARTICULARLY AFTER JORDAN DISENGAGED ITSELF FROM THE "PALESTINIAN BANK." UNLU URGES ALL THE PALESTINIAN SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THEIR SERVICES, DESPITE THE ENFORCED CLOSURE.

EDUCATION: AFTER THE AUTHORITIES HAVE CLOSED DOWN ALL THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, UNLU URGES THE MASSES TO STRUGGLE FOR THE RE-OPENING OF EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS. PEOPLE SHOULD NOT LEAVE THEIR HOMELAND AT THIS STAGE IN PURSUIT OF UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03056 03 OF 05 091712Z

FURTHER EDUCATION. WE URGE UNESCO, ARABS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES TO DISCUSS THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, INCLUDING THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, BECAUSE DEPRIVING PEOPLE OF EDUCATION IS AN UNCIVILIZED MEASURE CONTRARY TO ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS ENSURED BY INTERNATIONAL PRECEPTS, LAWS AND COVENANTS, AS WELL AS THE FOURTH GENEVA AGREEMENT. POPULAR

EDUCATION SHOULD BE PROMOTED AS A PRACTICAL AND MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURE AGAINST THE ZIONIST POLICY OF KEEPING THE PEOPLE IGNORANT.

POPULAR COMMITTEES: UNLU EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO BUILD UP THE INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY OF THE PEOPLE TO UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITIES' BAN ON POPULAR COMMITTEES AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THEM INTENDED TO FRIGHTEN THE MASSES, ISOLATE THE COMMITTEES AND FACILITATE THEIR ELIMINATION.

COMBATTING COLLABORATORS: UNLU APPLAUDS THE STRIKE FORCES, THE NUCLEUS OF THE POPULAR COMMITTEES, WHICH ACTED AGAINST COLLABORATORS AND EXECUTED THE SENTENCE PASSED BY THE INTIFADA AND . THE PEOPLE IN YATTA, HEBRON, ILAAR, JENIN AND JALAZONE REFUGEE CAMPS, QABATIYA, BIDYA JABALIYA, DEIR EL-BALAH AND OTHERS. STRIKE FORCES ARE URGED TO CONTINUE CLEANSING THE INTERNAL FRONT OF UNCLEANLINESS AND THOSE WHO HAVE SOLD THEIR SOULS AND HONOR TO THE OCCUPATION AND BETRAYED THEIR PEOPLE AND HOMELAND.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03056 04 OF 05 091713Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 ED-04 OMB-01
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 M-01 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /077 W

-----062512 091741Z /40

O 091707Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3447
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03056

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 25, 9/6/88

THE FACIST MOUNTED POLICE: UNLU URGES OUR MASSES
IN BEIT AL-MAQDES (JERUSALEM), THE ETERNAL CAPITAL
OF OUR PALESTINIAN STATE, TO CHALLENGE AND
CONFRONT THE AGGRESSION OF THE FACIST MOUNTED
POLICE WHO HARRASS THE POOR FARMERS WHO DISPLAY
AND SELL THEIR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE NEAR DAMASCUS
AND HEROD GATES IN AN ATTEMPT TO WARD OFF THE
HUNGER OF THEIR CHILDREN. THE MOUNTED POLICE
DESTROY THE FARMERS' PRODUCE AND FEED THEIR HORSES
ON THE FARMERS' VEGETABLES AND FRUITS, WHILE THE
OWNERS LOOK ON.

MONEY CHANGERS: UNLU URGES MONEYCHANGERS TO
REFRAIN FROM CREATING CHAOS IN THE FINANCIAL
MARKET. THEY SHOULD STOP SPREADING RUMORS AND
ABSTAIN FROM CREATING PANIC AMONG THE MASSS AS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03056 04 OF 05 091713Z

THEY HAVE DONE IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. SIMPLETONS
WERE ENCOURAGED TO GAMBLE THEIR SAVINGS AND
CHANGED ALL THEIR JORDANIAN DINARS INTO U.S.
DOLLARS. ANY ONE WHO CREATES PANIC, WHETHER
KNOWINGLY OR UNKNOWINGLY, WILL ONLY WASTE THE
SAVINGS OF OUR PEOPLE AND BRING MORE GAIN TO
ISRAELI AND AMERICAN BANKS.

MERCHANTS: UNLU URGES MERCHANTS TO FORM MORE
MERCHANT COMMITTEES, DEVELOP AND ACTIVATE THEM TO
ENCOURAGE NON-PAYMENT OF TAXES AND COLLECTIVELY
CONFRONT THE TAXMEN'S RAIDS. BOYCOTT OF THE
ENEMY'S PRODUCTS SHOULD CONTINUE AS DETAILED IN
THE PALESTINIAN MERCHANTS' STATEMENT. WE ORDER
OUR COURAGEOUS MERCHANTS IN GAZA NOT TO RESPOND TO
THE ORDERS ISSUED BY THE AUTHORITIES AND THE ARMY

TO PLACE SIGNS OUTSIDE THEIR SHOPS PROVIDING THE OWNER'S NAME AND ADDRESS.

VENDOR'S STALLS: UNLU DEMANDS THAT THE STREET VENDORS ORGANIZE THEMSELVES AND REMAIN COMMITTED TO OPENING AND CLOSING THEIR STALLS ACCORDING TO THE MERCHANTS' SCHEDULE. KEEPING THE STALLS OPEN ALL DAY WILL VIOLATE THE PURPOSE OF THE MERCHANTS' PARTIAL STRIKE. THE STRIKE FORCES ARE URGED TO ORGANISE THIS OPERATION.

PROPERTY RENT: UNLU DEMANDS THAT PROPERTY OWNERS REDUC RENT BY 25 PERCENT AND THAT TENANTS ABIDE BY THIS REQUEST AND PAY THEIR RENT IMMEDIATELY, WITHOUT HESITATION.

O MASSES OF THE INTIFADA AND ITS STRIKE FORCE:
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03056 04 OF 05 091713Z

UNLU IS AWARE OF THE STATE OF DISORDER AND PANIC AMONG ISRAELIS AND THEIR LEADERS DUE TO THE INTIFADA; THIS WAS CLEARLY SEEN THROUGH FACIST SHARON'S DEMANDS TO PUNISH PARENTS OF STONE-THROWERS, ARENS' DEMAND TO FORBID PALESTINIAN PEDESTRIANS FROM WALKING ON THE PAVEMENTS OF THE STREETS IN AN EFFORT TO ELIMINATE STONE THROWING, AND SHAMIR'S GREEN LIGHT TO SETTLERS TO FIRE LIVE AMUNITION AT PALESTINIANS. UNLU WISHES TO ASK THEM: WHY DO YOU CLOSE YOUR EYES AND REFUSE TO SEE THE FACTS ? WHY DO YOU TRY TO HIDE THE SUN BEHIND A SIEVE ? THE SOLUTION OF THESE PROBLEMS WILL COME ONLY THROUGH YOUR EVACUATION FROM OUR LAND AND RECOGNITION OF OUR LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND AN INDEPENDENT STATE. THE SOLUTION WILL NOT COME THROUGH OPPRESSION AND THREATS.

UNLU GREETES THE STRONG PALESTINIAN ARMS WHICH HAVE GIVEN THE STONE A REVOLUTIONARY NAME AND URGES THESE STRONG ARMS TO DROWN THE ENEMY AND ITS SETTLERS WITH MORE STONES AND MOLOTOVS AT ALL TIMES AND PLACES. UNLU CALLS ON THE MASSES TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING:

1. A GENERAL STRIKE TO BE OBSERVED ON SEPTEMBER 8, TO COMMEMORATE THE END OF THE NINTH MONTH OF THE INTIFADA AND PREPARATIONS TO START THE TENTH MONTH WITH GREAT VIGOUR.

2. SEPTEMBER 10, TO BE A DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03056 05 OF 05 091715Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 ED-04 OMB-01
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 M-01 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /077 W
-----062546 091741Z /40

O 091707Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3448
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03056

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 25, 9/6/88

OUR CLOSED SOCIETIES, INSTITUTIONS, UNIVERSITIES
AND LABOR UNIONS, WHEN SIT-INS SHOULD BE HELD
OUTSIDE THESE INSTITUTIONS.

3. SEPTEMBER 13, TO CELEBRATE THE MEETING OF
BROTHER ABU AMMAR (YASSER ARAFAT) WITH THE

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AT STRASSBOURG. SIT-INS TO BE HELD OUTSIDE EUROPEAN CONSULATES IN JERUSALEM AND MEMOS TO BE SUBMITTED CALLING ON THE GOVERNMENTS TO PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND SUPERVISION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4. SEPTEMBER 15, A CAMPAIGN TO PURIFY OUR INTERNAL FRONT FROM THE UNCLEAN COLLABORATORS AND TRAITORS AND TO FOLLOW UP ON THOSE WHO REFUSED TO UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03056 05 OF 05 091715Z

RESIGN TO COMPEL THEM TO RESIGN.

5. SEPTEMBER 17, A TOTAL STRIKE DAY TO COMMEMORATE THE MARTYRDOM OF THE THOSE WHO WERE MASSACRED IN SABRA AND SHATILA AND REMEMBER THE MARTYRS OF THE OTHER MASSACRES OF OUR PEOPLE.

6. SEPTEMBER 18, A DAY FOR VARIOUS ACTIVITIES AND CLASHES, TO CONDEMN THE MASSACRE OF OUR PEOPLE.

7. SEPTEMBER 22 COMMEMORATES THE DAY OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ALL PALESTINE IN 1948. THE DAY SHOULD BE DEDICATED TO STRENGTHENING THE AUTHORITY OF THE PEOPLE AND TO ESTABLISHING MORE POPULAR COMMITTEES, AIMING AT ANNOUNCING THE INDEPENDANCE OF OUR GREAT STATE.

8. SEPTEMBER 26, A TOTAL STRIKE DAY IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE DETAINEES AND IN PROTEST AGAINST THE EXISTANCE OF ANSAR III PRISON.

TOGETHER ON THE PATH OF STRUGGLE AND ESCALATION UNTIL THE ASPIRATIONS OF OUR PEOPLE FOR LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENCE ARE FULFILLED, WE SHALL BE VICTORIOUS

SIGNED: THE PLO, THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA, SEPTEMBER 6, 1988.
WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(E59)

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03054

FILM= D880802-0212

DATE= 09 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS: [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= NEW IDF TACTIC TO COMBAT THE INTIFADA: MASSIVE SWEEP

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= COMBAT, ARMED FORCES, OPERATIONS, ARREST, YOUTH

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		TS authority _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			
FOIA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or	
PA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or	

9204029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03054 01 OF 02 091607Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----060011 091621Z /45

O 091605Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3440
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03054

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: NEW IDF TACTIC TO COMBAT THE
INTIFADA: MASSIVE SWEEP

1. (U) SUMMARY. HUNDREDS OF IDF FORCES SEALED OFF KALKILYA SEPTEMBER 6 IN A CONTINUING OPERATION INTENDED TO ARREST YOUTHS SUSPECTED OF ANTI-ISRAELI ACTS. OVER 200 ARRESTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITHOUT CASUALTIES TO EITHER SIDE. DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN INDICATED THAT SIMILAR OPERATIONS WOULD FOLLOW IN OTHER CENTERS OF RESISTANCE. A SIMILAR OPERATION BEGAN SEPTEMBER 9 AGAINST THE VILLAGE OF MALIK, NEAR RAMALLAH. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) WITH A MASSIVE SHOW OF FORCE, THE IDF SEPTEMBER 6 CLOSED OFF KALKILYA AND BEGAN HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES FOR YOUTHS SUSPECTED OF ATTACKING SETTLER VEHICLES AND PARTICIPATING IN DISTURBANCES. IN THE OPERATION, WHICH WAS STILL

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03054 01 OF 02 091607Z

IN PROGRESS SEPTEMBER 9, HUNDREDS IDF TROOPS WITH HELICOPTER SUPPORT ARRESTED YOUTHS FROM A LIST OF NAMES, MANY OF WHOM ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING INTIFADA ACTIVISTS. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, DETAINEES WERE HANDCUFFED AND BLINDFOLDED, THEN TAKEN TO A SCHOOL FOR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

QUESTIONING BY SHIN BET AGENTS. A MILITARY PROSECUTOR WAS PRESENT TO SIGN DETENTION ORDERS, AND PRISONERS WERE THEN REMANDED TO THE FAR'A DETENTION FACILITY NEAR NABLUS. AS OF SEPTEMBER 9, OVER 200 YOUTHS REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN ARRESTED, AND IDF SOURCES HAVE INDICATED THE ACTION WILL CONTINUE UNTIL EVERYONE ON THE LIST HAS BEEN APPREHENDED. ACCORDING TO IDF REPORTS, NO CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED BY TOWNSPEOPLE OR TROOPS.

3. (U) WEST BANK COMMANDER GABI ORR IS QUOTED BY THE JERUSALEM POST AS SAYING THE RAID HAD BEEN PLANNED WEEKS IN ADVANCE AND WAS BASED ON INTELLIGENCE ON STONE-THROWERS GATHERED BY SHIN BET. OC CENTRAL COMMANDER AMRAM MITZNA SAID KALKILYA HAD BEEN TARGETED BECAUSE IT HAD BECOME A CENTER FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAELI VEHICLES PASSING THROUGH THE TOWN FROM WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS TO THE COAST. SETTLER GROUPS HAVE REPEATEDLY PRESSED FOR TOUGHER IDF MEASURES AGAINST THE STONE THROWERS. ON SEPTEMBER 7, DEFMIN RABIN SAID SIMILAR OPERATIONS WOULD BE HELD IN OTHER AREAS THAT HAD BECOME CENTERS OF ANTI-ISRAELI VIOLENCE.

4. (U) RADIO ISRAEL REPORTS SEPTEMBER 9 THAT A

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03054 01 OF 02 091607Z

SIMILAR SEARCH-AND-ARREST OPERATION HAS BEEN LAUNCHED AGAINST THE VILLAGE OF MALIK, NEAR RAMALLAH. WE DO NOT YET KNOW IF IT IS AS LARGE IN SCALE AS THE KALKILYA OPERATION.

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT. KALKILYA, LOCATED JUST EAST OF THE GREEN LINE, IS SURROUNDED BY JEWISH TOWNS. IT HAS BEEN A CENTER OF SETTLER-PALESTINIAN CLASHES SINCE APRIL 1987, WHEN A FIREBOMB KILLED TWO MEMBERS OF A JEWISH FAMILY DRIVING FROM THEIR SETTLEMENT NEAR KALKILYA TOWARDS PETAH TIKVA IN ISRAEL. KALKILYA HAS SEEN SOME OF THE HEAVIEST ACTION IN THE INTIFADA, WITH REPEATED SETTLER RAIDS INTO THE TOWN IN RESPONSE TO CONTINUED STONING AND FIREBOMBING ATTACKS ON JEWISH CARS. LENGTHY CURFEWS HAVE BEEN IMPOSED, WITH LITTLE APPARENT EFFECT.

6. [REDACTED] COMMENT CONTINUED. THE SEARCHING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ARREST OPERATION IN KALKILYA IS THE GOI'S LATEST ATTEMPT TO FIND A TECHNIQUE TO CRUSH THE INTIFADA. THE GOVERNMENT HAS COME UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE FROM SETTLERS TO MAKE THE ROADS SAFE FOR THEIR CARS. PERHAPS FOR THIS REASON, EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE RAID, INCLUDING A STAGED IDF PHOTO SHOWING A TROOPER IN FULL BATTLE GEAR BURSTING THROUGH THE DOOR OF A PALESTINIAN HOME, WHILE THE AGED OWNER AND HIS WIFE WATCH WITH A BEMUSED EXPRESSION. THE INTIFADA COMMANDS SUCH WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AMONG WEST BANKERS THAT, SHORT OF ARRESTING ALL YOUNG PEOPLE IN A TOWN OR VILLAGE, THE IDF IS

[REDACTED]

*NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03054 02 OF 02 091608Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----060020 091622Z /45

O 091605Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3441
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03054

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: NEW IDF TACTIC TO COMBAT THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLIKELY TO STOP STONE THROWING--WHICH
PALESTINIANS VIEW AS A SYMBOL OF RESISTANCE--BY
THIS WAVE OF MASS ARREST AND HOUSE-TO-HOUSE
SEARCHES. IF REPEATED, THIS TECHNIQUE WILL ALSO
INCREASE TENSIONS BY MAXIMIZING POINTS OF JEWISH-
PALESTINIAN FRICTION. AS A SEPTEMBER 8
EDITORIAL IN HA'ARETZ DESCRIBED IT, THE KALKILYA
SWEEP IS "A POINTLESS AND OPPRESSIVE
OPERATION." END COMMENT.
WILCOX

?

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

E53

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03015

FILM= D880797-0098

DATE= 08 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP, AUGUST 31-SEPTEMBER 5, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= WEST BANK, DEMONSTRATION, PRESS SUMMARY, VIOLENCE, REPORT, INT::

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info	TS authority to:
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 01 OF 03 081359Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00
ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /084 W
-----360233 081404Z /41

O 081357Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3408
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03015

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, AUGUST 31-SEPTEMBER 5,
1988

1. SUMMARY: VIOLENCE DECLINED SLIGHTLY. ONLY ONE PALESTINIAN WAS REPORTED KILLED. GENERAL STRIKES WERE OBSERVED AUGUST 30 AND 31. THERE ARE NEW SIGNS OF FRICTION BETWEEN THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS PUBLISHED DIFFERENT CASUALTY STATISTICS FOR THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF THE UPRISING. THIS REPORT WAS COMPILED MAINLY FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS. END SUMMARY.

ONE KILLED AND 31 INJURED

////////////////////

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 01 OF 03 081359Z

2. -- PALESTINIAN SOURCES CLAIMED THE IDF SHOT AND KILLED A 22-YEAR-OLD YOUTH AND WOUNDED FOUR OTHERS IN AN AUGUST 31 CLASH IN DEIR GHASSANEH, NEAR RAMALLAH. MILITARY SOURCES DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT.

-- PROTESTS ERUPTED IN NABLUS ON AUGUST 30 AFTER THE LIFTING OF A FIVE-DAY CURFEW. ACCORDING TO MILITARY SOURCES, SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED AT LEAST FIVE PERSONS, ONE OF THEM SERIOUSLY, WHILE PALESTINIAN SOURCES CLAIMED 13 YOUTHS WERE WOUNDED.

-- IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED ONE YOUTH IN QALQILYA DURING A CLASH WITH DEMONSTRATORS ON AUGUST 31; CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON THE TOWN. ALSO SHOT AND WOUNDED WERE TWO VILLAGERS IN HOUSAN, SOUTH OF BETHLEHEM; ONE IN BOURQIN, NEAR JENIN; AND ONE IN KAFR ADDEEK, NEAR NABLUS.

-- IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED FIVE PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES ON SEPTEMBER 2 IN AZZOUN, NEAR QALQILYA; NABLUS; AND ABU DIS, NEAR JERUSALEM.

-- THREE PALESTINIANS WERE REPORTED WOUNDED, SEPTEMBER 3 IN CLASHES WITH IDF SOLDIERS AT SILET AL HARTHIYEH.

-- ON SEPTEMBER 4, IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED AN 18-YEAR-OLD PALESTINIAN AT SUR, NEAR TULKAREM.

-- ONE PALESTINIAN WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED SEPTEMBER 5 IN JALBOUN, IN THE JENIN DISTRICT.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03015 01 OF 03 081359Z

-- AN ISRAELI SETTLER SUSTAINED HEAD INJURIES AUGUST 30 WHEN A ROCK WAS THROWN AT HIS VEHICLE NEAR ANABTA. LATER IN THE DAY, THE IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES IN TOWN.

-- A SECOND ISRAELI MOTORIST WAS WOUNDED BY STONES THROWN AT HIS CAR NEAR BIDYA, NABLUS DISTRICT, ON AUGUST 30.

GENERAL STIKES

//////////

3.-- SHOPS WERE SHUTTERED AND PALESTINIANS STAYED AWAY FROM WORK IN ISRAEL ON AUGUST 30 IN A STRIKE TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH THE DEPORTEES. THE STRIKE CONTINUED AUGUST 31 TO PROTEST THE ARSON DEATH OF THREE PALESTINIANS INSIDE ISRAEL.

CURFEWS

//////

4. -- BANI NAIM, NEAR HEBRON, REMAINED UNDER CURFEW FOR FOR THE SEVENTH CONSECUTIVE DAY.

-- CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON AUGUST 30 IN JAYYOUS, EAST OF QALQILYA, AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS. IDF CUT OFF WATER AND ELECTRICITY, WHILE BULLDOZERS CLOSED THE ENTRANCES TO THE VILLAGE, WITH SAND AND LARGE ROCKS.

-- TIL AND BOURIN VILLAGES, NEAR NABLUS, AND AZZOUN, NEAR TULKAREM, REMAIN UNDER CURFEW FOR A SECOND WEEK.

-- CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON QALQILYA AUGUST 31

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JERUSA 03015 01 OF 03 081359Z

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 02 OF 03 081401Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00
ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /084 W

-----360310 081404Z /41

O 081357Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3409
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03015

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, AUGUST 31-SEPTEMBER 5,

FOLLOWING CLASHES WITH SOLDIERS IN WHICH ONE YOUTH
WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED.

-- CURFEW REMAINS IMPOSED ON HOUSAN VILLAGE, NEAR
BETHLEHEM, FOR THE SIXTH DAY, AFTER DAY-LONG
CLASHES AUGUST 31. RESIDENTS REPORTED THAT THE
POWER SUPPLY HAD BEEN CUT OFF.

-- A CURFEW REMAINS IN EFFECT ON EIN ARIK, NEAR RAMALLAH, FOLLOWING DEMONSTRATIONS AUGUST 31 AND SEPTEMBER 1.

-- CURFEWS REMAINED IN FORCE ON THINNABEH, NEAR TULKAREM, AND THE TULKAREM REFUGEE CAMP, WHERE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 02 OF 03 081401Z

SOLDIERS BLOCKED OFF ROADS INTO THE CAMP WITH RAMPARTS OF EARTH AND STONES.

RIVALRY BETWEEN HAMAS AND INTIFADA LEADERSHIP

////////////////////////////////////

5.-- THERE ARE NEW SIGNS OF FRICTION BETWEEN ACTIVISTS OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, HAMAS, AND THE PLO-BACKED UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU). A STATEMENT BY UNLU CRITICIZED HAMAS FOR CALLING UNAUTHORIZED STRIKES AND URGED POPULAR COMMITTEES TO PROTECT MERCHANTS WHO IGNORED THEM. THE STATEMENT WARNED THAT HAMAS ACTIVITIES THREATEN TO UNDERMINE THE PALESTINIAN UNITY THAT HAS BEEN FORGED DURING THE INTIFADA.

-- A 40-PAGE HAMAS "COVENANT" OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE IS REPORTEDLY CIRCULATING IN THE WEST BANK. THE DOCUMENT REPORTEDLY RULES OUT CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL, SAYS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH "JIHAD," AND REJECTS ALL INITIATIVES, CONFERENCES AND PROPOSALS AS A WASTE OF TIME.

STATISTICS ON INTIFADA CASUALTIES

////////////////////////////////////

6.-- DEFENCE MINISTER RABIN SAID ON AUGUST 30 THAT 18,000 RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAD BEEN ARRESTED DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF THE INTIFADA, OF WHICH 5,600 REMAINED IN ISRAELI UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03015 02 OF 03 081401Z

PRISONS, INCLUDING 2,600 ADMINISTRATIVE

DETAINEES. 60 PERSONS HAVE BEEN DEPORTED AND 210 PALESTINIANS WERE KILLED BY ISRAELI GUNFIRE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA.

-- HAOLAM HAZEH HEBREW MAGAZINE AUGUST 18 REPORTED THAT THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN FATALITIES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA IS 257. THIS FIGURE INCLUDES THE TWO GAZA STRIP WORKERS WHO WERE BURNED ALIVE.

-- PALESTINIAN SOURCES REPORT 334 FATALITIES, OF WHICH 221 DIED FROM IDF GUNFIRE, 27 DIED FROM BEATINGS AND ELECTROCUTIONS, 59 DIED FROM TEAR GAS ASPHYXIATION, AND 27 DIED FROM OTHER CAUSES.

HOMES OF SUSPECTED COLLABORATORS BURNED

////////////////////////////////////

7.-- THE HOMES OF TWO SUSPECTED COLLABORATORS WERE BURNED AND DEMOLISHED IN QALQILYA ON AUGUST 30.

ISRAELI BULLDOZERS UPROOT OLIVE TREES

////////////////////////////////////

8.-- ON AUGUST 31, ISRAELI BULLDOZERS UPROOTED 30 FRUIT-BEARING OLIVE TREES IN BIDYA, WEST OF NABLUS.

ALTERNATIVE CLASSES BLOCKED

////////////////////////////////////

9. ON SEPTEMBER 5, THE IDF CLOSED THE SOCIETY OF

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00
ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01
SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /084 W

-----360355 081404Z /41

O 081357Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3410
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03015

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, AUGUST 31-SEPTEMBER 5,

FRIENDS OF AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY IN NABLUS AFTER
INFORMAL CLASSES WERE HELD ON THE SOCIETY'S
PREMISES FOR STUDENTS WHO WISH TO CONTINUE
STUDYING NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTINUED CLOSURE OF
ALL UNIVERSITIES, INCLUDING AN-NAJAH. EARLIER, A
CLASS AT THE ABU DIS COLLEGE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY WAS CLOSED AND 12 STUDENTS AND TWO
TEACHERS ARRESTED. ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ALLEGED
THE ALTERNATIVE CLASSES HAD BECOME "CENTERS OF
PROTEST." NABLUS BUSINESSMAN SAID KANAAN, WHO
HEADS THE FRIENDS OF AN-NAJAH SAID: "WE WERE
INVOLVED IN EDUCATION AND WE WERE NOT DOING
ANYTHING AGAINST THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL."

WILCOX
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 03 OF 03 081402Z

UNCLASSIFIED

ES2

R

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03004

FILM= D880793-0229

DATE= 07 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= LATEST LEAFLETS FROM THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP AND HAMAS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PUBLICATION, DOCUMENTATION, GUERRILLA, PALESTINIANS

TAGS= KPAL, PTER, IS, PNC, HAMAS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS) FPC/CDR	FEB 12
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	Date.
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			TS authority
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY on	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TO	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

93041029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03004 01 OF 02 071523Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 ED-04
OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /083 W
-----302777 071533Z /40

O 071517Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3395
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03004

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PTER, IS
SUBJECT: LATEST LEAFLETS FROM THE INTIFADA
LEADERSHIP AND HAMAS

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: THREE RECENT DOCUMENTS--INTIFADA
LEAFLET NO. 25 FROM SEPTEMBER 6, HAMAS LEAFLET
NO. 29 FROM SEPTEMBER 5, AND THE HAMAS
"COVENANT" OF AUGUST 18--PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO
THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNIFIED
LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU) AND THE
ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (HAMAS). THESE
DOCUMENTS, IN WHICH UNLU STRONGLY CRITICIZES
HAMAS FOR TRYING TO SPLIT THE RESISTANCE, WHILE
HAMAS SEEMS TO BE BACKING AWAY FROM
CONFRONTATION, INDICATE THAT UNLU CURRENTLY
RETAINS THE UPPER HAND IN SPEAKING AND ACTING

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03004 01 OF 02 071523Z

FOR THE INTIFADA. HOWEVER, HAMAS' STRATEGY
SEEMS SET FOR A LONG TERM EFFORT TO INCREASE ITS
INFLUENCE ON THE WEST BANK. END SUMMARY.

INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 25

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. UNLU LEAFLET NO. 25 DATED SEPTEMBER 6 (TRANSLATION PROVIDED SEPTEL) IS A RELATIVELY LENGTHY AND CONFIDENT-SOUNDING DOCUMENT THAT PROVIDES THE STRONGEST CRITICISM TO DATE OF HAMAS. HAMAS IS CONDEMNED FOR TRYING TO ORGANIZE PARALLEL STRIKES AND PROTESTS AND, AS A RESULT, AIDING "THE ENEMY" BY DIVIDING PALESTINIANS. HOWEVER, UNLU ALSO "EXTENDS A HAND" TO HAMAS TO JOIN THE UNLU AND CONSOLIDATE PALESTINIAN UNITY. (WE UNDERSTAND THIS IS AN INVITATION THAT HAS BEEN OFFERED, AND REFUSED, IN THE PAST.)

4. IN OTHER ISSUES, THE LEAFLET CONDEMNS THE CONTINUING CLOSURE OF SCHOOLS AND THE SHUTTING DOWN OF PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS. IT CALLS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE POPULAR COMMITTEES, WHICH HAVE BEEN OUTLAWED BY THE GOI. THE LEAFLET PRAISES RECENT ATTACKS ON COLLABORATORS AND URGES THEIR CONTINUATION. IT ALSO CALLS FOR GENERAL STRIKES ON SEPTEMBER 8, 17, AND 26.

HAMAS LEAFLET NO. 29

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03004 01 OF 02 071523Z

5. HAMAS LEAFLET NO. 29 DATED SEPTEMBER 5 (TEXT TO BE PROVIDED SEPTEL) TAKES A MORE CONCILIATORY TONE. IT CALLS FOR GENERAL STRIKES, BUT FOR THE SAME DAYS AS UNLU DOES. (THE FACT THAT THE HAMAS LEAFLET, WHICH APPEARED BEFORE THE UNLU ONE, CALLS FOR STRIKES ON THE SAME DAYS SUPPORTS REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED THAT THERE IS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS.) HOWEVER, THIS LEAFLET FOR THE FIRST TIME IS SIGNED "ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, PALESTINE," INSTEAD OF "GAZA," PROBABLY AN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE APPEAL AND STRENGTH BEYOND GAZ.

COVENANT OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

6. WE HAVE RECEIVED (AND POUCHED TO NEA/IAI) AN ENGLISH SUMMARY OF THE 40-PAGE HAMAS COVENANT DATED AUGUST 18. ALTHOUGH SUPPOSEDLY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CIRCULATING AMONG PALESTINIANS FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, WE HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BECOME AWARE OF IT THROUGH PRESS REPORTS AND LOCAL CONTACTS. WE ARE STILL TRYING TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE COMPLETE DOCUMENT FOR ANALYSIS.

7. THE COVENANT SETS OUT TO EXPLAIN THE PHILOSOPHY AND STRATEGY OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. IT STATES THAT "THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IS A UNIQUE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT WHICH GIVES ITS ALLEGIANCE TO GOD, USES ISLAM AS ITS WAY, AND RAISES THE BANNER OF GOD ON EVERY INCH OF PALESTINE." ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENT, HAMAS IS "ONE OF THE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03004 02 OF 02 071525Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 ED-04
OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /083 W
-----303033 071533Z /40

O 071517Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3396
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

[REDACTED] L SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03004

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PTER, IS
SUBJECT: LATEST LEAFLETS FROM THE INTIFADA

WINGS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN PALESTINE," AND IS CONNECTED WITH "THE MARTYR IZZEDIN QASSAM AND HIS BROTHERS THE MUJAHIDIN FROM THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN 1936." IT ALSO CLAIMS TIES TO "THE PALESTINIAN JIHAD AND THE JIHAD OF MUSLIM BROTHERS IN 1948 AND THE OPERATIONS OF MUSLIM BROTHERS IN 1968 AND AFTER." IT DEFINES ITS STRUCTURE AS BASED ON "MUSLIMS WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO GOD."

8. ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENT, THE HAMAS RESISTANCE IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT PALESTINE IS A TRUST FROM GOD (WAQF), NO PART OF WHICH MAY BE YIELDED OR CONCEDED. THEREFORE, ITS GOAL IS THE CREATION OF AN ISLAMIC STATE IN

████████████████████
████████████████████
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03004 02 OF 02 071525Z

ALL OF PALESTINE. HAMAS REJECTS "PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES" BECAUSE "THESE CONFERENCES WILL NOT CORRECT THE INJUSTICE OR RETURN THE RIGHTS, THEY ARE A SORT OF ARBITRATION BY UNBELIEVERS TO THE LAND OF THE MUSLIMS." INSTEAD, HAMAS SUPPORTS "JIHAD" COMPOSED OF BOTH ARMED STRUGGLE AND ISLAMIC EDUCATION.

9. THE COVENANT SAYS HAMAS BASES ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS ON RESPECT AND SUPPORT FOR THEIR AIMS. IT EXTENDS AN OFFER TO THEM TO JOIN TOGETHER IN A UNIFIED ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

10. HAMAS ALSO CLAIMS TO BE PART OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT. IT THEREFORE PROMISES TO RESPECT AND SUPPORT OTHER NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS AS LONG AS THEY "DO NOT GIVE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO THE COMMUNIST EAST OR THE CRUSADER WEST."

11. IN ONE OF ITS MORE AMBIGUOUS PASSAGES, THE COVENANT LIKENS THE HAMAS-PLO RELATIONSHIP TO THAT BETWEEN A SON AND HIS FATHER. THE DOCUMENT CRITICIZES THE PLO FOR ADOPTING THE GOAL OF A SECULAR STATE, A RESULT IT ATTRIBUTES TO "INVADING EXTERNAL THOUGHTS SINCE THE CRUSADERS,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUPPORTED BY ORIENTALISM, THE MISSIONARIES, AND COLONIALISM." IT CRYPTICALLY SAYS THAT UNTIL THE PLO ACCEPTS ISLAM, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO WILL BE "LIKE SON TO FATHER."

12. THE SUMMARY WE HAVE RECEIVED ENDS WITH A

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03004 02 OF 02 071525Z

CALL TO THE ARAB STATES TO OPEN THEIR BORDERS TO THE HAMAS MUJAHIDIN AND FACILITATE THEIR STRUGGLE.

13. COMMENT. THE DOCUMENT'S PRINCIPLES CORRESPOND TO LEAFLETS AND STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HAMAS, AS WELL AS TO TRADITIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD POSITIONS. AS THE TORTURED WORDING OF THE SECTION ON RELATIONS WITH THE PLO INDICATES, HAMAS HAS NOT YET WORKED OUT ITS STRATEGY VIS-A-VIS THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT HAMAS IS COMMITTED TO AN UNCOMPROMISING CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISRAEL AND ITS ELEMENTS OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE ADVOCATING TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE.

14. MANY PALESTINIANS BELIEVE ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE HAS SOUGHT EITHER TO CREATE OR MANIPULATE ISLAMIC GROUPS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DIVIDE AND WEAKEN THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE. FORGED LEAFLETS AND STATEMENTS HAVE ALSO CIRCULATED IN AN ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT THE UNLU. THESE ARE ISSUES WE WILL ADDRESS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR FORTHCOMING REPORT ON FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THESE DOCUMENTS, WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THEY ARE NOT LEGITIMATE. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO COMMENT ON THE EXTENT, IF ANY, OF CONNIVANCE BY OUTSIDE ELEMENTS IN THEIR PREPARATION AND/OR DISTRIBUTION. END COMMENT.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EJ25

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV14724

FILM= D880915-0753

DATE= 14 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, OCT. 14

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 14400, 88 TEL AVIV 14399

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ELECTION, CAMPAIGN, REVIEW

TAGS= PGOV, IS

FEB 12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY NO CLASSIFICATION

EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PART

DENY

DELETE Non-Responsive info

CLASSIFY as S or B or C or D or E or F or G or H or I or J or K or L or M or N or O or P or Q or R or S or T or U or V or W or X or Y or Z

TS authority [REDACTED]

PA Exemptions

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

RELIGIOUS PARTIES. END SUMMARY.

ASSESSMENTS

3. LIKUD: CAMPAIGN INFORMATION CO-DIRECTOR RONI MILO CONTINUED TO BE HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC LIKUD WOULD GAIN MORE SEATS THAN LABOR, WITH LIKUD HAVING A POTENTIAL WIN OF 48 SEATS. HE ALSO BELIEVED THE RIGHT/RELIGIOUS BLOC WOULD EMERGE LARGER THAN THE LEFT BLOC. CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION CO-DIRECTOR YITZHAK MODAI ALSO FELT GOOD ABOUT LIKUD'S PROSPECTS BUT, IN CONTRAST, FELT NO ONE COULD CALL THE ELECTION RESULTS AT THIS POINT.

4. LABOR: CAMPAIGN INFORMATION DIRECTOR ZVILI SAW NN BASIC SHIFT IN THE OVERALL ELECTORAL PICTURE AND BELIEVED THE RACE BETWEEN LIKUD AND LABOR WOULD END IN A "TIE." HE DID NOT BELIEVE LABOR WOULD MAKE REAL INROADS AMONG THE HEAVILY LIKUD-VOTING SEPHARDIM (JEWS OF NORTH AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EAST ORIGIN).

5. LABOR: ENERGY MINISTER SHAHAL, WHO HAS TITULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HAIFA REGION IN THE CAMPAIGN, ASSESSED THAT LABOR AND THE OTHER ANTI-LIKUD PARTIES MAY NOT BE ABLE TO WIN A "BLOCKING MAJORITY" OF 61 KNESSET SEATS. HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT IF LABOR EMERGED AS THE LARGEST PARTY IT MIGHT STILL BE ABLE TO FORM A NARROW COALITION WITHOUT LIKUD BY WINNING THE SUPPORT OF SOME OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES DURING

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14724 01 OF 03 141725Z

THE COALITION FORMATION PROCESS. (SHAHAL ALSO SAID SHARON TOLD HIM HE EXPECTED THE ELECTION TO RESULT IN A STANDOFF AND THERE TO BE NO ALTERNATIVE TO FORMING ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT.)

THE ARAB VOTE

6. SHAHAL FELT LABOR'S PROSPECTS FOR HOLDING ON TO ITS 1984 SHARE OF THE ARAB VOTES (WHICH GAVE IT 3 PLUS SEATS) HAD IMPROVED IN RECENT WEEKS. IN CONTRAST, LABOR KNESSET CANDIDATE YOSHI BEILIN, WHO IS HANDLING RESEARCH FOR THE CAMPAIGN HQ, HAD NO INFORMATION SUGGESTING A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER FOR THE PARTY AMONG ISRAELI ARABS. (MOST OF OUR LABOR CONTACTS BELIEVE IT WILL GAIN NO MORE THAN THE EQUIVALENT OF 2 SEATS FROM THE ISRAELI ARABS).

7. MK ABD AL WAHAB DAROUSHE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT HIS DEMOCRATIC ARAB PARTY'S CHANCES, NOTING THAT IT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ALREADY HAD ALMOST 10,000 MEMBERS. HE EXPECTED THE ISRAELI ARAB VOTE TO DELIVER ABOUT 13 SEATS TO THE FOLLOWING PARTIES:

HADASH (COMMUNISTS)	5
PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE	2 MINUS
LABOR	2
DAROUSHE	2
LIKUD	1
CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT	.5
MAPAM	.5

8. COMMENT: WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE DAROUSHE WILL HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME GETTING OVER THE 1 PERCENT THRESHOLD AND WIN A SEAT. HADASH, PLP AND CRM MAY DO

NNNN

PAGE 01 TEL AV 14724 02 OF 03 141725Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /068 W
-----354104 141808Z /41 38

O 141721Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1371
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 5279

SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14724

USIA FOR NEA AND R/NA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, OCT. 14

BETTER AND LIKUD LESS WELL AMONG ARAB VOTERS THAN HE SUGGESTED.

9. PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE KNESSET CANDIDATE RIAH AL ASAL ASSERTED TO US HIS PARTY WOULD DO WELL IN THE ELECTION, PICKING UP MANY OF THE 20,000 VOTES HE EXPECTED TO BE LOST BY LABOR. HE ARGUED THAT NEITHER HADASH NOR DAROUSHE WOULD BENEFIT FROM DEFECTIONS FROM LABOR. DAROUSHE WOULD NOT MAKE IT PAST THE 1 PERCENT THRESHOLD, HE CLAIMED. ASAL SAID ANOTHER PLUS FOR THE PLP WOULD BE THE VOTES OF ISLAMICS WHO WOULD BE PARTICIPATING IN THIS YEAR'S ELECTION.

THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES

10. THE STRUGGLE AMONG THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES HAS

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 14724 02 OF 03 141725Z

INTENSIFIED. THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP) IS SET TO STEP UP ITS ATTACKS ON THE MORE MODERATE MEMAD. MEMAD SEEMS LIKELY TO WIN A SEAT, HOWEVER, WHILE THE NRP MAY NOT WIN MORE THAN FOUR SEATS (DOWN FROM ITS CURRENT FIVE). NRP HAS DECIDED AGAINST CONCLUDING A SURPLUS VOTES AGREEMENT WITH EITHER RIVAL MEMAD OR THE NON-ZIONIST AGUDAT ISRAEL.

11. AGUDAT ISRAEL IS BATTLING THE NEW DEGEL HATORAH (TORAH FLAG) PARTY FOR THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX NON-ZIONIST ASHKENAZI (JEWS OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ORIGIN) VOTE. FOR ITS PART, SHAS IS SEEKING TO PREVENT EROSIONS IN ITS PRIMARILY SEPHARDI CONSTITUENCY. RABBINICAL ENDORSEMENTS ARE THE KEY FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX VOTE. RABBI SHACH IS THE SPONSOR AND PATRON OF SHAS AND DEGEL HATORAH, WHILE THE LUBAVITCHER AND GUR RABBIS ARE BACKING AGUDA. THESE RABBIS HAVE BEEN FEUDING FOR DECADES AND THEIR FIGHT HAS NOW TAKEN ON A POLITICAL DIMENSION.

12. AGUDA MK PORUSH BELIEVES HIS PARTY WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD ON TO ITS TWO SEATS. HIS ASSESSMENT WAS SHARED BY SHAS' KNESSET FACTION SECRETARY JACOBSON, WHO SAW THE FOLLOWING ELECTORAL OUTCOME IN THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX SECTOR: SHAS - 4; DEGEL HATORAH - 2; AND AGUDAT ISRAEL - 2 TO 3. LIKUD'S PONI MILO ALSO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXPECTED DEGEL HATORAH TO WIN 2 SEATS. THE IMPRESSIVE SHOWING OF DEGEL HATORAH'S FOUNDING MEETING, WHICH DREW THOUSANDS OF SHACH ADHERENTS, CONVINCED US THE NEW PARTY IS LIKELY TO WIN AT LEAST A SEAT. ALTHOUGH MILO ASSFRTED DEGEL HATORAH LIST LEADER RABBI RAVITZ IS CLOSE TO LIKUD, JACOBSON ASSERTED RAVITZ SHARES SHACH'S ESSENTIALLY DOVISH

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14724 02 OF 03 141725Z

OUTLOOK AND WOULD CERTAINLY FOLLOW SHACH'S LEAD. RAVITZ HAS ALSO PUBLICLY STATED THAT "EVERYTHING IS OPEN" REGARDING LIKUD OR LABOR AS COALITION PARTNERS.

THE CAMPAIGN

13. THE PARTIES ARE NOW HOLDING DAILY CAMPAIGN EVENTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. A SHAMIR-PERES TELEVISION DEBATE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR OCT. 23. MEANWHILE, TELEVISION AND RADIO ELECTION BROADCASTS ARE GETTING NASTIER. LABOR AND LIKUD CONTINUE TO TRADE CHARGES OVER THE DISRUPTION OF SEVERAL LABOR CAMPAIGN EVENTS. LABOR IS FOCUSING ITS TELEVISION ELECTION BROADCASTS ON THE PERES/RABIN DUO AND ITS "NEW FACES," WHICH HAS GENERATED CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE MINISTERS BEING KEPT OUT OF THE LIMELIGHT. LIKUD'S CAMPAIGN, RUN BY ARENS, HAS ALSO IRRITATED OTHER SENIOR LIKUD MINISTERS. ONLY IN THE LAST DAY HAS LIKUD BEEN SHARING THE SPOTLIGHT ON SHAMIR AND THE "LIKUD PRINCES" OF THE SHAMIR-ARENS CAMP WITH DAVID LEVY AND THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE LEVY AND SHARON CAMPS. SHARON'S TRIP TO HUNGARY AT A CRITICAL POINT IN THE CAMPAIGN WAS CLEARLY A SIGN OF PIQUE THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN LIKUD'S REBUTTAL OF THE SECURITY PROPOSAL OF LABOR'S GENERALS OR GIVEN A ROLE IN LIKUD'S BROADCASTS.

JNCERTAINTIES

14. NEXT WEEK THE SUPREME COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DECISION ON KAHANE'S APPEAL AGAINST THE KNESSET CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMITTEE'S DISQUALIFICATION OF HIS KACH PARTY. IF KACH IS NOT ALLOWED TO RUN, MOST OF HIS SUPPORTERS ARE LIKELY TO OPT FOR LIKUD, WHICH

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 14724 03 OF 03 141726Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /068 W
-----354110 141809Z /41 38

O 141721Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1372
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 5280

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14724

USIA FOR NEA AND R/NA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, OCT. 14

COULD GIVE IT ANOTHER 1-2 SEATS.

15. THERE CONTINUES TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF UNDECIDED VOTERS. LABOR AND LIKUD TO A LESSER DEGREE ARE FOCUSING THEIR CAMPAIGNS ON THESE VOTERS. LABOR IS FOLLOWING UP ON ITS TELEPHONE PROJECT TO IDENTIFY THE FLOATING VOTER WITH HOME VISITS PUT LACK OF VOLUNTEERS -- PARTICULARLY IN THE KEY TEL AVIV REGION -- MAKE IT UNLIKELY IT WILL REACH MORE THAN 4 PERCENT OF ITS 130,00N TARGET HOUSEHOLDS. LIKUD HAS NOTHING TO COMPETE WITH THIS LABOR EFFORT AND SEEMS ALSO TO BE SHORT ON VOLUNTEERS. IN ADDITION, AS ELECTION DAY APPROACHES, VOTERS WHO HAD EXPRESSFD SUPPORT FOR THE SMALLER PARTIES MAY (AS IN THE PAST) "RETURN HOME" TO THE TWO BIG PARTIES.

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 TEL AV 14724 03 OF 03 141726Z

16. THERE ARE WILDCARDS WHICH COULD OCCUR FROM NOW TO ELECTION DAY. THE MOST OBVIOUS WOULD BE A TERRORIST ATTACK IN ISRAEL; A BLOODY CONFRONTATION IN THE TERRITORIES INVOLVING IDF/ARABS/SETTLERS; A PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING WHICH DECLARES AN INDEPENDENT STATE/GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE; OR A DRAMATIC ECONOMIC EVENT, SUCH AS A COURT-ORDERED BREAK-UP OF THE LARGE AND FINANCIALLY PLAGUED KOOR INDUSTRIES.

POLLS

17. TELESEKER SURVEYED 1,000 JEWISH ISRAELIS AND CONDUCTED A SEPARATE SURVEY OF ISRAELI ARABS BY TELEPHONE OVER OCT. 6-10 (FBIS TA 1410104488). ACCORDING TO ITS FINDINGS, LABOR WOULD WIN MORE SEATS THAN LIKUD (44-38) AND THERE WOULD BE A BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST A LIKUD-LED NARROW GOVERNMENT. RESULTS FOLLOW:

PARTY	SEATS	
LABOR	44	
MAPAM	2	
CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT	7	
CENTER-SHINUI	2	
ZIONIST CENTER/LEFT PARTIES SUBTOTAL		55
HADASH (COMMUNISTS)	4	
PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE	2	
DAROUSHE	2	
NON-ZIONIST LEFT PARTIES SUBTOTAL		8
LIKUD	38	
TEHIYA	6	

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14724 03 OF 03 141726Z

TZOMET	1	
MOLEDET	1	
KACH	1	
RIGHT PARTIES SUBTOTAL		47

NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY	5	
SHAS	2	
ULTRAORTHODOX PARTIES	2	

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMAD 1
RELIGIOUS PARTIES SUBTOTAL 10

18. MAARIV NEWSPAPER ALSO REPORTED A TELEPHONE SURVEY CONDUCTED LAST WEEK BY THE UNKNOWN BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION. NO INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED ON ITS SAMPLE. THE POLL RESULTS SHOWED LABOR WOULD WIN MORE SEATS THAN LIKUD (43-38), WITH THE BLOCS ABOUT EVEN.

PICKERING

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

E121

TR

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03393

FILM= D880911-0469

DATE= 13 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC
AMMAN
TEL AVIV
CAIRO
DAMASCUS

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 27 OF 10/9/88

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DOCUMENTATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, OCCUPIED AREA, APPROVAL, DEMONS
TEXT

AS/FPC/CDR Date: FEB 11

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only: EO Citations
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	Non-Responsive Info	TS authority:
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	FOIA Exemptions	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS, PLO

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03393 01 OF 04 131624Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /084 W

-----260444 131644Z /41

O 131620Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3725
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03393

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 27 OF 10/9/88

1. SUMMARY. LEAFLET NO. 27 OF THE "PLO/UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING" (UNLU), DATED OCTOBER 9, REASSURED PALESTINIANS THAT THE PLO WAS WORKING TO PREPARE THE PNC AND TRANSLATE THEIR SUFFERINGS INTO WORLD-WIDE GAINS. IT REITERATED THE PROGRAM OUTLINED IN LEAFLET NO. 26, CALLING FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, CANCELLATION OF THE BRITISH SECURITY REGULATIONS, DISMANTLEMENT OF SETTLEMENTS, FREEING OF DETAINEES, AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION DURING A SHORT TRANSITION TO AN INDEPENDENT STATE WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL.

2. THE LEAFLET ALSO APPEALED FOR UNITY OF THE RANKS AND CALLED ON PALESTINIANS TO ENGAGE IN
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03393 01 OF 04 131624Z

"MASSIVE ACTIVITIES" DURING THE PNC. IT ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF EDUCATION, URGING INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY UNESCO, TO INTERVENE WITH THE ISRAELIS AND CALLED ON PALESTINIANS TO CONDUCT SIT-INS IN FRONT OF FOREIGN CONSULATES, SCHOOLS, AND UNIVERSITIES. UNLU ALSO INSTRUCTED PALESTINIANS TO ORGANIZE POPULAR EDUCATION. THE MASSES ARE ORDERED TO ASSIST FARMERS DURING THE OLIVE PICKING SEASON, AND MERCHANTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO MAINTAIN THEIR SHORTENED HOURS AND TAX STRIKE. UNLU ORDERS DOCTORS TO RESTRICT THEIR FEES TO NIS 12 PER VISIT, AND ALL PALESTINIANS ARE URGED TO COMBAT THE SECURITY FORCES' SEARCH-AND-ARREST CAMPAIGNS. STRIKES ARE SET FOR OCTOBER 14, 19, AND 26, AND CONFRONTATIONS ARE CALLED FOR AFTER FRIDAY AND SUNDAY PRAYERS. END SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF LEAFLET 27:

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE
A CALL ... A CALL ... A CALL
NO VOICE IS ABOVE THE VOICE OF THE UPRISING
NO VOICE IS ABOVE THE VOICE OF PALESTINIANS, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PLO
CALL NO. 27 - THE CALL OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL
COUNCIL (PNC) PUBLISHED BY THE PLO/THE UNIFIED
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU)

O MASSES OF THE GIGANTIC INTIFADA: YOU WHO HAVE
IMPOSED A SIEGE AND INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION ON
YOUR ZIONIST ENEMY. YOUR INTIFADA STARTS ITS 11TH
MONTH WITH STURDY STEPS, CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL
INEVITABLY GET YOUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF RETURN,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03393 01 OF 04 131624Z

SELF-DETERMINATION, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF YOUR
INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN NATIONAL STATE UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO, OUR SOLE LEGITIMATE
REPRESENTATIVE, DESPITE THE DESPERATE ATTEMPTS OF
THE ZIONIST ENEMY TO EXTINGUISH THE FLAMES OF YOUR
INTIFADA. THE ENEMY HAS RECENTLY ADOPTED A NEW
POLICY OF COMPREHENSIVE RAIDS ON WEST BANK TOWNS
AND VILLAGES, PARTICULARLY ON SATURDAYS AND
GENERAL STRIKE DAYS, DURING WHICH SEVERAL YOUTHS
ARE SHOT, KILLED OR ARRESTED; OLD MEN, WOMEN AND
CHILDREN ARE BEATEN; AND TOWNS, VILLAGES AND
REFUGEE CAMPS ARE CLOSED OFF FOR PROLONGED
PERIODS. THIS POLICY DEMONSTRATES THE DIFFICULT
CRISIS FACING OCCUPATION FORCES AND THE EXTENT OF
LOSSES INFLICTED ON ALL LEVELS.

O TORCH-BEARERS OF THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE: WHILE YOUR INTIFADA CONTINUES THE BATTLE, OUR HISTORIC LEADERSHIP, REPRESENTED BY THE PLO, IS MAKING GREAT EFFORTS TO TRANSLATE YOUR DAILY VICTORIES INTO WORLD WIDE GAINS IN FAVOR OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE--VICTORIES WHICH INCREASE THE ISOLATION OF OUR ENEMY AND ITS IMPERIALIST AMERICAN ALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME YOUR LEADERSHIP CONTINUES THE STRUGGLE AND PREPARES FOR HOLDING THE EXTRAORDINARY 19TH SESSION OF THE PNC, WHICH WILL, WITH ITS NEW RESOLUTIONS, CONSTITUTE A NEW WEAPON IN THE HANDS OF OUR MASSES AND RESPOND TO THE AIMS AND ASPIRATIONS OF OUR PEOPLE, THE PEOPLE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03393 02 OF 04 131625Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /084 W

-----260475 131644Z /41

O 131620Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3726
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03393

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 27 OF 10/9/88

OF THE PLO AND THE INTIFADA, FOR LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENCE. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT OUR NATIONAL COUNCIL WILL APPROVE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO FILL THE VACUUM CREATED BY THE JORDANIAN DECISIONS AND ADOPT PROGRAMS AND METHODS TO TRANSLATE THE SLOGANS OF OUR INTIFADA CALLING FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE INTO INCREASED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

UNLU, THE STRUGGLING ARM OF THE PLO IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT THE RESOLUTIONS AND PROGRAMS TO BE ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL, WHICH THE ENEMY FORCES AND THEIR ALLIES WILL TRY TO ABORT, WILL BE CAPABLE OF TERMINATING THE ATTEMPTS TO KEEP THE PLO AWAY FROM UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03393 02 OF 04 131625Z

REPRESENTING OUR PEOPLE IN AN INDEPENDENT DELEGATION TO AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH ALL OTHER PARTIES. THE PLO IS CAPABLE OF ENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA, AS WITNESSED DURING BROTHER ABU AMMAR'S VISIT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AT STRASBOURG LAST MONTH.

ON THIS OCCASION, WE CALL ON THE MASSES OF THE INTIFADA TO INITIATE MASSIVE ACTIVITIES INSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES DURING THE PNC MEETINGS AND SEND LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS OF SUPPORT.

ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION, WHICH FALLS DURING THIS MONTH, UNLU DEMANDS THAT THE UN CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND IMPLEMENT ITS RESOLUTIONS IN FULL, INCLUDING RESOLUTIONS WHICH ENSURE OUR PEOPLES' RIGHTS TO RETURN, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO. ON THIS OCCASION, UNLU CONGRATULATES THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRIES WHICH

SUPPORT OUR RIGHTS, AND REITERATES THE NEED TO ENSURE THE FOLLOWING LEGITIMATE DEMANDS:

1. WITHDRAWAL OF THE OCCUPATION FORCES FROM PALESTINIAN POPULATION CENTERS;
2. CANCELLATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE'S EMERGENCY REGULATIONS, WHICH ARE STILL IN USE;
3. STOPPING THE POLICY OF ANNEXATION AND UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03393 02 OF 04 131625Z

ESTABLISHING NEW SETTLEMENTS WHILE DISMANTLING EXISTING ONES;

4. FREEING PRISONERS OF THE INTIFADA AND CLOSING THE MILITARY DETENTION CAMPS;

5. PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE UNARMED PALESTINIANS FOR A PERIOD OF NO MORE THAN A FEW MONTHS IN PREPARATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL.

O MASSES OF THE INTIFADA: UNLU VALUES YOUR EFFORTS IN CONTINUING YOUR CONFRONTATIONS AGAINST THE OPPRESSIVE ENEMY AND THE NEW METHODS ADOPTED BY THE ENEMY'S GENERALS TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND ARREST CAMPAIGNS, CLOSE OFF TOWNS AND VILLAGES, AND USE PLASTIC BULLETS. WE BOW AND RESPECT THE PERSEVERANCE OF OUR MASSES IN COURAGEOUS HEBRON, THOSE WHO HEROICALLY CHALLENGE THE OCCUPATION FORCES AND THE HOARDS OF SETTLERS. THEY HAVE PROVED THAT HEBRON WILL NOT BE DESECRATED BY LEVINGER AND HIS GANG. WE VALUE ALSO THE POSITION OF THE MASSES IN THE STEADFAST GAZA STRIP, THOSE WHO TRANSFORMED THE FUNERAL INTO A VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION AGAINST OCCUPATION AND ITS AGENTS, AND VALUE THEIR DEFIANCE OF CURFEW ORDERS. A THOUSAND CHEERS TO ALL OUR MASSES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03393 03 OF 04 131627Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /084 W

-----260553 131644Z /41

O 131620Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3727
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03393

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 27 OF 10/9/88

O BUILDERS OF THE GREAT PALESTINIAN STATE: THE
FIERCE CAMPAIGNS WAGED BY THE ENEMY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
WHO HAVE DEVELOPED NEW
METHODS TO ERADICATE THE INTIFADA REQUIRE, NOW
MORE THAN EVER, MORE UNITY OF THE LINES UNDER THE
BANNER OF THE PLO. WE SHOULD BE COMMITTED TO THE
DECISIONS AND PROGRAMS OF ITS LEADERSHIP. ON THIS
OCCASION, UNLU EXTENDS ITS HAND, FERVENTLY TO ALL
THE STRUGGLING HONEST HANDS, SEEKING MORE
COORDINATION AND POOLING OF EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE
THE ENEMY'S CONSPIRACIES, WHICH TRY TO CREATE A
SPLIT IN THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL LINES. UNLU
CALLS ON YOU TO DEVELOP PLANS FOR STRUGGLE WHICH

WILL ENSURE STRONG RESISTANCE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S
FIERCE CAMPAIGN AND DEDICATE THEIR TIME FOR
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03393 03 OF 04 131627Z

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES:

EDUCATION: THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES' DECISION TO RENEW THE ORDERS TO CLOSE SCHOOLS AND HIGHER EDUCATION FACILITIES, TO DEPRIVE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OUR CHILDREN OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION, RIGHTS THAT WERE ENSURED BY ALL INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND PRECEPTS, IS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF THE FEAR OF THE EDUCATION WEAPON WHICH OBSESSES THE LEADERS OF THE OCCUPATION. CONSEQUENTLY, UNLU CALLS ON ALL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY UNESCO, TO INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY TO PUT AN END TO THE POLICY OF IGNORANCE USED BY THE OCCUPATION FORCES . UNLU URGES THE HIGHER EDUCATION COUNCIL; THE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATIONS, TEACHERS' UNIONS AND STUDENT COUNCILS; AS WELL AS PARENTS' COMMITTEES TO CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND WAGE AN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN TO EXPOSE THE OCCUPATION'S POLICY BY SENDING MEMOS AND HOLDING SIT-DOWN STRIKES OUTSIDE UN OFFICES AND FOREIGN CONSULATES, SCHOOLS, AND UNIVERSITIES TO DEMAND THEIR UNCONDITIONAL REOPENING. UNLU CALLS ON PALESTINIAN ACADEMICS AND EDUCATORS TO DRAW UP A PROGRAM FOR ALTERNATIVE POPULAR EDUCATION IN TOWNS, VILLAGES, AND REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND CHALLENGE THE OCCUPATION'S POLICY OF IGNORANCE.

AGRICULTURE: UNLU CALLS ON THE MASSES TO ASSIST FARMERS TO COLLECT THEIR OLIVES DURING THE OLIVE PICKING SEASON. OUR PALESTINIAN CULTURE WAS BLESSED WITH THE TRADITION OF HELPING EACH OTHER, ACCORDING TO THE HONORABLE 'ONEH TRADITION, WHICH
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03393 03 OF 04 131627Z

REQUIRES NEIGHBORS TO HELP EACH OTHER AT THE TIME OF NEED. LET US ALL ADHERE TO THIS TRADITION AND PRACTICE IT.

MERCHANTS: WE DEEPLY VALUE THE MERCHANTS' COMMITMENT TO NON-PAYMENT OF TAXES AND TO OPENING

THEIR SHOPS FROM 8 AM TO 12 NOON (COMMENT: THIS WAS A MISPRINT, ACCORDING TO CONGEN SOURCES; SHOPS THAT TRIED TO OPEN AT 8 AM WERE TOLD TO CLOSE UNTIL 9AM. END COMMENT.), AS WELL AS THEIR BOYCOTT OF ISRAELI PRODUCTS WHICH HAVE LOCAL ALTERNATIVES. WE WISH TO RENEW OUR CALL TO THEM TO REMAIN COMMITTED TO UNLU'S INSTRUCTIONS AND DEMAND THE MERCHANTS' COMMITTEES TO FOLLOW UP ON THIS MATTER.

THE INTERNAL FRONT: UNLU DEMAND THAT NO ONE ISSUE ANY STATEMENT IN ITS NAME. WE WARN OUR MASSES AGAINST SUSPICIOUS SLOGANS PAINTED ON WALLS AS WELL AS THREATENING LETTERS AND TELEPHONE CALLS. THESE ARE ISSUED BY ENEMY SOURCES AND AIM AT ABORTING THE INTIFADA.

POPULAR COMMITTEES: THESE COMMITTEES ARE URGED TO COURAGEOUSLY INTERVENE IN SOLVING INTERNAL FEUDS AND TO DEVELOP THEIR PRESENCE TO FOLLOW UP ON ALL CASES IN THE FIELD. MORE GUARDING COMMITTEES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

PHYSICIANS AND DOCTORS: UNLU DEMAND ALL GENERAL PRACTITIONERS AND SPECIALISTS TO TREAT OUR PEOPLE'S

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03393 04 OF 04 131629Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09

L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /084 W

-----260635 131644Z /41

O 131620Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3728
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03393

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 27 OF 10/9/88

PATIENTS AND THE WOUNDED DURING THESE DIFFICULT
TIMES WHERE PEOPLE SUFFER FROM INJURIES ALL DAY.
UNLU DEMANDS ALL DOCTORS TO RESTRICT THEIR FEES
FOR TREATING PATIENTS TO 12 NEW SHEKELS AT THE
MOST.

LAWYERS: UNLU DEMAND LAWYERS TO COORDINATE THEIR
ACTIVITIES DEALING WITH DETAINEES AMONG
THEMSELVES. THEY SHOULD FORM LEGAL COMMITTEES TO
DEFEND THE PRISONERS AND HOLD CONFERENCES TO
EXPOSE THE SITUATION OF PRISONERS IN THE DETENTION
CAMPS.

RESITING THE POLICY OF MASSIVE SWEEPS: POPULAR
COMMITTEES AND AND STRIKE FORCES SHOULD BE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03393 04 OF 04 131629Z

RESPONSIBLE FOR COMBATING THIS POLICY BY BEING
ALERT AND PREPARED AT ALL TIMES. THEY SHOULD
CREATE NEW METHODS OF RESISTANCE AND AID THOSE WHO
ARE WANTED BY THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES.

O MASSES OF THE GLORIOUS INTIFADA: UNLU URGES YOU
TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING OBLIGATIONS AND
ACTIVITIES:

-- OCTOBER 14, A GENERAL STRIKE DAY TO COMMEMORATE
THE MASSACRE AT QIBYA. OCTOBER 19, A GENERAL
STRIKE DAY TO PROTEST AGAINST THE SETTLERS WHO ARE
ASSISTED AND PROTECTED BY THE OCCUPATION FORCES

AGAINST UNARMED CIVILLIANS. OCTOBER 26, A GENERAL STRIKE DAY IN COMMEMORATION OF THE MASSACRE AT KUFR QASEM.

-- OCTOBER 11, THE BEGINNING OF THE OLIVE PICKING CAMPAIGN, WHICH WILL CONTINUE IN THE OCCUPIED HOMELAND UNTIL THE END OF THE SEASON.

-- OCTOBER 15, A DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE BESEIGED AREAS AND CONFRONTATION WITH THE SEARCH-AND-ARREST CAMPAIGNS FREQUENTLY WAGED ON SATURDAYS.

-- OCTOBER 22, ALSO A DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE BESEIGED AREAS.

-- OCTOBER 24, A DAY OF SIT-INS OUTSIDE UN OFFICES TO URGE THEM TO COMPEL ISRAEL TO BE COMMITTED TO THE UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

-- OCTOBER 29, A DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03393 04 OF 04 131629Z

BESEIGED AREAS AND CONFRONTING THE SEARCH-AND-ARREST CAMPAIGNS.

AFTER PRAYERS ON FRIDAYS AND SUNDAYS, THE DAYS SHOULD BE DEDICATED TO CONFRONTATIONS, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND MASSIVE MARCHES; VISITS TO MARTYR'S TOMBS; AND SEEING THE WOUNDED.

THE INTIFADA WILL CONTINUE UNTIL OUR PEOPLE ATTAIN LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENCE.

THE PLO
THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA.
"QAWEM", RESIST.
OCTOBER 9, 1988

END TEXT.

WILCOX

E20

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03386

FILM= D880911-0345

DATE= 13 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP, OCTOBER 4 - 10, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= VIOLENCE, WEST BANK, POLICE FORCE

TAGS= KPAL, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

IS/FPC/CDR

FEB 12 1989
Date.

EO Citations _____
EO Citations _____

TS authority 103
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03386 01 OF 03 131543Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00
RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 C-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
/075 W

-----256605 131603Z /46

O 131540Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3717
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03386

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, OCTOBER 4 - 10, 1988

1. SUMMARY: IN AN UNUSUALLY VIOLENT WEEK, NINE PALESTINIANS WERE REPORTED KILLED, INCLUDING TWO WHO DIED OF WOUNDS SUSTAINED EARLIER. THREE ALLEGED COLLABORATORS WERE KILLED. 80 PERSONS WERE WOUNDED, INCLUDING 11 ISRAELIS (3 IDF). AUTHORITIES INTENSIFIED SEARCH AND ARREST CAMPAIGNS. EAST JERUSALEM HIGH SCHOOLS WERE REOPENED. THE IDF UPROOTED OLIVE TREES IN ONE VILLAGE. CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON TEN LOCATIONS. A THREE-DAY STRIKE WAS CALLED IN NABLUS TO PROTEST THE KILLING OF A MAN THERE. A GENERAL STRIKE DAY WAS OBSERVED ON OCTOBER 9 TO MARK THE START OF THE ELEVENTH MONTH OF THE INTIFADEH. THIS REPORT WAS COMPILED MAINLY FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS. END SUMMARY.
2. 9 KILLED, 80 WOUNDED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03386 01 OF 03 131543Z

OCTOBER 4
THE IDF SPARKED A CLASH IN NABLUS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ARREST A PALESTINIAN WHO ALLEGEDLY TRIED TO STAB AN ARMY OFFICER AND GRAB HIS GUN. THE

OFFICER OPENED FIRE, WOUNDING THE MAN. SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO OTHERS IN THE CITY.

TWO ISRAELI MOTORISTS WERE INJURED BY BROKEN GLASS WHEN ROCKS WERE THROWN AT THEIR CARS NEAR A-RAM AND QALANDIA REFUGEE CAMP, NORTH OF JERUSALEM.

OCTOBER 5

TWO SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED WHEN A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL WAS THROWN AT THEIR JEEP ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF TULKAREM. A CURFEW WAS IMPOSED FOR SEVERAL HOURS AND SOLDIERS CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE SEARCHES.

A RESIDENT OF BALATA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS, WHO HAD SUFFERED WOUNDS IN A CLASH WITH SOLDIERS 10 DAYS AGO, DIED OF HIS WOUNDS.

VIOLENT PROTESTS ERUPTED IN NABLUS AFTER SOLDIERS TOOK A SERIOUSLY WOUNDED PALESTINIAN YOUTH FROM THE HOSPITAL IN NABLUS TO A HOSPITAL IN ISRAEL FOR INTERROGATION AND DETENTION. SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED 10 PALESTINIANS. IDF SOURCES SAID ONLY FIVE WERE WOUNDED.

AT BEIT SAHOUR THE BABY OF AN ISRAELI SETTLER WAS CUT BY GLASS SHARDS WHEN STONES THROWN AT HIS MOTHER'S CAR BROKE A WINDOW. LATER IN THE DAY, AN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03386 01 OF 03 131543Z

ISRAELI BUS WAS STONED AND TWO OF ITS WINDOWS WERE BROKEN. PASSENGERS GOT OFF AND THREW STONES AT AN ARAB HOME AND SMASHED THE WINDOWS OF A CAR PARKED NEARBY.

OCTOBER 6

SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED ONE MAN AND WOUNDED FOUR OTHERS DURING CLASHES IN NABLUS'S OLD CITY. SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A PALESTINIAN DURING CLASHES AT TULKAREM REFUGEE CAMP AND ANOTHER IN NEARBY JAYYOUS.

TWO PASSENGERS IN AN ISRAELI BUS WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED WHEN STONES SHATTERED THE WINDOWS OF THE BUS TRAVELLING ALONG THE SHUFAT ROAD IN NORTHERN JERUSALEM.

OCTOBER 7

SEVERE CLASHES WERE SPARKED IN NABLUS BY REPORTS

OF THE FATAL SHOOTING ON OCTOBER 6. SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED FOUR PALESTINIANS: THE HIGHEST SINGLE-DAY TOLL IN SIX MONTHS. 14 OTHER PALESTINIANS WERE WOUNDED. LOCAL SOURCES SAID TWO OF THE KILLED WERE SHOT IN THE HEAD BY ARMY SNIPERS. A CURFEW IMPOSED REMAINS AS OF OCTOBER 10.

THE IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED NINE PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES AT TUBAS, JENIN, JENIN REFUGEE CAMP AND ASKAR CAMP, NEAR NABLUS. ONE SOLDIER WAS LIGHTLY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03386 02 OF 03 131544Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00
RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 C-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
/075 W

-----256632 131602Z /41

O 131540Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3718
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03386

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, OCTOBER 4 - 10, 1988

INJURED WHEN HE WAS HIT BY A STONE THROWN NEAR
ASKAR CAMP.

OCTOBER 8
SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED ONE MAN DURING CLASHES IN
YAABAD, NEAR JENIN.

ONE RESIDENT OF EIN BEIT ILMA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR
NABLUS, DIED OF HEAD WOUNDS SUSTAINED IN CLASHES
ON SEPTEMBER 26. SEVEN OTHERS WERE SHOT AND
WOUNDED IN THE CAMP DURING THE MAN'S FUNERAL.

BLACK FLAGS FLEW IN NABLUS AND SCATTERED CLASHES
AND DEMONSTRATIONS WERE REPORTED DESPITE THE
CURFEW. SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED THREE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03386 02 OF 03 131544Z

PALESTINIANS.

IN TULKAREM, IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED THREE
PALESTINIANS DURING A CLASH. STORES IN TULKAREM,
QALQILYA AND JENIN WERE CLOSED OCTOBER 7, 8 AND 9,
IN MOURNING FOR THE DEAD.
AT RAMALLAH, IDF SHOT AND KILLED A YOUTH WHEN
SOLDIERS OPENED FIRE AFTER THEIR LOOKOUT POST WAS
STONED.

OCTOBER 9
SOLDIERS OPENED FIRE, KILLING TWO VILLAGERS, WHEN
AN IDF SWEEP ON YATTA, SOUTH OF HEBRON,
ENCOUNTERED RESISTANCE.

AFTER SOLDIERS COMPLETED A SWEEP AT KUFR NI'MEH,
NEAR RAMALLAH, YOUTHS RAISED PALESTINIAN FLAGS ON
TELEPHONE LINES AND STONED ISRAELI CARS. SOLDIERS
SHOT AND WOUNDED THREE YOUTHS.

THE IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED NINE OTHER PALESTINIAN
YOUTHS DURING CLASHES IN TULKAREM, HEBRON, SAIR,
NEAR HEBRON, ORTAS, NEAR BETHLEHEM AND JALAZONE
REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR RAMALLAH.

OCTOBER 10
SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A YOUTH DURING A RAID ON

ATTIL VILLAGE, NEAR TULKAREM.

DURING A RAID ON BAL'A, TULKAREM DISTRICT, SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED FOUR PALESTINIANS. CURFEW WAS IMPOSED. FOUR PERSONS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED IN OTHER CLASHES IN TULKAREM DISTRICT AND UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03386 02 OF 03 131544Z

THREE OTHERS IN JENIN.

AN ISRAELI BUS DRIVER AND TWO PASSENGERS WERE LIGHTLY INJURED BY SHATTERED WINDOW-GLASS WHEN A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL WAS THROWN AT AN ISRAELI BUS, NEAR SHUFAT, IN NORTHERN JERUSALEM.

3. SEARCH-AND-ARREST IN EAST JERUSALEM

OCTOBER 4

HUNDREDS OF JERUSALEM POLICEMEN PARTICIPATED IN A SWEEP OF THE SILWAN AND ABU TOR NEIGHBORHOODS, ROUNDING UP SUSPECTED INCITERS AS A REACTION TO RECENT DISTURBANCES, ESPECIALLY THE ATTACKS ON POLICEMEN STATIONED IN THE AREA. POLICE CONTINUED ON OCTOBER 5 AND 6 TO CHECK THE PAPERS OF RESIDENTS.

4. EAST JERUSALEM SCHOOLS REOPEN

OCTOBER 4-6

ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN EAST JERUSALEM OPENED FOR THE FIRST TIME THIS SCHOOL YEAR ON OCTOBER 4. SECONDARY SCHOOLS OPENED ON OCTOBER 6. THE OPENING WAS POSTPONED FROM SEPTEMBER 1 FOR SECURITY REASONS. AFTER DISTURBANCES AT THE SECONDARY CLASSES OF THE FRERE'S COLLEGE, STUDENTS WERE ORDERED HOME. SCHOOL REOPENED OCTOBER 10.

5. ATTACKS ON SUSPECTED COLLABORATORS

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03386 03 OF 03 131545Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00
RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 C-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
/075 W

-----256654 131603Z /41

O 131540Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3719
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03386

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, OCTOBER 4 - 10, 1988

OCTOBER 5
ACCORDING TO THE MAYOR OF ARIEL SETTLEMENT NEAR
TULKAREM, THE MUKHTAR OF ZAYTA, A NEARBY ARAB
VILLAGE, WAS ATTACKED BY AXE-WIELDING ASSAILANTS
AT HIS HOME ON OCTOBER 1 AND WAS RESCUED BY THE
IDF. THE MAYOR CHARGED THAT THE IDF HAD
DELIBERATELY CONCEALED THE INCIDENT.

OCTOBER 6
MASKED ASSAILANTS SHOT AND KILLED TWO PALESTINIANS
CONSIDERED TO BE COLLABORATORS WITH THE ISRAELI
AUTHORITIES. THE MUKHTAR OF BIDDIYA, SOUTH EAST
OF QALQILYA, WAS GUNNED DOWN WITH A KALCHNIKOV
RIFLE AND HIS BODY WAS PUT IN HIS CAR, WHICH WAS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03386 03 OF 03 131545Z

SET ABLAZE. HIS TWO YOUNG SONS WERE LIGHTLY INJURED. SOLDIERS IMPOSED CURFEW ON THE VILLAGE AND CONDUCTED A HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCH. THE SECOND SLAYING OCCURRED IN UM AL-FAHM, AN ISRAELI ARAB VILLAGE WITHIN THE GREEN LINE. MASKED ASSAILANTS APPROACHED AHMAD ZA'ROUR, 25 OF ANIN VILLAGE, WEST OF JENIN AND FIRED SEVERAL SHOTS AT HIS HEAD. ZA'ROUR HAD BEEN LIVING IN UM AL-FAHM FOR TWO MONTHS SINCE HE WAS BANISHED FROM HIS VILLAGE BY MEMBERS OF FATAH'S SHABIBA YOUTH MOVEMENT FOR SHOOTING AND WOUNDING THREE VILLAGERS AFTER HIS CAR WAS STONED.

OCTOBER 7

A SUSPECTED COLLABORATOR WAS FOUND STABBED TO DEATH IN A CAVE AT BURQA, NEAR NABLUS.

6. 3 DAY STRIKE PROTESTING NABLUS KILLINGS

OCTOBER 7

A 3 DAY STRIKE WAS CALLED IN NABLUS TO PROTEST THE KILLING OF TWO RESIDENTS THE DAY BEFORE.

7. GENERAL STRIKE

OCTOBER 9

A GENERAL STRIKE, CALLED BY THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA, WAS OBSERVED THROUGHOUT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO MARK THE START OF THE ELEVENTH MONTH OF THE INTIFADA.

8. CURFEWS AND CLOSURE OF VILLAGE ROADS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03386 03 OF 03 131545Z

OCTOBER 4

AUTHORITIES CLOSED OFF THE ROADS LEADING TO THE VILLAGES OF NABI SALEH AND BEIT RIMA, RAMALLAH DISTRICT, IN THE AFTERMATH OF DISTURBANCES AND DECLARED THEM CLOSED MILITARY ZONES.

OCTOBER 7

AUTHORITIES IMPOSED CURFEW ON NABLUS AFTER VIOLENT DISTURBANCES AND SHOOTING. THEY CONDUCTED HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES AND MADE ARRESTS.

CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON BIDYA, NEAR QALQILYA, AND ON THE ASKAR AND BALATA REFUGEE CAMPS NEAR NABLUS.

9. OLIVE TREES UPROOTED

OCTOBER 4
ISRAELI BULLDOZERS UPROOTED 40 FRUIT-BEARING OLIVE TREES ALONG A MAIN ROAD ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF NABLUS, CLAIMING THAT STONES WERE THROWN AT ISRAELI VEHICLES FROM THE ORCHARD.

WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JR (E/12)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV14400

FILM= D880897-0525

DATE= 07 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= TWENTY-FIVE DAYS TO THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 10640

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ELECTION, POLITICAL PARTY, CAMPAIGN

TAGS= KPRP, PGOV, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

S, FPC/CDR

Date.

MR Cases Only:

EU Citations _____

TS author:

CLASSIFY as S or

DOWNGRADE TB to S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 14400 01 OF 02 071722Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /098 W
-----354672 071742Z /46

O 071716Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1229
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 14400

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, KPRP, IS
SUBJECT: TWENTY-FIVE DAYS TO THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS

REF: TEL AVIV 10640

1. [REDACTED]
2. THIS IS THE MOST PLACID ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN MEMORY. THE PUBLIC IS APATHETIC. RALLIES ARE WEAKLY ATTENDED, BUMPER STICKERS ARE RARE AND SIGNS OF CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY MINIMAL. THE LAST FOUR YEARS HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY GOOD FOR ISRAEL AND MUCH OF WHAT THE TWO SENIOR PARTNERS IN THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT SEEM TO BE ARGUING ABOUT IS WHO SHOULD TAKE THE CREDIT. PERHAPS THE PARTICIPATION OF LIKUD AND LABOR IN THE NUG MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR THE PUBLIC TO TAKE THE POTSHOTS OF THE TWO AT EACH OTHER AS NEW OR SOMETHING TO GET EXCITED ABOUT.
3. THERE IS LITTLE TO BE SEEN OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION THAT TURNED THE 1981 CAMPAIGN

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 14400 01 OF 02 071722Z

VIOLENT. ALTHOUGH LABOR PERSONALITIES HAVE FACED SOME LIKUD-ORGANIZED PROTESTS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL THIS WEEK, THE ANTI-PATHY TO LABOR FROM SEPHARDIM (JEWS OF MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAN ORIGIN) SEEMS MUCH LESS THAN IN THE PAST. STILL, LABOR SEEMS UNLIKELY TO MAKE MUCH OF A DENT IN THIS ELECTION IN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE PRIMARILY SEPHARDI AND HEAVILY LIKUD POOR URBAN AREAS AND DEVELOPMENT TOWNS.

4. LIKUD RETAINS THE ABILITY TO HEAT THINGS UP -- BY ACTIVATING ITS SUPPORTERS IN THE STREET -- BUT ARENS PREFERS A LOW-KEY CAMPAIGN AIMED AT THE FLOATING VOTE BETWEEN LABOR AND LIKUD. DAVID LEVY AND SHARON, WHO ARE BEST AT BRINGING LIKUD'S CROWDS INTO THE STREET, HAVE BEEN KEPT ON THE MARGINS OF LIKUD'S CAMPAIGN.

5. THE PARTIES ARE BANKING A LOT ON THE TELEVISION ELECTION BROADCASTS THAT STARTED OCT. 4. THEIR OTHER EFFORTS -- PRESSING THE FLESH, RALLIES, NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING AND WRITTEN HANDOUTS -- REACH A FRACTION OF THE TV AUDIENCE AND ARE RECEIVING LESS EMPHASIS. SO FAR, THE PARTIES ARE TRYING A SERIOUS APPROACH AND FEW GIMMICKS. LABOR AND LIKUD ARE PLAYING A SAFE CAMPAIGN. THEIR TEAMS SEEM TO HAVE LEARNED THE LESSONS OF PAST FAILURES AND ARE TRYING TO AVOID REPEATING THEM. AT THIS POINT, THE CAMPAIGN HAS TAKEN THE FORM PRIMARILY OF A WAR OF PARTY SPOKESMEN AND TELEVISION ADS, DESCRIBED BY THE PRINT AND MEDIA JOURNALISTS WHO COVER THEM.

6. THE ELECTION BROADCASTS DEAL WITH THE FAMILIAR ISSUES: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE ECONOMY. LABOR BLAMES LIKUD FOR THE LEBANON WAR AND INFLATION, WHILE TAKING CREDIT FOR SOLVING THESE PROBLEMS. LIKUD

████████████████████
████████████████████
PAGE 03 TEL AV 14400 01 OF 02 071722Z

BLAMES LABOR FOR THE HISTADRUT'S PROBLEMS AND A (POLITICAL) PARTY ECONOMY, WHILE TAKING CREDIT FOR THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY. ALMOST EVERY PARTY HAS DRAWN ON ONE OR MORE OF ITS GENERALS TO BLESS ITS PITCH ON SECURITY. LABOR IS PUSHING FORWARD ITS NEW SEPHARDI FACES, INCLUDING SDEROT MAYOR AMIR PERETZ TO DAMN SPENDING ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT TOWNS. LIKUD IS STRESSING THAT IT WILL DELIVER REAL PEACE, PERSONAL SECURITY, A FREE ECONOMY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE. NEW LIKUD STARS BIBI NETHANYAHU AND BENNY BEGIN ARE BROUGHT OUT TO ATTACK PERES ON THE PEACE PROCESS. LIKUD IS ALSO TRYING TO IDENTIFY LABOR WITH A RETURN TO THE 1967 BORDERS AND A WILLINGNESS TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE PLO. MANY PARTIES ARE TRYING TO USE THE INTIFADA BUT THE RIGHT AND THE SMALL RIGHTWING PARTIES SEEM LIKELY TO BENEFIT MOST. SO FAR, HOWEVER, NO ISSUES SEEM TO HAVE CAUGHT FIRE. THE SPICY ALLEGATION OF LABOR SPYING ON LIKUD EVAPORATED AFTER A FEW DAYS IN THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ABSENCE OF ANY HARD EVIDENCE.

7. LIKUD AND LABOR ARE SO MUCH LARGER THAN THE SMALLER PARTIES AND TEND TO OVERSHADOW THEM DURING THE CAMPAIGN, ESPECIALLY IN TV ELECTION BROADCASTING. BUT THE SMALL PARTIES HAVE GOTTEN A FEW GOOD SHOTS IN AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LARGER ONES.

8. MOST OF TODAY'S POLLS SUGGEST A SLIGHT LABOR LEAD OVER LIKUD AND A TIE BETWEEN THE BLOCS, ALTHOUGH ONE POLL (WHICH SOME FAULT FOR THE HANDLING OF ITS DATA) REPORTS A LARGE LIKUD LEAD OVER LABOR AND A SOLID RIGHT/RELIGIOUS MAJORITY. AT THIS POINT, NEITHER WE NOR THE LOCAL EXPERTS/PUNDITS THINK IT IS POSSIBLE TO CALL THE ELECTION. LIKUD HOLDS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES OVER LABOR DUE TO DEMOGRAPHY (STRONG SEPHARDI AND

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 14400 02 OF 02 071721Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /098 W
-----354667 071742Z /46

O 071716Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1230
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED]

SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 14400

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, KPRP, IS
SUBJECT: TWENTY-FIVE DAYS TO THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FIRST-TIME VOTER SUPPORT FOR LIKUD), BECAUSE KACH'S DISQUALIFICATION WOULD RESULT IN ITS VOTES GOING MOSTLY TO LIKUD AND PARTIES AVAILABLE FOR A NARROW RIGHT/RELIGIOUS COALITION, AND SINCE ARAB DEFECTIONS FROM LABOR TO THE OTHER LEFT PARTIES ARE EXPECTED. BUT LABOR MAY DO WELL WITH ITS PEACE-SECURITY DUO IN PERES-RABIN AND ITS SUPERIOR ORGANIZATION, WHICH WOULD HELP ESTABLISH A BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST A LIKUD-LED NARROW GOVERNMENT. WE ALSO NOTE THAT THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES, I.E., WHO WILL BE AROUND (AND IN WHAT STRENGTH) COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON THE POST-ELECTION FORMATION NEGOTIATIONS. STAY TUNED.

HUGHES



NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification ** 

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E11)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV14399

FILM= D880897-0487

DATE= 07 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, OCT. 7

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 14113

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ELECTION, CAMPAIGN, REVIEW, POLITICAL PARTY, DATA

TAGS= PGOV, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority	
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or	

FEB 12

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>
[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 14399 01 OF 03 071656Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00 OPM-01 ACDA-12
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /111 W
-----353663 071721Z /46 38

O 071647Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1226
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 5237

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14399

USIA FOR R/NA AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, OCT. 7

REF: TEL AVIV 14113 ✓

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: TELEVISION AND RADIO ELECTION BROADCASTS HAVE STARTED BUT THIS IS, SO FAR, THE QUIETEST CAMPAIGN IN MEMORY. LIKUD CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR ARENS BELIEVES HIS PARTY IS AHEAD OF LABOR BUT SUGGESTED THE RACE WAS SO CLOSE HE COULD NOT TELL HOW THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WOULD LOOK. LABOR CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR SHOHAT IS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN HE WAS A MONTH AGO REGARDING LABOR'S PROSPECTS AND THINKS THE PARTY COULD GARNER THE 42 SEATS IT IS WINNING IN MOST POLLS (AND POSSIBLY GAIN A BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST A LIKUD-LED NARROW GOVERNMENT).
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 14399 01 OF 03 071656Z

THREE POLLS REPORT LABOR SLIGHTLY AHEAD OF LIKUD, WITH THE CENTER/LEFT AND RIGHT/RELIGIOUS BLOCKS RUNNING NECK AND NECK. ANOTHER POLL, HOWEVER, REPORTS A STRONG LIKUD ADVANTAGE OVER LABOR AND A SOLID RIGHT/RELIGIOUS BLOC MAJORITY. KAHANE'S KACH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PARTY WAS DISQUALIFIED BY THE KNESSET CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMITTEE (KCEC), WHILE THE NON-ZIONIST AND MOSTLY ISRAELI ARAB PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE WILL BE ALLOWED TO RUN. KAHANE IS APPEALING THE KCEC'S RULING TO THE SUPREME COURT. END SUMMARY.

ASSESSMENTS

3. LIKUD: CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR ARENS TOLD US OCT. 4 HE THINKS LIKUD WILL WIN MORE SEATS THAN LABOR AND WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO FORM A NARROW GOVERNMENT AFTER THE ELECTION. BUT HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A TIGHT RACE AND HE WOULD NOT GUESS WHAT THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WOULD LOOK LIKE (SEE TEL AVIV 14313).

4. LIKUD: CAMPAIGN FINANCE DIRECTOR MK OLMERT IS OPTIMISTIC LIKUD WILL BEAT LABOR 48 TO 38 SEATS. HE EXPECTED THE CAMPAIGN TO HEAT UP SOON AND GALVANIZE LIKUD'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORTERS.

5. LABOR: CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR SHOHAT TOLD US OCT. 4 HE WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN HE HAD BEEN A MONTH AGO AND NOW FELT LABOR COULD WIN THE 42 SEATS THE POLLS WERE GIVING IT (AND GIVE IT A SHOT AT A BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST A NARROW LIKUD-LED GOVERNMENT). HE CREDITED LABOR'S IMPROVED PROSPECTS TO ITS SUCCESSFUL TELEPHONE PROJECT AND THE SO FAR QUIET CAMPAIGN WHICH HE THOUGHT WORKED TO LABOR'S

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14399 01 OF 03 071656Z

ADVANTAGE.

6. LABOR: KNESSET CANDIDATE ELI BEN-MENACHEM (WHO COMES FROM AND HEADS THE POOR URBAN AREAS SECTION OF THE PARTY) AND YERUHAM DEVELOPMENT TOWN MAYOR BARUCH ALMAKAIS BOTH TOLD US LABOR WAS GETTING A BETTER HEARING IN THESE AREAS. NONETHELESS, THEY DID NOT BELIEVE LABOR WOULD MAKE MUCH OF A DENT IN THIS ELECTION IN LIKUD'S STRENGTH AMONG THE PRIMARILY SEPHARDI VOTERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT TOWNS AND POOR URBAN AREAS.

CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMITTEE

7. ON OCT. 5, THE KNESSET CENTRAL ELECTION COMMITTEE DISQUALIFIED KAHANE'S KACH FROM RUNNING IN THE NOVEMBER 1 ELECTIONS. KAHANE PLANS TO APPEAL THE RULING IN THE SUPREME COURT ON OCT. 7. IF THE COURT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UPHOLDS KACH'S DISQUALIFICATION, MOST OF ITS SUPPORTERS WILL LIKELY VOTE LIKUD. ON OCT. 6, THE KCEC VOTED BY A ONE-VOTE MARGIN TO ALLOW THE NON-ZIONIST AND PRIMARILY ISRAELI ARAB-BACKED PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE TO RUN IN THE ELECTIONS. LIKUD AND TEHIYA PLAN TO APPEAL THE DECISION TO THE SUPREME COURT. EARLIER, THE KCEC DISQUALIFIED THE UNITED YEMENITE LIST DUE TO A LACK OF SUFFICIENT VALID SIGNATURES IN ITS APPLICATION.

POLLS

8. DAHAF (LIKUD-COMMISSIONED) AND DECIMA (LABOR-COMMISSIONED) POLL RESULTS RELEASED TODAY REPORT LABOR HOLDS A SLIGHT EDGE OVER LIKUD AND THAT THE CENTER/LEFT AND RIGHT/RELIGIOUS BLOCS ARE RUNNING A DEAD HEAT. THE DAHAF POLL WAS TAKEN IN FACE-TO-FACE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 14399 02 OF 03 071657Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00 OPM-01 ACDA-12
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /111 W

-----353702 071721Z/46 38

O 071647Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1227
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 5238

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14399

USIA FOR R/NA AND NEA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, OCT. 7

INTERVIEWS OF 662 JEWISH ISRAELIS AFTER THE FIRST TELEVISION ELECTION BROADCASTS ON OCT. 4, WHILE THE DECIMA SURVEY OF 1,000 PERSONS WAS CONDUCTED BY TELEPHONE AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. A MAARIV NEWSPAPER-COMMISSIONED POLL OF 500 PERSONS SURVEYED BY TELEPHONE ALSO REPORTED LABOR A BIT AHEAD OF LIKUD (43-39) AND THE BLOCS EVEN. SOME 25 PERCENT OF THIS GROUP SAID THEY STILL WERE UNCERTAIN FOR WHOM TO VOTE. A MODI'IN EZRAHI SURVEY CONDUCTED DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF SEPTEMBER, ON THE OTHER HAND, REPORTED LIKUD FAR AHEAD OF LABOR AND THE RIGHT/RELIGIOUS BLOC AS HOLDING A SOLID MAJORITY. (WE NOTE THAT THESE POLLS WERE CONDUCTED BEFORE THE DIVISION OF THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX INTO FOUR PARTIES AND THE KCEC DISQUALIFICATION OF KACH.)



PAGE 02 TEL AV 14399 02 OF 03 071657Z

9. TABLE OF POLL RESULTS FOLLOWS:

PARTY	DAHAF	DECIMA	MODI'IN	MAARIV
-	EZRAHI			
ALIGNMENT (LABOR PARTY)	42	42PLUS	34	43
CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT	5	9MINUS	8	-
MAPAM	3	1	2	-
CENTER-SHINUI	2	1	1	-
SMALL LEFT PARTIES TOTAL				9
HADASH(COMMUNISTS)	6	6	-	-
PROGRESSIVE LIST.FOR PEACE	2	2	-	-
NON-ZIONIST LEFT TOTAL			8	8
LIKUD	41	37	41	39
TEHIYA	5	6	7	-
TZOMET	2	2	2	-
KACH	3	3	6	-
SMALL RIGHTS PARTIES TOTAL				11
NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY	4	4	4	-
AGUDAT ISRAEL	2	3MINUS	3	-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SHAS 3 3 3 -
MEMAD - 1 PLUS 1 -
RELIGIOUS PARTIES TOTAL 10

10. MAARIV ALSO REPORTED THAT LIKUD COMMISSIONED A SEPARATE TELEPHONE SURVEY OF 820 PERSONS WHICH WAS CONDUCTED LAST WEEK. THE SURVEY RESULTS SHOWED LIKUD

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14399 02 OF 03 071657Z

AND LABOR IN A DEAD HEAT AND A 62-58 ADVANTAGE FOR A RIGHT/RELIGIOUS BLOC:

LIKUD - 42
TEHIYA - 5
TZOMET - 2

KACH - 3

NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY - 4
SHAS - 4
AGUDAT ISRAEL - 2

LABOR - 42
CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT - 5
MAPAM - 3
CENTER-SHINUI - 1

HADASH (COMMUNISTS) - 5
PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE - 2

11. THE MAARIV COMMISSIONED SURVEY ALSO ASKED WHAT TYPE OF GOVERNMENT THOSE INTERVIEWED PREFERRED. UNDECIDED VOTERS PREFERRED A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT - 36 PERCENT; NARROW RIGHT - 33 PERCENT; AND NARROW LEFT - 30 PERCENT. THE SAMPLE MINUS THE UNDECIDED VOTERS PREFERRED A NARROW RIGHT GOVERNMENT - 38 PERCENT; NARROW LEFT - 32.5 PERCENT; AND NUG - 29.5 PERCENT.

12. THE MAARIV SURVEY ALSO ASKED IF TELEVISION ELECTION BROADCASTING CONVINCED PEOPLE TO CHANGE THEIR VIEWS. SOME 85 PERCENT SAID THEY WERE NOT INFLUENCED BY THE ADVERTISING, WHILE 15 PERCENT SAID THEY WERE. SOME 11 PERCENT OF THOSE WHO HAD ALREADY

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04

TEL AV 14399 02 OF 03 071657Z

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 14399 03 OF 03 071657Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00 OPM-01 ACDA-12
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /111 W
-----353707 071721Z /46 38

O 071647Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1228
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 5239

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14399

USIA FOR R/NA AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REVIEW, OCT. 7

DECIDED ON THEIR VOTE SAID THE ADVERTISING
MIGHT INFLUENCE THEM (TO CHANGE THEIR VIEWS). SOME
80 PERCENT OF THE UNDECIDED SAID THEY WOULD MAKE UP
THEIR MINDS WITHOUT BEING INFLUENCED BY THE
ADVERTISING, WHILE 20 PERCENT SAID THEY WERE
INFLUENCED.

TELEVISION/RADIO ELECTION BROADCASTING

13. TELEVISED POLITICAL BROADCASTS BEGAN ON OCT. 4
AND RADIO POLITICAL ADVERTISING THE DAY AFTER. THE
BROADCASTS HAVE BEEN MORE SERIOUS THAN IN 1984 AND
HAVE FOCUSED ON THE KEY PERSONALITIES, BASIC THEMES
AND SIMPLE MESSAGES. ASIDE FROM A FEW NASTY JABS,
THE MUD-SLINGING HAS NOT YET BEGUN.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 14399 03 OF 03 071657Z

GOING TO THE PUBLIC

14. PARTY LEADERS AND CANDIDATES HAVE STARTED TO GET
OUT TO PRESS THE FLESH. POLITICAL RALLIES THIS WEEK
FEATURING SHAMIR AND ARENS WHICH WE ATTENDED WERE
SPARSELY ATTENDED. PERES WENT OUT TO RAMLA, A MIXED
JEWISH-ARAB TOWN WITH A HIGH PROPORTION OF SERIARDI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JEWS INCLINED TO THE RIGHTWING PARTIES, AND RAN INTO A PROTEST ORGANIZED BY LIKUD SUPPORTERS. AFTERWARDS, HOWEVER, PERES WAS WELL-RECEIVED BY THE CROWD IN THE OPEN-AIR MARKET.

15. NO FURTHER DETAILS HAVE APPEARED TO CORROBORATE THE HAARETZ NEWSPAPER PRESS ALLEGATION THAT THE LABOR PARTY HAS BEEN "SPYING" ON LIKUD. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL ALSO DECIDED THERE WAS "INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE" TO LAUNCH AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGATION.

HUGHES

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R E106

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV14273

FILM= D880892-0210

DATE= 06 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= THOUGHTS ON THE ELECTION

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, ELECTION, COALITION GOVERNMENT, IMPLEMENTATION, PE PLAN, POLITICAL INITIATIVE, POLICY, KREME

TAGS= KPAL, KPRP, PREL, IS, JO

<<<<. >>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MS/FPC/CDR Date: FEB 13

MR Cases Only: _____

EO Citations _____

TS authority: _____

RELEASE DECLASSIFY

EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PART

DENY

DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

CLASSIFY as S or

DOWNGRADE IS to S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 14273 01 OF 03 061217Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02
T-01 /089 W

-----244571 061223Z/41 38

O 061213Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1166

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14273
FOR NEA/IAI AMBASSADOR PICKERING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO, KPRP
SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON THE ELECTION

1. [REDACTED]

THE ELECTIONS -- NO LEADER, NO TREND

2. THE ELECTION RACE REMAINS NECK AND NECK. WE HAVE HEARD OPTIMISM BUT LITTLE CONFIDENCE FROM LIKUD AND LABOR THAT EITHER WILL ACHIEVE A NARROW COALITION OF AT LEAST 61 SEATS IN ORDER TO AVOID EITHER ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT OR A MINORITY GOVERNMENT. LABOR IS PINNING ITS HOPES ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A BLOCKING MAJORITY WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE 7 OR 8 SEATS WHICH THE NON-ZIONIST LEFT IS EXPECTED TO WIN. WHILE THE SEATS OF THE NON-ZIONIST LEFT WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR A LABOR-LED COALITION, LABOR COULD COUNT ON THEIR PASSIVE SUPPORT IN VOTES OF CONFIDENCE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 14273 01 OF 03 061217Z

IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN A MINORITY GOVERNMENT IN THE NEAR TERM. LABOR SUGGEST THAT UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT COULD ENTICE RELIGIOUS PARTIES INTO WHAT WOULD THEN BECOME A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT.

3. WHILE LABOR'S OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO ENVISIONS A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MINORITY GOVERNMENT, THE LIKUD BELIEVES IT STANDS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF FORMING A RIGHT-RELIGIOUS MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. A HIGH IRONY IS THAT IT JUST MIGHT COME TO POWER ON THE RUINS OF THE CANDIDACY OF KAHANE'S KACH PARTY. THE KNESSET ELECTIONS COMMITTEE DECIDED 10 TO 5 TO DISQUALIFY THE PARTY BUT IT IS CERTAIN THAT KAHANE WILL APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. WE HAVE NO CLEAR SENSE OF WHAT THE COURT WILL DECIDE. IF THE DISQUALIFICATION STANDS, THE TWO OR THREE SEATS THAT KAHANE COULD BE EXPECTED TO WIN WOULD GO MOSTLY TO LIKUD AND INCREASE LIKUD'S CHANCES TO FORM A NARROW MAJORITY GOVERNMENT OF THE RIGHT AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES. THIS WOULD ALSO GIVE SHAMIR THE ADVANTAGE OF FORMING ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT ON HIS TERMS, HIS STATED PREFERENCE. MOSHE ARENS CONFIRMED TO US THAT KAHANE WOULD NOT BE A COALITION PARTNER TO LIKUD "IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES." ANOTHER IRONY IS THAT HALF OF ISRAEL'S ARAB VOTERS, BY AGAIN OPTING FOR A "PROTEST" VOTE FOR THE NON-ZIONIST LEFT, WILL PROBABLY FOREGO ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO TIP THE BALANCE.

ANOTHER NUG?

4. DF THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES, LIKUD, ESPECIALLY
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14273 01 OF 03 061217Z

SHAMIR AND MANY IN HIS CAMP, SEEM MUCH MORE CONTENT, SOME EVEN SAY EAGER, TO CONTINUE THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. THE NUG HAS EFFECTIVELY PARALYZED LABOR'S PEACE PROCESS INITIATIVES AND BLOCKED LABOR FROM IMPLEMENTING ANY POLICIES UNACCEPTABLE TO LIKUD. SHAMIR'S OPENNESS TO ANOTHER NUG MAY ALSO REFLECT A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF LIKUD'S PROSPECTS. PERES PUBLICLY STATED A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO THAT HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, BUT THERE IS DEEP SCEPTICISM ABOUT THIS EVEN WITHIN THE LABOR PARTY ITSELF. ARENS HAS SUGGESTED TO US, BUT HE IS THE ONLY ONE WE HAVE HEARD SAY THIS, THAT IN THE EVENT OF A DRAW, THE TWO LEADERS -- PERES AND SHAMIR -- MIGHT STEP ASIDE AND LET OTHERS TRY TO PUT TOGETHER ANOTHER NUG. WHEN WE QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT THIS, HE DID NOT MOVE OFF THE POINT. THERE IS A LOT OF UNHAPPINESS IN LABOR OVER PERES' DECISION TO FOCUS THE CAMPAIGN ON HIMSELF (AND TO LESSER EXTENT ON RABIN) -- PARTICULARLY FROM THE OTHER LABOR MINISTERS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- AND THIS UNHAPPINESS COULD TAKE ON TANGIBLE FORM IF LABOR DOES POORLY.

5. WHILE A NARROW MAJORITY COALITION COBBLED TOGETHER BY LABOR WOULD BE UNSTABLE AND COULD POSSIBLY LEAD TO NEW ELECTIONS WITHIN A YEAR OR SO, A NARROW LIKUD-LED GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE MORE STAYING POWER. THE LEFT SIDE OF LABOR ARGUES THAT A NARROW LABOR-LED MAJORITY GOVERNMENT WOULD AT LEAST PERMIT SOME INITIATIVES MOVING TOWARD PEACE TALKS, PERHAPS PICKING UP WHERE WE LEFT OFF WITH THE LONDON AGREEMENT, AND THAT SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS COULD ALLOW THEM TO WIN EITHER A NEW ELECTION OR A REFERENDUM WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 14273 02 OF 03 061217Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02
T-01 /089 W

-----244612 061223Z /41 38

O 061213Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1167

[REDACTED]

SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14273

FOR NEA/IAI AMBASSADOR PICKERING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO, KPRP

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON THE ELECTION

THE PEACE ISSUE

6. KING HUSSEIN'S "LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE" DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAS COMPLICATED LABOR'S TASK IN SELLING ITS PEACE PROCESS IDEAS TO THE ELECTORATE, BUT, SURPRISINGLY, PERHAPS NOT AS MUCH AS INITIALLY FEARED. LIKUD HAMMERS AWAY THAT HUSSEIN HAS NOW MADE CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO ARAB PARTNER FOR TERRITORIAL COMPROMISES, CONFIRMING ITS LONGSTANDING ASSERTION. LABOR AND EVEN LIKUD CONTINUE TO SAY THAT JORDAN REMAINS THE PREFERRED AND EVEN LOGICAL PARTNER IN THE NEXT STEPS TOWARD PEACE, ALTHOUGH DIFFERING ON JORDAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TERRITORIES. MOREOVER, LABOR IN THE CAMPAIGN IS TRYING TO CONVINCING THE VOTERS THAT ISRAEL HAS THE POWER TO ACHIEVE PEACE ALONG WITH SECURITY. LIKUD IS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 14273 02 OF 03 061217Z

EXPLOITING THE TABA ARBITRAL AWARD AS "EVIDENCE" OF WHAT "OUTSIDE" INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS (I.E., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE) MEANS FOR ISRAEL. FOR LABOR, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE IS AN ARAB PARTNER FOR PEACE REMAINS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM AND SOME STILL HARBOR HOPES THAT JORDAN WILL OPENLY SIGNAL IT IS STILL IN THE GAME.

7. ARENS, LEADING THE LIKUD CAMPAIGN, BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE LIKUD'S CHANCES OF BEING ABLE TO LEAD A NARROW MAJORITY GOVERNMENT AFTER THE ELECTIONS, LIKUD WILL NEED TO FIGHT FOR THE UNDECIDED VOTERS IN THE CENTER. LEVY AND SHARON PREFER TO FOCUS ON LIKUD'S TRADITIONAL CONSTITUENCY, BUT THEY HAVE SO FAR HAD MINIMAL INFLUENCE ON THE CONDUCT OF LIKUD'S CAMPAIGN.. SHAMIR IS EMPHASIZING HIS LEADERSHIP QUALITIES, STRESSING THAT ONLY LIKUD CAN PROVIDE "REAL SECURITY" AND NOT GIVE ON THE TERRITORIES. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO PLANNING WITHIN THE PARTY ITSELF FOR A LIKUD-LAUNCHED PEACE INITIATIVE. AUTONOMY ALONG CAMP DAVID LINES, FINDING "SOME" PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES WITH WHOM TO DEAL IN ORDER TO FORM SOME KIND OF GOVERNING/ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCILS AND IMPLEMENT AUTONOMY, AND THE IDEA OF A MINI-REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF ISRAEL, EGYPT AND JORDAN ARE THE OUTSIDE LIMITS OF LIKUD DISCUSSIONS ON NEXT PEACE STEPS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HOW DOES THE INTIFADA PLAY?

8. POLLS SAY THAT OVER 70 PERCENT OF THE PUBLIC

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14273 02 OF 03 061217Z

FAVORS A TOUGHER RESPONSE TO THE UPRISING. ARENS TOLD US THAT LIKUD DOES NOT HAVE DEFINITIVE DATA ON THE IMPACT OF THE INTIFADA ON THE ELECTIONS. ONE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADVISERS HAS TOLD US THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS CAREFUL NOT TO PERMIT WEDGES TO BE DRIVEN BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE IDF. THE PRIME MINISTER, WHEN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL, SUPPORTS THE FORCES OF ORDER AND DOES NOT GET INTO ANY CRITICISM OF THE IDF OR MOD, WE WERE TOLD. SHAMIR CONTINUES TO STRESS TO THE PALESTINIANS THAT VIOLENCE WILL NOT PAY OFF. SINCE RABIN'S WORDS ARE VERY SIMILAR, (EXCEPT HE ALSO STRESSES THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION) AND HIS DIRECTIVES IN DEALING WITH THE PALESTINIANS -- INCLUDING PLASTIC BULLETS -- CLEARLY BACK UP HIS TOUGH WORDS, RABIN IS WELL-POSITIONED TO REBUT ATTACKS FROM THE RIGHT. THE "SECOND REACTION" OF THE ISRAELI PUBLIC TO THE UPRISING HAS NOT MATERIALIZED. LABOR LEADERS, INCLUDING RABIN, SOMETIMES SPEAK OF IT, BUT AS A HOPE RATHER THAN EITHER AS A REALITY OR AS AN EXPECTATION.

PALESTINIAN ACTIONS WORK AGAINST LABOR

9. ALL LABOR POLITICIANS WITH WHOM WE SPEAK UNFAILINGLY MENTION THEIR FEAR THAT AN ATTACK BY THE PLO (OR SOMEOTHER TERRORIST GROUP) WOULD SEVERELY UNDERMINE THEIR CHANCES ON NOVEMBER 1ST. WE WOULD JUDGE THAT A MILITANT PNC WOULD ALSO NEGATIVELY AFFECT LABOR CHANCES. A MILITANT PNC WOULD LEAD TO VIOLENT PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE TERRITORIES AND A FORCEFUL GOI REACTION. THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WOULD REINFORCE HARDLINE SENTIMENTS HERE. THE IMPACT

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 14273 03 OF 03 061217Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
AMAD-01 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02
T-01 /089 W

-----244602 061223Z /41 38
O 061213Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1168

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14273

FOR NEA/IAI AMBASSADOR PICKERING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, JO, KPRP
SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON THE ELECTION


OF A PNC WHICH RESULTED IN A DECLARATION OF A
PROVISIONAL PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT,
GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE OR SOME KIND OF DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE WOULD STILL WORK TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE
RIGHT. IT WOULD BE MET BY OVERWHELMING CONDEMNATION
IN ISRAEL AND COULD LEAD TO SOME REINFORCEMENT OF
HARDLINERS BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTIES AROUSED HERE.
LIKUD IS ALREADY CLAIMING IN ITS CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
THAT THE PLO WILL USE ITS INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN THE
INTIFADA TO BENEFIT LABOR.

PEACE ISSUES JOINED

1N. WHILE THERE ARE STILL A LOT OF "UNDECIDEDS",
ISRAELI VOTERS WILL HAVE A CLEARLY DEFINED CHOICE ON
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


PAGE 02 TEL AV 14273 03 OF 03 061217Z

THE PEACE ISSUE. LIKUD IS SAYING "NO" TO ANY TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE AND "YES" TO MORE SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES, WHILE LABOR TALKS OF THE NECESSITY FOR ISRAEL TO GET OUT OF SOME OF THE TERRITORIES AND ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. IN ONE SENSE, THE QUESTION IS WHICH FEAR IS GREATER: THAT OF GIVING UP CONTROL OF THE TERRITORIES OR THAT OF SLIDING INTO A BI-NATIONAL, NON-JEWISH, NON-DEMOCRATIC STATE. TO THE EXTENT THAT TO THE VOTING PUBLIC THERE IS NO ARAB PARTNER FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THESE TOUGH QUESTIONS ARE PERMITTED TO SLIDE INTO THE HYPOTHETICAL AND THE FEAR OF GIVING UP CONTROL BECOMES PARAMOUNT.
HUGHES



NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E103

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03274

FILM= D880883-1025

DATE= 04 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

FEB 12 1989

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 26 OFFERS EXPANDED - POLITICAL AGENDA

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3228

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= HUMAN RIGHTS, MEETING AGENDA, DEMONSTRATION, PUBLICATION,
PALESTINIANS, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, OCCUPIED AREA

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PHUM, IS

IS, FPC, CDR Date: _____

MR Cases Only: _____

EO Citations _____

TS authority _____

() CLASSIFY as () S or () U

() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () U

DECLASSIFY IN PART

DELETE No. 1-Responsive info

DIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

RELEASE

EXCISE

DENY

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>
[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03274 01 OF 02 041503Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /074 W
-----067323 041521Z /43

P 041502Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3635
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03274

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 26 OFFERS EXPANDED
- POLITICAL AGENDA

REF: (A) JERUSALEM 3228, (B) FBIS LD 2309153188,
- (C) FBIS NC 2609085088

1. [REDACTED]
2. INTIFADA LEAFLET 26 DATED SEPTEMBER 27
CONTAINS A FULLER AND MORE FOCUSSED POLITICAL
AGENDA DIRECTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA THAN
PREVIOUS LEAFLETS. COMMENTS ON SIGNIFICANT
ASPECTS OF THE LEAFLET FOLLOW. (SEE REF A FOR
FULL TEXT.)
3. THE LEAFLET BEGINS WITH A STRIDENT
RHETORICAL INTRODUCTION, WHICH BOASTS OF THE
INTIFADA'S VICTORIES AND, INTER ALIA, REFERS TO
THE INTIFADA'S "PROTEST AGAINST THE OFFICIAL
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03274 01 OF 02 041503Z

ARAB IMPOTENCE" AND "AMERICAN IMPERIALISM" AND
SAYS PALESTINIANS "ARE NO LESS STRONG THAN THE
VIETNAMESE".

4. IT THEN LISTS DEMANDS FOR ADOPTION BY THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS FALL. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE PLO MAY BE PLANNING NEW RESOLUTIONS REPLACING OR REVISING THE NOW STALE SERIES OF RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE ADOPTED ANNUALLY UNDER THE AGENDA ITEMS: ISRAELI PRACTICES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LEAFLET DEMANDS CESSATION OF VARIOUS ISREALI PRACTICES SUCH AS DEPORTATION, TORTURE, ADMINISTRATIVE ARRESTS AND OTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES AND CALLS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF UNSC 605, 607 AND 608, FORESHADOWING THE CONTENT OF POSSIBLE NEW UNGA INITIATIVES.

5. THE LEAFLET'S CALL FOR "WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM PALESTINIAN AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, INCLUDING ARAB JERUSALEM" IS THE FIRST TIME A LEAFLET HAS EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PALESTINIANS TERRITORIAL CLAIM WILL BE LIMITED TO THE 1967 BORDERS. ALTHOUGH MOST WEST BANKERS HAVE LONG SUPPORTED THIS, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, AND OPPOSED THE REJECTIONIST VIEW THAT ALL OF PALESTINE MUST BE RECLAIMED, INTIFADA LEAFLETS HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY ARTICULATED THIS. IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT IN DISCUSSING THE USE OF UNSC 181 AS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CLAIMING A PALESTINIAN STATE, THE PLO'S ABU IYAD SAID TO

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03274 01 OF 02 041503Z

THE KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY ON SEPTEMBER 23 "BECAUSE WE ARE REALISTIC, THE 1967 BORDERS ARE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION." (REF B)

6. THE LIST OF DEMANDS TO THE UNGA ALSO ASKS THAT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BE PLACED UNDER UN SUPERVISION "FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES IN PREPARATION FOR THE EXERCISE OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS TO SELF DETERMINATION." UN TRUSTEESHIP DURING A TRANSITIONAL PHASE HAS BEEN A FAMILAR THEME IN STATEMENTS OF PLO LEADERS IN RECENT WEEKS CONCERNING THE AGENDA OF THE UPCOMING PNC.

7. LEAFLET 26 CALLS FOR DISMANTLING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, THE FIRST TIME THIS HAS APPEARED IN THE LEAFLETS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

8. THE LEAFLET REPEATS THE CALL IN PREVIOUS LEAFLETS FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AS AN INTERIM MEASURE UNDER UN SUPERVISION, AS A MATTER TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE AGENDA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE CONVENED TO BRING ABOUT A TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

9. IT ALSO CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL, IN THE INTERIM, OF IDF FORCES FROM ALL ARAB POPULATION CENTERS. THIS IS SOMETHING NEW IN THE LEAFLETS. IT IS REMINISCENT OF THE SECTION IN THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF AND REDEPLOYMENT OF REMAINING IDF FORCES TO SPECIFIC SECURITY LOCATIONS.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03274 02 OF 02 041505Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /074 W
-----067365 041520Z /43

P 041502Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3636
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03274

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 26 OFFERS EXPANDED

10. LEAFLET 26 PRAISES "BROTHER ABU AMAR" (ARAFAT) FOR HIS "HISTORIC SPEECH BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT". IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE INTIFADA, LEAFLETS NEVER MENTIONED ARAFAT OR THE PLO. THIS IS ANOTHER SIGN OF CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE INTIFADA LEAFLET WRITERS AND THE PLO AND THE DOMINANT POSITION OF PRO-FATAH ELEMENTS IN THE INTIFADA.

11. IN THE SECOND PART OF THE LEAFLET, WHICH IS FULL OF THE USUAL EXHORTATIONS TO PALESTINIANS TO SUSTAIN THE INTIFADA THROUGH VARIOUS MEANS, THE MASSES ARE URGED TO "GO OUT IN THE STREETS, SIMILAR TO THE EVENTS IN NABLUS, WHERE MASSES OF MASKED YOUTHS MARCHED IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER AND PUT ON RECORD THE FIRST MARCH OF THE PALESTINIAN POPULAR ARMY." AL NASR FROM NICOSIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03274 02 OF 02 041505Z

SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED THAT THE "FORCE 17 COMMAND WITHIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAS SUCCEEDED IN FORMING THE PALESTINIAN POPULAR ARMY" AS A NEW "MILITARY ARM OF THE BLESSED POPULAR REVOLUTION" IN THE TERRITORIES. (REF C)

12. PALESTINIAN CONTACTS TELL US THE REFERENCE TO THE "PALESTINIAN POPULAR ARMY" RELATES TO MARCHES BY UNARMED YOUTHS IN THE CASBAH IN NABLUS, CARRYING PALESTINIAN FLAGS AND WEARING MAKESHIFT UNIFORMS. THEY SAY THIS WAS A SIGN OF DEFIANCE TO THE IDF, WHICH SELDOM ENTERS THE CROWDED CASBAH, AND A REPLY TO AN EARLY MARCH IN THE AREA BY SUPPORTERS OF THE RIVAL ISLAMIC HAMMAS GROUP. THE REFERENCE TO A "POPULAR ARMY" DOES NOT MEAN, OUR SOURCES EMPHASIZE, THAT THE INTIFADA HAS REVERTED TO ARMED OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL, A POLICY IT HAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED TO DATE.

13. LIKE PREVIOUS LEAFLETS, NUMBER 26 CONTAINS AN IMPLIED CRITICISM OF THE RIVAL ISLAMIC HAMMAS, BY CALLING ON THE MASSES TO PRESERVE "UNITY OF THE INTERNAL FRONT" AND TO "COMBAT ALL SIGNS OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY DIFFERENCES AND FEUDS, WHICH THE ENEMY AND ITS AGENTS ARE TRYING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TO AROUSE." IN A REFERENCE TO PUBLICITY GIVEN
TO HAMMAS BY ISRAELI SPOKESMEN AND JOURNALISTS,
IT SAYS "ALL THE AUTHORITIES' ATTEMPTS TO 'BLOW
UP' SOME PARTIES AND CONSIDER THEM A FORCE EQUAL
TO THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OR THE UPRISING WILL
FAIL."

WILCOX

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03274 02 OF 02 041505Z

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E98)

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03234

FILM= D880871-0799

DATE= 29 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP, SEPTEMBER 20-26, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= WEST BANK, DEATH, ARMS

TAGS= KPAL, KPRP, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR Date.

RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE () DECLASSIFY
() DENY in PART
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority
PA Exemptions _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03234 01 OF 03 291316Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ANAE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02
T-01 /090 W

-----155013 291321Z /44

O 291315Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3615
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03234

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, SEPTEMBER 20-26, 1988

1. SUMMARY: PALESTINIAN CASUALTY TOLLS INCREASED SHARPLY AS A RESULT OF INCREASED USE OF PLASTIC BULLETS AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS. THREE PALESTINIANS WERE REPORTED KILLED IN INTIFADA CLASHES AND 75 WOUNDED. A FOURTH MAN, AN AMCIT, WAS SHOT BY AN UNKNOWN ASSAILANT. THREE SUSPECTED PALESTINIAN COLLABORATORS WERE BEATEN, WHILE OTHERS WERE VICTIMS OF VANDALISM. A GENERAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED SEPTEMBER 26. THIS REPORT WAS COMPILED MAINLY FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS. END SUMMARY.

FOUR KILLED, 75 INJURED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03234 01 OF 03 291316Z

THE WEEK WAS MARKED BY A SHARP RISE IN THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN CASUALTIES. FOUR WERE KILLED AND 75 WERE WOUNDED DURING CLASHES. THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP WERE SEALED OFF FOR 24 HOURS OVER YOM KIPPUR, SEPTEMBER 21, AND NO TRAFFIC WAS ALLOWED INTO ISRAEL.

SEPTEMBER 20

IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND INJURED A PALESTINIAN YOUTH DURING CLASHES AT ARTAS VILLAGE, NEAR BETHLEHEM. PALESTINIAN SOURCES SAID A SECOND YOUTH WAS ALSO WOUNDED.

A BLIND MAN WAS WOUNDED WHEN IDF SOLDIERS ASSAULTED HIM IN NABLUS.

IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A PALESTINIAN YOUTH DURING CLASHES AT BALATA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS.

SEPTEMBER 21

IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO YOUTHS DURING A DEMONSTRATION AT BALATA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS. A PALESTINIAN WOMAN WAS ALSO WOUNDED BY RUBBER BULLETS.

IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO BOYS DURING CLASHES IN NABLUS' CASBAH.

IDF SHOT AND WOUNDED A BOY DURING CLASHES AT ABWEIN VILLAGE, NEAR RAMALLAH. A SECOND PALESTINIAN YOUTH WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED AT JENIN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03234 01 OF 03 291316Z

REFUGEE CAMP AND A THIRD IN QALQILYA.

AN ISRAELI SOLDIER WAS LIGHTLY HURT IN CLASHES AT DHEISHEH REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR BETHLEHEM.

SEPTEMBER 22

SERIOUS CLASHES ERUPTED WHEN ABOUT 500 YOUTHS STAGED ONE OF THE LARGEST MARCHES OF THE UPRISING IN NABLUS' CASBAH. THE MARCHERS CARRIED PALESTINIAN FLAGS AND USED A LOUDSPEAKER TO SHOUT ANTI-ISRAELI SLOGANS. THEY WERE JOINED BY ANOTHER 500 YOUTHS, NEAR THE GATES OF THE CASBAH WHERE THEY WERE MET BY SOLDIERS WHO SHOT AND WOUNDED 11 PERSONS. IN OTHER PARTS OF NABLUS, SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED FOUR OTHER PALESTINIANS.

AT TALLUZA AND NAKURA, NORTH OF NABLUS, SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED THREE YOUTHS DURING CLASHES.

IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIAN YOUTHS AT BURQA, NORTH WEST OF NABLUS. THE DRIVER OF AN ISRAELI BUS TRAVELLING TO KIRYAT ARBA, NEAR HEBRON, WAS SLIGHTLY INJURED IN THE FACE AFTER STONES SMASHED THE WINDSHIELD OF HIS BUS. THE ISRAEL PASSENGERS GOT OFF THE BUS AND STONED ARAB CARS ON THE ROAD.

SEPTEMBER 23

A PALESTINIAN GIRL DIED AT MAKASSED HOSPITAL IN

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03234 02 OF 03 291317Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ANAE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02
T-01 /090 W

-----155042 291321Z /44

O 291315Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3616
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03234

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, SEPTEMBER 20-26, 1988

JERUSALEM OF WOUNDS SUSTAINED A WEEK EARLIER AT AMA'ARI REFUGEE CAMP NEAR RAMALLAH.

A PALESTINIAN-AMERICAN WAS SHOT AND KILLED EARLY FRIDAY AT MAZRAA SHARKIYA, NORTH OF RAMALLAH. THE MOTIVE WAS UNCLEAR, THOUGH NEIGHBORS HAVE INDICATED THE SHOOTING WAS THE RESULT OF A PRIVATE MATTER.

ONE PALESTINIAN WAS WOUNDED DURING A CLASH WITH TROOPS AT JAYUS, NEAR TULKAREM, WHEN SOLDIERS OPENED FIRE AT VILLAGERS WHO STONED THEIR JEEPS DURING A SEARCH-AND-ARREST RAID.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03234 02 OF 03 291317Z

SEPTEMBER 24

TWO PERSONS WERE REPORTED WOUNDED BY IDF GUNFIRE IN NABLUS; TWO PERSONS WERE WOUNDED AT DEIR DIBWAN, NEAR RAMALLAH; ONE MAN WAS WOUNDED AT YAABAD, NEAR JENIN; AND TWO MEN WERE WOUNDED DURING CLASHES AT TULKARM.

A VIS-NEWS CAMERAMAN REPORTED BEING ASSAULTED BY SOLDIERS WHEN HE TRIED TO FILM AN ARREST. HE SAID SOLDIERS STRUCK HIM WITH A RIFLE.

SEPTEMBER 25

A PALESTINIAN MAN WAS SHOT AND KILLED AT BEIT SURIK NORTHWEST OF JERUSALEM AFTER AN IDF FORCE WAS STONED WHILE RAIDING THE VILLAGE. ANOTHER MAN WAS INJURED IN THE CLASH.

PALESTINIAN SOURCES CLAIMED THAT ANOTHER 25 WERE INJURED IN SCATTERED INCIDENTS THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK.

SHIN BET PRISONER DIED FROM SUFFOCATION

A PALESTINIAN PRISONER WHO WAS ARRESTED ON JULY 19

AND DIED TWO DAYS LATER AT JENIN PRISON WHILE UNDER SHIN BET INTERROGATION SUFFOCATED TO DEATH ACCORDING TO AN AUTOPSY. THE FINDINGS WERE COMMUNICATED BY THE ISRAELI STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE TO THE ATTORNEY WHO REPRESENTS THE MAN'S FAMILY. HIS FAMILY WAS FIRST TOLD THAT HE HAD UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03234 02 OF 03 291317Z

DIED OF A HEART ATTACK; LATER, THAT HE HAD DIED OF PNEUMONIA; AND EVEN LATER INFORMED BY THE JENIN MILGOV THAT HE HAD DIED OF A SNAKE BITE.

PALESTINIANS ATTACK MORE SUSPECTED COLLABORATORS

SEPTEMBER 21

A MAN SUSPECTED OF COLLABORATION WITH ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WAS STABBED IN THE CHEST AND STOMACH AND HOSPITALIZED IN CRITICAL CONDITION IN NABLUS.

SEPTEMBER 22

ATTACKS ON EAST JERUSALEM ARABS WHO WORK FOR THE GOI OR WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF COLLABORATING WITH ISRAELI AUTHORITIES CONTINUED. IN JERUSALEM'S JABAL MUKABBER NEIGHBORHOOD A JEWISH-OWNED CAR THAT WAS IN THE POSSESSION OF AN ARAB RESIDENT WAS TORCHED. ONE PERSON WAS SLIGHTLY INJURED. IN WADI JOZ, THE CAR OF AN ARAB EMPLOYEE OF THE JERUSALEM MUNICIPALITY WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED BY FIRE.

SEPTEMBER 24

TWO SUSPECTED COLLABORATORS WERE BEATEN BY OTHER PALESTINIANS AT THE FAWWAR REFUGEE CAMP NEAR HEBRON. ONLY ONE OF THE MEN WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.

AUTHORITIES DEMOLISH ARAB BUILDINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03234 03 OF 03 291318Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ANAE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02
T-01 /090 W

-----155056 291321Z /44

O 291315Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3617
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03234

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, SEPTEMBER 20-26, 1988

SEPTEMBER 22

THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION DEMOLISHED 12 ARAB HOMES
IN THE JIFTLIK AREA, IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, AND
FIVE OTHERS IN JENIN, ALLEGING THAT THEY HAD BEEN
BUILT WITHOUT PERMITS.

SETTLERS EXPAND BEITAR SETTLEMENT

ON SEPTEMBER 20, SETTLERS AT BEITAR, A SETTLEMENT
CONSTRUCTED ON HUSAN AND NAHHALIN VILLAGE LANDS,
TOOK ADVANTAGE OF A CURFEW IMPOSED ON HUSAN TO
EXPAND THEIR SETTLEMENT AND INSTALL PREFABS AND
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03234 03 OF 03 291318Z

LEVEL A LARGE PLOT OF LAND FOR FUTURE CONSTRUCTION.

GENERAL STRIKES

PALESTINIANS OBSERVED A TOTAL STRIKE ON SEPTEMBER 26 AS AN EXPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY WITH DETAINEES AND A PROTEST AGAINST THE ANSAR III PRISON.

CURFEWS

THE THREE-DAY OLD CURFEW ON ARRABEH, NEAR JENIN, AND THE TWO-DAY OLD CURFEW ON BEIT FOURIK, NEAR NABLUS, WERE LIFTED ON SEPTEMBER 20.

THE CURFEW IMPOSED ON NEARBY QALANDIA CAMP, NEAR RAMALLAH, WAS LIFTED AFTER FOUR DAYS.

CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON SEPTEMBER 21, ON BALATA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR NABLUS FOLLOWING CLASHES.

THE MILITARY SEIGE IMPOSED FOR ONE WEEK ON BEIT RIMA AND DEIR GHASSANEH VILLAGES, RAMALLAH DISTRICT, WAS LIFTED ON SEPTEMBER 22.

AUTHORITIES CONFISCATE PRINTING MACHINES

IDF RAIDED AN UNDERGROUND PRESS OPERATED BY THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN AL-RAM, NORTH OF JERUSALEM, CONFISCATING PRINTING MACHINES AND COPIES OF A CLANDESTINE NEWSLETTER, AL-WATAN. THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03234 03 OF 03 291318Z

MAN WHO OPERATED THE MACHINE WAS ARRESTED.
WILCOX

E97

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03228

FILM= D880871-0145

DATE= 29 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
AMMAN

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 26, 9/27/88

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 318308

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= REQUEST, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMONSTRATION, OCCUPIED AREA, TEXT

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		S/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EU Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	FOIA Exemptions _____	TS authority for _____	
PA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or	
	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or	

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03228 01 OF 04 290911Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /068 W
-----143143 290927Z /11

O 290909Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3607
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03228

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 26, 9/27/88

REF: STATE 318308

1. LEAFLET NO. 26 OF "PLO/NIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING" DATED SEPTEMBER 27, 1988, SETS OUT A LIST OF POLITICAL DEMANDS TO BE ADOPTED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THESE INCLUDE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, CANCELLATION OF ISRAELI MILITARY LEGISLATION, DISMANTLING OF SETTLEMENTS, AND PLACEMENT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNDER UN SUPERVISION FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD. THE LEAFLET DEMANDS THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, RELEASE OF PRISONERS, RETURN OF DEPORTEES, THE HOLDING OF MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS UNDER UN SUPERVISION, AND CESSATION OF PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST PALESTINIANS. THE LEAFLET UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03228 01 OF 04 290911Z

INSTRUCTS PALESTINIANS TO INTENSIFY THE WORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, CONTINUE ATTACKS ON COLLABORATORS, TAKE ACTION AGAINST APPOINTED MUNICIPAL AND VILLAGE COUNCILS, AND CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TOWARD POPULAR EDUCATION. THE LEAFLET WARNS WORKERS NOT TO SPEND THE NIGHT INSIDE THE

GREEN LINE AS A WAY TO AVOID GENERAL STRIKES AND URGES MAXIMUM EFFORT TO HARVEST THE OLIVE CROP. THE LEAFLET CALLS FOR UNITY AND URGES PALESTINIANS TO ESCALATE DAILY CONFRONTATIONS. GENERAL STRIKES ARE CALLED FOR OCTOBER 3, TO PROTEST CLOSURE OF PALESTINIAN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND OCTOBER 9, TO MARK THE START OF THE 11TH MONTH OF THE UPRISING. WE WILL SEND COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE
A CALL .. A CALL .. A CALL
NO VOICE IS ABOVE THE VOICE OF THE UPRISING
NO VOICE IS ABOVE THE VOICE OF PALESTINIANS, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PLO
CALL NO. 26 - THE CALL OF PALESTINE, PUBLISHED BY
THE PLO/THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE
UPRISING (UNLU)

O MASSES OF OUR STRUGGLING PEOPLE: YOUR INTIFADA IS ACHIEVING NEW STRIDES SUCH AS THE RESOLUTIONS REACHED DURING THE MEETING OF LEADERS OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THE RESOLUTIONS EMPHASIZED YOUR JUST DEMANDS AND CALLED FOR PLACEMENT OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03228 01 OF 04 290911Z

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNDER UN SUPERVISION FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES IN PREPARATION FOR THE EXERCISE OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS TO SELF DETERMINATION. AFTER BROTHER ABU AMMAR, WHO HEADED THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, GAVE HIS HISTORIC SPEECH BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, EUROPEANS EMPHASIZEED THE NEED FOR ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND DECIDED TO EXPAND THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE PLO, RECOGNIZING IT AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF OUR PEOPLE. NOW, THE ZIONIST ENEMY ADMITS AGAIN, THIS TIME VIA SHAMIR, THAT THE INTIFADA CANNOT BE TERMINATED WITH THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE.

O HEROIC CHILDREN OF OUR PEOPLE: CONTINUATION OF YOUR POPULAR INTIFADA IS THE SOLE GUARANTEE TO BREAK THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND WILL FORCE IT TO SET ASIDE ITS

ARROGANCE AND THE INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS WHICH IT PLACES BEFORE THE PLO, OUR SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE. THE INTIFADA WILL CAUSE THE FAILURE OF ALL ALTERNATIVES TO THE PALESTINIAN OPTION, AS IT HAS UNDERMINED THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES CONSPIRACY AND THE JORDANIAN OPTION AND FORCED KING HUSSEIN TO ADMIT DEFEAT OF HIS PLANS FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND AS IT WILL ULTIMATELY FORCE ISRAEL TO CONFESS OUR ETERNAL NATIONAL RIGHTS. AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, WHICH SUPPORTS OUR ENEMY TO THE EXTREME, SHOULD REALIZE THAT IT IS COMPELLED TO GIVE MORE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03228 02 OF 04 290913Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /049 W
-----143205 290928Z /11

O 290909Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3608
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03228

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 26, 9/27/88

CONCESSIONS TO OUR PEOPLE AND NOT THE OPPOSITE. IT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE PLO AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIANS AND ADMIT THEIR RIGHTS TO RETURN, TO SELF DETERMINATION, AND TO ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR INDEPENDENT STATE ON THEIR NATIONAL SOIL WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL. ISRAEL SHOULD REALIZE THAT OUR STONES ARE NO LESS STRONG THAN ALL ITS POWER AND ITS SATELLITES. IT CANNOT EXTINGUISH THE RAYS OF HOPE FROM OUR CHILDREN'S EYES. ISRAEL IS NOT STRONGER THAN AMERICA, AND OUR PEOPLE ARE NO LESS STRONG THAN THE VIETNAMESE.

O MASSES OF THE INTIFADA: WE ARE A FREE AND STRUGGLING PEOPLE. THE GLORIOUS INTIFADA TAUGHT US THAT THROUGH IT, THROUGH OUR STRUGGLE AND UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03228 02 OF 04 290913Z

SACRIFICES AND BY INFLICTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LOSSES ON THE ENEMY, TRANSFORMING THEIR GAINS FROM THE OCCUPATION TO GREAT AND COSTLY LOSSES AND BY CREATING REAL CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES ON THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS WE CAN EXTRACT FROM THEM MORE AND MORE CONCESSIONS ON THE PATH TO FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE. YOUR INTIFADA IS THE STRONGEST VOICE OF PROTEST AGAINST THE OFFICIAL ARAB IMPOTENCE. YOU ARE ANNOUNCING, WITH GREAT VIGOR: NO TO OCCUPATION, YES AND A THOUSAND TIMES YES TO LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENCE. YOUR VOICES INSPIRED THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP TO FORGE YOUR CONSTANT, DIRECT AND GENERAL POLITICAL DEMANDS. UNLU AND ALL THE MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE URGE THE 43RD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO APPROVE OUR PEOPLE'S NATIONAL RIGHTS, ADOPT NECESSARY MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THEM AND FORCE ISRAEL TO BE COMMITTED TO THEM, AS FOLLOWS:

1. WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM PALESTINIAN AND ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, INCLUDING ARAB JERUSALEM.
2. CANCELLATION OF ALL ISRAELI ANNEXATION MOVES AND DISMANTLING OF SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

3. PLACEMENT OF OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES UNDER UN SUPERVISION TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO OUR MASSES FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD OF A FEW MONTHS AND PREPARE PALESTINIANS FREELY TO EXPRESS THEIR RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03228 02 OF 04 290913Z

4. CONVENING OF AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, UNDER UN SUPERVISION, ON THE BASIS OF ITS RESOLUTION RELATING TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, THE CORE OF THE MIDDLE EAST STRUGGLE, AND TO PREPARE FOR TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, PLACING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNDER UN SUPERVISION AND HOLDING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. ISRAEL SHOULD BE COMMITTED TO THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

- A. IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS NOS. 605, 607 AND 608.
- B. CANCELLATION OF THE EMERGENCY LAWS OF 1945 AND ALL THE LEGISLATIVE AND MILITARY ORDERS RELATING TO LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS.
- C. WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF FROM ALL THE PALESTINIAN POPULATED CENTERS.
- D. RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF THE INTIFADA AND RETURN OF DEPORTEES.
- E. HOLDING FREE MUNICIPAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS UNDER UN SUPERVISION.
- F. APPLICATION OF THE 4TH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 AND ALL THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS WHICH ORGANIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN OCCUPATION AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
- G. CESSATION OF ISRAELI PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST PALESTINIANS, SUCH AS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, KILLINGS, HOME DEMOLITIONS, TORTURE, DEPORTATION, ADMINISTRATIVE ARRESTS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENTS.

H. STRUGGLING MASSES OF OUR PEOPLE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS AND FORCING THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03228 03 OF 04 290914Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /068 W
-----143235 290928Z /11

O 290909Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3609
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03228

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 26, 9/27/88

AROGANT ENEMY TO RECOGNIZE THEM CAN BE ACHIEVED
THROUGH GREATER STRUGGLE ON ALL LEVELS AND
ESCALATION OF THE INTIFADA TO HIGHER LEVELS, WHILE
AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE.
ALONG THIS PATH WE URGE THE PEOPLE TO ADHERE TO
THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM:

-- OCCUPATION ATTACKS: CONDUCT MASSIVE ACTIVITIES
BEFORE THE OCCUPATION FORCES ATTACK. INTENSIFY
FORMATION OF SECURITY, POPULAR AND STRIKING
COMMITTEES. ADHERE TO SECRECY IN YOUR ACTIVITIES
AND PUT ON MASKS. MAINTAIN UNITY OF YOUR INTERNAL
GROUPS. GO OUT TO THE STREETS, SIMILAR TO THE
EVENTS IN NABLUS, WHERE MASSES OF MASKED YOUTHS
MARCHED IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER AND PUT ON RECORD
THE FIRST MARCH OF THE PALESTINIAN POPULAR ARMY.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03228 03 OF 04 290914Z

GREETINGS TO THEM, TO THE MASSES OF THE INTIFADA AND TO ALL THE HEROIC AREAS UNDER MILITARY SEIGE: QALQILYA, TULKAREM, ANABTA, KUFR MALIK AND GAZA STRIP, WHERE THE MASSES REFUSED TO RESPOND TO DEMANDS OF THE AUTHORITIES TO INSCRIBE THEIR NAMES AND ADDRESSES ON THE DOORS OF THEIR STORES.

-- INTIFADA INITIATIVES: TAKE THE INITIATIVE OF THE INTIFADA AND ESCALATE ACTION AGAINST APPOINTED MUNICIPAL AND VILLAGE COUNCILS. BOYCOTT THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AUTHORITIES, ITS OFFICES AND ITS ARAB EMPLOYEES. BOYCOTT AND LIQUIDATE THEIR AGENTS, SIMILAR TO THE HEROIC ACTIVITIES AGAINST THOSE WORKING IN GAZA, NABLUS, JENIN, SINJEL, YATTA AND OTHER PLACES.

-- POPULAR EDUCATION: POPULAR EDUCATION AIMS, NOT ONLY AT COMPLETING THE SCHOLASTIC CURRICULUM, BUT TO ERADICATE ILLITERACY AMONG ADULTS AND EXPAND NATIONAL EDUCATION. THIS REQUIRES TEACHING IN EVERY HOME, WITHOUT ANY FROM THE ENEMY. WE DEMAND THE ADMINISTRATION OF ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO DO THEIR DUTY AND DETERMINE THE STANDARD OF EDUCATION OF THE POPULAR STUDENTS. LET OUR MOTTO BE "EDUCATION FOR RESISTANCE."

-- LABORERS: WE CALL ON OUR LABORERS TO REMAIN COMMITTED TO ABSTAINING FROM GOING TO WORK ON TOTAL STRIKE DAYS AND NOT TO RESPOND TO THE ZIONIST EMPLOYERS WHO REQUEST THEM TO SPEND THE NIGHT INSIDE THE GREEN LINE BEFORE GENERAL STRIKE DAYS, LEST THEY MEET THE SAME FATE AS THE THREE GAZAN WORKERS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03228 03 OF 04 290914Z

-- MERCHANTS, FACTORIES AND WORKSHOPS: UNLU STRESSES THE NEED TO ABSTAIN FROM PAYING TAXES. MERCHANTS' COMMITTEES SHOULD FOLLOW UP ON THIS PROCEDURE AND CONTINUE TO BOYCOTT ISRAELI COMMODITIES WHICH HAVE LOCALLY MADE ALTERNATIVES BY DISTRIBUTING LISTS OF LOCAL PRODUCTS. NATIONAL PRODUCTS SHOULD PRICED AND THE COST SHOULD BE DECREASED, NOT INCREASED. WORKERS' SALARIES AND

WAGES SHOULD BE PAID IN FULL, AS THEY USED TO BE PAID BEFORE THE INTIFADA. WORKERS SHOULD BE PAID FOR TOTAL STRIKE DAYS.

-- AGRICULTURAL AND COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES: UNLU URGES ALL THE MASSES TO ASSIST IN PICKING THE OLIVE CROP AND FACILITATE ITS PRESSING. COOPERATIVE AND VOLUNTARY WORK SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO GATHER EVERY PALESTINIAN OLIVE. FARMERS AND OLIVE OIL MERCHANTS SHOULD SELL THEIR PRODUCE LOCALLY AT A FAIR PRICE. THIS IS OUR OIL AND WE SHOULD CONSUME IT LOCALLY, IF WE CANNOT EXPORT IT.

-- UNITY OF THE INTERNAL FRONT: UNLU EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITY OF THE INTERNAL FRONT WHICH HAS WITHSTOOD ALL FORMS OF PUNITIVE MEASURES. WE CALL ON THE MASSES TO COMBAT ALL SIGNS OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY DIFFERENCES AND FEUDS, WHICH THE ENEMY AND ITS AGENTS ARE TRYING TO AROUSE. ALL THE AUTHORITIES' ATTEMPTS TO "BLOW UP" SOME PARTIES AND CONSIDER THEM A FORCE EQUAL TO UNLU WILL FAIL.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03228 04 OF 04 290918Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /068 W

-----143353 290928Z /11

O 290909Z SEP 88

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3610
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 JERUSALEM 03228

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 26, 9/27/88

-- THE WANTED PERSONS: UNLU GREETES OUR PEOPLE'S CHILDREN, WANTED BY THE AUTHORITIES, WHO MUTINIED AGAINST ARREST ORDERS AND WENT UNDERGROUND. UNLU URGES THE MASSES TO SUPPORT THEM AND EXTEND A HELPING HAND TO THEM.

0 MASSES OF OUR GIVING PEOPLE: UNLU GREATLY VALUES THE STEADFASTNESS OF OUR COURAGEOUS MASSES IN QALQILYA, WHO WITH THEIR STONES, MOLOTOVS AND NAILS HAVE SPREAD TERROR IN THE HEARTS OF THE SETTLERS AND SHAKEN THE ZIONIST GENERALS. THEY HAVE RESPONDED TO THE CRUEL OPPRESSIVE MEASURES BY ESCALATING THEIR STRUGGLE. GREETINGS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES WHO HAVE STRONGLY CONFRONTED MINISTER RABIN AND HIS GANG IN KHAN YOUNIS. UNLU URGES THE POPULAR AND SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES, AS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03228 04 OF 04 290918Z

WELL AS THE STRIKING FORCES TO LAY OUT A PROGRAM OF STRUGGLE, WELL TIMED TO CONFORM TO THE PREVAILING CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AT EVERY LOCATION, TO EXECUTE THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES:

1. ESCALATE DAILY CONFRONTATIONS AGAINST OCCUPATION FORCES AND THE SETTLERS' GANGS AND SABOTAGE ENEMY PROPERTY.
2. CONTINUE TO PURGE THE INTERNAL FRONT FROM UNCLEAN AGENTS.
3. ACTIVATE VOLUNTEER WORK TO HELP FARMERS DURING THE OLIVE HARVEST.
4. MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY WITH THE BESEIGED AREAS AND REVOLUTIONIZE ALL THE LOCATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY

SO THAT THE ENEMY WILL NOT SUCCEED IN HITTING ONE ISOLATED AREA. SEND FOOD COMMODITIES AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THESE AREAS AND TAKE CARE OF THEIR PLANTATIONS.

5. MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY WITH THOSE WHO SUFFER BECAUSE OF THE INTIFADA, PRISONERS, WOUNDED AND FAMILIES OF MARTYRS, DEPORTEES AND OWNERS OF DEMOLISHED HOMES AS WELL AS THOSE EXPELLED FROM THEIR WORK, BY VISITING THEM, HOLDING SIT-INS AND EXTENDING A HELPING HAND TO THEM.

6. MONDAY OCTOBER 3 WILL BE A TOTAL STRIKE DAY IN PROTEST AGAINST CONTINUED CLOSURE OF SCHOOLS AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, BY THE AUTHORITIES. SUNDAY OCTOBER 9, SHOULD BE OBSERVED AS A TOTAL UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03228 04 OF 04 290918Z

STRIKE DAY ON THE OCCASION OF THE START OF THE TH MONTH OF THE INTIFADA.

MORE UNITY, STRUGGLE AND CONFRONTATION ON THE PATH TO ACHIEVING OUR PEOPLES' CONSTANT NATIONAL RIGHTS.

WE SHALL BE VICTORIOUS

THE PLO, THE UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

DATED SEPTEMBER 27, 1988.
WILCOX

E90

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03187

FILM= D880864-0464

DATE= 27 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= BASSAM ABU SHARIF INTERVIEW: PLO READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= INTERVIEW, NEGOTIATION, LIBERATION FRONT, PALESTINIANS, SOVEREIGN
UNSC RES 242

TAGS= KPAL, PBTS, IS, US, PLO, (ABU SHARIF, BASSAM)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY

EXCISE DECLASSIFY

DENY DECLASSIFY

DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

S, FPC/CDR _____ Date: _____

MR Cases Only _____

EO Citations _____

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority

DOWNGRADE TS to S or B or _____

9304029

<<<<>>>>
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03187 01 OF 05 271312Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /080 W
-----000650 271425Z /44

R 271309Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3573
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03187

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PBTS, KPAL
SUBJECT: BASSAM ABU SHARIF INTERVIEW: PLO READY
TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL

1. SUMMARY: THE JERUSALEM POST OF SEPTEMBER 16
RAN AN INTERVIEW OF THE PLO'S BASSAM ABU SHARIF
BY CORRESPONDENT MICHEL ZLOTOWSKI. IN THE
INTERVIEW, CONDUCTED IN STRASBOURG FOLLOWING
ARAFAT'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, ABU SHARIF ARGUES THAT THE PLO HAS
ACCEPTED UNSCR 242 AND 338, IS READY TO
NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF
242/338 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
FOR PALESTINIANS, AND THAT PALESTINIANS ARE
PREPARED TO LIVE PEACEFULLY ALONG SIDE ISRAEL AS
AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. HE SAYS THE
DATE FOR A PNC HAS BEEN DETERMINED, BUT DOES NOT
DISCLOSE FURTHER DETAILS. HE DEFENDS PLO
TERRORIST ATTACKS INSIDE ISRAEL (DIMONA) UNDER
THE TERMS OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION, AS RESPONSES
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03187 01 OF 05 271312Z

TO ISRAELI ATTACKS ON THE PLO ABROAD (ABU JIHAD,
LIMASOL). ABU SHARIF SAYS THE INTIFADA WILL
CONTINUE UNTIL ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND SAYS JORDAN'S
DISENGAGEMENT SHOWS "NOW THERE IS THE PLO, AND

ONLY THE PLO." THE TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW
FOLLOWS. END SUMMARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF INTERVIEW:

ABU SHARIF: I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE MEMBERS OF
THE (EUROPEAN) PARLIAMENT WERE EXPECTING, BUT
MANY OF THEM REACTED VERY POSITIVELY. MANY OF
THEM GOT A VERY CLEAR IDEA OF THE SERIOUS AND
COMMITTED STAND OF THE PLO TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF PEACE. I AM SURE THAT ARAFAT'S SPEECH
CLARIFIED THE POLITICAL STAND OF THE PLO ON MANY
ISSUES THAT ARE STILL REGARDED BY SOME POLITICAL
POWERS AS UNCLARIFIED. FOR EXAMPLE, TO TAKE UP
ONE ISSUE: I HEARD SEVERAL (ISRAELI) LABOUR
PARTY LEADERS DURING THE BEGINNING OF THEIR
ELECTION CAMPAIGN IMPOSE ON THE PLO CONDITIONS
SUCH AS THE RECOGNITION OF UN RESOLUTIONS 242
AND 338. CHAIRMAN AAFAT HAS SAID VERY CLEARLY
THAT HE ACCEPTS 242 AND 338. NOW THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT IS A WITNESS. SO WHENEVER SHIMON
PERES WILL COME AND SAY "THEY'LL HAVE TO
RECOGNIZE 242 AND 338," THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
CAN TELL HIM: "THEY DIDI" I KNOW AND YOU KNOW,
TOO, THAT ARAFAT ALREADY SAID THAT BEFORE. WE
ARE ACCEPTING ALL OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS.

JERUSALEM POST: DOES THAT INCLUDE THE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03187 01 OF 05 271312Z

RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TOO?

ABU SHARIF: LET'S NOT GET INTO SEMANTICS. IO
THERE IS A REAL INTENTION TO ESTABLISH PEACE,
THE FORMULA IS VERY CLEAR AND VERY SIMPLE. THE
PALESTINIANS ACCEPT 242 AND 338 AND AT THE SAME
TIME THEY EXPECT OTHERS TO ACCEPT THEIR RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION. SO ALL RESOLUTIONS THAT
CALL FOR THIS RIGHT SHOULD BE INCLUDED AMONG THE
RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AS A BASIC FOR A
SETTLEMENT AND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE.

JP: WHAT ABOUT THE PLO'S CHARTER?

ABU SHARIL: LET ME TELL YOU THIS. THE COVENANT
WAS DRAFTED BEFORE THIS LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO
WAS ELECTED. THE PLO HAS A PROGRAMME, THE SAME
WAY ANY PARTY WHICH WOULD HOPE TO WIN THE

ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL HAS ITS PROGRAME. WE DO NOT OPEN OLD FILES, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FILES OF HERUT, THE BACKBONE OF ONE OF THE PARTNERS OF THE ACTUAL GOVERNMENT. WE DON'T TALK ABOUT THEIR ANTHEM "FROM THE NILE TO THE EUPHEATES" (SIC). WE DON'T TALK ABOUT THE IDEAS OF EXPANSIONISM PUT FORWARD BY CERTAIN PEOPLE IN THE RULING CIRCLES LIKE SHARON. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT DEALS WITH THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THAT DEALS WITH REALITIES THAT THE PALESTINIANS ARE SEEING NOW VERY CLEARLY AND REALITIES THAT HAVE, UNFORTUNATELY, NOT BEEN SEEN BY THE RULING GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL UNTIL NOW. THE PALESTINIANS RESIST OCCUPATION BECAUSE THEY WANT THEIR FREEDOM, THEY WANT TO

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03187 02 OF 05 271313Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /080 W
-----000652 271425Z /44

R 271309Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3574
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03187

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PBTS, KPAL
SUBJECT: BASSAM ABU SHARIF INTERVIEW: PLO READY

ESTABLISH THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT STATE AND NOT
DESTROY ANOTHER PEOPLE'S STATE.

JP: INCLUDING ISRAEL?

ABJ SHARIF: INCLUDING ISRAEL.

JP: THE PLO NO LONGER WISHES TO DESTROY ISRAEL?

ABU SHARIF: THE PLO HAS NEVER SAID IT WANTED TO
DESTROY ISRAEL. I HOPE THAT PEOPLE WHO TALK A
LOT ABOUT 242 READ IT. THE PEOPLE WHO TALK
ABOUT THE COVENANT SHOULD READ IT TOO, BECAUSE
THE COVENANT DOESN'T SPEAK ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION
OF ISRAEL. BUT I AM NOT DEALING HERE WITH THE
COVENANT, I CONSIDER THAT THE POLITICAL PROGRAMME
OF THE PLO IS THE ONLY PAPER TO WHICH WE ARE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03187 02 OF 05 271313Z

COMMITTED. WE ARE DEALING WITH REALITIES. THE
REALITY IS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE CHOSEN
(ACTUAL) POLITICAL FORCES TO RULE THEM, BY
ELECTION. WE WANT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM.

JP: DO YOU MEAN TO SAY THAT THE PLO COVENANT IS
OUTDATED?

ABU SHARIF: I MEANT WHAT I SAID. I DON'T WANT
TO TALK ABOUT THE CHARTER, FRANKLY.

JP: BUT EVERY TIME YOU WILL MEET WITH AN
ISRAELI, HE WILL TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE COVENANT,
BECAUSE IN HIS EYES IT IS ONE OF THE MAIN
OBSTACLES TO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO.

ABU SHARIF: YASSER ARAFAT MADE CLEAR AND SAID
IN FRONT OF HUNDREDS OF PARLIAMENTARIANS THAT HE
IS HOLDING OUT HIS HAND FOR PEACE AND HE IS
WAITING FOR A COURAGEOUS ISRAELI LEADER TO SIT
DOWN AND TALK AND NEGOTIATE PFACE AND THAT HE IS
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE AND
NOT FOR DESTROYING OTHERS. HE IS VERY CLEAR ON
THAT.

JP: ARE YOU READY TO DEFINE THE BORDERS OF THE

PALESTINIAN STATE YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT?

ABU SHARIF: I THINK THAT THIS IS THE POINT WHICH SHOULD BE LEFT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRINCIPAL POINT FROM WHICH WE CAN START THIS PROCESS OF PEACEMAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE OCCUPIER OF WITHDRAWAL, OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03187 02 OF 05 271313Z

RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE PLO OF THE RESOLUTIONS THAT ENSURE SECURITY, SAFETY OF BORDERS AND SOVEREIGNTY FOR ISRAEL.

JP: IN THAT ORDER?

ABU SHARIF: NO, NOT NECESSARILY; ON AN EQUAL BASIS. BECAUSE IF PERES WOULD COME OUT AND SAY "I AM FOR THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS" - WE ARE SAYING THAT WE ARE FOR 242 AND 338 AND THE RIGHT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION - I THINK THIS IS A STARTING POINT.

JP: WHAT IF SHAMIR SAYS THAT?

ABU SHARIF: FRANKLY SPEAKING, I AM NOT DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN THE TWO, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES. BUT REGARDING THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, UP TO NOW I CANNOT DISTINGUISH THEM. THE FASCIST MEASURES THAT ARE BEING USED AGAINST OUR PEOPLE, IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, ARE BEING DECIDED BY BOTH AND IMPLEMENTED BY BOTH. I DON'T SAY "SHAMIR" OR "PERES," BUT WHOEVER WILL BE ELECTED BY THE ISRAELIS. BECAUSE HE WILL BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISRAELIS THE SAME WAY THE PLO IS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. I DO NOT ALLOW THE ISRAELIS OR THE AMERICANS OR THE JORDANIANS TO CHOOSE FOR OUR PEOPLE WHO REPRESENTS THEM. IN THE SAME WAY, I DON'T ALLOW MYSELF TO CHOOSE FOR THE ISRAELIS WHO REPRESENTS THEM. WE ARE READY TO DEAL WITH ANY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03187 03 OF 05 271316Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /080 W
-----000753 271425Z /44

R 271309Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3575
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03187

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PBTS, KPAL
SUBJECT: BASSAM ABU SHARIF INTERVIEW: PLO READY

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISRAELIS WHO ARE
COURAGEOUS ENOUGH TO SIT AND TALK AND NEGOTIATE
PEACE.

JP: DO YOU THINK THIS WILL BE THE OUTCOME OF
THE COMING EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE PNC?

ABU SHARIL: WHAT I HAVE JUST SAID IS BASED ON
RESOLUTIONS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL BECAUSE WHAT
I HAVE SAID DID NOT DEAL WITH THE MECHANISM OR
WITH THE APPARATUS OF ACHIEVING THE PEACE. WE
HAVE TAKEN A CLEAR STAND CALLING FOR THIS IN THE
CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE WHICH WILL HAVE AS PARTICIPANTS ALL
THE SIDES CONCERNED, ISRAEL, PLO AND OTHERS,
PLUS THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS HAS A LOGIC.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03187 03 OF 05 271316Z

SOME OF THE ISRAELI POLITICIANS TRY TO MISLEAD THE ISRAELIS BY SAYING THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE WILL BE A THREAT TO ISRAEL. "IF WE ALLOW A PALESTINIAN STATE ON OUR BORDERS, IT WILL MEAN THAT THE NEXT DAY YOU WILL HAVE TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. THEY WOULD BE TOO CLOSE TO US" AND SO ON. THEY ARE MISLEADING THE ISRAELIS AND MOBILIZING THEM PSYCHOLOGICALLY IN THE WRONG DIRECTION BECAUSE THEY HAVE THEIR OWN AIMS, POLITICAL AIMS, WHICH ARE DEFINITELY AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE REGION.

WE SAY "THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL" FOR TWO REASONS. ONE REASON IS THE GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. THESE STATES ARE SUPPOSED TO GIVE AN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE FOR SECURITY AND SECURE BORDERS. SECOND, IT IS FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR STATE, BECAUSE WE ARE THE ONES WHO ARE AFRAID OF THE GIGANTIC MILITARY MACHINE OF ISRAEL, OF THE NUCLEAR POWER OF ISRAEL. AND THEREFORE, WHEN WE HAVE THIS INTERNATIONAL FORUM, THE FIVE CAN DEFINITELY GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF OUR STATE AND OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

JP: HOW CAN YOU SAY THAT THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN CAN BE A GUARANTEE? THE UN HAS NEVER SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING A WAR OR AN ACT OF AGGRESSION?

ABU SHARIF. I DIDN'T SAY THE UN. I SAID THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03187 03 OF 05 271316Z

FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

JP: DON'T YOU THINK THAT DIRECT TALKS WOULD BE MUCH MORE FRUITFUL THAN GOING THROUGH ALL THIS INTERNATIONAL AND CONFERENCE BUSINESS?

ABU SHARIF: THE PLO WANTS TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL. DO YOU THINK WE ARE GOING TO AN

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO TALK TO KING HUSSEIN? OR TO NEGOTIATE WITH FRANCE OR WITH THE UNITED STATES? WE WANT TO GO TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL. THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE THE COUNTRIES THAT ARE ABLE TO SUPPLY ISRAEL OR PALESTINE WITH ARMS. THEIR PRESENCE, THEIR SIGNATURE ON THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE RESPECTED, BUT I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE BASIS REMAINS THE RESPECT OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE TWO MAIN PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, INDEPENDENT PALESTINE AND ISRAEL.

JP: DOES THAT MEAN THAT IF ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO HAVE DIRECT TALKS WITH YOU, YOU WOULD PENOUNCE THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE?

ABU SHARIF: I DIDN'T SAY THAT, BECAUSE UNTIL NOW WE SEE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS THE BEST WAY OF GETTING THE WHEELS OF PEACE TO MOVE. THE KNESSET'S DECISION STATING THAT NO (ISRAELI) GOVERNMENT IS ALLOWED TO NEGOTIATE THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK BEFORE A GENERAL PLEBISCITE IS STILL IN FORCE. UNTIL NOW, ALL THE EFFORTS OF THE PLO TO PUSH FORWARD A PEACEMAKING PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03187 04 OF 05 271319Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /080 W
-----000755 271425Z /44

R 271309Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3576
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03187

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PBTS, KPAL
SUBJECT: BASSAM ABU SHARIF INTERVIEW: PLO READY

RECEIVED ONLY A REJECTION FROM THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT AND ALSO A CERTAIN EXTENT FROM SOME
OTHER INTERNATIONAL CIRCLES.

JP: WHAT IS YASSER ARAFAT'S POSITION NOW WITHIN
THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT? WHAT IS THE STRENGTH
OF PEOPLE LIKE ABU MUSSA AND AHMAD JIBRIL?

ABU SHARIF: IN APRIL 1987 YASSER ARAFAT WAS
UNANIMOUSLY ELECTED AT THE LAST PNC MEETING AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE PLO. THE ONLY ONE WHO DID NOT
VOTE WAS ARAFAT HIMSELF. THE SMALL GROUPS
CONTROLLED BY THE SYRIANS, ABU MUSSA AND JIBRIL,
HAVE BEEN KNOWN FOR A LONG TIME AS SYRIAN
PUPPETS. THEY ARE NOT CONSIDERED BY THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AS PALESTINIAN
ORGANIZATIONS. ARAFAT, WHO STARTED AS LEADER OF
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03187 04 OF 05 271319Z

THE FATAH AND THEN LEADER OF THE PLO, IS NOW THE
LEADER OF THE PALESTINIANS. THERE ARE THOUSANDS
OF PALESTINIANS ALL THROUGH THE WORLD AND IN
PARTICULAR INSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHO
ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE (PLO) ORGANIZATION, BUT
WHO REGARD THE PLO AS THEIR NATIONAL IDENTITY,
AND WHO CONSIDER YASSER ARAFAT TO BE THEIR
LEADER.

JP: IF ARAFAT IS RECOGNIZED BY HIS OWN PEOPLE
IN SUCH A WAY, UHY ARE THERE SO MANY
DIFFICULTIES IN CONVENING THE PNC?

ABU SHARIF: THIS EXTRAORDINARY SESSION IS GOING
TO DEAL WITH AN HISTORIC ISSUE. OUR CENTRAL
COMMITTEE HAS DECIDED TO PREPARE THIS SESSION IN

A VERY SCIENTIFIC WAY BY DRAFTING ALL THE PAPERS NECESSARY ON THE ISSUE TO BE DISCUSSED. ALL THE AD-HOC COMMITTEES HAVE REMITTED THEIR PAPERS, AND NOW IT IS UP TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO DECIDE THE PROPER TIMING, NOT BECAUSE OF DISPUTES OR DIFFERENCES, BUT TO ACHIEVE THE BEST EFFECT ON THE PALESTINIANS, ON THE REGIONAL AND ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.

JP: THE DATE OF THE PNC HAS NOT BEEN SET YET?

ABU SHARIF: IT HAS.

JP: SO, WHEN?

ABU SHARIF: I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY WHEN.

MARWAN KANAFANI: IT WILL BE AT THE BEGINNING OF UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03187 04 OF 05 271319Z

OCTOBER.

JP: IS IT WISE TO HOLD THE PNC SESSION BEFORE THE ELECTIONS BOTH IN ISRAEL AND IN THE UNITED STATES?

ABU SHARIF: I DON'T MEAN THAT ISRAELI ELECTIONS ARE NOT IMPORTANT TO US. WE ARE FOLLOWING EVERY SINGLE SPEECH OF YOUR CAMPAIGN. WE ARE FOLLOWING WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE UNITED STATES BUT THESE EVENTS DO NOT INFLUENCE THE DECISION ON WHEN TO CONVENE THE PNC.

JP: WILL THE INTIFADA GO ON?

ABU SHARIF: THE INTIFADA WILL GO ON BECAUSE RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE OCCUPATION WILL CEASE.

JP: WHAT ABOUT THE TERRORIST ATTACKS INSIDE THE GREEN LINE?

ABU SHARIF: MILITARY OPERATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT AGAINST ISRAEL, THE ISRAELI ARMY, WILL DEFINITELY CONTINUE AS AN ACT OF RESISTANCE.

JP: I WAS ASKING YOU ABOUT TERRORIST ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS, LIKE IN HAIFA. (AT THIS POINT, ABU

SHARIF TURNED TO KANAFANI AND ASKED IN ARABIC WHO CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HAIFA TERRORIST ATTACK.)

ABU SHARIF: THE DIMONA OPERATION WAS PLO. HAIFA WAS JIBRIL. DIMONA WAS AN ATTACK AGAINST

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JERUSA 03187 04 OF 05 271319Z

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03187 05 OF 05 271322Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /080 W
-----000757 271425Z /44

R 271309Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3577
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 JERUSALEM 03187

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PBTS, KPAL
SUBJECT: BASSAM ABU SHARIF INTERVIEW: PLO READY

TRESPECTING THE DECLARATION OF CAIRO (1985
UNDERTAKING TO EGYPT BY ARAFAT NOT TO ATTACK
TARGETS OUTSIDE ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES). THE ASSASSINATION OF ABU JIHAD,
OF THREE PLO CADRES IN LIMASSOL, THE BOMBING OF
THE "SHIP OF RETURN," THE ASSASSINATION OF OTHER
CADRES IN ATHENS. IT IS SAID CLEARLY BY MANY
ISRAELI OFFICIALS THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PLO HEADQUARTERS AND
LEADERSHIP. WHY DO YOU EXPECT THE PLO TO REMAIN
SILENT? ARAFAT SAID IN STRASPOURG THAT THE PLO
WILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE CAIRO DECLARATION
UNTIL THE PLO DECIDES OTHERWISE, MAYBE AS A
REACTION TO THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE OF NO RESPECT
FOR THIS DECLARATION.

JP: WHAT WOULD YOU CONSIDER TO BE A SIGNIFICANT
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ENOUGH ISRAELI GESTURE FOR THE PLO TO CALL A HALT TO THE INTIFADA?

ABU SHARIF: JUDGING FROM THE ISRAELI OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE PLO PEACE OFFERS, THIS HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REALISTIC. INTIFADA IS RESISTANCE TO THE OCCUPATION. IF ISRAEL ANNOUNCES ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK AND FROM GAZA, THERE WILL BE NO NEED TO CONTINUE THE INTIFADA.

JP: WHAT WOULD ISRAEL GET IN EXCHANGE FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL?

ABU SHARIF: A NEGOTIATED PEACE, AN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY. WE WILL BE READY TO ACCEPT UN FORCES ON THE BORDERS IF THIS WOULD MAKE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FEEL BETTER.

JP: KING HUSSEIN'S DECISION (TO SEVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE LINKS WITH THE WEST BANK) HAS SURPRISED ARAFAT. DID IT PUT THE PLO IN A DIFFICULT POSITION?

ABU SHARIF: IT HAS INCREASED THE BURDEN OF OUR PEOPLE UNDER OCCUPATION. THE PLO DID NOT HESITATE TO STEP IN AND FILL THE GAP BY TAKING ALL THE RESPONSIBILITIES.

JP: DO YOU RESENT THE KING'S DECISION?
ABU SHARIF: THE CENTRAL COUNCIL HAS SAID THAT WE WILL KEEP OUR CONTACTS WITH THE KING.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JP: IN THIS NEW SITUATION, DOES JORDAN REMAIN A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT? IN CASE OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE, FOR INSTANCE?

ABU SHARIF: JORDAN HAS A PART OF ITS TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL, ACCORDING TO HIS MAJESTY, NEAR THE ARAVA VALLEY. THAT WOULD MAKE JORDAN A PARTY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE. BUT THE "JORDANIAN OPTION" WHICH SOME PEOPLE HAVE BEEN CALLING FOR,

IS OVER. NOW THERE IS THE PLO, AND ONLY THE
PLO. END TEXT.
WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

R (EBC)

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88CAIRO22795

FILM= D880857-0578

DATE= 25 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= CAIRO

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
COM

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 23-25, 1988 UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= REVIEW, NEWSPAPER, VISIT, LAND SETTLEMENT, POLICY

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	TS auth
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> B or

9304029

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22795 01 OF 05 251331Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----271360 251332Z /38

O 251322Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0172
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9791
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 CAIRO 22795

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 23-25, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22795 01 OF 05 251331Z

THIS REVIEW COVERS THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS
(GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED; AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION)

AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEEKLIES). BOTH CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-60,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD), BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

- MUBARAK WINDS UP A SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA.
- EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL STATES THAT QUICK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VERDICT ON TABA WOULD LEAD TO POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.
- COLUMNISTS COMMENT ON THE LAUNCHING OF THE ISRAELI SATELLITE.
- RIOT IN UPPER EGYPT IN PROTEST AGAINST GOVERNMENT POLICY.
- OPPOSITION AL-WAFD REPORTS EGYPT DENOUNCED ISRAEL'S METHODS OF DIVIDING THE ARABS; RUNS FIRST INTERVIEW TO APPEAR IN OPPOSITION PRESS WITH RETIRED ISRAELI GENERALS HARKABI AND YARIV.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 22795 01 OF 05 251331Z

ESTABLISHMENT PRESS: INTERNATIONAL NEWS

1. MUBARAK'S EUROPEAN TOUR. THE LEAD ITEM IN ALL WEEKEND PAPERS REPORTS MUBARAK'S TALKS IN YUGOSLAVIA ON VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, THE GULF WAR, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, FOREIGN DEBTS, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN STATEMENTS TO TV, MUBARAK CALLED UPON THE PLO TO MAKE WELL-STUDIED DECISIONS SO THAT THEY MAY NOT BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF DURING THE ISRAELI AND US ELECTIONS. AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON BOOSTING JOINT COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS AND THE EXCHANGE OF EXPERTISE, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY. REPORTEDLY, YUGOSLAVIA WILL SUPPORT EGYPT'S STAND TOWARDS

THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK. ALL PAPERS SEPTEMBER 25
REPORT MUBARAK'S ARRIVAL IN LONDON TO HOLD TALKS WITH
THATCHER, KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, AND THE BAHRAINI PRIME
MINISTER.

2. ARAFAT LEAVES CAIRO. ALL PAPERS SEPTEMBER 23 REPORT
ARAFAT LEFT CAIRO AFTER A ONE-DAY VISIT DURING WHICH HE
HELD TALKS WITH MUBARAK AND GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO EGYPTIAN
TELEVISION. ARAFAT RENEWED HIS CALL UPON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT
AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, NOTING THAT THE PNC WOULD
DISCUSS SEVEN OPTIONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
PALESTINIAN STATE IN ALGIERS NEXT MONTH. IN HIS TV
INTERVIEW, ARAFAT CALLED UPON ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE
PLO AND ESTABLISH A "COURAGEOUS" PEACE, ADDING THAT THE
UPRISING WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL "VICTORY" OR PEACE IS
ACHIEVED.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22795 02 OF 05 251331Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----271365 251332Z /38

O 251322Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0173
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9792
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 CAIRO 22795

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 23-25, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22795 02 OF 05 251331Z

3. TABA. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS A HIGH-LEVEL EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL AFFIRMED THAT THE VERDICT ON TABA WILL BE IN FAVOR OF EGYPT, NOTING THAT QUICK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VERDICT WOULD LEAD TO POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE SUBJECT OF CONFLICT. IN A RELATED ITEM, AHRAM REPORTS THAT DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY TAMIR WILL DISCUSS WITH EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS IN GENEVA MEANS OF CARRYING OUT THE AWARD.

AKHBAR EL-YOM SEPTEMBER 24 NOTES THAT MUBARAK HAD REFUSED AN ISRAELI OFFER TO CONSIDER THE HOTEL IN TABA A JOINT PROPERTY WITH 49 PER CENT FOR THE ISRAELI SIDE AND 51 PER CENT FOR THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. MUBARAK INFORMED THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BUILD A HOTEL ON A LAND THAT WAS NOT THEIRS. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 25 REPORTS THAT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AWARD, EGYPT WILL PUBLISH A WHITE BOOK ON TABA INCLUDING ALL DOCUMENTS, MAPS, AND PROCEEDINGS.

4. ON THE ISRAELI SATELLITE. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS

THE USSR ANNOUNCED THAT THE ISRAELI SATELLITE OFEK I COULD LEAD TO A NEW ESCALATION IN THE ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SAID THAT MOSCOW UNDERSTANDS ARAB FEARS ABOUT THE LAUNCHING OF THIS ISRAELI SATELLITE FOR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY SINCE ISRAEL INSISTS ON PROCEEDING WITH ITS MILITARY PROJECTS WHILE NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

AKHBAR'S DAILY COLUMNIST ABDEL MONEIM MURAD SEPTEMBER 23 COMMENTS ON THIS EVENT AND ACCUSES THE ARABS OF BEING LAZY AND BACKWARD BECAUSE THEY ONLY THINK ABOUT FOOD AND SEX, WHILE ISRAEL - A SMALL COUNTRY THAT IS NOT WEALTHY - HAS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 22795 02 OF 05 251331Z

MANAGED THROUGH HARD WORK TO ACHIEVE A TECHNOLOGICAL LEAP AND SURPASS ALL THE ARABS. THE COLUMNIST FURTHER CRITICIZES THE "STUPID" ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH THINK THAT THE US AND ISRAEL AIM AT INTRODUCING FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS TO REDUCE THEIR POPULATION SO THAT THEY MAY NOT POSE A DANGER TO THEM.

GUMHOURIYYA'S COLUMNIST AWATEF ABDEL GALIL SEPTEMBER 24 WRITES THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE SATELLITE IS NOT ESPIONAGE, BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS OBTAINED THE INFORMATION IT WANTS THROUGH US SATELLITES. NOTING THAT ISRAEL CAN NOW HIT ANY SPOT IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD WITH A NUCLEAR MISSILE, THE COLUMNIST CONCLUDES THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF LAUNCHING THE SATELLITE IS TO SERVE ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONIST AIMS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

5. INTERVIEW WITH PERES. FOR THE THIRD WEEK IN A ROW, AHARAM RUNS AN INTERVIEW WITH AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL. THIS TIME AHARAM INTERVIEWS PERES, WHO SAID THAT HIS MEETING WITH ABDEL MEGUID, PRESIDENT REAGAN, AND SHULTZ IS AIMED AT GIVING MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HOWEVER, PERES NOTED, THE MEETING WOULD HAVE LITTLE POSITIVE EFFECT BECAUSE THE PALESTINIANS STILL DO NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL OR RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. PERES EXPRESSED RESPECT FOR MUBARAK'S CONTINUOUS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PEACE.

ON THE SAME PAGE, AHARAM COMMENTS ON THE LAUNCHING OF THE ISRAELI SATELLITE AND WRITES THAT IT IS AIMED MAINLY AT OBLITERATING THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING TAKEN BY SURPRISE AS OCCURRED IN THE OCTOBER WAR.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22795 03 OF 05 251332Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W

-----271372 251333Z /38

O 251322Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0174
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9793
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 CAIRO 22795

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO

LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US

SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 23-25, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22795 03 OF 05 251332Z

6. EGYPT/US. ALL PAPERS SEPTEMBER 24 REPORT EGYPT AND THE US CONCLUDED A DEAL, WHEREBY THE FORMER WILL GET PILOTLESS BEACH CRAFT PLANES TO MONITOR EGYPTIAN SHORES AND DETECT ANY ATTEMPT BY FOREIGN SHIPS TO GET RID OF WASTE NEAR EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 22 REPORTS THAT USAID DECIDED TO DOUBLE ITS FINANCING TO THE COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY FROM DOLLARS 20 MILLION TO DOLLARS 40 MILLION.

7. EGYPTIAN-ARAB RELATIONS. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS EGYPT OBTAINED ITS FIRST LOAN FROM THE ARAB MONETARY FUND SINCE APRIL, WHEN THE FREEZE OF ITS MEMBERSHIP WAS TERMINATED. THE LOAN AMOUNTS TO DOLLARS 18.3 MILLION WITH AN ANNUAL INTEREST RATE RANGING BETWEEN 3.75 AND 4.75 PER CENT TO BE REPAID OVER FOUR INSTALLMENTS EVERY SIX MONTHS, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS TO TAKE PLACE AFTER A GRACE PERIOD OF 18 MONTHS. SEPARATELY, AHRAM REPORTS THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ARAB LABOR ORGANIZATION WILL DISCUSS A MEMORANDUM IN ITS MEETING SEPTEMBER 25 ON EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE ORGANIZATION.

8. EGYPT/KUWAIT. AKHBAR EL-YOM SEPTEMBER 24 REPORTS AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION FROM THE ARAB ORGANIZATION FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION LEFT FOR KUWAIT TO DISCUSS CONCLUDING A DEAL, WHEREBY EGYPT WILL PROVIDE KUWAIT WITH MODERN EGYPTIAN-MADE JEEPS.

9. EGYPT/UAE. ALL PAPERS SEPTEMBER 23 REPORT THAT TWO AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED WITH UAE AT THE END OF THE TALKS CURRENTLY HELD IN CAIRO. THE FIRST AGREEMENT IS FOR CULTURAL COOPERATION, AND THE SECOND IS FOR ACTIVATION OF TOURISM THROUGH ESTABLISHING A TOURIST COMPANY WITH
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 22795 03 OF 05 251332Z

CAPITAL OF LE 100 MILLION. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON ESTABLISHING A JOINT COMMITTEE TO BOOST AND FOLLOW UP COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS.

10. EGYPT/IMF/IBRD. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION NOW IN WEST BERLIN WILL HOLD TALKS WITH THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK ON IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW ECONOMIC REFORM COURSE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 24 REPORTS THE IMF HAILED THE SOUNDNESS OF THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC REFORM COURSE WHICH RESULTED IN INCREASING THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY 4 PER CENT.

11. EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL APPROVED. AHRAM REPORTS THE INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE IN SOFIA CONDEMNED ISRAELI ACTS OF REPRESSION AGAINST UNARMED PALESTINIANS AND CALLED FOR PUTTING AN END TO THESE INHUMAN PRACTICES. THE CONFERENCE AGREED TO A PROPOSAL BY THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION REGARDING THE DISPATCHING OF A FACT-FINDING COMMISSION TO THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. SEPARATELY, AHRAM REPORTS PERES ANNOUNCED AFTER MEETING WITH MITTERRAND THAT HE IS READY TO GIVE UP GAZA AND PARTS OF THE WEST BANK THAT CONTAIN A CLEAR ARAB MAJORITY.

12. EGYPT/CHINA. AHRAM SEPTEMBER 26 REPORTS EGYPT AND CHINA SIGNED AN AGREEMENT FOR EXCHANGING PROFESSORS, SENDING EGYPTIAN DELEGATES TO STUDY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA, AND RECEIVING CHINESE STUDENTS TO STUDY ARABIC IN EGYPT.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22795 04 OF 05 251332Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W
-----271377 251333Z /38

O 251322Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0175
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9794
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 CAIRO 22795

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 23-25, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22795 04 OF 05 251332Z

DOMESTIC NEWS

13. STRIKE IN MAHALLA. WEEKEND PAPERS REPORT THAT 45
WORKERS FROM MISR SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY, LOCATED IN
THE INDUSTRIAL CITY OF AL-MAHALLA AL-KUBRA NEAR

ALEXANDRIA, HAVE BEEN JAILED ON CHARGES OF RIOTING, RESISTING AUTHORITIES, AND IMPEDING PRODUCTION. THE WORKERS HAD SHOUTED ANTI-GOVERNMENT SLOGANS, ANNOUNCED A SIT-IN STRIKE, AND CALLED FOR CASHING THE ANNUAL SCHOOL BONUS, WHICH WAS NOT PAID TO WORKERS BY THE GOVERNMENT THIS YEAR.

14. LOCAL ADMINISTRATION REGULATION. AKHBAR SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS ON NEW AMENDMENTS IN THE EXECUTIVE REGULATION OF THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION LAW. THE AMENDMENTS INCLUDE PERMITTING THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO EXTEND THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE LOCAL COUNCILS TO FIVE YEARS INSTEAD OF FOUR.

15. MEAT BOYCOTT. AKHBAR SEPTEMBER 25 REPORTS HOUSEWIVES IN ALEXANDRIA ADDRESSED A WARNING TO BUTCHERS AND FISH AND POULTRY MERCHANTS TO REDUCE THEIR PRICES WITHIN A WEEK OTHERWISE A BOYCOTT WILL BE ANNOUNCED. THIS DECISION BY THE HOUSEWIVES WAS MADE AFTER STUDYING THE PROFIT MARGIN IN ALL SUPPLY COMMODITIES.

16. ARMS PRODUCTION. AHAM REPORTS STATE MINISTER FOR MILITARY PRODUCTION GAMAL AL-SAYYID AFFIRMED THAT THE LOCAL ARMS INDUSTRY SAVED 40 PER CENT OF ITS IMPORT COSTS. HE ADDED THAT EGYPT'S PROGRAM TO MANUFACTURE THE MIA1 TANK WAS PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO PLAN, NOTING THAT EGYPT WILL MANUFACTURE 90 PER CENT OF THE TANK IN A FEW UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 22795 04 OF 05 251332Z

YEARS.

17. AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY. AHAM SEPTEMBER 22 REPORTS THE PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INCREASED BY 100 PER CENT DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AGRICULTURAL BANK SAID THAT THE BANK ALLOCATED LE 284 MILLION LAST YEAR TO FINANCE AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, BUT ONLY 45 PER CENT OF THIS AMOUNT WAS USED.

18. TV NEWS SEPTEMBER 24: MUBARAK ARRIVED IN LONDON FOR A THREE-DAY VISIT AFTER WINDING UP HIS VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA; THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF UAE LEAVES CAIRO; THE SITUATION IN LEBANON; ISRAELI RAID ON TWO PALESTINIAN SITES IN SIDON RESULTING IN THE KILLING OF 33 PALESTINIANS; CLASHES BETWEEN ISRAELI FORCES AND PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF A PALESTINIAN CHILD; US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ABOUT

MONITORING THE IRAQI-IRANIAN BORDERS BY SATELLITES; THE MINISTER OF AWQAF RECEIVES HIS JORDANIAN AND IRAQI COUNTERPARTS; SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WITHDRAW FROM ANGOLA; THE HEAD OF THE EGYPTIAN RADIO AND TV FEDERATION RECEIVES THE VISITING AFRICAN MINISTERS OF INFORMATION.

19. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FOR SEPTEMBER 22: USD 1 EQUALS PT 231.0 (BUYING) AND PT 231.6 (SELLING).

OPPOSITION NEWS

20. EGYPT/ISRAEL. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 23 REPORTS STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 22795 05 OF 05 251333Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /051 W

-----271407 251334Z /38

O 251322Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0176
INFO USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
COMSIXTHFLT
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FBIS RESTON VA
USIA WASHDC 9795
USINFO WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 CAIRO 22795

USDOC FOR 4520/IEP/ANESA/ONE/JOHNSON
USCINCCENT FOR POLAD
ROME PASS MFO
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: WEEKEND CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 23-25, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22795 05 OF 05 251333Z

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI STRONGLY DENOUNCED A REPORT BY AN ISRAELI PAPER THAT MUBARAK INFORMED THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO THAT IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS WILLING TO CONCLUDE A RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. GHALI DESCRIBED THIS AS A GROUNDLESS LIE AND EXPRESSIVE OF "CHEAP" METHODS INTENDED TO DRIVE A WEDGE AMONG THE ARABS. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 24 REPORTS ISRAEL INFORMED EGYPT OF ITS PROTEST AGAINST THE INCREASED COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE PLO AND THE RECENT MUBARAK-ARAFAT MEETING. THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ISSUED A STATEMENT CLAIMING THAT ARAFAT'S VISIT TO CAIRO WAS A VIOLATION OF THE PEACE TREATY AND THAT EGYPTIAN-PALESTINIAN CONTACTS WOULD IMPEDE PEACE EFFORTS IN THE REGION.

AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 24 DEVOTES A WHOLE PAGE TO ISRAELI FOREIGN RELATIONS. HALF OF THE PAGE IS A REPORT ON THE LAUNCHING OF THE OFEK-I SATELLITE, IN WHICH AL-WAFD EXPRESSES THE BELIEF THAT TEL AVIV IS GETTING READY TO DEAL A QUICK PRE-EMPTIVE BLOW INSTEAD OF ENGAGING IN A WAR AGAINST THE ARABS.

ON THE OTHER HALF OF THE PAGE UNDER THE TITLE "THE

GENERALS OF WAR CALL FOR PEACE", AL-WAFD RUNS AN INTERVIEW WITH RETIRED ISRAELI GENERAL HARKABI AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE YARIV, WHO SAID THAT ESTABLISHING A PALESTINIAN STATE WAS A NECESSITY TO GUARANTEE ISRAELI SECURITY. HARKABI NOTED THAT OTHER RETIRED GENERALS AND US JEWS SUPPORT THIS IDEA TOO BUT THEY ARE AFRAID OF VOICING THEIR OPINION FOR FEAR OF TERRORISM OF JEWISH EXTREMISTS. HARKABI POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD THE PLO SHOULD BE CHANGED, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 CAIRO 22795 05 OF 05 251333Z

RECENT CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF THE PLO. (NOTE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE ARE AWARE OF AN OPPOSITION PAPER PUBLISHING INTERVIEWS WITH ISRAELIS.)

21. DEMONSTRATIONS. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 24 REPORTS THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE ISLAMIC GAM'AAT AND INHABITANTS BROKE OUT IN AL-MINYA IN PROTEST AGAINST THE PRICE INCREASES AND THE SIEGE LAID TO AL-RAHMAN MOSQUE, THE STRONGHOLD OF THE ISLAMIC GAM'AAT. LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED DENOUNCING THE GOVERNMENT FOR "ROBBING AND STARVING THE PEOPLE." AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 25 ADDS THAT DEMONSTRATIONS BROKE OUT IN SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNORATES IN UPPER EGYPT IN PROTEST AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE ANNUAL SCHOOL BONUS TO GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS.

22. ANOTHER TOUR BY MUBARAK. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 25 CLAIMS THAT MUBARAK WILL MAKE A TOUR OF EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES IN JANUARY TO CONSOLIDATE EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES.

23. ITALIAN PROPOSAL. AL-WAFD SEPTEMBER 25 REPORTS THAT ITALY HAS EXPRESSED READINESS TO HOST EGYPTIAN-IRANIAN TALKS IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF RELEASING THE EGYPTIAN PRISONERS IN IRAN.
WISNER

E88

R

UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Classification *** [redacted]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03168

FILM= D880853-0902

DATE= 23 SEP 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION INR

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [redacted]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA: DEFINING THE ISSUES

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 303639, 88 JERUSALEM 3004

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, ORGANIZATION, BACKGROUND INFORMATION, LIBERATION ;
DEMONSTRATION

TAGS= KPAL, PINR, PNAT, PTER, IS, JO, EG, PLO

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Case Only
<input type="checkbox"/> EXEMPT	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Classifications
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>
[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03168 01 OF 07 231438Z
ACTION INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /034 W
-----203037 231443Z /44

O 231435Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3548
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03168

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:
DEFINING THE ISSUES

REFS: A) STATE 303639, B) JERUSALEM 3004

1. [REDACTED]

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

2. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS POSING AN INCREASING CHALLENGE TO SECULAR NATIONALIST PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS ON THE WEST BANK. RECENT WEEKS HAVE SEEN DIRECT CHALLENGES BY THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD-CREATED GROUP "HAMAS" TO THE PLO/UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU) WHICH CURRENTLY LEADS THE UPRISING. THIS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03168 01 OF 07 231438Z

CHALLENGE, WHICH HAS MET WITH MIXED SUCCESS, HAS TAKEN THE FORM OF LEAFLETS CRITICAL OF UNLU AND THE PLO, ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ALTERNATIVE STRIKE DAYS, AND EVEN CLASHES IN CERTAIN LOCALITIES. THUS FAR, HAMAS HAS DEMONSTRATED STRENGTH IN


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THOSE AREAS WHERE EXISTING ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS HAVE WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT: NABLUS AND THE NORTHERN WEST BANK, WHERE IT SEEMS TO BE BEST ORGANIZED; THE RAMALLAH-EL BIREH AREA; AND HEBRON. ITS ATTEMPTS TO MAKE INROADS INTO THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR HAVE BEEN RESISTED BY LOCAL RESIDENTS. HAMAS REMAINS WEAK IN COSMOPOLITAN EAST JERUSALEM. WHATEVER THE CURRENT ACTUAL STRENGTH OF HAMAS--AND ESTIMATES VARY WIDELY--IT HAS SUCCEEDED IN BECOMING A FACTOR TO BE RECKONED WITH IN CONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF THE INTIFADA ON THE WEST BANK.

3. HAMAS IS NOT THE ONLY MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP FUNCTIONING ON THE WEST BANK. THE FATAH-AFFILIATED "ISLAMIC JIHAD"--NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE SHIITE GROUP OF THE SAME NAME FOUND IN LEBANON AND ELSEWHERE--WAS CRIPPLED BY THE KILLING OF THREE SENIOR LEADERS IN CYPRUS. IT HAS NOT RECOVERED TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS AN INDEPENDENT PLAYER IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. OTHER SMALL, SHADOWY GROUPS ALSO RISE AND FALL, CREATING LITTLE MORE THAN A RIPPLE.

4. THIS REPORT IS ONLY A PRELIMINARY ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY. ISLAMIC


PAGE 03 JERUSA 03168 01 OF 07 231438Z

FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE; UNDERSTANDING THEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND EXTERNAL GOALS WILL TAKE MUCH TIME AND PATIENCE. THIS IS A FIRST PASS AT THE SUBJECT ON THE WEST BANK, BASED TO A LARGE EXTENT ON CONTACTS FROM JERUSALEM AND THE NORTHERN WEST BANK CITY OF NABLUS. WE HAVE LESS COMPLETE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN WEST BANK. GAZA HAS ITS OWN PATTERN OF ISLAMIC POLITICS. WE WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION FROM CAIRO AND AMMAN ON EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN ISLAMIC POLITICAL TIES WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

HAMAS--BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

5. HAMAS IS A CREATION OF THE MUSLIM

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BROTHERHOOD (MB), WITH TIES TO THE MB THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC WORLD. THE NAME "HAMAS" WAS APPARENTLY CHOSEN IN FEBRUARY 1988, BUT NOT USED EXTENSIVELY UNTIL MAY. AN ACRONYM FOR "ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT," THE WORD ITSELF IS ARABIC FOR "ZEALOTS."

6. ALTHOUGH PALESTINIANS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE WEST BANK HAVE STRONG ISLAMIC CONVICTIONS, THEY TEND TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES POLITICALLY IN SECULAR TERMS. ISLAM HAS, HOWEVER, PLAYED A ROLE IN WEST BANK POLITICS SINCE THE LATE 1940S, WHEN THE MB FIRST CAME TO THE WEST BANK. THE MB WAS SHORTLY AFTER DISCREDITED IN THE EYES OF

[REDACTED]

NMNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03168 02 OF 07 231439Z
ACTION INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /034 W
-----203066 231444Z /41

O 231435Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3549
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03168

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

PALESTINIANS BY ITS SUPPORT FOR KING HUSSEIN IN HIS POWER STRUGGLE AGAINST PM NABULSI IN THE MID-50S. DURING JORDANIAN RULE, IT WAS TIGHTLY MONITORED BY JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE AND DID NOT GAIN SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE UNTIL THE MID- TO LATE-70S, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK.

7. IN 1976, MO SUPPORTERS ATTACKED AND BURNED A NABLUS THEATER SHOWING AN "IMMODEST" PLAY. THIS IS OFTEN CONSIDERED THE BEGINNING OF THE MB'S EMERGENCE AS A VIABLE POLITICAL FORCE IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS BUILT A POWER BASE IN AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY, WHERE THEY GAINED CONTROL OF THE STUDENT COUNCIL IN 1978. THIS SURGE IN POPULARITY WAS PROBABLY DUE

██████████
██████████
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03168 02 OF 07 231439Z

TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS: 1) THE RISE OF KHOMEINISM IN IRAN, WHICH GAVE FUNDAMENTALISM A BOOST THROUGHOUT THE MUSLIM WORLD; 2) THE DISCREDITING OF TRADITIONAL ARAB LEADERS IN THE WAKE OF SADAT'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM; 3) A LARGE INFLOW OF MONEY FROM THE MB IN JORDAN AND EGYPT; AND 4) THE DENIAL BY FUNDAMENTALISTS THAT THEY BELONGED TO THE FORMERLY DISCREDITED MB-- INSTEAD, THEY CALLED THEMSELVES THE "INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC BLOC."

8. SUPPORT FOR THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AT AN-NAJAH, AS ELSEWHERE IN THE WEST BANK, HAS EBBED AND FLOWED ACCORDING TO THE PLO'S FORTUNES AND THE STATUS OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD. SECULAR LEADERS IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK, AIDED BY PLO MONEY, WORKED TO CONTAIN THE FUNDAMENTALISTS AND REDUCE THEIR INFLUENCE IN AN-NAJAH UNIVERSITY. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS LOST CREDIBILITY, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE PLO BORE THE BRUNT OF THE FIGHTING DURING THE 1982 INVASION OF LEBANON AND DURING THE PERIOD OF ARAFAT-HUSSEIN RECONCILIATION. THEY HAVE GAINED STRENGTH WHEN THE PLO APPEARED WEAK AND DIVIDED.

9. BY THE END OF 1987, FUNDAMENTALISTS AND NATIONALISTS IN THE NORTHERN WEST BANK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ACHIEVED AN UNEASY STATUS QUO MARKED BY OCCASIONAL VIOLENT CLASHES. IN NABLUS THE FUNDAMENTALISTS TENDED TO BE RESENTED BY THE SECULAR COMMUNITY, BUT ALSO FEARED.

10. WHEN THE INTIFADA BEGAN, THE MB ACTED DECISIVELY TO SEIZE A ROLE. SEVERAL FACTORS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03168 02 OF 07 231439Z

CONTRIBUTED TO THE MB DECISION TO INVOLVE ITSELF FOR SEVERAL REASONS. ISLAMIC JIHAD HAD WON CONSIDERABLE PRESTIGE FOR ITS ROLE IN GAZA, AND THE MB FEARED LOSING SUPPORT AND CREDIBILITY IN THE FUNDAMENTALIST COMMUNITY. INDIVIDUAL MB MEMBERS WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INTIFADA; THE MB LEADERSHIP FEARED THAT IF MEMBERS COULD NOT USE THE MB AS A VEHICLE FOR PARTICIPATION, THEY WOULD TURN TO OTHER FUNDAMENTALIST OR NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS. MB LEADERS BELIEVED, THEN AS NOW, THAT THE INTIFADA WILL BE CARRIED TO A CONCLUSION. THEY WANTED A SAY IN THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT. FINALLY, THE MB HAD A READY-MADE ORGANIZATION PRESENT IN THE WEST BANK. ACCORDINGLY, THE MB CREATED HAMAS IN FEBRUARY 1988 AND BEGAN ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE UPRISING.

HAMAS--STRUCTURE

11. THE MB HAS ITS HEADQUARTERS IN CAIRO, WITH A BRANCH IN AMMAN. SUB-BRANCHES ARE PRESENT IN THE WEST BANK (NABLUS) AND GAZA. THE HEAD OF THE MB IN THE WEST BANK REPORTEDLY IS NABIL BUSHTAWI, OF NABLUS. OTHER KEY WEST-BANK FIGURES FROM NABLUS ARE SHEIKH SAID BILAL AND HAMID BITAWI.

12. THE RELATION BETWEEN CAIRO, AMMAN, THE WEST BANK, AND GAZA REMAINS UNCLEAR, AS IS THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NABLUS LEADERSHIP AND OTHER

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03168 03 OF 07 231441Z
ACTION INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /034 W

-----203112 231444Z /41

O 231435Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3550
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

SECTION 03 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03168

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

AREAS OF THE WEST BANK. THERE ARE STRONG LINKS WITH CAIRO AND AMMAN, AND SOME MB LEADERS MAY HOLD POSITIONS IN JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE. APPARENTLY, KY DECISIONS ARE MADE IN CAIRO AND AMMAN, BUT LOCAL UNITS RETAIN CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION. MONEY FLOWS IN FROM CAIRO AND AMMAN, AS WELL AS BEING RAISED LOCALLY THROUGH THE MOSQUES.

13. THE MB IN NABLUS REPORTEDLY CONSISTS OF APPROXIMATELY 150 MEMBERS HEADED BY A 4 OR 5 MAN COMMITTEE. THE LEADERSHIP CONSISTS OF MUSLIM SHEIKHS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AT AN-NAJAH AND BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITIES, INSTRUCTORS AT THE KULLIYET AL-DAWA (AN ISLAMIC COLLEGE AFFILIATED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03168 03 OF 07 231441Z

WITH JERUSALEM UNIVERSITY, LOCATED IN BEIT HANINA, NORTH JERUSALEM), EMPLOYEES OF THE ISLAMIC WAQF, A SHARIA JUDGE, AND VARIOUS MERCHANTS. THE "FOOT SOLDIERS" OF HAMAS/MB IN NABLUS CONSIST OF DISADVANTAGED YOUTHS FROM THE POORER SECTIONS OF THE OLD TOWN (CASBAH). THIS NETWORK SEEMS TO BE STABLE--FEW ARRESTS, FEW DEFECTIONS, FEW NEW CONVERTS.

14. THE LEADERSHIP MAKES USE OF THE MOSQUES TO PLAN, PROSELYTIZE, INSTRUCT, AND RAISE MONEY. THIS IS A MAJOR ADVANTAGE HAMAS POSSESSES OVER THE UNLU, SINCE MANY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS UNIVERSITIES, CHARITIES, AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES THROUGH WHICH THE UNLU COULD OPERATE HAVE BEEN CLOSED BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES.

HAMAS--METHOD OF OPERATION

15. ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT BY TIGHTLY KNIT CELLS OF AS FEW AS FIVE MEMBERS. OUTSIDERS RARELY PARTICIPATE IN HAMAS ACTIONS, A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE FROM INTIFADA ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL, WHICH DERIVE CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH FROM THE SPONTANEOUS PARTICIPATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS. HAMAS ALSO SEEKS MAXIMUM PUBLICITY FOR ITS ACTS. BEFORE A STRIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, RED SPRAY-PAINTED INSTRUCTIONS--BOLDLY SIGNED "HAMAS"--ARE IN EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT AREAS OF HAMAS INFLUENCE. AS A RESULT OF ITS PENCHANT FOR TIGHT CONTROL AND PUBLICITY, HAMAS TENDS NOT TO COOPERATE IN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03168 03 OF 07 231441Z

UNLU-ORGANIZED ACTIONS. IN NABLUS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAMAS HAS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN IMPROMPTU BLOOD DRIVES ORGANIZED ON SHORT NOTICE BY POPULAR COMMITTEES TO TREAT WOUNDED PALESTINIANS.

16. HAMAS USES DIFFERENT METHODS TO ENFORCE ITS STRIKE CALLS, DEPENDING ON ITS STRENGTH IN THE TOWN INVOLVED. IN RAMALLAH AND THE BEIT HANINA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NEIGHBORHOOD OF NORTH JERUSALEM, FOR EXAMPLE, HAMAS FOLLOWERS REPORTEDLY WERE ON THE SCENE TO ENFORCE THE SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE. ALTHOUGH NO CLASHES WERE REPORTED IN THESE AREAS, THERE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTATIONS WITH UNLU SUPPORTERS ON PRIOR OCCASIONS. NO CLASHES WERE REPORTED IN NABLUS, APPARENTLY BECAUSE THE UNLU CHOSE NOT TO TEST HAMAS' STRENGTH. IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, HAMAS HAS FIREBOMBED CHRISTIAN SHOPS THAT SOLD LIQUOR OR OTHERWISE DEFIED ITS ORDERS. IN BETHLEHEM, TIRES WERE BURNED AND THERE WERE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN HAMAS AND UNLU SUPPORTERS ON THE OCCASION OF THE SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE. SOME SHOPS WERE INTIMIDATED INTO CLOSING EARLY. HOWEVER, MOST STAYED OPEN. IN JERUSALEM, HAMAS WAS NOT IN EVIDENCE, AND THE STIKE CALL WAS LARGELY IGNORED.

HAMAS--RELATIVE REGIONAL STRENGTH

17. HAMAS APPEARS TO BE STRONGEST IN GAZA. IN THE WEST BANK, IT SEEMS TO BE BASED IN THE TOWNS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHERE THE INHABITANTS ARE RELATIVELY HOMOGENEOUS AND HAVE A RELIGIOUS


NNNN


PAGE 01 JERUSA 03168 04 OF 07 231443Z
ACTION INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /034 W

-----203160 231445Z /41
O 231435Z SEP 88

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3551
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 04 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03168

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

BENT. ITS PRIMARY WEST BANK STRONGHOLDS, IN DESCENDING ORDER OF INFLUENCE, APPEAR TO BE NABLUS, RAMALLAH, AND HEBRON. HAMAS IS PRESENT IN JERUSALEM, PARTICULARLY THE BEIT HANINA NEIGHBORHOOD IN NORTH JERUSALEM NEAR RAMALLAH. IN DOWNTOWN EAST JERUSALEM AND THE OLD CITY, HAMAS IS PRESENT BUT WEAK, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE COSMOPOLITAN CHARACTER OF THESE AREAS. HAMAS IS TRYING TO INCREASE ITS Foothold IN THE CHRISTIAN AREA OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR, THOUGH THUS FAR ITS INTIMIDATION TACTICS HAVE NOT PROVED SUCCESSFUL. (IN FACT, HAMAS ACTIONS IN THESE CHRISTIAN AREAS HAVE LED TO THE REAPPEARANCE OF HAMAM, THE "CHRISTIAN" RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, WHOSE ACRONYM FORMS THE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03168 04 OF 07 231443Z

ARABIC WORD FOR "DOVE.") WE DO NOT YET HAVE A GOOD FEEL FOR HAMAS IN HEBRON, THOUGH WE KNOW IT HAS BEEN ACTIVE. THE AUGUST 21 AND SEPTEMBER 9 STRIKE CALLS WERE OBSERVED THERE. IN ADDITION, ITS INHABITANTS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE STRONG RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HERE AS ELSEWHERE MUCH OF HAMAS' STRENGTH DERIVES FROM THE POPULATION'S TRADITIONAL SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS, RATHER THAN FROM A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE PLO.

18. HAMAS IS THOUGHT TO BE WEAK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, WHERE THE MB HAS TRADITIONALLY LACKED INFLUENCE AND ORGANIZATION, AND IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS, WHERE SECULAR NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS (FATAH, PFLP, COMMUNISTS, ETC.) REMAIN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FIRMLY ENTRENCHED. AN INTERESTING EXCEPTION IS NEW ASKAR CAMP WHERE, BECAUSE OF THE ARREST OF ALMOST THE ENTIRE FATAH LEADERSHIP, HAMAS HAS BEEN ABLE TO MOVE IN AND ORGANIZE.

19. IT IS DIFFICULT ACCURATELY TO GAUGE HAMAS' STRENGTH FROM THE SUCCESS OF ITS STRIKE CALLS. HAMAS HAS CHOSEN ITS DAYS WISELY--AUGUST 21 WAS THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATTEMPT TO BURN THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE, A TRADITIONAL DAY OF PROTEST, AND SEPTEMBER 9 WAS BOTH A FRIDAY, WHEN MANY SHOPS ARE CLOSED ANYWAY, AND THE BEGINNING OF A NEW MONTH OF THE INTIFADA, AGAIN A TRADITIONAL DAY OF PROTEST. THUS, HAMAS WAS CALLING FOR STRIKES ON DAYS THAT PEOPLE CUSTOMARILY MARK WITH STRIKES AND PROTESTS AND DID NOT ACT AGAINST THE FLOW OF THE INTIFADA.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03168 04 OF 07 231443Z

HAMAS--RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL

20. MANY WEST BANKERS BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL ACTIVELY SUPPORTS HAMAS IN AN EFFORT TO DIVIDE PALESTINIANS AND WEAKEN THE INTIFADA. THEY POINT TO THE FACT THAT HAMAS OPERATIVES ACT BOLDLY IN DISTRIBUTING THEIR LEAFLETS. SHOPKEEPERS IN JERUSALEM AND NABLUS REPORT THAT, WHEREAS UNLU LEAFLETS ARE DISTRIBUTED SECRETLY FOR FEAR OF ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES, HAMAS OPERATIVES WALK INTO SHOPS AND PRESENT THEIR LEAFLETS DIRECTLY TO THE OWNERS. MAYOR FREIJ OF BETHLEHEM CLAIMS THAT MEMBERS OF SOME WELL KNOWN FAMILIES WHO COLLABORATE WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SEEN AMONG HAMAS STREET GANGS IN BETHLEHEM. FURTHERMORE, DESPITE MASSIVE ARRESTS--AND THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF MANY MB LEADERS--RELATIVELY FEW HAMAS LEADERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED. IN RECENT WEEKS, FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS HAVE GIVEN INTERVIEWS TO ISRAELI PUBLICATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE LANDED SECULARIST LEADERS IN DETENTION. WE BELIEVE THAT, WHILE ISRAELI FORCES MAY BE TURNING A BLIND EYE TO HAMAS ACTIVITIES, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT ISRAEL IS PROVIDING ACTIVE SUPPORT.

HAMAS--RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

██████████

NNNN
██████████

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03168 05 OF 07 231444Z
ACTION INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /034 W

-----203213 231449Z /41

O 231435Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3552
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

██████████ SECTION 05 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03168

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

21. HAMAS' FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, AS SET OUT
IN ITS AUGUST 18 CHARTER (REF B), PUT IT IN
OPPOSITION TO THE SECULAR LEADERSHIP OF THE
INTIFADA. ACCORDING TO THE CHARTER, HAMAS
CONSIDERS ALL OF PALESTINE AN ISLAMIC "WAQF," OR
TRUST FROM GOD. CEDING ANY PART OF IT TO A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JEWISH STATE WOULD VIOLATE THAT TRUST. HAMAS OPPOSES THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION TOWARD WHICH THE PLO SEEMS TO BE INCHING. IT OPPOSES THE CREATION OF A SECULAR STATE IN PALESTINE, AS CALLED FOR IN THE PLO COVENANT. INSTEAD, IT DEMANDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE. IT ALSO OPPOSES CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE. AS HAMAS LEAFLET NO. 28 SUCCINCTLY PHRASED IT, "NEGOTIATION WITH THE ENEMY IS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03168 05 OF 07 231444Z

RETREAT AND CAPITULATION." INSTEAD, HAMAS CALLS FOR LIBERATING ALL OF PALESTINE THROUGH JIHAD--BOTH ARMED STRUGGLE AND PROSELYTIZING.

24. THIS HAMAS/UNLU COMPETITION HAS LED TO A BATTLE OF LEAFLETS AND STRIKE CALLS. HAMAS LEAFLETS EXCORIATE THE PLO--PARTICULARLY FATAH-- AND THE UNLU FOR CAPITULATING TO THE ZIONIST ENEMY. UNLU, IN RESPONSE, ACCUSES HAMAS OF SERVING ISRAEL BY DIVIDING THE UPRISING. AT THE SAME TIME, UNLU INVITES HAMAS TO JOIN THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP.

25. HAMAS, TO DATE, HAS REJECTED ALL CALLS FOR UNITY WITH UNLU. ONE EXCUSE OFTEN HEARD IS THAT HAMAS WILL NOT SIT ON THE SAME COMMITTEE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. OTHERS SAY IT WILL NOT SIT WITH ANY LEFTIST GROUP, SUCH AS THE PFLP. OTHER SOURCES, INCLUDING SOME CLOSE TO THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP IN NABLUS, HAVE TOLD US HAMAS HAS AGREED IN PRIVATE TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AND WILL SOON JOIN NOT ONLY THE UNLU BUT THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AS WELL. ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, HAMAS IS MAINTAINING ITS PUBLIC STANCE IN OPPOSITION TO THE UNLU IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN ITS ORGANIZATION.

24. UNDOUBTEDLY, THERE ARE CONTACTS AND EVEN OCCASIONAL COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. HOWEVER, RECONCILIATION AND/OR UNITY BETWEEN THEM SEEMS UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME. HAMAS APPEARS GENUINELY COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF CREATING AN

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03168 05 OF 07 231444Z

ISLAMIC STATE IN ALL OF PALESTINE. THIS IS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE WITH THE SECULAR NATIONALISTS THAT CANNOT BE PAPERED OVER. IT IS THEREFORE LIKELY THAT THE UNLU AND HAMAS WOULD FORGE A PERMANENT ALLIANCE.

25. MOST IMPORTANTLY, HAMAS RETAINS ITS FEAR OF BEING COOPTED INTO THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND BECOMING IRRELEVANT. THIS FEAR WAS ONE OF THE MAIN FACTORS SPURRING THE CREATION OF HAMAS. IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT THE MB WOULD SACRIFICE ITS CREATION NOW, JUST WHEN IT IS GAINING ACCEPTANCE AS A PLAYER. HOWEVER, SHOULD HAMAS FAIL TO MAINTAIN ITS FOOHOLD AND BECOME THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION OR IRRELEVANCE, IT MIGHT AT THAT POINT CONSIDER COOPERATING WITH THE SECULARIST NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP OF THE UNLU FOR TACTICAL REASONS.

HAMAS--PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

26. GAUGING THE CURRENT STRENGTH OF HAMAS IS A RISKY ENDEAVOR. IN MANY REGIONS OF THE WEST BANK, ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS ARE HELD IN HIGH REGARD, AND SUPPORT FOR HAMAS APPEARS TO DERIVE MUCH OF ITS STRENGTH FROM THAT TRADITIONAL RESPECT RATHER THAN FROM A CONSCIOUS CHOICE BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALIST AND SECULAR OPTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HAMAS IS BEING TAKEN INCREASINGLY SERIOUSLY THROUGHOUT THE WEST BANK. WHETHER THAT IS BECAUSE OF ACTUAL STRENGTH AND


NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03168 06 OF 07 231445Z
ACTION INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /034 W
-----203235 231450Z /41

O 231435Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3553
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 06 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03168

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

INFLUENCE, OR MERELY DUE TO INSPIRED
SELF-PROMOTION, WE CANNOT SAY. IN ANY CASE, IT
IS CLEAR THAT THE HAMAS PHENOMENON WILL BE A
SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN FUTURE CALCULATIONS.

27. ALTHOUGH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM WILL REMAIN
A FEATURE OF THE WEST BANK LANDSCAPE, IMPORTANT
FACTORS WORK AGAINST IT BECOMING A PERVASIVE
INFLUENCE OR REPLACING THE SECULARIST STRAIN IN
WEST BANK POLITICS. WEST BANKERS AS A WHOLE ARE
WELL EDUCATED, MUCH TRAVELED, AND CAPITALISTIC
IN ORIENTATION. THEY ARE UNLIKELY WILLINGLY TO
TURN TO THE NARROW ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST WORLD
VIEW, NO MATTER HOW DEEP THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT
WITH THE PLO LEADERSHIP.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03168 06 OF 07 231445Z

28. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE MB HAS HAD ONLY A BRIEF
AND UNDISTINGUISHED HISTORY IN THE WEST BANK.
IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT, THE INTIFADA ENJOYS
VERY WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AMONG WEST BANKERS, WHO
ARE GENERALLY OPPOSED TO ANY EFFORT TO DISRUPT
THIS UNITY AND THREATEN THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE UPRISING. THUS FAR, PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE UNLU AND HAMAS, AND SUPPORT FOR THE FUNDAMENTALISTS HAS BEEN RELATIVELY COST FREE. IN A SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE UNLU AND HAMAS, MUCH OF THAT SUPPORT COULD MELT AWAY.

29. IN ADDITION THE WEST BANK, UNLIKE GAZA, CONTAINS AN IMPORTANT CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. AS NOTED ABOVE, HAMAS IS MEETING RESISTANCE IN THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE OF BETHLEHEM-BEIT JALA-BEIT SAHOUR, EVEN TO THE POINT OF STIMULATING THE REACTIVATION OF A RIVAL CHRISTIAN GROUP. STILL, HAMAS HAS EXTENDED ITS INFLUENCE TO THE LARGELY CHRISTIAN RAMALLAH-EL BIREH AREA, PROVING THAT IT CAN SURVIVE IN A MIXED CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM ENVIRONMENT. THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER OF THESE AREAS IS ALSO SLOWLY BEING DILUTED AS CHRISTIANS EMIGRATE TO FRIENDLIER CLIMES.

30. NONETHELESS, DESPITE THE FACTORS WORKING AGAINST THE SPREAD OF FUNDAMENTALIST INFLUENCE, THERE ARE SITUATIONS IN WHICH FUNDAMENTALIST STRENGTH COULD GROW TO THE POINT THAT HAMAS WOULD BECOME A SPOILER IN ATTEMPTS TO BRING PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS TOGETHER. ALTHOUGH WIDESPREAD DECAPITATION THROUGH ARREST OF THE UNLU LEADERSHIP IS NOT LIKELY, GIVEN ITS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03168 06 OF 07 231445Z

OVERWHELMING POPULAR SUPPORT, ISRAELI EFFORTS TO DO SO TEND TO PROMOTE HAMAS IN SPECIFIC AREAS, SUCH AS IN THE EXAMPLE OF THE NEW ASKAR CAMP GIVEN ABOVE.

31. WEST BANKERS ARE BOTH RELIGIOUS AND NATIONALISTIC. THUS FAR, THEIR POLITICS HAVE FOLLOWED THE NATIONALIST BENT OF THEIR CHARACTER AND CULTURE. THEY HAVE SUPPORTED THE PLO BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THE PLO IS THE ONLY VIABLE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED EXPRESSION OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. THEY HAVE THEREFORE CONTINUED TO BACK THE PLO DESPITE MANY DISAPPOINTMENTS, AND THE MAJORITY ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE PLO FAIL TO OVERCOME ITS IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS AND TAKE INITIATIVES THAT WILL LEAD TO A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL, THE UNITY OF THE INTIFADA COULD BEGIN TO FRAY ONE CAN IMAGINE A SCENARIO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IN WHICH PFLP, DFLP, AND COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES, WHO ARE NOW WORKING WITH FATAH, COULD REVERT TO MORE EXTREME POSITIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THE SECULAR-NATIONALIST PRAGMATIC CONSENSUS THAT IS THE DOMINANT FEATURE OF THE INTIFADA COULD CRUMBLE, AND FUNDAMENTALISM COULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT NEW INROADS, ESPECIALLY AMONG DISPOSSESSED GROUPS. THUS, ALTHOUGH A MASS-BASED FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO EMERGE, THE FUNDAMENTALISTS COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF GROWING DESPAIR AND SECULAR-NATIONALIST DISUNITY TO FURTHER ITS POLICIES OF

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03168 07 OF 07 231446Z
ACTION INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NEA-06
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 /034 W

-----203261 231452Z /41

O 231435Z SEP 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3554
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 07 OF 07 JERUSALEM 03168

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PNAT, PTER, KPAL, IS, JO, EG
SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE INTIFADA:

CONFRONTATION AND REJECTION.

32. DESPITE THE AVOWED ANTI-ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF HAMAS, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE MAIN CONTEST WILL, FOR THE TIME BEING, BE BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE UNLU. THE MB HAS TRADITIONALLY FOCUSED ON ONE MAINSTREAM OPPONENT AT A TIME--THE WAFD IN EGYPT, THE BAATH IN SYRIA. ITS CURRENT OPPONENT IN ITS STRUGGLE FOR THE SOULS OF PALESTINIANS IS THE MAJOR COMPONENT OF THE UNLU, FATAH. UNTIL THIS STRUGGLE IS DECIDED, HAMAS IS UNLIKELY TO DIRECT ITS EFFORTS PRIMARILY AGAINST ISRAEL.

ISLAMIC JIHAD

*
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03168 07 OF 07 231446Z

33. THIS REPORT HAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON HAMAS/MB BOTH BECAUSE HAMAS IS THE MAIN FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP ON THE WEST BANK, AND BECAUSE WE HAVE SO LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE OTHER ISLAMIC PARTIES. ISLAMIC JIHAD, THE ONLY OTHER SUCH GROUP WITH A SIGNIFICANT WEST-BANK FOLLOWING, WAS ESTABLISHED BY ABU JIHAD TO ENHANCE FATAH'S APPEAL WITH RELIGIOUS MUSLIMS. ALTHOUGH IT HAS IN THE PAST CLAIMED INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS SUCH AS THE OCTOBER 1986 ATTACK AT THE DUNG GATE, IT WAS DECAPITATED WHEN THREE SENIOR LEADERS WERE ASSASSINATED IN CYPRUS. OUR INFORMATION IS THAT ITS CURRENT INFLUENCE ON THE WEST BANK IS MINOR AND THAT IT IS INCAPABLE OF ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF THE MAINSTREAM FATAH ORGANIZATION ON THE WEST BANK. IT SEEMS TO BE DOING MOST OF ITS ORGANIZING IN WEST BANK PRISONS, WHERE A STRICT QUOTA SYSTEM AMONG GROUPS IS ENFORCED BY THE PRISONERS. WE HAVE NO FIRM INFORMATION ON LINKS BETWEEN ISLAMIC JIHAD ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA, OR WHETHER THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS ARE IN FACT THE SAME.

QUESTIONS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

34. THIS BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALIST ACTIVITY ON THE WEST BANK DOES
NOT ADDRESS SEVERAL ISSUES OF CONTINUING
IMPORTANCE, SUCH AS KEY FIGURES IN MB/HAMAS AND
ISLAMIC JIHAD; COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HAMAS UNITS
IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WEST BANK, GAZA,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03168 07 OF 07 231446Z

CAIRO, AND AMMAN; THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ISLAMIC JIHAD AND HAMAS IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA; AND FATAH-HAMAS RELATIONS. WE WILL BE
EXPLORING THESE ISSUES IN FUTURE REPORTING.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Elb.

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15542

FILM= D880962-0625

DATE= 29 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION SS

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC
JERUSALEM

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= EXDIS

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION WITH TERRITORIES

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 15885

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DISCUSSION, PRESS COMMENTS, DEATH SQUAD

TAGS= PREL, IS, US

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	S/FPC/CDR	Date:
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	EO Citations:	
FOIA Exemptions	PA Exemptions	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	TS =
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> & as

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15542 01 OF 02 291200Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----177360 291201Z /38

O 291357Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1752
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15542

EXDIS
DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, US
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION WITH TERRITORIES
- COORDINATOR ON PRESS REPORT OF DEATH SQUADS

REF: TEL AVIV 15885

1. [REDACTED]

2. IN MEETING OCTOBER 27, DCM PURSUED WITH GOI COORDINATOR FOR THE TERRITORIES GOREN THE REUTER REPORT OF IDF DEATH SQUADS IN THE TERRITORIES AND GOREN'S COMMENTS IN THEIR CONVERSATION OF THE PREVIOUS DAY (SEE REFTEL). DCM SAID HE WANTED TO EXPAND ON HIS QUESTION OF THE PREVIOUS DAY AND HAVE GOREN'S REACTION. HE SAID THAT, AS GOREN AND OTHERS HAVE TOLD US, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GOI HAS VARIOUS SPECIAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE TERRITORIES CARRYING OUT SPECIAL OPERATIONS INCLUDING SETTING UP AMBUSHES AIMED AT PALESTINIANS CARRYING OUT ACTIONS AGAINST THE OCCUPATION. DCM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE ISRAELI UNITS, USING INFORMATION FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, STAKE OUT ROUTES OF APPROACH AND ESCAPE IN ORDER TO APPREHEND PALESTINIAN ACTIVISTS. HE ASKED ABOUT THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15542 01 OF 02 291200Z

ROE IN SUCH CASES, AS WELL AS THE ROE FOR SPECIAL UNITS INVOLVED IN OTHER KINDS OF OPERATIONS.

3. GOREN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NO OBJECTIVE AND NO UNIT TO CARRY OUT THE KINDS OF THINGS ALLEGED IN THE PRESS. HE SAID THERE WAS NO IDF UNIT, NO POLICE UNIT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OR NO UNIT OF THE SERVICES WHICH HAD ANY AUTHORIZATION TO OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF ROE OTHER THAN THOSE WE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF. DCM SAID THAT, NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAD BEEN HINTS IN THE ISRAELI PRESS AND THE WORD WAS CIRCULATING AROUND THAT THERE HAD BEEN DEATHS UNDER SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THERE WAS A PERCEPTION THAT SOME UNITS WERE OPERATING BEYOND THOSE ROE OR AT LEAST ON THE VERY MARGINS OF LEGALITY. GOREN REPEATED THAT THERE WERE NO ISRAELI UNITS WHICH WERE AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE BEYOND THE STANDARD ROE. DCM ASKED ABOUT THE KILLINGS IN YATTA. GOREN SAID THAT WAS A CASE OF A GROUP OF MASKED PALESTINIANS CARRYING OUT AN ACTION WHO WERE CONFRONTED BY REGULAR IDF SOLDIERS. THE SOLDIERS WERE IN DANGER AND HAD FIRED AT THOSE PALESTINIANS WHO SEEMED TO BE GIVING ORDERS. GOREN INDICATED THE IDF WAS SURPRISED AFTERWARD TO LEARN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEAD PALESTINIANS AND REGRETTED THE FATALITIES NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN OF MORE VALUE TO THE IDF ALIVE.

4. DCM ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF PROVOCATIONS, NOTING THAT THE GIVATI BRIGADE IN PARTICULAR HAD A REPUTATION OF AGGRESSIVENESS AND PROVOCATION TO DRAW PALESTINIAN REPOSE. GOREN WENT INTO A LONG MONOLOGUE ABOUT THE HIGH QUALITY OF THE GIVATI BRIGADE (HIS OLD UNIT -- HE WAS S-2) AND THE DIFFICULTY OF SOLDIERS

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15542 01 OF 02 291200Z

CARRYING OUT POLICE WORK BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO ENGAGE AT ALL IN THE QUESTION OF PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR.

5. COMMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL PRESS SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT HE HAD BEEN WORKING ON A "DEATH SQUADS" STORY FOR MONTHS AND WAS CONVINCED THERE WAS SOMETHING TO IT. HE TOLD US HIS ORGANIZATION HAD BUILT UP A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS FROM BOTH PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI SOURCES. IN OUR CONVERSATION WITH HIM, HE FOCUSED ON WHAT HE THOUGHT WERE THE VERY BROAD TERMS OF ISRAELI DENIALS AND SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS TRUE THAT THERE WERE VERBAL ORDERS TO SHOOT THOSE WITH BLOOD ON THEIR HANDS. HE ASSERTED THAT THE IDF RULES WERE SUFFICIENTLY ELASTIC THAT IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO BREAK THE LAW IN ORDER TO SHOOT SOMEONE.

6. COMMENT CONTINUED: IF THERE WERE EXTRA-LEGAL OPERATIONS ON DEATH SQUAD LINES BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE TERRITORIES, WE WOULD THINK THAT ALL OF THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PUBLICITY OVER THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS WOULD BE CAUTIONARY. AS STATED REFTEL, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION OF DEATH SQUADS IN THE REUTER REPORT, EXCEPT OCCASIONAL CLAIMS BY PALESTINIANS TO CONGEN JERUSALEM OFFICERS, WHICH WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SUBSTANTIATE, OF PALESTINIANS BEING KILLED IN COLD BLOOD. REGARDING ISRAELI SECURITY PRACTICES, ESPECIALLY IN THIS PERIOD BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS (NOVEMBER 1) AND LEADING UP TO A POSSIBLE PNC ONE CAN BE SURE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15542 02 OF 02 291200Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----177354 291200Z /38

O 291357Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1753
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15542

[REDACTED]

E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, US
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION WITH TERRITORIES

GOING TO BE VERY ACTIVE AND EVEN AGGRESSIVE IN THEIR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY OPERATIONS. END COMMENT. PICKERING

[REDACTED]

ε NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***

*** Current Classification ***

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

El65

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15532

FILM= D880959-0677

DATE= 28 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
JERUSALEM
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= GAZA WRAP-UP; OCT 20-26, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CASUALTY, VIOLENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEATH SQUAD, ALLEGATION, DENIA

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, IS, GZ, (RABIN, YITZHAK)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		S / FPC / CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info	TS	
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	1 1 5 of
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TO	1 1 5 of

R

U

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15532 01 OF 03 281707Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/069 W

-----132524 281711Z/40

O 281835Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1733
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15532

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: GAZA WRAP-UP; OCT 20-26, 1988

1. (U) SUMMARY: APPROXIMATELY 40 WERE WOUNDED IN INTIFADA VIOLENCE IN THE PERIOD, AND ONE WAS KILLED. TWO ISRAELI VEHICLES WERE STONED. AN OCT 26 GENERAL STRIKE GOT SOLID ADHERENCE, DESPITE CONFUSION OVER THE PROPER DATE. THE IDF DEMOLISHED ONE HOUSE AND SEALED FOUR OTHERS. DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN DENIED A REUTERS STORY THAT THE IDF HAD SET UP TWO "DEATH SQUADS," AND, RESPONDING TO THE DEATH OF A GAZA GIRL AND THE WOUNDING OF A NUMBER OF GIRLS AND SMALL CHILDREN IN GAZA, SAID IDF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HAD NOT CHANGED. RABIN AND CHIEF OF STAFF SHOMRON ANTICIPATED INCREASED VIOLENCE AT THE TIME OF ISRAELI ELECTIONS (NOV 1), BALFOUR DAY (NOV 2), AND THE PNC MEETINGS. ABOUT 50 GAZANS WERE RELEASED FROM ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION. END

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15532 01 OF 03 281707Z

SUMMARY

2. (U) APPROXIMATELY 40 WOUNDED:

-- ON OCT 21/22, APPROXIMATELY 20 GAZANS WERE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORTED WOUNDED IN VARIOUS CLASHES IN RAFAH, KHAN YUNIS, SHATI REFUGEE CAMP, AND DAYR AL-BALAH CAMP (PRESS REPORTS DID NOT GIVE BREAKDOWN OF NUMBERS BY LOCATION). ONE OF THE WOUNDED WAS A 13 YEAR OLD GIRL.

-- ON OCT 23, TWO GAZANS WERE WOUNDED IN DISTURBANCES IN SHATI CAMP. IN RAFAH, ONE YOUTH WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED, AND, IN JABALYA CAMP, A RESIDENT WAS WOUNDED, APPARENTLY BY ANOTHER RESIDENT.

-- ON OCT 24, A SEVEN YEAR OLD RAFAH BOY WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN THE CHEST BY A PLASTIC BULLET. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE PRESS INITIALLY REPORTED THAT THE BOY HAD DIED OF HIS INJURIES, BUT LATER RETRACTED THE STORY, BASED APPARENTLY ON MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM TEL HASHOMER HOSPITAL WHERE HE WAS IN INTENSIVE CARE.

-- ALSO ON OCT 24, IN THE SAME DEMONSTRATION WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT INJURY OF THE SEVEN YEAR OLD BOY, A 16 YEAR OLD WAS WOUNDED WITH A PLASTIC BULLET. THREE YOUTHS IN NUSAIRAT CAMP, INCLUDING ONE GIRL, WERE ALSO WOUNDED.

-- ON OCT 25, THREE WERE WOUNDED IN GAZA CITY WHEN TROOPS OPENED FIRE AFTER AN IDF TANKER TRUCK CAME

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15532 01 OF 03 281707Z

UNDER FIREBOMB ATTACK. THREE WERE WOUNDED IN NUSAIRAT CAMP, AND THREE OTHERS ELSEWHERE IN GAZA. A 23 YEAR OLD WAS WOUNDED IN SHATI CAMP.

-- ON OCT 26, FOUR WERE WOUNDED, INCLUDING A FIVE YEAR OLD BOY, IN VARIOUS CLASHES IN MAGHAZI AND JABALYA CAMPS, AND RAFAH TOWN.

3. (U) ONE KILLED; A SECOND DIES IN QUESTIONABLE CIRCUMSTANCES:

-- ON OCT 25, A 14 YEAR OLD GIRL WAS KILLED BY A PLASTIC BULLET IN SHATI CAMP WHEN IDF TROOPS, ATTACKED BY ROCKS AND FIREBOMBS, OPENED FIRE. THE IDF SAYS THAT ATTEMPTS TO DISPERSE THE DEMONSTRATORS FAILED, THE UNIT WAS IN DANGER, AND SOLDIERS FIRST FIRED INTO THE AIR AND THEN AT THE LEGS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- ON OCT 26, A THREE YEAR OLD DIED IN KHAN YUNIS. HER FAMILY CLAIMED THE CAUSE WAS TEAR GAS INHALATION. HOWEVER, THE IDF ANNOUNCED OCT 27 THAT POST MORTEM REVEALED THE GIRL HAD DIED OF PNEUMONIA (PERHAPS COMPLICATED BY DOWNS SYNDROME AND A CONGENITAL HEART DEFECT). IDF SPOKESMAN COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THE GIRL HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO TEAR GAS. HOWEVER, JERUSALEM POST OF OCT 28. REPORTS AN EYEWITNESS CLAIM THAT TROOPS HAD THROWN A TEAR GAS GRENADE INTO THE GIRL'S HOUSE WHILE BREAKING UP A DEMONSTRATION.

4. (U) OTHER VIOLENCE:

-- ON OCT 26, TWO ISRAELI VEHICLES WERE STONED IN THE SOUTHERN GAZA STRIP.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 15532 01 OF 03 281707Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15532 02 OF 03 281707Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/069 W

-----132526 281711Z /40
O 281835Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1734
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15532

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: GAZA WRAP-UP; OCT 20-26, 1988

5. (U) CURFEWS:

-- ON OCT 21/22, IDF PLACED CURFEWS ON NUSAIRAT
AND JABALYA CAMPS, AND ON SHABURA NEIGHBORHOOD OF
RAFAH.

-- ON OCT 25, IDF PLACED A CURFEW ON SHATI CAMP
AFTER DISTURBANCES IN WHICH THE 14 YEAR OLD GIRL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WAS KILLED, AND ON KHAN YUNIS CAMP. CURFEW
REMAINED IN EFFECT ON NUSAIRAT CAMP.

-- ON OCT 26, SEVEN OF EIGHT REFUGEE CAMPS IN GAZA
WERE REPORTED UNDER CURFEW.

6. [REDACTED] STRIKES:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15532 02 OF 03 281707Z

-- A STRIKE CALLED FOR OCT 26 GOT NEARLY FULL
PARTICIPATION IN GAZA, DESPITE APPARENT CONFUSION
OVER THE ACTUAL STRIKE DATE. STRIKE PARTICIPATION
WAS REPORTED MORE SPORADIC IN THE WEST BANK THAN
IN GAZA. A UNIFIED LEADERSHIP PAMPHLET CALLED FOR
A STRIKE OCT 26 TO COMMEMORATE A LATE-1950'S
MASSACRE AT KFAR QASSIM, WHILE A HAMAS PAMPHLET
CALLED OCT 29 THE PROPER COMMEMORATION DAY. THE
PRESS REPORTED THAT THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP, IN AN
UNPRECEDENTED ACT OF COOPERATION WITH HAMAS,
WITHDREW ITS STRIKE ORDER. RON KRUMER,
TERRITORIES' COORDINATOR'S OFFICE DIRECTOR, GAVE
US A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION, CALLING THE LIMITED
ADHERENCE IN THE WEST BANK THE RESULT OF CONFUSION
OVER THE CORRECT DATE AND CONTRADICTIONARY,
LAST-MINUTE, WORD-OF-MOUTH INSTRUCTIONS THAT ONLY
CONFUSED PEOPLE FURTHER.

-- COMMENT: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GAZA AND WEST
BANK ADHERENCE TO THE OCT 26 STRIKE MAY BE AN
EXAMPLE OF REPORTED TIGHT INTIFADA DISCIPLINE IN
GAZA. WE HAVE HEARD THIS PHENOMENON ATTRIBUTED TO
GAZA'S MORE COMPACT, URBAN NATURE, AND TO THE
PROMINENT ROLE OF GAZA'S ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP, WITH
ITS REPUTATION FOR TIGHTER DISCIPLINE THAN THE
MORE DOMINANT SECULAR LEADERSHIP OF THE WEST
BANK. END COMMENT.

-- IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, OCT 29 HAS TO BE
CONSIDERED A PROBABLE STRIKE DAY.

7. (U) DEMOLITIONS AND SEALINGS:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15532 02 OF 03 281707Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-- ON OCT 25, IDF FORCES DEMOLISHED THE RAFAH HOME OF A SUSPECTED ISLAMIC JIHAD MEMBER WHO IS ACCUSED OF STABBING FOUR WARDENS WHILE VISITING HIS BROTHER IN GAZA JAIL IN JULY. THE IDF ALSO SEALED FOUR HOMES IN KHAN YUNIS BELONGING TO FAMILIES OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF THREATENING AND ATTACKING LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION.

8. (U) OFFICIAL, PUBLIC DENIAL OF IDF "DEATH SQUADS":

-- DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN DENIED THE TRUTH OF AN OCT 23 REUTERS STORY THAT SAID THE IDF HAD SET UP TWO UNDERCOVER UNITS AS "DEATH SQUADS." RABIN SAID IDF UNITS OPERATE WITHIN THE LAW.

9. (U) RABIN REAFFIRMS RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:

-- IN A TOUR OF GAZA, OCT 26, RABIN RESPONDED TO THE DEATH OF A GAZA GIRL AND THE WOUNDINGS OF GIRLS AND LITTLE CHILDREN, SAYING THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE IDF'S RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. HE SAID IT WAS ADVISABLE FOR LITTLE GIRLS NOT TO RUN AROUND WHEN VIOLENCE IS OCCURRING.

10. (U) RABIN AND SHOMRON ANTICIPATE INCREASED VIOLENCE:

-- IN COMMENTS TO THE PRESS ON OCT 25, RABIN SAID HE EXPECTED DISTURBANCES WOULD GET WORSE ON ISRAEL'S ELECTION DAY (NOV 1), ON BALFOUR DAY (NOV 2), AND AT THE TIME OF THE ANTICIPATED NOVEMBER PNC MEETINGS. IDF CHIEF OF STAFF SHOMRON ECHOED THESE SENTIMENTS IN COMMENTS MADE THE FOLLOWING

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV. 15532 02 OF 03 281707Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15532 03 OF 03 281707Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/069 W

-----132533 281712Z /40

O 281835Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1735
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15532

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, PINS, IS
SUBJECT: GAZA WRAP-UP; OCT 20-26, 1988

DAY.

11. (U) GAZANS RELEASED FROM KETZIOT:

-- ON OCT 23, APPROXIMATELY 50 GAZANS WERE RELEASED FROM ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IN KETZIOT, IN WHAT THE IDF CALLED A "HUMANE GESTURE." BEFORE THEIR RELEASE, AN IDF OFFICER WAS REPORTED TO HAVE EXPRESSED TO THEM THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD NO LONGER PARTICIPATE IN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OR RIOTS.

12. [REDACTED] REPORTED RAID ON ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY:

-- FBIS (TA 2310130188) REPORTED THAT SECURITY FORCES HAD RAIDED GAZA'S ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 15532 03 OF 03 281707Z

(PRECISE TIME NOT SPECIFIED) AND ARRESTED SUSPECTED ISLAMIC RESISTANCE LEADERS. RON KRUMER SAYS HE HAS NOT HEARD OF SUCH A RAID, AND DOUBTS ITS TRUTH SINCE THE UNIVERSITY REMAINS CLOSED, BUT WILL CHECK. PICKERING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E164

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

R

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03581

FILM= D880959-0542

DATE= 28 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= INTIFADA LEADERSHIP'S APPEAL TO ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PEACE, SOVEREIGNTY, PALESTINIANS, TEXT

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, PLO

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority	
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03581 01 OF 03 281550Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01
/088 W

-----130011 281615Z /41

O 281549Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3873
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03581

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PLO, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEADERSHIP'S APPEAL TO
ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION

1. [REDACTED]
2. ON OCTOBER 26 THE PLO/UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING, THE UNDERGROUND INTIFADA LEADERSHIP, ISSUED "A SPECIAL APPEAL TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION" CALLING FOR PEACE AND COEXISTENCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS, BASED ON A TWO-STATE SOLUTION, SECURITY FOR PALESTINIANS AND ISRAEL, AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO. THE LEAFLET, ISSUED IN HEBREW AND ENGLISH, WAS CONCEIVED OF SEVERAL WEEKS AGO IN CONTACTS BETWEEN PRO-FATAH PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FATAH ELEMENT IN THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP TOOK THE LEAD ON THIS PROJECT. ALTHOUGH IT WAS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE PFLP, DFLP AND COMMUNIST ELEMENTS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03581 01 OF 03 281550Z

OF THE LEADERSHIP DID NOT SIGN OFF ON IT, BUT ACQUIESCED IN ITS ISSUANCE IN THE NAME OF THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP.

3. BEGIN TEXT: A SPECIAL APPEAL TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC, TO THE LOVERS OF A JUST AND HONORABLE PEACE TO ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA,

DURING THE PAST 21 YEARS, WHICH IS THE AGE OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, THE CASE OF THE OCCUPATION AND PEACE HAS NEVER LIKE NOW BEEN THE CENTER OF YOUR DAILY AND ELECTION CONCERNS. YOU WERE NEVER THIS CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT OUR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WANT, AND WHAT OUR COMING EMERGENCY PNC SESSION -- THE SESSION OF THE POPULAR UPRISING -- WILL DECIDE. WE ARE NOW WITNESSING HISTORIC TIMES IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS EXPERIENCING A PERIOD OF OPENNESS AND A DESIRE TO SOLVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THIS IS A TIME IN WHICH OUR PEOPLE ARE MORE DETERMINED THAN EVER TO OBTAIN THEIR JUST AND LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND ACCOMPLISH A COMPREHENSIVE AND LASTING PEACE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF THIS AREA.

BUT INSTEAD OF YOUR LEADERS STATING THE CLEAR TRUTH, THEY INSTEAD TRY TO BLOCK EVERY INITIATIVE AIMED AT SOLVING OUR BLOODY CONFLICT IN AN HONORABLE AND JUST WAY. YOUR LEADERS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03581 01 OF 03 281550Z

CONSCIOUSLY DISTORT OUR BLESSED POPULAR UPRISING, ITS GOALS AND ITS DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL MEANS BY INCREASING THEIR OPPRESSIVE MEASURES, VIOLATING THE MOST BASIC OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE AIMED AT PROTECTING WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE AGED. YOUR LEADERS ARE WORKING ON THE ILLUSION THAT THEY CAN DEMORALISE AND EXHAUST OUR PEOPLE AND THEREFORE CRUSH THE UPRISING: WE APPROACH YOU FROM A POSITION OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE WAY OF REPRESSION AND TERROR WHICH YOUR ARMY AND GOVERNMENT PRACTICE AGAINST OUR UNARMED PEOPLE IS PROVING EVERY DAY ITS FAILURE BECAUSE OUR PEOPLE'S UPRISING IS ACCELERATING. YOUR LEADERS' ACTION WILL NOT PRODUCE ANY SIGN OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES AND THE VICTIMS. THEREFORE, THE ONLY GUARANTEED WAY TO PEACE IS BY GRANTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SELF DETERMINATION, THE RIGHT TO RETURN, AND TO ESTABLISH THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, (PEACE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED) BY GUARANTEES OF MUTUAL SECURITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA.

AND CONTRARY TO WHAT YOUR GOVERNMENT LEADERS ARE ACCUSING US OF, WE PRESENT TO YOU IN A CLEAR WAY AND IN THE NAME OF OUR PEOPLE, THAT THE BLESSED UPRISING CAME AS AN EXPRESSION OF OUR PEOPLE'S REFUSAL TO OCCUPATION AND INSISTENCE ON LIVING IN FREEDOM, LIBERTY AND HONOR JUST LIKE ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, WHO ARE ABLE TO EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY. THIS HAS BEEN OUR CONTINUOUS SEARCH, FOR A JUST PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ALL. THE SLOGAN OF THE UPRISING HAS ALSO

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 JERUSA 03581 01 OF 03 281550Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03581 02 OF 03 281552Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01
/088 W

-----130064 281616Z/41

O 281549Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3874
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03581

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PLO, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEADERSHIP'S APPEAL TO

BEEN CLEAR. THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW
FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967 SO THAT WE
CAN CREATE OUR PALESTINIAN STATE ON IT. THUS WE
WERE ABLE TO REMOVE EVERY JUSTIFICATION BY YOU
FOR SUPPORTING THE REPRESSION AND TERROR
PRACTICES BY YOUR ARMY IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES. IT ALSO REMOVED ALL THE FAKE MASKS
AND THE DISTORTED PICTURES WHICH YOUR LEADERS
HAVE TRIED TO PAINT ABOUT OUR PEOPLE AND THEIR
UPRISING. WE ARE ALSO CALLING EVERYONE WITH A
LIVE CONSCIOUS TO MOBILISE IN DEFENCE OF
HUMANITY IN THE FACE OF THE UGLY OCCUPATION. IT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SHOULD NOT BE SAID BY ISRAELIS THAT WE DIDN'T KNOW. THE PICTURES OF THE REPRESSION AND THE TERROR ARE CLEAR IN FRONT OF THE EYES OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.

THE UPRISING HAS PROVED THE FAILURE OF THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03581 02 OF 03 281552Z

MILITARY EXPANSIONIST POLICIES AND THE THREATS WITH "TRANSFER" AND THE VARIOUS OPTIONS THAT ARE BEING ATTEMPTED TO BE IMPOSED ON OUR PEOPLE. OPTIONS LIKE AUTONOMY AND THE CONDOMINIUM PLAN AND OTHERS. WE HAVE SHOWN THAT NO OPTION EXISTS EXCEPT THE PALESTINIAN OPTION REPRESENTED BY THE PLO, OUR SOLE AND LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH AUTHORITY. IN THE SAME WAY THAT OUR PEOPLE DON'T IMPOSE THE PERSONALITY OR THE IDENTITY OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL IN THIS CONFERENCE, WE INSIST ON OUR RIGHT TO CHOOSE BY OURSELVES WHO REPRESENTS US. AND IN THIS CONTEXT OUR CHOICE IS THE PLO AS THE SOLE AND LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL OUR PEOPLE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE. PEACE WILL NOT BE WITHOUT GIVING OUR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS. THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES TO THE PLO WILL NOT PRODUCE RESULTS AND IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. ATTEMPTS TO SEPARATE OUR PEOPLE FROM THEIR BRETHREN OUTSIDE WILL ALSO FAIL.

THE PLO/UNIFIED LEADERSHIP FEELS THAT THE CLARITY OF THE UPRISING'S SLOGANS AND ITS PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC NATURE ARE A VIVID EXPRESSION OF THE PALESTINIANS' DESIRE FOR A JUST PEACE AND SECURITY. IT APPROACHES ISRAELIS IN ORDER TO CREATE THE KIND OF ATMOSPHERE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS JUST PEACE THAT WILL GIVE SECURITY TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE AREA INCLUDING THE STATES IN THE AREA. THIS INCLUDES THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND ISRAEL. FOR THIS IT CALLS ON THE ISRAELIS TO VOTE FOR PEACE, FOR

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03581 02 OF 03 281552Z

WITHDRAWAL AND AGAINST WAR AND OCCUPATION. FOR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, FOR RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF PALESTINIANS TO SELF DETERMINATION, FOR THE RECOGNITION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO.

THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP GREETES ALL THE ISRAELIS PROGRESSIVE AND PEACE FORCES FOR ITS COURAGE AND APPLAUDS ALL THE MOVEMENTS THAT DENOUNCE THE ISRAELI TERROR IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

THE PLO/UNIFIED LEADERSHIP AND IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UPRISING CALLS ON OUR ARAB BRETHREN INSIDE TO VOTE FOR THE LISTS THAT RAISE SLOGANS SUPPORTING THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF OUR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE LED BY THE PLO. AND THOSE LISTS THAT SUPPORT THE CONVENING OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PLO IN ORDER TO CREATE THE PALESTINIAN STATE UNDER ITS LEADERSHIP. THIS VOTE WILL INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND THE POWER OF OUR BROTHER THE ARAB CITIZENS.

THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING ADDRESSES THE MINDS AND LIVE CONSCIOUSNESS OF EVERY ISRAELI SO THAT THEY CAN GRAB THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO REACH A JUST PEACE. THIS APPEAL IS MADE WITH THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP COGNIZANT OF ITS HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITY, AND AT THE SAME TIME ITS PERSISTENCE TO CONTINUE THE UPRISING UNTIL THE FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM JERUSALEM, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS ACCOMPLISHED AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE ABLE TO ENJOY THEIR RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION, THE RIGHT TO RETURN AND TO ESTABLISH THE INDEPENDENT

████████████████████

████████████████████

PAGE 04 JERUSA 03581 02 OF 03 281552Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03581 03 OF 03 281553Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01
/088 W

-----130104 281616Z /41

O 281549Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3875
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03581

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PLO, IS
SUBJECT: INTIFADA LEADERSHIP'S APPEAL TO

PALESTINIAN STATE.

A THOUSAND YESES TO A JUST PEACE, FREEDOM AND
LIBERTY AND A THOUSAND NOES TO OCCUPATION.

PLO/UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING
26/10/88 END TEXT.

WILCOX

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E158

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15391

FILM= D880952-0415

DATE= 26 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= HISTADRUT'S KESSAR ON ELECTIONS, ECONOMY, ETC.

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 14992

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CAMPAIGN, ELECTION, ELECTION FORECAST, POLITICAL PARTY, PROGRAM

TAGS= ELAB, PGOV, IS, (KESSAR, ISRAEL)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY			
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info			
FOIA Exemptions			TS authority
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

<<<<>>>> [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15391 01 OF 02 261720Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 HA-09 L-03 LAB-04
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00
OPM-01 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /077 W

-----343320 261856Z/43

R 261714Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1690

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15391

FOR S/IL, NEA/IAI AND NEA/RA
PASS LABOR FOR ILAB-DAVEY
PASS USTR

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ELAB, PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: HISTADRUT'S KESSAR ON ELECTIONS, ECONOMY, ETC.

REF: TEL AVIV 14992

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY

HISTADRUT SECRETARY GENERAL ISRAEL KESSAR BELIEVES THE HISTADRUT ISSUE WILL NOT HURT THE LABOR PARTY IN ISRAEL'S NOVEMBER 1 PARLIAMENTARY (KNESSET) ELECTIONS. SAID IN AN OCTOBER 24 CONVERSATION WITH THE EMBASSY LABOR ATTACHE, KESSAR PREDICTED A VIRTUAL TIE BETWEEN LABOR AND LIKUD, FOLLOWED BY COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT. HE HOPED FOR AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN BANKERS TRUST AND KOOR, AND WAS HAPPY AT KOOR'S PROGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS IN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15391 01 OF 02 261720Z

CARRYING OUT A RECOVERY PROGRAM. HE REITERATED THAT WEST BANK AND GAZA UNIONS ARE PLO FRONTS AND SAID HIS SUPPORT OF ENGINEER UNION DEPSEC GEN COHEN-KAGAN TO BE ISRAEL'S NEW LABOR ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON WAS A CONCILIATORY GESTURE TO THE PROFESSIONAL UNIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. HE'S ACTIVE IN THE CAMPAIGN, IF NOT ON TV

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

KESSAR SAID HE HAS BEEN OUT CAMPAIGNING THROUGHOUT ISRAEL, EVEN IF HE HAS NOT APPEARED ON TV, AS HARDLY ANYONE BUT PERES AND RABIN HAS BEEN FEATURED IN LABOR'S ADVERTISEMENTS. THIS WAS THE STRATEGY OF LABOR'S CAMPAIGN CONSULTANTS. KESSAR WAS NOT SURE THIS WAS BEST, BUT SAID HE DID NOT MIND, AND WOULD APPEAR SOON IN LABOR'S TV ADS. HE NOTED THAT HE WAS NOT THE ONLY ONE KEPT IN THE BACKGROUND. KNESSET SPEAKER HILLEL WAS UPSET AT NOT BEING ALLOWED TO EXPLOIT HIS BOOK ABOUT HIS UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ, AND MINISTER SHAHAL COMPLAINED RECENTLY TO KESSAR ABOUT HIS EXCLUSION.

4. EVEN ELECTION, PROBLEMS AFTER

KESSAR SAID THERE WILL BE "NO KNOCKOUT, NO BIG CHANGE" FOR THE BIG PARTIES IN THE ELECTION RESULTS--A SEAT OR TWO EITHER WAY. THERE WILL BE CHANGES FOR SOME OF THE SMALL PARTIES, AND THE CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT WILL GAIN, BUT THIS WILL NOT HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE BLOCS. HE WOULD NOT RULE OUT FORMATION OF A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT WITHOUT ROTATION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. HISTADRUT WILL BE ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE LABOR PARTY IN THE GOVERNMENT, IN VIEW OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE HISTADRUT SICK FUND (KUPAT HOLIM CLALIT) AND ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES (KOOR AND OTHER HEVRAT OVDIM FIRMS).
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15391 01 OF 02 261720Z

5. HISTADRUT WILL NOT HURT LABOR IN THE ELECTIONS

KESSAR SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE HISTADRUT ISSUE WOULD HURT LABOR IN THE ELECTIONS. IN HIS FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE PUBLIC, HE FOUND LITTLE CONCERN FOR THE PROBLEMS OF HISTADRUT'S ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES, EXCEPT AMONG THEIR EMPLOYEES, WHO WERE WORRIED ABOUT THEIR JOBS. KESSAR THOUGHT IT HARD TO TELL HOW THIS WOULD INFLUENCE THEIR VOTE: FOR LIKUD OUT OF ANGER, OR FOR LABOR TO PROTECT THE ENTERPRISES THAT EMPLOY THEM. THE ISSUE DIED DOWN AFTER THE INITIAL FUROR AROUSED WHEN KOOR ANNOUNCED A QUARTER BILLION DOLLAR LOSS LAST MAY, KESSAR ASSERTED, BECAUSE THE PUBLIC WAS REASSURED THAT KOOR'S NEW MANAGEMENT WAS DOING A GOOD JOB. IT REDUCED KOOR EXPENSES BY 100 MILLION DOLLARS IN 3-4 MONTHS, HE ADDED. ALTHOUGH BANKER'S TRUST REINTRODUCED THE KOOR ISSUE BY APPEALING TO THE COURTS TO DISSOLVE THE FIRM, KESSAR DID NOT THINK KOOR WOULD AFFECT THE ELECTION RESULTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6. KOOR

KESSAR FELT BANKERS' TRUST (BT) HAD BEEN SHORT-SIGHTED IN TRYING TO USE THE PRE-ELECTORAL PERIOD FOR LEVERAGE AGAINST KOOR. HE THOUGHT BT MIGHT HAVE BEEN ILL-ADVISED BY ITS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN ISRAEL FOR THE KOOR CASE (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH BT'S GENERAL REPRESENTATIVE HERE, KESSAR NOTED). KESSAR THOUGHT THIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, FORMER DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FINANCE UNDER LIKUD FINANCE MINISTER HURWITZ, MIGHT BE TRYING TO HELP LIKUD BY PERSUADING BT TO PROCEED IN THIS FASHION. KESSAR HAD ASKED BANKERS' TRUST TO GIVE HIM A FEW DAYS TO FIND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THEM, BUT BT INSISTED ON PRESSING AHEAD WITH THE CASE. KESSAR SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO CRITICIZE BANKERS' TRUST AND EXACERBATE THE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 15391 01 OF 02 261720Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15391 02 OF 02 261721Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 HA-09 L-03 LAB-04
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00
OPM-01 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /077 W

-----343324 261856Z /43

R 261714Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1691

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15391

FOR S/IL, NEA/IAI AND NEA/RA
PASS LABOR FOR ILAB-DAVEY
PASS USTR

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ELAB, PGOV, JS
SUBJECT: HISTADRUT'S KESSAR ON ELECTIONS, ECONOMY, ETC.

SITUATION. KESSAR THOUGHT THE FACT MANY KOOR WORKERS
VOTE LIKUD HELPED INFLUENCE PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, BUT
THAT THE GOVERNMENT INTERVENED SO HELPFULLY BECAUSE IT
AND THE BANK OF ISRAEL REALIZED THIS WAS A BIG PROBLEM
FOR THE GOI AND THE ISRAELI BANKS, NOT JUST FOR KOOR.
THE BIG QUESTION WOULD NOW BE IF THE GOI, AFTER THE
ELECTION, WOULD ACTUALLY MAKE AVAILABLE 50 MILLION
DOLLARS IN EXCHANGE FOR SHARES, AS ANNOUNCED. (COMMENT:
FINANCE MINISTER NISSIM TOLD US THIS OFFER NO LONGER

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

STANDS.)

7. PENSION FUNDS IN GOOD SHAPE NOW

KESSAR SAID THE HISTADRUT PENSION FUNDS ARE NOT A PROBLEM
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15391 02 OF 02 261721Z

NEEDING THE PROTECTION OF A LABOR PARTY PRESENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT, AS ARE THE SICK FUND (KUPAT HOLIM) AND KOOR AND OTHER HISTADRUT (HEVRAT OVDIM) ENTERPRISES. THE FISCAL/ACTUARIAL SITUATION OF THE FUNDS HAD IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY SINCE THE CONTRIBUTION WAS RAISED BY ONE AND A HALF PERCENT OF SALARY (AN ADDITIONAL ONE PERCENT FROM EMPLOYERS, HALF PERCENT FROM EMPLOYEES). KESSAR ADDED THAT THIS SITUATION WAS SOLIDIFIED WHEN THE HISTADRUT SUCCEEDED IN PRESSING NISSIM NOT TO DECREASE THE INTEREST RATE PAID TO THE FUNDS ON GOVERNMENT BONDS BY ONE PERCENT, BUT TO LEAVE IT AT 6.3 PERCENT.

8. WB/G UNIONS ARE JUST PLO FRONTS, KESSAR REITERATES

SINCE KESSAR PROTESTED TO US ABOUT THE HEARINGS ON THE PALESTINIAN WORKER RIGHTS PETITION AGAINST ISRAEL, THERE HAVE BEEN NEWS REPORTS THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS ASKED THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE TO DROP THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE GROUNDS OF NON-RECOGNITION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORIES, THE LABOR ATTACHE NOTED. KESSAR COMMENTED THAT THE PLO NEEDS UNIONS IN THE TERRITORIES AS COVER FOR ITS ACTIVITIES. UNABLE TO PUT ANYONE OPENLY ON ITS PAYROLL AND OPEN OFFICES IN THE TERRITORIES AS IT DOES ABROAD, IT FINDS UNIONS THE MOST CONVENIENT SUBSTITUTE, KESSAR ALLEGED.

9. NEW WASHINGTON LABOR ATTACHE

KESSAR DENIED THAT ISRAEL'S NEW LABOR ATTACHE ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR ITS WASHINGTON EMBASSY, ELI COHEN-KAGAN, IS A LIBERAL. KESSAR SAID HE IS A LABOR PARTY PERSON. (COMMENT: MAYBE WASHINGTON IS WORTH NOT A MASS BUT A QUICK CONVERSION). KESSAR OBSERVED THAT MANY WANTED THE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15391 02 OF 02 261721Z

WASHINGTON JOB, THE MOST DESIRABLE FOREIGN ASSIGNMENT FOR ISRAELIS, AND CRITICIZED COHEN-KAGAN AS NON-LABOR OUT OF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JEALOUSY. KESSAR SAID HE RECOMMENDED COHEN-KAGAN FOR THE JOB TO ENCOURAGE THE PROFESSIONAL UNIONS. HE NOTED THAT THESE HARD ECONOMIC TIMES MADE IT HARD FOR THEM, AND OTHER UNIONS, TO GET MUCH IN CONCRETE TERMS, AND THAT THEY HAVE LONG BEEN DISSATISFIED WITHIN THE HISTADRUT BECAUSE OF ITS WAGE POLICY, SO HE WANTED TO GIVE THEM SOMETHING, IF ONLY A GESTURE LIKE THIS. PICKERING

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E157)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15385

FILM= D880951-0845

DATE= 26 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION SS

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC
JERUSALEM

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= EXDIS **EXEMPTED**

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= QUERY TO GOI ON PRESS REPORT OF DEATH SQUADS

REFERENCE= 88 STATE 347937

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DEATH, ALLEGATION, POLICE FORCE, MEETING

TAGS= PREL, IS, US

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date.

- RELEASE
- EXCISE
- DENY
- DELETE Non-Responsive Info
- FOIA Exemptions _____
- PA Exemptions _____
- DECLASSIFY
- DECLASSIFY in PART

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to G or

67304629

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15385 261554Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----332047 261556Z /38

O 261550Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1682
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

[REDACTED] TEL AVIV 15385

**EXCIS
DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, US
SUBJECT: QUERY TO GOI ON PRESS REPORT OF DEATH SQUADS

REF: STATE 347937

1. [REDACTED]

2. DCM RAISED THE PRESS REPORT OF IDF DEATH SQUADS OPERATING IN THE TERRITORIES WITH GOREN ON 10/26. DCM SAID WE HAD SEEN THE REUTER REPORT OF OCTOBER 23 ALLEGING THE EXISTENCE OF IDF DEATH SQUADS IN THE TERRITORIES, THE IDF DENIAL STATEMENT OF 10/24 AND THE TEXT OF A RADIO INTERVIEW GIVEN BY RABIN 10/25 WITH VOICE OF ISRAEL ALSO DENYING THE REUTER REPORT. DCM SAID HE WANTED TO ASK GOREN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL COORDINATOR FOR ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORIES, FOR HIS OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE REUTERS REPORT. GOREN SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THERE WERE NO SUCH ACTIVITIES. NONE AT ALL. HE SAID THE GOI WAS USING SPECIAL UNITS IN THE TERRITORIES TO CARRY OUT SECURITY WORK BUT THAT NONE HAD ANY AUTHORITY TO OPEN FIRE BEYOND THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WHICH THE U.S. HAD BEEN INFORMED.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


PAGE 02 TEL AV 15385 261554Z

3. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO/NO INFORMATION WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION IN THE REUTER REPORT. IN OUR MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ISRAELI HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND PALESTINIANS, WE HAVE NEVER HEARD AN ALLEGATION OF DEATH SQUADS. TO BE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SURE, WE HAVE HEARD PLENTY ABOUT ABUSES LEADING TO SERIOUS INJURY AND DEATH (THREE CASES OF DEATH WHILE IN DETENTION ARE NOW UNDER ISRAELI INVESTIGATION). WE ALSO UNDERSTAND FROM INTERNATIONAL PRESS SOURCES THAT REUTER MAY HAVE RUN A STORY WITH INSUFFICIENT SUBSTANTIATION. HOWEVER, THERE IS A SMALL GRAY AREA OF GOI OPERATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE SPARKED THE REUTER PIECE. WE KNOW THAT THE IDF IS SETTING UP AMBUSHES AIMED, WE WERE TOLD, AT APPREHENDING PALESTINIANS CARRYING OUT ACTION AGAINST THE OCCUPATION. THE IDF APPARENTLY USES INTELLIGENCE DATA TO STAKE OUT TARGETED LOCATIONS OR ROUTES OF INGRESS/EGRESS. IT IS REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT SOME OF THESE IDF OPERATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN THE USE OF LIVE FIRE AND PROBABLY PALESTINIAN CASUALTIES. WE WILL BE PURSUING THIS FURTHER. WE ALSO HAVE SEVERAL REPORTS, ESPECIALLY RE GAZA, OF IDF PROVOCATIONS LEADING TO PALESTINIAN REACTION AND A TOUGH IDF RESPONSE. THE GIVATI BRIGADE SEEMS PARTICULARLY TO BE INVOLVED IN THIS. END COMMENT. PICKERING



NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** 

*** Current Classification *** 

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EIS6

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15339

FILM= D880951-0022

DATE= 26 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= LIKUD CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR ARENS OPTIMISTIC - REGARDING NOV. 1 KNESS
ELECTIONS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CAMPAIGN, COALITION GOVERNMENT, ELECTION FORECAST, POLITICAL P/

TAGS= KPAL, PGOV, IS, (ARENS, MISHA)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(S) FPC/CDR

Date.

- RELEASE
- EXCISE
- DENY
- DELETE Non-Responsive Info
- FDA Exemptions _____
- PA Exemptions _____

- DECLASSIFY
- DECLASSIFY IN PART

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

- TS authority to:
- CLASSIFY as S or
- DOWNGRADE TS to S or

Handwritten initials

FEE 10

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[[[]]]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15339 01 OF 02 261040Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /054 W
-----313334 261044Z /25

O 261032Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1668
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15339

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: LIKUD CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR ARENS OPTIMISTIC
REGARDING NOV. 1 KNESSET ELECTIONS

1. [REDACTED]

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: LIKUD CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR MISHA ARENS TOLD AMBASSADOR ON OCT. 25 HE BELIEVED LIKUD WOULD WIN "SIGNIFICANTLY" MORE SEATS THAN THE LABOR PARTY AND BE IN A POSITION TO FORM A NARROW GOVERNMENT WITHOUT LABOR AFTER THE ELECTIONS. HE ADDED THAT THIS NARROW COALITION OPTION WOULD GIVE LIKUD THE UPPER HAND IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH LABOR ON FORMATION OF ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

ARENS: LIKUD WILL TAKE ELECTION

3. AMBASSADOR MET WITH LIKUD CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR MISHA ARENS ON OCT. 25. ARENS BELIEVED LIKUD WOULD WIN "SIGNIFICANTLY" MORE SEATS THAN LABOR IN THE NOV. 1 ELECTION AND SAID THERE WOULD BE A MAJORITY FOR A
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15339 01 OF 02 261040Z

NARROW LIKUD-LED RIGHT/RELIGIOUS GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD ENABLE LIKUD TO NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH WITH LABOR ON THE FORMATION OF ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, HE ADDED.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LIKUD CAMPAIGN GOING WELL

4. ARENS WAS SATISFIED WITH LIKUD'S CAMPAIGN AND PLEASED BY THE CROWDS ITS RALLIES HAD BEEN ATTRACTING. HE NOTED THAT SHARON WOULD BE APPEARING (FOR THE FIRST TIME) ON LIKUD'S TELEVISION ELECTION BROADCAST THIS EVENING. ARENS DID NOT EXPECT ANY SIGNIFICANT SURPRISES OVER THE NEXT WEEK. HE THOUGHT PERES HAD ALREADY PULLED ALL THE RABBITS HE HAD OUT OF HIS HAT. LIKUD, ARENS SAID, HAD FOCUSED ON FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE CAMPAIGN, AND HAD SOUGHT TO TAG PERES WITH THE LABEL OF BEING UNTRUSTWORTHY AND A RISK-TAKER.

5. ARENS BELIEVED THE DISQUALIFICATION OF KACH WOULD WORK TO LIKUD'S ADVANTAGE. HE DID NOT SEE ANY LIKUD LOSS OF SUPPORT IN ITS CORE SEPHARDI CONSTITUENCY OR AMONG YOUNG VOTERS. HE ALSO ASSERTED LIKUD WOULD DOUBLE ITS NON-JEWISH VOTE AND GARNER THE EQUIVALENT OF A SEAT FROM THAT SECTOR. HE SPECULATED THAT THOSE LIKUD-INCLINED VOTERS WHO HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE SMALL RIGHT PARTIES WOULD "COME HOME" TO LIKUD, BUT THIS WAS A GUT FEELING AND A HOPE MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE. ARENS NOTED THAT LABOR'S EZER WEIZMAN HAD MADE A MISTAKE BY PUBLICLY SAYING LABOR WOULD CONSIDER A MINORITY GOVERNMENT DEPENDENT ON THE NON-ZIONIST, PRIMARILY ARAB PARTIES. ARENS COMPLIMENTED LABOR'S TELEPHONE CAMPAIGN TO TARGET

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15339 01 OF 02 261040Z

UNDECIDED VOTERS BUT DOUBTED LABOR HAD BEEN ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY FOLLOW-UP. LIKUD'S OWN EFFORTS HAD BEEN ON THE PRECINCT LEVEL RATHER THAN THE CENTRALLY-MOUNTED CAMPAIGN OF LABOR.

EVENTS OVER THE LAST WEEK

6. WE ASKED HOW EVENTS OVER THE LAST WEEK WOULD AFFECT THE CAMPAIGN. ARENS BELIEVED THAT TERRORISM AND INFILTRATIONS STRENGTHENED LIKUD AND REINFORCED THE FEELING THAT ISRAEL HAD TO BE STRONG AND NOT TAKE RISKS. HE THOUGHT THE HUSSEIN NIGHTLINE INTERVIEW COULD CUT BOTH WAYS. THE SHAMIR-PERES DEBATE HAD PROBABLY WORKED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF LIKUD, HE SAID, BECAUSE LABOR BUILT UP EXPECTATIONS OF A PERES "KNOCKOUT" OF SHAMIR. EVEN A SHAMIR-PERES DRAW WORKED TO LIKUD'S BENEFIT, IN HIS VIEW.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DOUBTS ISRAELI POLL RELIABILITY

7. ARENS DID NOT CONSIDER THE ISRAELI ELECTION SURVEYS DEPENDABLE AND HE DID NOT RELY ON THEM. HE POINTED TO THE DIFFICULT STATISTICAL PROBLEM CAUSED BY THE ABUNDANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES, THE LACK OF COVERAGE OF THE ARAB SECTOR AND EVEN PROBLEMS WITH GETTING AN ACCURATE JEWISH SAMPLE. ACCURACY BECAME EVEN MORE PROBLEMATIC BY THE DISTRIBUTION OF UNCERTAIN VOTERS (WHICH HE BELIEVED NUMBERED ABOUT 20 PERCENT AT THIS POINT), THE TENDENCY OF PART OF THE PUBLIC TO CONCEAL ITS PREFERENCES, AND THE QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF TRANSLATING RAW POLL DATA INTO KNESSET SEATS.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15339 02 OF 02 261040Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /054 W

-----313343 261044Z /25

O 261032Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1669
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15339

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: LIKUD CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR ARENS OPTIMISTIC

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES

8. ARENS WAS CONVINCED NONE OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES OTHER THAN MEMAD WERE CAPABLE OF ENTERING A LABOR-LED NARROW COALITION BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION FROM THEIR CONSTITUENCIES. HE THOUGHT THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, AGUDAT ISRAEL AND SHAS WERE DEFINITELY ORIENTED TOWARD LIKUD. WE ASKED IF LIKUD HAD REACHED ANY PRE-ELECTION COALITION ARRANGEMENTS WITH ANY OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES. ARENS SUGGESTED THERE WERE SOME "IMPLICIT" UNDERSTANDINGS BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL.

THE INTIFADA

9. LOOKING AHEAD, ARENS ASSERTED THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF A LIKUD ELECTION VICTORY WOULD HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON THE UPRISING. HE DID NOT GIVE RABIN "GOOD MARKS" FOR HIS HANDLING OF THE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15339 02 OF 02 261040Z

INTIFADA. RABIN HAD SAID THINGS THAT WERE UNNECESSARY AND HAD SET THE WRONG TONE. BY CONTRAST, ARENS SAID HE WOULD HAVE WORKED ON THE EXPECTATIONS OF PALESTINIANS, MAKING IT CLEAR THE UPRISING WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN PRESSURING ISRAEL. ARENS WOULD HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT GIVE IN TO THE INTIFADA.

PEACE PROCESS

10. WE RAISED WITH ARENS LIKUD'S CAMPAIGN PEACE PROCESS PITCH. HE NOTED THE "SERIOUS PROBLEM" OF FINDING AN ARAB PARTNER. ARENS ARGUED THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT CONCEPT AS DETAILED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS WAS AS APPLICABLE TODAY AS A DECADE AGO ("THERE IS NO OTHER WAY"). HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD OPPOSED THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS BECAUSE THEY REQUIRED THE "TRANSFER" OF ISRAELIS FROM THE SINAI. HE WAS JUST AS OPPOSED TO THE "TRANSFER" OF ARABS, NOTING HIS SATISFACTION THAT THE KACH PARTY OF KAHANE (WHO HE BELIEVED WAS CRAZY) HAD BEEN DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING IN THE ELECTION.

11. ARENS EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR RENEWAL OF A VIBRANT PEACE PROCESS FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI AND U.S. ELECTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE REITERATED OPPOSITION TO THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERNATIONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFERENCE IN FAMILIAR TERMS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THE SECRETARY'S PROPOSAL TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT AND A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT ON AN INTERLOCKED BASIS WAS A MISTAKE WHICH CONFOUNDED THE PURPOSE OF AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. IN ARENS' VIEW, AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT HAD BEEN SETTLED UPON AT CAMP DAVID BECAUSE OF THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15339 02 OF 02 261040Z

INABILITY OF THE PARTIES TO AGREE IN DETAIL ABOUT FINAL STATUS QUESTIONS. THE CONCEPT WAS THAT A PERIOD OF YEARS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PREPARE THE GROUNDWORK FOR PRODUCTIVE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING THE INTIFADA, MORE -- NOT LESS -- TIME MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO FIND THE PROPER PATH.

12. THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ'S SUGGESTION WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PROCEED BEYOND THE INTERIM PHASE. THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED WHY LIKUD SUSPICION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE APPROACH TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WAS MISPLACED AND SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT WANT TO LOOK AT THIS ISSUE AGAIN IN THE FUTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSING OUR JOINT OBJECTIVES. ARENS AGREED THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE USEFUL.

PICKERING

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EISS

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15301

FILM= D880950-0382

DATE= 26 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NE DEPARTMENT OF STATE *by* IS/FPC/CDR Date.

TO= STATE
JERUSALEM

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY In PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____
TS authority for:
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= LABOR AND LIKUD PARTIES' ECONOMIC PLATFORMS

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 10709

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CAMPAIGN, POLITICAL PARTY, ECONOMIC REFORM, POLICY

TAGS= ECON, ELAB, IS, LIKUD, LABOR

9304029

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15301 01 OF 03 260711Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 EXIM-06 NSAE-00 COME-00 LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00
ITC-01 OPIC-07 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00 FRB-03
OPM-01 USIE-00 JUSE-00 SP-02 C-01 E-01 T-01
/068 W

-----302255 260721Z /12

R 260701Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1661
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15301

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: ECON, ELAB, IS
SUBJECT: LABOR AND LIKUD PARTIES' ECONOMIC PLATFORMS

REF: TEL AVIV 10709

1. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

2. THE LABOR AND LIKUD ECONOMIC PLATFORMS ARE
SIMILAR IN SUBSTANCE BUT DIFFER IN PERSPECTIVE AND
APPROACH. LABOR IS ATTEMPTING TO DISTANCE ITSELF
FROM ITS TRADITIONAL INTERVENTIONIST ORIENTATION AND
TO ENCOURAGE GREATER OPERATION OF MARKET FORCES IN
THE ECONOMY. THE LIKUD STRATEGY EMPHASIZES LABOR'S
ECONOMIC FAILURES WHILE CHAMPIONING THE CAUSE OF THE
FREE MARKET AND CLAIMING CREDIT FOR THE SUCCESS OF
THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT'S (NUG) STABILIZATION
PROGRAM. PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S ECONOMIC ADVISER
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15301 01 OF 03 260711Z

NOTES THAT, DESPITE THE CAMPAIGN RHETORIC, A BASIC
CONSENSUS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES EXISTS BETWEEN THE TWO
MAJOR PARTIES. OTHER ISRAELI ECONOMIC OBSERVERS,
INCLUDING BANK OF ISRAEL GOVERNOR MICHAEL BRUNO,
AGREE WITH THIS OBSERVATION. THUS THE POLICIES
ADOPTED BY THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, WHETHER HEADED BY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LIKUD OR LABOR OR THE TWO TOGETHER IN ANOTHER NUG,
WILL LIKELY NOT DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY FROM CURRENT
ECONOMIC POLICY.

THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM

3. THE LABOR PARTY HAS ADOPTED THE STYLE OF A U.S.
POLITICAL PARTY IN THAT IT RELIES ON CONSULTANTS,
ACADEMICIANS, AND THINK TANKS FOR ECONOMIC IDEAS,
PROPOSALS, AND POSITION PAPERS. THE POSITIONS
PRESENTED HEREIN ARE PROVIDED BY THE SOCIAL ECONOMIC
PLATFORM ADVISORS TO LABOR WHO ARE PARTICULARLY
CLOSE TO SHIMON PERES.

4. THE CURRENT STABILIZATION PLAN RELIES ON FIXED
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES AND RELATIVELY HIGH INTEREST
RATES. THE LABOR PLAN CALLS FOR A SHIFT FROM THE
SHORT TERM MEASURES OF THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM TO
POLICIES THAT WOULD FOSTER FASTER EXPORT-LED GROWTH
(5 PERCENT PER YEAR) AND REDUCE THE EXTERNAL DEBT
COMPONENT OF THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT WHILE
MAINTAINING PRICE STABILITY. THE MACROECONOMIC VIEW
OF THE LABOR PLATFORM FEATURES:

- MAINTAINING FISCAL RESTRAINT, INCLUDING THE

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15301 01 OF 03 260711Z

CURRENT LEVEL OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

- MAINTAINING THE PER CAPITA LEVEL OF TRANSFER
PAYMENTS BY CONSTRAINING THEIR GROWTH RATE TO THAT
OF THE POPULATION

- ADJUSTING THE EXCHANGE RATE TO ENCOURAGE EXPORTS
AND DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING

- LOWERING THE LONG-TERM COST OF CAPITAL TO
ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY AND IN THE
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS

- OPENING UP THE ECONOMY TO THE WORLD MARKET AND
STRENGTHENING COMPETITION WITHIN THE ECONOMY

- GIVING PREFERENCE TO OUTLYING DEVELOPMENT REGIONS

5. LABOR SEES THE NEED FOR AN ECONOMIC-SOCIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT, HASTADRUT, AND EMPLOYERS (SIMILAR TO THE ACCORD WHICH ENABLED THE RECENT ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PLAN TO SUCCEED) TO FORM THE FOUNDATION FOR THE MICROECONOMIC MEASURES AND REFORMS OF THE LABOR PLATFORM. THIS CONVENTION WOULD INCLUDE:

- REFORM OF WAGE AGREEMENTS WHEREBY FIRM AND INDUSTRY AGREEMENTS ARE PRIMARILY DETERMINED BY NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE, WITH COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS BEING PAID QUARTERLY.
- REFORM OF THE CAPITAL MARKET BY REDUCING THE GOVERNMENT'S DOMINANT ROLE IN THE CAPITAL MARKET AND BY ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATION OF SAVERS AND INVESTORS

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15301 02 OF 03 260711Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 EXIM-06 NSAE-00 COME-00 LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00
ITC-01 OPIC-07 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00 FRB-03
OPM-01 USIE-00 JUSE-00 SP-02 C-01 E-01 T-01
/068 W

-----302264 260721Z /12

R 260701Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1662
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15301

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: ECON, ELAB, IS
SUBJECT: LABOR AND LIKUD PARTIES' ECONOMIC PLATFORMS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- BROADENING OF THE TAX BASE WHILE REDUCING MARGINAL RATES, AND BALANCING THE BUDGET BY INCREASING VALUE ADDED TAXES (VAT). THE TAX SYSTEM SHOULD BE PRESCRIPTIVE TO ATTAIN SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND NATIONAL GOALS.
- INCREASED INVESTMENT IN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE TO AVOID A SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN THE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATE.
- ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING HEALTH CARE FUNDS; REFORMING BOTH THE FINANCING AND PROVISION OF HEALTH SERVICES TO HALT THE CHRONIC DEFICITS OF HEALTH CARE FUNDS (INSURERS) AND PROVIDERS OF SERVICES (HOSPITALS, ETC.).



PAGE 02 TEL AV 15301 02 OF 03 260711Z

- PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS WHILE PRESERVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
- INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL WHICH WOULD BE TREATED FOR TAX PURPOSES AS INVESTMENTS IN PHYSICAL CAPITAL.

THE LIKUD ECONOMIC PLATFORM

5. THE LIKUD PARTY, MADE UP OF THE HERUT (DOMINANT) AND LIBERAL FACTIONS, DOES NOT POSSESS THE INTERVENTIONIST TENDENCIES OF LABOR. THE LIKUD EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO MAINTAIN CURRENT ECONOMIC STABILITY AND CLAIMS CREDIT FOR RECENT SUCCESSSES BASED ON ITS CONTROL OF MANY OF THE ECONOMIC-RELATED MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS. LIKUD POINTS TO INFLATION, WHICH HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM 450 PERCENT TO 16 PERCENT IN THE PERIOD 1985-88 AND STATES IT WILL IMPLEMENT SUCH ADDITIONAL MEASURES AS ARE NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE CURRENT INFLATION RATE EVEN FURTHER. THE LIKUD'S COMMITMENT TO A FREE MARKET ECONOMY FORMS THE FOUNDATION OF ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAM. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE KEY POINTS CONTAINED IN THE LIKUD PARTY ECONOMIC PLATFORM:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES TO CREATE AN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE FREE ENTERPRISE

- REDUCED GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15301 02 OF 03 260711Z

- REFORM OF THE CAPITAL MARKET TO ENCOURAGE GREATER PRIVATE SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT

- REDUCTION IN THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING THE TAX ADMINISTRATION

- SALE OF GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES EXCEPT WHERE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE CANNOT FUNCTION

- USE OF FUNDS FROM THE PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT OWNED COMPANIES TO REDUCE TAXES

- REFORM OF THE TAX STRUCTURE FOR A MORE EQUITABLE TAX BURDEN

- CREATION OF JOBS TO ENSURE FULL EMPLOYMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE OF REAL WAGES

- INCREASED COMPETITIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE ISRAELI ECONOMY

- REDUCING INFLATION, THROUGH APPROPRIATE MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY, TO THE LEVELS OF ISRAEL'S MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS

- EXPORT PROMOTION AS THE MEANS TO ARRIVE AT ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

- DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOURISM SECTOR AS A MAJOR EXPORT SECTOR BY DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE WORLD WIDE MARKETING NETWORK

6. ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL, THE LIKUD HAS ARTICULATED ITS VIEWS THROUGH ATTACKS ON LABOR AND HAS FOCUSED

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15301 03 OF 03 260712Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 EXIM-06 NSAE-00 COME-00 LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00
ITC-01 OPIC-07 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INRE-00 FRB-03
OPM-01 USIE-00 JUSE-00 SP-02 C-01 E-01 T-01
/068 W

-----302300 260721Z /12
R 260701Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1663
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15301

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: ECON, ELAB, IS
SUBJECT: LABOR AND LIKUD PARTIES' ECONOMIC PLATFORMS

ON THE SHORTCOMINGS OF LABOR ECONOMIC POLICY.
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A LIKUD PORTRAIT OF A
VIBRANT AND SUCCESSFUL FREE MARKET ECONOMY, THE
LIKUD CONDEMNS TRADITIONAL LABOR POSITIONS
CONCERNING THE CUMBERSOME HISTADRUT, SUBSIDIES FOR
INEFFICIENT INDUSTRIES, EXCESSIVE REGULATION AND
TAXES, AND LABOR'S SUPPOSED GENERAL DISTASTE FOR
CONSUMERISM, PERSONAL WEALTH, AND THE MARKET
ECONOMY. LIKUD HAS CRITICIZED LABOR FOR WAGE
BREACHES AND FOR PAYMENTS TO FAILING HISTADRUT
COMPANIES. LIKUD CLAIMS THESE COMPANIES FAIL
BECAUSE OF WEAK MANAGEMENT AND INEFFICIENCY DIRECTLY
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE SELF-SEEKING CONSIDERATIONS OF
THE LABOR PARTY.

7. LABOR, FOR ALL ITS POSITION PAPERS, IS WEAKENED
BY ITS INABILITY TO PRODUCE A STRONG PERSONALITY TO
TOUT AS THEIR FUTURE FINANCE MINISTER OR LEADER ON
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15301 03 OF 03 260712Z

ECONOMIC ISSUES. GAD YA'ACOB, THE CURRENT MINISTER OF ECONOMICS AND PLANNING AND A LABOR CANDIDATE FOR THE FINANCE MINISTRY, HAS HAD LIMITED IMPACT ON POLICY AND IS PERCEIVED AS A MARGINAL FIGURE IN THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. IN THE EVENT OF THE FORMATION OF A LABOR GOVERNMENT, SHIMON PERES MAY HAVE TO GIVE CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THE FINANCE PORTFOLIO. BY CONTRAST, CURRENT LIKUD FINANCE MINISTER MOSHE NISSIM IS EFFECTIVE AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT ELECTORALLY, WIDELY RESPECTED.

8. AMOS RUBIN, ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, INDICATED IN A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH US THAT DESPITE DIFFERING TACTICAL APPROACHES TO THE ECONOMY, THERE IS IN FACT AN UNDERLYING CONSENSUS ON OBJECTIVES BETWEEN THE LIKUD AND LABOR. OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING BANK OF ISRAEL GOVERNOR MICHAEL BRUNO, AND BUSINESSMEN HAVE REACHED SIMILAR CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE ECONOMIC PLATFORMS OF THE TWO PARTIES. RUBIN CHARACTERIZED LABOR AS MORE PRAGMATIC THAN IDEOLOGICAL, NOTING THAT ITS TRADITIONAL INTERVENTIONIST ROLE WAS A MEANS TO AN END--NATION BUILDING--NOT AN IDEOLOGY.

COMMENT

9. THE LIBERAL FACTION'S FREE MARKET IDEOLOGY AND LIKUD'S NON-INTERVENTIONIST TENDENCIES ARE FORGING A TIMELY MATCH IN TUNE WITH ISRAELI SOCIETY. THE PUBLIC HAS NOT RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO THE LABOR ECONOMIC PLATFORM (ASIDE FROM EXPRESSIONS OF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15301 03 OF 03 260712Z

SUPPORT FOR PERES BY SOME INDUSTRIALISTS). ADMITTEDLY, PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES OVERSHADOW ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN. THE LABOR PARTY, HOWEVER, NEEDS TO PUBLICIZE ITS CURRENT ECONOMIC POSITIONS WHICH ARE EVOLVING IN STEP WITH THE ISRAELI PUBLIC MOOD. SHIMON PERES IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE "MAARIV" NEWSPAPER IN JULY STATED THAT "THE SITUATION OF THE ECONOMY TODAY IS DETERMINED MORE BY MARKETS THAN BY GOVERNMENTS."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REMARK IS FAR FROM THE TRADITIONAL LABOR VIEW ON THE ECONOMY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT, BUT IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL PERCEPTION OF LABOR AMONG THE ELECTORATE.

10. A REVIEW OF LABOR'S POLICY STATEMENTS AND LIKUD'S PRACTICES SUPPORTS RUBIN'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE PARTIES ARE BY AND LARGE IN BASIC AGREEMENT ON FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC ISSUES. LABOR HAS BEEN DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE PROBLEM-RIDDEN HISTADRUT AND KUPAT HOLIM AND APPEARS MORE PRAGMATIC ON ECONOMIC ISSUES THAN IN THE PAST. LIKUD, IF ELECTED, MAY LIKELY ADOPT SOME OF THE REFORMS ARTICULATED IN LABOR'S ECONOMIC PLATFORM. IT THUS APPEARS LIKELY THAT CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICIES WILL NOT SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGE SHOULD EITHER LABOR OR LIKUD FORM A GOVERNMENT OR IN THE EVENT A NEW NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT EMERGES FROM THE ELECTIONS. PICKERING

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ES4

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** NOFORN

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE350126

FILM= D880953-0522

DATE= 26 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= INR/NESA:JBIGUS

OFFICE= ORIGIN INR

TO= INTSUM COLLECTIVE
BEIRUT
TRSY
MULTIPLE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= NOFORN

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= INTSUM 208, OCTOBER 26, 1988 SECRET SECRET

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT, PALESTINIANS, LIBERATION FRONT, POPULA
RESOLUTION, GOVERNMENT REACTION

TAGS= KPAL, PINR, EG, IS, PNC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		
FOIA Exemptions			TS authority to.
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

FEE 12

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>

PAGE 01 STATE 350126
ORIGIN INR-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-00 SS-00 AF-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
MMO-01 IO-19 NEA-06 ARA-00 PM-10 EAP-00 AIT-02
INRE-00 SP-02 C-01 DS-01 P-02 /054 R

DRAFTED BY: INR/NESA:JBIGUS
APPROVED BY: INR/NESA:WEWHITE
INR/NESA:MCUROCHER

-----364261 270112Z /70

P 262253Z OCT 88 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
SECDEF WASHDC/ISA 0000
JCS WASHDC/OJCS/J-5 0000
DIA/DE4 WASHDC
NSC WASHDC 0000
USMISSION USVIENNA
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
USCENCTOM MACDILL AB FL/POLAD
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT/INTAF/FOR POLAD KRUSE
COMSIXFLT
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
NSA FT MEADE MD
USIA WASHDC
NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD

██████████ 350126

NOFORN/NOCONTRACT FOR MBFR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EG, IS, PINR, KPAL
SUBJECT: INTSUM 208, OCTOBER 26, 1988

██████████
██████████
PAGE 02 STATE 350126

USDEL MBFR VIENNA FOR AMBASSADOR
LONDON FOR MILLIKEN
PARIS FOR WINN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN AND FOR MFO CLUVERIUS
DOD/ISA FOR NESA
CINCEUR FOR POLAD
CINCUSNAVEUR FOR INTAF
NSC FOR RODMAN
NSA FOR CHIEF G GROUP
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

--WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS

ARAB STATES: ACCEPTANCE OF
A PALESTINIAN STATE

1. [REDACTED] IF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC)
CONVENES IN NOVEMBER AND DECLARES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, AS NOW APPEARS LIKELY,
MOST ARAB STATES WILL ANNOUNCE THEIR SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH
EGYPT, JORDAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE RESERVATIONS THAT
SUCH A STATE IS WORKABLE, OR DESIRABLE, THEY CANNOT
AFFORD TO APPEAR LESS THAN FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE
PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

EGYPT

2. [REDACTED] PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD PREFER THAT A
PALESTINIAN ENTITY BE ESTABLISHED IN CONFEDERATION WITH
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STATE 350126

JORDAN. BUT THE SIGNALS ARE CLEAR THAT EGYPT WILL
RECOGNIZE WHATEVER MANIFESTATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE THE PNC
MAY ANNOUNCE--INCLUDING A PALESTINIAN STATE. FAILING TO
DO SO WOULD NOT ONLY PUT MUBARAK OUT OF STEP WITH KEY
ARAB ALLIES, BUT WITH HIS OWN POPULATION, WHICH IS LIKELY
TO VOICE STRONG SUPPORT.

3. [REDACTED] FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID SAID ON
OCTOBER 17 THAT THE UN PARTITION RESOLUTION OF 1947
(RESOLUTION 181) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE "BIRTH
CERTIFICATE" OF A PALESTINIAN STATE AS WELL AS OF ISRAEL.

4. [REDACTED] IN THE WAKE OF JORDAN'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM
THE WEST BANK, MUBARAK SAID AS EARLY AS AUGUST 30 THAT
EGYPT WOULD AGREE TO AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE
BASED ON "WISDOM AND ACCURATE CONSIDERATIONS." PLO CHIEF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ARAFAT APPEARS TO HAVE GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO CONSULT MUBARAK ON PLO STRATEGY; ARAFAT PROBABLY IS COUNTING ON THE EGYPTIAN LEADER TO HELP OBTAIN MORE FAVORABLE US AND EUROPEAN REACTIONS.

5. [REDACTED] MUBARAK HAS ARGUED THAT THE PLO MUST TAILOR ITS STATEMENTS TO US AND ISRAELI AUDIENCES AND WAIT UNTIL THE TENSE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAS PASSED. PUTTING OFF THE PNC UNTIL MID-NOVEMBER AND PERHAPS MENTIONING UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 MIGHT REPRESENT THE PLO'S BEST EFFORT TO MEET THOSE CONDITIONS.

JORDAN

6. [REDACTED] KING HUSSEIN HAS PLEDGED TO ACCEPT WHATEVER DECLARATION THE PLO DECIDES TO MAKE ABOUT A PALESTINIAN STATE, A POSITION FOREIGN MINISTER AL-MASRI
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 STATE 350126

REAFFIRMED IN AN OCTOBER 15 INTERVIEW. WITH A LARGE PALESTINIAN POPULATION ON THE EAST BANK, AND HAVING PUBLICLY HANDED OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WEST BANK TO THE PLO, THERE IS LITTLE ELSE FOR HUSSEIN TO DO.

7. [REDACTED] THE PRIVATE JORDANIAN REACTION IS LIKELY TO BE LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC. IN AN OCTOBER 11 MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS SUDDARTH AND PICKERING, PRIME MINISTER RIFA'I SAID THAT DECLARING AN INDEPENDENT STATE BASED ON RESOLUTION 181 REPRESENTED A "MIDDLE GROUND" FOR ARAFAT AND WOULD DO NOTHING TO MOVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE FORWARD.

SAUDI ARABIA

8. [REDACTED] THE SAUDIS WILL RECOGNIZE A PALESTINIAN STATE PROMPTLY; THEY ARE ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL ALLIES OF ARAFAT'S MAINSTREAM PLO, AND A SO ITS MOST RELIABLE FINANCIAL SUPPORTER. AS A KEY ARAB STATE AND ISLAMIC LEADER, SAUDI ARABIA COULD NOT AFORD TO BE SEEN HOLDING BACK FROM SUPPORTING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND THE UPRISING. IN ANY CASE, THE VAGUE DECLARATION THE PLO APPEARS TO HAVE IN MIND WOULD NOT COMMIT THE SAUDIS TO ANY COURSE OF ACTION OTHER THAN A PUBLIC SHOW OF SUPPORT.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SYRIA

9. [REDACTED] LOATHING ARAFAT AND PROBABLY FEARING HE
WOULD GAIN IN STATURE, PRESIDENT ASSAD DOES NOT FAVOR
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 05 STATE 350126

CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. ALSO, THE
SYRIANS ARE CONCERNED LEST THE PLO COUPLE A DECLARATION
WITH SOME FORM OF RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL; A RECENT
EDITORIAL IN THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PRESS ARGUED THIS
WOULD AMOUNT TO CANCELING THE PALESTINE NATIONAL
CHARTER. SHULTZ

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EJSD

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88STATE347937

FILM= D880947-0937

DATE= 25 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= NEA/IAI:JLHIRSCH

OFFICE= ORIGIN NEA

TO= TEL AVIV
JERUSALEM

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= PRESS REPORTS ON DEATH SQUADS: QUERY TO GOI

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DEATH, PRESS COMMENTS, MEETING, PALESTINIANS

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, OPRC, IS, US, (WEIZMAN, STEVE)

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS, FPC/CDR Date: FEB 12

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions _____
 PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
 EO Citations _____

TS authority _____

CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TO S or

9364029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

R

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 STATE 347937
ORIGIN NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 PM-10 PA-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 C-01
PRS-01 P-02 /038 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI:JLHIRSCH
APPROVED BY: NEA:ESWALKER

-----242265 251637Z /48 38

O 251616Z OCT 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] STATE 347937

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, US
SUBJECT: PRESS REPORTS ON DEATH SQUADS: QUERY TO GOI

1. [REDACTED]
2. ON OCTOBER 24, DAS WALKER RAISED WITH ISRAELI DCM ERAN THE REUTERS REPORT DATED LINED JERUSALEM, OCTOBER 23, BY STEVE WEIZMAN REGARDING PALESTINIAN ACCUATIONS THAT ISRAEL IS RUNNING UNDERCOVER DEATH SQUADS AGAINST ORGANIZERS OF THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING. THE WEIZMAN STORY REFERRED TO UNDERCOVER UNITS CODE NAMED "CHERRY" AND "SAMSON". WALKER REQUESTED ERAN TO OBTAIN OFFICIAL GOI RESPONSE AS TO WHETHER THERE IS ANY BASIS TO THESE REPORTS.
4. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO MAKE PARALLEL INQUIRY WITH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL.
5. AS MURPHY WILL BE MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL OF PRESIDENTS OF NATIONAL ARAB-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS ON
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 STATE 347937

OCTOBER 27. ISSUE IS CERTAIN TO BE RAISED. REQUEST RESPONSE BY OPENING OF BUSINESS OCTOBER 27. WHITEHEAD

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E151
R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15211

FILM= D880946-0500

DATE= 25 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
JERUSALEM

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= THE ECONOMY: AN IMPORTANT BUT OVERSHADOWED ISSUE IN THE ISRAELI
ELECTION CAMPAIGN

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 14547, 88 TEL AVIV 14672

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ELECTION, CAMPAIGN, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, POLICY

TAGS= PGOV, ECON, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

S/FPC/CDR Date: FEB 12 1989

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS author: _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	FOIA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or

9364029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15211 01 OF 03 250757Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
EB-00 H-01 EXIM-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03
LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00 PM-10 ITC-01 OPIC-07 PA-01
CEA-01 OMB-01 STR-17 INRE-00 FRB-03 USIE-00 JUSE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 E-01 P-02 T-01
/094 W

-----214522 250811Z /24

R 250750Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1600
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDOC WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15211

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, IS
SUBJECT: THE ECONOMY: AN IMPORTANT BUT OVERSHADOWED
ISSUE IN THE ISRAELI ELECTION CAMPAIGN

REF: A) TEL AVIV 14547, B) TEL AVIV 14672,
C) TEL AVIV 11779, D) TEL AVIV 14992

1. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY

2. THE ISRAELI ECONOMY CURRENTLY IS EXPERIENCING A
MARKED ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
HAS DECLINED. UNEMPLOYMENT HAS JUMPED SHARPLY.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 15211 01 OF 03 250757Z

ISRAEL'S LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CONCERN IS UNDER LEGAL
THREAT OF LIQUIDATION. THE AGRICULTURAL,
EDUCATION, AND HEALTH SECTORS ALL HAVE EXPERIENCED
AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT YEAR. UNIVERSITY
ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE REFUSED TO BEGIN THE ACADEMIC

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

YEAR, CLAIMING INSUFFICIENT GOVERNMENT FUNDING. PUBLIC HOSPITAL STAFFS ARE THREATENING TO STRIKE. THE LOCAL STOCK MARKET IS DEPRESSED. WE EXPECT THE ISRAELI ECONOMY TO EXPERIENCE ONLY MINIMAL GROWTH THIS YEAR.

3. ALTHOUGH THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY HAS EMERGED AS A KEY ISSUE IN THE CAMPAIGN, IT HAS BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY THE PEACE AND SECURITY DEBATE. THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO A DELAY IN THE SCOPE OF THE CURRENT SLOWDOWN BEING PERCEIVED BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC. ALSO, THE EXISTENCE OF THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT HAS DAMPENED DEBATE ON PAST ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE BOTH LIKUD AND LABOR SHARED IN ITS FORMULATION. IN ADDITION, THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN LIKUD AND LABOR ON FUTURE ECONOMIC POLICY IN THAT BOTH PARTIES ARE EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR BUDGETARY RESTRAINT, REDUCED GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY, AND THE OPENING OF THE ISRAELI ECONOMY TO INCREASED COMPETITION.

4. GIVEN THIS GENERAL CONSENSUS, THE DEBATE BETWEEN LIKUD AND LABOR HAS FOCUSED NOT ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT ON THE COMPETENCE OF THE ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP THE PARTIES WOULD PROVIDE. LIKUD ALSO HAS TRIED TO PIN THE PROBLEMS OF THE HISTADRUT'S FALTERING INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES ON THE (LABOR)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15211 01 OF 03 250757Z

"PARTY ECONOMY," IN CONTRAST TO THE LIKUD'S ADVOCACY OF A "FREE ECONOMY." ON THESE ISSUES, LIKUD HAS THE ADVANTAGE OVER LABOR. END SUMMARY.

5. THE ISRAELI ECONOMY CURRENTLY IS IN THE MIDST OF A MARKED ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION DROPPED 3.5 PERCENT IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR, STABILIZED IN THE SECOND QUARTER, AND PROBABLY DROPPED AGAIN IN THE THIRD. UNEMPLOYMENT JUMPED SHARPLY OVER THE SUMMER AND IS NOW PROBABLY RUNNING AROUND 6.5 TO 7.0 PERCENT. THE LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CONCERN IN ISRAEL, WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR ALMOST TEN PERCENT OF GDP, IS UNDER LEGAL THREAT OF LIQUIDATION (REFTEL A). THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE LARGEST BANK IN ISRAEL RECENTLY WERE FORCED TO RESIGN EN MASSE OVER THEIR HANDLING OF A BANKING SCANDAL WHICH HAS SPANNED SEVERAL YEARS (REFTEL B). THE AGRICULTURAL, EDUCATION, AND HEALTH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTORS ALL HAVE EXPERIENCED AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT YEAR CAUSED IN PART BY THE GOVERNMENT'S TIGHT BUDGETARY POLICIES. REAL INTEREST RATES ARE RUNNING AT ABOUT 35 PERCENT. THE LOCAL STOCK MARKET IS DEPRESSED. WE EXPECT THE ISRAELI ECONOMY TO EXPERIENCE ONLY MINIMAL GROWTH THIS YEAR. (REFTEL C).

6. ECONOMIC ISSUES HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZED IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN BY LIKUD AND LABOR, AS WELL AS BY THE SMALL CENTER-SHINUI PARTY. BUT THE GENERAL STATE OF THE ECONOMY TRAILS FAR BEHIND QUESTIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY AS AN ELECTORAL ISSUE.

7. IN PART, THIS IS THE RESULT OF A DELAY IN THE FULL SCOPE OF THE CURRENT SLOWDOWN BEING PERCEIVED BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THE RISE IN UNEMPLOYMENT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 15211 01 OF 03 250757Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15211 02 OF 03 250757Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
EB-00 H-01 EXIM-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03
LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00 PM-10 ITC-01 OPIC-07 PA-01
CEA-01 OMB-01 STR-17 INRE-00 FRB-03 USIE-00 JUSE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 E-01 P-02 T-01
/094 W

-----214510 250812Z /24

P 250750Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1601
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDOC WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

[REDACTED]

SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15211

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, IS
SUBJECT: THE ECONOMY: AN IMPORTANT BUT OVERSHADOWED

STILL HAS AFFECTED ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE
POPULACE; OFFICIALS AT THE TREASURY TELL US THEY
EXPECT REALLY SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF JOB LAYOFFS
WILL OCCUR ONLY AFTER THE ELECTIONS. ALSO, THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AVERAGE ISRAELI STILL TENDS TO JUDGE THE SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN TERMS OF ITS ABILITY TO RESTRAIN INFLATION AND THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN HAS ACTED OVER RECENT MONTHS TO SUPPRESS THE RISE IN THE GENERAL PRICE LEVEL.

8. THE EXISTENCE OF THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15211 02 OF 03 250757Z

HAS TENDED TO DAMPEN DEBATE BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES ON PAST ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE BOTH LIKUD AND LABOR SHARED IN THE FORMULATION OF THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM WHICH CONTINUES TO GUIDE GOVERNMENT ACTION ON THE ECONOMY. LABOR HAS BEEN POINTING OUT THAT THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM WAS INITIATED UNDER PERES' PREMIERSHIP AND WAS PUSHED THROUGH THE CABINET BY LABOR OVER THE OPPOSITION OF A NUMBER OF LIKUD MINISTERS. LIKUD, MEANWHILE, HAS ATTEMPTED TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR ITSELF FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM IN BRINGING INFLATION DOWN FROM OVER 440 PERCENT TO AN ANNUAL RATE OF LESS THAN 20 PERCENT.

9. THERE IS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN LIKUD AND LABOR ON FUTURE ECONOMIC POLICY. THE PLATFORMS OF BOTH PARTIES STRESS BUDGETARY RESTRAINT, REDUCED GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY AND ESPECIALLY IN THE CAPITAL MARKET, AND THE OPENING OF THE ISRAELI ECONOMY TO INCREASED COMPETITION. (THE ECONOMIC PLATFORMS OF THE MAJOR PARTIES WILL BE DISCUSSED IN SEPTEL.) GIVEN THIS CONSENSUS, THE DEBATE BETWEEN LIKUD AND LABOR HAS FOCUSED NOT ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT ON THE QUALITY OF ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP THE PARTIES WOULD PROVIDE.

10. LIKUD HAS BEEN ABLE TO SCORE POLITICAL POINTS AMONG THE POPULACE BY EMPHASISING THE LONG-RUNNING PROBLEMS OF THE HISTADRUT'S "WORKERS ECONOMY". IT HAS ARGUED THAT MISMANAGEMENT RESULTED IN THE CLOSURES AND RESTRUCTURING OF MAJOR HISTADRUT ENTERPRISES AND THAT THIS IS A SAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP A LABOR GOVERNMENT WOULD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15211 02 OF 03 250757Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PROVIDE ISRAEL. THE LIKUD ALSO HAS ASSERTED THAT A NEW LABOR GOVERNMENT WOULD RAID THE PUBLIC TREASURY TO BAIL OUT FAILING HISTADRUT ENTERPRISES. LABOR HAS TRIED TO PARRY THESE THRUSTS, BUT THEY HAVE HAD THEIR EFFECT. DURING THE SUMMER, LABOR TRIED TO DEEMPHASIZE ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE HISTRADUT LABOR FEDERATION, BUT LABOR'S RELIANCE ON HISTADRUT'S ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN MACHINERY PRECLUDED LABOR FROM CONTINUING TO KEEP HISTADRUT'S ACTIVISTS IN THE BACKGROUND (REFTEL D).

11. THE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE HISTADRUT HAVE MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR LABOR TO CRITICIZE THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF MOSHE NISSIM, THE LIKUD MINISTER OF FINANCE. OVER THE PAST YEAR, NISSIM HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN ONE OF THE MOST POPULAR MINISTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT. HIS WILLINGNESS TO BATTLE POWERFUL INTEREST GROUPS IN DEFENSE OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BUDGET HAS MADE HIM A SYMBOL IN ISRAEL OF RESPONSIBLE ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP.

12. NISSIM ALSO HAS BENEFITED FROM A CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC'S EXPECTATIONS REGARDING PROPER GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC ACTIONS; THE REDUCTIONS HE ORDERED THIS MONTH IN SUBSIDIES FOR BASIC COMMODITIES JUST A MONTH BEFORE ELECTIONS WAS ACCEPTED WITH LITTLE COMPLAINT BY A PUBLIC WHICH IN PRIOR YEARS HAD BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL LARGESS IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO ELECTIONS. LIKUD HAS MADE LIMITED USE OF NISSIM IN ITS TELEVISION ELECTION BROADCASTS; LABOR HAS COUNTERED WITH GAD YACOBI, THE MINISTER OF ECONOMICS AND PLANNING. YACOBI SUFFERS, HOWEVER, FROM THE QUITE CORRECT PUBLIC PERCEPTION THAT THE ECONOMICS MINISTRY IS A MARGINAL CABINET PORTFOLIO WITH LITTLE INPUT INTO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV. 15211 02 OF 03 250757Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15211 03 OF 03 250757Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
EB-00 H-01 EXIM-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03
LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00 PM-10 ITC-01 OPIC-07 PA-01
CEA-01 OMB-01 STR-17 INRE-00 FRB-03 USIE-00 JUSE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 E-01 P-02 T-01
/094 W

-----214514 250812Z /24

P 250750Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1602

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDOC WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15211

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, IS
SUBJECT: THE ECONOMY: AN IMPORTANT BUT OVERSHADOWED

ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES. LIKUD HAS IN NISSIM A REAL
POLITICAL ADVANTAGE ON THE ISSUE OF COMPETENCE OF
ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP. STILL, LIKUD HAS SPENT MORE
OF ITS TELEVISION TIME AND PRESS ADVERTISEMENTS IN
ATTACKING THE LABOR-HISTADRUT DUO THAN IN
PRESENTING ITS OWN POLICIES. PICKERING

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E143

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88AMMAN12467

FILM= D880943-0703

DATE= 24 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= AMMAN

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= RR REVIEW A/CDC

SUBJECT= LOCAL MEDIA HIGHLIGHT PAN-ARAB SYMBOLISM . OF 'ARAFAT/MUBARAK/HUS
MEETING IN AQABA

REFERENCE= 88 AMMAN 12430

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DISCUSSION, FOREIGN RELATIONS, MEETING, REPORT

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, EG, JO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		MR Cases Only:	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EU Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY in PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY			TS aut.
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions			

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 AMMAN 12467 01 OF 02 241431Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
PA-01 INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /035 W
-----146564 241614Z /43

O 241423Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2466
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 12467

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, EG, JO
SUBJECT: LOCAL MEDIA HIGHLIGHT PAN-ARAB SYMBOLISM
OF 'ARAFAT/MUBARAK/HUSSEIN MEETING IN AQABA

REF: AMMAN 12430 (NOTAL)

1. (C) SUMMARY. JORDANIAN MEDIA HAVE WARMLY PRAISED THE MUBARAK/'ARAFAT/HUSSEIN MEETING IN AQABA, ALTHOUGH NO DETAILS OF THE TALKS HAVE EMERGED IN PRINT. A BRIEF PRESS STATEMENT BY HUSSEIN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE MEETING. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS, LOCAL REPORTAGE HAS FOCUSED ON THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF THE MEETING AND ON JORDAN'S CONTINUING ROLE-- WITHIN A PAN-ARAB EFFORT--TO PROMOTE THE PEACE PROCESS AND HASTEN CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. REPORTS AND COMMENTARIES IN THE JORDANIAN PRESS HAVE NOT DRAWN AN EXPLICIT CONNECTION BETWEEN THE AQABA TALKS AND THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS, ALTHOUGH THERE IS PRIVATE SPECULATION THAT THE VISIT MAY HELP PERES AT THE POLLS. END SUMMARY.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 AMMAN 12467 01 OF 02 241431Z

2. (U) FEW DETAILS OF HUSSEIN'S OCTOBER 23 AQABA TALKS WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND PLO CHAIRMAN 'ARAFAT HAVE BEEN REVEALED, BUT JORDANIAN MEDIA HAVE HERALDED THE OCCASION IN HYPERBOLIC TERMS AS A "HISTORIC" MOMENT IN ARAB COORDINATION ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EDITORIALS IN ALL NEWSPAPERS HAVE WELCOMED THE VISIT, Q AND SEVERAL CITE THE MUBARAK/ARAFAT SHUTTLE TO AQABA AND BAGHDAD AS ONLY THE BEGINNING OF "A BROADER ARAB EFFORT" TO BOLSTER SUPPORT FOR THE "PALESTINIAN POLITICAL DRIVE FOR NATIONAL RIGHTS."

3. (U) LOCAL NEWSPAPERS ARE FILLED WITH REPORTS AND COMMENTARIES ON THE AQABA MEETINGS, BUT NONE DEPART FROM THE CAUTIOUS OFFICIAL LINE ON THE MEETINGS. WITH STYLISTIC VARIATIONS, ALL EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- JORDAN IS PLEASED TO RENEW DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO, AND TO SEE THE PLO "SHOULDERING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES" IN THE PEACE PROCESS;

-- JORDAN HAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHICH GIVES HUSSEIN AND THE GOJ A ROLE TO PLAY "WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES" IN THE PEACE PROCESS;

-- "JORDAN'S LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK DOES NOT MEAN THAT JORDAN HAS ALSO DISENGAGED FROM OVERALL PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS";

-- MUBARAK DESERVES SPECIAL PERSONAL RECOGNITION FOR HIS ROLE IN FOSTERING INTER-ARAB COOPERATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS (ARAFAT, IN CONTRAST, IS SELDOM MENTIONED BY NAME, ALTHOUGH THE RENEWAL OF HIGH LEVEL GOJ-PLO DIALOGUE IS UNIVERSALLY LAUDED);

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 AMMAN 12467 01 OF 02 241431Z

-- PEACE PROCESS CONSULTATION AMONG THE ARAB STATES-- AIMED AT CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE--WILL CONTINUE BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE NOVEMBER 12 ALGIERS PNC.

HUSSEIN: TALKS ENHANCED "PAN-ARAB ACTION"

4. (U) NO OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWED THE TRIPARTITE TALKS IN AQABA, BUT KING HUSSEIN ISSUED A BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE PETRA NEWS AGENCY. HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE TALKS HAD BOLSTERED "THE SPECIAL, DISTINGUISHED JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONSHIP," AND MADE "A GOOD CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS ENHANCING PAN-ARAB ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S HEROIC STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR NATIONAL AND LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVES." THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT ECHOED HUSSEIN'S FAMILIAR CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE (UNDER UN AUSPICES, AND INCLUDING THE FIVE PERMS AND ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, INCLUDING THE PLO), AND EMPHASIZED THE PLO'S "LEADING ROLE IN ATTAINING A JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT BECAUSE THE PALESTINE QUESTION CONSTITUTES THE CORE OF THE CONFLICT."

MUBARAK AND AL-BAZ: HINTS OF SUBSTANCE, MESSAGE TO ISRAEL

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 AMMAN 12467 02 OF 02 241431Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
PA-01 INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /035 W
-----146615 241615Z /43

O 241423Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2467
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 AMMAN 12467

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, EG, JO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: LOCAL MEDIA HIGHLIGHT PAN-ARAB SYMBOLISM

5. (U) SPEAKING AFTER HIS RETURN TO CAIRO, PRESIDENT MUBARAK CAME CLOSEST TO REVEALING DETAILS OF THE AQABA TALKS. EMPHASIZING THE "VERY GOOD ATMOSPHERE" WHICH PREVAILED BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND THE PLO CHAIRMAN, HE REPORTEDLY STATED THAT "ABU 'AMMAR SAID HE WAS IN FAVOR OF A CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN." WHILE LOCALLY REPORTED EXCERPTS OF HIS REMARKS DO NOT SPECIFY THE KING'S RESPONSE TO THAT PROPOSAL, THE EGYPTIAN LEADER NOTED THAT "KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WILL COOPERATE...FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE LAND AND THE ATTAINMENT OF PEACE." MUBARAK IS QUOTED IN LOCAL MEDIA AS DENYING THAT THE AQABA MEETING WAS CALCULATED EITHER TO HELP PERES OR TO HURT SHAMIR IN THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS, BUT PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR 'OSAMA AL-BAZ DREW AN ELECTORAL MESSAGE FROM THE VISIT: "WE WANT THE ISRAELI VOTER, WHETHER ARAB OR JEW, TO UNDERSTAND WHERE HIS SPECIFIC INTEREST LIES. ...LET HIM KNOW WHEN HE CASTS HIS VOTE THAT THERE IS AN ARAB PARTNER READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 AMMAN 12467 02 OF 02 241431Z

6. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PERCEIVED SUBSTANTIVE CONSEQUENCE, THE JORDANIAN MEDIA HAVE FASTENED ON THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF THE MEETING IN AQABA. THE TONE OF LOCAL NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MEETING ALSO UNDERSCORES THE SENSITIVITY OF RENEWED HIGH LEVEL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOJ AND THE PLO, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE TWO SIDES ACTUALLY SAY TO EACH OTHER. MOREOVER, JORDAN'S MEDIA ARE FULL OF REPORTS ON THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS (MANY LIFTED DIRECTLY FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS), BUT LOCAL REPORTAGE MAKES NO MENTION OF A POSSIBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE AQABA TALKS AND THE IMMINENT ISRAELI ELECTIONS. THERE IS SPECULATION, HOWEVER, THAT THE VISIT WAS ORCHESTRATED BY MUBARAK AT THE REQUEST OF PERES TO HELP LABOR AT THE POLLS.

7. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SUDDARTH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E133

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15031

FILM= D880934-0114

DATE= 20 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
JERUSALEM
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= GAZA WRAP-UP; OCT 13-19

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= VIOLENCE, OCCUPIED AREA, INCIDENT

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PTER, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	S, FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only: _____
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations: _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	_____ TS authorit
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive info		
FOIA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

████████████████████
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15031 01 OF 02 201726Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----346302 201729Z /43

O 201724Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1510
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

████████████████████ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15031

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, PINS, PTER, IS
SUBJECT: GAZA WRAP-UP; OCT 13:19

1. (LOU) SUMMARY. APPROXIMATELY 23 GAZANS AND THREE ISRAELI MILITARY WERE WOUNDED IN INTIFADA VIOLENCE IN THE PERIOD. NO ONE WAS KILLED. THERE WERE TWO GENERAL STRIKES, WHICH THE IDF ANTICIPATED BY IMPOSING CURFEWS ON WIDESPREAD AREAS. LIKUD-SPONSORED BUSES OF ISRAELIS ENTERED GAZA OCT 19 TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST GIVING UP GAZA, BUT THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS. RECENT HAND GRENADE ATTACKS IN GAZA AND ASSASSINATIONS OF "COLLABORATORS," AS WELL AS PLO STATEMENTS ON USE OF ARMS, HAVE PROMPTED STRONG REACTION FROM PM SHAMIR AND DEFMIN RABIN, BUT OPINION IS THAT SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN TACTICS OF INTIFADA VIOLENCE IS NOT LIKELY. END SUMMARY

2. (U) APPROXIMATELY 23 WOUNDED:

-- ON OCT 13, A 10 YEAR OLD BOY (PLACE OF RESIDENCE

████████████████████

████████████████████

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15031 01 OF 02 201726Z

NOT IDENTIFIED) WAS HIT IN THE CHEST WITH A PLASTIC BULLET; A 15 YEAR OLD FROM BAIT LAHYA WAS WOUNDFD.

-- ON OCT 14 AND 15, FIVE GAZANS WERE WOUNDED: TWO FROM RAFAH WERE HIT BY PLASTIC BULLETS WHEN IDF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FORCES DISPERSED ABOUT 100 STONE-THROWING YOUTH;
TWO FROM AL-NASIR NEIGHBORHOOD OF GAZA CITY AND ONE
FROM NUSAIRAT REFUGEE CAMP WERE WOUNDED.

-- ON OCT 16, A YOUTH FROM KHAN YUNIS WAS SERIOUSLY
WOUNDED IN THE EYE WITH A RUBBER BULLET, AND A 16
YEAR OLD FROM SHATI CAMP AND A 14 YEAR OLD FROM
RAFAH WERE WOUNDED.

-- ON OCT 17, BETWEEN EIGHT AND ELEVEN YOUTHS WERE
WOUNDED (REPORTS DIFFER): FOUR WERE WOUNDED IN
RAFAH, THREE IN SHATI CAMP, AND ONE IN KHAN YUNIS.

-- ON OCT 18, A 17 YEAR OLD, REPORTED TO HAVE
INCITED STUDENTS TO LAUNCH DEMONSTRATIONS, WAS
WOUNDED IN NUSAIRAT CAMP.

-- ON OCT 19, A 16 YEAR OLD FROM GAZA CITY WAS
REPORTED SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.

3. (U) TWO IDF SOLDIERS AND ONE BORDER POLICEMAN
WOUNDED:

-- ON OCT 15, TWO IDF SOLDIERS WERE HIT BY STONES
AND SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN AL-NASIR NEIGHBORHOOD OF
GAZA CITY.

-- ALSO ON OCT 15, A BORDER POLICEMAN SUFFERED A
BROKEN HAND IN A STONE-THROWING INCIDENT IN BURAIJ

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15031 01 OF 02 201726Z

CAMP.

4. (U) NONE KILLED:

-- FOR THE THIRD WEEK IN A ROW, NO ONE WAS
REPORTED KILLED IN DIRECTLY INTIFADA-RELATED
VIOLENCE.

5. (U) GENERAL STRIKES:

-- LIKE THE WEST BANK, GAZA OBSERVED GENERAL
STRIKES OCT 14 AND 19, CALLED BY THE UNIFIED
LEADERSHIP AND THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE (HAMAS).

-- THERE ARE CONFLICTING REPORTS THAT A STRIKE HAS
BEEN CALLED FOR OCT 24.

-- A STRIKE IS SET FOR OCT 26.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6. (U) CURFEWS:

-- THE IDF CONTINUES ITS NEWLY-INTRODUCED PRACTICE OF ATTEMPTING TO PREEMPT VIOLENCE ON STRIKE DAYS BY IMPOSING WIDESPREAD CURFEWS. IN ANTICIPATION OF THE OCT 19 GENERAL STRIKE, THE IDF PLACED CURFEWS ON NINE GAZA CAMPS AND TOWNS.

7. LIKUD BUSES "TOUR" GAZA:

-- ON OCT 19, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, SOME 50 BUSES, SPONSORED BY THE LIKUD PARTY, CARRYING ISRAELIS, ENTERED GAZA TO BACK DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL HOLD ON TO GAZA. ALTHOUGH THE BUSES AVOIDED THE CENTER OF GAZA CITY, THEY REPORTEDLY STOPPED AT AN AREA UNDER CURFEW, ON THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15031 02 OF 02 201726Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01
PRS-01 DS-01 .SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----346313 201730Z /43

O 201724Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1511
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15031

E.O. 12356: N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: PHUM, KPAL, PINS, PTER, IS
SUBJECT: GAZA WRAP-UP; OCT 13-19

CITY. THERE WERE APPARENTLY NO SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH AT LEAST ONE OF THE BUS PASSENGERS IS SAID TO HAVE BEHAVED PROVOCATIVELY.

8. [REDACTED] CHANGE IN INTIFADA TACTICS?

-- RECENT HAND GRENADE ATTACKS IN GAZA, THE USE OF FIREARMS IN ASSASSINATIONS OF "COLLABORATORS," AND PROVOCATIVE PLO STATEMENTS ABOUT THE USE OF ARMS IN THE CASE OF A LIKUD VICTORY, HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER INTIFADA VIOLENCE IS HEADED INTO A NEW PHASE. ON OCT 16, PM SHAMIR SAID NO ARABS WOULD SURVIVE IF THEY RESORTED TO FIREARMS. ON THE SAME DAY, DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN SAID ARMS WOULD BE MET WITH ARMS. HOWEVER, RABIN SAID THERE HAD NOT BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE USE OF FIREARMS, A THEME ECHOED BY IDF CHIEF OF STAFF SHOMRON.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15031 02 OF 02 201726Z

-- IN RECENT EMBASSY DISCUSSIONS, TWO GAZA SOURCES ALSO DOUBTED THAT RECENT GAZA HAND-GRENADE ATTACKS WERE ANY MORE THAN ISOLATED INCIDENTS. PICKERING

UNCLASSIFIED

E13

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03487

FILM= D880937-0667

DATE= 21 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK DATA PROJECT STUDY "THE PRICE OF INSURGENCY: CIVIL RIGH
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES"

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS RELEASE, REPORT, OCCUPIED AREA, WEST BANK, HUMAN RIGHTS

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, IS, (SHALEV, CARMEL)

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		S/FPC/CDR	FE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	Date.
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART		TS authority
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions			

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03487 01 OF 02 211404Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /073 W

-----025660 211410Z /47

O 211402Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3807

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03487

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK DATA PROJECT STUDY "THE
PRICE OF INSURGENCY: CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES"

1. THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE DESCRIBES THE
ABOVE-TITLED STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA WHICH WAS RELEASED OCTOBER 18 IN
JERUSALEM. THE AUTHOR, CARMEL SHALEV, IS AN
ISRAELI LAWYER WHO TEACHES AT TEL AVIV
UNIVERSITY. WE ARE POUCHING COPY OF THE STUDY,
WHICH IS SIXTY PAGES LONG, TO NEA/IAI AND HA.

2. BEGIN PRESS RELEASE:

THE WEST BANK DATABASE PROJECT HAS RELEASED A
REPORT ON CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE INTIFADA.
THE REPORT, WRITTEN FOR THE PROJECT BY CARMEL
SHALEV, COVERS THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1987-
-SEPTEMBER 1988. IT IS ONE SEGMENT OF A
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03487 01 OF 02 211404Z

MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
TERRITORIES UNDER INTIFADA NOW BEING PREPARED BY
THE PROJECT FOR ITS 1988 ANNUAL REPORT. THE
REPORT SHOWS A HORRIFYING INCREASE IN THE NUMBER
OF CIVIL RIGHTS INFRINGEMENTS AS A RESULT OF
MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IN THEIR

ATTEMPT TO QUELL THE CIVILIAN UPRISING. THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY OFFICIAL ACTS OF GOVERNMENT (LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL) THAT LEGITIMATE THESE INFRINGEMENTS AND AMOUNT TO A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION COMPELLED US TO RELEASE THE FINDINGS SEPARATELY, WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE ENTIRE 1988 SURVEY.

THE NUMBERS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. OVER 250 PALESTINIAN DEATH CASUALTIES, COMPARED TO 8 IN 1986 AND 22 IN 1987; 2,500 ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION ORDERS, COMPARED TO 37 IN 1986 AND 62 IN 1987; OVER 5,000 INJURED; OVER 18,000 ARRESTS. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN UNDER CURFEWS AND CLOSURES AT DIFFERENT TIMES INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE TOTAL CLOSURE OF THE ENTIRE TERRITORIES FOR 3 DAYS IN MARCH AND AGAIN FOR 4 DAYS IN APRIL.

THE QUALITATIVE CHANGE IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE IDF BEATING POLICY, INTRODUCED IN JANUARY; STRINGENT AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, AS WELL AS CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF MINORS; NEW MEASURES OF COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT, INCLUDING THE SEVERANCE OF INTERNATIONAL UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03487 01 OF 02 211404Z

TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS; AND A PERVASIVE SYSTEM OF BUREAUCRATIC HARASSMENT BY THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (WITH RESPECT TO TAX ENFORCEMENT, UTILITY PAYMENTS, LICENSE RENEWAL, ID CARDS, EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL, AND HEALTH COVERAGE) DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE DEPENDENCY OF THE POPULATION ON ISRAELI AUTHORITIES AND PREEMPT A BOYCOTT ON THEIR SERVICES.

IN ADDITION, THE DYNAMIC OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN ISRAELI SETTLERS AND THE LOCAL ARAB INHABITANTS HAS CONTINUED TO ESCALATE, FINDING EXPRESSION IN VANDALISM AND KILLINGS BY SETTLERS IN THE WAY OF RETALIATION. THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY ALARMING EVIDENCE OF THE APPLICATION OF A DOUBLE STANDARD OF JUSTICE BY MILITARY AND CIVIL COURTS. FOR MERE COMPARISON OF EXTREMITIES, MOUNIRA DAOUD, A 22 YEAR OLD WOMAN INVOLVED IN STONE THROWING IN THE BEITA CLASH BETWEEN

ISRAELI HIKERS AND LOCAL VILLAGERS THAT RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF 2 YOUNG PALESTINIAN MEN AND A 15 YEAR OLD ISRAELI GIRL, WAS ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY, DETAINED PENDING TRIAL FOR 5 MONTHS, AND THEN SENTENCED BY THE NABLUS MILITARY COURT TO AN ADDITIONAL 4 MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, PINHAS WALLERSTEIN, HEAD OF THE SAMARIA REGIONAL COUNCIL, WHO WAS ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE JANUARY SHOOTING TO DEATH OF A 17 YEAR OLD FLEEING FROM A ROAD BLOCK AND CHARGED WITH MANSLAUGHTER IN THE JERUSALEM DISTRICT COURT IN AUGUST, WAS RELEASED ON ONGOING BAIL THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PERIOD.

ONE MAY ALSO NOTE A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03487 02 OF 02 211404Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /073 W

-----025675 211410Z /47

O 211402Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3808

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03487

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK DATA PROJECT STUDY "THE

DISCREPANCY BETWEEN OFFICIAL POLICY GUIDELINES AND THEIR ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION BY SECURITY FORCES IN THE FIELD. THE CONSTANT FLOW OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT EXCESSIVE BRUTALITY INDICATES THAT SUCH EXCESSES HAVE BECOME AN ACTUAL NORM OF BEHAVIOR.

THE SEVERE MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES MUST BE EVALUATED WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF EFFERVESCENT CIVIL DISTURBANCES, EVEN WHERE THERE IS A TENDENCY TO EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF "SECURITY" TO BLUR TERRORIST AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THE CYCLE OF THE CONTINUING VIOLENCE ON THE PART OF THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION AND THE INCREASING VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS CALLS CLEARLY FOR SOME KIND OF POLITICAL SOLUTION BEYOND THE SCOPE AND CAPACITY OF MERE LAW AND ORDER ENFORCEMENT. END PRESS RELEASE.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03487 02 OF 02 211404Z

WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

R (E12)

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV14992

FILM= D880933-0400

DATE= 20 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= HISTADRUT AND ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 14546, 88 TEL AVIV 14114

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ECONOMIC RECOVERY, LABOR UNION, CAMPAIGN

TAGS= KPRP, PGOV, ELAB, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART	_____ TS authority	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____			

9304029

<<<<<<>>>>>> [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 14992 01 OF 03 201256Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 SCL-01 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 MMO-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 ED-04 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INM-07 HHS-04
INRE-00 OPM-01 RP-10 OES-09 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 OIG-04 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /120 W
-----332401 201322Z /40 38

O 201248Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1489

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14992

FOR S/IL, NEA/IAI AND NEA/RA
PASS LABOR FOR ILAB-DAVEY

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP, PGOV, ELAB, IS
SUBJECT: HISTADRUT AND ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS ✓

REF: A) TEL AVIV 14546, B) TEL AVIV 14114, C) TEL AVIV
10993, D) TEL AVIV 9572, E) TEL AVIV 11048

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY

THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (HISTADRUT) IS BOTH
ISSUE AND ACTOR IN ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS. LIKUD USES
HISTADRUT PROBLEMS AGAINST LABOR, WHILE LABOR DRAWS ON
HISTADRUT RESOURCES IN ITS CAMPAIGN, TO THE EXTENT
PERMITTED BY LAW. HISTADRUT WANTS LABOR IN THE NEXT
GOVERNMENT TO SAFEGUARD HISTADRUT'S ECONOMIC
ENTERPRISES, HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AGAINST LIKUD ATTACK. SOME OF THESE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 14992 01 OF 03 201256Z

INSTITUTIONS FACED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN 1988 (REF A,
C AND D). LABOR TRIED TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM HISTADRUT
IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CAMPAIGN, BUT BECAUSE
HISTADRUT PROVIDES MUCH OF LABOR'S (AND MAPAM'S)
CAMPAIGN MANPOWER, THE TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION WAS
QUICKLY RESTORED TO GRACE. DOWN IN THE MOUTH IN JULY,
HISTADRUT OFFICIALS ARE NOW CONFIDENT LABOR WILL DO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ABOUT AS WELL IN THIS ELECTION AS IN THE LAST. END SUMMARY.

3. HISTADRUT AS AN ELECTORAL MACHINE

MORE THAN JUST A LABOR FEDERATION, HISTADRUT CREATED AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO EMPLOY AND CARE FOR WAVES OF JEWISH IMMIGRANTS. IT REMAINS A MAMMOTH, FAR-FLUNG ORGANIZATION. MOST ISRAELIS BELONG TO ITS SICK FUND, UNIONS AND/OR WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION (NA'AMAT). KIBBUTZIM, MOSHAVIM, COOPERATIVES AND OTHER HISTADRUT ENTERPRISES EMPLOY 23 PERCENT OF EMPLOYED ISRAELIS. HISTADRUT INSTITUTIONS OPERATE HOSPITALS, CLINICS, DAY-CARE CENTERS, VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS, RETIREMENT AND NURSING HOMES, SPORTS AND YOUTH CLUBS THROUGHOUT ISRAEL. THE LABOR PARTY AND ITS ALLIES (MAPAM AND INDEPENDENT LIBERALS) SELECT ALL ELECTED AND MANY APPOINTED OFFICIALS OF THESE INSTITUTIONS AND OF MOST LABOR COUNCILS OVERSEEING THESE ACTIVITIES IN EACH TOWN OR REGION. PARTY MILITANTS FILL POLICY JOBS THROUGHOUT THE SYSTEM. AT ELECTION TIME, THESE OFFICIALS AND MILITANTS BECOME CAMPAIGN ORGANIZERS AND WORKERS.

4. CAMPAIGN RESTRICTIONS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14992 01 OF 03 201256Z

CAMPAIGN LAWS FORBID USE OF HISTADRUT INSTITUTION FUNDS AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE CAMPAIGN, BUT NOT PERSONNEL. USE OF SOME OTHER RESOURCES, SUCH AS COMPANY VEHICLES TO GET VOTERS TO THE POLLS, MAY OCCUR. HOWEVER, OUR HISTADRUT SOURCES SAY THEY ARE BEING MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS THIS TIME IN USING RESOURCES FROM HISTADRUT FIRMS; NOT ONLY IS LIKUD WATCHING CLOSELY, BUT THESE FIRMS HAVE PROBLEMS OF THEIR OWN.

5. HISTADRUT AS AN ISSUE

ALTHOUGH PEACE AND THE UPRISING IN THE TERRITORIES ARE THE TOP ELECTORAL ISSUE, SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ALSO PLAY A ROLE. HISTADRUT IS CENTRAL TO MANY OF THEM. LABOR PARTY PHONE SURVEYS SHOWED THAT MEDICAL CARE AND THE FATE OF HISTADRUT ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES WERE MAJOR VOTER CONCERNS. LIKUD'S CAMPAIGN ALLEGES THAT HISTADRUT CONTROLS AND MISMANAGES TOO MUCH OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMY AND SOCIAL SYSTEM. LIKUD ATTRIBUTES PROBLEMS AT KOOR, HEVRAT OVDIM AND KUPAT HOLIM TO THEIR BEING RUN BY A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION CONTROLLED BY A POLITICAL PARTY. ONE LIKUD ELECTION AD IMPLIED THAT MONEY FROM THE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS' PENSION FUNDS HELPS FINANCE LABOR'S CAMPAIGN.

6. HISTADRUT'S PROBLEMS: KUPAT HOLIM

HISTADRUT'S GENERAL SICK FUND (KUPAT HOLIM CLALIT) IS A NATIONAL HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION. IT COVERS FOUR-FIFTHS OF ISRAEL'S POPULATION, OPERATES A THIRD OF ITS HOSPITALS AND MOST LOCAL CLINICS. IT HAS BEEN IN TURMOIL THIS YEAR (REF C). HARD HIT BY ELIMINATION OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES, RISING MEDICAL COSTS AND DEMAND FOR BETTER SERVICE, KUPAT HOLIM IS TRYING TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE SERVICE. IT HAS BEEN CAUGHT BETWEEN DEMANDS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 14992 01 OF 03 201256Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 14992 02 OF 03 201257Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 SCL-01 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 MMO-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 ED-04 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INM-07 HHS-04
INRE-00 OPM-01 RP-10 OES-09 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 OIG-04 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /120 W
-----332431 201322Z /40 38

O 201248Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1490

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14992

FOR S/IL, NEA/IAI AND NEA/RA
PASS LABOR FOR ILAB-DAVEY

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP, PGOV, ELAB, IS
SUBJECT: HISTADRUJ AND ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS

FOR HIGHER PAY BY DOCTORS, NURSES AND OTHER EMPLOYEES
AND THE FINANCE MINISTRY'S POWER TO VETO INCREASES.
FINANCE ARGUES THAT ISRAEL SPENDS ADEQUATE FUNDS ON A
PER CAPITA BASIS FOR MEDICAL CARE BUT THAT WASTE, BAD
PRACTICES AND BAD ORGANIZATION DIMINISH THE FULL IMPACT
OF THAT FUNDING. AFTER STRIKES NEARLY ALL YEAR, AN
AGREEMENT ON EXTRA COMPENSATION FOR A SECOND SHIFT TO
ELIMINATE BACKLOGS WAS FINALLY APPROVED BY THE FINANCE
MINISTRY IN OCTOBER.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7. HISTADRUT'S PROBLEMS: KOOR AND HEVRAT OVDIM

HISTADRUT ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES (HEVRAT OVDIM) ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT A QUARTER OF GNP. THEY INCLUDE KOOR, ISRAEL'S MAJOR INDUSTRIAL CONGLOMERATE. FACED WITH PROBLEMS

PAGE 02 TEL AV 14992 02 OF 03 201257Z

COMMON TO MATURE INDUSTRY IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD, KOOR HAS ALSO BEEN CAUGHT IN A PROFIT SQUEEZE AND GENERAL SLOWDOWN IN ISRAEL'S INDUSTRIAL EXPORT SECTOR, EXACERBATED BY INCREASING OVERVALUATION OF THE SHEKEL AND BY HEVRAT OVDIM'S LEADERSHIP IN IMPROVING WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS AND GENEROSITY IN SEVERANCE PAY. KOOR LOST A QUARTER BILLION DOLLARS IN 1987. IN MAY AND JUNE, HISTADRUT MADE SWEEPING CHANGES IN KOOR MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION. KOOR TOUGHENED ITS APPROACH TO LABOR RELATIONS. HISTADRUT SIMILARLY RESTRUCTURED HEVRAT OVDIM AND ESTABLISHED A JOINT LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE TO REPLACE HISTADRUT'S TRADE UNION DEPARTMENT AS FINAL ARBITER IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT IMPASSES. NEVERTHELESS, IN OCTOBER, BANKERS' TRUST THREATENED TO SUE TO DISSOLVE KOOR (REF A), AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER RESTRUCTURING ARE STILL UNDER WAY.

8. NEW OPTIMISM THAT HISTADRUT WON'T SINK LABOR

IN JULY, THE LABOR PARTY TRIED TO SIDESTEP THE HISTADRUT ISSUE AND GIVE SECRETARY GENERAL ISRAEL KESSAR A LOW PROFILE IN THE CAMPAIGN. HISTADRUT OFFICIALS WERE THEN WORRIED THAT LIKUD WOULD WIN THE ELECTION. THE MOOD CHANGED BY SEPTEMBER. KESSAR'S BLASTS AT PARTY EFFORTS TO KEEP HIM IN THE BACKGROUND (ALTHOUGH NUMBER 4 ON THE LABOR KNESSET ELECTION LIST) HAD EFFECT AND HE WAS BACK IN THE CAMPAIGN. HISTADRUT ACTIVISTS SENSED THAT VOTERS, THOUGH FEARFUL OF JOB LOSS IN HISTADRUT AND OTHER INDUSTRIES AND UPSET AT THE HEALTH CRISIS, SAW HISTADRUT ACTING TO REMEDY ITS PROBLEMS AND GAVE OTHER ISSUES TOP BILLING. IN OCTOBER, THE KUPAT HOLIM IMPASSE WAS RESOLVED, ALTHOUGH PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION REMAINS. BANKERS' TRUST REVIVED THE KOOR ISSUE, BUT THE THREAT TO

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14992 02 OF 03 201257Z

THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND TO THE MANY LIKUD VOTERS WORKING IN KOOR WAS SO GREAT THAT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(OF LIKUD) QUICKLY RALLIED THE GOVERNMENT BEHIND KOOR. HOW WILL KOOR AFFECT THE ELECTION? ONE HISTADRUT SOURCE SAID IT MIGHT COST LABOR ONE KNESSET SEAT, BUT NOT GIVE LIKUD AN EDGE. IN ANOTHER LAST MINUTE DEVELOPMENT, HISTADRUT SIGNED AN INTERIM COST-OF-LIVING AGREEMENT WITH THE MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION GIVING ALL EMPLOYED ISRAELIS A 4.5 PERCENT INCREASE, OR ABOUT 50 PERCENT COMPENSATION FOR THE CPI INCREASE SINCE APRIL, RATHER THAN 70 PERCENT AS UNDER THE EXPIRED AGREEMENT. THIS REMOVED THE THREAT OF ANOTHER POTENTIAL PRE-ELECTORAL CRISIS.

9. DISGRUNTLEMENT AT LABOR PARTY CAMPAIGN TACTICS

ASIDE FROM THE TEMPORARY DECISION TO PUT KESSAR IN THE CLOSET, OTHER LABOR PARTY CAMPAIGN ELEMENTS UPSET MANY IN THE HISTADRUT-LABOR PARTY CAMPAIGN MACHINERY. RATHER THAN TRADITIONAL MASS RALLIES AND DOOR-TO-DOOR CAMPAIGNING, THE LABOR PARTY, ADVISED BY PROFESSIONAL CONSULTANTS, EMPHASIZED THE PERSONALITY OF PARTY LEADER PERES AND USED TELEPHONE SURVEYS TO PINPOINT UNDECIDED VOTERS. DOOR-TO-DOOR CAMPAIGNING WITH THE UNDECIDED IS NOW TAKING PLACE, AND HISTADRUT ACTIVISTS ARE HAPPY TO BE BACK IN THE ACT.

10. PROBLEMS AND MOOD IN THE KEY TEL AVIV AREA

IN BAT YAM, NEAR TEL AVIV, THE LABOR PARTY MAYOR, DUMPED FOR REELECTION, WILL RUN AS AN INDEPENDENT IN THE FEBRUARY MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. HE IS STOPPING MUNICIPAL HISTADRUT AND PARTY ACTIVISTS FROM TAKING TIME OFF TO CAMPAIGN NOW. HISTADRUT ACTIVISTS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY RECRUITING ENOUGH RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERS TO CANVASS THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 14992 02 OF 03 201257Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 14992 03 OF 03 201257Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 SCL-01 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 MMO-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 ED-04 OMB-01 STR-17 SIL-01 INM-07 HHS-04
INRE-00 OPM-01 RP-10 OES-09 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 OIG-04 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /120 W
-----332440 201322Z /40 38

O 201248Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1491

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 14992

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR S/IL, NEA/IAI AND NEA/RA
PASS LABOR FOR ILAB-DAVEY

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP, PGOV, ELAB, IS
SUBJECT: HISTADRUT AND ISRAEL'S ELECTIONS

UNDECIDED. IN TEL AVIV, PARTY LEADER SPEISER LOST IN HIS BID FOR THE KNESSET LIST LAST SPRING AND IS SITTING OUT THE CAMPAIGN. NEVERTHELESS, OUR MAJOR TEL AVIV HISTADRUT CONTACT TELLS US, THE TEL AVIV PARTY BRANCH IS FULLY ACTIVE IN THE CAMPAIGN AND RECRUITING ENOUGH ACTIVISTS TO CANVASS THE UNCOMMITTED NOW AND WORK THE POLLS ON ELECTION DAY. HE SAYS BOTH LABOR AND LIKUD ARE DISCONCERTED BY THE GENERAL APATHY. HE ADDS THAT THE TEL AVIV LABOR PARTY SEES MORE CHANCE OF A NARROW LABOR VICTORY ENABLING LABOR AT LEAST TO MAKE PERES PRIME MINISTER IN ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, THAN OF A LIKUD VICTORY ALLOWING IT TO CHOOSE THE PRIME MINISTER OR FORM A NARROW COALITION.

11. HISTADRUT'S ARABS AND THE ARAB VOTE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 14992 03 OF 03 201257Z

HISTADRUT'S LEADING ARAB, NAWAF MASSALHA (REF E) HAS A SAFE SLOT ON LABOR'S KNESSET LIST. HE HEADS THE PARTY'S CAMPAIGN IN THE ARAB SECTOR, THE FIRST ARAB TO DO SO. HE LEADS ABOUT 200 ARAB EMPLOYEES IN HISTADRUT INSTITUTIONS IN ARAB VILLAGES AND CAN DRAW ON HISTADRUT'S JEWISH OFFICIALS. THEY HOPE HE WILL PARTIALLY OFFSET DEFENSE MINISTER RABIN'S ROUGH HANDLING OF THE UPRISING AND THE DEPARTURE OF PRESENT LABOR ARAB KNESSET MEMBER (DAROUSHE) TO FORM A SEPARATE ARAB PARTY. THEY ARE BETTING THAT MASSALHA AND HIS HISTADRUT ARAB STAFF WILL REDUCE LABOR'S LOSS OF ARAB VOTES, VITAL IN A CLOSE ELECTION.

12. HISTADRUT NEEDS THE LABOR PARTY IN GOVERNMENT

LABOR PARTICIPATION IN THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO HISTADRUT. ALTHOUGH A LIKUD-LED COALITION WITH LABOR IN OPPOSITION WOULD GIVE HISTADRUT'S TRADE UNIONS MORE FREEDOM OF MANEUVER, IT WOULD AGGRAVATE HISTADRUT'S OTHER PROBLEMS. HISTADRUT'S ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES, HEALTH CARE SYSTEM AND PENSION FUNDS WOULD ALL BE VULNERABLE WITH NO LABOR PARTY MINISTERS TO PARRY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BUDGETARY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL MOVES WHICH WOULD WEAKEN THEM FINANCIALLY.

13. BUT NOT EVERYONE IN THE LABOR PARTY AGREES

ALTHOUGH HISTADRUT OFFICIALS FEEL LABOR PARTY PARTICIPATION IN THE NEXT GOVERNMENT IS VITAL FOR HISTADRUT, THERE ARE THOSE IN THE PARTY WHO OPPOSE PARTICIPATION IN A NEW NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT MIGHT BLOCK MOV8MENT TOWARD PEACE. THEY HOPE TO BRING ABOUT NEW ELECTIONS IF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 14992 03 OF 03 201257Z

LABOR IS UNABLE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT LIKUD. MANY IN HISTADRUT FEAR A FIERCE CLASH IN THE PARTY IF THE ELECTION RESULTS MAKE A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT THE ONLY OPTION FOR LABOR PARTICIPATION. PICKERING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E131

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03469

FILM= D880933-0544

DATE= 20 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TALK TOUGH AGAINST USE OF FIREARMS BY PALESTIN

REFERENCE= 88 BEIRUT 1510

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= AUTHORITIES, PALESTINIANS, DISCUSSION, CLAIM, POLICY, LIBERATION
FRONT, ARMS CONTROL

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

FEE 2
Date.

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____
TS authority
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[[[
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03469 01 OF 02 201438Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /090 W
-----336727 201442Z /40

O 201441Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3796
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

[[[SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03469

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TALK TOUGH AGAINST
USE OF FIREARMS BY PALESTINIANS

REF: BEIRUT FBIS NC1510-083588 ✓

1. [[[

2. SUMMARY: ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED
STRONG WARNINGS AGAINST THE USE OF FIREARMS BY
PALESTINIANS, RESPONDING TO RECENT GRENADE
ATTACKS ON IDF FORCES AND SHOOTINGS OF
PALESTINIANS BY OTHER PALESTINIANS. SOME
ISRAELI OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT THE PALESTINIANS
ARE ABANDONNG THE POLICY FOLLOWED THUS FAR IN
THE INTIFADA OF REFRAINING FROM THE USE OF
FIREARMS. WE DOUBT THIS. END SUMMARY.

[[[

[[[

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03469 01 OF 02 201438Z

3. PALESTINIANS HAVE LARGELY AVOIDED USING
FIREARMS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS IN THE INTIFADA,
IN THE REALIZATION THAT "ARMED STRUGGLE" WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

GUNS HAS BEEN A FUTILE POLICY IN THE PAST AND THAT BY REFRAINING FROM THIS, THEY HAVE HELPED BUILD THE "DAVID VS GOLIATH" IMAGE THEY SEEK TO CULTIVATE. ONLY ONE SOLDIER HAS BEEN KILLED BY GUNFIRE, AND WE KNOW OF NO OTHER USE OF GUNS BY PALESTINIANS AGAINST ISRAELIS IN THE INTIFADA.

4. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN FIVE HAND GRENADE ATTACKS--THREE IN THE LAST TEN DAYS--AGAINST IDF FORCES IN GAZA. THE GRENADE ATTACKS, A RECENT GANGLAND-STYLE KILLING OF A PALESTINIAN MUKHTAR FROM QALQILYA WHO WAS REGARDED AS A COLLABORATOR AND LAND SCAM OPERATOR, AND A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO THE PLO'S HANI AL-HASSAN THAT IF SHAMIR WINS THE ELECTIONS PALESTINIANS WILL USE BULLETS INSTEAD OF STONES, HAVE PROVOKED A FLURRY OF WARNINGS FROM ISRAEL OFFICIALS.

5. ISRAELI MILITARY SOURCES WERE QUOTED IN THE PRESS LAST WEEKEND SAYING, "THE USE OF FIREARMS BY PALESTINIANS WILL MEAN A WHOLE NEW BALLGAME. IT WILL, IN FACT, MAKE IT EASIER FOR SOLDIERS TO RESPOND; THEY WILL BE ABLE TO SHOOT BACK."

6. PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR SAID OCT 16 THAT "NOT ONE ARAB WOULD SURVIVE" IF THE RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BEGAN TO USE LIVE WEAPONS. AFTER CRITICISM IN THE ISRAELI PRESS (AL

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03469 01 OF 02 201438Z

HAMISHMAR COLUMNIST ARIE PALGI WROTE OCT 17 THAT SHAMIR'S COMMENTS "SMACKED OF GENOCIDE), SHAMIR'S OFFICE EXPLAINED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS TALKING ABOUT RESPONDING IN KIND ONLY AGAINST PALESTINIANS WHO WERE USING FIREARMS.

7. IDF CHIEF OF STAFF DAN SHOMRON SAID OCT 16 THAT WHILE HE COULD NOT DETECT A DEFINITE SHIFT TO THE USE OF FIREARMS BY PALESTINIANS, THE POSSIBILITY NEED NOT BE RULED OUT. REPLYING IN THE CABINET TO A QUESTION ABOUT HANI AL-HASSAN'S REPORTED REMARKS, SHOMRON SAID THE RESPONSE OF THE IDF WOULD BE MUCH SIMPLER THAN THE PRESENT ONE; THE IDF WAS WELL-TRAINED TO DEAL WITH ARMED ATTACKS. HE ADDED THAT FIREARMS MIGHT BE VIEWED AS THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP THE INTIFADA GOING AND THAT ARMS ARE USED BY SOME FACTIONS WHICH FEAR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THAT THE PLO MIGHT SOON PROPOSE A POLITICAL INITIATIVE.

8. AL-QUDS REPORTED OCT 16 THAT DEFMIN RABIN SAID THAT THE USE OF FIREARMS SHOWS THAT THE INTIFADA HAS STARTED TO WAIN AND THAT ITS ORGANIZERS ARE LOSING CONTROL.

9. A PROMINENT PALESTINIAN JOURNALIST TOLD US OCT 18 THAT THE HAD HEARD BOTH FROM ARAFAT AND THE LATE ABU JIHAD "THROUGH HIS OWN EARS" THAT IT WAS PLO POLICY TO REFRAIN FROM USING FIREARMS AGAINST ISRAELIS IN THE INTIFADA, AND THAT THIS POLICY WILL REMAIN FIRM WHOEVER WINS THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. HE DOUBTED THE RELIABILITY OF THE REMARK ATTRIBUTED TO HANI AL-HASSAN AND PREDICTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THIS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 JERUSA 03469 01 OF 02 201438Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03469 02 OF 02 201438Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02
P-02 T-01 /090 W

-----336732 201442Z /40

O 201441Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3797
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03469

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TALK TOUGH AGAINST

POLICY. (NOTE: THE AL-HASSAN QUOTE, ACCORDING TO REF FBIS REPORT, CAME FROM THE NEWSPAPER AL ITTIHAD, AS REPORTED IN A CLANDESTINE BROADCAST FROM THE "VOICE OF PALESTINE" OCT 15, 1988.) THERE HAVE PRESS REPORTS THAT THE GRENADE ATTACKS IN GAZA WERE BY THE EXTREMIST ISLAMIC JIHAD AND WERE NOT THE WORK OF THE INTIFADA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEADERSHIP. THE BRITISH CG TOLD US THAT ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD THE UK EMBASSY PRIVATELY THAT THEY BELIEVE ISLAMIC ELEMENTS ARE BEHIND THE GRENADE ATTACKS.

10. COMMENT: WE DOUBT THAT THE UNDERGROUND LEADERSHIP OF THE INTIFADA OR THE PLO HAVE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03469 02 OF 02 201438Z

DECIDED TO REVERSE THEIR POLICY AND TO ENCOURAGE THE USE OF FIREARMS. SUCH A SHIFT IN STRATEGY WOULD DO GREAT DAMAGE TO THE UNDERDOG IMAGE THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO CULTIVATE FOR THE INTIFADA, AS AN UNARMED PEOPLES' PROTEST AGAINST A HEAVILY ARMED IDF.

WILCOX

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E205

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03778

FILM= D881012-0551

DATE= 16 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
BEIRUT

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= INDEPENDENCE DAY PASSES QUIETLY IN EAST JERUSALEM; WEST BANK SEA OFF

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3745, 88 JERUSALEM 3621

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= INDEPENDENCE, WEST BANK, PALESTINIANS, COMMEMORATIVE CELEBRAT
KREME

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, PNAT, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	60 Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info		TS =
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03778 01 OF 03 161109Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 DS-01
/098 W

-----152572 161128Z /12

O 161044Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 40300
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03778

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENCE DAY PASSES QUIETLY IN EAST
JERUSALEM; WEST BANK SEALED OFF

REF: A) JERUSALEM 3745, B) JERUSALEM 3621

1. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY

2. THE MASSIVE SECURITY PRESENCE IN EAST
JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK DISCOURAGED
PALESTINIANS FROM TAKING TO THE STREETS IN
CELEBRATION OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
NEVERTHELESS, PALESTINIANS CONGRATULATED EACH
OTHER ON THE STREET AND CELEBRATED QUIETLY IN
HOMES AND OFFICES. IN REMOTE VILLAGES,
CELEBRATIONS APPARENTLY WERE MORE OPEN AND

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03778 01 OF 03 161109Z

DEMONSTRATIVE. RESIDENTS OF NABLUS REPORTEDLY
SET OFF FIREWORKS AND RAISED FLAGS. WHILE FEW
EXPECT THE STATUS QUO ON THE GROUND TO CHANGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SOON, MOST BELIEVE A CHALLENGE HAS BEEN ISSUED TO THE U.S. AND ISRAEL TO RESPOND TO THE OVERTURES MADE IN ALGIERS. IN THE SHORT RUN, THE REJUVENATION OF THE INTIFADA COMBINED WITH ISRAEL'S INCREASED CONFIDENCE IN ITS ABILITY TO DAMP DOWN THE VIOLENCE MAY LEAD TO A PERIOD OF HEIGHTENED CONFRONTATION.

SHOPS OPEN, MASSIVE POLICE PRESENCE

3. NOVEMBER 15, THE DAY PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE WAS PROCLAIMED IN ALGIERS, PASSED QUIETLY IN EAST JERUSALEM. POLICE, BORDER POLICE, AND IDF TROOPS WERE OUT IN FORCE, IN SOME AREAS OUTNUMBERING RESIDENTS AND TOURISTS. UNITS WERE POSITIONED IN THE VICINITY OF MOSQUES, AND PATROLS BLANKETED THE OLD CITY (WHERE THE RED BERETS OF PARATROOPERS WERE IN EVIDENCE) AND EAST JERUSALEM. CONGENOFFS NOTED PATROLS OF 15 POLICEMEN IN BLUE SWEATSHIRTS CARRYING BILLY CLUBS AND TEAR GAS CANNISTERS, ACCOMPANIED BY THREE PADDY WAGONS, SLOWLY WALKING THE STREETS OF THE SALAHEDDIN COMMERCIAL DISTRICT.

4. MOST EAST JERUSALEM SHOPS OPENED, DESPITE RUMORS THE PREVIOUS DAY OF A STRIKE. AN INFORMAL TOUR OF EAST JERUSALEM NEIGHBORHOODS INDICATED THAT APPROXIMATELY NINE OUT OF TEN

████████████████████

████████████████████

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03778 01 OF 03 161109Z

SHOPS OUTSIDE THE OLD CITY WERE OPEN; ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS INSIDE THE OLD CITY WERE OPEN. THERE WERE FEW CUSTOMERS AND FEW PEOPLE ON THE STREETS, BUT THE CITY WAS NOT DESERTED. THE NORMAL CRUSH OF PEOPLE AT THE DAMASCUS GATE WAS GONE, AND A NUMBER OF STREET VENDORS OF VEGETABLES USUALLY CLUSTERED NEAR THE EAST JERUSALEM BUS STATION WERE ABSENT. IN ADDITION, THE WEST BANK WAS SEALED OFF UNTIL MIDNIGHT, PREVENTING MANY FROM COMING TO EAST JERUSALEM.

QUIET CELEBRATIONS

5. DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS FOLLOWING THE DECLARATION FROM ALGIERS (WHICH PALESTINIANS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

COULD HEAR ON VARIOUS ARABIC RADIO STATIONS), PALESTINIAN FLAGS WERE RAISED IN SCATTERED AREAS OF THE CITY. ACCORDING TO A CONGEN FSN, AT 3:00 AM A LARGE FLAG WAS RAISED IN THE SAWAHIEH NEIGHBORHOOD. POLICE SOON REMOVED THE FLAG AND ARRESTED THE OWNER OF THE HOUSE WHERE IT WAS DISPLAYED. MOST FLAGS HAD BEEN REMOVED BY DAYBREAK. REACTION BY PALESTINIAN JERUSALEMITES WAS GENERALLY LIMITED TO HANDSHAKES AND SMILES ON THE STREET AND QUIET GATHERINGS IN HOMES AND OFFICES. AT LEAST ONE AREA GROCERY HANDED OUT FREE SWEETS TO MARK THE OCCASION. INCIPIENT OR POTENTIAL GATHERINGS AND MARCHES WERE QUICKLY BROKEN UP BY SECURITY FORCES. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, POLICE DISPERSED THREE ATTEMPTED PARADES IN THE A-TUR NEIGHBORHOOD ON THE MOUNT OF OLIVES. BRIEF CURFEWS WERE REPORTEDLY IMPOSED THERE AND IN BETHANY, JUST BEYOND THE EASTERN LIMIT OF THE MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY. OTHER REPORTS INDICATE THAT BALLOONS BEARING THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 JERUSA 03778 01 OF 03 161109Z

COLORS OF THE PALESTINIAN FLAG WERE RELEASED AT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03778 02 OF 03 161112Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 DS-01
/098 W

-----152703 161129Z /12

O 161044Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4031
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03778

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENCE DAY PASSES QUIETLY IN EAST
JERUSALEM; WEST BANK SEALED OFF

5:00 PM IN THE BEIT HAINA NEIGHBORHOOD OF
NORTHERN JERUSALEM.

6. THE MASSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF JOY, INCLUDING
SONGS AND FLAGS, CALLED FOR IN LEAFLET NO. 28 OF
THE INTIFADA LEADERSHIP (REF B) DID NOT OCCUR,

UNCLASSIFIED

NO DOUBT DISCOURAGED BY THE MASSIVE SECURITY PRESENCE IN THE CITY. ALTHOUGH CONGEN OBSERVERS THROUGHOUT THE CITY DID NOT DETECT ANY ACTIVITY ON THE HARAM ESH-SHARIF OR IN THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE, THE ANNOUNCED CENTER OF ACTIVITIES, THE NOVEMBER 16 JERUSALEM POST REPORTED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF NATIONALIST INSTITUTIONS, UNIONS, AND CHARITABLE ASSOCIATIONS MET AT AL-AQSA TO READ AND SIGN A COPY OF THE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03778 02 OF 03 161112Z

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. ISLAMIC WAQF OFFICIALS CONFIRMED THAT, ALTHOUGH SECURITY FORCES TURNED AWAY MANY PALESTINIANS WISHING TO ENTER THE HARAM, THEY ALLOWED HANNA SINIORA, SARI NUSSEIBEH, AND OTHER NOTABLES TO ENTER UNMOLESTED AT AROUND 4:30 PM. THE POST ALSO REPORTED PEOPLE DANCING AND SINGING IN THE SQUARE IN FRONT OF THE MOSQUE, BUT OUR OBSERVERS DID NOT OBSERVE SUCH ACTIVITY. RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING NOVEMBER 16 THAT "WHAT WAS SUPPOSED TO HAPPEN TUESDAY WILL HAPPEN WEDNESDAY" BUT, GIVEN THE CONTINUING MASSIVE SHOW OF FORCE IN THE CITY, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EAST JERUSALEMITES WILL TAKE TO THE STREETS.

"WE ARE HAPPY INSIDE"

7. THE MUTED EXTERNAL REACTION MASKED A GENUINE SENSE OF HAPPINESS AND ACCOMPLISHMENT ON THE PART OF MOST EAST JERUSALEMITES. A LOCAL BUSINESSMAN COMMENTED SIMPLY, "WE ARE HAPPY INSIDE." MOST PEOPLE WE TALKED TO BELIEVE THE DECLARATION HAS MAINLY SYMBOLIC VALUE. NONE EXPECTED AN IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION. THEY BELIEVE THE PLO HAS ISSUED A CHALLENGE TO ISRAEL AND THE U.S. TO PROVE THEY ARE PREPARED FOR PEACE. MORE THAN ONE SHOPKEEPER SAID THAT, WHILE THE DECLARATION WAS FOR PALESTINIANS, ACCEPTANCE OF 242 AND 338 "IS FOR THE AMERICANS."

8. THE EAST JERUSALEM ARABIC PRESS GREETED THE DECLARATION WITH BANNER HEADLINES NOVEMBER 15

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03778 02 OF 03 161112Z

AND 16 (SEPTELS). HANNA SINIORA'S OFFICE IN THE AL-FAJR NEWSPAPER WAS A REVOLVING DOOR FOR INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTS COMING TO VIDEOTAPE, RECORD, AND WRITE DOWN HIS COMMENTS. HE STATED THAT THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WAS EVERYTHING HE HAD HOPED FOR AND EXPECTED, AND CALLED THE DOCUMENT "A STEP TOWARD PEACE." HE SAID A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE HAD TAKEN PLACE, A CHANGE MARKED BY THE ACCEPTANCE OF MODERATION BY SUCH OBSTRUCTIONISTS AS GEORGE HABASH AND NAYEF HAWATMEH. IBRAHIM KARAEEN AND RAYMONDA TAWIL OF THE (CLOSED) PALESTINE PRESS SERVICE EXPRESSED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE BALL IS NOW BACK IN THE U.S. COURT AND HOPED FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON.

WEST BANK SEALED--SOME DEMONSTRATIONS REPORTED

9. THE WEST BANK WAS SEALED OFF NOVEMBER 15. ALL REFUGEE CAMPS AND ALL TOWNS EXCEPT RAMALLAH, QALQILYA, AND HEBRON WERE UNDER CURFEW. REPORTS ON THE PALESTINIAN RESPONSE IN THE WEST BANK TO THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ARE SKETCHY. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, DEMONSTRATORS IN NABLUS DEFIED THE CURFEW AFTER SUNDOWN TO SET OFF FIREWORKS, LIGHT BONFIRES, AND SING NATIONALIST SONGS. THE AUTHORITIES RESPONDED BY CUTTING OFF ELECTRICITY TO THE TOWN. (ELECTRICITY REPORTEDLY WAS ALSO CUT OFF IN HEBRON, BUT WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS THERE.) AN AMERICAN REPORTER TOLD US HE HAD OBSERVED NUMEROUS DEMONSTRATIONS AND EVEN PARADES IN SMALL VILLAGES, BUT THAT LARGER TOWNS AND CITIES WERE WELL-CONTROLLED BY THE HEAVY IDF PRESENCE. THIS SOURCE DESCRIBED A JOYFUL PARADE

PAGE 04 JERUSA 03778 02 OF 03 161112Z

IN BIR ZEIT VILLAGE, WITH BANNERS PROCLAIMING "YES TO THE ALGIERS DECLARATION" AND HAPPY CROWDS ON THE STREETS AND BALCONIES. THERE ARE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03778 03 OF 03 161116Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 DS-01
/098 W

-----153003 161129Z /12

O 161044Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 40320
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03778

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENCE DAY PASSES QUIETLY IN EAST
JERUSALEM; WEST BANK SEALED OFF

AS YET NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES FROM THE WEST
BANK.

COMMENT

10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS LIKELY
TO GIVE THE INTIFADA--AND THE PLO--A MUCH NEEDED
SHOT IN THE ARM. IT HAS VISIBLY RAISED MORALE
AMONG ALL SECTORS OF THE POPULATION. MANY
PALESTINIANS, NOT EXPECTING A POSITIVE RESPONSE
FROM ISRAEL, PREDICT AN ESCALATION OF THE
INTIFADA. FATAH IN PARTICULAR WILL PROBABLY
EMERGE WITH ENHANCED PRESTIGE, AND THE ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISTS HAVE LIKELY SUFFERED AT LEAST A
TEMPORARY SETBACK. WE WILL BE WATCHING THEIR
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03778 03 OF 03 161116Z

RESPONSE CAREFULLY.

11. THE SUCCESS OF ITS SHOW OF FORCE IN EAST
JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK IS ALSO LIKELY TO
ENCOURAGE ISRAEL'S BELIEVE IN ITS ABILITY TO
CONTAIN THE INTIFADA BY FORCE. THE STAGE HAS
THUS BEEN SET FOR AN INCREASE IN VIOLENCE OVER
THE SHORT RUN AS RECHARGED PALESTINIANS MEET
INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES.

12. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
CUBBISON

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E204

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

R

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03745

FILM= D881012-0660

DATE= 16 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= TERRITORIES QUIET DURING PNC

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, MARTIAL LAW, MEETING

TAGS= KPAL, KPRP, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, IS, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

W

S/FPC/CDR

Date:

RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE () DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS author:
() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or

9304029

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03745 161223Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /086 W
-----156312 161231Z/10

O 161215Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4033

[REDACTED] JERUSALEM 03745

FOL TEL DTD 14 NOV 88 SENT ACTION ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION QUOTE:

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KPAL, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: TERRITORIES QUIET DURING PNC

REFS: A) FBIS AMMAN JO 102052Z NOV 88,
B) JERUSALEM 3708

1. THE WEST BANK AND EAST JERUSALEM HAVE
WITNESSED RELATIVE QUIET DURING THE FIRST THREE
DAYS OF THE PNC AS A RESULT OF THE IDF'S SHOW OF
FORCE. FOOT AND JEEP PATROLS, BACKED IN SOME
AREAS BY ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND GRAVEL
THROWERS, ARE OUT IN FORCE IN NABLUS, RAMALLAH,
HEBRON, EAST JERUSALEM, AND OTHER WEST BANK
POPULATION AREAS. EAST JERUSALEM SCHOOLS WERE
CLOSED BY THE AUTHORITIES NOVEMBER 12 - 19 AS A
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. THE AUTHORITIES ALSO
SEALED OFF THE WEST BANK NOVEMBER 11 - 13
(TRAVEL WAS PERMITTED NOVEMBER 14), CUT
TELEPHONE LINES, BANNED DISTRIBUTION OF EAST

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03745 161223Z

JERUSALEM ARABIC NEWSPAPERS, AND IMPOSED
PREEMPTIVE CURFEWS ON SUSPECTED TROUBLE SPOTS.
IDF LEAFLETS AND ISRAELI ARABIC TELEVISION
WARNED AGAINST VIOLENCE, THREATENING PRISON AND
FINES FOR VIOLATORS.

2. PRESS REPORTS--SKETCHY BECAUSE OF THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SEALING OF THE TERRITORIES--INDICATE ONLY ONE KILLED (IN JENIN) AND A SMALL NUMBER INJURED IN WEEKEND CLASHES, AS THE WEEKEND OF VIOLENCE FEARED BY SOME WEST BANKERS (REF B) AND CALLED FOR BY A HAMAS LEAFLET ISSUED THROUGH THE MOSQUES NOVEMBER 11 (REF A) DID NOT MATERIALIZE. THE HAMAS LEAFLET ALSO WARNED THE PNC AGAINST RECOGNIZING OR TALKING PEACE WITH ISRAEL. IN A MILITANT CALL TO JIHAD, THE LEAFLET REJECTED "A TRUNCATED STATE" AND TERMED DECLARATION OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE "A STAB IN THE BACK OF THE 'CHILDREN OF THE STONES.'"

3. OLD CITY MERCHANTS ARE UNCERTAIN WHAT TO EXPECT ON NOVEMBER 15, THE DAY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. MANY BELIEVE A STRIKE WILL BE CALLED IN SOLIDARITY WITH ISRAELI ARABS WHO HAVE CALLED A NOVEMBER 15 STRIKE TO PROTEST HOUSE DEMOLITIONS. SOME BELIEVE A LEAFLET WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR "INDEPENDENCE DAY" WILL BE ISSUED BY THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING THIS AFTERNOON (NOVEMBER 14). IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH INSTRUCTIONS, MERCHANTS ARE GENERALLY PLANNING TO OPEN THEIR SHOPS FROM 9:00 AM UNTIL NOON AS USUAL. THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE WILL LIKELY BE THE FOCUS OF THE CELEBRATIONS/

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03745 161223Z

CONFRONTATIONS EXPECTED IN THE LATE AFTERNOON TO COINCIDE WITH THE DECLARATION FROM ALGIERS.
CUBBISON UNQUOTE
CUBBISON

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E193

R

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03733

FILM= D880999-0051

DATE= 10 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION SS

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= EXDIS

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= (OADR)

SUBJECT= THE U.S. AND THE PNC

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, RESOLUTION, APPROVAL, PEACE PLAN, RECOGNITION

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, IS, XF, PLO

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
IN PART

AS/FPC/CDR Date:
MB Cases Only:
EO Citations
TS authority

CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or

9304029

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03733 01 OF 03 101431Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----232232 101433Z /38

O 101427Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4003
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03733

EXDIS
DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PLO, IS, XF
SUBJECT: THE U.S. AND THE PNC

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE PNC WILL ADOPT A DECLARATION OF PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE BASED ON UNGA RESOLUTION 181 OF 1947 THAT WILL FALL FAR SHORT OF CHALLENGING ISRAEL AND WILL NOT EVEN APPROACH OUR CONDITIONS FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. IF THIS LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR IS THE RESULT, IT WILL BE ANOTHER, ALTHOUGH NOT UNEXPECTED, DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH, COMING AFTER THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS, WILL FURTHER CLOUD THE ENVIRONMENT FOR MOVEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IT NEED NOT, HOWEVER, BE A DEAD LOSS, SINCE IT REPRESENTS A SLIGHT, BUT SIGNIFICANT INCHING FORWARD IN PLO DOCTRINE TOWARD RECOGNIZING ISRAEL. WE SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID UNDUE CRITICISM OR CONDEMNATION OF THE PNC'S DECISIONS, SINCE THIS WOULD LIKELY HURT THE MODERATE PALESTINIANS ELEMENTS WHO SEEK FURTHER POLITICAL STEPS AND NEED OUR ENCOURAGEMENT,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03733 01 OF 03 101431Z

ESPECIALLY NOW. END SUMMARY

3. ALL OUR PALEYTINIAN CONTACTS HERE BELIEVE THE PNC, WHICH OPENS NOVEMBER 12, WILL ADOPT A RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT TEXT WHICH RECENTLY APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIVE PORTION OF THIS READS:

-- " WE, THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, REPRESENTED BY THE PNC, DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE SOIL OF PALESTINE, WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL, BASED ON THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S NATURAL RIGHT TO A HOMELAND AND ON UN RESOLUTION 181 FROM 1947." (SEE PARA 13 FOR FULL DRAFT TEXT.)

4. IF, INDEED, THE PNC CAN DO NO BETTER THAN THIS, IT WILL MEAN THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE UPHEAVAL OF THE INTIFADA, JORDAN'S DISENGAGEMENT AND CHALLENGE TO THE PLO, STRONG PRESSURE AND EXPECTATIONS FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD AND PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THE PLO HAS FAILED TO RISE TO THESE CHALLENGES. THE PROPOSED DRAFT IS THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR, AND THE PLO WILL HAVE CONFIRMED THE INABILITY OF ITS MODERATE CENTER AND ARAFAT TO OVERCOME THE HARDLINERS ON ITS PERIPHERY AND THE INABILITY OF THE MODERATE PRAGMATISTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, WHO ARE IN THE MAJORITY HERE, TO MOVE THE PLO DECISIVELY.

5. THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPRESS RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, ACCEPTING 242 OR THE 1967 BORDER MAKES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03733 01 OF 03 101431Z

SUCH A RESOLUTION USELESS, IF NOT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AS A WAY OF GALVANIZING ISRAEL, AND MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD NOW. PALESTINIANS WILL ARGUE THAT ACCEPTANCE OF 181 IS A HISTORIC STEP, SINCE BY EMBRACING IT THEY ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL WHILE ALSO USING IT TO JUSTIFY THE LEGAL EXISTENCE OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. THEY WILL ARGUE, FURTHER, THAT CITING 181 IS NOT INTENDED TO DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE TWO STATES AND THAT, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, EVERYONE KNOWS NEGOTIATIONS MUST START WITH THE 1967 BORDERS.

6. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS, WHO FEAR A PALESTINIAN STATE OF ANY KIND, WILL ANGRILY DISMISS ANY RESOLUTION BASED ON 181 AS AN EFFORT TO TURN BACK THE CLOCK AND AN APPARENT CONFIRMATION THAT PALESTINIANS WANT TO RECLAIM, IF NOT ALL, A LARGE PART OF ISRAEL. THEY WILL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SEE IT AS EVIDENCE THAT THE PLO, WHATEVER EXPLANATIONS ARE GIVEN, IS NO LESS UNACCEPTABLE THAN BEFORE AS A CREDIBLE NEGOTIATING PARTNER.

7. AS AN AMBIGUOUS, LEFT-HANDED SUBSTITUTE FOR CLEAR RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND AS A WAY OF SIDESTEPPING 242, A RESOLUTION BASED ON 181 WILL BE ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF PLO WAFLING IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE ITS INTERNAL RIVALRIES. IT WILL ROB A PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE POSITIVE IMPACT IT MIGHT HAVE IF IT CAME WITHA

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03733 02 OF 03 101433Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----232304 101435Z /38

O 101427Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4004
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03733

[REDACTED]

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PLO, IS, XF
SUBJECT: THE U.S. AND THE PNC

FORTHRIGHT ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL AND 242 AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MOVEMENT ON ENDING VIOLENCE, BEYOND THE CAIRO DECLARATION.

8. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE WILL BE LAST-MINUTE CHANGES IN THE PNC DRAFT, CONFIRMING EARLIER OPTIMISTIC PREDICTIONS THAT THE PNC WOULD TAKE BOLD ACTION; BUT THE SIGNS NOW ARE DISCOURAGING. ONE CLEAR SIGNAL THAT THE MODERATES HAVE ALREADY LOST THE BATTLE FOR A BREAKTHROUGH IS A MESSAGE TO THE PNC SIGNED BY A COMPOSITE GROUP OF PROMINENT NATIONALISTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE MESSAGE CALLS ON THE PNC TO DO NO MORE THAN DECLARE INDEPENDENCE BASED ON 181, ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROPOSED DRAFT, AND IT EXPLICITLY REJECTS 242 (SEE SEPTTEL FOR TEXT). UNTIL RECENTLY, MANY PRO-FATAH NATIONALISTS HERE HAD HIGH HOPES THAT THE PNC WOULD GO FURTHER. ONE INTIFADA LEAFLET POINTEDLY COUNSELLED THE PNC TO MAKE A CLEAR

██████████
██████████
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03733 02 OF 03 101433Z

DECISION, AND SPOKE OF A TWO-STATE SOLUTION BASED ON THE 1967 BOUNDARIES. NOW, THE MODERATES HERE SEEM TO HAVE SUCCUMBED TO THE EMERGING PLO/PNC CONSENSUS. THEY CLAIM THAT A MORE FORTHCOMING PNC STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF GENEROUS PUBLIC COMMENTS IN RECENT MONTHS BY BASSAM ABU SHARIF AND OTHERS IS IMPOSSIBLE, GIVEN THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS RESULTS, WHICH THEY INTERPRET AS THE DISAPPEARANCE OF AN "ISRAELI OPTION" FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE MODERATES HERE ALSO SEEM LESS ABLE THAN BEFORE TO PERSUADE THE PFLP AND OTHER RADICAL MINORITY ELEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES TO BE MORE ACCOMMODATING.

9. NEVERTHELESS, A PNC RESOLUTION LIKE THE PROPOSED DRAFT NEED NOT BE A DEAD LOSS AS AN INGREDIENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS OVER THE LONG RUN. IT WILL BE A PSYCHOLOGICAL STEP OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PALESTINIANS, AND IT MIGHT MOVE THEM IN THE FUTURE TO MORE REALISTIC BEHAVIOR. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE DOES NOT ORDAIN AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE; AND SOPHISTICATED PALESTINIANS KNOW THAT REAL PROGRESS FOR THEM WILL DEPEND ON POLITICAL FORMULAS THAT WILL DRAW THE ISRAELIS INTO NEGOTIATIONS AND MAKE THE PLO MORE ACCEPTABLE IN THE EYES OF THE U.S. AND EUROPE. INDEED, HAVING

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLARED INDEPENDENCE, THE PLO LEADERSHIP MAY BE EXPOSED TO INCREASING PRESSURE TO DELIVER.

10. ALSO, A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE COULD BE USEFUL IF THE PALESTINIANS CAN USE IT TO PUT ASIDE THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH SELF

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03733 02 OF 03 101433Z

DETERMINATION. BY DECLARING INDEPENDENCE AS A UNILATERAL ACT OF SELF DETERMINATION, THE PLO COULD, IF IT CHOSE IT, MORE EASILY DROP ITS DEMAND TO ISRAEL AND THE U.S. THAT WE ACCEPT SELF DETERMINATION AS A CONDITION TO FURTHER PALESTINIAN CONCESSIONS.

11. THE REFERENCE TO 181 IN A PNC DECLARATION WOULD BE IN FACT A STEP FORWARD IN THE TORTURED DOCTRINE OF THE PLO. IT SUPERSEDES, DE FACTO, THE PALESTINIAN CHARTER BY ACCEPTING THE UN PARTITION RESOLUTION THAT LEGITIMIZED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL AS WELL AS THE CONCEPT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. ALTHOUGH ANY POSITIVE IMPACT OF THIS ON ISRAEL NOW WILL BE OVERWHELMED BY THE GEOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS OF 181, IT CREATES A NEW FOUNDATION ON WHICH PALESTINIAN PRAGMATISTS COULD BUILD IN THE FUTURE FOR A CLEAR ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL AND NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON 242.

12. HOW SHOULD THE U.S. REACT TO A PNC DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THIS KIND? WHILE WE SHOULD NOT STRAIN TO FIND VIRTUE IN THE RESULTS OF THE PNC, WHICH FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WILL BE MOST UNSATISFACTORY, WE SHOULD, ON THE OTHER HAND, AVOID UNDUE CRITICISM OR

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03733 03 OF 03 101433Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----232315 101435Z /38

O 101427Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4005
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03733
[REDACTED]

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPAL, PLO, IS, XF
SUBJECT: THE U.S. AND THE PNC

CONDEMNATION. JUST AS ISRAELIS ARE FACING NEW POLITICAL CONVULSIONS AS THEY TRY TO SORT OUT THEIR FUTURE, SO ARE THE PALESTINIANS. THE MODERATE, PRAGMATIC ELEMENTS, WHO ARE A SIGNIFICANT FORCE IN THE PLO AND WHO REPRESENT THE MAJORITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, NEED OUR ENCOURAGEMENT. THEY LOOK FOR AND REACT POSITIVELY TO ANY SIGNAL OF U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT. THEREFORE, IN REACTING TO THE PNC, WHILE RESTATING OUR VIEWS, WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO SUSTAIN THOSE WHO ARE STILL TRYING TO MOVE THE PLO AND THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD OR AT LEAST TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST THE RADICALS. OUR SUPPORT FOR THE MODERATES IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT NOW, AS ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS SEEM TO BE ENTERING AN EVEN MORE TROUBLED CHAPTER.

13. FULL TEXT OF PROPOSED PNC DRAFT, WHICH WAS PRINTED IN LOCAL HEBREW AND ARAB-LANGUAGE PAPERS FOLLOWS:

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03733 03 OF 03 101433Z

BEGIN TEXT: WE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, REPRESENTED BY THE PNC, DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE SOIL OF PALESTINE WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL AND THAT BASED ON THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S NATURAL RIGHT TO A HOMELAND AND ON U.N. RESOLUTION 181 FROM 1947.

THE PLO IS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH ARAB AND ISLAMIC SUMMITS, ESPECIALLY THE FEZ SUMMIT.

THE PLO DEMANDS FROM SISTER AND FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRIES AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FROM THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, TO WORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS, RELEVANT TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AND THE GENEVA AGREEMENT.

THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) ANNOUNCES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE AND STRESSES THAT THE CONFLICT CAN BE SOLVED BY INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS AND THROUGH AN ACTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, IN WHICH THE PLO PARTICIPATES ON EQUAL GROUNDS. END TEXT.
WILCOX

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

E91

R

UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Classification *** [redacted]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV16165

FILM= D880994-0593

DATE= 09 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [redacted]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= FORMATION MANEUVERING - NOV. 8

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 16009

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESIDENT, CONSULTATION, SCHEDULE, POLICY, ELECTION, NEGOTIATION

TAGS= PGOV, IS, (HERZOG, CHAIM)

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXEMPT	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	_____ TS authority _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info	Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as [] S or	
PA Exemptions _____	Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to () S or	

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 16165 01 OF 03 091035Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /075 W
-----127471 091121Z /12

P 091031Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2025
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 16165

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: FORMATION MANEUVERING - NOV. 8

REF: TEL AVIV 16009

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HERZOG STARTED CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTY REPRESENTATIVES ON NOV. 7. MEANWHILE, LIKUD IS SEEKING THE BACKING OF A RIGHT/RELIGIOUS KNESSET MAJORITY TO SUPPORT THE NAMING OF SHAMIR TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. LABOR, FOR ITS PART, IS TRYING TO DEVELOP A BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST LIKUD BY RECRUITING ONE OF THE LARGER RELIGIOUS PARTIES (MOST LIKELY SHAS). THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTIES HAVE SO FAR REFUSED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO EITHER LIKUD OR LABOR. IN ADDITION, SHAMIR AND HIS CONFIDANTS ARE ACTIVELY PUSHING THE MESSAGE SHAMIR WOULD PREFER A BROAD GOVERNMENT (ON HIS TERMS) WITH LABOR RATHER THAN DEPEND ON THE EXTREME RIGHT AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES. BUT THIS MAY BE A PLOY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 16165 01 OF 03 091035Z

UNDECLARED RELIGIOUS PARTIES TO COMMIT TO SHAMIR RATHER THAN HAVE TO MAKE THE BEST DEAL THEY CAN LATER AS PARTNERS IN A BROAD GOVERNMENT. FOR NOW, SHAMIR IS FOCUSED ON GAINING THE OPTION OF A RIGHT/RELIGIOUS MAJORITY COALITION, WHICH WOULD ALSO GIVE HIM THE UPPER HAND SHOULD HE DECIDE LATER TO INVITE LABOR TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JOIN A BROADER GOVERNMENT UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY.

PRESIDENT'S CONSULTATIONS

3. PRESIDENT HERZOG BEGAN "INFORMAL" CONSULTATIONS WITH LIKUD, LABOR AND TEHIYA ON NOV. 7. HERZOG NOTED DURING THE MEETINGS THE CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A "BROAD GOVERNMENT," I.E., LIKUD AND LABOR, AND RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A BROAD GOVERNMENT WHOSE MANDATE WOULD BE TO CHANGE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM. LIKUD REPLIED THAT SHAMIR, IF NAMED AS FORMATEUR, WOULD ACT TO ESTABLISH A STABLE AND BROAD GOVERNMENT. TEHIYA ALSO ADVOCATED THE APPOINTMENT OF SHAMIR. LABOR PROPOSED THAT PERES BE GIVEN THE NOD.

4. HERZOG WILL MEET WITH THE CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY ON NOV. 8; WITH HADASH, MOLEDET, AND AGUDAT ISRAEL ON NOV. 9; AND WITH DEGEL HATORAH, CENTER-SHINUI, DAROUSHA'S DEMOCRATIC ARAB PARTY, MAPAM, TZOMET, AND THE PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE ON NOV. 10. SHAS HAS DELAYED MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN ORDER TO CONSULT WITH ITS COUNCIL OF TORAH SAGES FIRST.

LIKUD PARTY CONTACTS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 16165 01 OF 03 091035Z

5. LIKUD'S NEGOTIATING TEAM MET WITH AGUDAT ISRAEL, WHICH EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR A WRITTEN LIKUD COMMITMENT TO PASS "WHO IS A JEW" LEGISLATION PLUS 2 DEPUTY MINISTER POSITIONS FOR THE PARTY. SHAMIR AND SHARON ALSO WERE SAID TO HAVE MADE TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH RABBI SHACH, THE PATRON OF SHAS AND DEGEL HATORAH, TO SEEK HIS INFLUENCE IN BRINGING THE TWO PARTIES OVER TO LIKUD. SHAMIR IS ALSO BELIEVED TO BE SEEKING A MEETING WITH SHAS' OTHER PATRON, RABBI OVADIA YOSEF. (LIKUD INFIGHTING ALSO CONTINUED WITH DAVID LEVY SHARPLY ATTACKING SHARON FOR CONDUCTING "PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES BEHIND THE BACK OF LEVY'S NEGOTIATING TEAM. SHARON ARGUED THAT HE ACTED WITH SHAMIR'S KNOWLEDGE AFTER LEVY'S TEAM FAILED TO ACHIEVE RESULTS.) THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY ANNOUNCED IT WOULD PROPOSE SHAMIR AS PRIME MINISTER BUT WOULD ASK HIM TO INVITE LABOR TO JOIN ON THR BASIS OF "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ARABS AND CONTINUATION OF SETTLEMENTS (I.E., TERMS LABOR ASSERTS ARE UNACCEPTABLE).

6. RAFUL EYTAN OF TZOMET ANNOUNCED HE WOULD BACK SHAMIR AS FORMATEUR, BUT ALSO SUGGESTED BRINGING IN LABOR AS A JUNIOR PARTNER IN A LIKUD-LED GOVERNMENT. LIKUD AND TEHIYA ALSO DISCUSSED PORTFOLIOS, WITH TEHIYA SEEKING TWO MINISTRIES AND CHAIRMANSHIPS OF THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON SETTLEMENTS (FOR YUVAL NEEMAN) AND ON IMMIGRATION (FOR GEULA COHEN). MOLEDET'S REHAVAM ZE'EV TOLD ASSOCIATES LIKUD WAS PREPARED TO GIVE HIM THE POST OF DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER. LIKUD DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER RONI MILO TOLD US LIKUD WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM GIVING ZE'EV THE POSITION.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 16165 02 OF 03 091036Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /075 W
-----127514 091122Z /12

P 091031Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2026
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 16165

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: FORMATION MANEUVERING - NOV. 8

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LABOR PARTY CONTACTS

7. PERES, RABIN AND KNESSET FACTION LEADER RAFI EDRI MET LATE NOV. 7 WITH RABBI OVADIA YOSEF AND SHAS' LEADERSHIP TO CONVINCING THEM TO BACK PERES' FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT. IN EARLIER MEETINGS, LABOR REPORTEDLY SOUGHT TO GAIN SHAS SUPPORT BY OFFERING 4 PORTFOLIOS (INTERIOR, HOUSING, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, AND LABOR/SOCIAL WELFARE) PLUS A SHARP INCREASE IN FUNDING FOR PARTY-RELATED INSTITUTIONS. LABOR HAS ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH DEGEL HATORAH, WHICH APPEARS TO BE SUPPORTING ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT (WITH SHAMIR AS PRIME MINISTER, PERES AS FOREIGN MINISTER AND RABIN AS DEFENSE MINISTER).

8. INCOMING LABOR MKS YOSSEI BEILIN AND MICHA GOLDMAN BOTH TOLD US LABOR'S PROSPECTS FOR WINNING OVER ONE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 16165 02 OF 03 091036Z

OF THE LARGE RELIGIOUS PARTIES AND THUS FORMING A BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST A NARROW LIKUD GOVERNMENT WERE NOT VERY GOOD. BEILIN SAID LIKUD'S CHANCES WERE "MUCH BETTER."

INTERNAL TENSIONS IN LABOR

9. A RABIN NOV. 4 COMMUNIQUE REJECTING A LINK BETWEEN THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE JERICHO TERRORIST INCIDENT WAS SEEN AS AIMED AT PERES, WHO HAD MADE THE ASSOCIATION. THIS WAS THE FIRST RECENT PUBLIC DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO. RABIN ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT LABOR SHOULD LOOK AT THE "REAL REASONS" FOR THE ELECTION OUTCOME. STILL, RABIN'S BLAST DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE START OF A CAMPAIGN AGAINST PERES. (PERES AND RABIN, FOR EXAMPLE, MADE A POINT OF MEETING TOGETHER WITH SHAS LEADERS ON NOV. 7.) MEANWHILE, LABOR'S "SHILUV" CIRCLE, HEADED BY MK MICHA HARISH AND INCLUDING MANY MID-LEVEL PARTY ACTIVISTS, CALLED ON THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PARTY'S FAILURE IN THE ELECTION TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. SHILUV ALSO ADVOCATED LABOR'S GOING INTO THE OPPOSITION. LABOR'S EXECUTIVE IS SCHEDULED TO MEET NOV. 10. THE CRITICISM PERES FACES AT THE MEETING WILL BE AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF WHETHER SENIOR PARTY PERSONALITIES ARE PREPARED TO ACT AGAINST HIM. IN BEILIN'S VIEW, THE FRUSTRATION IN THE PARTY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTION OUTCOME WAS UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO PERES' OUSTER.

DOES SHAMIR WANT A GOVERNMENT WITH LABOR?

10. SHAMIR REPORTEDLY SAID DURING TALKS WITH OTHER
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 16165 02 OF 03 091036Z

PARTY LEADERS THAT HE PREFERRED AS BROAD A GOVERNMENT AS POSSIBLE AND THAT HE HAD NOT GIVEN UP HOPE ON BRINGING LABOR IN (ON HIS TERMS, I.E., NO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, ETC.). DEPUTY MINISTER RONI MILO ALSO TOLD US NOV. 7 THAT SHAMIR PREFERRED TO LEAD A BROAD GOVERNMENT (WITH NO ROTATION) INCLUDING LABOR MINISTERS RATHER THAN BE DEPENDENT ON A NARROW COALITION BASED ON THE EXTREME RIGHT AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES. TODAY'S HAARETZ NEWSPAPER ALSO CARRIED A FRONT-PAGE ARTICLE QUOTING A "SHAMIR CONFIDANT" (MOST PROBABLY MILO) MAKING THE SAME POINTS. MINISTER OF LABOR KATZAV ALSO PUBLICLY HINTED LIKUD WOULD PREFER TO BRING LABOR INTO A NEW GOVERNMENT.

11. THE MESSAGE THAT SHAMIR AND CO. ARE SENDING, THAT SHAMIR WOULD LIKE TO BRING LABOR INTO A GOVERNMENT (ON HIS TERMS), CAN SERVE SHORT AND LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVES. IN THE SHORT-TERM, THE MESSAGE COULD RESTRAIN RELIGIOUS AND RIGHTWING PARTY DEMANDS BY SUGGESTING SHAMIR HAS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A NARROW GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, OFFERING TO BRING IN LABOR MIGHT MAKE IT EASIER FOR SOME OF THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTIES TO SUPPORT LIKUD FORMATION OF A BROAD GOVERNMENT. OVER THE LONGER TERM, IF SHAMIR IS IN A POSITION TO FORM A NARROW GOVERNMENT, HE WOULD ALSO BE WELL-POSITIONED TO BRING IN LABOR ON HIS TERMS.

WHICH WAY WILL SHAS GO? WHICH WAY AGUDA?

12. INTERNAL DECISION MAKING IN SHAS AND AGUDA IS MURKY. SHAS LEADERS LIKE INTERIOR MINISTRY DIRGEN RABBI DERI, DEPUTY SOCIAL WELFARE MINISTER RAPHAEL
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 16165 03 OF 03 091036Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /075 W
-----127475 091122Z /12

P 091031Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2027
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 16165

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: FORMATION MANEUVERING - NOV. 8

PINHASI AND INCOMING MK RABBI YAIR LEVY PREFER AN ALLIANCE WITH LABOR. BUT OTHER SHAS INFLUENTIALS ARE SWAYED BY THE PARTY'S VOTERS PREFERENCE FOR LIKUD. MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO YITZHAK PERETZ AND INCOMING MKS RABBIS ARYE GAMLIEL AND YOSEF AZRAN REPORTEDLY ARE INCLINED TO LIKUD. RIVALRY BETWEEN DERI AND PERETZ ADDS ANOTHER TWIST TO THE PROCESS OF SHAS' DETERMINATION OF ITS POLITICAL PREFERENCE. SHAS' DECISION WILL BE FINALLY ORCHESTRATED IN ITS COUNCIL OF TORAH SAGES, LED BY RABBI OVADIA YOSEF. FOR ITS PART, AGUDA'S DECISION-MAKING IS COMPLICATED BY THE INFLUENCE OF THE U.S.-RESIDENT LUBAVITCHER RABBI, WHOSE PERSONAL SUPPORT CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO AGUDA'S RISE FROM 2 TO 5 SEATS IN THE ELECTION. WHILE SOME AGUDA LEADERS LIKE MK MENACHEM PORUSH PREFER LABOR, THE LUBAVITCHER RABBI HOLDS HAWKISH VIEWS STRONGLY AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF LABOR. AGUDA SEEMS A LIKELY RECRUIT FOR LIKUD.

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



PAGE 02 TEL AV 16165 03 OF 03 091036Z

PICKERING



NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E190

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03711

FILM= D880995-0046

DATE= 09 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= PALESTINIAN ACADEMICIAN ANALYZES THE - "AQABA SUMMIT"

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, SUMMIT MEETING, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, DEMONSTRATION
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

TAGS= KPAL, PBTS, IS, JO, (ABDUL-HADI, MAHDI)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY

EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PART

DENY

DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

IS, FPC, CDR _____ Date: FEB 13 1989

MR Cases Only: _____

EO Citations _____

TS authority _____

CLASSIFY, as S or

DOWNGRADE TS to S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[[[>>>]]]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03711 01 OF 03 091318Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01
/087 W

-----135264 091343Z /46

R 091316Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3987
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

[[[REDACTED]]] SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03711

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN ACADEMICIAN ANALYZES THE
- "AQABA SUMMIT"

1. [REDACTED] SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN
ARTICLE BY DR. MAHDI ABDUL-HADI, PRESIDENT OF
THE PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (PASSIA), A JERUSALEM
THINK-TANK. ABDUL-HADI SPENT A YEAR AT HARVARD
AND FORMERLY WORKED FOR CROWN PRINCE HASSAN IN
AMMAN, BUT HAS SINCE BROKEN WITH JORDAN AND
CONSIDERS HIMSELF A MAINSTREAM PRO-FATAH
NATIONALIST. IN HIS ARTICLE, HE PRESENTS THE
AQABA SUMMIT AS A HOPEFUL "NEW CHAPTER" IN
PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS WHICH MEANS
THAT JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS WILL COOPERATE,
FOLLOWING THE JULY DISENGAGEMENT DECISIONS FROM
WHICH THERE WILL BE NO RETREAT, ON A POLITICAL

[[[REDACTED]]]
[[[REDACTED]]]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03711 01 OF 03 091318Z

SOLUTION VIA A PALESTINIAN STATE THAT WOULD LEAD
TO CONFEDERATION. HE CLAIMS THE COOPERATIVE
PRINCIPLE SET AT THE SUMMIT MEANS THAT
PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN WILL NOT BE "JORDANIZED"
AND THAT PALESTINIANS WILL NOT USE FINANCIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEVERAGE TO DAMAGE JORDAN'S ECONOMY. FINALLY, HE DESCRIBES THE SUMMIT AS A MESSAGE TO ISRAEL THAT THERE IS A PALESTINIAN PARTNER IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND A CLEAR PALESTINIAN OPTION PUT FORTH BY THE PLO THAT COULD FREE ISRAELIS FROM THEIR "NIGHTMARE OF INSECURITY." ABDUL-HADI'S ARTICLE IS A SYNTHESIS OF THE MODERATE, PRO-FATAH PEACE POSITION WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE MAINSTREAM LEADERSHIP HERE. IT WAS WRITTEN BEFORE THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS WHEN PALESTINIANS STILL HOPED FOR A LABOR PARTY VICTORY. A GLOOMY ABDUL-HADI TOLD US THE OTHER DAY THAT THE OPTIMISM EXPRESSED IN HIS ARTICLE IS NOW LESS JUSTIFIED IN VIEW OF THE ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS. END SUMMARY

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT:

AQABA: AN ARAB FORUM FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCES
BY MAHDI ABDUL-HADI
EAST JERUSALEM

IN PREPARATION FOR CONVENING THE HISTORIC PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS ON NOVEMBER 12, PLO CHAIRMAN YASSERE ARAFAT WENT HIMSELF OR SENT EMISSARIES TO ALMOST EVERY MAJOR WORLD CAPITAL FOR CONSULTATIONS, LEAVING THE MOST SENSITIVE AND CRITICAL ONE, AMMAN, FOR LAST.

████████████████████
████████████████████
PAGE 03 JERUSA 03711 01 OF 03 091318Z

ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 22 CHAIRMAN ARAFAT AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT HELD THE LONG-EXPECTED MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN AT THE ROYAL PALACE IN AQABA. WHAT DID THE THREE LEADERS HOPE TO ACHIEVE IN THAT MEETING, AND WHAT IS ITS MESSAGE FOR THE INTIFADA, THE PNC, AND ISRAEL?

FOR THE PALESTINIANS, THE AQABA FORUM SIGNALLED AN OPEN TRUCE WITH THE JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT'S POLICIES AND PRACTICES, A PALESTINIAN TRUCE NOT TO CONFRONT OR CONTRADICT THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE DISENGAGEMENT, BUT ACCEPTING, WELCOMING, AND PROMOTING IT AND STRESSING THAT THERE IS NO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. ARAFAT WANTED THE AQABA MEETING IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE AMMAN TO SUPPORT THE HISTORIC RESOLUTIONS THAT WILL COME

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OUT OF THE PNC: THE DECLARATION OF PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE, THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE DRAFTING OF A POLITICAL PROGRAM, AND FINALLY, ENDORSEMENT OF THE CONFEDERATION THESIS BETWEEN PALESTINE AND JORDAN. THIS MEANS, FROM A PALESTINIAN PERSPECTIVE, THAT JORDAN HAS REAFFIRMED THAT THE PLO IS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE. IT MEANS ALSO THAT THE DISENGAGEMENT MUST REMAIN JORDAN'S OVERALL STRATEGY AND SHOULD NOT BE MISREAD AS IN INTERIM POLITICAL TACTIC. AND FINALLY, AQABA SIGNALS THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN MUTUAL INTEREST IN PROMOTING THE INTIFADA'S GOAL OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03711 02 OF 03 091319Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 .SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01
/087 W

-----135267 091343Z /46

R 091316Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3988
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

[REDACTED]

SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN ACADEMICIAN ANALYZES THE
- "AQABA SUMMIT"

TO THE PALESTINIANS LIVING IN THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, THE AQABA FORUM FILLED AN URGENT NEED FOR REASSURANCE, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE MIDDLE CLASS BUSINESSMEN AND THOSE WHO OPPOSED THE DISENGAGEMENT, THAT A NEW CHAPTER IN PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS IS BEING DRAFTED, AND THAT THEIR AGGREGATE RIGHTS IN THE LAND WHERE THEY RESIDE WILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED AS A RESULT OF THE JULY 31 DISENGAGEMENT. NEITHER SHOULD THEY HAVE ANY FEAR OF ATTENDING THE PNC MEETING IN ALGIERS. THE PRESENCE OF PNC MEMBERS FROM JORDAN, WHO ACCOUNT FOR ALMOST A THIRD OF THE TOTAL SEATS IN THE PNC, IS ESSENTIAL. JUDGING BY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, THEY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03711 02 OF 03 091319Z

ARE EXPECTED TO ENDORSE ARAFAT'S POLITICAL PROGRAM. IT WAS DUE TO THEIR PRESENCE THAT THE PNC IN 1984 MEETING IN AMMAN WAS ABLE TO CONVENE A QUORUM DESPITE THE BOYCOTT OF THE OPPOSITION CAMP, THEN LED BY HABASH, HAWATMEH AND JIBRIL. IT WAS DUE ALSO TO THEIR SUPPORT THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP SUCCEEDED IN 1985 IN ENDORSING THE FEBRUARY 11 ACCORDS WITH JORDAN. AND FINALLY, THE AQABA FORUM SENDS A MESSAGE TO ALL THE PALESTINIANS IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN, WHO HAVE TRADITIONALLY RESISTED ASSIMILATION, THAT THERE IS A HALT TO THE "JORDANIZATION" POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE AMMAN GOVERNMENT WHICH CAME AS A RESULT OF THE DISENGAGEMENT.

FOR JORDANIANS, THE AQABA FORUM MEANT THAT AMMAN IS NOT ISOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE DISENGAGEMENT BUT IS BACK IN A LEADING ROLE IN A NEW GEOPOLITICAL PACT WITH CAIRO AND BAGHDAD, A PACT THAT EMBRACES THE PLO AND WHICH WILL NOT BE TORPEDOED BY SYRIA. JORDAN, FURTHERMORE, STRENGTHENS ITS POSITION THAT THERE WILL BE NO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, THAT THE INTIFADA WILL REMAIN CONFINED TO ITS PRESENT TERRITORY, AND THAT A NEW CHAPTER IN THE PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONSHIP WILL OPEN, BASED ON

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT, AND ON AN EQUAL FOOTING, TO REACH THE STAGE OF CONFEDERATION. IN THIS, WE CAN SENSE THE INFLUENCE OF MRS. THATCHER, WHO MET WITH KING HUSSEIN LAST MONTH AND WHO IS KNOWN TO SUPPORT CONFEDERATION.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03711 02 OF 03 091319Z

THERE IS ANOTHER URGENT NEED, AND THAT IS TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN JORDANIANS THAT BY HAVING PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO BACK ACTIVE ON THE JORDANIAN POLITICAL SCENE, AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION IS AT HAND TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE SUDDEN DEVALUATION OF THE JORDANIAN DINAR. IF THE DINAR DROPS FURTHER, JORDAN WILL FACE A DISASTER. MONEY TRANSFERS THROUGH JORDANIAN BANKS FROM PALESTINIANS ABROAD TO THEIR RELATIVES, WHICH ACCOUNT FOR A FULL THIRD OF JORDAN'S LIQUIDITY, STOPPED IN THE WAKE OF THE DISENGAGEMENT. BUT IF THE PALESTINIANS COME BACK POLITICALLY, SO WILL THEY ECONOMICALLY.

FOR THE EGYPTIANS, THE AQABA FORUM SHOWED THAT EGYPT IS GENUINELY SUPPORTIVE OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS. EGYPT HAS RETURNED TO THE ARAB FAMILY IN A LEADING ROLE, AND CAIRO IS RETURNING A FAVOR TO JORDAN, WHO INITIATED THE WELCOME BACK TO THE ARAB HEARTH. EGYPT UNDERScoreD A STRONG BACKING FOR THE PALESTINIANS CAUSE WHILE ENCOURAGING ARAFAT PERSONALLY TO GO ON WITH HIS PLANS AND NOT GIVE UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE PALESTINIAN OPPOSITION CAMPS. FINALLY, EGYPT RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO WASHINGTON'S URGING TO WORK FOR NORMALIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN ARAB RIVALS (SUCH AS CHAIRMAN ARAFAT AND KING HUSSEIN) AND TO MAINTAIN ITS POTENTIAL AS A INTERMEDIARY FOR PLO-AMERICAN NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS.

THERE IS A MESSAGE TO BE READ FROM AQABA BY ALL ISRAELIS: THERE IS INDEED AN ARAB PARTNER FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT AT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. AMMAN, CAIRO, AND THE PLO CALL ON ISRAELI VOTERS TO CAST THEIR BALLOTS FOR REASON,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 JERUSA 03711 02 OF 03 091319Z

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03711 03 OF 03 091320Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12
USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01
/087 W

-----135270 091344Z /46

R 091316Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3989
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03711

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PBTS, KPAL, IS, JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN ACADEMICIAN ANALYZES THE
- "AQABA SUMMIT"

AND FREE THEMSELVES FROM THE NIGHTMARE OF
INSECURITY. STABILITY AND SECURITY FOR THE
JEWISH STATE IS IN EMBRACING THE PALESTINAIN
PEACE OPTION. THIS OPTION WAS OUTLINED CLEARLY
IN ABC TV'S NIGHTLINE INTERVIEW WITH KING
HUSSEIN ON OCTOBER 21. IT WAS OUTLINED ALSO IN
THE STATEMENT OCTOBER 23, IN AQABA, BY MUBARAK'S
CHIEF POLITICAL ADVISER, OSAMA AL BAZ. A THIRD
DEMONSTRATION OF A HAND EXTENDED IN PEACE IS THE
LATEST STATEMENTS OF CHAIRMAN ARAFAT FROM
BAGHDAD: "WE WILL CONTINUE NOT TO USE ARMS, NOT
OUT OF WEAKNESS BUT TO SHOW THE ISRAELI CITIZENS
THAT THE WAY OF PEACE AND NOT OF WAR AND
BLOODSHED IS BEST FOR OUR CHILDREN."

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03711 03 OF 03 091320Z

THE PEACE OPTION WAS PUT FORTH ALSO OCTOBER 25
IN THE UNPRECEDENTED DIRECT PLO APPEAL FROM
TUNIS TO ISRAELI JEWISH AND ARAB VOTERS: "THE
ISRAELI VOTER HAS A HISTORIC CHANCE TO HELP
DEFINE THE SHAPE OF HIS DESTINY...ON NOVEMBER 1
HE IS NOT GOING TO AN ORDINARY POLL, HE IS GOING
TO A POLL ON THE SHAPE OF THE FUTURE. EITHER HE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ELECTS WAR OR HE ELECTS PEACE."

THE AQABA ARAB FORUM IS A MAJOR, DIRECT RESPONSE TO MOSCOW'S REQUEST TO THE PLO AND JORDAN THAT THE KEY TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION IS BASED ON THE CONFEDERATION THESIS AND O ACCEPTING ISRAEL AS A REALITY. IT IS ALSO A MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON THAT ARABS, ALONG WITH THE PLO, ARE WILLING TO PURSUE THE CONFEDERATION THESIS, AND PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IT IS AN ANSWER ALSO TO THE WASHINGTON-MOSCOW UNDERSTANDING. WHAT IS NEEDED NOW, AFTER AQABA, IS AN ISRAELI LEADERSHIP TO ACCEPT THE ARAB-PALESTINIAN PEACE OPTION: THE INTIFADA PEACE MESSAGE, AN UNARMED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO AND BUILD A NEW PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, A MESSAGE FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE BASED ON COEXISTENCE BETWEEN TWO STATES.

MAHDI ABDUL-HADI
OCTOBER 25, 1988

DR. MAHDI ABDUL-HADI, A PALESTINIAN ACADEMICIAN, IS THE PRESIDENT OF PASSIA, THE PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03711 03 OF 03 091320Z

AFFAIRS, BASED IN EAST JERUSALEM.

END TEXT.
WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E184

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV16009

FILM= D880984-0701

DATE= 05 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= GOVERNMENT FORMATION UPDATE - NOV. 4

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 15904

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ELECTION RESULTS, POLITICAL PARTY, MINISTER, COALITION GOVERNMENT

TAGS= PGOV, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____	
PA Exemptions _____	

[Handwritten initials]

IS/PPC/CDR	Date: _____
MR Cases Only:	_____
EO Citations	_____
_____ TS authority =	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

9304029

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 16009 051104Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 SCL-01 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /079 W

-----306624 051119Z /22

O 051101Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1952
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] TEL AVIV 16009

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMATION UPDATE - NOV. 4

REF: TEL AVIV 15904

FINAL ELECTION RESULTS; NO CHANGES

1. AFTER COMPLETING THE COUNT OF THE SOLDIERS VOTE, THE KNESSET CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMITTEE RELEASED THE FINAL ELECTION RESULTS ON NOV. 4: LIKUD - 40 SEATS; LABOR - 39 SEATS; SHAS - 6 SEATS; NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY - 5 SEATS; AGUDAT YISRAEL - 5 SEATS; CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT - 5 SEATS; HADASH - 4 SEATS; TEHIYA - 3 SEATS; MAPAM - 3 SEATS; TZOMET - 2 SEATS; MOLEDET - 2 SEATS; CENTER/SHINUI - 2 SEATS; DEGEL HATORAH - 2 SEATS; PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE - 1 SEAT; AND DEMOCRATIC ARAB PARTY (DAROUSHA) - 1 SEAT. CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THE SOLDIERS VOTE DID NOT SHIFT A SEAT OR TWO TO THE RIGHT.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 16009 051104Z

PRESIDENT TO START FORMATION TALKS ON MONDAY

2. ISRAEL RADIO REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT HERZOG WILL BEGIN HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH KNESSET FACTION REPRESENTATIVES ON NOV. 7.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FORMATION CONTACTS BETWEEN PARTIES

3. THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY AND MOLEDET REPORTEDLY TOLD LIKUD NOV. 3 THEY WILL RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE ASK SHAMIR TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. LIKUD'S NEGOTIATING TEAM PLANS TO MEET AGAIN WITH SHAS ON NOV. 4, AGUDA AND DEGEL HATORAH ON NOV. 6, AND TEHIYA AND TZOMET ON NOV. 7. FOR ITS PART, LABOR WILL MEET AGAIN WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES AND ITS ZIONIST LEFT SMALL PARTY ALLIES EARLY IN THE WEEK.

SIGNS OF UPRISING IN LABOR

4. DIRECT PUBLIC CRITICISM OF PERES IS BEING HEARD FROM SECOND-ECHELON PARTY ACTIVISTS, AS WELL AS GENERAL CRITICISM IN THE PARTY FOR LABOR'S FAILED CAMPAIGN AND ITS CURRENT FORMATION STANCE. AT A NOV. 3 MEETING OF THE PARTY'S "YOUNG GENERATION" CIRCLE, WHICH INCLUDES SEVERAL INCOMING MKS, MAYORS AND HISTADRUT OFFICIALS, CALLS WERE MADE FOR PERES TO RESIGN FROM THE PARTY CHAIRMANSHIP. INCOMING MK RAANAN COHEN (ANTI-PERES INDEPENDENT) AND UNSUCCESSFUL KNESSET CANDIDATE YITZHAK ELIASHIV (RABIN SUPPORTER) CALLED FOR PERES' DEPARTURE AND FORMATION OF A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT WITH RABIN AS DEFENSE MINISTER.

████████████████████
████████████████████
PAGE 03 TEL AV 16009 051104Z

5. IN CONTRAST, PARTY DOVES (INCLUDING SEVERAL EXISTING AND INCOMING MKS) ARE SAID TO BE SEEKING ASSURANCES FROM PERES THAT HE WILL NOT JOIN LIKUD IN A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. MEANWHILE, MK ORA NAMIR (A DOVISH RABIN SUPPORTER WHO HAD DISPUTED PERES' WATERING-DOWN OF THE LABOR PLATFORM PLANK ON RELIGIOUS ISSUES) CALLED ON PERES TO CEASE THE "POINTLESS AND DAMAGING" MEETINGS WITH THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTIES. SHE REPORTEDLY IS WORKING TO CONVENE THE PARTY EXECUTIVE TO DISCUSS "A COMPLETE OVERHAUL" OF THE PARTY. SOME MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE ALSO SEEKING A MEETING OF THAT BODY TO DISCUSS THE ELECTION OUTCOME.

6. RESPONDING IN A NOV. 4 PRESS INTERVIEW TO HIS CRITICS, PERES STATED HE WILL CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO WIN OVER THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTIES. IF HE DOES NOT SUCCEED, LABOR WILL GO INTO THE OPPOSITION. PERES ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT HE PLANS TO CONTINUE HIS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEADERSHIP OF LABOR.

7. COMMENT: SENIOR PARTY CRITICS OF PERES CONTINUE TO AVOID DIRECT CRITICISM OF HIM ALTHOUGH THEY CRITICIZE LABOR'S FAILED CAMPAIGN (WHICH WAS RUN BY PERES). RABIN HAS KEPT HIS SILENCE, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL KNOWN RABIN SUPPORTERS HAVE ATTACKED PERES. THOSE IN THE SECOND-ECHELON OF THE PARTY ARE LESS WILLING TO HOLD THEIR FIRE. MANY BARELY RESTRAINED THEIR CRITICISM OF PERES DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND NOW ARE GOING PUBLIC WITH RELISH. PICKERING

[REDACTED]

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

ET88

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03701

FILM= D880990-0929

DATE= 08 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP, NOVEMBER 1 - 7, 1988

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3692

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= HOLIDAY, ARREST, MEETING, MURDER

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date: FEB 12
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE	IN PART	_____ TS authority to	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
FOIA exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____			

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03701 01 OF 03 081356Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00
RP-10 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /094 W
-----044001 081412Z/41

O 081355Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3976
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03701

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, NOVEMBER 1 - 7, 1988

REF: JERUSALEM 3692

1. SUMMARY: THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WERE SEALED OFF NOVEMBER 1, ISRAELI ELECTION DAY, AND NOVEMBER 2, THE ANNIVERSARY OF BALFOUR DECLARATION. SOLDIERS RAIDED SEVERAL WEST BANK VILLAGES AND ARRESTED RESIDENTS TO PREEMPT PROTESTS IN ADVANCE OF THE NOVEMBER 12 PNC MEETING. FOUR PALESTINIANS WERE REPORTED SHOT AND KILLED AND AN IDF SOLDIER WAS STABBED TO DEATH. 55 PALESTINIANS WERE WOUNDED. ONE ISRAELI CIVILIAN WAS INJURED BY A STONE, THREE OTHERS SUFFERED BURNS FROM MOLOTOV COCKTAILS, AND A SOLDIER WAS INJURED BY A BRICK. FOUR HOMES WERE DEMOLISHED AND ANOTHER WAS SEALED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03701 01 OF 03 081356Z

FOR SECURITY REASONS. MORE THAN 100 OLIVE TREES WERE UPROOTED. EXTENDED CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON SEVEN LOCATIONS. A GENERAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES NOVEMBER 2. END SUMMARY.
2. FIVE KILLED, 60 WOUNDED

NOVEMBER 1

THREE ISRAELI PASSENGERS SUFFERED BURNS AFTER A MOLOTOV COCKTAIL HIT THEIR CAR IN EAST JERUSALEM. SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A PALESTINIAN YOUTH AT THINNABEH, NEAR TULKAREM. TWO OTHERS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED IN CLASHES IN NABLUS AND ANOTHER WAS WOUNDED IN KUFR MALIK, NEAR RAMALLAH.

NOVEMBER 2

ON A GENERAL STRIKE DAY MARKING THE 71ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION, SOLDIERS FATALLY SHOT A PALESTINIAN YOUTH FOLLOWING CLASHES IN QALQILYA, AND LATER WOUNDED HIS MOTHER. ANOTHER PALESTINIAN WAS ALSO SHOT AND WOUNDED. PALESTINIANS SOURCES SAID THAT SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED 10 PALESTINIANS IN CLASHES IN NABLUS AND TULKAREM. ONE ISRAELI SOLDIER WAS WOUNDED AND HOSPITALIZED AFTER BEING HIT BY A BRICK DROPPED ON HIM DURING CLASHES IN NABLUS.

NOVEMBER 3

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED A PALESTINIAN YOUTH DURING CLASHES IN NABLUS' CASBAH AND TWO OTHERS AT NEARBY BALATA REFUGEE CAMP. AT IDNA, NEAR HEBRON, SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS. ISRAELI POLICEMEN FIRED RUBBER BULLETS AND WOUNDED UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03701 01 OF 03 081356Z

TWO PALESTINIANS AFTER A POLICE BULLDOZER DEMOLISHED A MEMORIAL ERECTED FOR A LOCAL YOUTH KILLED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO AT JABAL MUKABBER IN SOUTH JERUSALEM.

NOVEMBER 4

SETTLERS FROM QARNEI SHOMRON ERECTED ROADBLOCKS ON THE NABLUS-QALQILYA ROAD, STONED ARAB CARS AND INJURED ONE PALESTINIAN YOUTH. SETTLERS FROM GINAT SHOMRON AND QARNEI SHOMRON WENT TO QALQILYA AND TRIED TO TAKE REVENGE AGAINST ARABS WHO HAD STONED AN ISRAELI CAR EARLIER AND LIGHTLY INJURED AN ISRAELI WOMAN.

NOVEMBER 5

SOLDIERS OPENED FIRE AT STONE THROWERS IN RAMALLAH AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS. ANOTHER PALESTINIAN WAS WOUNDED IN BETHLEHEM, TWO IN TULKAREM, THREE IN SILWAD AND TWO IN BALATA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR

NABLUS.

NOVEMBER 6
SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED ONE PALESTINIAN AND
WOUNDED FOUR OTHERS DURING A RAID ON KUFR YASID
VILLAGE, NEAR NABLUS. IN THE CLASHES THAT ERUPTED
DURING THE YOUTH'S FUNERAL, TWO MORE PALESTINIANS
WERE WOUNDED. ANOTHER PALESTINIAN WAS SHOT AND
WOUNDED AT ASSIRA SHAMALIYA, NEAR NABLUS.

NOVEMBER 7
DURING AN IDF RAID AT KUFR SALEM, NEAR NABLUS,

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03701 02 OF 03 081357Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00
RP-10 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /094 W
-----044032 081413Z /41

O 081355Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3977
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03701

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, NOVEMBER 1 - 7, 1988

WHILE ALL THE MEN HAD GONE OUT TO PICK OLIVES, SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED A PALESTINIAN WOMAN AND WOUNDED NINE OTHERS. IN THE OLD CITY OF NABLUS, SOLDIERS SHOT AT STUDENTS DEMANDING THE OPENING OF WEST BANK SCHOOLS AND WOUNDED FOUR OF THEM. AT MOSHAV MESU'A, IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, ABOUT 30 KMS. NORTH OF JERICHO, AN ARAB YOUTH FROM TAMMUN VILLAGE, NORTH EAST OF NABLUS, FATALLY STABBED AN IDF SOLDIER. (THIS BRINGS THE NUMBER OF ISRAELI DEATHS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA TO 8.) THE ASSAILANT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SHOT AND KILLED BY AN ISRAELI RESERVIST. (REFTEL)

3. BEEFED UP FORCES ANTICIPATE DISTURBANCES
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03701 02 OF 03 081357Z

AUTHORITIES SEALED OFF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES NOVEMBER 1, ELECTION DAY, AND NOVEMBER 2, THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION. SOLDIERS BLOCKED PASSAGE TO AND FROM ISRAEL AND PREVENTED MOVEMENT BETWEEN DISTRICTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE BRIDGES WITH JORDAN WERE ALSO CLOSED. JOURNALISTS WERE ONLY ALLOWED IN WITH AN ARMY ESCORT.

THE IDF HAS CONVERTED SCHOOLS IN SEVERAL TOWNS AND VILLAGES INTO TEMPORARY BARRACKS AS PART OF ITS INCREASED DEPLOYMENT INTENDED TO CURB UNREST IN ADVANCE OF NEXT WEEK'S MEETING OF THE PNC. ON NOVEMBER 6, SOLDIERS RAIDED SEVERAL WEST BANK VILLAGES TO PREEMPT PLANNED PROTESTS, SETTING UP ROADBLOCKS AND DESPATCHING INCREASED PATROLS IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS. THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARE EXPECTED TO BE CLOSED AND JOURNALISTS BARRED ENTRY DURING ALL OR PART OF THE PNC SESSION. (SEPTTEL)

4. PALESTINIAN HOMES AND ORCHARDS RAZED

AUTHORITIES ARRESTED, NOVEMBER 3, FOUR PALESTINIANS SUSPECTED OF KILLING A SUSPECTED COLLABORATOR OCTOBER 6 AT BURQA, NEAR NABLUS, AND DISCOVERED AN ARMS CACHE IN THEIR POSSESSION.

LATER, SOLDIERS DESTROYED THE HOMES OF THREE OF THE SUSPECTS AND SEALED OFF THE HOME OF THE FOURTH. KARNEI SHOMRON SETTLERS UPROOTED 30 OLIVE TREES AT NEIGHBORING KUFR LAQIF NOVEMBER 4, AFTER TELEPHONE LINES TO THEIR COMMUNITY WERE CUT. AT BIDYA, WEST OF NABLUS, NOVEMBER 7, SOLDIERS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03701 02 OF 03 081357Z

UPROOTED ABOUT 100 OLIVE TREES FOLLOWING TWO MOLOTOV COCKTAIL ATTACKS IN THE AREA. ON THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 7, IDF BULLDOZERS IN TAMMUN DEMOLISHED THE HOME OF THE PALESTINIAN WHO HAD EARLIER STABBED TO DEATH AN ISRAELI SOLDIER AT MASU'A.

5. CURFEWS

THE CURFEW IMPOSED ON JERICHO AND THE SURROUNDING REFUGEE CAMPS OCTOBER 30 AFTER MOLOTOV COCKTAILS WERE THROWN AT AN ISRAELI BUS WAS LIFTED ON NOVEMBER 3, AFTER 5 DAYS.

ON NOVEMBER 4, AUTHORITIES LIFTED THE CURFEW IMPOSED ON BEIT SAHOUR, AFTER 5 DAYS.

THE CURFEW ON QALQILYA, IMPOSED AFTER DISTURBANCES ON NOVEMBER 1, WAS LIFTED ON NOVEMBER 6, AFTER 5 DAYS.

A NUMBER OF CURFEWS WERE STILL IN EFFECT ON NOVEMBER 7: RUJAYB, NEAR NABLUS - 9 DAYS; AZZEH REFUGEE CAMP IN BETHLEHEM - 22 DAYS; BURQIN VILLAGE, NEAR JENIN - 18 DAYS (THE RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SURRENDER A NUMBER OF VILLAGE YOUTHS WANTED BY THE ARMY, AND VILLAGERS WERE ALLOWED TO HARVEST THEIR OLIVES); KUFR MALIK - ABOUT 50 DAYS OF COMPLETE CLOSURE.

6. OTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES

THE IDF HAS HELD ABOUT 85 ARAB OWNED VEHICLES AT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03701 03 OF 03 081357Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00
RP-10 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /094 W
-----044042 081413Z /41

O 081355Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3978
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03701

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, NOVEMBER 1 - 7, 1988

THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL IN RUJAYB VILLAGE SINCE
DISTURBANCES OCTOBER 30. ELECTRICITY TO THE
VILLAGE HAS BEEN CUT SINCE THAT DATE.

7. GENERAL STRIKE

A GENERAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED THROUGHOUT THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA NOVEMBER 2.
WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

File

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15904

FILM= D880977-0228

DATE= 03 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= GOVERNMENT FORMATION MANEUVERING BEGINS

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 15763

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= RELIGIOUS GROUP, REQUEST, LEGISLATION, POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION,
COALITION GOVERNMENT, INTERIM GOVERNMENT

TAGS= PGOV, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE () DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

IS/FPC/CDR

Date.

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority
() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<>>>
[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15904 01 OF 02 031628Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 SCL-01 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /079 W

-----142023 031633Z /47

O 031626Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1893
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15904

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMATION MANEUVERING BEGINS

REF: TEL AVIV 15763

1. SUMMARY: LIKUD AND LABOR ARE COURTING THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES, THE KEY BUILDING BLOCK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NARROW COALITION. THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES HAVE MADE A SHOW OF KEEPING THEIR OPTIONS OPEN BUT LIKUD CLEARLY HAS THE INSIDE TRACK. DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL RELIGIOUS PARTY REQUESTS FOR PORTFOLIOS AND RELIGIOUS LEGISLATION, THERE IS LITTLE SUGGESTION LIKUD AND THE RELIGIOUS CANNOT WORK THESE ISSUES OUT. LIKEWISE, LIKUD AND THE SMALL RIGHTWING PARTIES APPEAR ABLE TO AGREE ON ENOUGH TO FORM A BASIS FOR COOPERATION. SHAMIR AND PERES ARE NOT INCLINED TO CONSIDER ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT (NUG) AT THIS TIME. THE SOLDIERS VOTE WILL BE COUNTED BY NOV. 4 AND OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS WILL BE PUBLISHED AFTERWARDS. PRESIDENT HERZOG MAY BEGIN FORMATION

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 TEL AV 15904 01 OF 02 031628Z

CONSULTATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF KNESSET FACTIONS EARLY NEXT WEEK. INTERNAL LABOR PARTY CRITICISM OF ITS FAILED ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS RISING BUT SO FAR WITHOUT PUBLIC ATTACKS ON PERES. END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FINAL ELECTION RESULTS NOT YET READY

2. THE KNESSET CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMITTEE INFORMED US THE COUNTING OF THE SOLDIERS VOTE WILL BE COMPLETED NOV. 4. WE ANTICIPATE THAT ANY CHANGES WILL BENEFIT THE RIGHT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LEFT AND FURTHER IMPROVE SHAMIR'S CHANCES TO FORM A RIGHT/RELIGIOUS COALITION. MEANWHILE, OVERALL ELECTIONS RESULTS REMAIN AS REPORTED IN REFTEL. ALTHOUGH THERE IS AN OUTSIDE CHANCE THE OFFICIAL RESULTS MAY BE PUBLISHED AS EARLY AS NOV. 4, IT IS MORE LIKELY THEY WILL APPEAR NEXT WEEK.

FORMATION: THE PRESIDENT

3. PRESIDENT HERZOG SPOKE "INFORMALLY" TO SHAMIR AND PERES ON NOV. 2. THE PRESIDENT'S LEGAL ADVISER EXPLAINED TO US THERE IS NO LEGAL BAR TO THE PRESIDENT'S HOLDING "INFORMAL" CONTACTS WITH PARTY LEADERS ON THE FORMATION EVEN BEFORE THE ELECTION RESULTS ARE OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED. (THE LAW STATES THE PRESIDENT MAY BEGIN CONSULTATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF KNESSET FACTIONS AFTER THE OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS ARE PUBLISHED.) HERZOG MAY CONDUCT MORE "INFORMAL" CONTACTS BEFORE LAUNCHING HIS FORMAL CONSULTATIONS EARLY-MID NEXT WEEK.

LIKUD CONTACTS WITH RELIGIOUS AND RIGHTWING PARTIES

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15904 01 OF 02 031628Z

4. SHAMIR IS SEEKING TO ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR A LIKUD-LED NARROW RIGHT/RELIGIOUS COALITION BEFORE HERZOG STARTS HIS FORMAL CONSULTATIONS. LIKUD SOURCES EXPECT TO REACH A MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES, DESPITE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON PORTFOLIOS AND RELIGIOUS LEGISLATION.

5. SHAMIR MET WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES AND TEHIYA ON NOV. 2. LIKUD'S NEGOTIATING TEAM (NISSIM, ARENS, LEVY, SHARON AND KATZAV) PLANS A SECOND ROUND OF MEETINGS WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES NOV. 3. SHAMIR ALSO MET WITH TZOMET AND MOLEDET LEADERS NOV. 3.

6. SHAMIR TOLD TEHIYA AND NRP REPRESENTATIVES NOV. 2 HE WOULD NOT BACK DOWN ON HIS COMMITMENT TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS BUT REPORTEDLY WAS AGREEABLE TO DEMANDS FOR MORE SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TEHIYA IS PUSHING A GUSH EMUNIM PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING 11 SETTLEMENTS IN THE TERRITORIES. TEHIYA IS ALSO INTERESTED IN EITHER YUVAL NEEMAN FOR THE HOUSING PORTFOLIO (TO PUSH SETTLEMENTS) OR GEULA COHEN AS MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION AND ABSORPTION AND NEEMAN AS DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER.

7. THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES ALSO STATED THEIR PORTFOLIO PREFERENCES. SHAS ASKED FOR 3 MINISTERIES FROM AMONG INTERIOR, EDUCATION, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS OR HOUSING. THE NRP ASKED FOR EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, AT A MINIMUM. AGUDA REPORTEDLY WANTED SEVERAL MINISTRY DIRECTOR-GENERALSHIPS. DEGEL HATORAH WAS ALSO ANGLING FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PORTFOLIO. OTHER RELIGIOUS PARTIES' DEMANDS INCLUDED: RESOLVING THE "WHO IS A JEW" ISSUE BY CHANGING THE LAW OF RETURN (NRP, AGUDA) OR VIA THE RABBINICAL COURTS OR CONVERSION LAWS (SHAS); EXCLUDING RABBINICAL COURTS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 TEL AV 15904 01 OF 02 031628Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15904 02 OF 02 031629Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 SCL-01 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02
T-01 /079 W

-----142036 031632Z /47

O 031626Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1894
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15904

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, IS
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMATION MANEUVERING BEGINS

FROM THE JURISDICTION OF THE STATE'S HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (SHAS, AGUDA); STRICTER SABBATH LAWS TO LIMIT ENTERTAINMENT AND WORKING HOURS; EQUALIZING THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX SCHOOL SYSTEMS WITH THAT OF THE STATE-RELIGIOUS AND STATE SYSTEMS; AND INCREASING FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS AND RELATED INSTITUTIONS.

8. MOLEDET'S REHEVAM ZE'EVY PROPOSED THE HOLDING OF A NATIONAL REFERENDUM ON THE TRANSFER OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARABS. IN A RADIO INTERVIEW THIS MORNING,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HOWEVER, HE DID NOT SUGGEST HIS PARTICIPATION IN A LIKUD-LED GOVERNMENT WAS DEPENDENT ON GETTING HIS REFERENDUM. ZE'EVY ALSO TOLD ISRAEL RADIO HE WAS NOT DEMANDING A CABINET PORTFOLIO.

LABOR'S CONTACTS WITH THE RELIGIOUS AND LEFT PARTIES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15904 02 OF 02 031629Z

9. PERES ALSO MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES ON NOV. 2. BUT NRP POLITICAL SECRETARY YAHALOM LATER SUGGESTED THERE WAS LITTLE BASIS FOR HIS PARTY'S COOPERATION WITH LABOR. LABOR'S SEC GEN BARAM PUBLICLY SAID LABOR'S TALKS WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES WOULD SOON COLLAPSE. NONETHELESS, RELIGIOUS PARTY LEADERS LIKE FORMER CHIEF RABBI OVADIA YOSEF (SHAS) AND MK MENACHEM PORUSH (AGUDA) CONTINUED TO STATE PUBLICLY THAT ALL OPTIONS WERE OPEN.

10. PERES WILL BE MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT (CRM), MAPAM AND CENTER-SHINUI NOV. 3. CRM LEADER ALONI REPORTEDLY URGED PERES TO END HIS "HUMILIATING" EFFORTS WITH THE RELIGIOUS AND JOIN CRM IN OPPOSITION. CRM MK SARID ASSERTED PERES HAD NO CHANCE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT. MAPAM CONTINUED TO GIVE ITS SUPPORT TO PERES TO FORM A GOVERNMENT BUT ALSO URGED LABOR TO REJECT A NUG WITH LIKUD.

SHAMIR, PERES: NO MOVES ON NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

11. BOTH SHAMIR AND PERES SAID PUBLICLY THEY WOULD NOT INITIATE APPROACHES TO THE OTHER ON THE FORMATION OF A NUG AT THIS TIME. SHAMIR SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO TALK TO PERES ON THE ISSUE IF PERES MADE A REQUEST, WHILE PERES SAID SHAMIR'S POLITICAL STATEMENTS INDICATED THERE WAS NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT.

RUMBLING IN LABOR AGAINST PERES

12. WE HEAR CONTINUING BUT MUTED CRITICISM OF PERES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15904 02 OF 02 031629Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IN THE PARTY FOR LABOR'S FAILURE IN THE ELECTION. PERES' CRITICS COMPLAIN THAT HE ERRED IN BUILDING THE PARTY'S CAMPAIGN AROUND HIS PERSONAL LEADERSHIP (EXCLUDING THE OTHER LABOR MINISTERS) AND ON ONE-ISSUE (PEACE). THIS WAS PERES' FOURTH FAILURE TO LEAD LABOR TO VICTORY, IT IS ALSO NOTED. SOME PRIVATELY SUGGEST HE SHOULD PAY THE PRICE FOR LABOR'S FAILURE BY RESIGNING AS PARTY CHAIRMAN. PUBLICLY, MINISTER OF ABSORPTION TZUR CALLED FOR A RADICAL REFORM AS A RESULT OF THE FAILED ELECTION STRATEGY. MINISTER OF ENERGY SHAHAL URGED A DEEP AND SERIOUS STOCK-TAKING. KNESSET FACTION LEADER EDRI NOTED THAT CRITICISM WITHIN THE PARTY COULD NOT BE SWEEPED UNDER THE CARPET AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR LABOR'S FAILURE WOULD HAVE TO PAY. SO FAR, SENIOR LABOR PERSONALITIES HAVE HELD BACK FROM PUBLICLY CALLING FOR PERES TO GO. NEITHER HAVE WE HEARD OF ANY RANK AND FILE GROUPS ORGANIZING AGAINST PERES.

PICKERING



NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E181

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03640

FILM= D880977-0101

DATE= 03 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= WHITHER HAMAS?

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3168, 88 JERUSALEM 3004

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= WEST BANK, RECONCILIATION, PEACE PLAN, PALESTINIANS, RELIGIOUS GR

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PTER, PINS, PHUM, ASEC, IS, JO

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY
 DENY IN PART
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

[Handwritten initials]

IS/FPC/CDR

Date.

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or
 S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03640 01 OF 03 031532Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /090 W
-----137176 031544Z /40

O 031531Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3932
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03640

LONDON FOR MILLIKEN, PARIS FOR WINN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINS, PHUM, KPAL, ASEC, IS, JO
SUBJECT: WHITHER, HAMAS?

REFS: A) JERUSALEM 3168, B) JERUSALEM 3004

1. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY

2. THE CURRENT LULL IN THE OVERT HAMAS-PLO
COMPETITION ON THE WEST BANK IS BASED ON A
SHARED TACTICAL INTEREST IN ENDING ISRAELI
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03640 01 OF 03 031532Z

OCCUPATION. UNDERNEATH THE CURRENT CONCORD,
HOWEVER, DIVERGENT VISIONS OF POST-OCCUPATION
PALESTINE ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF A LONG-TERM
RIVALRY. ALTHOUGH WELL ORGANIZED, HAMAS REMAINS
TOO WEAK TO TAKE ON EITHER THE PLO OR ISRAELI
FORCES IN FRONTAL CONFRONTATIONS. NEVERTHELESS,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

IF THE UPCOMING PNC EMBARKS ON A POLITICAL PROCESS, HAMAS-PLO COMPETITION WILL LIKELY INTENSIFY.

TACTICAL RECONCILIATION

3. OCTOBER WAS A MONTH OF RELATIVE PEACE BETWEEN HAMAS AND THE PLO/UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU), AS PALESTINIANS CLOSED RANKS IN THE FACE OF ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE AND RULE. REPORTS ARE CIRCULATING OF HIGH-LEVEL FATAH-HAMAS MEETINGS ABROAD TO WORK OUT A MODUS VIVENDI BETWEEN THE GROUPS. (THUS FAR, HAMAS HAS DEALT ONLY WITH FATAH. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HAMAS WOULD COUNTENANCE SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WITH THE PLO'S LEFTIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE PFLP, DFLP, AND COMMUNISTS.) RECENT LEAFLETS BY BOTH HAMAS (E.G. NUMBERS 30 AND 31) AND UNLU (27 AND 28) HAVE PLACED UNITY AT THE TOP OF THE AGENDA AND DENOUNCED FORGED LEAFLETS MEANT TO DIVIDE THE RESISTANCE. THEY HAVE ALSO DEALT WITH SIMILAR TOPICS OF PRACTICAL INTEREST TO PALESTINIANS, SUCH AS EDUCATION, TAXES, AND THE OLIVE HARVEST.

4. EARLIER IN THE INTIFADA, HAMAS CALLED STRIKE DAYS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ORDERED BY UNLU.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03640 01 OF 03 031532Z

THESE WERE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS SHOWS OF INDEPENDENCE AND TESTS OF STRENGTH. HOWEVER, RECENT LEAFLETS HAVE CALLED FOR IDENTICAL STRIKE DAYS. UNLU EVEN TOOK THE UNPRECEDENTED STEP OF CHANGING ONE OF ITS STRIKE DAYS TO MATCH THE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED HAMAS DATE, ALTHOUGH THE CHANGE IS PROBABLY MORE INDICATIVE OF DISARRAY IN THE UNLU (GETTING THE ORIGINAL DATE WRONG) THAN PERCEIVED WEAKNESS VIS-A-VIS HAMAS.

5. HAMAS AND FATAH SHARE A COMMON NATIONALIST GROUND AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL. AS THE HAMAS COVENANT (REF B) STATES, "NATIONALISM IS PART OF THE RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE." THIS SHARED INTEREST MAKES THE FATAH-DOMINATED PLO "THE NEAREST OF THE DEAR TO THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT," AND PERMITS HAMAS TO COOPERATE WITH FATAH ON A TACTICAL BASIS WITHOUT ABANDONING ITS LONG TERM GOALS. THE COVENANT ASSERTS THAT HAMAS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

"SUPPORTS HIM (THE PLO) WHEN THE ENEMY ATTACKS,
AND HOPES FOR HIM HEAVENLY GUIDANCE AND COUNSEL."

6. IN ADDITION, THE WEST BANK HAMAS LEADERSHIP
REMAINS COMPOSED LARGELY OF CONSERVATIVE,
TRADITIONAL MUSLIM CLERGY. THESE NOTABLES HAVE
TRADITIONALLY OPTED FOR EDUCATION AND
PROSELYTIZING, AND CAME LATE TO THE INTIFADA.
THEY ARE IKELY TO PURSUE TACTICAL COMPROMISE TO
THE EXTENT POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THEIR
PROGRAMS AMONG MUSLIMS.

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03640 02 OF 03 031533Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /090 W

-----137233 031544Z /40

O 031531Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3933
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03640

LONDON FOR MILLIKEN, PARIS FOR WINN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINS, PHUM, KPAL, ASEC, IS, JO
SUBJECT: WHITHER HAMAS?

7. DESPITE THE CURRENT LULL, HAMAS AND THE UNLU CONTINUE TO OFFER FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT VISIONS OF POST-OCCUPATION PALESTINE. IN THE HAMAS STRATEGY, ISLAM IS PARAMOUNT. AS THE COVENANT STATES, "WE CANNOT REPLACE THE PRESENT AND FUTURE ISLAMIC PALESTINE WITH SECULAR THINKING." DESPITE OCCASIONAL RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY, USUALLY CIRCULATED BY FATAH SUPPORTERS, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP WILL NOT COUNTENANCE A TWO-STATE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03640 02 OF 03 031533Z

SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN QUESTION.

8. THIS UNDERLYING TENSION SURFACES WHENEVER THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS REVIVED. UNLU LEAFLETS 25 AND 26 CONTAINED A FAIRLY SOPHISTICATED POLITICAL PROGRAM TIED TO THE PNC MEETING. THE HAMAS RESPONSE, CONTAINED IN LEAFLET 30, WAS TO REAFFIRM ITS UNYIELDING REFUSAL TO "GIVE UP AN ATOM OF OUR BELOVED HOMELAND."

9. THE HAMAS-UNLU SPLIT IS ALSO APPARENT IN THE CONTEXT OF DEALINGS WITH ISRAEL. HAMAS CATEGORICALLY REJECTS THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE LEADING TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION. THE COVENANT DISMISSES "THE SO-CALLED PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES." CONSEQUENTLY, HAMAS DID NOT JOIN UNLU OR THE PLO IN APPEALS TO THE ISRAELI ELECTORATE TO SUPPORT "PEACE-LOVING" PARTIES. INSTEAD, ITS ELECTION EVE LEAFLET (NO. 31) WAS FILLED WITH BITTER ANTI-JEWISH INVECTIVE.

JOCKEYING FOR POSITION

10. THE CURRENT HAMAS-UNLU PEACE CONCEALS A CONTINUING BATTLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF PALESTINIANS. WHILE PRAISING UNITY, THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEAFLETS COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER IN ADDRESSING ISSUES OF CONCERN TO PALESTINIANS SUCH AS EDUCATION AND THE OLIVE HARVEST. IN SOME AREAS, UNLU HAS BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE IN COMBATTING HAMAS' INFLUENCE. WE HAVE REPORTS OF UNLU SUPPORTERS ENGAGING IN UNPROVOKED ATTACKS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03640 02 OF 03 031533Z

AGAINST HAMAS SUPPORTERS IN THE NORTHERN TOWNS OF TULKAREM AND JENIN.

11. HAMAS IS CONTINUING TO RELY ON THE MOSQUES TO PREACH, PROSELYTIZE, AND EDUCATE--THE TRADITIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD STRATEGY. JERUSALEM WAQF OFFICIAL ADNAN HUSSEINI RECENTLY COMPLAINED THAT IMAMS IN MANY MOSQUES WERE PREACHING PRO-HAMAS MESSAGES IN VIOLATION OF WAQF INSTRUCTIONS. THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP IN THE WEST BANK HAS RESISTED INCLUSION IN UNLU COMMITTEES, AND HAMAS GRAFFITI IS WIDESPREAD IN STRONGHOLDS SUCH AS THE NABLUS CASBAH.

12. THE OCTOBER 30 JERUSALEM POST, CITING "WELL-INFORMED ISRAELI SOURCES," REPORTED THAT HAMAS AND THE PFLP-GC HAD AGREED ON POLITICAL (BUT NOT MILITARY OR TERRORIST) COOPERATION TO OPPOSE FATAH IN THE TERRITORIES. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY EVIDENCE OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT AND BELIEVE ONE UNLIKELY GIVEN THE DIVERGENT IDEOLOGIES OF HAMAS AND THE PFLP-GC. NEVERTHELESS HAMAS, RELYING ON ITS SOLID ORGANIZATION, BELIEVES THAT IT IS MAKING INROADS AND GAINING STRENGTH AT FATAH'S EXPENSE.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

13. IF THE PLO USES THE OCCASION OF THE PNC TO EMBARK ON A POLITICAL PROCESS, IT WILL CROSS A HAMAS "RED LINE" AND SPUR INTENSIFIED HAMAS-UNLU COMPETITION. AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND/OR

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03640 03 OF 03 031534Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01
DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /090 W
-----137247 031544Z /40

O 031531Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3934
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03640

LONDON FOR MILLIKEN, PARIS FOR WINN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINS, PHUM, KPAL, ASEC, IS, JO
SUBJECT: WHITHER HAMAS?

UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WOULD
MORE CLEARLY REVEAL THE HAMAS-UNLU IDEOLOGICAL
SPLIT AND MAKE FURTHER TACTICAL COOPERATION
DIFFICULT.

14. IT IS UNLIKELY, GIVEN FATAH'S SUPERIOR
STRENGTH IN THE WEST BANK, THAT SUCH A SPLIT
WOULD MANIFEST ITSELF IN MAJOR ISLAMIC VIOLENCE
AGAINST THE FATAH SECULAR NATIONALISTS, ALTHOUGH
THIS POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE RULED OUT ENTIRELY.

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03040 05 OF 05 031534Z

GIVEN THE VULNERABILITY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERSHIP TO ISRAELI RETALIATION, IT IS ALSO UNLIKELY THAT HAMAS WOULD ESCALATE THE VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAELI FORCES IN THE WEST BANK. (ALTHOUGH AN INCREASING NUMBER OF HAMAS "FOOT SOLDIERS" HAVE BEEN DETAINED RECENTLY, THE LEADERSHIP HAS REMAINED ESSENTIALLY UNSCATHED DESPITE BOLD PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS BY CERTAIN KEY FIGURES WHICH WOULD HAVE LANDED SECULARIST LEADERS IN PRISON.) INSTEAD, HAMAS WOULD PROBABLY STEP UP ITS PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS--THROUGH LEAFLETS, GRAFFITI, SERMONS, SOCIAL ACTIVITIES ORGANIZED THROUGH THE MOSQUES, AND THE CALLING OF SEPARATE STRIKE DAYS.

15. HAMAS WILL NOT SOON REPLACE FATAH AS THE DOMINANT POLITICAL FORCE IN THE WEST BANK AND IS UNLIKELY TO FORCE AN OVERT TEST OF STRENGTH. BUT, AS NOTED REF A, IF FATAH IS UNABLE TO TRANSLATE THE INTIFADA INTO POLITICAL GAINS, THE INFLUENCE OF HAMAS COULD GROW, ERODING FATAH'S LEADERSHIP AND THE COHESION OF THE UPRISING.

16. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*

E80

R

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03631

FILM= D880976-0018

DATE= 03 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
USUN NEW YORK

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= WEST BANK WRAP UP, OCTOBER 25 - 31, 1988

REFERENCE= 88 JERUSALEM 3591

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= OCCUPIED AREA, PALESTINIANS, BOMBING, CASUALTY

TAGS= KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

W/FPC/CDR

DATE

- RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
- EXCISE () DECLASSIFY
- () DENY IN PART
- () DELETE Non-Responsive Info
- FOIA Exemptions _____
- Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority _____

- () CLASSIFY as () S or
- () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03631 01 OF 03 030923Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-02 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 DS-01
/092 W

-----116467 030952Z /12

O 030922Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3923
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03631

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PIMS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, OCTOBER 25 - 31, 1988

REF: JERUSALEM 3591

1. SUMMARY: THE IDF BEEFED UP ITS FORCES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND AUTHORITIES ARRESTED SEVERAL PALESTINIANS AS A PRE-EMPTIVE MEASURE IN ANTICIPATION OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ISRAELI ELECTIONS AND THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION. FOUR PALESTINIANS WERE REPORTED KILLED IN THE WEST BANK AND FOUR ISRAELIS WERE KILLED IN THE FIRE-BOMBING OF A BUS IN JERICHO. 56 PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED, WHILE FIVE ISRAELI CIVILIANS AND AN ARAB WERE INJURED BY STONES. SEVEN HOMES WERE DEMOLISHED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03631 01 OF 03 030923Z

FOR SECURITY REASONS. CURFEWS CONTINUED AT A NUMBER OF LOCATIONS. AUTHORITIES ORDERED CLOSURE OF SEVERAL SCHOOLS IN EAST JERUSALEM. PM SHAMIR INAUGURATED A NEW SETTLEMENT. A GENERAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OCTOBER 26 AND 29. THIS REPORT WAS COMPILED MAINLY FROM

PRESS ACCOUNTS. END SUMMARY.

2. 4 ISRAELIS KILLED IN FIREBOMBING OF BUS

OCTOBER 30:

IN THE FIRST FATAL ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI VEHICLE SINCE THE START OF THE INTIFADA (REF), THREE MOLOTOV COCKTAILS WERE THROWN AT AN ISRAELI BUS IN JERICHO, KILLING FOUR ISRAELI PASSENGERS AND WOUNDING FIVE OTHERS. THIS RAISES THE TOLL OF ISRAELI DEATHS TO SEVEN SINCE THE START OF THE INTIFADA.

3. THREE KILLED, 62 WOUNDED

OCTOBER 25:

SOLDIERS, WHO ARRIVED IN CIVILIAN VEHICLES AT BEIT FURIK, NEAR NABLUS, SHOT AND WOUNDED FOUR PALESTINIANS.

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED ONE PALESTINIAN DURING CLASHES IN TAMMUN, NORTH OF NABLUS, DURING AN IDF RAID. TWO OTHER PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED IN NABLUS AND RAMALLAH.

FOUR ISRAELI BUSES WERE STONED IN EAST JERUSALEM AND TWO PASSENGERS WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03631 01 OF 03 030923Z

OCTOBER 26:

THREE PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED DURING CLASHES IN NABLUS, TWO IN JENIN, ONE AT TULKAREM REFUGEE CAMP, ONE IN TOUBAS AND ONE IN BIR ZEIT.

A PASSENGER ON AN ISRAELI BUS WAS SLIGHTLY INJURED AFTER A STONE SHATTERED THE BUS WINDOW NEAR BEIT SAFAFA IN WEST JERUSALEM.

OCTOBER 27:

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED SIX PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES AT NABLUS'S CASBAH. IN ANOTHER INCIDENT IN THE CITY, AN ARMY BUS WAS STONED AND SOLDIERS OPENED FIRE, WOUNDING A TEENAGER.

SIX OTHER PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED IN CLASHES IN JENIN, TULKAREM, RAMALLAH AND IDNA, NEAR HEBRON.

OCTOBER 28:

A FOUR-MONTH-OLD BOY DIED IN TULKAREM DISTRICT,
AFTER INHALING TEARGAS.

IDF SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED TWO PALESTINIANS
DURING DEMONSTRATION AT NABLUS'S CASBAH.

OCTOBER 29:

THE IDF REPORTED SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED FIVE
PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES AT RUJAYB, NEAR
NABLUS. HOSPITAL OFFICIALS SAID SEVEN WERE
WOUNDED. IN OTHER CLASHES NEAR NABLUS, TWO

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03631 02 OF 03 030924Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-02 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 DS-01
/092 W

-----116510 030952Z /12

O 030922Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3924
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03631

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS

SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, OCTOBER 25 - 31, 1988

PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED AT BALATA AND EIN BEIT ILMA REFUGEE CAMPS. ONE OTHER WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED IN NABLUS.

THE ARAB DRIVER OF A TAXI WITH ISRAELI LICENSE PLATES WAS LIGHTLY INJURED IN THE EYE, AFTER HIS CAR WAS STONED NEAR SHUFAT, IN NORTHERN JERUSALEM.

SOLDIERS SHOT AND WOUNDED THREE PALESTINIANS DURING CLASHES IN JENIN AND ANOTHER AT NEARBY EL FALAMEH VILLAGE. THREE PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED IN AIDA REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR BETHLEHEM, AND FOUR OTHERS AT EL-JEEB, NEAR RAMALLAH.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03631 02 OF 03 030924Z

OCTOBER 30:

SOLDIERS SHOT AND KILLED A PALESTINIAN YOUTH DURING CLASHES IN BEIT SAHOUR, NEAR BETHLEHEM, AFTER SUNDAY CHURCH SERVICES. A CURFEW WAS CLAMPED ON THE CITY.

AT RUJAYB, NEAR NABLUS, THE BODY OF A PALESTINIAN YOUTH WAS FOUND SHOT IN THE HEAD AFTER CLASHES IN THE VILLAGE. TWO PALESTINIANS WERE SHOT AND WOUNDED AT KUFR SALEM, NEAR NABLUS AND ANOTHER AT QALANDIA REFUGEE CAMP, NORTH OF JERUSALEM.

4. HOMES DEMOLISHED

OCTOBER 31

IDF DEMOLITION EXPERTS BLEW UP TWO ARAB HOMES IN JERICHO AND BULLDOZED A THIRD, BELONGING TO FAMILIES OF THREE PALESTINIANS SAID TO HAVE CONFESSED TO THE MOLOTOV COCKTAIL ATTACK ON THE ISRAELI BUS IN WHICH AN ISRAELI WOMAN AND HER THREE CHILDREN WERE KILLED. THE SOLDIERS DEMOLISHED FOUR OTHER HOMES IN JERICHO AND THE NEIGHBORING VILLAGE OF AUJA WHICH BELONGED TO PALESTINIANS WHO HAD REPORTEDLY CONFESSED TO OTHER MOLOTOV COCKTAIL ATTACKS ON ISRAELI VEHICLES.

5. GENERAL STRIKES

THE UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING CALLED A GENERAL STRIKE DAY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO MARK THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE KUFR QASEM MASSACRE IN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03631 02 OF 03 030924Z

1956. THERE WAS CONFUSION OVER STRIKE DAYS, AS UNLU CHANGED ITS OCTOBER 26 STRIKE CALL TO CONINCIDE WITH THE OCTOBER 29 HAMAS STRIKE. AS A RESULT, A PARTIAL STRIKE WAS OBSERVED ON OCTOBER 26, WITH A BROADER OBSERVANCE ON OCTOBER 29; SHOPS WERE SHUTTERED, STREETS WERE DESERTED AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CAME TO A HALT.

6. CURFEWS

AS OF OCTOBER 31, A CURFEW REMAINED IMPOSED ON AZZEH REFUGEE CAMP FOR THE 15TH DAY. AUTHORITIES CUT OFF THE WATER SUPPLY TO THE CAMP. OTHER CONTINUING CURFEWS WERE AT KAFR MALIK (40 DAYS), BEIT SAHUR (2 DAYS), AND JERICHO (2 DAYS).

7. SCHOOL CONFLICTS IN JERUSALEM

ON OCTOBER 25, EDUCATION OFFICIALS SUSPENDED 58 STUDENTS OF EAST JERUSALEM'S LARGEST PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL FOR BOYS FOR TWO DAYS AND CLOSED THE SCHOOL FOR SIX DAYS AS A RESULT OF THE STUDENTS' INSISTENCE ON LEAVING THE SCHOOL AT NOON IN COMPLIANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN AN UNLU LEAFLET, WHILE THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM CALLS FOR THEM TO REMAIN UNTIL 1:15 P.M.

ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ORDERED CLOSURE OF THE NIZAMIYEH GIRL'S SCHOOL IN BEIT HANINA AND THE YOUNG MOSLEM WOMENS SOCIETY SCHOOL AT WADI JOZ IN EAST JERUSALEM FOR 20 DAYS, EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 31, AFTER THE GIRLS DEMONSTRATED AND THREW STONES.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03631 03 OF 03 030924Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-02 STR-17 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 DS-01
/092 W

-----116513 030952Z /12

O 030922Z NOV 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3925
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 03631

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KPAL, PHUM, PINS, PBTS, ASEC, IS
SUBJECT: WEST BANK WRAP UP, OCTOBER 25 - 31, 1988

8. SHAMIR DEDICATES A NEW WEST BANK SETTLEMENT

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR DEDICATED, OCTOBER 26, A NEW
WEST BANK SETTLEMENT, NORTH EAST OF DEIR QADDIS,
RAMALLAH DISTRICT. NA'ALE, ("WE SHALL GO UP") IS
EXPECTED TO RECEIVE ITS FIRST RESIDENTS, 27
FAMILIES OF ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES,
NEXT MONTH.

9. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

WILCOX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EN
R

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15763

FILM= D880971-0765

DATE= 02 NOV 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS=

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= (OADR)

SUBJECT= ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS: INITIAL EMBASSY - ASSESSMENT BASED ON UNOFFICIAL RETURNS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= EMBASSY, ELECTION, POLITICAL PARTY, RELIGION, MEETING, VOTING, DAT

TAGS= KPRP, PGOV, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive to
FOIA Exemptions
A Exemptions

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
IN PART

FPC/CDR

FEB 12

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS auth:
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or

9354629

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

<<<<>>>>
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15763 01 OF 03 020843Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /073 W
-----020101 020847Z /11

O 020837Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1834
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15763

CAIRO FOR SECDEF'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, KPRP, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS: INITIAL EMBASSY
- ASSESSMENT BASED ON UNOFFICIAL RETURNS

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: UNOFFICIAL RESULTS INDICATE LIKUD HAS
EDGED OUT LABOR AS THE LARGEST PARTY (39-38) AND WILL
BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO GET THE NOD FROM PRESIDENT
HERZOG TO FORM THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. ALREADY LAST
NIGHT (NOV. 1), LABOR AND LIKUD WERE COURTING THE
RELIGIOUS PARTIES, THE BIG WINNERS IN THE ELECTION.
PERES AND SHAMIR WILL BE MEETING WITH EACH OTHER
EARLY NOV. 2 AND LATER IN THE DAY MEETING SEPARATELY
WITH RELIGIOUS PARTY REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS
FORMATION OPTIONS. PERES' HOPE IS TO ENTICE ONE OF
THE LARGER ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTIES TO HIS SIDE TO GAIN
A BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST A LIKUD-LED NARROW
GOVERNMENT. SHAMIR, MEANWHILE, IS TALKING UP MOVING

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15763 01 OF 03 020843Z

TOWARD FORMATION OF A NARROW LIKUD-LED COALITION.
END SUMMARY.

3. ISRAEL RADIO AT 0700L ON NOV. 2 REPORTED THE
FOLLOWING RESULTS OF YESTERDAY'S KNESSET ELECTION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BASED ON 99 PERCENT OF THE VOTE (FIGURES IN PARENTHESES SHOW SEATS WON IN THE 1984 ELECTION):

PARTY	1988	1984
LIKUD	39	(41)
TEHIYA	3	(5)
TZOMET	2	(-)
MOLEDET	2	(-)
KACH	-	(1)
OTHER (OMETZ; TAMI)	-	(2)

SUBTOTAL RIGHT	46	(49)
NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY		5 (4)
SHAS	6	(4)
AGUDA	5	(2)
DEGEL HATORAH		2 (-)
OTHER (MORASHA)		- (2)

SUBTOTAL RELIGIOUS	18	(12)
LABOR ALIGNMENT	38	(44)
CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT		5 (3)
MAPAM	3	(-)
CENTER-SHINUI	2	(3)
OTHER (YAHAD)	-	(3)

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15763 01 OF 03 020843Z

SUBTOTAL LEFT	48	(53)
HADASH	5	(4)
PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE	2	(2)
DEMOCRATIC ARAB PARTY	1	(-)

SUBTOTAL NON-ZIONIST LEFT	8	(6)

(WE HAVE HEARD A PROJECTION WHICH SUGGESTS THAT WHEN THE SOLDIERS VOTE IS IN, LIKUD AND TEHIYA COULD EACH GO UP ONE SEAT AND DEGEL HATORAH AND ONE OF THE NON-ZIONIST LEFT LISTS COULD EACH LOSE ONE SEAT.)

4. LIKUD APPEARS TO HAVE EDGED OUT LABOR (39-38) AND SHAMIR IS IN THE LEADING POSITION TO GET THE FIRST SHOT AT FORMING THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. THE ZIONIST LEFT HAS 48 SEATS AND THE RIGHT HAS 46 SEATS. BUT THE LEFT (ZIONIST AND NON-ZIONIST) DOES NOT HAVE A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

61-SEAT BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST A LIKUD-LED NARROW RIGHT/RELIGIOUS COALITION. LIKUD, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS A REASONABLE CHANCE TO BRING THE SMALL RIGHT AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES INTO A NARROW MAJORITY COALITION. LABOR HAS A THEORETICAL CHANCE FOR A LEFT/RELIGIOUS MAJORITY IF IT CAN GET ALL THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES ON BOARD.

5. ACCORDING TO THE ELECTION RESULTS:
--LIKUD AND LABOR DROPPED FROM THEIR 1984 RESULTS, WITH LABOR SUFFERING A MORE SIGNIFICANT SETBACK. LABOR'S LOSSES COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES SINCE 1984 AND THE DROP IN LABOR'S ARAB VOTE. LIKUD APPEARS TO HAVE LOST VOTES MOSTLY TO THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES. THE SIZES OF THE ZIONIST RIGHT AND LEFT BLOCS REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME AS IN 1984.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 TEL AV 15763 02 OF 03 020844Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /073 W
-----020124 020849Z /11

O 020837Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1835
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15763
CAIRO FOR SECDEF'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: PGOV, KPRP, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS: INITIAL EMBASSY

--THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX NON-ZIONIST RELIGIOUS PARTIES WERE THE BIG WINNERS IN THE ELECTION, INCREASING FROM 6 TO 13 SEATS -- A RECORD FOR THESE PARTIES, ALMOST DOUBLING THE PREVIOUS HIGH OF 7 NON-ZIONIST RELIGIOUS MKS ELECTED IN 1984. THE NRP HELD ITS OWN, WHILE MODERATE OFFSHOOT MEMAD FAILED TO PASS THE THRESHOLD FOR A SEAT. OVERALL, RELIGIOUS PARTIES HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR HIGHEST VOTE TOTAL IN ISRAELI HISTORY.

--ON THE ZIONIST LEFT, THE CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT INCREASED FROM THE 3 SEATS IT WON IN 1984 TO 5 SEATS. MAPAM, RUNNING INDEPENDENTLY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN TWO DECADES, WON 3 SEATS.

--REHEVEM ZE'EVY'S MOLEDET PARTY, WHICH ADVOCATES TRANSFER OF WEST BANK/GAZA ARABS, WON TWO SEATS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15763 02 OF 03 020844Z

--THE ISRAELI ARAB VOTE GAVE THE SMALL NON-ZIONIST LEFT PARTIES EIGHT SEATS, TWO MORE THAN THEY RECEIVED IN 1984. THE ZIONIST PARTIES SHARE OF THE ISRAELI ARAB VOTE DROPPED FROM ONE HALF TO A THIRD. THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE ARAB TURNOUT. THE LACK OF SURPLUS VOTE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE NON-ZIONIST LEFT PARTIES SEEMS TO HAVE LOST THEM VOTES EQUAL TO 1-2 SEATS. MANY ISLAMICS APPEAR NOT TO HAVE VOTED OR TO HAVE TURNED IN BLANK BALLOTS. DAROUSA'S DEMOCRATIC ARAB PARTY APPEARS TO HAVE PASSED THE THRESHOLD FOR A SEAT.

--THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY LIKUD AND LABOR ON SECURITY, PEACE AND THE ECONOMY DID NOT HELP THE TWO PARTIES RETAIN THEIR SHARE OF THE ELECTORATE. LIKUD APPARENTLY LOST VOTES TO ULTRA-ORTHODOX RELIGIOUS PARTIES LACKING CLEAR POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY OR THE ECONOMY. THIS SHIFT TO THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTIES APPARENTLY HAD MORE TO DO WITH THEIR HARD SELL TO RELIGIOUS AND TRADITIONAL VOTERS AND THE VIGOROUS CAMPAIGNS THEY WAGED. BY AND LARGE, THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX PARTIES ARE COMFORTABLE WITH LIKUD POSITIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES.

INITIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6. SHAMIR NOTED EARLY NOV. 2 THAT THE ELECTION RESULTS WERE AS YET INCOMPLETE, BUT HE BELIEVED LIKUD WOULD BE ABLE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE RIGHT (AND RELIGIOUS). LATER, SHAMIR STATED PLAINLY THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO CONTINUE THE NUG IN ITS CURRENT FORMAT. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT TOTALLY RULE OUT ANOTHER COALITION WITH LABOR (ON HIS TERMS). FOR HIS PART,

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15763 02 OF 03 020844Z

PERES SAID LABOR WOULD LAUNCH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES "TONIGHT" (NOV. 1). SHAS LIST LEADER RABBI PERETZ AND NRP SPOKESMEN EXPRESSED INCLINATIONS TO LIKUD BUT SAID THEY REMAINED UNCOMMITTED. SHAS, AGUDA AND THE NRP HAVE ALREADY STATED THEIR HEAVY AND COMPETING DEMANDS FOR 2-3 PORTFOLIOS EACH.

7. SHAMIR AND PERES ALSO PLAN TO MEET EARLY NOV. 2 TO DISCUSS THE ELECTION RESULTS, PERHAPS BUILDING EACH'S BARGAINING LEVERAGE WITH THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES BUT POSSIBLY ALSO EXPLORING A NEW NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT.

PRIVATE REACTIONS

8. LABOR: KNESSET SPEAKER HILLEL CONFIDED TO US HE DID NOT SEE HOW LABOR COULD COMPETE WITH LIKUD IN GAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES. MK HARISH EXPECTED SHAMIR TO GET THE NOD TO FORM A GOVERNMENT FIRST. ONLY IF SHAMIR FAILED, HE CONTINUED, WOULD LABOR HAVE A CHANCE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO LABOR GOING INTO A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT--IF SHAMIR GAVE LABOR THE OPPORTUNITY. INCOMING MK ELIAV EXPECTED LIKUD TO ESTABLISH A NARROW RIGHT/RELIGIOUS COALITION. EVEN IF SHAMIR OFFERED LABOR THE CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, HE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR LABOR TO GO INTO THE OPPOSITION. MK RAMON LIKEWISE SIMPLY SAID LABOR WOULD HAVE TO GO INTO OPPOSITION. INCOMING MK BURG ADMITTED LABOR HAD NO PRIVATE UNDERSTANDINGS WITH ANY OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES. INCOMING MK BEILIN ADMITTED THAT ANY PERES

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15763 03 OF 03 020844Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /073 W
-----020132 020849Z /11

O 020837Z NOV 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1836
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 03 TEL AVIV 15763

CAIRO FOR SECDEF'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, KPRP, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS: INITIAL EMBASSY

EFFORT TO COMPOSE A GOVERNMENT WOULD FACE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES. (PERES PR CONSULTANT TEOMIM TOLD US THAT A LABOR TELEPHONE SURVEY INDICATED THAT THE JERICHO FIRE-BOMBING DEATHS MAY HAVE COST LABOR 3-4 SEATS.)

9. NRP. PARTY SEC GEN YAHALOM TOLD US HE EXPECTED SHAMIR WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO FORM A GOVERNMENT AND SEEK TO BRING THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES ON BOARD. (HE NOTED THAT THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX GAIN WAS "A SEVERE BLOW.") MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO SHAPIRA ALSO SAID HE EXPECTED LIKUD TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NRP.

10. CRM. NOT SURPRISINGLY, LIST LEADER ALONI EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RIGHT/RELIGIOUS COALITION. IN CONTRAST, MK ZUCKER BELIEVED THE ELECTION RESULTS WOULD ULTIMATELY RESULT IN LIKUD AND LABOR ESTABLISHING A NUG.

[REDACTED]
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15763 03 OF 03 020844Z

11. LIKUD. THE MOOD OF LIKUD CONTACTS AT PARTY HEADQUARTERS AFTER THE INITIAL RETURNS WAS GLUM BUT PICKED UP AS IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE STRONG SHOWING OF THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES GAVE LIKUD A GOOD CHANCE OF ESTABLISHING A RIGHT-RELIGIOUS MAJORITY.

STRATEGIES

12. LIKUD'S NEGOTIATORS WILL BE WORKING TO LINE UP THE RIGHT AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES BEYOND THE 61 SEATS NEEDED TO FORM A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. SHAMIR SHOULD TRY TO INCLUDE EVERY RIGHT/RELIGIOUS PARTY TO IMPROVE THE CHANCES FOR STABILITY FOR A GOVERNMENT THAT COULD FACE CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS ON SETTLEMENTS AND RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS. WHILE SHAMIR CAN PASS UP ON ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE SMALL RIGHT PARTIES, HE NEEDS ALL THE LARGER RELIGIOUS PARTIES FOR A MAJORITY.

13. SHAMIR MAY PREFER TO INCLUDE LABOR IN A COALITION DESPITE HIS PUBLIC POSTURING AGAINST A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. IF SO, HIS STRATEGY WILL BE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS CAPABLE OF FORMING A NARROW COALITION IN ORDER TO ENHANCE HIS BARGAINING LEVERAGE IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH LABOR.

14. PERES' STRATEGY IS SIMPLER: HE NEEDS TO WIN OVER ONLY ONE OF THE LARGE RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A BLOCKING MAJORITY AGAINST A LIKUD-LED NARROW GOVERNMENT. SHAS (AND DEGEL HATORAH) ARE LABOR'S PRIME TARGETS, AGUDA IS MORE PROBLEMATIC AND THE NRP UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO BLOCK LIKUD. BUT EVEN IF PERES MAKES AN EXTRAORDINARY OFFER, THESE PARTIES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15763 03 OF 03 020844Z

WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COOPERATE WITH LABOR RATHER THAN LIKUD. MEANWHILE, WITHIN LABOR, PERES' OPPONENTS AND RIVALS ARE OPENLY CARPING ABOUT THE ELECTION OUTCOME AND CRITICIZING PERES FOR THE LOSS.

PICKERING

UNCLASSIFIED

R E173a

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

3828916

September 26, 1988

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, apparently may seek a United States visa for the purpose of attending and addressing the United Nations General Assembly, as well as speaking to the National Press Club. We urge you to exercise your authority and right to deny any request for such visa.

Section 6 of P.L. 80-357 reserves for the Secretary of State the complete authority to "control the entrance of aliens" to the (U.N.) Headquarters District in such a manner as to "safeguard its own security." Both the Departments of State and Justice have affirmed the right of the United States to deny visas to persons seeking to enter the Headquarters District of the United Nations under Section 212(a), paragraphs 27 and 29 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In January 1986 State Department spokesman Charles Redman reiterated U.S. policy on this matter: "We will as a matter of principle exclude individuals who personally advocate terrorism or who we believe have participated in or supported terrorist activities."

And in May 1986, when members of the Senate wrote to you concerning a possible Arafat request for a visa, you responded, "... I have no desire to see Arafat in the United States. Should he apply for a visa, his applications will receive my most severe scrutiny, including a thorough review of all the legal and other factors and circumstances pertinent to his application.... We share a common desire that Arafat should not come to the United States."

Arafat's PLO has claimed responsibility for a host of terrorist activities in which numerous innocent persons, including many Americans, were killed. As recently as May, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, in testimony before Congressional committees, stated that the State Department was aware that Arafat, "may have personally approved a series of terrorist attacks against American citizens and facilities abroad...."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	IS/FPC/CDR	Date
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Invo			
FOIA Exemptions			
PA Exemptions			
	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as		TS authority to
	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TO		

The Honorable George Shultz
September 26, 1988
page 2

Arafat should be denied access to our country until he and the PLO renounce terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. Before he is admitted into our country, Arafat and the PLO must accept the same reasonable requirements that the United States has consistently demanded in order to have dealings with them:

- formal recognition of Israel's rights to exist;
- acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338; and
- elimination from the PLO Charter of the call for the destruction of Israel.

The United States confers no diplomatic immunity on the PLO or its United Nations "Observer Mission." We must continue our policy of denying admission to our country those, including Arafat, who profess terrorism as a tool of foreign policy.

As a matter of law and policy, we urge you to deny Yasser Arafat permission to enter the United States. We look forward to hearing from you as to your decision on this important issue.


Sincerely,



Dennis DeConcini



Charles E. Grassley




Patrick J. Leahy




Alfonse M. D'Amato




Pete Wilson



Dan Quayle




Daniel P. Moynihan




Daniel K. Inouye

The Honorable George Shultz
September 26, 1988
page 3




J. James Exon



John F. Kerry



William V. Roth, Jr.



Frank R. Lautenberg



Wendell H. Ford




Donald W. Riegle, Jr.




Malcolm Wallop



Jesse Helms



Chic Hecht




Larry Pressler



Robert Dole




Rudy Boschwitz




Steve Symms



David Karnes




Gordon J. Humphrey



Frank H. Murkowski

The Honorable George Shultz
September 26, 1988
page 4


Thomas A. Daschle


Quentin N. Burdick



Carl M. Levin



Paul S. Sarbanes



Alan J. Dixon


Lloyd Bentsen



(Y-ACAFAT-U.N.)
Arlen Specter


Orrin G. Hatch



Howard M. Metzenbaum



Phil Gramm



John H. Glenn, Jr.


Bob Gramm


Don Nickles


Dave Durenberger



Albert Gore, Jr.


John Heinz


The Honorable George Shultz
September 26, 1988
page 5




Robert W. Kasten, Jr.




William Armstrong



John McCain




Alan K. Simpson



James R. Sasser




Lawton Chiles




James A. McClure



Warren B. Rudman



Christopher J. Dodd



William Proxmire



Max Baucus

UNCLASSIFIED

E169

R

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15651

FILM= n/a

DATE= 31 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC
ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= (OADR)

SUBJECT= THE ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS TOMORROW

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 15440, FBIS TA3101112788, FBIS TA3010101888

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= n/a

TAGS= KPRP, PGOV, IS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE DECLASSIFY

EXCISE DECLASSIFY

DENY DECLASSIFY

DELETE Non-Responsive Info IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

is FPC/CDR _____ Date: _____

MR Cases Only: _____

EO Citations _____

CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority: _____

DOWNGRADE TS to S or _____

S or _____

9304029

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15651 01 OF 02 311835Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /057 W
-----270211 311843Z/40

O 312030Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1809
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 15651

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, KPRP, IS
SUBJECT: THE ISRAELI KNESSET ELECTIONS TOMORROW

REFS: (A) TEL AVIV 15440, (B) FBIS TA3101112788,
(B) FBIS TA3010101888

1 [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: THE OUTCOME OF TOMORROW'S ISRAELI ELECTION IS LIKELY TO BE A CLOSE ONE. THE RIGHT WAS GIVEN A BOOST BY THE OCT. 30 FIRE-BOMBING OF AN ISRAELI BUS IN JERICHO WHICH CAUSED FOUR DEATHS. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE TRAGEDY HAS BEEN HEAVY AND PROBABLE COVERAGE OF THE FUNERALS ON TELEVISION NEWS TONIGHT WILL HAVE ADDITIONAL IMPACT. THE ATTACK WILL SHIFT SOME OF THE FLOATING VOTE TO LIKUD AND CONFIRM THOSE ON THE RIGHT WHO DO NOT BELIEVE ISRAEL CAN TAKE RISKS. LIKUD CAMPAIGN INFORMATION DIRECTOR MILO TOLD US LIKUD WILL EDGE OUT THE LABOR PARTY AND LIKELY HAVE THE OPTION OF A NARROW RIGHT/RELIGIOUS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15651 01 OF 02 311835Z

GOVERNMENT. BUT SHAMIR, IN HIS VIEW, CONTINUED TO PREFER TO LEAD ANOTHER NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT (NUG) WITHOUT ROTATION RATHER THAN FORM A NARROW, UNSTABLE COALITION DEPENDENT ON THE SMALL RIGHT AND RELIGIOUS PARTIES. (SHAMIR, FOR THE LAST WEEK, HAS BEEN REITERATING AVERSION TO ANOTHER NUG.) THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CAMPAIGN OFFICIALLY CLOSED THE EVENING OF OCT. 30 WITH LIKUD AND LABOR TELEVISION ELECTION BROADCASTS AND A SMALLER THAN EXPECTED LIKUD RALLY IN TEL AVIV. END SUMMARY.

IMPACT OF JERICHO FIRE-BOMBING

3. THERE HAS BEEN HEAVY MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE JERICHO FIRE-BOMBING OF A BUS WHICH RESULTED IN FOUR ISRAELI DEATHS. PROBABLE TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE OF THE FUNERALS TONIGHT WILL HAVE A CONTINUING IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC. LABOR SOURCES ASSUME THE ATTACK WILL BENEFIT THE RIGHT ON ELECTION DAY. SOME IN LABOR SUGGESTED THE IMPACT OF THE EVENT ON THE ELECTION TOMORROW WILL BE "MARGINAL," BUT OTHERS NOTED THAT IN A CLOSE RACE EVEN A SMALL SHIFT COULD BE CRITICAL. LIKUD CAMPAIGN INFORMATION DIRECTOR (DEPUTY MINISTER) RONI MILO EXPECTED THE FIRE-BOMBING WOULD BRING SOME UNDECIDED VOTERS WAVERING BETWEEN LIKUD AND LABOR INTO THE LIKUD COLUMN, AND PROBABLY ENABLE ZE'EV'S NEW "MOLEDET" PARTY TO CROSS THE 1 PERCENT THRESHOLD AND WIN A KNESSET SEAT.

THE VIEW FROM LIKUD

4. LIKUD'S MILO EXPECTED A CLOSE ELECTION, WITH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIKUD AND LABOR NOT MORE THAN 2-3

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15651 01 OF 02 311835Z

SEATS. HE THOUGHT LIKUD WOULD COME OUT AHEAD OF LABOR 42-40 AND WOULD HAVE THE OPTION OF FORMING A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. MILO ASSERTED, HOWEVER, THAT SHAMIR HAD NO DESIRE TO ESTABLISH A NARROW RIGHT/RELIGIOUS COALITION DEPENDENT ON THE BLACKMAIL OF THE SMALL PARTIES. RATHER, SHAMIR PREFERRED ANOTHER NUG WITHOUT ROTATION. (SHAMIR, IN THE LAST WEEK, HAS BEEN EXPRESSING HIS AVERSION TO ANOTHER NUG.)

5. MILO DOUBTED LABOR WOULD ENTER A NUG WITHOUT PERES OR THAT RABIN ALONE COULD SOMEHOW BE ENTICED INTO A LIKUD-LED GOVERNMENT WITHOUT LABOR. MILO NOTED THAT LIKUD WOULD BE IN A STRONG POSITION IN POST-ELECTION NEGOTIATIONS WITH LABOR BECAUSE SHAMIR HELD THE PRIME MINISTRY AND COULD REMAIN AS CARETAKER IN THE POST AS LONG AS NECESSARY UNTIL THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH LABOR. UNDER THIS SCENARIO, MILO SAID PERES MIGHT PREFER TO TAKE THE


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FINANCE PORTFOLIO IN THE NEXT GOVERNMENT. SHAMIR WOULD THEN OFFER ARENS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. THE REST OF THE LIKUD AND LABOR MINISTERS WOULD STAY WHERE THEY WERE, MORE OR LESS. DAVID LEVY WOULD BE UNHAPPY, MILO AGREED, BUT THAT WAS THAT.

POLLS

6. THE FINAL FOUR POLLS (REF B) PUBLISHED TODAY REPORTED THE SMALL PARTIES CONTINUED TO RETAIN THEIR INCREASES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE TWO LARGE PARTIES. OTHERWISE, RESULTS WERE CONTRADICTIONARY. DAHAF REPORTED LIKUD AND LABOR TIED AT 40 SEATS EACH, WITH THE TWO BLOCS TIED AT 60 SEATS. (MILO ASSERTED TO US THAT LIKUD WAS REALLY AHEAD BECAUSE DAHAF'S POLLSTER HAD EVALUATED HER RESULTS EXTRA RIGOROUSLY IN ORDER



PAGE 04 TEL AV 15651 01 OF 02 311835Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EL6

R

*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88JERUSA03591

FILM= D880965-0184

DATE= 31 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= JERUSALEM

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= FOUR ISRAELIS KILLED IN JERICHO BUS ATTACK

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= BUS, BOMBING, PALESTINIANS, INCIDENT, CASUALTY

TAGS= KPAL, PREL, PHUM, PTER, ASEC, IS

<<<<>>>>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
IN PART

IS/FPC/CDR

Date:

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations _____

TS authority _____
 CLASSIFY as S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or

9304029

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 JERUSA 03591 01 OF 02 311541Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/067 W

-----261523 311549Z/47

O 311450Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3880
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03591

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: FOUR ISRAELIS KILLED IN JERICHO BUS
ATTACK

1. [REDACTED] SUMMARY. FOUR ISRAELIS WERE KILLED
OCTOBER 30 WHEN THE EGGED BUS IN WHICH THEY WERE
RIDING WAS HIT BY FIVE MOLOTOV COCKTAILS IN
JERICHO. THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE RESPONDED
WITH LARGE-SCALE ARRESTS AND HARSH RHETORIC.
PALESTINIANS ARE AMBIVALENT. THEY DECRY THE
DEATHS, BUT NOTE THE DAILY LOSS OF PALESTINIAN
LIVES IN THE INTIFADA. THE INCIDENT IS LIKELY
TO STRENGTHEN HARD LINERS ON BOTH SIDES AND
BOLSTER LIKUD'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS. END
SUMMARY.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03591 01 OF 02 311541Z

2. (U) AN ISRAELI WOMAN AND THREE OF HER
CHILDREN WERE KILLED, AND SEVEN OTHERS WERE
INJURED, WHEN AN EGGED BUS WAS ATTACKED WITH
MOLOTOV COCKTAILS IN JERICHO OCTOBER 30. THE
BUS, WHICH WAS EN ROUTE FROM TIBERIAS TO
JERUSALEM, WAS HIT BY MULTIPLE FIRE BOMBS AS IT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WAS PASSING THROUGH THE NORTHERN OUTSKIRTS OF JERICHO AROUND 7:45 PM. ACCORDING TO THE OCTOBER 31 JERUSALEM POST, THE AMBUSH WAS PLANNED WELL. YOUTHS SLOWED THE BUS BY PLACING STONES ON THE ROAD AND THEN HIT IT WITH FIVE PETROL BOMBS. ACCORDING TO A PASSENGER ON THE BUS, THE WOMAN WHO DIED PANICKED AND FROZE IN HER SEAT AT THE BACK OF THE BUS, RESISTING EFFORTS TO SAVE HER. THE INCIDENT IS THE FIRST FATAL ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI VEHICLE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA.

3. (U) ISRAELI RESPONSE HAS BEEN PREDICTABLY SWIFT AND HARSH. THE JERUSALEM POST QUOTES PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR AS PROMISING "AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE...THE MURDERERS WILL BE PUNISHED AND THEIR MURDEROUS INTENTIONS ERADICATED." FOREIGN MINISTER PERES VOWED THAT "THE PERPETRATORS WILL BE CAUGHT AND TERRORISM WILL BE FOUGHT TO THE BITTER END." THE SETTLERS' COMMITTEE FOR SAFE TRAVEL BLAMED THE GOVERNMENT'S LAX SECURITY POLICIES FOR THE INCIDENT AND CALLED FOR THE EXPUSION OF "ANYONE WHO DARES TO LIFT A HAND AGAINST A SOLDIER." GUSH EMUNIM DEMANDED THE EXPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS RELEASED IN THE 1985 PRISONER EXCHANGE WITH THE AHMED JIBRIL ORGANIZATION.

██████████

██████████

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03591 01 OF 02 311541Z

4. ██████ THE IDF CLAMPED A CURFEW ON JERICHO SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT. ACCORDING TO MAYOR KHALAF, SEVERAL HUNDRED MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 60 WERE DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING. THOSE OVER AGE 35 SUBSEQUENTLY WERE RELEASED. HE ADDED THAT SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL YOUTHS THEY BELIEVE PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK AND ARE HOLDING OTHERS FOR FURTHER QUESTIONING.

5. ██████ RESPONSE AMONG PALESTINIANS CONTACTED BY THE CONGEN HAS BEEN AMBIVALENT. WHILE ALL PRIVATELY DECRY THE LOSS OF LIFE AND THE PROBABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES, MANY POINT TO THE DAILY KILLING OF ARABS AND ASK WHY ISRAELIS DO NOT DENOUNCE THESE ACTS. BETHLEHEM MAYOR ELIAS FREIJ TERMED THE INCIDENT "A BAD ACT" AND PREDICTED A SEVERE ISRAELI RESPONSE. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT "NO ONE CAN DENOUNCE THE ACT,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SINCE ISRAELIS DO NOT DENOUNCE THE KILLING OF ARABS." JERICHO MAYOR KHALAF PRIVATELY CONDEMNED VIOLENCE AGAINST BOTH JEWS AND ARABS. NABLUS BUSINESSMAN BASEL KANAAN, WHILE CRITICIZING VIOLENCE, SAID THAT THE OCTOBER 18 KILLING OF A FIVE YEAR OLD IN NABLUS WAS WORSE BECAUSE THE JERICHO ATTACK HAD NOT BEEN AIMED AT CHILDREN.

6. JOURNALISTS MAHDI ABDUL-HADI, HANNA SINIORA, AND DAOUD KUTTAB ALL SAID THEY WERE DEEPLY DISTRESSED BY THE ATTACK. THEY PROMISED TO MAKE STATEMENTS IN THE PRESS AND SAID THEY WERE WORKING WITH OTHERS ON A POSSIBLE STATEMENT BY WEST BANK PALESTINIANS CONDEMNING VIOLENCE.

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03591 02 OF 02 311541Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01
/067 W

-----261530 311549Z /47

O 311450Z OCT 88
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3881
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 03591

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PTER, ASEC, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: FOUR ISRAELIS KILLED IN JERICHO BUS

RADWAN ABU AYYASH, PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION, NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE IN THE TERRITORIES TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT. SINIORA, HOWEVER, SAID HE PLANNED TO PUBLISH ONE TOMORROW WITHOUT SUBMITTING IT TO THE CENSORS. KUTTAB ALSO ADDED THAT EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY TO CONTACT THE PLO AND GET IT TO DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDEMN THE ACT. ABDUL-HADI SAID HE AND OTHERS LIKE HIM THOUGHT A STATEMENT, IF IT MATERIALIZED, SHOULD ALSO CONDEMN THE KILLING OF THE NABLUS FIVE YEAR OLD, WHILE ADDING THAT EFFORTS TO AVENGE THE KILLINGS OF PALESTINIANS

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03591 02 OF 02 311541Z

WERE WRONG.

7. [REDACTED] COMMENT. WHILE NO ONE YET HAS A FIRM IDEA OF WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE JERICHO ATTACK, BOTH ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN OBSERVERS BELIEVE THE DEATHS OF ISRAELI CITIZENS WILL WEAKEN MODERATES ON BOTH SIDES AND ENHANCE LIKUD'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS. GIVEN THE POLITICAL AND EMOTIONAL RESPONSE IN ISRAEL, THE INCIDENT IS LIKELY TO PROVOKE HARSH IDF MEASURES, INCLUDING HOUSE DEMOLITIONS AND THE LEVELING OF THE ROADSIDE BANANA GROVE WHERE THE ATTACKERS ARE SAID TO HAVE WAITED. SINCE THE PERPETRATORS REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN ARRESTED, THEIR TRIAL FOR MURDER IS LIKELY. DEPORTATIONS SEEM A MORE REMOTE POSSIBILITY SINCE, UNLIKE THE BEITA INCIDENT, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IS MORE CLEAR AND SUSPECTS ARE IN CUSTODY.

8. [REDACTED] COMMENT CONTINUED. THE ATTACK IS BEING PORTRAYED BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS AND SETTLERS AS AN ESCALATION IN PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE. THEY CITE INTIFADA LEAFLET NO. 28, WHICH APPEARED ON OCTOBER 30, AS CALLING FOR INCREASED VIOLENCE DURING THE PNC MEETING, INCLUDING "MORE PETROL BOMBS AND MORE STONES." HOWEVER, IT IS PREMATURE TO ATTRIBUTE THE DEATHS TO A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PALESTINIAN DECISION TO ESCALATE THE UPRISING.
EARLIER INTIFADA LEAFLETS HAVE CONTAINED SIMILAR
EXHORTATIONS TO STEPPED-UP STREET ACTION,
INCLUDING MORE DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE USE OF
STONES AND MOLOTOVS. END COMMENT.
WILCOX

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 JERUSA 03591 02 OF 02 311541Z

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

6153

leName : ...t9001158/aaaaeu ds.tel

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00054 01 OF 03 040758Z
ACTION H-03

UNCLASSIFIED P
B1

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-08 SS-00 IO-06 DS-01 /018 W
-----101003 040804Z /20

R 040750Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9078
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
USDOC WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

EXCISE

SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 00054

STATE/H PLEASE PASS TO REP. LANTOS' OFFICE

GENEVA FOR USTR

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ETRD, BU, US

SUBJECT: LANTOS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DIMITROV

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. FOREIGN MINISTER DIMITROV STRESSED BULGARIA'S COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL REFORMS, BUT WAS VAGUE ABOUT THE EMERGENCE OF MULTIPLE POLITICAL PARTIES. HE SAID THAT BULGARIA WAS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HE INSISTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS ON TREATMENT OF THE MUSLIM MINORITY IN BULGARIA, BUT THAT CHANGES MUST BE MADE CAREFULLY AND SLOWLY. MLADENOV AND HE WOULD WELCOME A CHANCE FOR HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AT THE OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE IN MID-FEBRUARY, HE SAID. END SUMMARY.

9702193

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: _____
IM/TPS/CR/IR
 RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
EO Citations
IN PART

FOIA Exemptions: B1
PA Exemptions: _____
CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00054 01 OF 03 040758Z

POLITICAL REFORMS

3. FOREIGN MINISTER BOYKO DIMITROV MET WITH CONGRESSMAN LANTOS, AMBASSADOR AND EMBOFF DECEMBER 22. LANTOS ASKED WHETHER BULGARIA WAS MORE LIKELY TO DEVELOP ALONG THE LINES OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHERE THE BASIC FRAMEWORK WAS RETAINED, BUT MULTIPLE VIEWS COULD BE EXPRESSED, OR ALONG THE LINES OF HUNGARY AND POLAND, WHERE MULTIPLE PARTIES AND FREE ELECTIONS HAD

UNCLASSIFIED

APPEARED. DIMITROV GAVE A GUARDED RESPONSE, SAYING THE AGRARIAN PARTY WOULD BE TRANSFORMED AND EMERGE AS A BONA FIDE ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PARTY, WITH ELEMENTS OF BOTH COOPERATION AND COMPETITION WITH THE CP.

4. DIMITROV WENT ON TO RECALL THAT BULGARIA HAD HAD A LONGER EXPERIENCE WITH POLITICAL PARTIES THAN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WAS OPPOSITION WITHIN CERTAIN LEVELS OF THE CP--PRIMARILY THAT GENERATION IN ITS 50'S--TO ALLOWING A REAL OPPOSITION, BUT THIS GROUP WAS FAIRLY ISOLATED. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID, THE PARTY SHOULD NOT GO OUT OF ITS WAY TO CREATE AN "OPPOSITION," WHICH WOULD BE A FARCE. THE AGRARIANS AND "GREENS" WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY EMERGE AS PARTIES, HE THOUGHT.

5. DIMITROV SAID THAT EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE PARTIES WAS NOT A PRE-CONDITION FOR FREE ELECTIONS. WHAT WAS NECESSARY WAS MULTIPLE CANDIDATES, NOMINATED BY PEOPLE OUTSIDE OF NORMAL PARTY PROCESSES.

6. DIMITROV ADMITTED TO "ONE POINT OF CONCERN," THE ALLEGED DEMAGOGY OF THOSE WHO GET LARGE NUMBERS OF

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00054 01 OF 03 040758Z

PEOPLE OUT ON THE STREET SHOUTING FOR ELECTIONS AND RESIGNATIONS. SOME OF THE SAME PEOPLE THEN SAY ON TV THAT THE CP IS FORCING QUICK ELECTIONS.

7. DIMITROV SAID THAT THE GOB WAS THINKING OF WAYS THAT RESPONSIBLE ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL GROUPS CAN EMERGE. DIALOGUE WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY, BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN FORMALIZED. CONDITIONS DID NOT YET EXIST FOR A ROUNDTABLE, BUT A CHANNEL AND FORM WOULD BE FOUND, HE INSISTED. THE OTHER FORCES WERE NOT YET PREPARED, HE CHARGED, SAYING THEY HAD ONLY CHECKLISTS OF NEGATIVES. BULGARIA NEEDS FREE AND CONTESTED ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, HE SAID, EVEN IF NO ALTERNATIVE PARTIES HAD CRYSTALLIZED. THIS WOULD HELP FORM A NATIONAL CONSENSUS, AND A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH WAS WIDELY ACCEPTED COULD GO FORWARD TO DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS.

8. THE PRESENT CP AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WERE NOT CAPABLE, DIMITROV LAMENTED, AND "NEW TYPES" WERE NEEDED. FOR THE PARTY, SOMETHING CLOSE TO DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM WAS NEEDED, AND SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTIES WERE BEING STUDIED AS MODELS. DIMITROV SAID, HOWEVER, THAT A CHANGE IN PARTY NAME WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED, AS THE PARTY'S HISTORY HAD BEEN POSITIVE UP UNTIL THE PAST 12 YEARS, BEFORE WHICH ZHIVKOV'S POWER HAD BEEN CONSTRAINED BY PARTY TRADITION AND COLLECTIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEADERSHIP. THE PARTY HAD SUFFERED, BUT THE IMPORTANT
THING NOW WAS TO PRESENT A NEW IMAGE AND CHARACTER.
THERE WAS NOT MUCH TIME, HE SAID. SINCE THE PARTY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00054 02 OF 03 040759Z
ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-08 SS-00 IO-06 DS-01 /018 W
-----101034 040805Z /20

R 040750Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9079
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
USDOC WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 00054

STATE/H PLEASE PASS TO REP. LANTOS' OFFICE

GENEVA FOR USTR

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ETRD, BU, US
SUBJECT: LANTOS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DIMITROV


HAD CREATED THE VACUUM OF POLITICAL CULTURE, ONE
OF ITS DUTIES WAS TO TRANSFORM NOT ONLY THE CP, BUT
OTHER PARTIES AS WELL. THINGS WOULD BE "CHAOTIC" IF
THE CP LEFT THE GOVERNMENT, HE ASSERTED.

RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

UNCLASSIFIED

9. LANTOS SAID THAT FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN BULGARIA AND ISRAEL WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE TO MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. THIS WOULD BE VIEWED FAVORABLY IN THE U.S., BUT WAS ALSO THE RIGHT THING TO DO.

UNCLASSIFIED



PAGE 02 SOFIA 00054 02 OF 03 040759Z

10. DIMITROV REPLIED THAT IT WAS HARD TO BE SPECIFIC. THE GOB WAS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING THE QUESTION WITH A VIEW TO MOVING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

B1

TURKISH MINORITY

12. DIMITROV REFERRED TO A REPORT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN BULGARIA'S TREATMENT OF MUSLIMS, SAYING THAT THERE HAD IN FACT BEEN MOVEMENT IN REGARDS TO PROTECTING RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS. SPECIFICS VARIED FROM LOCALITY TO LOCALITY, AND THE MOST DELICATE POINT, USE OF TURKISH NAMES, HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED, BUT THERE HAD BEEN "TREMENDOUS CHANGE," HE INSISTED. SINCE EMOTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS WERE INVOLVED, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE QUICKLY, HE SAID.

13. LANTOS SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN AND REMAINED OUTRAGED



PAGE 03 SOFIA 00054 02 OF 03 040759Z

OVER FORCED NAME CHANGES. DIMITROV REPLIED THAT BULGARIA NEEDED RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY, BUT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WAS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO FINDING A CIVILIZED SOLUTION, NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE OF INTER-

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS, BUT BECAUSE IT WAS NECESSARY THAT ALL BULGARIAN CITIZENS FEEL EQUAL REGARDLESS OF RELIGION, LANGUAGE, OR CUSTOMS. EACH STEP TOWARD THIS GOAL, HOWEVER, MUST BE CAUTIOUS, AND ACCEPTABLE TO A BROAD NATIONAL CONSENSUS TO AVOID ETHNIC UNREST AND CONFLICT.

UNCLASSIFIED

FUTURE CONTACTS

14. LANTOS EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON ANY TIME BEFORE THE JULY 4 CONGRESSIONAL RECESS, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT CONGRESS WOULD BE VERY ATTENTIVE TO WHAT DIMITROV HAD TO SAY. DIMITROV REPLIED THAT "WE HAVE OUR SURVIVAL TO THINK ABOUT," DURING THAT PERIOD, AND NOTED THAT SECRETARY BAKER HAD A STANDING INVITATION TO VISIT BULGARIA, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE AND MLADENOV MIGHT BE ABLE TO TALK WITH THE SECRETARY DURING THE OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE IN MID-FEBRUARY. LANTOS SAID THAT HE WOULD SEE SECRETARY BAKER UPON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD REPORT ON HIS TRIP.

15. THE AMBASSADOR TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE MEETING TO EXPRESS THANKS TO DIMITROV FOR GOB EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST.

NNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00054 03 OF 03 040759Z
ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 EUR-08 SS-00 IO-06 DS-01 /018 W
-----101025 040804Z /20

R 040750Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9080

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
USDOC WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 00054

STATE/H PLEASE PASS TO REP. LANTOS' OFFICE

GENEVA FOR USTR

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ETRD, BU, US

SUBJECT: LANTOS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DIMITROV

DIMITROV SAID THAT BULGARIA WOULD HAVE OFFICIALS ON DUTY IN RUSE IN VIEW OF THE FLUID SITUATION INSIDE ROMANIA. HE ALSO REMARKED THAT THE EC WAS CONSIDERING USE OF BULGARIAN FACILITIES IN SENDING IN A FIELD HOSPITAL TO BE LOCATED IN RUSE.

COMMENT

16. AFTER THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK, INCLUDING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS AND RESTORATION OF RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC RIGHTS, DIMITROV'S CAUTIOUS COMMENTS ABOUT PROGRESS ON POLITICAL REFORMS,

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00054 03 OF 03 040759Z

AND THE NEED FOR CAUTION ON THE TURKISH ISSUE ARE SOMEWHAT OUT OF DATE. IT MAY BE THAT DIMITROV WAS MERELY BEING GUARDED BEFORE A FINAL DECISION WAS TAKEN.

17. CONGRESSMAN LANTOS DID NOT CLEAR THIS MESSAGE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. POLANSKY

UNCLASSIFIED

leName : .../t891210/aaaaahhn.tel

UNCLASSIFIED B1

E137

PAGE 01
ACTION EUR-00

SOFIA 06972 01 OF 03 281233Z

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01
	OMB-01	INRE-00	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	P-02
	T-01	/037 W					

-----270200 300743Z /12

R 281221Z DEC 89
 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9001
 INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

EXCISE

SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 06972

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, BU
 SUBJECT: MLADENOV REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO
 - DEMOCRATIZATIONS; LANTOS SAYS USG IS
 - PREPARED TO HELP

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN A MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN TOM LANTOS, BULGARIAN LEADER PETUR MLADENOV REAFFIRMED HIS GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS, INCLUDING DIALOGUE WITH INDEPENDENT FORCES AND DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION OF THE COUNTRY'S ETHNIC PROBLEMS. IN RESPONSE TO LANTOS' RESTATEMENT OF THE USG'S PREPAREDNESS TO OFFER ECONOMIC ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE, SUCH AS GATT AND MFN STATUS, MLADENOV SAID THAT THE PROGRESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION WOULD CONTINUE AND THAT REFORMS WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONALLY AND LEGISLATIVELY GUARANTEED. HE REPEATED HIS

9702193
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 () RELEASE
 () EXCISE
 () DENY
 JMWTS/CR/IR PRRS Date: 11-21-97
 () DECLASSIFY
 () DECLASSIFY IN PART
 EO Citations
 () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C
 FOIA Exemptions
 EA Exemptions

PAGE 02 SOFIA 06972 01 OF 03 281233Z

INVITATION TO HOST SECRETARY BAKER ON A VISIT TO BULGARIA AND, AT LANTOS' SUGGESTION, HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER EXPLORING GREATER BILATERAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. FINALLY, HE ROUNDLY CRITICIZED ROMANIA'S OUSTED LEADER CEAUCESCU AS A DICTATOR AND CRIMINAL, SUPPORTED BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY'S OFFERS TO ASSIST IN MEDICAL AID TO VICTIMS OF RECENT CIVIL CONFLICT THERE, AND CONFIRMED THE MINISTRY'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IN EVACUATING AMERICAN PERSONNEL FROM BUCHAREST. END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. IN A NINETY-MINUTE MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN AND MRS. TOM LANTOS, THE AMBASSADOR, AND POST HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER (NOTETAKER) ON 23 DECEMBER, BULGARIAN LEADER PETUR MLADENOV REAFFIRMED HIS LEADERSHIP'S AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S (BCP) COMMITMENT TO COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. HE WELCOMED POLITICAL PLURALISM, HE SAID, BECAUSE "NO PARTY CAN SUCCEED ON ITS OWN--WE NEED UNITY OF THE PEOPLE." HE SAID THAT BULGARIA MUST BE A "PEACEFUL, OPEN COUNTRY," AND SHOULD "ACHIEVE UNITY WITH ALL FORCES, INCLUDING NEWLY ARISING ONES, TO WORK TO DEVELOP A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY."

4. MLADENOV UNVEILED A POLITICAL TIMETABLE, BEGINNING WITH ROUNDTABLE TALKS WITH NON-STATE ORGANIZATIONS. ON 22 DECEMBER, HE MET WITH THE PATRIARCH OF THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH. ON 25 DECEMBER, HE SAID, HE WOULD MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AGRARIAN PARTY. MEETINGS WITH TRADE UNIONS WOULD BE ORGANIZED NEXT, THEN WITH THE FATHERLAND FRONT (THE PARTY'S GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS, OF WHICH ALMOST THE ENTIRE POPULATION IS A VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY



PAGE 03 SOFIA 06972 01 OF 03 281233Z

MEMBER), AND, FINALLY, "NEWLY FOUNDED," INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS. THIS WOULD LEAD INTO A PARTY CONGRESS WHICH IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR 19 MARCH 1990 BUT WHICH MAY BE SCHEDULED FOR AN EVEN EARLIER DATE. IN ANNOUNCING THIS POSSIBLE CHANGE, MLADENOV TURNED TO THE AMBASSADOR AND SAID, "DON'T TELL ZHELO ZHELEV" (CHAIRMAN, UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES) "OR YOUR OTHER FRIENDS ABOUT THIS." FINALLY, "FREE ELECTIONS" WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE END OF MAY, 1990.

5. THE GOAL OF ALL OF THESE TALKS, MLADENOV CONTINUED, IS TO "DISCUSS MATTERS OF DEVELOPMENT AND TRY TO JOIN EFFORTS TO SOLVE BULGARIA'S PROBLEMS. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT HOW THE WORLD EVALUATES US. IT'S VERY IMPORTANT WHETHER THE WORLD IS SYMPATHETIC OR NOT AND WHETHER THE WORLD IS READY TO COOPERATE." THE UNITED STATES IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO BULGARIA, HE SAID, IN LIGHT OF ITS "ROLE IN THE WORLD AND IN EUROPE. WE'D APPRECIATE A FAVORABLE ATTITUDE FROM THE UNITED STATES," HE ADDED, INCLUDING A VISIT FROM SECRETARY BAKER. "I'D BE HAPPY TO WELCOME HIM, EVEN THOUGH I'M NO LONGER FOREIGN MINISTER," HE SAID.

UNCLASSIFIED

6. CONGRESSMAN LANTOS IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AND MRS. LANTOS AS "BULGARIA'S BIGGEST FRIENDS IN THE CONGRESS AND POSSIBLY IN THE UNITED STATES." "WE FEEL WE'RE TALKING AMONG FRIENDS," HE SAID, "AND CAN BE CANDID

BECAUSE WE WANT TO BE OF HELP." THAT HELP COULD INCLUDE MFN STATUS, AS HE WAS WORKING ALREADY ON THE USSR'S BEHALF, OPIC RIGHTS, JOINT VENTURES, REGULAR RELATIONS BETWEEN BULGARIA'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE US CONGRESS, AND GREATER TIES WITH THE EC, THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, AND TAIWAN.

UNCLASSIFIED



NNNN



PAGE 01 SOFIA 06972 02 OF 03 281235Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /037 W

-----270202 300744Z /12

R 281221Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9002
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS




SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 06972

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, BU
SUBJECT: MLADENOV REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO

UNCLASSIFIED

7. "REMAINING PROBLEMS" HAD TO BE RESOLVED, HOWEVER, BEFORE THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION BECAME AS "FORTHCOMING" WITH BULGARIA AS IT WAS BEING WITH HUNGARY AND POLAND. THESE INCLUDED RESOLUTION OF THE ETHNIC PROBLEMS INVOLVING TURKS, POMAKS, AND GYPSIES AND THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT OF REFORMS SUCH AS PRESS FREEDOMS AND POLITICAL PLURALISM WHICH



UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 06972 02 OF 03 281235Z

HAVE ALREADY BEGUN IN PRACTICE IF NOT IN LAW. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS "PLEASED TO HEAR" THAT 80,000 ETHNIC TURKS WHO FLED BULGARIA DURING THE SUMMER HAD RETURNED. "I KNOW WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR LEADERSHIP FULLY REINTEGRATING THEM, WITH JOBS AND HOUSES, IN BULGARIAN SOCIETY." "WE WANT TO SEE AS HAPPY AN ENDING AS POSSIBLE," HE STATED.

8. IN ROMANIA, THINGS WERE SUDDENLY MOVING VERY RAPIDLY, HE OBSERVED.

B1

HE SAID THAT ROMANIA WOULD, IN THE NEXT "THREE TO SIX WEEKS," BE EAGER "TO SHOW IT'S MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY WITH FULL FORCE." WITH CHANGE ALSO MOVING WITH FULL FORCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE GDR, HE CONTINUED, HE WAS "ANXIOUS TO SEE THAT THE PROCESS IN BULGARIA" DOES NOT BECOME SO SLOW THAT BULGARIA IS LEFT BEHIND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THIS "FAST-MOVING" REGION. "IT SEEMS TO ME," HE EXPLAINED, "THAT THERE IS ALMOST A RACE TO INTRODUCED DEMOCRATIC MEASURES, INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY."

9. LANTOS THEN TURNED TO EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HUNGARY HAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED FULL RELATIONS, AS HAD ROMANIA EARLIER, AND POLAND WOULD FOLLOW IN A FEW WEEKS. IN THE GDR, "MODROW SAYS THEY'RE READY, TOO, AND I HAD THE SAME IMPRESSION IN PRAGUE." HE SAID, "I SUGGEST THAT IT IS IN BULGARIA'S INTEREST TO QUICKEN THE PROCESS, TO STAY AHEAD OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR." HE THEN URGED MLADENOV NOT TO BE AFRAID OF REPERCUSSIONS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST.

B1

UNCLASSIFIED

10. MLADENOV ASSURED LANTOS THAT HIS "TEAM" INCLUDES A MAJORITY WHICH IS "SINCERELY COMMITTED TO THE

PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIZATION" AND THAT IT WOULD "SEE SUCCESS." THE MAJORITY ARE "PEOPLE I'VE KNOWN FOR YEARS. DUE TO UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO EXPRESS THEIR REAL VIEWS. "NOW THEY ARE ABLE, AND NONE WANT TO SLOW DOWN." HE CONTINUED, "PLURALISM WILL BE IRREVERSIBLE. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRATIZATION WILL BE IRREVERSIBLE." BUT CAUTION IS IN ORDER. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO AVOID "DESTABILIZATION" AND TO "TIME THINGS REASONABLY." IT WILL TAKE TIME TO DEVELOP NEW LAWS. IT WILL ALSO TAKE TIME TO "SOLVE PROBLEMS IN THE MORAL SPHERE," WHERE THE "DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WORDS AND DEEDS HAS LED TO CYNICISM." OTHER CHANGES CANNOT BE IMMEDIATE, EITHER: THE YOUNG PEOPLE (OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY BUILDING ON 14 DECEMBER WHEN MLADENOV WAS SHOUTED DOWN) DEMANDED IMMEDIATE RESIGNATIONS OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS, BUT THIS WOULD MEAN IMMEDIATE ELECTIONS, FOR WHICH THEY ARE NOT READY. "WE HAVE TO LEARN TO BE DEMOCRATIC AND TOLERANT" AND TO KNOW LEGISLATIVE METHODS, HE SAID. "THIS IS TRUE FOR COMMUNISTS AND FOR EVERYONE ELSE."

UNCLASSIFIED

11. AS TO THE ETHNIC PROBLEM, MLADENOV SAID THAT THIS WAS A "SENSITIVE ISSUE" AND "THE MOST DIFFICULT HERITAGE" OF THE ZHIVKOV REGIME. "PEOPLE ARE BORN EQUAL AND SHOULD HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS," HE CONTINUED. "RELIGION, FAITH, AND ONE'S ORIGIN ARE PRIVATE MATTERS. OUR LEGISLATION WILL SETTLE THIS." HE CONCLUDED, "MY FRIENDS (IN THE LEADERSHIP) AND I

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 06972 03 OF 03 281235Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-00	L-C3	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01
	OMB-01	INRE-00	USIA-00	SF-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	P-02
	T-01	/037 W					

-----270203 300744Z /12

R 281221Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9003
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 06972

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINS, BU
SUBJECT: MLADENOV REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO

AGREE: NATIONALISM AND CHAUVINISM ARE DANGEROUS TO ANY COUNTRY."

12. AS TO LANTOS' ADVICE ON BULGARIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS, MLADENOV SAID, "WE ARE A SMALL COUNTRY AND LISTEN TO ADVICE OF FRIENDS. WE'LL CONSIDER WHAT YOU SAID VERY SERIOUSLY. PLEASE REMEMBER THIS MIGHT LEAD TO FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. WE HAVE THE LARGEST INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD AMONG SOCIALIST COUNTRIES."

13. MLADENOV SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE UNITED STATES' FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TO BULGARIA AND THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE ITS EFFORTS TOWARD MFN STATUS, GATT, AND, LATER, PARTICIPATION IN THE EC.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 SOFIA 06972 03 OF 03 281235Z

14. FINALLY, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM LANTOS, MLADENOV SAID THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED AT CEAUCESCU'S OVERTHROW IN ROMANIA. HE AND CEAUCESCU HAD ALWAYS HAD "A MUTUAL HATRED," HE SAID. IN THE DISTANT FUTURE, HE PREDICTED THAT ROMANIA "WILL BE PLURALISTIC" AND THAT THE MONARCHY WILL NOT BE RESTORED. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, HE AFFIRMED THAT BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOYKO DIMITROV WOULD ASSIST US WITH THE EVACUATION OF US PERSONNEL AND THAT THE COMMON MARKET MIGHT USE A BULGARIAN HOSPITAL AS A SITE FOR TREATING THE WOUNDED. THE AMBASSADOR THANKED MLADENOV FOR HIS COOPERATION IN THE EVACUATION AND INFORMED HIM OF A SUCCESSFUL 22 DECEMBER MEETING ON NARCOTICS ISSUES WITH INTERIOR MINISTER TANEV (REPORTED SEPTEL).

UNCLASSIFIED

15. COMMENT. [

B1

leName : .../t891210/aaaaahhn.tel

MLADENOV WAS, ALTHOUGH EQUALLY CORDIAL, RESERVED AND NON-SPECIFIC IN HIS ASSERTIONS THAT THE COUNTRY WOULD CONTINUE ITS PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND THAT IT WOULD MOVE TO ASSURE FULL RIGHTS FOR ITS ETHNIC MINORITIES. LIKEWISE, HE WAS NON-COMMITTAL IN HIS RESPONSE TO LANTOS' SUGGESTION THAT BULGARIA ASSUME FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. END COMMENT. POLANSKY

31
UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

UNCLASSIFIED

2
E221

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00612 01 OF 03 301444Z
ACTION EUR-00

R

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
 PA-02 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /019 W
-----311240 310313Z /66

R 301431Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9468
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 00612

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU, PHUM
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS 25 JANUARY

25 JANUARY

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO" -----

1. THE MANAGING COUNCIL OF BANU (BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY) HELD A SESSION WHICH DISCUSSED THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BULGARIAN VILLAGE: THE "NECESSARY EQUALITY OF THE THREE FORMS OF OWNERSHIP" (STATE, COOPERATIVE, AND PRIVATE), TAXES, CREDITS, AND OTHER ISSUES. THE SESSION PROPOSED THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT, FREE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, THE OPENING OF BULGARIA TOWARD EUROPE AND THE WHOLE WORLD, AND ITS JOINING A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS. BANU'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP WAS TASKED WITH ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND CHILE AND UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00612 01 OF 03 301444Z

ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA.

2. RD EDITOR-IN-CHIEF RADOSLAV RADEV IS AUTHOR OF A LENGTHY ARTICLE IN WHICH HE RESPONDS TO CRITICS' DEMANDS FOR HIS RESIGNATION. RADEV EXPLAINS THAT HE AND THE NEWSPAPER PERSONALLY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME PUBLICATIONS (BEFORE 10 NOVEMBER 1989) WHICH WERE AIMED AT DISCREDITING PEOPLE WHO HAD BECOME "INCONVENIENT" FOR TODOR ZHIVKOV AND HIS ENTOURAGE. AS EXAMPLES, RADEV MENTIONS ARTICLES AGAINST STOYAN MIKHAILOV, WHO, TWO DAYS AFTER THE

9702193
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN/PS/CR/IR/RRS/Dir: 11-21-97
 RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART
EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
TS authority to
 CLASSIFY as () S cr () C S cr
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S cr () C

PUBLICATION, WAS EXPELLED FROM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC/BCP, AND JOURNALIST GEORGI TAMBUEV, WHO WAS ACCUSED OF SLANDERING A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN ETRPOLE. RADEV CLAIMS THAT DURING ZHIVKOV'S TOTALITARIAN RULE NO ONE DARED DISOBEY HIM, THAT A NUMBER OF CRITICAL ARTICLES IN THE SPIRIT OF RESTRUCTURING WERE STOPPED, AND THAT EVEN RADEV HIMSELF AS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF DID NOT HAVE THE FREEDOM TO PUBLISH EVERYTHING HE CONSIDERED USEFUL AND NECESSARY.

3. IVAN VURBANOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE ECOGLASNOST CHAPTER IN SVISHTOV, STATES THAT, FOR ECOLOGICAL REASONS, HE AND HIS ORGANIZATION ARE CATEGORICALLY AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN BULGARIA. IN ANOTHER ARTICLE, HOWEVER, ATANAS GEORGIEV, A SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASSERTS THAT NUCLEAR POWER IS THE ONLY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE "FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR ENERGY SYSTEM."

4. RD PROVIDES SOME DETAILS ABOUT THE NEW BILL ON RELIGION, WHICH WAS SENT FOR DISCUSSION TO MANY ORGANIZATIONS AND WHICH WILL BE PUT FORWARD AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THE BILL INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS: ALL CITIZENS WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO CARRY OUT THE RITES SPECIFIC TO THEIR RELIGION. RELIGIOUS

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00612 01 OF 03 301444Z

COMMITTEES WILL BE SEPARATED FROM THE STATE AND WILL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW. ALL RELIGIONS AND THEIR ESTABLISHMENTS WILL BE JURIDICALLY RECOGNIZED BY THE COURTS. RELIGIOUS GROUPS WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO RUN THEIR OWN SCHOOLS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (AS WAS PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED). PARENTS WILL HAVE THE FREEDOM TO IMPART RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE TO THEIR CHILDREN IF THEY SO WISH. FINALLY, RELIGIOUS GROUPS WILL BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES.

5. IVAN SHPATOV, MINISTER OF INTERNAL TRADE, FOCUSES ON THE SHORTAGE OF SOME FOODSTUFFS, SUCH AS MILK AND DAIRY PRODUCTS, SUGAR, AND COFFEE, WHICH ARE LACKING DUE TO INSUFFICIENT PRODUCTION (MILK) OR DELAYED IMPORTS (SUGAR, COFFEE). IN SOME CASES, HOWEVER, THE SHORTAGES ARE DUE TO WEAKNESSES IN EFFICIENCY OF PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRODUCTS.

6. MINISTER OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS KHRISTO KHRISTOV SAYS THAT, AS AN AUSTERITY MEASURE, MINISTRY PERSONNEL WHO ARE WORKING ABROAD MUST BE CUT BACK BY 15 TO 20 PERCENT.

7. ACCORDING TO A RD CORRESPONDENT, IN HIS 24 JANUARY STATEMENT ON TELEVISION, UDF (UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES) CHAIRMAN ZHELYU ZHELEV DID NOT DENY QUOTES OF HIS REMARKS CARRIED BY THE DUTCH NEWSPAPER "DE VOLKSKRANT" UNDER THE

ate Printed: 07/15/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 90SOFIA00612

CHANNEL: n/a

2

ileName : .../t900111/aaaaaino.tel

TITLE: "OPPOSITION IN SOFIA DEMANDS THAT THE EEC POSTPONE THE GRANTING OF AID" (TO BULGARIA). BORISLAV KOSTURKOV, A JOURNALIST FROM "ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME," DISAGREES WITH THE CONCLUSIONS MADE BY THE RD CORRESPONDENT THAT IF THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00612 02 OF 03 301509Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
PA-02 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /019 W
-----322144 310314Z /66

R 301431Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9469
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 00612

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU, PHUM

SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS 25 JANUARY

"OPPORTUNITY FOR AID IS MISSED," IT WILL BE ZHELEV'S
FAULT.

8. THE NATIONAL CONSTITUENT CONFERENCE OF THE UNION OF FIGHTERS AGAINST FASCISM AND CAPITALISM TOOK PLACE IN SOFIA. ARMY GENERAL DOBRI DZHUROV, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GREETED THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE. KRUM RADONOV WAS ELECTED AS THE NEW CHAIRMAN OF THE UNION.

9. A UNION OF SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZE FIRMS, BOTH STATE AND COOPERATIVELY OWNED, WAS Q'MED. ITS GOAL IS TO SECURE THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF ITS MEMBERS AND TO CREATE A JOINT-STOCK BANK AND A STOCK MARKET OF THE UNION. IT ADOPTED A TEMPORARY ECONOMIC PLATFORM AND A STATUTE. NEITHER ARE DESCRIBED.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00612 02 OF 03 301509Z

10. IN A MEETING OF EMPLOYEES OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH, PARTICIPANTS DEMANDED THE RESIGNATION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY, WAGE-INCREASES FOR MEDICAL WORKERS, FREEDOM TO ENGAGE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE, A 7-HOUR WORKDAY AND A 5-DAY WORKWEEK. THE MEETING WAS ORGANIZED BY THE INDEPENDENT TRADE UNION "PODKREPA'S" BRANCH FOR MEDICAL WORKERS. ACCORDING TO "PODKREPA," IF THE MINISTRY FAILS TO MEET THESE DEMANDS, A GENERAL NATIONAL ONE-HOUR STRIKE OF MEDICAL WORKERS WILL BE HELD ON 31 JANUARY. ITS DURATION WILL INCREASE BY 1 HOUR EVERY DAY. TEAMS WILL BE FORMED FOR URGENT MEDICAL AID.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

11. WE SHOULD USE "EUROPEAN CRITERIA" IN THE MODERNIZATION, POLITICAL RENOVATION, AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOCIETY, SAYS PETUR-EMIL MITEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COORDINATION COUNCIL OF THE "BULGARIAN ROAD TO EUROPE" BCP INITIATIVE GROUP. "WE ARE FOR A SOCIALLY ORIENTED MARKET ECONOMY WITH HIGHLY DEVELOPED COLLECTIVE FORMS OF OWNERSHIP, WITH POWERFUL SOCIAL FUNDS, AND NOT FOR DEMOCRATIC-CAPITALISM", SAYS MITEV. "VREME"

12. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE VARNA BCP ORGANIZATION GAVE A VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE TO PETKO DANEV, CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND FIRST SECRETARY OF THE OBLAST AND MUNICIPAL BCP COMMITTEE IN VARNA AND PROPOSED THAT THE CC/BCP NOT ELECT HIM TO ANY IMPORTANT POSTS. (NOTE: IN A RECENT TV BROADCAST, A REPORTER CLAIMED THAT DANEV HAD ORDERED THAT JOURNALISTS IN VARNA NOT SHOW OR PUBLISH A CRITICAL REPORT THEY HAVE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00612 02 OF 03 301509Z

PREPARED.) "NARODNA MLADEZH."

13. "ROUND-TABLE" PARTICIPANT (IN THE UDF) YANKO YANKOV IS A LAWYER WHO WAS A POLITICAL PRISONER FROM 1984 UNTIL

OCTOBER, 1989. IN THE MAGAZINE "OTFCHESTVO" HE DESCRIBES HIS STAY IN PRISON AND THE ILL-TREATMENT TO WHICH HE WAS SUBJECTED. ALTHOUGH HE DECLARES THAT THE DISBANDED SIXTH DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY OCCUPY A SECRET APARTMENT IN SOFIA, AT 86 TOLBUKIN BOULEVARD, THE MAGAZINE REPORTS THAT AN INSPECTION OF THIS ADDRESS SHOWED THAT THIS WAS NOT TRUE.

14. "NM" REPORTS THAT A SOFIA WOMAN WHO WORKS AT KREMIKOVTSI METALLURGICAL COMBINE WENT ON A HUNGER STRIKE. SHE SAID THAT SHE HAS BEEN WAITING FOR 10 YEARS FOR AN APARTMENT. NOW SHE LIVES IN ONE ROOM WITH HER TWO CHILDREN, PAYS A HIGH RENT, AND FEELS DESPERATE BECAUSE NO ONE IS INTERESTED IN HER PROBLEMS. THE STRIKE WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN FRONT OF THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL DIRECTOR OF THE FIRM "KREMIKOVTSI."

15. IN A SHORT PARAGRAPH, "NM" NOTES THAT BOOKSTORES' AND PUBLISHERS' REMAINING STOCKS OF BOOKS BY TODOR ZHIVKOV WILL BE RECYCLED FOR PAPER.

ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME

16. A "PEASANT DEMOCRATIC UNION" WAS SET UP IN THE VILLAGE OF YAKIMOVO, MIHAILOVGRAD OBLAST. IT UNITES NON-PARTY PEOPLE, COMMUNISTS, AND BANU MEMBERS. THE PURPOSE OF THE UNION IS TO SPEED UP ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORM, TO STOP MIGRATION AWAY FROM THE VILLAGE, AND TO

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00612 03 OF 03 301446Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-05	CIAE-00	DODE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09
	PA-02	INRE-00	USIE-00	SP-02	PRS-01	/019 W	
				-----311243 310315Z /66			

R 301431Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9170
 INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03. SOFIA 00612

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU, PHUM

SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS 25 JANUARY

RESTORE THE VITALITY OF VILLAGES.

17. THE MINERS FROM THREE MORE MINES (IN ZLATOGRAĐ, RUDOZEM AND MADAN) JOINED THE STRIKE OF THE MINERS FROM THE FIRM "GORUBSO." MINERS FROM CHELOPECH MINE HAVE BEEN ON A SITDOWN HUNGER STRIKE FOR THREE DAYS IN THE MINE. THEY DEMAND THE RESIGNATION OF THE DIRECTOR AND THREE OTHER LEADERS.

18. ON 24 JANUARY, BUS DRIVERS IN VELIKO TURNOVO WENT ON A PRELIMINARY 7-HOUR STRIKE AND PARALYZED CITY TRANSPORTATION. THEY INSISTED ON THE RESIGNATIONS OF THE LEADERS OF THEIR FIRM, "AVTOSTOPANSTVO."

KOOPERATIVNO SELO

 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00612 03 OF 03 301446Z

19. "ECOGLASNOST," JOINTLY WITH THE "COMMITTEE FOR THE ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC PROTECTION OF SVISHTOV" AND THE "MOTHERS AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS" INITIATIVE COMMITTEE, PRESENTED LOCAL LEADERS WITH A PETITION WITH 6,000 SIGNATURES OF MOTHERS FROM SVISHTOV AND 500 MEDICAL WORKERS. THEY ARE PROTESTING AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION OF BELENE NUCLEAR POWER STATION BECAUSE THEY CLAIM THAT ITS CONSTRUCTION WILL FORCE THE CLOSURE OF 6 ENTERPRISES FOR FOOD STUFFS AND THE ONLY BULGARIAN ENTERPRISE FOR DIETETIC CHILDREN'S FOOD.

20. ON 24 JANUARY A GROUP OF 50 - 60 CITIZENS GATHERED AT THE "SERDIKA" BOROUGH BCP COMMITTEE IN SOFIA. THEY WERE SHOUTING: "DOWN WITH BCP," "BEFORE AND NOW, THE BCP IS A MAFIA," AND "UDF" (UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES). THEY BROKE THE SIGN BEARING THE NAME OF THE COMMITTEE AND TRIED TO ENTER THE BUILDING. THE GROUP DISPERSED AFTER MILITIAMEN WERE CALLED BY NEARBY CITIZENS. POLANSKY

2
F214

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00599 01 OF 07 301154Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00
	DODE-00	H-01	NEA-04	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	AGRE-00	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/043 W

-----265652 301423Z /49

R 301130Z JAN 90
 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9452
 INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SOFIA 00599

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A
 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
 SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: 12-17 JANUARY

12 JANUARY

1. IN AN INTERVIEW, ANABEL MARKOVA, THE WIFE OF THE BULGARIAN WRITER GEORGI MARKOV WHO FLED FROM THE COUNTRY IN 1969, REVEALS THAT MARKOV LIVED AND WORKED THEREAFTER IN LONDON, WHERE HE WAS KILLED FOR HIS CRITICISM OF THE POLITICAL REGIME IN BULGARIA. MARKOVA RECENTLY MET WITH POLITBURO MEMBER ALEXANDER LILOV, BUT NO DETAILS OF THE MEETING ARE GIVEN.

2. THE PEOPLE OF VARNA ARE INDIGNANT AND ARE PROTESTING AGAINST THE POLLUTION OF THE CITY'S DRINKING WATER, IN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00599 01 OF 07 301154Z

SPITE OF PRESS STATEMENTS RECOMMENDING ITS USE. THE POPULATION INSISTS ON CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW WATER PIPELINE.

3. RD CARRIES THE PROGRAM DECLARATION OF THE "MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MARXISM AND RENOVATION OF SOCIALISM." IT SAYS THAT THE MOVEMENT SUPPORTS "MARXISM FREE FROM THE DOGMA OF STALINISM." THE MOVEMENT WILL WORK FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL EFFORTS OF ALL PEOPLE WHO ARE LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT DEEP ECONOMIC, SOCIO-POLITICAL AND MORAL CRISIS OF

9702193
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 () RELEASE
 () EXCISE
 () DENY
 IN/IPS/CK/IR RRS Date: 11-21-97
 () DECLASSIFY
 () DECLASSIFY IN PART
 EO Citations
 PA Exemptions
 Exemptions
 () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C
 TS authority to

BULGARIAN SOCIETY. THE MOVEMENT WILL WORK FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FREE, DEMOCRATIC AND HUMANE SOCIALIST SOCIETY AND WILL RESIST ANY ATTEMPTS TO "RESTORE CAPITALISM" IN THE COUNTRY, THE DECLARATION READS.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

4. IN AN INTERVIEW FOR "OTECHESTVEN FRONT," THE NOTED SURGEON DR. ALEXANDER CHIRKOV DELINEATES DEFORMATIONS IN THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC HEALTH. THESE WERE ALL CAUSED BY THE TOTALITARIAN REGIME, HE SAYS. HE POINTS OUT THE NECESSITY FOR SERIOUS CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH ESTABLISHMENTS IN BULGARIA, AND OF IMPROVEMENT OF THE QUALITY OF FOOD, ESPECIALLY FOR CHILDREN, WHO GET SICK MORE OFTEN THAN CHILDREN IN WEST EUROPE DUE TO SHORTAGES OF FRESH FRUITS, VEGETABLES, AND NATURAL FRUIT AND VEGETABLE JUICES.

5. A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY, WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN 1987 BUT WAS NOT PUBLISHED, SHOWS THAT THE REAL INCOME OF THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR BUYING-POWER ARE DECREASING CONSTANTLY WHILE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO LIVE ON THE POVERTY LINE GROWS. "OTECHESTVEN FRONT."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00599 01 OF 07 301154Z

6. THE TASK OF THE "GREEN" PARTY IN BULGARIA IS TO FIGHT FOR DEMOCRATIZATION, FOR ELIMINATION OF THE BCP'S MONOPOLY ON STATE POWER, AND FOR CHANGES IN THE MAIN STRUCTURES OF POWER IN ORDER TO CREATE A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. THE "GREEN" PARTY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE ECOLOGIZATION OF INDUSTRY, IN THE JUST RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS OF OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL LAND, AND OTHER IMPORTANT PROBLEMS, SAYS FILIP DIMITROV, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE "GREEN" PARTY. "KOOPERATIVNO SELO."

7. ON 23 JANUARY 1989, A GROUP OF SOFIA UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSORS (INCLUDING NIKOLAY GENCHEV, NIKOLAY VASILEV, AND KRISTIAN VASILEV) RAISED DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY OF THE UNIVERSITY AND REJECTED CATEGORICALLY THE ATTEMPTS OF SOME PEOPLE TO "IMPOSE THE ELECTION" OF TODOR ZHIVKOV AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL FOR UNIVERSITY STRATEGY. TODOR ZHIVKOV WAS DULY INFORMED AND, TWO DAYS LATER, HE SENT A LETTER SAYING THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE CC/BCP, AND THAT IT WAS NOT CORRECT. "NARODNA MLADZH." "

8. "STURSHEL" (THE SATIRICAL PAPER) PUBLISHES A LETTER OF OGNYAN DOYNOV, BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO NORWAY, IN WHICH HE PROTESTS AGAINST A "STURSHEL" ARTICLE BY PETUR NEZNAKOMOV, WHO "DISCREDITS A BULGARJAN AMEASSADOR BEFORE THE BULGARIAN AND FOREIGN PUBLIC." DOYNOV DECLARES HE IS

ate Printed: 07/15/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 90SOFIA00599

CHANNEL: n/a

2

ilaName : .../t900111/aaaaainu.tel

SUING NEZNAKOMOV. IN HIS REPLY TO DOYNOV, NEZNAKOMOV SAYS THAT HE WILL INVITE ALL OF HIS COLLEAGUES TO ATTEND THE TRIAL, AT WHICH THEY WILL GET TO KNOW MANY FACTS ABOUT THE NOMENCLATURE CADRES, WHICH, UNTIL NOW, HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CONCEALED FROM THE PUBLIC.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00599 02 OF 07 301156Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00
	DODE-00	H-01	NEA-04	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	AGRE-00	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/043 W

-----265743 301423Z /49

R 301130Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9453
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 07 SOFIA 00599

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: 12-17 JANUARY

NARODNA KULTURA

9. THE LATEST NATIONAL PHOTO EXHIBITION IN SOFIA PROVED THAT PHOTOGRAPHERS ARE STILL AFRAID OF UNOFFICIAL CENSORSHIP IN BULGARIA. THAT IS WHY NO ONE DARED SHOW OR

Date Printed: 07/15/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 90SOFIA00599

CHANNEL: n/a

2

FileName : .../t900111/aaaaainu.tel

DISPLAY ANYTHING DIVERGING FROM THE USUAL PRODUCTS OF TOTALITARIAN CULTURE, SAYS GEORGI LOZANOV. THE SPECIAL PRIZE FOR CIVIC COURAGE WAS AWARDED TO SIMON VARSANO, WHO, EARLY IN 1989, WAS SHOT IN THE LEG BY SECURITY AGENTS WHO SAW HIM WRITING THE WORDS "TODOR BERIA ZHIVKOV". ON A WALL.

10. ARCHITECT YAVOR DICHEV PROPOSES CHANGES IN THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00599 02 OF 07 301156Z

BULGARIAN COAT-OF-ARMS: REMOVAL OF ALL SYMBOLS (I.E., THE RED STAR) EXCEPT THE LION AND THE "681," THE YEAR OF THE FOUNDING OF THE BULGARIAN STATE.

11. IN TURGOVISHTTE, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE MUNICIPAL BCP COMMITTEE TEODOR GHYAOUROV, A CLOSE RELATIVE OF PENCHO KUBADISNKI, ORGANIZED A 5 JANUARY MEETING TO PROTEST THE PRO-MUSLIM DECISION OF 29 DECEMBER. RADOSLAV CHERKEZOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE LOCAL CLUB FOR GLASNOST AND DEMOCRACY, WAS TAKEN FORCIBLY TO THE MEETING, WHERE PARTICIPANTS SPAT AT HIM AND CALLED HIM "TRAITOR."

12. THE NATIONAL QUESTION HAS MANY ASPECTS, SAYS ALEKSANDUR MILANOV IN "LITERATUREN FRONT." ALMOST EVERY FAMILY KEEPS THE MEMORY OF RELATIVES SLAIN BY THE TURKS DURING THEIR RULE IN BULGARIA, BUT THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE HAVE NEVER HATED THE TURKISH PEOPLE. THEY ONLY HATED THE TURKISH RULERS DURING THE FIVE CENTURIES UNDER THE TURKISH YOKE. NOW, SOME PEOPLE ARE MISLED BY THOSE WHO SUPPORTED ZHIVKOV'S ASSIMILATION CAMPAIGN AND NOW SHOUT: "BULGARIANS IN BULGARIA" WITHOUT THINKING THAT THERE ARE MANY BULGARIANS WHO LIVE IN TURKEY, MOLDAVIA, THE UKRAINE, YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE AND MANY OTHER COUNTRIES. WHAT HAS THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT DONE TO DEFEND THE RIGHTS OF THESE BULGARIANS? NO ONE WAS ALLOWED TO EVEN MENTION THEM. FOR TWO FULL DECADES, ZHIVKOV AND HIS ASSOCIATES DID NOT ALLOW ANYTHING TO BE SAID OR PUBLISHED ABOUT THE ATROCITIES OF THE TURKS DURING THEIR RULE IN BULGARIA BECAUSE THIS COULD ALLEGEDLY HURT THE NATIONALIST FEELINGS OF OUR TURKISH COMPATRIOTS, AS IF THEY WERE TO BLAME FOR THE CRIMES OF SULTANIC DESPOTISM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE STILL DO NOT KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT THE FORCIBLE CHANGE OF NAMES OF THE MUSLIMS IN 1984. THOSE WHO INCITED NATIONAL UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00599 02 OF 07 301156Z

HATRED IN BULGARIA ARE STILL NOT PUNISHED, SAYS MILANOV.

13. GEORGI MISHEV ALSO DENOUNCES THE VIOLENT CHANGE OF MUSLIM NAMES IN 1984 AND INSISTS THAT THE BULGARIAN PUBLIC

Date Printed: 07/15/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 90SOFIA00599

CHANNEL: n/a

2

FileName : .../t900111/aaaaainu.tel

BE TOLD THE TRUTH ABOUT IT AND ABOUT THE REASONS WHY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE LEFT THEIR HOMES FOR TURKEY IN THE SUMMER OF 1989. "LITERATUREN FRONT."

13 JANUARY

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO"

14. IN 1972 DRAZHA VULCHEVA (FORMER DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY), AMBITIOUS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE LOCAL BCP COMMITTEE IN PLOVDIV, SLANDERED A GROUP OF COMMUNISTS AND ACCUSED THEM OF ORGANIZING ANTI-PARTY AND FACTIONIST ACTIVITIES. AS A RESULT, 34 COMMUNISTS WERE PUNISHED, OFFENDED AND HUMILIATED. FOUR OF THEM WERE EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY. ONE OF THEM WAS ANTON YUGOV, A MAN WHOM TODOR ZHIVKOV HAD BEEN TRYING TO EXPEL FOR A LONG TIME. THE INCIDENT HELPED DRAZHA VULCHEVA IN HER PROMOTION TO HIGHER POSTS IN SOFIA.

15. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE INDEPENDENT BULGARIAN TRADE UNIONS, PROFESSOR KRUSTYU PETKOV, MADE A SHORT VISIT TO POLAND, WHERE HE MET WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ALL-POLISH TRADE UNION ASSOCIATION ALFRED MIODOWICZ AND DISCUSSED QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE STRUCTURE OF THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. PETKOV WAS RECEIVED BY THE MINISTER OF LABOR JACZEK KURON. THEY DISCUSSED "THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT." PETKOV ALSO MET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF WARSAW'S "SOLIDARITY"

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00599 03 OF 07 301158Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO

LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00	
DODE-00	H-01	NEA-04	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	
TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02	GMB-G1	JNRE-00	AGRE-00	USIE-00	
SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/043 W	

21. IN A SESSION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPANTS DECIDED TO SUGGEST TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS THE FOLLOWING: SETTING UP A MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE & FOOD INDUSTRY AND A COMMITTEE FOR FORESTS & FOREST INDUSTRY, WHICH WILL REPLACE THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE & FORESTS. IT WAS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE COMMISSION ON SELF-SUFFICIENCY BE DISSOLVED AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON WATERS BE UNDER THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY & PLANNING. UNSPECIFIED PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO DECREE NO 56 (ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC INVESTMENT) WERE ALSO MADE.

14 JANUARY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00599. 03 OF 07 301158Z

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO"

22. AT THE SESSION OF THE SOFIA CITY PEOPLE'S COUNCIL THE MAYOR OF SOFIA STEFAN NINOV WAS GIVEN A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE. (NOTE: ECOGLASNOST EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND "GREEN PARTY" CHAIRMAN ALEXANDER KARAKACHANOV, WHO IS ALSO A SOFIA CITY COUNCILLOR, HAD MADE THE MOTION AGAINST THE MAYOR DUE TO HIS PART IN THE BEATINGS OF ECOGLASNOST ACTIVISTS IN A SOFIA PARK ON 26 OCTOBER 1989.)

23. A "UNITED FRONT FOR RESTRUCTURING AND DEFENSE OF SOCIALISM" WAS ESTABLISHED. IT UNITES THE "SOCIAL FORUM FOR RESTRUCTURING AND DEFENSE OF SOCIALISM," THE "MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALIST RENOVATION 'EDINSTVO,'" THE "MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MARXISM AND RENOVATION OF SOCIALISM," AND THE "ALTERNATIVE FORUM." IN ITS DECLARATION THE UNITED FRONT SAYS THAT THE PROCESS OF RESTRUCTURING IS VERY SLOW. IT APPEALS TO ALL SOCIALIST FORCES TO UNITE IN ACCELERATING CHANGES IN THE BULGARIAN SOCIETY.

24. A "NON-PARTY PEOPLE FOR DEMOCRACY" INITIATIVE GROUP WAS FORMED.

25. A CLUB "RODOLYUBIE" ("PATRIOTISM") WAS ESTABLISHED. IT WILL UNITE AUTHORS WRITING ABOUT PATRIOTIC EDUCATION, THE DEFENSE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAWS, AND THE UNITY OF THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE.

26. THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE & PUBLIC CONTROL OFFERS A PROGRAM FOR THE NEW ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF ORGANS FOR STATE AND PUBLIC CONTROL AND THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THEY SHOULD BE FORMED.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00599 04 OF 07 301202Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00	
	DODE-00	H-01	NEA-04	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	AGRE-00	USIE-00	
	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/043 W	
-----265747 301424Z /49								

R 301130Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9455
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 SOFIA 00599

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU

SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: 12-17 JANUARY

27. BTA'S (BULGARIAN PRESS AGENCY) BELGRADE CORRESPONDENT NIKOLAY KOEV PROTESTS AGAINST THE BIASED AND TENDENTIOUS APPROACH OF TELEVISION "SKOPJE" IN ITS REPORTS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS IN BULGARIA. THE EMPHASIS OF THE REPORTS WAS DELIBERATELY PUT ON ANTI-COMMUNIST SLOGANS RAISED AT PROTESTS AROUND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING. THESE DISRUPTIVE AND NON-CONSTRUCTIVE PROTESTS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS SINCERE EFFORTS TO REFORM WITHOUT CONFRONTATION.

28. "ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME" CARRIES AN APPEAL FOR RESTORATION
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00599 04 OF 07 301202Z

OF THE BULGARIAN AGRARIAN YOUTH UNION. AFTER THE COMMUNISTS CONSOLIDATED THEIR POWER IN 1948, THE AGRARIAN PARTY WAS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE AS AN "ALLIED" PARTY WITHOUT A POLITICAL PLATFORM. IT WAS ALSO FORBIDDEN TO ORGANIZE YOUNG PEOPLE'S CHAPTERS, AS THE BCP DID WITH ITS "PIONEERS" AND "KOMSOMOLS".

29. A UNION OF BULGARIAN PHYSICIANS WAS FORMED IN SOFIA.
30. THE "ECOGLASNOST" CHAPTER IN SVISHTOV PROTESTED AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BELENE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.

15 JANUARY

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO"

31. LETTERS TO THE EDITOR INSIST ON: REDUCTION OF THE BCP PARTY APPARATUS, CHANGING THE NAME AND THE COAT-OF-ARMS OF THE BULGARIAN STATE, REVEALING THE NAMES OF BULGARIAN MILLIONAIRES, ACCELERATING DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, AND PUNISHING PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN VIOLATING THE COUNTRY'S LAWS AND MORAL NORMS FOR YEARS.

32. WITHOUT EXPLANATION OR COMMENT, RD CARRIES THE FULL TEXT OF THE DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ADOPTED BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1948.

33. ANTON ANTONOV, EXPERT AT THE STATE NAVIGATION INSPECTORATE, ORGANIZED A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE ALARMING ABSENCE OF SAFETY IN TRANSPORTATION. HOWEVER, THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT REFUSED TO PROVIDE A ROOM FOR THE DISCUSSION, AND MINISTER OF TRANSPORT TRIFON PASHOV, ALTHOUGH HE WAS INVITED, REFUSED TO ATTEND.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00599 04 OF 07 301202Z

ANTONOV HAS RAISED HIS OWN CANDIDATURE FOR DEPUTY MINISTER AND OFFERS A PROGRAM FOR GUARANTEEING SAFETY IN TRANSPORTATION.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

34. ALDIN TOPALOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE "MUSLIM SECTION" OF THE ASENOVGRAD CHAPTER OF THE INDEPENDENT (HUMAN RIGHTS) SOCIETY ACCUSES THE TOTALITARIAN REGIME OF ZHIVKOV OF CREATING THE EXISTING NATIONALIST HOSTILITIES. HE ALSO ACCUSES THE LOCAL NOMENCLATURA CADRES, WHICH ARE STILL INTACT, FOR THEIR DELIBERATE INCITEMENT OF CITIZENS AGAINST THE PRO-MUSLIM DECISIONS OF 29 DECEMBER.

ate Printed: 07/15/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 90SOFIA00599

CHANNEL: n/a

2

ileName : .../t900111/aaaaainu.tel

"KOOPERATIVNO SELO."

TRUD

35. THE PROVISIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE BULGARIAN TRADE UNIONS HELD A SESSION WHICH APPROVED URGENT MEASURES IN THE SOCIAL INTEREST OF BULGARIAN WORKING PEOPLE: HIGHER PENSIONS, WORKING CLOTHES, LABOR SAFETY MEASURES, AND OTHERS. THE PROPOSALS WILL BE OFFERED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR DISCUSSION.

36. TRADE UNIONS CHAIRMAN PETKOV DECLARED THAT HE WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE 14TH BCP CONGRESS BECAUSE THIS RUNS COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNIONS.

37. "TRUD" ALSO CARRIES A DECLARATION OF THE BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE BULGARIAN TEACHERS UNION. THE UNION IS DEMANDING DEMOCRATIZATION OF EDUCATION AND JUST RESOLUTION OF "THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS" OF TEACHERS.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00599 05 OF 07 301204Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00
	DODE-00	H-01	NEA-04	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	AGRE-00	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/043 W

-----265750 301425Z /49

R 301130Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9456
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 SOFIA 00599

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU

SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: 12-17 JANUARY

38. A SOVIET JOURNALIST'S ARTICLE, PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET NEWSPAPER "IZVESTIA," IS SUMMARIZED. THE ARTICLE DESCRIBES THE FORCIBLE CHANGE OF BULGARIAN MUSLIMS' NAMES IN 1984. THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT THE FORMER SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO BULGARIA LEONID GREKOV CALLED SOVIET JOURNALISTS AND STRICTLY FORBODE THE PUBLICATION OF ANY MATERIALS ABOUT THIS CAMPAIGN. "THIS IS ZHIVKOV'S REQUEST", GREKOV IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID. THE AUTHOR OF THE ARTICLE FOLLOWS THE COURSE OF EVENTS SINCE 1984 AND FOCUSES ON THE MUSLIMS' FLIGHT FROM THEIR HOMES IN 1989. AT THIS STAGE, JOURNALISTS WERE ALLOWED TO WRITE ABOUT THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00599 05 OF 07 301204Z

EMIGRATING MUSLIMS, BUT THEY HAD BEEN DULY INSTRUCTED BEFOREHAND, SAYS THE SOVIET JOURNALIST. "THE BULGARIANS SHOULD RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM BY THEMSELVES. NEITHER "PAN-TURKISM" NOR "MANIFESTATIONS OF SEPARATISM" NOR "BULGARIAN CHAUVINISM" WILL HELP THE COUNTRY ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION", SAYS THE AUTHOR IN CLOSING.

39. "NARODNA MLADZH" REPORTS THE FORMATION IN RUSE OF A COORDINATION COUNCIL IN SUPPORT OF THE BCP INITIATIVE GROUP "BULGARIAN ROAD TO EUROPE."

POGLED"

40. SHORT NOTES ABOUT THE "MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM," AN IDEOLOGICAL "TREND" IN THE BCP, DESCRIBE ITS GOALS OF WIDE POLITICAL LIBERTIES AND MULTIPLE FORMS OF OWNERSHIP. (NOTE: SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 55 BELOW.)

41. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEW SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY DECLARE THAT THE PARTY IS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS WITH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ORIENTATION, AND FOR COOPERATION WITH ALL DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN THE COUNTRY IN CREATING A DEMOCRATIC LAWFUL STATE WITHIN A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM.

42. NOTED BULGARIAN JOURNALIST VELISLAVA DUREVA TELLS ABOUT THE CONSTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE AND NUMEROUS ADMINISTRATIVE PUNISHMENTS IMPOSED BY THE NOMENCLATURA CADRES AT THE OKRUG BCP COMMITTEES IN PLOVDIV ON

JOURNALISTS, POETS AND WRITERS WHO DARED TO DIVERGE FROM THE COMMON POLITICAL PATH. DUREVA MENTIONS THE NAMES OF CADRE MEMBERS WHO DEFENDED NIKOLAY HAITOV WHEN HE WAS CORRECTLY ACCUSED OF PLAGIARISM. NOW, ONE OF THESE PEOPLE, PETUR ANASTASOV, IS DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT AT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00599 05 OF 07 301204Z

THE CC/BCP, AND ANOTHER, ATANAS MOSENGOV, IS AN ENTERPRISE DIRECTOR. A THIRD, EMIL KALUCHEV, IS NOW EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE DANOV PUBLISHING HOUSE IN PLOVDIV.

43. YULIANA NEDEVA IS AUTHOR OF AN ARTICLE ABOUT THE PERSECUTION OF THE PAINTER SVETLIN RUSEV, ACTIVIST ON THE COMMITTEE FOR ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION OF RUSE, DURING THE REGIME OF ZHIVKOV AND HIS ASSOCIATES. RUSEV WAS EXCLUDED FROM ARTISTIC CIRCLES AND DENIED MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO PAINT AND WRITE. HE WAS ISOLATED BY HIS LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION, HIS WRITTEN WORKS WERE REFUSED BY EDITORS OF ARTISTIC AND CULTURAL JOURNALS, THE ARTISTS' UNION DID NOT DIRECT COMMISSIONS TO HIM, AND HIS WORKS WERE NOT ACCEPTED AND EVEN REMOVED PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EXHIBITIONS.

16 JANUARY

"ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME

44. IN 1985 OFFICERS FROM THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND STATE SECURITY CONFISCATED THE MANUSCRIPT OF THE MEMOIRS OF KHRISTO STRATEV, BANU (AGRARIAN PARTY) ACTIVIST AND ASSOCIATE OF NIKOLA PETKOV, WHO WAS ARRESTED AND SPENT LONG YEARS IN PRISON AS A RESULT OF A SENTENCE BASED ON FALSE ACCUSATIONS AT THE TRIAL IN 1952 AGAINST BANU LEADERS. IN 1985 THE STRATEVS WERE ADVISED NOT TO COMPLAIN. BUT TODAY THEY WANT JUSTICE AND THE RETURN OF THE DOCUMENTS.

45. ZHIVKOV'S DECISION IN 1967 TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL WAS A GREAT MISTAKE, SAYS JOURNALIST IVAN GLUSHKOV. BULGARIA WAS DEPRIVED OF THE POSSIBILITY TO COOPERATE WITH ISRAEL IN THE CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC FIELD

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00599 06 OF 07 301206Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00
	DODE-00	H-01	NEA-04	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	AGRE-00	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/043 W

-----276035 301756Z /49

R 301130Z JAN 90
 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9457
 INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 07 SOFIA 00599

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A
 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
 SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: 12-17 JANUARY

WITH ISRAEL. THE DECISION OF 1967 WAS NOT REALLY IN
 BULGARIA'S INTERESTS. IT IS TIME TO NORMALIZE OUR
 RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, GLUSHKOV POINTS OUT.

18 JANUARY

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO"

46. THE TEXTILE COMBINE IN GABROVO IS SUFFERING FROM
 SHORTAGES OF MATERIALS AND FUEL OIL. IT WILL THEREFORE
 BE UNABLE TO FULFILL PRODUCTION PLANS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00599 06 OF 07 301206Z

47. THE LEADERSHIPS OF OVER 60 ENTERPRISES AND FIRMS IN
 PLEVEN REGION REGISTERED A TRADE BANK "JOINT STOCK
 COMPANY" WITH INITIAL CAPITAL OF 5.5 MILLION LEVA.

48. THE "INITIATIVE COMMITTEE FOR RENOVATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE UNION OF BULGARIAN MOTORISTS" CRITICIZED SHARPLY THE "GROSS TOTALITARIAN LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL VRACHEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE UNION."

49. IN AN INTERVIEW, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ALEXANDER TOMOV, MEMBER OF THE COORDINATION COUNCIL OF THE "MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM" AND MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION FOR PREPARATION OF THE 14TH EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF THE BCP, NOTES THAT THE MOVEMENT IS AN IDEOLOGICAL TREND IN THE BCP, WHOSE TASK IS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN BULGARIAN SOCIETY AND TO CONSTRUCT A SOCIETY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM WITH RADICAL ECONOMIC REFORM. MEMBERS OF THE MOVEMENT ARE MOSTLY SCIENTIFIC WORKERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WORKING CLASS.

50. THE GRAND MUFTI OF MUSLIMS IN BULGARIA, NEDYU GENDZHEV, MET WITH THE MAYOR OF SOFIA, STEFAN NINOV. THE MAYOR VOLUNTEERED TO HELP IN ACCELERATING THE REPAIR OF THE MOSQUE "BANYA BASHI" IN SOFIA. THE GRAND MUFTI ALSO RAISED DEMANDS FOR RECEIVING MATERIAL AID FOR EDUCATION AND IMPROVING THE PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION OF IMAMS.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

51. "LITERATUREN FRONT" CARRIES AN ARTICLE BY METODI GEORGIEV WHICH SHARPLY CRITICIZES JOURNALISTS, WRITERS AND UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00599 06 OF 07 301206Z

PUBLIC ACTIVISTS WHO WERE IN ZHIVKOV'S ENTOURAGE AND PRAISED HIM BUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER 10 NOVEMBER 1989 SIMPLY "CHANGED THEIR COLOR." THESE PEOPLE TRY TO PRESENT THEMSELVES AS VICTIMS OF ZHIVKOV'S REGIME AND QUICKLY ADAPT THEMSELVES TO THE NEW SITUATION. ACCORDING TO GEORGIEV, THEY INCLUDE RADOSLAV RADEV, PAVEL PISAREV, VLADIMIR TOPENCHAROV, ILIYA KYULYOVSKI, PETUR KOZHUKHAROV, AND DR. VASIL IVANOV.

52. LF CARRIES THE APPEAL OF A GROUP OF BEIJING STUDENTS WHO WENT ON A HUNGER STRIKE IN THE SUMMER OF 1989. "WE COULDN'T PUBLISH THE APPEAL EARLIER BECAUSE WE WERE UNDER THE CENSORSHIP OF 'GOOD RELATIONS,'" READS THE SHORT NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR OF THE APPEAL. HOWEVER, "GOOD RELATIONS" AND "NON-INTERFERENCE" DO NOT MEAN GIVING UP THE PURSUIT OF THOROUGHNESS OF INFORMATION AND LISTENING TO THE "OTHER'S SIDE OPINION," SAYS THE AUTHOR.

53. "NARODNA MLADZH" CARRIES THE MOCKING LETTER OF A "BULGARIAN-SPEAKING AND ELECTRICITY-DEPRIVED" JOURNALIST WHO REMINDS READERS THAT IN 1958 IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE PROBLEMS OF ELECTRIFICATION OF BULGARIA HAD BEEN

RESOLVED. HOWEVER, ELECTRICITY IS NOT ENOUGH. THE AUTHOR ASKS MINISTER OF ENERGY NIKOLA TODORIEV, "WHEN SHOULD A MINISTER RESIGN IF HE HAS NOT BEEN APPOINTED FOR LIFE?" A NOTE APPENDED TO THE LETTER READS: "TO BE READ BY CANDLE LIGHT."

54. LIVE-STOCK BREEDERS IN GODECH (NEAR SOFIA) WARNED THAT THEY WILL GO STRIKE IF THEIR DEMANDS FOR BETTER WORKING CONDITIONS AND HIGHER WAGES ARE NOT MET IN SEVEN DAYS.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00599 07 OF 07 301207Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00
	DODE-00	H-01	NEA-04	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03
	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	AGRE-00	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/043 W

-----302072 301914Z /49

R 301130Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9458
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 SOFIA 00599

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM. BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: 12-07 JANUARY

55. REDUCTION IN THE EXPORT OF CONSUMER GOODS, PRODUCTION EXPENDITURES, AND PRICE CONTROLS, AND INCREASE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE AND PENSIONS ARE AMONG IDEAS FOR STABILIZING THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY. THEY ARE EXPLAINED BY BENYO BENEV, CHIEF DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMY & MANAGEMENT. "ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME"

56. VALIA GANCHEV, A JOURNALIST FROM SOFIA PRESS, IS STILL ON HUNGER STRIKE. HER COLLEAGUES HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR HER GOALS BUT HAVE APPEALED TO HER TO TERMINATE THE STRIKE BECAUSE HER DEMANDS CONCERNING THE LAW ON MASS MEDIA, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS' UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00599 07 OF 07 301207Z

LABOR, FREEDOM OF CRITICISM, AND MANY OTHERS CANNOT BE RESOLVED OVERNIGHT.

57. "UCHITEL'SKO DELO" CARRIES A LETTER IN WHICH A GROUP OF BCP MEMBERS ADDRESS TODOR ZHIVKOV IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLENUM ON AGRICULTURE IN MAY, 1989. THEY WERE SEVERELY PUNISHED FOR THEIR CRITICISM OF ZHIVKOV'S POLICIES, WHICH LED THE COUNTRY INTO A DEEP CRISIS.

58. "ANTENI" CARRIES AN ARTICLE BY SENIOR RESEARCH WORKER VELKO VULKANOV WHO DESCRIBES THE DICTATORSHIP OF YAROSLAV RADEV, FORMER DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON BULGARIAN LEGISLATION. EVEN THOUGH HE WAS INCOMPETENT, HE WAS GIVEN A HIGH ACADEMIC POSITION, SAYS VULKANOV. POLANSKY.

UNCLASSIFIED

Ellen

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED *R*

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00093 01 OF 03 050954Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00	DODE-00
H-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10
PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01
P-02	T-01	/038 W				

-----207634 051449Z /49

R 050942Z JAN 90
 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9118
 INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 00093

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: N/A
 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
 SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

31 DECEMBER, 1989

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO"

1. THE POLITBURO OF THE CC/BCP HELD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PERMANENT BOARD OF BANU (BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY) IN CONNECTION WITH THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND IN THE TWO PARTIES. THE PARTIES GAVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE FORTHCOMING "ROUND TABLE" DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS AND TO QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE FORTHCOMING SESSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00093 01 OF 03 050954Z

2. TURKEY'S FOREIGN MINISTER MESUT YILMAZ HAS DECLARED HIS SATISFACTION WITH THE DECISION OF THE BULGARIAN AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW THE TURKISH-SPEAKING AND MUSLIM POPULATION TO HAVE A FREE CHOICE OF NAMES.

1 JANUARY, 1990

"RABOTNICHESKO DELC"

9702193
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 () RELEASE
 () EXCISE
 () DENY
 () DECLASSIFY
 () IN PART
 EO Citations
 RRS Date: 11-21-97

TS authority to
 () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
 () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C
 FOIA Exemptions
 PA Exemptions

3. ON 31 DECEMBER AT A MEETING IN SOFIA, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BCP INITIATIVE GROUP FOR THE "BULGARIAN ROAD TO EUROPE" PRESENTED THEIR PLATFORM. THE FORMATION OF A COORDINATION COUNCIL WILL TAKE PLACE ON 4 JANUARY 1990 AT SOFIA UNIVERSITY.

"POGLED"

4. PROMINENT BULGARIAN ECONOMISTS WILL DISCUSS VARIANTS FOR THE FUTURE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF BULGARIA ON 5 JANUARY AT SOFIA UNIVERSITY.

5. THE GOAL OF THE "GREEN" PARTY IN BULGARIA WILL BE THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL, DECLARED ALEXANDER KARAKACHANOV, ONE OF THE INITIATORS OF THE PARTY AND FORMER "ECOGLASNOST" SECRETARY. UNLIKE "ECOGLASNOST," THE "GREEN" PARTY IS A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, KARAKACHANOV NOTED.

2 JANUARY, 1990

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00093 01 OF 03 050954Z

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO"

6. AN ARTICLE REPORTS ON THE DISSATISFACTION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION IN KURDZALI WITH THE DECISION OF THE CC/BCP FOR FREE CHOICE OF NAMES FOR THE TURKISH-SPEAKING AND MUSLIM POPULATION.

7. A LENGTHY ARTICLE BY LIDIA LECHEVA PROVIDES ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN BELENE. THE AUTHOR MAKES PROPOSALS FOR GUARANTEEING THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

8. RD CARRIES AN INTERVIEW WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE EAGLEBERGER, WHO DECLARED THAT REFORMS IN BULGARIA ARE ENCOURAGING.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

9. "OTEHESTVEN FRONT" IS NOT "FOR SALE", DECLARES ITS EDITORIAL STAFF. IT HAS PUBLISHED AND WILL PUBLISH MATERIALS OFFERED BY THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES UNION, ECOGLASNOST, PODKREPA, AND OTHER SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS, BUT IT HAS ITS OWN POSITION, WHICH IS THE UNITING OF ALL DEMOCRATIC AND PATRIOTIC FORCES WHICH CARE FOR BULGARIA AND WORK FOR THE BULGARJAN PEOPLE AND ITS "SOCIALIST CHOICE." THE DECLARATION FEARS

Date Printed: 07/15/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 90SOFIA00093

CHANNEL: n/a

FileName : ...t9001151/aaaaenyf.tel

3 JANUARY
-----RABOTNICHESKO DELO

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00093 02 OF 03 050955Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00	DODE-00
	H-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10
	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01
	P-02	T-01	/038 W				

-----207636 051449Z /49

R 050942Z JAN 90
 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9119
 INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 00093

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: N/A
 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
 SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

10. OVER 15,000 PEOPLE IN KURDZHALI PROTESTED AGAINST THE DECISION OF THE CC/BCP FOR FREE CHOICE OF NAMES FOR THE TURKISH-SPEAKING AND MUSLIM POPULATION. "BULGARIA - FOR THE BULGARIANS" AND "TURKS - IN TURKEY" ARE TWO OF THE SLOGANS RAISED AT THE MEETING. ANOPEY IJUKANOV ADDRESSED THE MEETING AND EXPLAINED THE POSITION OF THE CC/BCP.

HOWEVER, SOME OF HIS STATEMENTS WERE BOOED, AND HIS RESIGNATION WAS DEMANDED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING. FINALLY, THE COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL UNITY ADOPTED A DECLARATION WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

11. OVER 150 AUTOMOBILES FROM KURDZHALI HAVE HEADED FOR UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00093 02 OF 03 050955Z

SOFIA. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS AUTO-MARCH WILL DELIVER THE "NATIONAL UNITY" DECLARATION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO DEMAND A REFERENDUM ON RESOLVING THE NATIONAL QUESTION.

12. AT A MEETING IN SOFIA HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE FROM KURDZHALI INSISTED ON A REFERENDUM ON THE QUESTION OF THE TURKISH-SPEAKING AND MUSLIM POPULATION AND ON STUDYING THE OPINION OF THE PEOPLE FROM REGIONS WHERE THE NATIONAL QUESTION IS VERY GRAVE. THE DECLARATION ON BEHALF OF THE UNION FOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN KURDZHALI INSISTS ON AN ANSWER TO ITS DEMANDS ON 4 JANUARY. OTHERWISE, THE AUTHORS OF THE DECLARATION WILL APPEAL TO THE POPULATION FROM KURDZHALI REGION AND FROM ALL REGIONS OF BULGARIA TO GO ON A WARNING STRIKE ON 5 JANUARY.

13. A PROTEST MEETING WAS ALSO HELD IN HASKOVO.

14. THE POLITBURO OF THE CC/BCP ISSUED A DECLARATION WHICH NOTES THAT THE NEGATIVE REACTION OF PART OF THE POPULATION AGAINST THE DECISION FOR RETURNING TURKISH - ARABIC NAMES COULD HAVE BEEN PREDICTED. THE DISSATISFACTION OF PART OF THE POPULATION IN RAZGRAD REGION AND ESPECIALLY IN KURDZHALI WAS NOTED. HOWEVER, THE POLITBURO BELIEVES THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK AT PRESENT IS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND UNITY, WHICH WILL GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY.

15. MINISTER OF INTERIOR ATANAS SEMERDZHEIV ORDERED THE FORMATION OF A GROUP FOR TIES WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE PUBLIC. THE PURPOSE OF THE GROUP IS TO FURTHER DEVELOP GLASNOST AND TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ABOUT CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR. THE GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY SENIOR RESEARCH UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00093 02 OF 03 050955Z

WORKER YORDAN ORMANKOV. AFTER THEIR APPROVAL, THE STATUTE AND STATEMENT OF FUNCTIONS OF THE GROUP WILL BE ANNOUNCED IN THE MASS MEDIA

16. AT THE INITIATIVE OF INTERIOR MINISTER SEMERDZHIEV, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND NEWLY FORMED PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS. "WE ARE FOR POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES WHICH SHOULD FOCUS ON SOCIAL ISSUES AND SHOULD BE UNDER THEIR CONTROL", "DECLARED SEMERDZHIEV.

17. THE COMMISSION FOR DEFENSE OF PUBLIC INTERESTS AND CITIZENS RIGHTS WILL HOLD A SESSION ON 4 JANUARY. IT WILL DISCUSS THE ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS DURING THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND ON THE NATIONAL UNITY OF THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE.

18. THE PERMANENT COMMISSION ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WILL HOLD A SESSION ON 4 JANUARY TO DISCUSS THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE MINISTRIES OF ECONOMICS AND PLANNING, FINANCE, INDUSTRIES & TECHNOLOGIES, AGRICULTURE AND FORESTS, AND CONSTRUCTION, ARCHITECTURE, AND URBANIZATION.

19. RD CARRIES SHORT SUMMARIES OF THE PLATFORMS OF THREE ORGANIZATIONS OF BCP MEMBERS, WHICH WILL SOON HOLD CONSTITUENT MEETINGS. THEY ARE: THE ALTERNATIVE SOCIALIST ORGANIZATION, WHICH ASSUMES THE FUNCTIONS OF A PARTY FACTION; THE COORDINATION COUNCIL OF THE INITIATIVE "BULGARIAN ROAD TO EUROPE," AND THE BCP - DEMOCRATIC FORUM.

20. TIES IN TOURISM BETWEEN BULGARIA AND ISRAEL ARE DEVELOPING SUCCESSFULLY, ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL REPORT.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 00093 03 OF 03 050956Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00	DODE-00
	H-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10
	PA-02	OME-01	INPE-00	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01
	P-02	T-01	/038 W				

-----207611 051449Z /49

R 050942Z JAN 90
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9120
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 00093

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

21. AN INITIATIVE COMMITTEE IN PLOVDIV HAS RESUMED THE LEGAL ACTIVITIES OF THE BULGARIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH WAS DISSOLVED IN 1947.

22. THE COORDINATION COUNCIL OF THE INITIATIVE GROUP "BULGARIAN ROAD TO EUROPE" EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE "HALF-WAY" CONDITIONS FOR FREE INTER-PARTY ELECTIONS. THE COORDINATION COUNCIL INSISTS ON THE PROVISION OF ROOMS, PRINTING, AND XEROX MACHINES BELONGING TO THE PARTY TO ALL WINGS, IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS AND FACTIONS OF THE PARTY.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 00093 03 OF 03 050956Z

23. "LITE RATUREN FRONT" CARRIES AN ARTICLE ABOUT THE CORRUPTION AND NUMEROUS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE FORMER FIRST SECRETARY OF VARNA DISTRICT BCP COMMITTEE TODOR STOICHEV, WHO WAS TOLERATED AND SUPPORTED BY TODOR ZHIVKOV. RECENTLY, TODOR STOICHEV WAS EXPELLED FROM THE BCP.

24. BULGARIAN WRITER VASIL STANILOV HAS GONE ON A HUNGER STRIKE TO INSIST ON ABOLITION OF ALL OF ARTICLE 1 FROM THE BULGARIAN CONSTITUTION. A GROUP OF PLAYWRIGHTS EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT. LF.

25. THE SAME ISSUE OF LF CARRIES CARTOONS OF TODOR ZHIVKOV BY ARTIST TODOR TSONEV, WHO, UNDER ZHIVKOV, WAS PROSECUTED AND HAD ALL OF HIS CARTOONS CONFISCATED BY STATE SECURITY ORGANS.

26. IN 1963 AND 1964 TODOR ZHIVKOV APPLIED GREAT EFFORTS

TO MAKE BULGARIA A SOVIET REPUBLIC. HE LAUNCHED HIS IDEA AT A PLENUM OF THE CC/BCP ON 31 JULY 1963, AT A SPECIAL PLENUM ON 4 DECEMBER 1963, AND AT YET ANOTHER PLENUM ON 26 FEBRUARY 1964. AFTER THAT A BULGARIAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT DELEGATION WENT TO MOSCOW TO CONVINCED KHRUSHCHEV TO APPROVE THE IDEA OF BULGARIA'S JOINING THE SOVIET UNION. THE STORY IS CARRIED IN "NARODNA KULTURA."

VECHERNI NOVINI, 2 JANUARY

27. THIS ISSUE CARRIES THE STORY OF AN OPEN LETTER TO TODOR ZHIVKOV WRITTEN BY A GROUP OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN 1982. FOR THEIR SHARP CRITICISM THE AUTHORS OF THE GROUP WERE EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY AND PUT IN JAIL. THE ARTICLE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 SOFIA 00093 03 OF 03 050956Z

IN VN IS ABOUT TWO OF THEM WHO WERE REHABILITATED RECENTLY.

28. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL STATISTICS, PERNIK IS AMONG THE SEVEN MOST POLLUTED CITIES IN BULGARIA. AN ARTICLE IN "OTEHESTVEN FRONT," 3 JANUARY, POINTS OUT THE REASONS FOR THE POLLUTION AND INSISTS ON CLOSING DOWN SOME OF THE PRODUCTION UNITS IN THE CITY.

29. LIKE ROMANIA, BULGARIA HAS ITS OWN PRETORIAN BODYGUARDS, SAYS WRITER DIMITUR PAUNOV. ITS FUNCTIONS, COMMAND, AND POSITION IN EVENTS ARE STILL A SECRET. THE FIRST HOPE FOR RAISING THE CORNER OF THE CURTAIN IS THE DISBANDMENT OF THE 6TH DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, ALTHOUGH NO ONE KNOWS ANYTHING ABOUT ITS OFFICERS. THE APPOINTMENT OF ATANAS SEMERDZHIEV AS MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR IS THE SECOND HOPE, THE AUTHOR SAYS. ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME, 3 JANUARY.
POLANSKY

6/14/97

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SOFIA 07021 01 OF 03 291817Z
ACTION H-03

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
PM-10 OPIC-08 STR-18 SIL-01 INRE-00 SP-02 P-02
/079 W

-----314155 310315Z /63

R 291512Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9053
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
USDOC WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 07021

GENEVA FOR USTR

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ETRD, BU, US
SUBJECT: LANTOS MEETINGS WITH TODOROV AND PIRINSKI

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. SENIOR BULGARIAN OFFICIALS MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVE TOM LANTOS INDICATED MOVEMENT TOWARD MULTIPLE PARTIES IN BULGARIA MIGHT BE SLOWER THAN IN OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THOUGH ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD BY MID-YEAR. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO IMPROVE BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

TODOROV MEETING

9702193

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
() RELEASE
() EXCISE
() DENY
IM/IPS/CP/IR RRS Date: 11-21-97
DECLASSIFY: EO Citations
DECLASSIFY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
Authority to
() CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

PAGE 02 SOFIA 07021 01 OF 03 291817Z

3. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN STANKO TODOROV, MEETING WITH REP. LANTOS, AMBASSADOR, AND EMBOFF DECEMBER 22, SAID THAT THE MAIN ARGUMENT AGAINST BULGARIA'S BEING PART OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME, THAT BULGARIA WAS NOT DEMOCRATIC, HAD NOW DISAPPEARED.

4. LANTOS REPLIED THAT HE WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE BULGARIA MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY, AND ASKED WHEN THE ASSEMBLY WOULD PASS LEGISLATION ALLOWING OTHER

UNCLASSIFIED

POLITICAL PARTIES TO BE ORGANIZED, AND WHEN WOULD TRULY FREE ELECTIONS BE SCHEDULED? TODOROV REPLIED THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE SCHEDULED BY MID-1990, AND WOULD BE PRELIMINARY ELECTIONS. CONSIDERATION OF A NEW ELECTION LAW WAS UNDERWAY, BUT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. THE ASSEMBLY WAS STUDYING THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE U.S.

UNCLASSIFIED

5. LANTOS NOTED THAT HE WAS THE ONLY MEMBER OF CONGRESS BORN IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND THAT SOME OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OFTEN LOOKED TO HIM TO TAKE THE LEAD REGARDING COUNTRIES IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. FOR HIS PART, HE SAID, HE WOULD BE PLEASED IF CONDITIONS IN BULGARIA PROCEEDED TO THE POINT WHERE HE COULD OFFER LEGISLATION REGARDING MFN, OPIC, AND AID, AS HE HAD FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND.

6. TODOROV REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THAT THERE WERE NO REMAINING BARRIERS TO NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. WHILE HE COULDN'T SAY THAT BULGARIA DIDN'T WANT AID, IT WAS NOT IN GREAT NEED. WHAT THE GOB WANTS IS NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS, HE SAID, WHICH WERE PREVENTED BY LACK OF MFN. BULGARIA WANTED TO SEE MORE ACTIVE

PAGE 03 SOFIA 07021 01 OF 03 291817Z

COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND BULGARIAN COMPANIES, WHICH COULD ONLY HAPPEN IF THE U.S. CONGRESS REMOVED EXISTING RESTRICTIONS, HE ASSERTED.

7. LANTOS POINTED OUT THAT CONGRESS CAN MOVE VERY QUICKLY WHEN CONDITIONS WARRANT. ACTION REGARDING BULGARIA COULD TAKE PLACE QUICKLY IF THERE WERE FREE ELECTIONS, FREE EMIGRATION, AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ESPECIALLY FOR THE TURKISH MINORITY. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT HE SAID. ALSO, THERE WAS NO REASON WHY THE GOB SHOULDN'T RESTORE FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. IF THESE THINGS WERE DONE, LANTOS SAID, HE WAS READY TO MOVE VERY RAPIDLY. THERE WAS LOTS OF GOOD WILL TOWARD BULGARIA.

8. TODOROV REPLIED THAT BULGARIA WOULD DO THESE THINGS, NOT TO PLEASE THE U.S., BUT BECAUSE THEY WERE NECESSARY.

9. THE JANUARY SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD ADDRESS THE MOST PRESSING ECONOMIC MEASURES, TODOROV REMARKED, INCLUDING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM, AND IT WOULD DISCUSS AND ADOPT LAWS PROVIDING FOR FURTHER DEMOCRATIZATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

10. LANTOS ASKED IF THE U.S. COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE

ROLE IN HELPING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCFS, RECALLING THAT THE U.S. HAS EXPERTS IN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS AND PARTIES. THESE HAD GONE TO HUNGARY, AND LEADERS ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM THERE HAD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 07021 02 OF 03 291821Z
ACTION H-03

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02
	CIAE-00	EB-00	DODE-00	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09
	PM-10	OPIC-08	STR-18	SIL-01	INRE-00	SP-02	P-02
	/079 W						

-----314156 310315Z /63

R 291512Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9054
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
USDOC WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 07021

GENEVA FOR USTR

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ETRD, BU, US
SUBJECT: LANTOS MEETINGS WITH TODOROV AND PIRINSKI

11. TODOROV AVOIDED GIVING A DIRECT ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, SAYING THAT BULGARIA HAD TO CLARIFY CERTAIN QUESTIONS FOR ITSELF. AN ELECTION LAW WAS UNDER PREPARATION. THE CONSTITUTION NEEDED AMENDMENTS AND A DECISION MUST BE MADE AS TO WHETHER THE NATIONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ASSEMBLY SHOULD MEET IN PERMANENT SESSION. IF SO, THE STATE COUNCIL WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS. UNDER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION, TODOROV SAID, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAD 400 MEMBERS. PERHAPS 200 TO 250 MEMBERS WOULD DO. THE ROLE OF A PRESIDENT/HEAD OF STATE WAS OPEN. DECISIONS ON SUCH QUESTIONS COULD PROBABLY BE MADE IN FEBRUARY. THE ASSEMBLY WAS MUCH MORE

PAGE 02 SOFIA 07021 02 OF 03 291821Z

ACTIVE THAN IT HAD BEEN IN THE PAST, TODOROV ASSERTED.

PIRINSKI MEETING

12. REPRESENTATIVE LANTOS MET THE SAME DAY WITH DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS GEORGI PIRINSKI.

13. PIRINSKI SAID THAT BULGARIA WAS MOVING AWAY FROM A TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM, AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO RETURN TO VALUES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE PREVAILING IN THE 1944-47 PERIOD. THE PARTY WOULD NO LONGER CLAIM A MONOPOLY ON TRUTH, HE SAID, BUT WOULD SEEK A DIALOG WITH OTHERS.

14. REGARDING THE ECONOMY, THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WOULD SEEK SHORT-TERM STABILITY FOR 1990 THROUGH CONTROL OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT AND FOREIGN DEBT. A DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WOULD BEGIN IN 1991. THE STABILIZATION WOULD BE SOUGHT IN A NEW WAY, HE CLAIMED, THROUGH DIALOG WITH THE COMPANIES.

15. ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING WOULD RESUME IN 1991 IN BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE, HE PREDICTED. UNEMPLOYMENT WAS NOT OVERT YET, BUT WAS PRESENT IN OVERMANNED INDUSTRIES. A DECREE IN EARLY DECEMBER HAD SET THE BASIS FOR MEASURES TO DEAL WITH LAID-OFF WORKERS THROUGH REEDUCATION AND OTHER MEANS. THERE WAS A QUESTION OF LABOR ELASTICITY, HOW QUICKLY WORKERS COULD ADJUST TO THE FULL BLAST OF WORLD ECONOMIC COMPETITION. OVER THE LONG RUN, HEAVY INDUSTRY HAD TO BECOME MORE EFFICIENT. THE

PAGE 03 SOFIA 07021 02 OF 03 291821Z

UNCLASSIFIED

HEAVY INVESTMENT IN HIGH TECH SECTORS, METALLURGY, AUTOMATIZATION, DATA PROCESSING AND HICHER CHEMISTRY WAS NOT BEING USED EFFICIENTLY. MANAGERIAL KNOW-HOW AND MARKET ORIENTATION WERE NECESSARY, HE STRESSED.

UNCLASSIFIED

16. LANTOS URGED PIRINSKI TO INVITE PHILANTHROPIST AND ENTREPRENEUR GEORGE SOROS TO BULGARIA. HE ALSO ASKED IF THE GOB WAS READY TO MOVE TOWARD PLURALISM IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE.


17. PIRINSKI REPLIED THAT IT WAS, IN THE SENSE OF PERMITTING DIVERGENT POINTS OF VIEW, INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS, AND GENUINE DIALOG WITH OPPOSING POINTS OF VIEW, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF BASIC SOCIALIST VALUES, WHICH HE CLAIMED WERE INTRINSIC TO BULGARIAN SOCIETY. PIRINSKI DISCUSSED THE DECEMBER 14 DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN SOMEWHAT NEGATIVE TERMS, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT SOME OF THE DEMONSTRATORS FELT INSULTED AT BEING TERMED "EXTREMISTS." A FINE BALANCE HAD TO BE MAINTAINED, HE SAID.

18. PIRINSKI SAID THAT BULGARIA FACED A RANGE OF PROBLEMS INCLUDING THOSE POSED BY SEVERAL ETHNIC GROUPS SUCH AS THE MACEDONIANS. THERE WAS A SENSE OF IMPAIRED NATIONAL PRIDE, HE CLAIMED, WHICH WAS A POWERFUL RECIPE FOR "FASCISM," THOUGH ONLY A SMALL MINORITY "WANT CONCENTRATION CAMPS FOR COMMUNISTS."

19. LANTOS ASKED IF IT WERE FEASIBLE TO STRUCTURE ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSIONS WITH CLEARLY INDEPENDENT GROUPS. PIRINSKI SAID THAT A WIDE RANGE OF GROUPS HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEMONSTRATION.



NNNN



PAGE 01 SOFIA 07021 03 OF 03 291821Z
ACTION H-03

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	EUR-00	SS-00	HA-02
	CIAE-00	EB-00	DODE-00	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09
	PM-10	OPIC-08	STR-18	STL-01	INRF-00	SP-02	P-02
	/079 W						

UNCLASSIFIED

-----314157 310315Z /63

R 291512Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9055
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
USDOC WASHDC
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 07021

GENEVA FOR USTR

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ETRD, BU, US

SUBJECT: LANTOS MEETINGS WITH TODOROV AND PIRINSKI

TIONS, INCLUDING SOME HE TERMED "BLACK SHIRTS," YOUTHS
IN BLACK LEATHER JACKETS WHO HAD ALLEGEDLY SHOUTED
AT MLADENOV, "WE GIVE YOU A YEAR," AND, "WE'VE
HAD OUR SKINS TAKEN OFF, NOW IT'S YOUR TURN." THE
LEGITIMACY OF ANY GROUP NEEDED TO BE EARNED, HE SAID,
THROUGH ITS PLATFORM

RFE BROADCASTS, HE CHARGED,
GAVE ONLY ONE POINT OF VIEW, AND HINDERED THE PROCESS
OF BEGINNING A DIALOG.

20. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED HOW INDEPENDENT GROUPS
WERE TO HAVE ACCESS TO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AS
THEY DID NOT HAVE THEIR OWN NEWSPAPERS AND OTHER

PAGE 02 SOFIA 07021 03 OF 03 291821Z

MEDIA. PIRINSKI REPLIED THAT SINCE NOVEMBER 10,
THE PRESS AND TV HAVE GIVEN THE INDEPENDENT MOVE-
MENTS "GREATER PLAY" THAN THE PARTY POINT OF VIEW,
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EDITORIALS, REPORTING ON THE
DECISIONS OF PLENUMS, ETC. HE CITED A LONG TRUD
INTERVIEW WITH KARAKACHANOV OF ECOGLASNOST, WHO WAS
LEAVING TO FORM A GREEN PARTY, AND THE POPULAR
TV PROGRAM "EVERY SUNDAY," WHOSE COVERAGE OF NEW
GROUPS HAD MANY COMMUNISTS "HOPPING MAD."

21. LANTOS ASKED WHETHER BULGARIA WAS LIKELY TO
DEVELOP MORE ALONG CURRENT SOVIET POLITICAL REFORM
LINES, OR ACCORDING TO THE POLISH/HUNGARIAN MODEL.
DODGING THE QUESTION SOMEWHAT, PIRINSKI SAID THAT
BULGARIA WOULD SEEK SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF
THE 1947 CONSTITUTION, WHICH PERMITTED THREE FORMS
OF PROPERTY, RECOGNIZED THE LABOR BASIS OF VALUE,
AND SOUGHT STATE PROTECTION FOR FAIR WAGES AND BENE-
FITS, BALANCING SOCIAL EQUALITY WITH ECONOMIC

UNCLASSIFIED

fileName : ...t/t89126/aaaaaehz.tel

EFFICIENCY. -----

COMMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

22. BOTH TODOROV AND PIRINSKI LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT PROGRESS TOWARD MULTIPLE PARTIES WOULD BE FAIRLY SLOW AND MEASURED IF THEY HAD THEIR WAY. THEIR CAUTION MAY HAVE BEEN A RESULT OF THE LACK OF A CLEAR LINE, PRIOR TO THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BEGIN. POLANSKY

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

UNCLASSIFIED

ileName : .../t891218/aaaaanfz.tel

PAGE 01 SOFIA 06954 271043Z
ACTION EUR-00

UNCLASSIFIED

1133

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 NEA-06 NSAE-00
PM-10 EAP-00 PA-01 CPR-02 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
P-02 /028 W

-----111413 272117Z /60

R 271038Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8995
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

[REDACTED] SOFIA 06954

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, BU, IS, KS
SUBJECT: GOTSEV SUGGESTS ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC
- RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SOUTH KOREA

REF: TEL AVIV 971

1. (U) ON DEC 11-13 THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF BULGARIA HELD ITS LATEST PLENUM.
ON A DAILY BASIS, THE NEWSPAPER "RABOTNICHESKO DELO"
IS CARRYING SOME OF THE SPEECHES WHICH WERE MADE AT
THE PLENUM.

2. (U) THE DECEMBER 21 EDITION CARRIES THE SPEECH MADE
BY LYUBEN GOTSEV, A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
AND A DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT MAKES
TWO INTERESTING POINTS:

--AFTER THE RELEVANT PREPARATION AND CLARIFICATIONS
ARE CARRIED OUT WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES, DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS SHOULD BE RESTORED WITH ISRAEL IN THE
FIRST HALF OF 1990.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 SOFIA 06954 271043Z

--THE NECESSARY STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO ACTIVATE
THE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA, BEGINNING FIRST
WITH CONSULAR AND AFTER THAT POLITICAL RELATIONS.
THE GOAL SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BY THE END OF 1990.

3. (C) BULGARIA WAS MOVING IN THE ABOVE DIRECTIONS
EVEN UNDER ZHIVKOV, BUT THE PACE HAD BEEN VERY SLOW.
AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITH SOUTH KOREA FOR THE

9702193
DEPARTMENT OF STATE JM/IPS/CR/IR/RRS Date: 11-21-97
 DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE
 DENY
EO Citations
IN PART
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
IS authority to
() CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec
() DOWNGRADE IS to () S or () C

UNCLASSIFIED

ESTABLISHMENT OF TRADE OFFICES IN THE TWO CAPITALS.
THE SOUTH KOREANS OPENED THEIR OFFICE HERE EARLIER
THIS YEAR. INFORMAL TRADE TALKS HAVE ALSO BEEN
HELD WITH THE ISRAELIS (REFTEL). GIVEN THE
FACT THAT GOTSEV FELT FREE TO MAKE THE SUGGESTIONS
OPENLY AT THE PLENUM SUGGESTS STRONGLY THAT AT SENIOR
LEVELS OF AT LEAST THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, BOTH HAVE
SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT. IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE CALLING
HIS SPEECH TO THE ATTENTION OF BOTH THE SOUTH KOREANS
AND THE ISRAELIS.
POLANSKY

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

UNCLASSIFIED

NEWS BRIEFER

LEAD STORIES AND/OR EDITORIALS IN THE MALAYSIAN PRESS AFFECTING THE U.S.



AMB ^{Plane}

DATE: September 11, 1991

HEADLINE: PLANE CRASH REMAINS TAKEN FOR POST-MORTEM

PUBLICATION: NST p. 2, STAR, p. 4, ALL PAPERS

GIST: POLICE ANNOUNCE FINDING OF SIX REMAINS THAT WILL BE SENT TO QUEEN ELIZABETH HOSPITAL TOMORROW.

HEADLINE: CORY LEADS THOUSANDS IN RALLY TO BACK US BASES

PUBLICATION: FRONT PAGE MOST PAPERS

GIST: WIRESERVICES

MEDIA REACTION: YES

HEADLINE: NO MONEY NO TALK

PUBLICATION: NST EDITORIAL p. 8

GIST: RENEWED US-ISRAELIS TENSION IS LINKED TO FINANCIAL AID AND PEACE TALKS

MEDIA REACTION: YES

HEADLINE: WHY IS THE US KEEPING SILENT?

PUBLICATION: BH p. 8, EDITORIAL

GIST: U.S. IS SILENT ON INDEPENDENCE OF AZERBAIJAN, KAZAKSTAN UZBEKISTAN BECAUSE THEY FEAR THIS COULD LEAD TO ISLAMIC RESURGENCE. U.S. DARES TO BE TOUGH WITH ARABS BUT NOT WITH ISRAEL BECAUSE THE JEWS DECIDE WHO IS ELECTED TO WHITE HOUSE. IN ORDER TO NOT OFFEND ISRAEL, BUSH IS AFRAID TO SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE OF THE ISLAMIC SOVIET REPUBLICS.

MEDIA REACTION: YES

HEADLINE: KELANTAN BARS AL-ARQAM EXPO

PUBLICATION: NST p. 2

GIST: IN KOTA BARU, PAS GOVERNMENT BANS EXPO BY AURAD MUHAMMADIAH TARIKAT SECT BECAUSE OF SECT'S HERESY.

USIS - Fm
Trans. pls.

143
R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/FPC/CDR *CDR* Date: *11/15/92*

RELEASE DECLASSIFY MIR Cases Only

EXCISE DOWNGRADE TO Exemptions

DELETE IN PART

DELETE Non-Responsive Info _____ TS authority to

FOIA Exemptions _____ CLASSIFY as S or C

PA Exemptions _____ DOWNGRADE TS to S or C

9303252

1
E11

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 ABU DH 04831 160757Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-10
CIAE-00 EB-08 DODE-00 H-01 NSC-01 NSAE-00 HA-08
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 SSN-02 USIE-00 SP-02
SPRS-01 /087 W

-----271030 161808Z /45

R 160700Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5152
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USLO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/GR/TR ¹⁸ Date: 9/3/97
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PART
 DENY NO Citations

FOIA Exemptions _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec. _____
PA Exemptions _____ () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

9305025

ABU DHABI 4831

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SOPN TC
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV'S DEATH -- UAE CONDOLENCE

1. (LOU) NOVEMBER 12, UAE PRESIDENT SAHIKH ZAYID SENT CABLE OF CONDOLENCE TO PRESIDUM OF SUPREME SOVIET UPON OCCASION OF SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S DEATH. CABLE, AS REPORTED IN PRESS, WAS BRIEF AND CORRECT -- WITHOUT EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO SOVIET-UAE RELATIONS.
2. (C) LOCAL NEWSPAPERS HERE CARRIED SEVERAL WIRE-SERVICE REPORTS RELATING TO DEATH OF BREZHNEV, INCLUDING BRIEF BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF HIM; SOVIET AND WORLD-WIDE REACTION TO NEWS; AND IMPLICATIONS OF HIS PASSING FOR THE FUTURE. ONE LOCAL ENGLISH-

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 ABU DH 04831 160757Z

LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER AVAILED ITSELF OF THE SITUATION TO PUBLISH AN EDITORIAL CASTIGATING WHAT IT TERMED AS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "STRIDENT POSTURE" TOWARD

UNCLASSIFIED

SOVIETS, IN CONTRADICTION TO WHAT IT CLAIMED WERE PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S CONSTRUCTIVE ATTEMPTS TO RESTRAIN THE ARMS RACE. THE EDITORIAL MADE MILD, PASSING CRITICISM OF SOVIET INVASIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AFGHANISTAN, BUT WENT ON TO COMMEND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ARAB CAUSES, VIZ, MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR ARAB NATIONS CONFRONTING ISRAEL IN SUPPORT OF PALESTINIANS.

UNCLASSIFIED

3. (C) COMMENT: ALTHOUGH COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES -- AND ATTENDANT INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS THESE ENTAIG -- ARE ON UPSWING HERE, PROSPECTS FOR FULL FORMAL UAE/USSR RELATIONS WILL, WE THINK, REMAIN DIM FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ANYWAY. BREZHNEV'S DEATH ITSELF SHOULD NEITHER IMPROVE NOR OTHERWISE CHANGE SOVIET-UAE RELATIONS. UAE IS UNLIKELY TO USE THIS OCCASION TO MAKE ANY DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TO NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP -- OR RESPOND FAVORABLY TO ANY SUCH MOVES ON SOVIETS' PART, SINCE UAE CONTINUES TO FOLLOW SAUDI LEAD IN DETERMINING APPROPRIATE POSITION TO TAKE ON EAST/WEST ISSUES. OF COURSE, UAE CAN BE EXPECTED TO ALSO CONTINUE PERMITTING UAE NEWSPAPERS TO GIVE EXPRESSION TO LOCAL ANGER OVER U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY, EVEN WHEN, AS IN EXAMPLE CITED IN PARA 2 ABOVE, EDITORIAL COMMENTARY PLACES SOVIET UNION IN MORE FAVORABLE LIGHT THAN U.S. OUR HOSTS VIEW PRESS AS "SAFETY VALVE" FOR REGIONAL FRUSTRATIONS RATHER THAN AS MEANS OF SIGNALLING CHANGE OF TRADITIONAL UAE POSITION RE USSR.

LUMSDEN
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03

ABU DH 04831 160757Z

UNCLASSIFIED

Date Printed: 08/11/1997

DOC NUMBER: 82CAIRO28621

CHANNEL: n/a

FileName : .../t821167/aaaaccvm.v.el

R
E79

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 28621 01 OF 02 131126Z
ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 PA-02 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SPRS-01 /023 W
-----175027 131128Z /10

O 131117Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4608
INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 9/3/97
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY EO Citations
 DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ CLASSIFY as S or C Sec. _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C

9305025

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 28621

TUNIS FOR FSI/STAFFORD AND LOFTUS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW FOR NOVEMBER 12

1. HIGHLIGHTS

-- LEAD STORY IN ALL JOURNALS IS DEATH OF BREZHNEV
AND SPECULATION AS TO HIS SUCCESSOR

-- MUBARAK MEETS CODEL HAMILTON

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 28621 01 OF 02 131126Z

-- ALI TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECSTATE
SHULTZ NOVEMBER 13

UNCLASSIFIED

END HIGHLIGHTS

2. BREZHNEV. TOP STORY IN ALL NOVEMBER 12 DAILIES IS THE DEATH OF SOVIET PREMIER BREZHNEV AND SPECULATION UNCLASSIFIED

ON HIS SUCCESSOR. THE PAPERS CARRY MINISTER OF STATE FOR FORAF BOUTROS GHALI'S CONDOLENCES ON EGYPT'S BEHALF TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE IN WHICH HE PRAISES BREZHNEV'S DETERMINATION TO SHOULDER HIS RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD HIS COUNTRY, EVEN UP TO THE LAST MINUTE DESPITE HIS ILLNESS. GHALI ASSERTS THAT BREZHNEV'S DEATH WILL HAVE WORLDWIDE REPERCUSSIONS.

3. CODEL HAMILTON: SECOND LEAD STORY IS ONE-HOUR MEETING NOVEMBER 12 BETWEEN MUBARAK AND CODEL HAMILTON ATTENDED BY AMBASSADOR ATHERTON. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, CONG. HAMILTON TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE TALKS WERE VERY GOOD AND THAT MUBARAK HAD ASSERTED HIS COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. "THAT GAVE US HOPE THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE END," HAMILTON SAID. QUESTIONED AS TO ISRAEL'S READINESS TO HALT OR FREEZE THE BUILDING OF SETTLEMENTS, HAMILTON IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE CODEL WAS IN THE AREA TO STUDY A NUMBER OF ISSUES, AND THAT WHILE IN ISRAEL THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN GENERAL WITH PRIMIN BEGIN AND OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS WHO HAD "SOUNDED THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE." UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03. CAIRO 28621 01 OF 02 131126Z

4. MUBARAK: PRESS ALSO GIVES PROMINENT COVERAGE TO A NOVEMBER 12 MEETING BETWEEN MUBARAK AND A DELEGATION OF SENIOR EDITORS FROM AMERICAN CATHOLIC PAPERS. AFTER MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, JOHN FINK, LEADER OF THE GROUP WHILE ADDRESSING JOURNALISTS, SAID THAT MUBARAK HAD GIVEN HIS DELEGATION THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS DOING HIS BEST TO ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE AREA. HE REPORTEDLY COMMENTED FURTHER THAT OFFICIALS IN ISRAEL ALSO WANT PEACE BUT THAT NEITHER BEGIN NOR THE ARABS TRUST EACH OTHER AND THAT IS THE PROBLEM.

5. REAGAN/ALI MEETING: NOVEMBER 12 PRESS NOTES THAT

Date Printed: 08/11/1997

DOC NUMBER: 82CAIRO28621

CHANNEL: n/a

FileName : .../t821167/aaaaccvvr.tel

PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL RECEIVE DEPRIMIN AND FORMIN ALI NOVEMBER 13 AT WHICH TIME ALI WILL DELIVER A WRITTEN MESSAGE ON MIDEAST PROBLEMS. PAPERS ADD THAT HE WILL MEET WITH SECSTATE SHULTZ LATER IN THE EVENING AND NOVEMBER 14 WITH SECDEF WEINBERGER AS WELL AS OTHER SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS. QUOTINGXALON HIS JUST-CONCLUDED MEETINGS WITH PALESTINIANS IN PARIS, ALI UNCLASSIFIED

3

SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE PALESTINIANS WELCOMED THE IDEA OF A FEDERAL UNION OR A CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN BUT THAT REQUIRES THE HOLDING OF A PLEBISCITE ON SELF-DETERMINATION. HE ADDED THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE NOT GIVEN JORDANIAN KING HUSSEIN THE AUTHORITY TO SPEAK FOR THEM.

6. GHALI: GUMHURIYA, QUOTING FROM A GHALI INTERVIEW TO THE KUWAITI NEWSPAPER AL-NABAA, WRITES THAT EGYPT

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 28621 02 OF 02 131126Z
ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 PA-02 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SPRS-01 /023 W
-----175033 131128Z /10

O 131117Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4609
INFO AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA

Date Printed: 08/11/1997

DOC NUMBER: 82CAIRO28621

CHANNEL: n/a

FileName : .../t821167/aaaascvr.tel

AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 28621

WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND THE U.S. ON PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY UNLESS JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS PARTICIPATE. HE REPORTEDLY STRESSED THAT DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PLO WAS ESSENTIAL.

7. PRC: THE PRESS REPORTS THAT THE CHINESE PREMIER HAS ACCEPTED AN OFFICIAL INVITATION TO VISIT EGYPT FROM DECEMBER 20-24.

8. SUDAN: MUBARAK MET NOVEMBER 12 WITH THE VISITING SUDANESE VICE PRESIDENT. AHRAM ALSO WRITES THAT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 CAIRO 28621 02 OF 02 131126Z

THE SUDANESE MINISTER OF STATE FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS WILL ARRIVE THIS WEEK AT THE HEAD OF A DELEGATION.

9. DETAINEES:

-- NOVEMBER 12 AKHBAR REPORTS THAT THE 304 AL-JIHAD DETAINEES WILL GO TO TRIAL ON DECEMBER 4 IN A COURTROOM WHICH WILL HAVE 16 DETENTION AREAS FOR THE DEFENDENTS. THE CASE FILE TO DATE COVERS 30 THOUSAND PAGES, ACCORDING TO AKHBAR.

-- THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE GAZETTE REPORTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION COURT HAS REFERRED THE CASES OF 72 DETAINEES, ARRESTED UNDER THE OCTOBER 8, 1981 EMERGENCY LAW, TO THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL

Date Printed: 08/11/1997

DOC NUMBER: 82CAIRO28621

CHANNEL: n/a

FileName : .../t821167/aaaaccvn.te

COURT FOR A DECISION ON THE LAW'S LEGALITY. THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT MEANWHILE HAS ORDERED A SUSPENSION
OF THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S
FINDING. AHERTON

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

629



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AM: NS20008-0113

(b) (1) (a) (5)

PAGE 01 STATE 274229
ORIGIN MOOS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:AEJONES:POW
APPROVED BY NEA:NAVELIOTES
NEA/ARN:DLMACK
S/S-O:RSHERMAN

-----233760 290047Z /60
O 290041Z SEP 82 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 274229
UNCLASSIFIED

MODIS
CAIRO ALSO FOR HABIB; BEIRUT ALSO FOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINR, LE, SY, PLO
SUBJECT: PLO RETURN TO LEBANON

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]

THIS IS A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE PLO DEPARTURE PLAN NEGOTIATED BY AMB. HABIB. THE RETURN OF THESE PLO ELEMENTS TO LEBANON COULD LEAD TO FURTHER HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, WHICH WOULD HAVE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON AND THE REGION.

PAGE 02 STATE 274229

3. AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER SHOULD COORDINATE WITH AMB.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]

EXEMPTIONS: [REDACTED]

FO OADR: [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFY ON: [REDACTED]

DATE: 3/6/96

9302566

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PAGANELLI TO DEVISE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF BRINGING THIS MATTER FORCEFULLY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. THE SECRETARY WILL RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH FOMMIN KHADDAM WHEN HE MEETS WITH HIM ON SEPT. 30 IN NEW YORK. THE SECRETARY WILL ALSO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM WITH FOMMIN SAUD DURING THEIR OCT. 8 MEETING.

4. FOR JIDDA: CHARGE SUDDARTH SHOULD APPROACH THE SAUDIS ON THIS ISSUE AND IMPRESS UPON THEM THE SERIOUS

CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD RESULT FROM A CONTINUATION OF THE PLO ACTIVITIES OUTLINED IN SEPTTEL MENTIONED ABOVE.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DAM

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

58

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20006-0609

P
AUG 15

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04744 01 OF 03 200706Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 M
-----132511 200709Z /12
@ 200805Z JUL 02 ZPP4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7448

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 4744

UNCLASSIFIED

MODIS DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIS

E.O. 12065: ROS-1,3,4 7/19/02 (HABIS, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, PLO, SY, XF
SUBJECT: HABIS MISSION:

1. ~~(S) SUMMARY~~

2. SUMMARY: JOINED BY DILLON AND DRAPER, I HAD A LONG MEETING TODAY, JULY 19, WITH [] WITH REGARD TO HIS SESSION EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH PLO LEADERS YASIR ARAFAT, ABU WALID, AND HANI AL-HASSAN. [] HAS BEEN CHRONICALLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT PLO INTENTIONS, BUT ON THIS OCCASION TOLD ME HE WAS NOW REPEAT NOW CONVINCED THAT ARAFAT WAS DETERMINED TO LEAVE BEIRUT OR WAS AT LEAST RESIGNED TO ITS INEVITABILITY. HE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF DISPERSAL TO SIX OR MORE ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE VARIOUS PLO ORGANIZATIONS AND COMBATANTS. ARAFAT WAS INSISTENT THAT HIS DECISION WAS ALL THAT COUNTED, AND THAT AS REGARDS DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON, "THE SOONER THE BETTER". ARAFAT CONSIDERS IT UNBELIEVABLE, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD EXPECT THE PLO TO WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF ALL THE MOP ELEMENTS.

ARAFAT - AND ARAFAT LIKED THE IDEA - THAT THE PLO WITHDRAW

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04744 01 OF 03 200706Z

TO NORTHERN LEBANON, THEN COLLECT ALL THE OTHER

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DENY <input type="checkbox"/> EXEMPTIONS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART <input type="checkbox"/> (S)	() CLASSIFY TO () DOWNGRADE TO () S OR () S OR	(S authority to)
--	--	--	------------------

9302566

IS/PFC/CDR. [Signature] Date: 3/6/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COMBATANTS IN THE AREA, AND DISPERSE ALL OF THEM TO RECIPIENT COUNTRIES UNDER A TIMETABLE AGREED IN ADVANCE. I SAID I DOUBTED THIS WOULD BE WORKABLE BUT DID NOT CLOSE THE DOOR COMPLETELY.

3. [] SAID THAT SHARON HAD TOLD BASHIR GENAYEL EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT THE IDF WOULD GO INTO WEST BEIRUT WITHIN 48 HOURS. END SUMMARY.

4. [] SAID IN OUR MEETING TODAY THAT HE HAD HAD A GOOD SESSION EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH PLO LEADERS YASIR ARAFAT, ABU WALID AND HANI AL-HASSAN. ALTHOUGH THE FACT MAY HAVE NOT BEEN REPORTED FULLY, I HAVE BEEN URGING STRONGLY THAT [] GET IN TOUCH DIRECTLY - AND FACE-TO-FACE - WITH THE PLO LEADERS - BECAUSE I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT HAZZAN HAS NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY FORTHRIGHT IN HIS DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RESPECTIVE GOL AND U.S. POSITIONS. I HAVE SENSED THAT [] WOULD BE MORE SPECIFIC AND, IN THE PROCESS, DEVELOP MORE INSIGHT INTO THE PLO POSITION. FORTUNATELY, TOO, [] HAS BEEN CHRONICALLY SKEPTICAL OF PLO INTENTIONS, AND MANY OF ARAFAT'S WELL-KNOWN NEGOTIATING STYLE.

5. THEREFORE, I WAS IMPRESSED WHEN [] SAID FLATLY THAT HE WAS NOT REPEAT NOW CONVINCED THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP REALIZED IT HAD TO LEAVE BEIRUT AS WELL AS LEBANON FOR GOOD AND THAT THE COMBATANTS HAD TO LEAVE ALSO. WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE RESIGNED TO THE PRESSURE BEING APPLIED TO THEM OR WHETHER IT WAS BECAUSE THEY SAW ADVANTAGES IN MOVING WAS NOT SO IMPORTANT. THE DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, AND ARAFAT HAD STRESSED THAT IT WAS HIS OWN DECISION.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03

BEIRUT 04744 01 OF 03 200706Z

NO ONE, ARAFAT HAD SAID, WOULD CONTEST HIM. IN AN ASIDE, [] SAID THAT HE SENSED THAT PLO MORALE WAS LOW.

6. EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT, ARAFAT AND COMPANY HAD INDICATED THEY WERE PREPARED TO DISPERSE THE PLO MEMBERS TO A VARIETY OF COUNTRIES. IRAQ, SYRIA, LIBYA, JORDAN AND EGYPT WERE MENTIONED. IT IS HARD TO TAKE THIS SERIOUSLY, BUT [] VENTURED THE OPINION THAT ARAFAT HIMSELF WOULD GO TO GREECE, AT LEAST INITIALLY, IN PART BECAUSE PAPANDREOU HAD ISSUED AN INVITATION. [] THOUGHT

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THAT ARAFAT WANTED TO GO THERE SO THAT HE COULD LEVEL ACCUSATIONS AT THE ARAB WORLD FOR HAVING LET THE PLO DOWN. WHILE THESE OTHER COUNTRIES WERE MENTIONED, [] ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SYRIA WOULD BE THE DESTINATION FOR SOME, PRIMARILY HABBASH, MAATHAN, AND PERHAPS JABRIL.

7. I HAD EARLIER ASKED [] WHETHER HE COULD TRY TO FIND OUT IN HIS MEETING WITH THE PLO LEADERS SOMETHING SPECIFIC ABOUT THE VARIOUS PLO PASSPORT HOLDERS, UNITS WITH CONNECTIONS TO VARIOUS ARAB COUNTRIES, ETC., AND [] APPARENTLY ASKED THEM SQUARELY WHAT THEY COULD PROVIDE. ARAFAT INTER ALIA SAID THAT HE HAD TWO BATTALIONS OF COMBATANTS WHO HAD CONNECTIONS WITH JORDAN. HE AND THE OTHERS WENT ON TO SAY THAT SYRIA HAD OVER-ESTIMATED THE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN ASYLUM, AND HAD SAID THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE DELIBERATELY IN ORDER TO FRIGHTEN OTHER COUNTRIES AWAY FROM ACCEPTING PLO MEMBERS.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04744 02 OF 03 200722Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----132684 200723Z /12
O 200805Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7440

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIRUT 4744

MODIS

FROM HABIB

UNCLASSIFIED

8. ARAFAT AT ONE POINT SAID THAT AS REGARDS DEPARTURE, "THE SOONER THE BETTER." HOWEVER, HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RANK AND FILE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF DISPERSAL DIRECTLY FROM BEIRUT TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THEY WANTED TO MOVE OUT OF BEIRUT UNDER ARAFAT'S PERSONAL FLAG, SO TO SPEAK. THIS WAS WHY HE SAID TO [] THAT HE WANTED TO GO TO THE BIG'A - TO NORTHERN LEBANON - AS A FIRST STEP. AT THAT POINT, IN RELATIVE SECURITY, THE MOVEMENT TO OTHER RECIPIENT COUNTRIES COULD BEGIN. [] SAID THAT HE HAD THEN PROPOSED - CLEARLY AGAINST THE SENTIMENTS OF SARKIS - THAT ARAFAT CONSIDER GOING TO THE BIG'A AND COLLECTING ALL THE OTHER COMBATANTS IN THE AREA AT THE SAME TIME, SOME 12,000 OF THEM ACCORDING TO ARAFAT'S GUESS, AND THEN MOVE OUT PROMPTLY FROM THE BIG'A UNDER A TIME TABLE TO BE AGREED IN ADVANCE WITH THE GOL. [] SAID THAT ARAFAT LIKED THIS IDEA VERY MUCH. I BROKE IN AT THIS POINT IN [] DIGITAL TO SAY THAT I DOUBTED THAT THIS WOULD BE WORKABLE, THAT THE BIG'A STOPOVER HAD ALL THE SAME OBJECTIONS WHICH SARKIS HAD OUTLINED TO ME, BUT DID NOT CLOSE THE DOOR COMPLETELY TO THE CONCEPT.

9. [] SAID THAT ARAFAT FOUND IT UNBELIEVABLE THAT THE HRF WOULD COME IN TO BEIRUT AFTER EVACUATION OF THE
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04744 02 OF 03 200722Z

PLG HAD BEGUN, ARAFAT SAID THIS SHOWED THERE WAS NO TRUST ON THE PART OF THE U.S. OF THE PLG. []

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ANSWERED RATHER CLEVERLY THAT IT WAS THE SOL THAT DID NOT TRUST THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE POSSIBILITY OF DISSSENT AMONG THE VARIOUS FACTIONS, THE RISK FROM LEBANESE ARMED ELEMENTS IN BEIRUT, ETC.

10. [] THEN WENT ON TO SAY TO ARAFAT AND COMPANY THAT THE SOL HAD ALREADY COME THROUGH WITH MANY PLO REQUESTS (E.G., THAT THERE BE AN MNF, THAT THE LAF BE JOINED WITH THE MNF DURING THE ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT, THAT THERE BE SOME INTERPOSITION OF FORCES BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE PLO, THAT THERE BE UN OBSERVERS, ETC.). [] SAID THAT, AFTER HAVING GIVEN THAT, THE SOL COULD DO NO FURTHER NEGOTIATING ON THE "TIMING" OF THE MNF. ARAFAT THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE FRENCH ACCOMPANY THE PLO CONVOYS LEAVING BEIRUT, AND [] SAID HE THOUGHT THIS COULD BE A POSSIBILITY. WHEN I QUESTIONED HIM ON WHY HE HAD SAID SUCH A THING, [] SAID THAT HE HAD BASED HIS SUPPOSITION ON COMMENTS MADE TO HIM BY GENERAL TAHIR, WHO WOULD NOT OBJECT.

11. [] THEN REVEALED SOMETHING WHICH SAYS SOMETHING ABOUT THIS WHOLE EXASPERATING NEGOTIATING PROCESS I HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HEAVY ARMS WERE NOT TO BE TAKEN BY THE PLO WHEN THEY LEFT BEIRUT. [] SAID HE HAD NOT MADE IT CLEAR, BECAUSE THE SOL DID NOT WANT TO BE SADDLED WITH THE HEAVY ARMS. THE SOL COULD NOT PROTECT THEM. THIS WAS THEIR WELL-KNOWN POSITION. [] HAD NOT, MOREOVER, TOLD THE PLO THAT NEITHER THE U.S. NOR ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO THEIR CARRYING OUT HEAVY ARMS. I INSISTED TO [] THAT HE MUST TELL THE PLO FLATLY THAT

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04744 Q2 OF 03 2007222

THERE IS NO REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHATSOEVER THAT THE PLO CAN TAKE OUT ANYTHING BUT THEIR SIDE, INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. [] SAID HE WOULD DO SO IN HIS NEXT MEETING WITH THEM.

12. [] APPARENTLY DID NOT GET DEEPLY INTO THE SUBJECT OF A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED FORCES. HOWEVER, HIS BEST ESTIMATE BASED ON HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT AND COMPANY WAS THAT FROM 5-6000 COMBATANTS WOULD BE EVACUATED FROM THE PLO, NOT REPEAT NOT COUNTING THE PLA, WHICH IS AT LEAST 1600 IN NUMBER, PERHAPS MORE.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

AN EVACUATION OF SOME 8000 COMBATANTS IS, THEREFORE, STILL A BALLPARK FIGURE. [REDACTED] HAD ASKED ARAFAT AND COMPANY ABOUT NON-ARAB FOREIGNERS AMONG THE PLO, AND ARAFAT HAD ADMITTED THERE WERE SOME PAKISTANIS AND OTHERS. THERE WERE A FEW IRANIANS. HOWEVER, ARAFAT HAD SAID THAT THERE WERE SOME 5,000 IRANIANS IN SYRIA AND THAT HE EXPECTED THEM TO BE INSERTED TEMPORARILY INTO LEBANON FOR SOME 24 HOURS - FOR POLITICAL REASONS - AFTER WHICH THEY WOULD BE BROUGHT OUT AND PERHAPS SENT TO THE IRAQI-SYRIAN BORDER.

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04744 03 OF 03 200724Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----132714 200725Z /12
O 200005Z JUL 02 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7450

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BEIRUT 4744

MODIS
FROM HABIB

UNCLASSIFIED

13. ASKING THAT I RETAIN THE INFORMATION IN GREAT CONFIDENCE. [] SAID THAT SHARON HAD TALKED TO BASHIR GENAYEL EARLIER IN THE DAY AND HAD ADVISED HIM THAT THE IDF WOULD MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT "WITHIN 48 HOURS". SHARON REPORTEDLY HAD ALSO TOLD BASHIR NOT TO TELL SARKIS, [] OR ME. [] WAS NOT INCLINED TO ATTACH A LOT OF SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS REVELATION SINCE IT HAD BEEN MADE PREVIOUSLY TO BASHIR. IT COULD BE A FORM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, SINCE SHARON WAS WELL AWARE THAT BASHIR WAS NOT LIKELY TO KEEP SUCH ADVICE A SECRET. COMMENT: AS I HAVE ALREADY ADVISED OVER THE SECURE TELEPHONE, HE SHOULD CAREFULLY ANALYZE THE PROSPECTS OF MILITARY MOVES INTO WEST BEIRUT OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. SHARON IN TODAY'S CONVERSATION WITH ME DID NOT TALK OF DEADLINES AS SUCH, BUT HE INDICATED THAT HE EXPECTED TO HEAR THE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KHADDAFI AND SAID AS EARLY AS THURSDAY NIGHT OR WEDNESDAY MORNING, AND WOULD REGARD THAT REPORT AS A SIGNIFICANT BENCH MARK. HOWEVER, WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, IS THE BEGINNING OF THE ID AL-PITA. FINALLY, THE "EIGHT DAYS" BEGIN ALLEGEDLY WAS GOING TO GIVE ME IN MY NEGOTIATIONS FALL DUE ON ABOUT JULY 21 OR 22. END COMMENT.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04744 03 OF 03 200724Z
DILLON

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

57

~~SECRET~~

AM: NS20006-0321

Handwritten initials and marks

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04460 051412Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----360276 051410Z /45

Z 051345Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7208
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

9302566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1. RELEASE
2. EXCHANGE
3. DELAY
FOIA Exemptions
PK Exemptions
(1) DECLASSIFIED
(2) DECLASSIFIED IN PART
(3) (S)

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4460

UNCLASSIFIED

NODIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 7/8/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PINT, LE, IS, US, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: EFFORTS FOR CEASEFIRE, OPENING OF CROSSING
AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM

IS/FRG/CDR
CLASSIFY as
DO UPGRADE IS to
1 S M
1 S M

Handwritten: 4/1/92 5:49:49

1. ~~(CONTAINING TENTS)~~
2. THIS IS A SUMMARY REPORT, DETAILS BY SEPTEL. ADDRESSEES SHOULD HOLD CLOSELY THE FACT THAT I MET SECRETLY WITH SHARON THIS MONDAY AFTERNOON, '7)6 S, JOINED BY DRAPER, KINCHE, SHARON'S MILITARY AIDE, AND A FEW OTHERS WERE WITH SHARON.

3. BASIC OUTCOME WAS AS FOLLOWS:
 --A) SHARON AGREED THAT ISRAEL WOULD DECLARE A UNILATERAL

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04460 051412Z
CEASEFIRE AT 1600 LOCAL HOURS TODAY WITH THE USUAL CONDITION

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT FIRE THEREAFTER UNLESS FIRED UPON.
-- B) SHARON WILL BE CHECKING WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THIS AFTERNOON AS REGARDS ELIMINATING THE IDF CHECKPOINT AT THE EXIT OF GALERIE SIMAAN AS WELL AS ELIMINATING IDF CONTROLS ON THE ROAD UP TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

(1) (U) (A) (S)

V--C) SIMILARLY, SHARON WILL ALSO CHECK WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FOR AN ANSWER TO MY HUMANITARIAN APPEAL TO RESTORE WATER AND POWER TO WEST BEIRUT, AND ALLOW FOOD AND OTHER NECESSITIES INTO THAT PART OF THE CITY. HE PREDICTED THAT ANY RELAXATION WOULD BE FOR A LIMITED TIME ONLY.

4. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING, I GOT IN TOUCH FIRST WITH PRININ HAZZAN AND THEN WITH SARKIS, TO EXPLAIN THAT A CEASEFIRE WOULD COMMENCE AT 1600. I URGED HAZZAN TO GET THE WORD TO ALL PLO QUARTERS AS FAST AS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH THE CEASEFIRE. I ALSO PRESSED HIM TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY WITH THE MILITARY COMMISSION SESSIONS. HE SAID ONE SUCH SESSION HAD BEEN HELD ALREADY AND ANOTHER WAS TO BE CONVENED LATER IN THE DAY. I TOLD HE THAT HE WAS PROVIDING HIS UPDATED "PLAN" TO THE MILITARY COMMISSION MEMBERS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE US-FRENCH MNF.

5. OTHER KEY POINTS:
SHARON STRONGLY AFFIRMED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT A PLO POLITICAL PRESENCE OF ANY KIND IN LEBANON OR EVEN A TOKEN MILITARY PRESENCE. I REFUSED TO ACCEPT HIS ARGUMENTS.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04460 081412Z

-- HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IF "D-DAY" WAS NOT SET SOON, HE WOULD RESUME THE HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE CITY, AND SHUT OFF WATER, POWER AND SUPPLIES ONCE GAIN.

-- HE SAID ISRAEL HAD DECIDED NOT TO LET ANY TERRORISTS STAY IN BEIRUT, WHILE HE WOULD PREFER A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THE IDF WILL GO INTO WEST BEIRUT IF NECESSARY. AS FOR THE CIVILIANS, IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THEM TO BECOME THIRSTY AND LEAVE, RATHER THAN STAY AND BE KILLED LATER. I SAID I WOULD IN NO WAY ACCEPT HIS PREMISE THAT WEST

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT MIGHT HAVE TO BE ENTERED AND ARGUED THAT A POLITICAL
SOLUTION COULD BE ACHIEVED.
DILLON

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

551

~~SECRET~~

AM: NS20005-0610

P
D
(A) (1) (A) (2)

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 163040
ORIGIN NODS-00

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:CHILL:JD
APPROVED BY P:EAGLESBURGER
NEA:NAVELIOTES
S/S:-O:ESHERMAN

-----311727 140052Z /60
Z 140045Z JUN 82 ZFFN
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
WHITE HOUSE FLASH 0000

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ STATE 163040

NODIS
FOR HABIB

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 6/13/02 (EAGLESBURGER, LAWRENCE)
TAGS: NOPS, HARR, LE, IS, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION INSTRUCTIONS
REF: STATE 163009

1. ~~SECRET ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. YOUR INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN AS STATED IN PARAS 1-5 REPTEL.
3. IT IS TOO EARLY TO MAKE DECISION AS TO WHETHER YOU SHOULD BE RECALLED HERE FOR CONSULTATIONS. WE STILL BELIEVE YOU SHOULD GO TO BEIRUT AS SOON AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, RECOGNIZING THAT IT IS NOW UP TO THE ISRAELIS TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR YOUR MEETING TO BE PRODUCTIVE ALONG LINES DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY TO ARENS AS STATED BELOW.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 163040

4. THE SECRETARY WANTS YOU TOMORROW (JUNE 14) IN

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOIA Exemption: (A)(1)

EXEMPTION BY: [Signature]

DATE: 2/6/86

IS/FPC/ODR [Signature]

EO Guidance: [Signature]

CLASSIFY / as () S ()

DOWNGRADE IS to () S ()

DATE: 2/6/86

UNCLASSIFIED

JERUSALEM TO SEE BEGIN FOR A GOOD DISCUSSION OF OUR OVERALL POLICY OBJECTIVES SO THAT WE MAY HAVE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING THAN WE APPEAR TO HAVE AT PRESENT AS TO WHERE THE U.S. AND ISRAEL MAY OR MAY NOT AGREE. YOU WILL KNOW BEST HOW TO DRAM ON THIS CABLE AND REPTEL AND HOW TO STRUCTURE YOUR DISCUSSIONS. YOU SHOULD AVOID ISRAELI ATTEMPTS TO OVERFOCUS ON PEACEKEEPING ISSUES WHICH ARE ONLY PART, ALBEIT IMPORTANT PART, OF WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. OUR OVERALL GOAL REMAINS CENTERED AROUND A NEW DEAL FOR LEBANON WITH A REVIVIFIED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXTENDING ITS AUTHORITY OVER ALL LEBANESE TERRITORY.

5. AFTER BEING BRIEFED ON SECURE TELCONS CONCERNING YOUR SESSIONS WITH BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES TODAY, THE SECRETARY TELEPHONED ARENS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THERE IS NO WAY THAT THE U.S. CAN ACQUIESCE IN AN ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF LEBANON LASTING FOR FIVE YEARS OR FOR ANY LENGTHY PERIOD; SHOULD ISRAEL SEEK TO DO SO, IT WILL DO SO ON ITS OWN.

-- WE DO NOT WANT TO HEAR ULTIMATUMS ABOUT UNIFIL, ETC. WE WILL WORK TO DO WHAT IS BEST AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. BOTH OPTIONS (UNIFIL AND A NON-UN MNF) ARE NEEDED.

-- "CONTRACTS" WITH TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO A MNF ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION. WE WILL WORK TO SEE THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE ADEQUATE FOR ISRAEL'S INTERESTS.

-- IN HABIB'S MEETINGS TOMORROW WE LOOK FOR A BROAD EXCHANGE ON THE FUTURE OF LEBANON COVERING OUR RESPECTIVE GOALS.

PAGE 03

STATE 163040

-- THE SECRETARY WANTS PHIL HABIB TO GO TO BEIRUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRIBUTOR TO THIS PROCESS. HABIB MUST BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH LEBANESE OFFICIALS WITHOUT INTIMIDATION. IT IS ONE THING FOR ISRAEL TO MOVE TO RELIEVE SYRIAN OR PLO PRESSURE BUT QUITE ANOTHER TO CREATE THE PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI INTIMIDATION OF LEBANON'S LEGALLY INSTITUTED GOVERNMENT.

6. THE SECRETARY TOLD ARENS THAT REPORTS COMING IN, NOW

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

OF 100 PLUS IDF TANKS IN THE AREA OF LEBANON'S PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IS MIND-BOGGLING. HE ASKED ARENS FOR CLARIFICATION AND ARENS SAID HE WOULD CALL JERUSALEM RIGHT AWAY (MIDNIGHT ISRAEL TIME). IF ISRAELIS WANT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETINGS WITH US IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON IN THE NEXT WEEK TO GO AHEAD AS PLANNED, THIS SITUATION MUST BE CLEARED UP AT ONCE. ARENS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.

7.

(A) (A)

8. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR CABLE ON YOUR MEETING
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 STATE 163040

TODAY WITH BEGIN AND REALIZE AFRESH THE INCREDIBLE SITUATION YOU ARE FACING. THE SECRETARY WANTS YOU TO KNOW OF HIS STRONG AND CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR MISSION.

9. FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S CALL TO ARENS HE SPOKE TO LEBANESE AMBASSADOR ITANI AND TOLD HIM TO CONVEY TO SARKIS OUR FIRM HOPE THAT SARKIS WILL ACT AS THE SOVEREIGN LEADER OF A SOVEREIGN NATION, FREE OF INTIMIDATION FROM EITHER SYRIA, THE PLO, OR THE ISRAELIS. WE WANT SYRIA AND ISRAEL OUT OF LEBANON AND THE PLO DISARMED AND ABSORBED UNDER GOL AUTHORITY. ITANI WAS HIGHLY GRATIFIED TO GET THIS MESSAGE AND UNDERTOOK TO PASS IT ON IMMEDIATELY.

10. THANI HAS NOW CONTACTED VELIOTES WITH MESSAGE FROM
~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SARKIS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) GOL IS GRATEFUL FOR THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE:

(B) A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY IS SARKIS' OBJECTIVE, BUT THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE SO LONG AS ISRAELI TANKS ARE POSITIONED IN BAABDA.

(C) USG SHOULD MOVE TO GET ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM BAABDA.

11. EAGLEBURGER IS TELLING ARENS TONIGHT THAT WHILE WE WANT PLO AND SYRIA OUT OF BEIRUT, THERE MUST BE NO SUGGESTION OF ISRAELI MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE GOL. HE IS EMPHASIZING GOL MUST BE AND BE PERCEIVED AS INDEPENDENT. THEREFORE, IT MOST IMPORTANT IDF MOVE AWAY FROM BAABDA. SECRETARY WANTS YOU TO REINFORCE THIS MESSAGE WITH

PAGE 08 STATE 163040

ISRAELIS TOMORROW. HAIG

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

529

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AM: NS20005-0478

(A)(A)
(A)(3)

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08563 01 OF 02 091606Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----132077 091607Z /41
Z 091533Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0676
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 08563

NODIS DECAPTIONED

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY FLASH

FOR THE SECRETARY AND HABIB FROM LEWIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/9/82 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-N
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, US, SY, PLO
SUBJECT: LEBANESE HOSTILITIES: BEGIN PROVIDES HABIB WITH
- ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS INTO ISRAELI STRATEGY
REF: JERUSALEM 1785

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEFORE FLYING TO DAMASCUS WEDNESDAY MORNING TO SEE
PRESIDENT ASSAD, HABIB MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AT
HIS RESIDENCE FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF HOUR TO PROBE
INTO BEGIN'S THINKING FURTHER ABOUT THE CONDITIONS FOR
A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. BEGIN WAS ALONE; I ACCOMPANIED
HABIB.

3. BEGIN BEGAN BY THANKING THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRE-
TARY FOR THE U.S. NEGATIVE VOTE LAST NIGHT ON THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI MILI-
TARY ACTIONS IN LEBANON. BEGIN ASKED THAT HIS PROFOUND

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 08563 01 OF 02 091606Z

THANKS BE CONVEYED TO BOTH, SAYING THAT "ALTHOUGH HE DID

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

7302566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOIA Exemptions

EXEMPTION CODE

EXEMPTION AUTHORITY

EXEMPTION DATE

EXEMPTION BY

ED (if known)

CLASSIFY AND

DECLASSIFY

DATE

BY

3/6/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NOT REQUEST YOUR VETO, WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL INDEED FOR IT."

4. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB'S QUERIES ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS NEAR BEIRUT AND CLOSE TO THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY, BEGIN CONFIDED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION OF THE ISRAELI STRATEGY. REMINDING HABIB THAT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FACED BY THE ISRAELIS IS TO GET THE PLO NORTH OF HASBAYYAH TO PULL BACK AN ADDITIONAL TWENTY FIVE KILOMETERS TO THE 40-KILOMETER LINE, AS HAS NOW BEEN MILITARILY ACCOMPLISHED BY THE IDF IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN PARTS OF LEBANON. THE STRATEGY, CONCEIVED BY DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, IS TO "ENCIRCLE" THE SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES IN EASTERN LEBANON, MOVING NORTH AND THEN EAST "BEHIND THEM" TO PUT THE ISRAELI FORCES IN POSITION TO GO AFTER THE PLO FROM THE NORTH IF NECESSARY. HOWEVER, BEGIN SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE ISRAELI FORCES NOT TO ATTACK THE SYRIAN OR PLO UNITS IN THE EAST, PREFERRING TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS BY POLITICAL MEANS AND THROUGH HABIB THAT IT WOULD BE WISER FOR SYRIA TO ACCOMPLISH THE NECESSARY ACTIONS TO MOVE THE PLO NORTHWARD OUT OF RANGE. IN OTHER WORDS, BEGIN EXPLAINED THE OPERATIONS IN THE BEIRUT AREA AS PART OF THIS ENCIRCLEMENT STRATEGY INTENDED TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS WHICH WOULD THEN PERSUADE THEM TO DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY VIS-A-VIS THE PLO, THUS AVOIDING HOSTILITIES WITH SYRIA.

5. HABIB THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO PERSUADE ASSAD TO TAKE THE ACTIONS REQUESTED IN BEGIN'S MESSAGE TO THE SYRIANS, BUT HE VISUALIZED HIS CHANCES AS VERY SLIM. HABIB SAID THAT THE FIRST INDICATIONS THROUGH ONE OF ASSAD'S TRUSTED ASSOCIATES (QADDOUR) WERE NOT ENCOURAGING; NONETHELESS HE WOULD DO HIS BEST. HABIB SAID HE WOULD HAVE MUCH MORE CHANCE IF HE COULD TELL ASSAD THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES NORTH OF THE FORTY KILOMETER LINE WOULD

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

TEL AV 08563 01 OF 02 091606Z

WITHDRAW BEHIND THAT ROUGH LINE AS SOON AS THE PLO UNITS HAD MOVED NORTH AND THE FIGHTING HAD STOPPED. BEGIN DEMURRED. BEGIN INSISTED THAT ISRAELI FORCES WILL REMAIN AFTER THE FIGHTING STOPS IN THE NORTH AS WELL AS THE SOU N. UNTIL ACCEPTABLE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN PLACE TO ASSURE THAT THE AREA BEHIND THE FORTY KILOMETER LINE WILL REMAIN CLEAR OF PLO PRESENCE, EITHER THROUGH A MULTINATION-AL FORCE OR SOME OTHER MEANS. HABIB TRIED STRENUOUSLY TO EXTRACT THE COMMITMENT FROM BEGIN THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NORTHERN POINTS WOULD OCCUR AS SOON AS PLO MOVEMENT TOOK

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PLACE AND A CEASEFIRE TOOK EFFECT, BUT BEGIN WOULD NOT AGREE. FINALLY BEGIN AUTHORIZED HABIB TO SAY ONLY THAT ONCE THE PLO HAD MOVED NORTH AND A CEASEFIRE WAS IN EFFECT, ISRAEL WILL NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF WITHDRAWAL. HE THEN HEDGED EVEN THIS COMMITMENT BY SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT GIVE HABIB "A HARD PROMISE," AND THAT HABIB "CANNOT PROMISE ASSAD ANYTHING NOW." HE SUGGESTED THAT HABIB USE THE WORDS WITH ASSAD: "NEGOTIATIONS CAN THEN OPEN."

6. BEGIN CONFIDED THAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO KEEP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS TO "PERSUADE THEM" TO MOVE THE PLO OUT. TO PROMISE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ADVANCE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THAT STRATEGY. AT ONE POINT BEGIN MADE AN ANALOGY WITH THE IDF'S ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY ON THE EAST BANK OF THE SUEZ CANAL IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT FIRED AT THAT ARMY, BUT THAT BY KEEPING IT ENCIRCLED IT HAD FACILITATED THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS.

7. AFTER REALIZING THAT THIS WAS AS FAR AS BEGIN WOULD GO AT THIS TIME, AND THAT BEGIN WAS CLEARLY ASSUMING HABIB .

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08563 02 OF 02 091606Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----132107 091608Z /41
Z 091633Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8677
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 08563

NODIS

MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE MORE THAN ONE TRIP BACK AND FORTH TO DAMASCUS. WE TURNED TO ANOTHER RELATED SUBJECT. BEFORE DOING SO HOWEVER, BEGIN RECONFIRMED AGAIN THAT ISRAEL'S ONLY PURPOSE IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE FORTY KILOMETER LINE IS TO PROVIDE LEVERAGE TO FORCE THE SYRIANS TO ARRANGE FOR PLO WITHDRAWAL NORTHWARD.

8. AS WE WERE LEAVING, WE QUERIED BEGIN ABOUT HIS EXCHANGES WITH BASHIR GENAYEL. BEGIN CONFIDED THAT BASHIR HAD MET WITH GENERAL EITAN, APPARENTLY MONDAY NIGHT. AMONG OTHER THINGS AT THAT MEETING, EITAN APPARENTLY SUGGESTED TO BASHIR THAT HE APPOINT A "COMMISSIONER" TO TAKE OVER IN TYRE. BASHIR REPORTEDLY SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT THE PHALANGE COUNCIL BEFORE RESPONDING.

9.

(D)(1)(a)(5)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

[

(S)(1)

11. WE PROBED FURTHER TO TRY TO PIN DOWN WHETHER THE NORTHERN MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE A PRELUDE TO A LINK-UP BETWEEN THE PHALANGIST AREA AND THE IDF FORCES, INTENDED TO ASSURE BASHIR'S ELECTION AT THE FORTHCOMING LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL BALLOTING. BEGIN WAS SOMEWHAT COY ON THIS SUBJECT, SAYING THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS THAT BASHIR HAD A VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF BEING ELECTED PRESIDENT UNIL CAMILLE CHAMOUN'S CHANCES WERE MUCH BETTER. HE DID NOT CATEGORICALLY DENY ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MILITARY MOVES AND THE PRE-ELECTORAL MANEUVERING, CONTENTING HIMSELF WITH STRESSING THE MILITARY PURPOSE VIS-A-VIS SYRIA AND THE PLO. BOTH HABIB AND I WERE LEFT HOWEVER WITH THE

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

TEL AV 08863 02 OF 02 091606Z

DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT THE GAME BEHIND THESE MILITARY MOVES IS THOFOLD: TO PRODUCE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT AND TO FORCE THE PLO OUT OF THE HAS-BAYYAH AREA ON THE ONE HAND, AND PERHAPS TO LINK UP WITH BASHIR'S FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE NEARLY CERTAIN A RESTRUCTURING OF THE POLITICAL GAME IN BEIRUT IN THE WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. IF OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE CORRECT, THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD OCCUR ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AFTER A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE ARE SURE TO BE LENGTHY AND LABORIOUS.

12. LONG AFTER HABIB'S DEPARTURE, I RECEIVED SECTO 8045

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AUTHORIZING HABIB TO TAKE "A FIRM LINE WITH BEGIN TODAY TO GET HIM TO PULL BACK HIS GROUND FORCES, ETC." IN LIGHT OF THE STRATEGY PICTURE BEGIN OUTLINED THIS MORNING, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE OBJECTIVE IN THIS MESSAGE WILL BE EXTREMELY HARD IF NOT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE.

13. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR ME TO MAKE THE POINTS IN SECTO 8045 PRIOR TO HABIB'S RETURN. TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON BEGIN, HABIB WILL NEED TO HAVE NOT ONLY THE AUTHORIZATION IN THIS MESSAGE BUT ALSO SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ASSAD CONCERNING THE OBJECTIVE BEGIN IS SEEKING WITH RESPECT TO THE PLO IN THE HASBAYYAH AREA.

14. WE DO NOT KNOW YET WHEN HABIB WILL RETURN HERE. IF HE IS TOO LONG DELAYED, IT MAY BE BEST FOR ME TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT HIM, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO AWAIT HIS JUDGMENT ON THIS TACTICAL ISSUE.

15. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AM: NS20002-0580

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 01 PARIS 08030 01 OF 02 112000Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----152453 112010Z /41
O 112001Z MAR 02 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1009

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 08030
MODIS DECAPTIONED
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HADID

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 3/11/02 (HADID, P.C.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XP, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO
SUBJ: HADID MISSION: SUNNING-UP REPORT

FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
DENY
IN PART
11/11/02

(1) CLASSIFY AS
(1) DOWNGRADE 18 10 1 18 02
11/11/02

1. ~~SECRET~~ (TEXT).
2. THIS REPORT IS INTENDED TO SUMMARIZE THE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS I HAVE REACHED AFTER A TWO AND A HALF WEEK TRIP, DURING WHICH I VISITED LEBANON, ISRAEL, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND HAD LENGTHY TALKS WITH THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS THERE, ALONG WITH OPPOSITION FIGURES IN ISRAEL AND IMPORTANT POLITICIANS IN LEBANON. (I ALSO HAD BRIEF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THE ELYSEE, AND DRAPER BRIEFED A BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE REPRESENTATIVE WHILE HE WERE IN PARIS.)
3. YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU AND THE PRESIDENT ENTRUSTED ME WITH TWO BASIC TASKS:
 - (1) PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE JULY CEASE-FIRE, THEREBY REDUCING THE CHANCES THAT MAJOR MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH CONSEQUENCES HARMFUL TO OVERALL

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 02 PARIS 08030 01 OF 02 112000Z
AMERICAN INTERESTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

-- (2) EXAMINING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION WHICH, IF LEFT STATIC AND UNTENDED, COULD PRODUCE FUTURE MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS AND BLOW-UPS.

4. THE CEASE-FIRE: I BELIEVE THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EARLY BREAKDOWN HAS BEEN REDUCED. ISRAEL, LEBANON, SYRIA, AND SAUDI ARABIA -- EACH IN ITS OWN WAY -- REAFFIRMED THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND FANO INTENDED TO PRESS ARAFAT TO COMPLY. EVERYTHING WE HAVE HEARD INDIRECTLY FROM THE PLO INDICATES THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. I EXPLICITLY DESCRIBED TO ALL LEADERS WHY WE BELIEVED THE RECENT FATAN INCURSION ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER WAS A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION BECAUSE IT ORIGINATED IN LEBANON. I USED TO GOOD EFFECT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT SEND GUNBOATS OUT INTO INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND THEN BOMBARD TARGETS IN LEBANON, AND ARGUE THAT SINCE THE VESSELS CAME FROM INTERNATIONAL WATERS THIS WOULD NOT BE A VIOLATION. I SAID IT WOULD BE A VIOLATION JUST AS A COMMANDO GROUP COMING FROM LEBANON AND MOVING THROUGH SYRIA AND JORDAN WOULD BE. DEBIR APPLAUDED MY USE OF THIS SIMILE. HE REPEATED TO ME HIS PLEDGE THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO BREAK THE CEASE-FIRE.

5. I GRAPHICALLY DESCRIBED TO ALL CONCERNED THE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS OF A CEASE-FIRE BREAKDOWN AND THE POSSIBLE MAGNITUDE OF AN ISRAELI MILITARY RESPONSE. IT IS CLEAR THAT IF THERE IS A MAJOR INCIDENT INVOLVING THE LOSS OF ISRAELI LIVES THE REACTION WILL BE DRASTIC. I GAVE AMPLE WARNING TO BE PASSED TO THE PLO OF THE DANGER FROM A MAJOR PROVOCATION. FOR ITS PART, ISRAEL HAS BEEN

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

PARIS 06030 01 OF 02 112000Z

LEFT IN NO DOUBT OF DEEP US RESERVATIONS OVER MAJOR ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON, AND I UNDERLINED THE WAY THAT BELLICOSE ISRAELI STATEMENTS AND LEAKS HAD CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH HAD BECOME HIGHLY NEGATIVE AND EMBARRASSING TO ISRAEL'S IMAGE. AFTER A GREAT DEAL OF HEATED ARGUMENT I AM HOPEFUL THAT DEBIR, AT LEAST, ACCEPTS THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO APPEAR LESS BELLICOSE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE SHARON IS CONVINCED.

6. I TRIED ALSO TO SET A RECEPTIVE STAGE FOR THE UNIPOL

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COMMANDER'S FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON THE BEST WAYS TO MAKE USE OF UNIFIL'S EXPANDED FORCE; AND SAN LEUIS AND MORRIS DRAPER FOLLOWED UP THIS WITH CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF "TRADE-OFFS", UNDER WHICH THE UN MIGHT TRY TO PERSUADE THE PALESTINIANS TO WITHDRAW THEIR HEAVY WEAPONRY OUT OF RANGE OF ISRAEL.

7. INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION: I SECURED CROWN PRINCE FAHO'S STRONG COMMITMENT TO STAY FULLY ENGAGED IN LEBANON, AND TO WORK FOR THE STAGED WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS.
SECRET

I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT WE MUST HAVE AN ARAB FULCRUM TO APPLY LEVERAGE TO THE SYRIANS, WHO REMAIN HARD AND UNYIELDING IN ALL MATTERS LEBANESE.

8. SIMILARLY, I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT THE US MUST PURSUE -- WITHOUT VARIATION -- ITS POLICY OF

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 PARIS 08030 02 OF 02 112009Z
ACTION NOOS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----183801 112013Z /42
O 112001Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1890

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 08030
NOOS

PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING A UNITED, INTEGRAL LEBANON, SOVEREIGN WITHIN ITS TRADITIONAL BORDERS. WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE DIVERTED INTO POORLY THOUGHT THROUGH SCHEMES FOR PARTITIONING THE COUNTRY INTO THREE, FOUR, OR MORE AREAS OR WORKING FOR A FORM OF CANTONIZATION WHICH REDUCES TO IMPOTENCE THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

9. THE FORTHCOMING LEBANESE ELECTIONS INHERENTLY HAVE ELEMENTS WHICH COULD PRODUCE EITHER MAJOR MARONITE-SYRIAN CLASHES, OR ANOTHER LEBANESE CIVIL CONFLICT, OR ISRAELI MILITARY INTERVENTION, OR A COMBINATION OF ALL THREE. AGAIN, HOWEVER, I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES HAVE THE CAPACITY TO HANDLE THE SITUATION, INCLUDING HEAVY SYRIAN INTIMIDATION -- AND WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO GO BEYOND DEMONSTRATIONS OF OUR ALREADY PRONOUNCED INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME. THE STAGE MAY BE SET FOR AN ELECTORAL IMPASSE, AND A LEBANESE FORM OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, AT WHICH POINT THE LEBANESE GENIUS FOR COMPROMISE MAY HELP PRODUCE AN OUTCOME SATISFACTORY TO US INTERESTS. THERE IS PLENTY OF ROOM FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE EVENT THINGS BEGIN TO GET OUT OF HAND.

10. SOME RELATED IMPRESSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: ASSAD REMAINS CONVINCED WE ARE TRYING TO DESTABILIZE HIS REGIME, DESPITE MY CATEGORICAL DENIALS AUTHORIZED BY YOU AND

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 08030 02 OF 02 112009Z

THE PRESIDENT. [

(b) (1) (a) 5

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Wj (1) (a) (5)

-- WHILE I PERSONALLY FAVOR CLOSER CONSULTATIONS WITH ISRAEL OVER CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES, INCLUDING MAJOR SYRIAN MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON, WE SHOULD NOT AGREE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMAL US-ISRAELI COMMISSION OR COMMITTEE, AS PROPOSED BY BEGIN. IT IS NOT NECESSARY, GIVEN OUR ABILITY TO CONSULT INFORMALLY AND REGULARLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE INEVITABLE LEAK OF A FORMAL ARRANGEMENT COULD DAMAGE US GREATLY IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE SAME THING APPLIES TO THE SUGGESTION THAT A TRI-PARTITE MECHANISM BE ORGANIZED WITH ISRAEL AND FRANCE.

-- I, THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT WE PUT TOGETHER A [] TEAM UNDER DRAPER FOR REGULAR, SYSTEMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS BEGINNING IN APRIL AND CONTINUING AT APPROXIMATELY TWO-MONTH INTERVALS THROUGH THIS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT YEAR AHEAD.

b) (1) (a) (5)

-- WE SHOULD GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO UN AND UNIFIL EFFORTS TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF ITS EXPANDED FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE SO-CALLED "GAP", EVEN THOUGH THIS WILL ENCOUNTER STRONG ISRAELI RESISTANCE AND SUSPICION. THE SHI'A INHABITANTS ARE AMONG THE MOST RELIABLE AND STRONGEST SUPPORTERS OF A UNITED LEBANON AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT;

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PARIS 08030 02 OF 02 112009Z

HOWEVER, THEY DESPERATELY NEED TO SEE PROGRESS TOWARDS AND EXTENSION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE AREA.

-- WE SHOULD SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S INTEGRITY; IN THIS CONNECTION, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR YOU TO RECEIVE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL OR MAY.

-- IF A STRONG PRESIDENT EMERGES FROM THE LEBANESE ELECTIONS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER SPECIAL LEGISLATION TO

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

GIVE LEBANON A REAL SHOT IN THE ARM ECONOMICALLY, AND THEREBY INDUCE SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF COUNTRIES TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL FUNDING CONTRIBUTIONS.

11. PUBLIC HANDLING OF OUR EFFORTS: THROUGHOUT THE TRIP I HAVE AVOIDED ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR PRESS BACKGROUNDING. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THE UTILITY OF MY SAYING A FEW WORDS TO THE PRESS AFTER I HAVE REPORTED TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT, AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST. MARESCA

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

520

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20005-0446

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 01 JERUSA 01781 01 OF 02 082039Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----075417 082044Z /62
Z 082022Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM ANCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2370
INFO ANEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
ANEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
ANEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01781

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

E.O. 12965: RDS 1,3,4 6/8/02 (GROVE, BRANDON) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SECOND MEETING WITH BEGIN --JUNE 8, 1982

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. I MET EVENING JUNE 8 WITH PH BEGIN AT KNESSET FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE AND A HALF HOURS, NOT COUNTING PERIOD WHEN HE ABSENTED HIMSELF FOR KNESSET ACTION ON NO CONFIDENCE MOTION. BEGIN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FOMMIN SHAMIR AND SAN LEWIS AND HOWELL JOINED ME.
- 3.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9302566

FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

(b) (1)
(b) (7) (C)
(b) (7) (D)

CLASSIFIED BY
DATE

DOWNLOADED BY

IS/PC/IONR

3/16/90

(b) (1) (c) (d) (e)

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(U)(A)(S)

5. I TOLD BEGIN I WOULD LIKE TO TALK IN MORE DETAIL ABOUT ENDING THE HOSTILITIES, BEGINNING WITH THE SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE CITY OF BEIRUT, WHERE I HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE LACK OF GAS, ELECTRICITY AND OTHER BASIC NEEDS. IS IT NECESSARY, I ASKED, TO CONTINUE TO BOMB BEIRUT IN LIGHT OF BEGIN'S POINT THAT THE IDF HAD ACHIEVED ITS OBJECTIVES, EXCEPT WITH REGARD TO PLO ARTILLERY IN THE SOUTHERN BEKAA? BEGIN WAS INITIALLY QUITE DEFENSIVE, ARGUING THAT HE HAD NOT BOMBED BEIRUT BUT ONLY THE PLO HEADQUARTERS WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE ARAFAT WAS KILLED. SAYING THAT I RECOGNIZED HIS STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, I THEREFORE ASKED HIM TO CONSIDER ENDING AIR STRIKES THAT, WHATEVER THEIR TARGET, INEVITABLY CAUSED HEAVY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN A CITY OF 2 MILLION. AT THIS POINT, BEGIN WAS INTERRUPTED BY A PHONE CALL FROM SHARON TO REPORT THAT A STIFF FIGHT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 JERUSA 01701 01 OF 02 082039Z

IS UNDER WAY IN SIDON WHERE THERE ARE 1000 PLO EFFECTIVES AND 30 TANKS. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED AN END TO THE BOMBING RAIDS AGAINST BEIRUT WITH SHARON AND ASSURED ME THAT MY REQUEST WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT "WITH SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING."

6. BEGIN THEN RETURNED TO OUR CONVERSATION OF JUNE 7, PREFACING HIS REMARKS WITH THE COMMENT THAT THEY REFLECTED INTENSIVE CABINET DISCUSSIONS THE PREVIOUS NIGHT BUT REPRESENT ONLY ISRAELI "THOUGHTS" REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNDER WHICH THE IDF MIGHT BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON. HE LISTED THREE POSSIBLE OPTIONS IN DESCENDING ORDER OF ISRAELI PREFERENCE:

-- A U.S. FORCE WHICH WOULD BE IMMUNE TO PRESSURES FOR WITHDRAWAL WITH A SIGNED AGREEMENT REGARDING THE PROHIBITION OF PLO ENTRY INTO THE 40 KILOMETER AREA OF OPERATIONS:

-- AN MFO ALONG THE LINES OF THAT IN THE SINAI, WITH A DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND OTHER APPARATUS BASED ON A SIGNED AGREEMENT.

-- "LAST AND LEAST POSITIVE", AN ENLARGED UNIFIL WITH A CLEAR AGREEMENT ON PREVENTING ANY PLO PRESENCE. BEGIN SAID UNIFIL HAD BEEN "USEFUL" BUT PERFORMANCE VARIED GREATLY AMONG NATIONAL CONTINGENTS.

BEGIN AGAIN STRESSED THAT THERE MUST BE A CLEAR AGREEMENT ON TERMS OF REFERENCE UNDER ANY OF THESE OPTIONS AND I REMINDED HIM THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST ALSO HAVE ISRAELI COMMITMENTS AND AGREEMENTS.

7. RETURNING TO HIS COMMENTS DURING OUR FIRST MEETING ABOUT THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A RETURN TO A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT, BEGIN SOFTENED HIS APPROACH

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

JERUSA 01781 01 QF 02 002039Z

SOMEWHAT. HE INSISTED, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT,

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 01 JERUSA 01781 02 OF 02 082045Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----075675 082051Z /62
Z 082022Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM ANCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2371
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01781

NODIS

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

IF RE-ESTABLISHED, MUST INCLUDE A PROHIBITION AGAINST
ATTACKS AGAINST JEWS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. I WENT OVER
WITH BEGIN THE REASONS WHY I HAD SAID LAST JULY THAT
THIS WAS NOT A REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT. I TOLD HIM THAT
WE CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE OURSELVES HOSTAGE TO THE
ACTIONS OF EXTREMISTS SUCH AS THOSE WE BELIEVE WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK ON AMBASSADOR ARGOV. I URGED
THAT BEGIN THINK MORE ABOUT THIS PROPOSITION AND NOT RPT
NOT MAKE IT A CONDITION AT THIS TIME. AMBASSADOR LEWIS
ADDED THAT WE MUST BE PRACTICAL; WE CAN'T HOPE TO SOLVE
EVERY ASPECT OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY PROBLEM WITH A SINGLE
AGREEMENT OR ARRANGEMENT.

B. BEGIN SAID THAT THE PLO HAD STEADFASTLY MAINTAINED
THAT THE ARRANGEMENT NEGOTIATED BY HABIB HAD APPLIED ONLY
TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. I REPLIED THAT, WHATEVER
THEIR PUBLIC POSITION, THEY HAD NOT QUIBBLED WITH MY
FORMULATION THAT IT ALSO APPLIED TO ATTACKS MOUNTED
THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES. I AGREED THAT, IF WE DO

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01781 02 OF 02 082045Z

ACHIEVE A FURTHER CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, WE WILL PERHAPS
HAVE TO BE MORE PRECISE THAN WE WERE LAST JULY. I

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REMINDED BEGIN THAT, AT THAT TIME, IT WAS ISRAELI OBJECTION TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO THAT SHAPED TO SOME DEGREE THE VAGUENESS OF WHAT WAS ACHIEVED. MAYBE, I CONCLUDED, WE HAVE ALL LEARNED SOMETHING FROM THAT EXPERIENCE AND WILL HAVE TO BE MORE PRECISE IN THE AGREEMENT AND PROCEDURES SHOULD ANOTHER ARRANGEMENT BE NEGOTIATED. IN THE END, BEGIN AGREED NOT TO MAKE HIS REQUIREMENT REGARDING ATTACKS AGAINST JEWS ANYWHERE A FORMAL POSITION AT THIS TIME. HE DID NOT COMMENT ON MY STATEMENT THAT ONE IMPORTANT QUESTION TO CONTEMPLATE IS WHAT KIND OF RESPONSE IS APPROPRIATE IN CASES OF TERRORISM CARRIED OUT BY THE LUNATIC FRINGE.

9. COMMENTING ON THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN LONDON TODAY, BEGIN SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S POINTS REGARDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND THE NEED TO STAMP OUT TERRORISM.

10. I ASKED BEGIN HOW WE WOULD DETERMINE THE AREA IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN WHICH AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE MIGHT OPERATE? HE REPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE GLAD TO DRAW A LINE 40 KILOMETERS FROM THE BORDER. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELI FORCES ARE NOW BEYOND THAT LINE, SHAMIR AND BEGIN SAID THESE ARE "TACTICAL" POSITIONS. BEGIN STATED STRONGLY THAT IT IS NOT AN ISRAELI OBJECTIVE TO PRESS MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH THE GOAL OF DOING AWAY WITH THE PLO ENTIRELY. IDF ELEMENTS ARE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF DAMOUR, HE SAID, BUT ISRAEL DOES NOT INTEND TO TAKE DAMOUR EVEN THOUGH IT WAS ORIGINALLY A CHRISTIAN TOWN. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, BEGIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IDF WOULD PULL BACK TO

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 JERUSA 01701 02 OF 02 082045Z

40-KILOMETER LINE BASIS FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE. ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO HADDOQ'S ENCLAVE UNDER NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, BEGIN SAID THIS IS FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE.

11. BEFORE DEPARTING, I TOLD BEGIN THAT BEFORE THE CURRENT FIGHTING IT HAD BEEN MY INTENTION TO COME TO THE AREA TO DISCUSS LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. IF WE ARE ABLE TO BRING THE CURRENT SITUATION UNDER CONTROL, THOSE LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS WILL STILL BE THERE AND WE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THEM WITH ISRAEL AND OTHER

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS. BEGIN NEEDED.

12. WE AGREED THAT SHOULD A RESPONSE FROM THE SYRIANS
BE RECEIVED OVERNIGHT, WE WOULD CONTACT FOMIN SHAMIR
WHO WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO MAKE BEGIN. GROVE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

Handwritten notes: (1) a 5:2 15

~~SECRET~~

AM: NS20002-0538

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03676 01 OF 05 091728Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----040710 091732Z /43
D 091708Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3647
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 03676

MODIS DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/9/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-N
TAGS: IS, LE, SY, JO, SA, MILI, MOPS, PSOR, PLO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION ON LEBANON: MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR ONE HOUR AND FIFTY MINUTES ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 8. BEGIN ATTEMPTED TO PROJECT A CHIPPER PROFILE BUT WAS DRAIN AND SHOWED EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED FATIGUE.

BEGIN POSED A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. THESE INCLUDED THE TRUE PLO POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF THE CEASEFIRE, A SUGGESTION FOR A JOINT U.S.-ISRAEL COMMISSION TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE EVENT OF SYRIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE MARONITES, A POINTED QUESTION ON AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PLO BUILDUP IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND OF COURSE THE INEVITABLE REQUEST FOR REMOVING THE SYRIAN MISSILES. DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, WHO WAS IN A TRUCULENT AND BULLYING MOOD, ALSO RAISED A NUMBER OF PROVOCATIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT AMERICAN POLICY IN

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03676 01 OF 05 091728Z

LEBANON AND SYRIA. THE CONVERSATION WAS OFTEN INTERRUPTED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Handwritten notes and stamps on the right margin: '930256', '3/8/86', 'LAWYER (S) 10/1', 'JEF 89', 'EXCEPTIONS', 'M', '3/8/86'.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AND HEATED. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES A REASONABLY DETAILED, CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THIS DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY. 3. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR ONE HOUR AND FIFTY MINUTES IN AN UPPER ROOM AT HIS HOME ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 8. BEGIN WAS ALERT AND ASSERTIVE, BUT OBVIOUSLY WAS PHYSICALLY UNCOMFORTABLE AS HE SAT IN HIS WHEELCHAIR. ATTENDING ON THE ISRAELI SIDE WERE FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON, PRIME MINISTER'S AIDE AYNER, AND INTELLIGENCE CHIEF GENERAL SAGI. TWENTY MINUTES INTO OUR DISCUSSION, DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, GENERAL TANIR AND MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KINCHE JOINED THE GROUP. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEMIS, DAS DRAPER, OCH BROWN AND POL/C HARE. A STENOGRAPHER RECORDED THE CONVERSATION.

(b) (1)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

b(1)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03676 02 OF 05 091737Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ABS-00 /000 N
-----041152 091740Z /03
O 091708Z MAR 82 ZPF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3548
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 TEL AVIV 03676

NODIS

7

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

J.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

11. BEGIN THEN SPOKE AGAIN OF THE FACT THAT ISRAEL MAY HAVE A "WEAKNESS" IN THAT, WHILE ACCEPTING THE CEASEFIRE, ISRAEL WOULD NOW HAVE TO WAIT FOR ITS PEOPLE TO BE KILLED BEFORE RESPONDING. AFTER MAKING A SARCASTIC REFERENCE TO

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

TEL AV 03676 02 OF 05 091737Z

BRZEZINSKI'S UNHELPFUL COMMENT RE SHARON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MARCH 7 ABC PROGRAM AND TO CONTRADICTIONARY U.S. STATEMENTS ON THE PLO BUILDUP IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, BEGIN WANTED TO KNOW WHY THE IMPRESSION WAS BEING CREATED THAT THE UNITED STATES BELIEVED ISRAEL WAS THE CULPRIT, WANTED TO INVAD LEBANON, AND WAS INTERESTED IN KEEPING THE PLO, WHICH WAS AN AGENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, IN PLACE. BEGIN REFERRED TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR PERCY IN WHICH HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST THE IRABIS WAS NOT ACTUALLY AN ATTACK AGAINST IRABI TERRITORY BUT RATHER WAS AIMED AT A SOURCE OF DANGER TO ISRAELI CHILDREN. BY THE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SAME REASONING HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT AN ATTACK AGAINST THE PLO WOULD NOT REALLY BE AN ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON.

12. I EXPLAINED THE AMERICAN POPULAR REVULSION OVER THE USE OF FORCE, ESPECIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE FORCE, AND OUR PREFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS INSTEAD OF CONFRONTATIONS. I SAID ALSO THAT THE CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN WIDELY APPAUDED SINCE IT HAD PRODUCED A CESSATION OF BLOODSHED AND KILLING. THE PRESS, I OBSERVED, HAD ALSO INTENSIFIED THE LEVEL OF CRITICISM OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS, SOMETIMES WITHOUT FOUNDATION, THOUGH ONE COULD NOT IGNORE SOME OF THE TOUGH STATEMENTS WHICH COME FROM ISRAELI SPOKESMEN. FRANKLY, AS A DEMOCRACY AND ALLY, ISRAEL WAS JUDGED IN THE EXPECTATION OF HIGHER STANDARDS. AMBASSADOR LEVIE ADDED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF THE PLO HAD BEEN STATED CLEARLY, ON THE RECORD, BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT U.S. POLICY TO ENCOURAGE A PLO ARMS BUILDUP IN LEBANON; WE CATEGORICALLY OPPOSED IT. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, HE DID NOT REGARD THE BUILDUP PER SE AS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT NOR SOMETHING WHICH COULD JUSTIFY ANY PRE-

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03676 03 OF 05 091746Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----041401 091746Z /41
O 091700Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3549
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 TEL AVIV 03676

NODIS
EMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION BY ISRAEL. WE DO NOT WANT A WAR TO
BREAK OUT IN LEBANON WHICH WOULD HAVE VERY DANGEROUS CONSE-
QUENCES, NOT ONLY FOR OUR INTERESTS BUT ALSO THOSE OF
ISRAEL. LEVIS STRESSED AGAIN THAT HE DID NOT LIKE THE
BUILDUP AND HADIS WAS WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM BUT, ABSENT
AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL, HE OPPOSED ANY ISRAELI MILITARY
ACTION. BEGIN REPLIED BY ASKING ME TO TELL THE PRESIDENT
AND SECRETARY HAID THAT ISRAEL SURELY DID NOT WANT WAR, BUT
THAT WE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT, WHILE THIS ISSUE WAS OF POLI-
TICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES, FOR ISRAEL IT WAS A
"MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH."

13. BEGIN THEN ASKED WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN IF THE
CHRISTIANS AGAIN FACE ANNIHILATION BY THE SYRIANS? HE TOLD
ME HE HAD MET DASHIR GENAYEL ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND HAD
ALWAYS LEFT THESE CONVERSATIONS WITH A DEEP APPRECIATION OF
THE CHRISTIANS' VULNERABILITY TO THE SUPERIOR SYRIAN MILI-
TARY FORCE IN LEBANON. HE THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT WE
ESTABLISH A "JOINT COMMISSION" POSSIBLY COMPOSED OF THREE
PERSONS FROM EACH SIDE, TO MONITOR THE SITUATION CLOSELY
AND TO DEVELOP CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE EVENT THAT THE
SYRIANS AGAIN MOVED MILITARILY AGAINST THE MARONITE COMMUNI-
TY. I REPLIED THAT I PERSONALLY THOUGHT THAT HIS IDEA HAD
MERIT AND WOULD BE A LOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE CONSULTATIONS
WHICH HE HAD ALREADY BEGUN ON LEBANON (BUT SEE MY LATER
QUALIFYING COMMENTS BELOW WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT).

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03676 03 OF 05 091746Z

I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL IN WHAT
IT SAYS PUBLICLY ABOUT THE MARONITE COMMUNITY IN LEBANON.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SINCE THIS ONLY CREATES PROBLEMS FOR THAT COMMUNITY.

14. BEGIN SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ABOUT FRANCE'S HISTORICAL ROLE WITH THE MARONITES AND THAT MITTERRAND HAD AGREED THAT THE ANNIHILATION OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY COULD NOT BE ALLOWED. BEGIN SAID THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED, AS HE HAD DONE WITH US, ISRAEL'S "WEAKNESS" IN WAITING PASSIVELY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BE ATTACKED; AND THAT, IF ISRAEL WERE ATTACKED AND SOME OF ITS PEOPLE WERE KILLED, "ISRAEL WOULD SMASH THE TERRORISTS." BEGIN REPORTED THAT MITTERRAND DID NOT SAY ANYTHING WHICH EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL'S POSITION AND WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON LEBANESE ISSUES. SHAMIR WOULD BE GOING TO PARIS TO PURSUE THESE DISCUSSIONS IN TWO MONTHS. BEGIN EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO TELL BASHIR THE NEXT TIME THEY MET THAT THE U.S. WAS INTERESTED IN HIS COMMUNITY'S SECURITY AND THAT BASHIR HAD NOTHING TO FEAR. "THE U.S. AND ISRAEL SHOULD REASON TOGETHER." I SAID AGAIN I WOULD REPORT HIS PROPOSAL AND MY PERSONAL VIEW WHICH FAVORED CONTINUED, INFORMAL, CONSULTATIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH HAD ALREADY OCCURRED, PROVIDED THAT SUCH TALKS WERE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

h) (a)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

7

7

(b)(1)

J

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03676 04 OF 05 091756Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----042037 091757Z /43
O 091708Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3880
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 TEL AVIV 03676

NODIS

[

7

(A) (C)

L

~~SECRET~~

J

UNCLASSIFIED

~~_____~~

(S) (U)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

┌

(b) (1)

SECRET

└

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03676 05 OF 05 091759Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----042127 091803Z /43
O 091700Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3661
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

~~SECTION 05 OF 05~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 TEL AVIV 03676

MODIS
TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

22. AT THIS POINT, BEGIN, ASSUMING THE MANTLE OF ELDER STATESMAN, TOOK CONTROL OF THE CONVERSATION. HE SAID HE ESTABLISHING A "JOINT COMMISSION." I REPLIED THAT I WOULD FAITHFULLY CONVEY HIS PROPOSAL BUT HAD TO POINT OUT FRANKLY THAT I PREFERRED A MORE INFORMAL MECHANISM. A FORMAL JOINT COMMISSION COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE LIKELY EVENT THAT THERE WERE A LEAK. BEGIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD EARLIER, HOWEVER, THAT I HAD SUPPORTED HIS IDEA OF PREPARING CONTINGENCY PLANS IN THE EVENT THAT THE SYRIANS ATTACKED OR THREATENED THE CHRISTIANS. I SAID THIS WAS CORRECT BUT EMPHASIZED THIS WAS ONLY MY PERSONAL VIEW AND THAT I COULD NOT COMMIT MY GOVERNMENT. BEGIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND OBSERVED THAT THE MECHANICS WERE LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS. (COMMENT: BEGIN'S LAST REMARKS SHOULD BE HELPFUL AS HE PREPARE TO ANSWER HIS PROPOSAL.)

23. BEGIN THEN REPEATED HIS STATEMENT THAT IF THERE WERE NO TERRORIST INCURSIONS ACROSS ISRAEL'S BORDERS, ISRAEL WOULD NOT ATTACK. HOWEVER, IF ISRAEL WERE ATTACKED, IT WOULD SMASH THE TERRORISTS, THOUGH THE ISRAELI FORCES WOULD THEN WITHDRAW; THEY WOULD NOT REMAIN ON LEBANESE SOIL. HE ONCE AGAIN REVIEWED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY MAIS ON

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03676 06 OF 06 091759Z

WHAT CONSTITUTED A "CLEAR PROVOCATION" AGAINST ISRAEL; I DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

24. THIS MESSAGE CLEARED BY DRAPER BUT NOT REVIEWED BY
HABIB BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.

25. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TOPASS TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
JIDDA, CAIRO, AND JERUSALEM. LEIS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

(b) (1) (2) (3) (5)

AN: NB30005-0585

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02390 01 OF 03 302256Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----072036 302308Z /61

C 302229Z JUN 83 ZFF4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5847
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

9302566
3/6/85
SECRET

SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02390

MODIS

STADIS //

FROM HABIB FOR DISTRIBUTION BY S/S - HILL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US, SY, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KIMCHE AND MFA,
JUNE 30

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING A TWO-HOUR MEETING EVENING JUNE 30, I FIRST BRIEFED DAVID KIMCHE ON MY DISCUSSIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND LEBANON. WHILE EMPHASIZING THAT HIS QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED, KIMCHE THEN ASKED SIGNIFICANTLY IF IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE UNDER THE CONCEPT -- WHICH I HAD SURFACED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES LAST MONDAY -- THAT IT COULD BE WORKED IN A WAY FOR PLO WITHDRAWAL TO TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHILE THE SYRIAN/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE WOULD BE STAGGERED. KIMCHE EXPLAINED THAT PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WAS IN MANY WAYS MORE IMPORTANT TO ISRAEL THAN SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THIS ELEMENT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN BEING ABLE TO SELL SUCH A CONCEPT POLITICALLY.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02390 01 OF 03 302256Z

I IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT I FOUND KIMCHE'S APPROACH VERY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERESTING AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE IT ENER-
GETICALLY IF APPROVED BY HIS MINISTERS. KIMCHE DID NOT
KNOW IF THIS IDEA WOULD BE FLOATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER
OR HIS TWO MINISTERS DURING MY MEETING WITH THEM EARLY
TOMORROW MORNING. IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO GERMINATE, HE
SAID. IF IT DOES NOT COME UP, HE ADVISED THAT I SHOULD
REMAIN HERE FOR A BIT LONGER. THIS IS A FIRST INDICATION
THAT ISRAEL'S INITIALLY SHARP REJECTION OF THE CONCEPT MAY
BE CHANGING AFTER A PERIOD OF REFLECTION. I SUSPECT THAT
KIMCHE HAD AUTHORIZATION FROM SHAMIR TO FLOAT THIS VARIANT.
END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY AMBASSADORS LEWIS, DRAPER, AND FAIRBANKS,
AND HARE, I MET WITH DAVID KIMCHE FOR TWO HOURS THE
EVENING OF JUNE 30. KIMCHE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HANON
BAR-ON, YITZHAK ORON AND EITAN BENTSUR.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

9

6

L

J

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02390 02 OF 03 302258Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----072120 302324Z /61
O 302229Z JUN 83 ZFF4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02390

NODIS

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

FROM HABIB FOR DISTRIBUTION BY S/S - HILL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US, SY, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KIMCHE AND MFA,
JUNE 30

(B-X)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(S) (1)

7. KIMCHE AND HIS COLLEAGUES TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS EXPOSITION TO STATE THAT A MAJOR PROBLEM WAS GENAYEL'S UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK DIRECTLY TO THE ISRAELIS. THIS INEVITABLY LED TO CONFUSION AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS. KIMCHE EXPLAINED THAT THE FACT THAT FATTAL WAS NOT PLUGGED IN UNDERMINED THE VALUE OF HIS NOW SCHEDULED BIWEEKLY MEETINGS WITH HIM. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM AND HAD URGED THE LEBANESE TO ESTABLISH MORE DIRECT CONTACT. I HAD RECEIVED A TEMPORIZING REPLY BUT I URGED KIMCHE TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH FATTAL. HE WOULD NOT BE MISUSED AND HAD AFTER ALL NEGOTIATED THE AGREEMENT.

8. AFTER THIS INTRODUCTION, KIMCHE SAID HE HAD SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT THE CONCEPT I HAD PRESENTED LAST MONDAY TO THE MINISTERS. THOUGH HE STRESSED HIS QUESTIONS HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED AROUND THE CIRCUIT. (HOWEVER, I BELIEVE HE WAS SPEAKING WITH SHAMIR'S BLESSING.) KIMCHE EXPLAINED THAT IN MANY WAYS PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. GIVEN THIS, HE WONDERED IF ONE COULD MAKE A DEAL WHICH WOULD PROVIDE

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA 02390 02 OF 03 302258Z

FOR SIMULTANEOUS PLO AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHILE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS WERE STAGGERED. I IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN INTERESTING VARIANT, AND RECALLED THAT IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE SAUDIS AND THE PLO, INCLUDING WITH ARAFAT, THE PLO HAD STATED THEY WERE PREPARED TO LEAVE IN CONJUNCTION WITH A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, AND MIGHT EVEN BEGIN THEIR WITHDRAWAL BEFORE THE SYRIANS. THESE WERE, I CONTINUED, KNOWN POSITIONS; WHAT WAS UNKNOWN NOW WAS THE VALIDITY OF THESE STATEMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE PLO AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY,

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SYRIAN ATTITUDES. NEVERTHELESS, IF WE HAD ISRAELI AGREEMENT, I SAW NO REASON WHY THIS APPROACH COULD NOT BE EXPLORED AND WORKED ON.

9. BAR-ON ASKED A SECOND QUESTION, NAMELY, WHERE WOULD THE PLO GO? I SAID MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE CURRENT POWER STRUGGLE. A PERMANENT SPLIT IN THE PLO WAS POSSIBLE. ANOTHER OUTCOME COULD BE A PLC STILL NOMINALLY UNDER ARAFAT'S LEADERSHIP BUT MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE SYRIANS AND RADICAL ELEMENTS. IN THE EVENT, I ASSUMED A NUMBER OF THE PLO WOULD GO TO SYRIA FROM WHERE THEY HAD ORIGINALLY COME. TUNISIA HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE THE PLO, THOUGH THEY UNDOUBTEDLY HAD A LIMIT. JORDAN WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF FATAH LOYALISTS HAVING JORDANIAN CITIZENSHIP.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02390 03 OF 03 302259Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----072072 302325Z /61
O 302229Z JUN 83 ZFF4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5848
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02390

MODIS

STADIS//

FROM HABIB FOR DISTRIBUTION BY S/S - HILL

E.O. 12356: DECL. OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US, SY, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KIMCHE AND MFA,
JUNE 30

10. KIMCHE SAID ONE ADVANTAGE OF THIS VARIANT WOULD BE TO MAKE IT MORE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE DOMESTICALLY, GIVEN THE SECURITY THREAT WHICH THE PLO PRESENTED. I SAID THAT IF THE MINISTERS ASKED ME TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH, I WAS MORE THAN READY TO DO SO IN GREATEST SECRECY WITH FAHD ALONE. I ASKED IF I SHOULD DROP THIS IDEA IN MY JULY 1 MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. KIMCHE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LET THE MINISTERS INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT; IF THEY DID NOT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD GET TOGETHER LATER. IN ANY EVENT IT COULD BE PURSUED FURTHER OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT MIGHT TAKE A LITTLE TIME FOR THE IDEA TO TAKE ROOT. KIMCHE CRYPTICALLY EXPLAINED.

11. I THEN REHEARSED AGAIN THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING FULL WITHDRAWALS IF WE WERE TO OBTAIN A PEACEFUL

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02390 03 OF 03 302259Z

AND INTEGRAL LEBANON. I SAID THAT WHILE I WAS MAINTAINING A NON-COMMITTAL POSTURE ON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, IT SIMPLY

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

WOULD NOT BET THE SYRIANS OUT. THE LEBANESE WOULD BE ABLE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY. I SAID, IF GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY, WHATEVER MISGIVING THE ISRAELIS MIGHT HAVE. OUR AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS, WHO UNDERSTANDS THE SYRIANS VERY WELL, BELIEVED THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD WELCOME PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND WOULD NOT GET OUT, THEREBY LEADING EFFECTIVELY TO THE PARTITION OF LEBANON. ON THE OTHER HAND, AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI THOUGHT OUR APPROACH OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN FULL WITHDRAWALS. AT LEAST, IT WAS REALISTIC.

12. I THEN TOLD KIMCHE THAT I HAD BROACHED THE CONCEPT WITH GEMAYEL, SALEM AND HADDAD, WHO HAD KEPT THE IDEA FROM MAZZAN. I HAD TWICE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A PROPOSAL -- SIMPLY AN IDEA WHICH NEEDED ISRAELI APPROVAL AND FURTHER REFINEMENT. THE LEBANESE HAD REACTED FAVORABLY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY RAISED A NUMBER OF TACTICAL QUESTIONS ON HOW THIS APPROACH MIGHT BE PURSUED; AND, I ADDED, GEMAYEL HAD GIVEN THE CONCEPT HIS OFFICIAL APPROVAL.

(S)(1)

14. I EXPANDED ON THIS THEME BY SUGGESTING THAT WHILE SYRIA WANTED TO HAVE HEGEMONY IN LEBANON, THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE A PHYSICAL PRESENCE. THIS SYRIAN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INTEREST ALSO HAD TO BE PLACED AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE DANGER THAN ISRAELI "NORTH BANK" WOULD POSE TO SYRIA. AS THIS DISCUSSION DREW TO A CLOSE, I IMPRESSED UPON KIMCHE THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING SOME LATITUDE TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH. I REALIZED I HAD PLACED A HEAVY LOAD ON THE TABLE LAST MONDAY BUT I WAS GRATIFIED THAT THERE NOW APPEARED TO BE SOME OPENING ON THE ISRAELI SIDE.
KEENE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

P ~~11~~ (a) (5) 496
TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: MB30003-0375

PAGE 01 TEL AM 05212 01 OF 02 191151Z
ACTION HQDS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----164232 191154Z /10
C 191145Z APR 83 ZFF-W
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3013
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 05212

HQDIS

DECAPTIONED

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIS

SUBJECT: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: ISRAEL-LEBANON
NEGOTIATIONS

FOR INFORMATION	
FOR APPROVAL	
FOR SIGNATURE	
FOR ENDORSEMENT	
FOR COMMENT	
FOR OTHER ACTION	
FOR EXCEPTIONS	

9302566

1. [REDACTED]
2. I BELIEVE WE ARE AT A POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHERE WE CAN EITHER MAKE AN EFFORT TO BRING THEM TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION OR FACE THE PROSPECT OF AN IMPASSE FOLLOWED BY PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS. OBVIOUSLY, I PREFER THE FIRST OPTION. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO ACCEPT A PROTRACTED AFFAIR WITH WHAT WOULD PROBABLY BE AN UNSATISFACTORY CONCLUSION. I SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT IT IS TIME WE MADE OUR OWN DECISION AS TO A REASONABLE SOLUTION TO THE REMAINING PROBLEMS. I WISH TO AVOID AN UNSATISFACTORY AND UNPRODUCTIVE COURSE BASED UPON THE FAINT HOPE THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE WILL EACH MAKE THE NECESSARY COMPROMISES TO REACH ULTIMATE AGREEMENT WITHOUT A MAJOR PUSH FROM US.

3. THE COURSE I PROPOSE WILL DEMAND THE MOST RETREAT FROM PRESENT POSITIONS ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING GIVEN THE EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAELI DEMANDS

()	()	()	()
()	()	()	()
()	()	()	()
()	()	()	()

3.5.80

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

PAGE 02 TEL AM 05212 01 OF 02 191151Z

HAVE GONE BEYOND PURELY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

~~_____~~

OBVIOUS DESIRE OF THE ISRAELIS TO DOMINATE THE SOUTHERN PART OF LEBANON, INCLUDING A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF DIRECT CONTROL OVER THAT REGION. THE LEBANESE MEANWHILE HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS TO ASSERT THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND TO LIMIT THEIR CONCESSIONS TO AVOID JEOPARDIZING THEIR INTERNAL CONSENSUS OR THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB NATIONS AND ADVERSELY AFFECT THE MORALE OF THE ARMY.

4. OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES WITH THE TWO SIDES. ON THE BASIS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, WE HAVE PRODUCED A DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH I BELIEVE IS REASONABLE. WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE. IF WE CANNOT RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES BETWEEN US, WE WILL INDICATE THE DIFFERENCES CLEARLY. AT THAT POINT, WHICH SHOULD BE REACHED ON APRIL 19, I WOULD PROPOSE TO GO TO ISRAEL AND INFORM THEM WHERE THINGS STAND. THEN, ON APRIL 20 I WOULD PROPOSE TO HAVE THE LEBANESE TABLE THE PACKAGE AGREEMENT, WHICH I WOULD SUPPORT TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE IN THE TRIPARTITE MEETING AT KHALDE.

(CA) (A)
(A) (S)

~~_____~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

F

~~_____~~

T

(A)(1)

L

J

~~_____~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~_____~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
PAGE 01 TEL AV 05212 02 OF 02 191152Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ACS-00 /000 W
-----164244 191156Z /10
C 191145Z APR 03 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3014
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 05212

NODIS

7.


(A)(1)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



(S)(1)



UNCLASSIFIED





Department of State

TELEGRAM

493

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS30002-0646

(b) (1) (a)
(3) (5)

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03347 01 OF 02 261829Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----312313 261832Z /41
O 261801Z MAR 83 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2607
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 03347

NODIS

JERUSALEM FOR AMB. HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL MARCH 26 RE POSSIBLE MEETINGS
BETWEEN SENIOR GOL AND GOI OFFICIALS

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DILLOX MET ALONE WITH
PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL MORNING OF MARCH 26. DURING
DISCUSSION OF STATUS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS (SEPTEL),
GEMAYEL WOULD NOT AGREE TO A NEAR TERM SALIM/SHAMIR
MEETING. ON THE OTHER HAND, A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING WAS
REACHED THAT HABIB WOULD SET UP A TANNUS/LEVY MEETING
AND THAT QUASSIS WOULD BE MEETING WITH BEN-TOV. THERE
WAS NO CONCLUSION REGARDING A BUSTANI/BEN-TOV MEETING,
ALTHOUGH THAT POSSIBILITY WAS NOT ADAMANTLY RULED OUT.
END SUMMARY.

3. HABIB BROACHED POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN GOL FOMMIN
SALIM AND GOI FOMMIN SHAMIR. GEMAYEL REPLIED THAT HABIB

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03347 01 OF 02 261829Z

KNEW HIS POSITION: HE DID NOT WISH TO AGREE TO SUCH A

UNCLASSIFIED

9302566
EO Citation:
() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE IS to () S or
[Handwritten notes and stamps]

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

MEETING WITHOUT KNOWING THE RESULTS IN ADVANCE. HABIB PERSISTED THAT THE MEETING MIGHT BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. THERE WERE UNDOUBTEDLY THINGS THAT COULD BE SETTLED FACE-TO-FACE BETWEEN THE TWO MINISTERS THAT COULD NOT OTHERWISE BE SETTLED. HE ASKED GENAYEL TO CONTINUE TO CONSIDER MEETING, EMPHASIZING HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE THE MEETING COULD BE KEPT SECRET.

4. GENAYEL CAME BACK THAT HE WAS SURE THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT KEEP SUCH A MEETING SECRET. HABIB REPLIED THAT ONE COULD NOT BE 100 PERCENT SURE BUT THAT SHANIR WAS FAR BETTER THAN SHARON IN THAT RESPECT. NOT ONLY WAS HE DIPLOMATICALLY MORE PROFESSIONAL, HE WAS A BORN CONSPIRATOR WHO BELIEVED IN SECRECY. GENAYEL RECALLED HIS BROTHER BASHIR'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE ISRAELIS. AFTER BASHIR HAD AGREED TO MEET WITH BEGIN LATE LAST AUGUST IN ISRAEL ON A PROMISE OF ABSOLUTE SECRECY, THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT ONLY LEAKED THE FACT OF THE MEETING TO THE PRESS, THEY HAD GIVEN THE PRESS THE COMPLETE MINUTES OF THE MEETING. SHOULD THERE BE A SALIH/SHANIR MEETING AND THEY DID THE SAME THING, IT WOULD CAUSE MANY PROBLEMS; IT MIGHT DESTROY EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE MEETING WERE A FINAL STEP, GOOD RESULTS COULD COUNTER BAD EFFECTS. BUT TO DO IT TODAY WAS DANGEROUS. GENAYEL ALSO RECALLED HIS OWN PROBLEMS IN ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE SECRETLY WITH SHARON AND BEING EMBARRASSED WHEN SHARON PUBLICLY RELEASED A "NON-PAPER." FURTHERMORE, GENAYEL SAID, "THE ISRAELIS WILL TAKE CARE NOT TO FINALIZE THINGS AT THAT MEETING. THEY WILL MANAGE A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE MUST BE A NEXT STEP -- A MEETING BETWEEN ME AND BEGIN."

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03347 01 OF 02 261829Z

5. HABIB RETURNED TO THE ARGUMENT, POINTING OUT THAT IF THE LEBANESE KNEW IN ADVANCE THAT EVERYTHING WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL, THERE WOULD BE NO REASON TO HAVE THE MEETING. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS. FURTHERMORE, HABIB SAID, "I WOULD BE THERE. IF THE MEETING LEAKS, I CAN TAKE THE BLAME. YOU COULD SAY I PRESSURED YOU. I WOULD BE YOUR FIG LEAF."

6. GENAYEL REPLIED THAT HE WAS "AFRAID OF BLACKMAIL." HE CLARIFIED THAT IT WAS NOT BLACKMAIL VIS A VIS THE

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~_____~~
ARABS OR EVEN LEBANON'S OWN MUSLIMS THAT WORRIED HIM. HE WAS WORRIED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD INCREASE THEIR DEMANDS. THEY WOULD NOT BE CONTENT TO SETTLE WITH SALIN. THEY WOULD RAISE EVEN BIGGER PROBLEMS -- PROBLEMS THAT COULD ONLY BE SETTLED WITH A GENAYEL/BEGIN MEETING.

7. HABIB THEN SHIFTED GROUND, SUGGESTING IT WAS TIME TO LET GENERAL TANNUS TALK TO THE NEW ISRAELI CHIEF OF STAFF. HE DESCRIBED GEN. LEVY AS MORE REASONABLE THAN EITAN. GENAYEL REPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY ASKED FOR A TANNUS/LEVY MEETING. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT IF IT SHOWED GOOD FAITH ON THE LEBANESE PART, HE WOULD APPROVE THE MEETING. TURNING DIRECTLY TO HABIB, GENAYEL SAID, "OKAY, YOU CAN ORGANIZE THE MEETING." HABIB AGREED, SAYING THE GOL COULD RATIONALIZE ITS DECISION BY SAYING THAT SUCH A MEETING WAS MERELY AN EXTENSION OF TALKS NOW GOING ON. FURTHERMORE, IF THINGS TURNED SOUR, THE LEBANESE COULD BLAME HIM. HE ALSO TOLD GENAYEL HE HAD CONTINUED TO BUILD UP TANNUS IN HIS TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS (AS WELL AS ATTEMPTING TO BUILD UP THE LEBANESE ARMY).

8.7

7 (b)(1)(4)(3)(5)

~~_____~~
UNCLASSIFIED
~~_____~~

UNCLASSIFIED

**PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03347 02 OF 02 261830Z
ACTION NODS-00**

**INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----312317 261832Z /41
O 261801Z MAR 83 ZFFG
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2600
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE**

**SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 03347
NODIS**

2) (1) (a) (3) (c)

**9. AMB. HABIB DID NOT SEE THIS TELEGRAM BEFORE HIS
DEPARTURE FOR JERUSALEM. DILLON**

UNCLASSIFIED

(47)

SADIXED

DIST:
S/S Only

~~UNCLASSIFIED SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
TIME
~~DATE AND~~ DATE AND ~~TIME~~: APRIL 25, 1983 at 4:30 P.M.
PLACE: AL-SALAM HYATT HOTEL, CAIRO

P
(8) (1)
(9) (5)
(5)

- PARTICIPANTS:
- SECRETARY SHULTZ
- AMBASSADOR ATHERTON
- AMBASSADOR CLUVERIUS
- AMBASSADOR CUTLER
- AMBASSADOR DILLON
- AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS
- MR. BRANDON GROVE
- AMBASSADOR HABIB
- MR. WILLIAM KIRBY
- AMBASSADOR LEWIS
- AMBASSADOR MURPHY
- MR. KEN MCKUNE (NOTETAKER)
- AMBASSADOR NEWLIN
- AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI
DAS
- ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ PELLETRAU
- MR. PETER RODMAN
- MR. RAY SEITZ
- MR. HOWARD TEICHER
- AMBASSADOR VIETS
- ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FOIA Exemption (b) (1), (b) (5) - X

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED BY: [] DATE: []

DATE: 11/19/96

10/13/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Secretary Shultz introduced his remarks by saying that ~~the~~ the reasons for his meeting with the Chiefs of Mission were twofold: first, to get the benefit of their experience and wise counsel, and second, to set out ^{what our objectives are and} how ~~we~~ our policy will be proceeding during the coming period. ~~what its objectives are~~ ^{We want to} and to do this ~~in such a way~~ ^{so} that as things begin to happen, we can continue to make use of the built-in communications network which has been in use during the past month.

Speaking of the Lebanese negotiations, the Secretary said that he was impressed by what has been accomplished, and this in spite of the sense of discouragement that can arise if one gets too preoccupied with the details ^{and complexities} of problems. He said that he had been following Phil's and Maury's efforts closely, had recently had a chance to review the situation in Washington with the NSC group, and believes that the amount of progress to date has been substantial. If the remaining issues are difficult, it is also true that some difficult things have been resolved.

Referring to his own travels, the Secretary said that there seems to be perpetual discussion about "trips" and that he had resisted being too quick on the trigger in travelling to the Middle East. Nevertheless, he said, now appears to be a good time to help Phil and his colleagues; and maybe at least we can get Lebanon and Israel to come to an agreement.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

2

With respect to the peace process, the Secretary said that here too a great deal has taken place. If one compares General Arab attitudes today with those of a year ago--particularly in the case of Jordan--it seems that the Arabs, despite their terrible disappointment that it has not been possible to move to negotiations yet, nevertheless feel that they can no longer entertain the hope of moving Israel by force. Thus, some form of negotiation will be necessary. Of course, the strength of this feeling varies from country to country and from time to time, according to circumstances.

The Secretary said that he recognizes that the Chiefs of Mission have put in a lot of effort, and have done much. It is amusing, he said, that the papers always give the impression that unless the Secretary of State is travelling, nothing is happening. Of course, a lot is happening, and relying on one's Ambassadors is an effective way to proceed.

Overall, the Secretary said, one can describe what we have accomplished as a huge surge which we must now try to keep from moving back. ^{years.} In terms of this trip, said the Secretary we will be meeting the Egyptians, then having another session with the Chiefs of Mission, then going on to Israel. Fairly early on, we will be then going to Beirut in line with our first priority to work out the Lebanese situation. As it becomes necessary, trips may ~~take~~ take ^{us} place to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan. As this ^{happens} ~~take place~~, it will be important for all of the Chiefs of Mission to keep the Secretary posted on what is

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

3

taking place in their respective countries. In a sense, the onward itinerary will depend upon what there is to talk about and how much time is available. Fahd and King Hussein have both agreed that the US should give priority to the Lebanon negotiations and that the Secretary would be welcome in ~~their~~ their countries—
^{this means}
~~so~~ they are waiting to see what happens. We don't know what Damascus is thinking.

On timing, the Secretary must go to the OECD meetings on May 8 and 9. While he does not wish to place any artificial constraint on this process, it is relatively important that he go to Paris ~~because~~ because that meeting will be preparation for the Williamsburg economic summit and for the NATO meetings.

The Secretary mentioned his recent interview with Meg Greenfield of the Washington Post and recommended that everyone take a look at it for a good general idea of the present US view of the ME situation.

In ~~conclusion~~ conclusion, the Secretary ~~said~~ said that President REagan is very determined, very current on latest developments, and absolutely will not fall off of his position one way or the other. This does not mean that the President is inflexible, but that his Initiative represents a considered judgment of what is necessary to get a negotiation going. The President is not going to give up or lose heart. He will push on with determination.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI referred to the possibility of the Secretary visiting Damascus, emphasizing that Syria, together with Israel and Lebanon, serves as "the ^{third} ~~third~~ leg of the triangle," and thus is crucial to the ongoing process. He expressed the view that it is in our interest to inform the Syrian Government of the Secretary's interest in visiting Damascus, so as to explore the possibility of securing an agreement-in-principle for such a visit.

THE SECRETARY responded that the timing of this issue is important and that there are tactical issues involved: how would discussion of a Syrian trip ~~interplay~~ interplay with the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations? Would this inject undue Syrian influence into the talks, so that they could say that unless so-and-so is acceptable, there would be no (Syrian) withdrawal. Another question that arises is that of the growing Soviet presence inside Syria, and what is this doing to the Syrian position?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES, referring to what Ambassador Paganelli had told the Syrian Government about the Secretary's travels in the region, said that Paganelli had carried out his instructions exactly. He said that from a tactical point of view, it would be best if the Syrians ^{were to ask} ~~asked~~ if the Secretary would like to come to Damascus.

~~AMBASSADOR HABIB~~ AMBASSADOR HABIB said that the trouble is that the Syrians won't ask. If you ask, they will agree.

But If the Secretary goes to Saudi Arabia-and/or Jordan, ^{or if he gets on Israeli-Lebanese?} he must _^ ^{agree}

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

5

also go to Syria.

THE SECRETARY jested that, ^{if this was the case,} ~~in referring to a possible~~
~~Damascus~~ perhaps Phil was raising an incentive not to
reach an Israeli-Lebanese agreement.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that the Secretary can expect
to be asked by the Israelis if he planned to go to Damascus.
The Israelis are uncomfortable with the fact that ~~that~~
the US has no direct assurances from the Syrians regarding
withdrawal.

AMBASSADOR MURPHY said that the Saudis would also be
likely to encourage the Secretary to visit Syria, ^{rather than} ~~Saudi~~
Arabia.

THE SECRETARY mentioned ^{in passing} that perhaps he could visit
Jubail and see how it was coming along.

AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI asked whether the Secretary would
agree in principle to making a visit to Damascus, or would
he agree that the Ambassador should ask the Syrian government
for ^{its} ~~their~~ reaction to such a suggestion.

THE SECRETARY ~~responded~~ responded that he would
prefer to return to that question at a later point.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES suggested ~~that~~ that Ambassadors
Newlin and Cutler speak about Algerian and Tunisian perceptions
at this time, and ~~how~~ how they see themselves involved.

AMBASSADOR NEWLIN SAID THAT with respect to Lebanon,
the Algerian government has taken the position that it supports

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

an independent Lebanese government that ~~has~~ has sovereignty over all its territory, ^{Algeria} ~~and~~ will support any deal that the Lebanese government supports. Benjedid has sent his adviser to the Saudis, to King Hussein, and to the Syrians. The Algerians realize that the situation is ^{very} difficult, and they are prepared to play a role behind the scenes to the extent possible. They have no hang-ups about Amin Gemayel as the head of the Lebanese government. As they told Eagleburger, they agree totally with US objectives in Lebanon. As for the peace process, it is difficult to know exactly what they are up to. They appear to be trying to nudge Arafat into finding a way to give King Hussein the green light. There are also some signs that the Algerians want us ~~to~~ to amend the September initiative.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES ~~said that~~ suggested that Bill Kirby could draft up some talking points on Lebanon and the peace process for all the Ambassadors to use on their host governments.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS asked what would happen if the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations came out without a resolution that was clear cut: would this reinforce the standard Arab approach to resort to the lowest common denominator for a unified position? Would there be another Arab League meeting ~~with~~ adopting unhelpful positions so that Lebanon would be unable to move?

AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID THAT Amin Gemayel believes that if he can come up with an agreement that is consistent with maintaini

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

an internal Lebanese consensus, under those circumstances his biggest concern would be the Syrians, and what their reaction would be. As for the process, Gemayel needs the support of the Lebanese cabinet, which means the Muslim ~~is~~ element in it. Assuming that, the Parliament would be the next stage. At ~~this time~~ ^{present}, Gemayel believes that with fairly good internal support, he can tell the Arabs "This is what we are going to do." Gemayel would not go for anything having to do with the Arab League.

AMBASSADOR DILLON said that Gemayel appears to be concerned that his negotiators may have gone too far already in terms of what domestic Lebanese politics will bear.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that Gemayel is also worried about his internal consensus, and that he do something to demonstrate his awareness of its necessity.

(b) (1)
(b) (5)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(b)(5)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES said that any Lebanese-Israeli agreement would promptly enter into the public domain, and he asked what would be the schedule for parliamentary action on this?

AMBASSADOR DILLON said that on May 15, the government's 6-months grant of emergency powers would lapse and parliamentary rule would resume.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that Amin Gemayel had told him that he would forward to Parliament any ~~any~~ agreement within a period of ten days from signing.

AMBASSADOR DILLON said that when any agreement becomes public knowledge, it is likely that political pressures of various sorts would come into play.

AMBASSADOR CUTLER said that as far as the Tunisians are concerned, the Lebanon negotiations--both of themselves and as they relate to the larger peace process--are an earnest of US intentions vis-a-vis the Middle East, and also are a test of

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

whether the US will show that it is serious about Israel. In the event of a Lebanese-Israeli agreement, it will be important to see what kind of reaction there will be from Syria and from the PLO. If there are Syrian reservations, backed up by ~~those~~ ^{objections} from the PLO, this will mean trouble for the moderate Arabs and another split in the Arab ranks. Tunisians do not want this to happen. So, Syria is key.

AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI said that this underscores the fact of the role of Syria as bell-wether.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that we should not overlook that Syria could be opposed to any agreement whatsoever. It may choose to oppose an ~~X~~ agreement. The question is: is the Syrian position that there is a line that they will accept and another they will reject, or is it the case that they will not accept anything?

AMBASSADOR LEWIS asked if we are being realistic in the discussion. Are ~~there~~ there any Arab ^s ~~states~~ that will help push Syria if it is recalcitrant? The Saudis? The Algerians?

AMBASSADOR NEWLIN said that the pushing and working has to take place before an ~~X~~ agreement is made public.

AMBASSADOR VELIBTES referred to an earlier statement by Ambassador Newlin and wondered whether the Algerians would be prepared to say publicly that they will support an ~~X~~ agreement that the Lebanese government accepts.

AMBASSADOR VIETS said that the test for the validity of any agreement will begin when movement starts between Jerusalem and Beirut. If the perception ^{in the Arab world} is that Lebanon has been pressured

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

harder than Israel, then it will not make much difference what Gemayel and the Lebanese Parliament do.

THE SECRETARY asked Ambassador Newlin if the Algerian people know what are the ^{issues} ~~terms~~ of ~~the~~ Lebanese-Israeli agreement.

AMBASSADOR NEWLIN responded affirmatively, saying that the (Algerian) Secretary-General could give an exposition of the negotiations similar in most respects to that given earlier this morning by Ambassador Habib.

AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI said that at this point, we can only guess where the Syrians are ~~vis-a-vis~~ vis-a-vis an agreement since there hasn't been any discussion with them for six months. Their ^{ir} position as spelled out to the Europeans and others who talk with them is that Syria will accept nothing that derogates ^{from} Lebanese sovereignty or poses a threat to Syrian security.

Theoretically, there are a lot of things that could fit the ^{two criteria} ~~definition~~: joint patrols, Haddad's role, open borders, aerial surveillance, reconnaissance, etc. If we go to the Syrians with a package that incorporates a Lebanese tilt, then it will be up to the Syrians to decide how much they really want to get Israel out of Lebanon. As for the question of Soviet influence in Lebanon, that is something we don't know very much about. The Soviets gave them the material support they needed, and there has been and to some extent continues to be a lot of hot rhetoric that has tended to re-build Syrian confidence that was battered last fall. But, after all, Gromyko too has said that all foreign forces should get out of Lebanon. At any rate, the Ambassador said, he does not believe that Assad is

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

or is likely to become beholden to the Soviets to the extent that they can control his policies.

~~SECRET~~
THE SECRETARY asked ~~if~~ ^{whether} the Syrians ⁱⁿ consult ^{by} the Saudis about withdrawal from Lebanon, would ~~they~~ be seeking payment for this?

AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI responded that the pattern exists, it has been done before.

THE SECRETARY commented that that is why Khaddam is in Saudi Arabia today.

AMBASSADOR MURPHY replied that perhaps it hasn't reached that point yet, but it may be building up to it.

AMBASSADOR ATHERTON said that in Egypt, the perception is that obtaining a Syrian withdrawal will be more difficult than ^{an} ~~the~~ Israeli one. One of the notions current here is that Israel is in no particular hurry to withdraw from Lebanon; without granting the idea, perhaps there ^{may be} ~~is~~ similar reasoning ^{applicable} ~~with respect~~ to the Syrians.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that if Syria blocks an agreement and Israel stays in Lebanon, then US-Israeli relations will stagnate and this may work to the advantage of the Syrians. Another thing perhaps working in the Syrians' favor ~~was~~ was the removal of Sharon from the Defence Ministry.

AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI replied that the Israeli presence in Lebanon is awfully close and not something to be ignored, regardless of who is Israeli Defence Minister.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES asked Ambassador Lewis to repeat ^{some of} his earlier comments on how Israelis see the situation in Lebanon.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS responded by saying that Israeli society is sick of the war and ^{the} Israeli presence in Lebanon. Their army, which is built on reserves, is perforce doing continual rotations to boost morale. There are stores ^{of} everywhere to the effect that Lebanon is a losing game and the boys should come home. People ^{now} believe they shouldn't have taken the Phalang seriously in the first place. At the same time, the Israeli military believe that the Lebanese army is untested, unreliable; and therefore, they need Haddad and his boys plus Israeli advice ^{Moysevel's} Protecting Israel's northern towns against shelling has become a political desideratum for the Begin government. Begin will tell the Secretary that he realizes that there is no such thing as a 100% guarantee, but he will want maximum assurances before withdrawing. Another thing is that Israelis generally believe that within a short time the PLO will come back: within weeks or months of withdrawal there would be small unit operations against Israel from south Le^banon. Therefore, there must be an Israeli role ^{to prevent this} ~~in the region~~. In the event that the Secretary's visit and Habib's efforts fail, the Israelis are likely to withdraw to the Awali river line, which will ^{parallel} ~~be~~ the Vietnam syndrome. And so the Cabinet is doing a lot of soul-searching at present.

AMBASSADOR DILLON said that if anything is clear, it is that the Lebanese do not want the PLO back doing what it did.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

13

Another point is that we need to be careful who we call the PLO: in South Lebanon, there are a lot of people operating--some local people, some Shias, some Palestinians, some Druze--and we should not lump them together as PLO. As for the Lebanese army, ~~it~~ it won't be strong enough for years to fight the Syrians or the Israelis, ^{but} it can undertake ~~duties~~ to fight militias and guerillas and what have you.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that in his view, the Lebanese army has such ^{to} capability now. ^{what} The Israelis really want ^s to do the job themselves. When they say Haddad, they don't mean Haddad or ^{even} Haddad and his 1500 ragamuffins. They mean Israeli leadership and Israeli patrols on top of that. They reason that Lebanese inability to do the job equals the necessity for Israel to do it. ^{This is all} ~~That's~~ open to question. Amin Gemayel says that the Lebanese are in a better position than ^{the} the Israelis to play this role--because they will get the cooperation which is needed to do it.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES said that if we don't succeed, perhaps we can have another change ^c in six months as far as Israel is concerned. Is this realistic for Lebanon? Could the Lebanese hang together, consolidate their authority around Beirut or north of the Awali?

AMBASSADOR HABIB responded that first we have to describe the situation accurately. If there is no agreement, the Israelis ^{will} withdraw to the Awali and the Syrians ^{will} stay in the Bekaa. This ^{will} will not guarantee that the Israelis will be safe from attack,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

14

There will be organized resistance, some of it organized ~~perhaps~~ ^{no doubt} by the Syrians, the PLO will come back, there will be renewed fighting between the various groups, ^{and} the Lebanese government will erode away ^{with} Amin Gemayel ~~is not~~ ^{not being} successful in ~~pulling~~ pulling together a unified Lebanon.

AMBASSADOR DILLON said that one reason Gemayel has wide, if thin, support is the perception that he is a clever fellow who has garnered US support, including from President Reagan ^{personally.} and the Secretary, ^A Delay, failure, the US leaning on Lebanon and not on Israel--these will destroy a lot of that attraction. On the other hand, a little success could strengthen Gemayel's position and support his ~~own~~ efforts for a unified Lebanon.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said ~~strongly~~ that what the US cannot do is support any kind of solution that means partition. The US should resist that with ~~all~~ all the means at its disposal.

THE SECRETARY said that ~~what is being said is~~ ^{all this means} that we have a one-time set of factors, and if it doesn't work, there may not be a government of Lebanon to work with. If the deal falls through, it won't be possible to put it back together and the variables will ~~be~~ change beyond control.

AMBASSADOR HABIB added that if there is no resolution, the Syrians will begin supporting guerilla activities.

AMBASSADOR DILLON said that the traditional reasons for the success of the Israeli Defence Forces will not work in southern Lebanon: southern consolidation for Israeli forces will not solve their ⁽¹⁾ problem.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY said that we should get a statement together for our Ambassadors to communicate to their governments let them know what the situation is. This will be the groundwork for subsequent reports and can be used to win their support for an agreement when it is reached.

THE SECRETARY then asked for reactions to the Jordanian announcement ^{regarding} their non-participation in negotiations and Palestinian reaction to the Hussein/Arafat failure to agree.

CONSUL-GENERAL GROVE said ~~that~~ after the September 1 initiative, there was a rising curve of Palestinian expectations and a general welcoming of the possibility of a Jordanian role. West Bankers in general hoped that King Hussein would come into negotiations and that with PLO approval, probably overt, it would be possible for them to get in as well. Thus, King Hussein's announcement caused widespread disappointment. Since then, two schools of thought seem to have been developing. The majority, despite their disappointment, do not believe ² that the initiative is dead and have not given up hope that the King may yet come in. The newer line of thinking, however, is that maybe the moment was not ripe: ^{even if} King Hussein ^{had agreed to} ~~would have~~ ~~negotiated,~~ ~~said he was in,~~ but the Israelis would have stood him up; and even if they did not, the US would not have exerted its influence sufficiently to advance ^{Palestinian} ~~their~~ interest^s ^{in crucial issues.} In this light, King Hussein was saved from a mistake at the last moment. ^{However, Mr Grove cont.} This ~~is~~ is not to say that all is lost. The West Bankers are watching the US like ~~the~~ hawks, and view us as the only actor with possible

UNCLASSIFIED

influence.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS asked whether this meant that the Palestinians were not raising their voices to ask the PLO to change its position.

CONSUL-GENERAL GROVE replied that they were doing so behind the scenes, but it is becoming progressively harder to do

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES observed that it may be getting to the point that we have to wonder if there really is a peace process. Is it relevant to ask if a Lebanese agreement can give any impetus to the peace process? What is King Hussein thinking and doing?

AMBASSADOR VIETS replied that the failure of the Secretary visit would mean the end of the game.

(b)(1)
(b)(5)

UNCLASSIFIED

7

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

17

(S) (U)
b:5

AMBASSADOR CUTLER said that the Tunisians' thesis runs that Arafat has to get tough on the PLO radicals, and in order to do so he needs some help, some gesture from the US.

AMBASSADOR VIETS said that whereas King Hussein used to take the view that the US long ago should have made its opening to the PLO, his current view is that to do so ^{now} ~~under present~~ ~~circumstances~~ would be to court an endless series of demands from the PLO.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES referred to a question that the Algerians had relayed to the US through the Saudis (and which subsequently ^{seemed} ~~proved~~ to have come from the PLO), namely, would the US accept a statement to the effect that "The future of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza will not be imposed upon them." The interesting thing, ~~is that~~ ^{is that} Saudi Prince Bandar (who relayed the message) ~~did not~~ mad no mention of the PLO. Speaking to Ambassador Murphy, Assistant Secretary Veliotes

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

asked whether he could add anything on this matter.

AMBASSADOR MURPHY said that when Saudi Foreign Minister Saud saw the reply to the question, he acted as if he had ~~never~~ never seen a text of the Camp David accords. He had read the response most carefully.

[THE SECRETARY observed that it seems that people don't read what they don't like. Another example was how few people in the Israeli government had read the text of President Reagan's September 1 address.]

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that it is clear that the Arabs remain concerned ~~and~~ about "what the US will do on the Palestinian question." They are all looking to the US to solve the Lebanese and Palestinian questions. If the negotiating process does not appear to be resolving those issues, there will be a trend toward radicalism in the region.

CONSUL-GENERAL GROVE said that more than radicalism, the region will face renewed Soviet momentum and activity. Thus, we cannot not have a peace process.

MR. TEICHER, ~~referring~~ referring to the Palestinian/PLO and Syrian/Soviet ~~connections~~ connections--and specifically to current Syrian strength and PLO weakness, asked what are the prospects for any real change by the PLO or Arafat in their positions.

AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI SAID THAT as far as the PLO is concerned, Arafat is liable to continue to hold back unless there is a quid pro quo such as participation in negotiations. For ~~the~~ President Carter had advised Assad to restrain Syria's

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

19

Palestinian friends so as to let Arafat and company have a go. Assad's response: that's all bunk, Israel does not want peace, it is an expansionist power, this initiative is false and we will not support it.

Referring to the Secretary's earlier remark, AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI said that Arab perceptions have indeed changed, and they believe that since September 1 they have stepped forward with more flexible positions only to find that the US has done nothing and that Israel has totally resisted.

THE SECRETARY said that that is our position. At this point, it is exactly what we want--not movement by the US, not in either direction.

AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI said that the perception is that the US states its principles, but does nothing to back them up. Settlement policy is a good example.

THE SECRETARY said that it is the only example. As for Lebanon, we're struggling with that.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that the situation ~~may~~ be that the Syrians and Soviets are determined to block the Reagan initiative. Add to that Arafat's weakness. In all frankness, it is very difficult to say that the peace process is going anywhere. If we assume that King Hussein got to the negotiating table--with Begin as Prime Minister, it would never be possible to negotiate ^a final status agreement. That's what Camp David ~~is all about~~ ^{was designed to avoid.} We all thought that after five years, Begin would no longer be in power.

AMBASSADOR ATHERTON said that Begin himself had said the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

same thing himself to Secretary Vance at the time.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that we may be kidding ourselves if we think that ~~someone~~^{any} is going to do ~~something~~^{any} to help Arafat help Hussein get into the peace process.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that that was his very point this morning in asking whether the peace process is viable. The funny thing is that everyone wanted to say it is, but their reasons all ~~ran~~^{ran} in the other direction.

AMBASSADOR VIETS said that he had just spent five minutes explaining ~~why~~^{that} it is possible to have a peace process.

AMBASSADOR ATHERTON ~~SAID~~ that Egypt too believes that the process is still alive, although ~~they~~^{Egyptians} are beginning to get anxious about it. He asked whether it is possible to split the PLO. ■ Palestinians are needed to participate in the process, the Syrians have no incentive to let their Palestinians get in, but are there any others^{whom it might be possible} to split away. Perhaps US policy over the last five years or so has worked to drive the PLO together, instead of working to further inherent splitting tendencies in the organization.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that the only Palestinians are those who have the name PLO or Arafat. No one is willing to refute the Rabat Conference decision.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

AMBASSADOR VIETS said that it would be interesting to speculate what would have happened ~~if~~ if--when King Hussein arrived in Washington last December, saying that he was ready to negotiate with Israel ^{and} giving peace in exchange for withdrawal ^{to} from the West Bank--the reply had been different. What would Israel have done?

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that he had only heard about this offer by Hussein earlier in the day. As he understood it, Hussein's ~~position had been~~ ^{offer would have been announced by him saying} that he could not join Camp David, but ~~he would state that~~ since he believes in peace, he was prepared to go beyond Camp David. The impact of such a statement upon Israel would, over time, have been volcanic. It would have caused an extraordinary upheaval in Israel.

AMBASSADOR VELIOTES said that ^{Hussein's idea} ~~this~~ had been relayed to Foreign Minister Shamir in New York. He had responded only that Israel would want to ensure that Camp David ~~was followed~~ would be followed.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that it must be remembered that Shamir ^{is} the revisionist foreign minister of the Likud government. His reaction ^{was very likely quite} ~~could well have been very~~ different from that of the Israeli body politic at large. The only way to get Israel to make true concessions is to give true peace--which is not what the Arabs are prepared to give.

AMBASSADOR NEWLIN said that as far as the Arabs are concerned, the Pes resolution means peace.

THE SECRETARY asked whether King Hussein's comments meant

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

22

~~SECRET~~

[
(d)
b(1)(5)
1
ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES wondered if King Hussein might come round ^{again} to the same position if an agreement could be reached in Lebanon.

AMBASSADOR VIEWS said that Hussein, more than anyone else in the Arab world, wants and needs peace with Israel.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that the next time he makes an offer, then, don't turn him down.

THE SECRETARY ~~was~~ said that we did not turn him down. ^{that it would be better} We advised him ^{again} to negotiate transition arrangements first, and thereby be far ahead of the game. He eventually agreed with this position.

AMBASSADOR HABIB asked what would have happened if we had said that to Sadat when he was ready to negotiate.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES said that if King Hussein was willing to go to Jerusalem, he would be very glad to take the King's offer at value.

AMBASSADOR ATHERTON said that it should be remembered that the reason we came up with Camp David was that there was no way to get Israel to talk about final status.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that it makes a big difference if the goal is to get negotiations started or if the aim is to leap over ~~this~~ ^{this} (Begin) government to the Israeli people and to negotiate beyond Camp David.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

AMBASSADOR MURPHY said that if King Hussein did not ask for moderate Arab government support, he may not have been serious.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ^{VELIOTES} said that a lot of time had been spent talking about guarantees.

AMBASSADOR VIETS said that ^{in all fairness} that was not in the context of ^{Hussein's} ~~his~~ original offer.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS wondered whether there might be another change ^c after a Lebanese settlement. Could we go back to King Hussein and try again?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES said that it depends on the circumstances.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that for Israel, peace is the goal. For the Arabs, it's territory.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that Israel loves peace as long as they can keep all the territory they've got. The Begin government wants to keep the territory.

AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS said that some ^{Arabs} ~~Arabs~~ don't want only to get back ~~the~~ the territory.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that Israel had wanted peace ^{too} before it held any territories.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

24

AMBASSADOR DILLON said that some Arabs want justice. And speaking of territory, if the Maronite government in Lebanon gets control of its territory, there is likely to follow a new wave of Palestinian refugees to somewhere.

CONSUL-GENERAL GROVE said that he was not aware of a single West Banker for whom ~~the~~ Camp David represented a viable process or vehicle. *This perhaps should give the US pause.*

THE SECRETARY said that in his experience, people usually don't read things they don't like. Many top Israeli leaders had not read the President's September 1 speech. And many West Bankers had not read the Camp David accords.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that the Arabs had carefully read the President's Initiative, and are no doubt asking if they are really certain it is dead or not. They may also be having second thoughts about Hussein and his approach to getting into the negotiations.

AMBASSADOR VIETS said that from the Arab perspective, the one way to begin a review of the Reagan initiative and for it to attract support is for the US to be seen as getting its relationship with Israel under control.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that Lebanon agreement would be a good indication.

AMBASSADOR MURPHY SAID THAT ^{Lebanon agreement} ~~it~~ is the only thing we can do. We have already shown that it is impossible to deal with Israel and with the Palestinian question, Lebanon is all that is left.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AMBASSADOR ATHERTON said that we can try to split the PLO, by talking to some members of Fatah, for example--but not in their capacity as members of the PLO.

MR TEICHER said that we had Walid Khalidi in the situation room; and Qawasmeh and Milhem came and talked to the Secretary, but they couldn't do anything except report back to the PLO and Arafat.

AMBASSADOR ATHERTON ^{said that} We can talk to some of these individuals without recognizing the PLO. Kissinger recently confirmed during a Cairo trip that the US commitment (to Israel re the PLO) always was meant to reserve the right to have contact. In fact, there were technical dealings with the PLO in Lebanon.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that what is necessary is to keep working on the ^{existing} process which already has validity.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS said that any move by the US re the PLO would scare off the Begin government. ^{It would also take years to develop desired consequences. The Ambassador added} ~~He also~~ ^{added} that Arafat had told Hussein that there would be voting at the Algiers PNC, but it did not happen that way. Arafat wants to be the head of a ~~movement~~ movement, not the head of a rump group.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES said that he was not discarding the possibility that Arafat (deliberately) had himself outflanked on the talks with Hussein--because he did not want to accept the results.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONCLUSION

26

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

In summation

THE SECRETARY said that he did not know what to take from all the preceding except that ~~the~~ everyone was feeling defeated. Getting more stability should be important to Saudi Arabia; Syria may not care; it should be important to Jordan.

A lot of Palestinians live in the West Bank and Gaza, in Lebanon, in Jordan, in Syria. Their plight is pretty miserable, they have no prospects. This seems worthy of drawing to the attention of people, including the Israelis perhaps. A good part of the reason ^{for the Palestinian dilemma} is the PLO. Maybe some people are having second thoughts about ~~it~~ Saudi Arabia ^{for example,} ~~thinks so, I'm told.~~ ^{The Saudis} they are counselling a policy of freezing out the PLO--are they doing it ~~themselves~~ themselves? In our own public statements, we ^{have been trying} ~~tried~~ to highlight the difficulties caused by the PLO, that they are not helping the Palestinian people.

UNCLASSIFIED

But as for our meeting, I don't sense any direction coming out of our discussions, there's disagreement.

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that there is general agreement that we ought to focus on Lebanon.

THE SECRETARY said that as for the peace process, the general feeling seems to be "bolder, not milder." In our discussion with King Hussein about the Camp David process, we told him that if you want to talk about ~~the~~ full peace issues, it is useful to change the environment first by getting a quick agreement on transition arrangements. This will set

Assistant Secretary Velivker said that as a group we are optimistic by nature but today we are focusing on problems.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

27

up a different structure in the area, then it would be possible to proceed with full peace ~~discussions~~ discussions. I think this was good advice, and I won't second guess it at this time. The US has proposals on the table which represent progress for the Palestinians, and ^{un}til we see ~~something~~ something better we should stick with what we have. Tomorrow, perhaps we can focus on what we want to tell the governments about Lebanon and the peace process. *We should also talk about the Iraq-Iran war*

AMBASSADOR HABIB said that in his opinion, if there is to be an agreement on Lebanon, it will be necessary for the US to tilt to Lebanon on the big issues. There are also dozens of little issues, all of which could cause unforeseen difficulties. The package of all these little details is what has to be accomplished. It will not be easy, and success is not assured.

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY said that we have to push hard to get ^{an} ~~it~~ ^{agreement} accomplished in the period of time that we have. If that is not done, the word for it is "US failure." And the consequences for ^{the} US and others are unpleasant. So, we have to work on our general principles and the details. Let's not be defeated before we get started.

UNCLASSIFIED

Cleared: S:Edelman
S/S:Chill

} 9/10

~~SECRET~~ **SECRET**

470

P
(S)(1)(a)(5)

LEBANESE CONCEPT OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

CLASSIFIED

I. THE SETTING



IS. F. 1000R 2/15/90

CONFIDENTIAL

() CLASSIFIED () S or
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

9302566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE

EXEMPTIONS (S)(1)

EX Exemptions

II. SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SECURITY REGION

Lebanon's commitment to the security of Israel is demonstrated by:

--Agreement to a Security Region that encompasses over one-third of Lebanese territory where extraordinary security measures and reasonable equipment limitations in the two Lebanese army brigades will be applied.

--The Lebanese Armed Forces will establish special security measures to prevent the infiltration of hostile forces in Lebanon into the Security Region, by coordinating the efforts of forces both in and on the border of the Security Region to prevent these acts.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

--Methods include rapid, practical and direct communications links between respective Lebanese and Israeli military commanders in the border region and Tannous will make this happen.

--Lebanon has established a Territorial Brigade under its command structure operating from the Israeli-Lebanese border to the Zahrani River. The core of the brigade will be Haddad's forces in which functional and capable combat units will be integrated intact. Tannous has even provided Israel with the names of commanders and officers designated for this brigade. This, coupled with the integration of the existing Civil Guard into an ANSAR organization and subordination of the police and the ISF to this brigade should ensure that the security situation as you know it now will not only remain intact, but will be enhanced. There will be more forces totally dedicated to the security of Israel than you have now.

--A review of all security measures and procedures after the first three months, but this will be an ongoing effort.

--An Israeli-Lebanese Security Arrangements Committee to oversee security arrangements.

--Up to eight Joint Supervisory Teams operating daily to verify violations but with permission to observe Lebanese techniques in this regard. A carte blanche to the Committee to determine areas, composition and equipment for the teams.

--Full cooperation with Israeli covert and overt intelligence collection activities in the Security Region.

--Lebanese acquiescence on Israeli aerial surveillance.

--Contact between commanders in border area with Committee approval and direct contacts between GOI/GOL representatives through Joint Teams, and the Committee's office.

--Two Joint Supervisory Centers in the Security Region.

--Joint Command Post Exercises (with forces on their own side of the border) to determine procedures to respond to potential urgent hostile threats along the border.

--Lebanese commitment to act quickly and effectively in response to unauthorized activities, including reaction to Israeli intelligence alerts. (The U.S. training is designed to emphasize this capability.)

--Use of UNIFIL to quiet the inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps.

--Full consultation with the Security Arrangements Committee on any changes to the Territorial Brigade.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
- 3 -

III. The sum total of these arrangements is that one-third of Lebanon plus one regular LAF brigade and the dedicated Territorial Brigade, civil guard, ISF and police, with strong popular support will be dedicated to the security of Israel. The above security arrangements constitute a reasonable balance between Lebanese sovereignty and the real security requirements of Israel. Taken as a total concept, they provide an attainable and visible security structure and a means for closer cooperation between the IDF and the LAF. The proof of the effectiveness of the total system in the Security Region will be the willingness of the IDF to allow the Lebanese to grow within the system and as a result achieve a viable military structure which, based upon popular support, will benefit both sides. A short term view of restriction and of supervision will not build the relationships you want. But a long term view of confidence in the Lebanese army and its leaders, coupled with the coordination and contact outlined above, will provide the incentive for a closer relationship between your countries.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

319

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S CH 1/19

P (b)(1) (b)(5)



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ST:

'S

~~SECRET~~

January 19, 1983

TO : The Secretary
 : The Deputy Secretary *LOBS*

FROM : NEA - David T. Schneider, Acting

SUBJECT : Habib Readout on his January 19 Talks with the Israelis

Phil Habib called at midday on January 19 to report on the state of play in the wake of his talks with the Israelis today. He continues to see a real uphill battle ahead. Phil has drafted a cable which soon should be in the Department.

The Israelis have stood fast today. Their present demands would cause a fundamental break between Lebanon and the Arab League. At this point it is difficult to see where we will be a week from now, Phil said. To date, it has not been possible to convince Israel to accept our draft over the Israeli draft. Nevertheless, Phil and Sam Lewis feel very strongly that he should be allowed to have the next few days to do what he can

(b)(1) (b)(5)

Phil believes he should complete discussions with the Israelis, including a meeting tomorrow with Shamir and one with Sharon, as well as meeting on Friday with Begin. He then anticipates the need to go to Lebanon to talk with Gemayel. With Gemayel's reaction in hand, Phil would make a quick trip to Riyadh to see King Fahd in an effort to maintain the support of the moderate Arabs. He also foresees spending several hours in Cairo with Mubarak, as Roy Atherton has urged him to do. At that point he would return to Jerusalem to see what could be achieved in the wake of his discussions in Lebanon and elsewhere.

If Phil then does not get enough to take back to Gemayel and pursue, he would plan to return immediately to Washington to meet with the President and the Secretary, as well as to present at the time of the Mubarak visit. He would plan to arrive on Tuesday, January 25.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FRC/CDR *9/11* Date: *2/5/83*

EO 1.3
 () Classify as
 () Downgrade to () S or
 ()

DECLASSIFY IN PART

EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FOIA () Deny

0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 6

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Phil feels confident he now knows what the Israelis want and intends to turn up the pressure considerably when he sees Shamir tomorrow and Begin on Friday.

(S)(1)
(4)(5)
(S)(5)

We need to be perceived in Jerusalem as having gone the extra mile. In that regard, it is important that Phil be permitted to finish the present sequence.

We are working on instructions to Phil to go out overnight but will hold up sending them forward until we have been able to digest the cable he has enroute.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Drafted:NEA/IAI:MSpendleton/gp
1/19/83 x23672 Wang #3447B

MS

Cleared:NEA - WTCluverius

MC

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

469



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

P
(8)(1)(9)5

DIST:
S
D
S/P
S/S
S/S-I



UNCLASSIFIED

April 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Habib/Lewis-Veliotes Telecon, April 11, 1983

9302566
FOIA Exemptions
pa Exemptions
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRETARY OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EASTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1
3
5
1
6
0
0
0
0
0

Ambassadors Habib and Lewis called Assistant Secretary Veliotes secure on the morning of April 11, in particular to report on Lewis' meetings earlier in the day with Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Arens. The peace process was not the item most on their minds. Lewis said the thing that has struck him most was that the combination of the President's statement on F-16s and the press spokesman's comments on settlements last Friday has produced a great deal of anger and annoyance in Israel. This anger is being suppressed, although it overflowed in Sunday's Cabinet meeting where Arens, Shamir and Sharon all were vehement about standing firm against U.S. pressure. Lewis expects the reaction to be psychological rigidity that will complicate the Lebanon negotiations.

Lewis' meeting with Begin:

Lewis spent an hour and a half with Begin this morning. He described the conversation as a good one, both quiet and frank. Lewis used the guidance he received yesterday in the Sierra cable and gave a "good but careful" reading on how we got where we are on the peace process. Lewis stressed the President's determination to persevere and said we remain convinced that Jordan is the only viable partner for Israel in the process.

Begin was skeptical about the peace process but continues to say that he would like to see Hussein enter within the Camp David framework. Begin clearly manifested distaste about what he considered to be the wooing of Arafat by the U.S. Lewis said that he noted no great sense of celebration about yesterday's events. What appears to be most on Begin's mind is the overall continued bad state of the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship. Lewis drew on the Sierra cable to discuss F-16s, what the President's statement means and what it does not. In Lewis' view, this helped somewhat. He is not certain that Begin himself had the story straight prior to this conversation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Begin asked about possible plans by the Secretary's to visit the Middle East. Lewis told Begin that the President is interested in having the Secretary visit the region at an appropriate time, but no final decision has been made and no dates have been set.

When Begin returned to the nature of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, Lewis stressed that we would continue to face problems until an agreement on Lebanon is hammered out. Begin suggested that the recent Lebanese proposals that Haddad become Deputy Brigade Commander responsible for G-2 had been rejected by Arens.

Lewis describes Begin in a serene but deeply concerned mood. He was not strident and is clearly attempting to figure out what to do about the relationship with the U.S. [

(b)(1)(a)(5)

[redacted] On Lebanon, Begin would welcome new ideas we might have.

Lewis' meeting with Arens:

Lewis also spent an hour and a half with Arens reviewing a series of bilateral issues. Much of the conversation reflected Arens' acute but controlled anger regarding the F-16 statement and its implication on the LAVI aircraft issue. [

[] In the meantime, Arens is still pressing hard for answers on the technical -- rather than the financial -- aspects of the LAVI program.

With regard to the peace process, Lewis notes that Arens' view of the Reagan initiative has not changed; even if Hussein joined, there is no prospect that anything useful would come out of the negotiations.

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

6
1
5
1
7
3
0
0
0
1

UNCLASSIFIED

Habib's Plans:

Habib and Draper will be meeting with Kimche and others later today to review the bidding on Lebanon. Habib will meet with Arens and Shamir on Tuesday, and a meeting with Prime Minister Begin is scheduled for 8:30 a.m. Jerusalem time on Wednesday. Phil tentatively plans to leave for Beirut on Wednesday afternoon or Thursday morning. He hopes that if we have suggestions for him on the negotiations, they will be transmitted to him Tuesday night prior to his meeting with Begin on Wednesday morning. Barring further guidance, he will plan to persevere along the track we have been following.

With regard to the proposals on assurances to Israel that Eli Rubinstein had floated last Thursday, Habib said it was his tentative belief that we should be prepared to give the Israelis a letter indicating our willingness to do our best regarding implementation of the final agreement. He promised Veliotes that he and Sam Lewis would send in a preliminary draft within the next 24 hours. With regard to the proposal that Haddad become Deputy Brigade Commander for G-2, Habib said that Draper has been told that this proposal is being modified. It apparently was not an approved Lebanese position. Lewis observed that the Israeli Cabinet was not formally decided about the proposal, although the idea came in for a good deal of ridicule at the Sunday Cabinet session. The upshot is that it is still on the table, but that the Israeli reaction has been quite negative. Draper is telling the Lebanese not to see the proposal as rejected as of yet.

cc: NEA:Amb. Veliotes
NEA:RPelletreau
WAKirby
DMack
S/S:CHill

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted:NEA/IAI:MSPendleton/gp
x23672 4/11/83 #4396B

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ (29)

DIST:
S
D
P
S/S
S/S-I

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

July 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Secretary
Subject: Habib Mission: An International Force for Beirut

Phil Habib's negotiations are now at the point where specific decisions are required. The PLO generally accepts that its headquarters, leadership, and the bulk of its fighters (estimated between 3,000 and 5,000) must leave Beirut and Lebanon. They are also aware that time is of the essence.

Phil stresses that he has not yet achieved a breakthrough. But, he emphasizes, he must now have the answers to two specific questions before a breakthrough will be possible:

1. Where will the PLO go when they leave Beirut?
2. Can an international force be put into Beirut?

On the first question, we have examined all possibilities: none are fully desirable. Despite a number of drawbacks Egypt seems to be the best choice. It is large enough, strong enough, and moderate enough to handle the problem.

Related to this, and even more urgent, is the Lebanese insistence that an international force be put into Beirut. The Lebanese are not confident in their own capability to handle a situation in which the PLO would give up their heavy weapons at specified locations, go through a departure processing (probably with Red Cross involvement), and board ships at Beirut port. Symbolically and psychologically, the Lebanese require an international presence to bolster their morale as

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOIA Exemptions
BA Exemptions

CLASSIFY AS
UNCLASSIFY

LD Creations

CLASSIFY AS
UNCLASSIFY

DATE
2/5/82

UNCLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

they reestablish control over their capital. They want a force of from 1,500 to 2,000 for a limited period (up to thirty days) to monitor the laying down of arms, process the PLO into ships, and facilitate the establishment of authority in Beirut by the Lebanese army. They want France and the U.S. to provide the force... They do not want it to be under UN auspices.

The French have given their agreement in principle (Cheysson to Haig), providing that all parties want such a force and that the Lebanese government makes a specific request. At this point it appears that the Palestinians (who fear for their safety once they have laid down their heavy arms) would welcome such a force; they reportedly also would like a U.S. Navy escort for the ships taking them to their destination.

Thus we are seeking your decision--in principle--at this point, on whether the United States would join France in this international effort.

The Department of State is in favor of a U.S.-French International Force. Phil Habib believes that a positive response is needed as soon as possible; without it, the negotiations cannot proceed. Habib also believes that U.S. participation is essential to ease Lebanese fears. Even more significantly, U.S. participation is essential to get the Israelis to keep the ceasefire strictly, to refrain from assaulting West Beirut, and to accept the terms of the package deal. Without U.S. participation, Habib points out, the French are unlikely to go it alone; an attempt by us to set up a force without our own participation could take weeks and such a delay would kill any hope of agreement and put us back into the UN to face another veto situation. In sum, while a U.S. role cannot guarantee success, the absence of U.S. participation would doom it. In Habib's words, U.S. participation is "the clincher."

Beyond this, we believe that a U.S. role in helping the Palestinians emerge from this crisis with some semblance of dignity could gain us credit with the Arab world and bring benefits to the peace process, particularly if combined with an evolution of Palestinian thinking, under Egyptian tutelage, toward a moderate political stance.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Although Habib says the danger to U.S. personnel will be minimal and the time of deployment limited, the War Powers Resolution requires us to file a report to Congress. Consultations would also be needed for a number of practical reasons--to explain the limited nature of the operation, and to explain that we would not be going into a situation involving imminent hostilities.

DOD can concur with the use of U.S. forces to help evacuate the PLO leadership and fighters from Beirut if no other alternative can be found. DOD is very concerned about the strong possibility of U.S. involvement in hostilities. Defense believes a number of alternative sources of troops should be urgently explored, e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Norway. If you approve in principle the use of U.S. forces, the following questions should be answered before U.S. forces are committed:

- A. Do all concerned forces in the conflict provide assurances of safety, e.g., Syria, IDF, Lebanese forces, PLO, PLA?
- B. Do Palestinians agree to hand in all armaments including small arms, side arms, grenades, etc? If not, specifically what is permitted? Disposition of these weapons?
- C. What is exact role of U.S. forces? For example, can they leave immediately after PLO are evacuated? Will we set a definite time limit?
- D. What are the rules of engagement for U.S. forces, and who shall command the international force?

Finally, if U.S. forces must be used as a result of a State determination that no other alternative is feasible, then Israel must be advised in the strongest terms (including hints we would withdraw support and hold up weapons deliveries) that further moves forward by them are absolutely unacceptable. We must be given sufficient time after an agreement is reached to organize and conduct an effective evacuation operation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize State and DOD to proceed with plans aimed at providing a U.S. role in a temporary force to assist the Lebanese Government in maintaining peace in Beirut,

UNCLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 - UNCLASSIFIED

recognizing that the implementation of such plans would necessarily be contingent upon successful completion of negotiations, any required statutory procedures for funding, and Congressional consultations. (DOD concurs with reservations as stated above.)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab-- U.S. Support for PLO Withdrawal from Beirut

cc:SecDef
Chairman JCS

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED
UNRECORDED

314a
P
(A) (C) (a) (b)

STATUS OF LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

Phil Habib and Morris Draper have completed a round of talks in Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem. Prime Minister Begin was very negative about Phil's proposals for starting direct Lebanese-Israeli talks. He insists the negotiations be at ministerial level with alternate sessions in Jerusalem. Although Begin agreed to submit Phil's proposals to Sunday's cabinet meeting, the outlook is for continued stalemate.

In the course of wide-ranging discussions in Beirut, Phil found Lebanese leaders eager for discussions with Israel and ready for far-reaching compromises intended to satisfy Israel's interest in the security of its northern border. To get talks started, Gemayel would be willing to seek his government's approval for starting substantive negotiations on political and military matters with a delegation headed by a senior Lebanese civilian. The Lebanese feel unable to meet Israel's other procedural demands.

Phil also urged the Lebanese to accelerate their contacts with the PLO and Syria. Gemayel assured him that he would but stressed that it would greatly strengthen his hand if he could begin negotiations with Israel.

Phil's talks in Damascus were less encouraging. President Assad made himself unavailable, and Foreign Minister Khaddam did not reveal any new positions. Khaddam confirmed Syrian readiness to begin negotiations with Lebanon on Syrian withdrawal, making clear that Syria would only leave after Israel.

During his meeting with Foreign Minister Shamir, Phil advanced a compromise calling for an initial Lebanese-Israeli meeting at the sub-ministerial political level which would proceed right away to substance. The venue of the negotiations would alternate between Israel and Lebanon but would be outside the two capitals. Subsequently, Defense Minister Sharon alleged we were preventing Gemayel from improving relations with Israel and asserted that Israel had created strategic opportunities for the U.S. which we were neglecting.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOIA Exemptions
EXEMPTIONS
DENY
DECLASSIFY
IN PART
(S) (U)

ISPERIORR-1111
3/27/90

93025606

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(S) (U)
(9) (S)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

LDX'D TO NSC-MCFARLANE 1618 HOI
6/26. JGM

June 26, 1982

(b)(1)(a)

DIST:
6/26

S-2

D

P

NEA

S/S

S/S-I

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. ©
Subject: Situation in Lebanon, June 26

UNCLASSIFIED

We have been in touch with Phil Habib several times today. Sarkis has told him that the Lebanese government will hold together and that Wazzan, the Muslim Prime Minister, will come back into the government after a day or two more of cooling off. L

(b)(1)(a)

The Lebanese want to work with us next week on a proper resolution (that some third country would introduce) after they see what develops from the Arab League meeting in Tunis this weekend.

So far today, the ceasefire around Beirut continues in effect. Sharon believes, however, that yesterday's shelling has brought the PLO almost to its knees; Sharon will certainly press tomorrow in the Cabinet for authority to resume shelling on Monday, when the "48 hours of quiet" the Israelis promised us runs out. There are other indications that Arafat may be confused, alarmed, and seeking a way out with safety. The PLO radio today said that they are studying our two points (PLO to hand over arms to Lebanese; PLO leaders depart Lebanon safely) and may respond soon. Phil believes their answer will be negative, but he recognizes as well that we should not pass up this moment to press for a breakthrough.

Thus, at this point, we want to move on two tracks: (a) to press the Israelis to keep the ceasefire; and (b) use the current tension and fear of renewed Israeli shelling to press the PLO to a decision.

Therefore, Phil will go to Sarkis again to ask him urgently to get the Lebanese to convey the sense that time is just about running out and that an Israeli move is imminent.

At the same time, however, it is important to weigh in with Begin before the Israeli cabinet meeting Sunday morning. I have, therefore, called Arens to insist that Israel give us 24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
() RELEASE
() EXCISE
() DENY
() DECLASSIFY
() IN PART
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE
() TS to
() TS to
EO Guidelines
IS/FPC/CDR
Date: 5/5/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

more hours -- until Monday noon -- so that Phil can capitalize on the current state of apprehension in West Beirut to get the PLO to come to terms. In this regard, Phil will ask the Lebanese not only to convey a sense of urgency to the PLO, but also assure them that their safety will be guaranteed as they depart, and that ship passage from Beirut can be arranged for this purpose.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

EXCISE

117911

P
(290)
(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)
it

UNCLASSIFIED

'82 JUN 25 PM:21

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
SS

TO: D - Ambassador Stoessel
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
SUBJECT: Situation on the Lebanon Crisis

Situation on the Ground

Our efforts to achieve a political solution continue to be hung up on our inability to achieve an effective and lasting cease-fire on either the Syrian or Beirut fronts.

On the Beirut front, the entire area of west Beirut has now been subjected to aerial bombardment and artillery shelling. Both the American University of Beirut and the American Community School are reported to have been hit. Israeli forces are positioned to undertake an assault on the city as early as June 26. The latest in a series of cease-fires was holding as of 2000 Washington time June 25.

Although our main attention has been focussed on Beirut, the Syrian front continues to hold the potential of wider war. In the last 48 hours, the Israelis have engaged in major military operations against Syrian forces along the Beirut-Damascus road. The Syrians have now been forced back to within eight to nine kilometers of the pass into the Bekaa Valley. The Israeli objective is probably to take the pass and secure the ridge line from north to south overlooking the Bekaa.

Evacuation of Americans

We successfully completed the withdrawal of 597 people from Lebanon on June 24. Sixth fleet ships took off 250 American citizens, 171 green card holders and 211 Third Country nationals from the port of Juniyah without incident. The Chancery in west Beirut has been closed. Ambassador Dillon and the embassy staff are carrying out embassy functions, including support for Phil Habib, from the Ambassador's residence in Yarze.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFICATION
EXCISE
DECLASSIFY
IN PART
(S)(1)

ES/EPIC/CDR
EC Operations
CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE TS to
() S or
To authority to

9302500

Ym Date 3/5/96

UNCLASSIFIED

RDS-3 6/25/02

DECLASSIFIED

Diplomatic Efforts

UNCLASSIFIED

Our present diplomatic efforts are focussed on two main objectives: getting a complete cease-fire on all fronts and getting the PLO to lay down its arms and put itself under the authority of the Government of Lebanon. Within the last 24 hours, we have taken the following steps:

(A) (a) (a)
-- prepared a Security Council resolution which would support the above two objectives for possible use in New York.

In addition to these actions, Phil Habib continues to work hard on the Lebanese to get from them a consensus on objectives and the decisions necessary to implement a takeover of west Beirut. Phil's efforts have been complicated by Israel's unremitting military action against Beirut and by the inability of the Lebanese to get their act together. His efforts in Beirut were complicated even further on June 25 when the Lebanese Prime Minister resigned, followed by further defections from the Cabinet and/or National Salvation Committee. Phil has deferred going to Israel believing that he must have solid proposals from the Lebanese and PLO to discuss with the Israelis if the Israeli military option is to be turned off.

International Reactions

International reaction against the Israeli invasion has been sharpening in intensity. The Saudis in particular, as well as the Egyptians, have taken an increasingly firm line, and King Fahd has written the President personally warning of serious complications for U.S.-Saudi relations if Israel attacks west Beirut. We also face an increasing divergency between our policy and that of the west Europeans. The French have been out in front in Europe and yesterday Mitterand issued a call for Security Council action to halt the fighting in Beirut and proposing the UN Observers to support the Lebanese

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

in taking over the city. Other Europeans have been increasingly uncomfortable with Israel's actions and with our inability so far to gain Israeli agreement to stop the fighting. The Soviets have been relatively quiet following their stiff statement last week.

Drafted: NEA/ARN:JCollins:fw
6/25/82 X-21019
#0753C

Cleared: NEA:CHill

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

P
(W) (1) (1) (2) (2) (1) (1)

MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR WITH PHILIP HABIB
AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE, JERUSALEM, ON JULY 21, 1981, at 6 p.m.

PRESENT: DRAPER, BROWN, HILL, PORAN, BAR-ON, AVNER

UNCLASSIFIED

1: I owe you an answer. I have it and I shall read it to you. I ^{it} ~~presented~~ the press outside that I will read to them when the meeting is over. I would, however, like, if possible, that you first dispatch it to Washington, may be from the consulate here. I would not like the Secretary to hear about it from the media when he receives it himself.

Habib: Perhaps we can do that but let me hear the statement first. I am a natural born optimist so I presume the statement will be welcome.

in which I read out the last letter from the Secretary and also the message I got from Mr. Brown this morning
M: We had a detailed discussion in the Cabinet from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. This is the statement (PM reads):

- "1. The Government agrees that Mr. Begin will embark upon contacts with the President of Lebanon, Mr. Sarkiss, and the Government of Lebanon with the aim of establishing peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon, from where the terrorist organizations intentionally attack the territory of Israel and murder and maim its citizens.
- 2. The government of Israel will under no circumstances conduct negotiations, directly or indirectly, with the Arab terrorist organizations whose declared aim is the destruction of Israel and its people, and who intentionally turn their arms supplied to them in large quantities by the Soviet Union, Libya and others, against the Jewish civilian population. Likewise, the government of Israel does not authorize anybody to conduct negotiations with the aforementioned organizations.

The government will continue to defend the citizens of Israel; this is its right and duty. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9302566 IS/FPC/CDR Date: 2/3/96

UNCLASSIFIED

<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SECURITY
<input type="checkbox"/> EXT. USE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IN FILE
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	
<input type="checkbox"/> ()	
<input type="checkbox"/> FOIA Exemptions	(b) (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> Exemptions	

<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	() () () ()
<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	() () () ()

~~DE PROXY~~

bib: My optimism is not misplaced. I believe I can work on the basis of
 cision. I won't promise anything. It takes the proper responses. I do believe
 wever, that I owe you some degree of specificity as to what I will be trying
 e Cabinet decision speaks of my discussions with the government of Lebanon with
 arkiss. It does not preclude bringing others into the issue. And by I do not
 an the PLO. I shall not negotiate with the PLO.

1: The language of our statement is not negative. We purposefully left it vague.

bib: Let me tell you what I will do. Anticipating a positive response I ~~was~~ ^{have} arranged
 to go tomorrow to Beirut. I have an appointment to see Sartre tomorrow. I am going
 to have to make it very clear that I am proceeding on my instructions originally
 provided to seek a cease-fire. In my discussions I am going to define the cease-fire
 as a de facto one in the sense that there will be no attacks from Lebanon on Israel
 and from Israel on Lebanon. That will include the ~~enclave~~ ^{enclave} - that there should be
 no attacks on and from the enclave of Major ~~...~~ I would hope that my understanding
 of the cease-fire includes this. As I read the text of the Cabinet statement it
 describes the aim of establishing peace relations between Israel and Lebanon and that,
 I read to mean, authorizing me to seek a cease-fire.

73

~~SECRET~~

- 3 - UNCLASSIFIED



(S) (1)

UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~

13

- 4 -

UNCLASSIFIED




(b) (1)



UNCLASSIFIED

.15



2/6

UNCLASSIFIED



(b)(1)

UNCLASSIFIED



7
13

- 6 -

UNCLASSIFIED

(A) (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

١٠

- 7 -

UNCLASSIFIED

(A) (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

2
B

- 8 -

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(1)

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

10
13

- 9 -

UNCLASSIFIED

(A) (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


(A)(1)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

$\frac{12}{13}$

UNCLASSIFIED




(b)(1)

UNCLASSIFIED



13/13

UNCLASSIFIED



(b) (1)

L

Habib: The statement I shall make is as follows: "On the basis of the statement of the Government of Israel presented to me by the Prime Minister I will proceed with my mission as directed by President Reagan to seek to secure a cease-fire along the Israeli-Lebanese border as a first step to bring calm to the area".

P.M.: That is acceptable, (It is decided that the Prime Minister and Habib will appear before the Press outside together. The Prime Minister reads the Government's statement and then bids farewell to the Press whereupon Habib reads his statement. Neither the Prime Minister nor Habib were to entertain any questions).

Habib: One crucial point - what date should I shoot for as a target date - what date should I shoot for?

P.M.: As the beginning or the end?

Habib: The cease-fire is the end.

P.M.: Then, the sooner the better.

Habib: That's all I have to say.

The meeting adjourned at 19.40.

Q. P. E. 23/11

UNCLASSIFIED

Radio communication between Habib and Veliotos
July 6/82 a.m.

o.k.

(23)
SADIXED

DIST:
S/S
S/S-I

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCISE

P
A(1)(a)

8218994

RELEASE	()
EXCISE	(X)
DELIT.	()
FOIA Exempt	as not
Exempt	()
CLASSIFY	()
DECLASSIFY	()

9302566

Habib: You have a good point, but the only trouble is...what I am concerned about is by you fellows telling them to come later they will just sit and wait until later. It isn't that the Palestinians don't think they have a new lease on life. They do in the sense that they don't think that the Israelis dare come in after them yet. Despite all the pressure. You know you had 80,000 people demonstrating against the Israeli policy in Israel today. That is not a ~~unimportant~~ unimportant number of people. Moreover, the Labor party is already on record that they don't come in Beirut. There is some opinion around here that the Palestinians don't ever intend to get out of Beirut. They will just sit and wait it out. They got all the supplies they need. If the rest of the population in there gets cholera and dysentery and die they don't care.... They have their water, they got their food, they are nice and closed in, they got their guns and ammunition, and they will wait it out. The only way we can get them out is through negotiation in my opinion or to blow them out. If you blow them out, you are

UNCLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

you are going to have ~~of~~ a mess on your hands. As it is we are getting a ~~mess~~ mess on our hands because of the way the Israelis are behaving about people going in and out.

Veliotis: That word you were search^{ing} for is ~~inconsiderable~~ inconsiderable, by the way, Mr. Ambassador. Alright, I am going to go back to work to otherwise save your faltering mission one more time. See if we can get these messages out to the Syrians and so forth. I just want you to know, Sir, that we are doing our very best to support you ~~_____~~

Habib: My faltering mission could have been a success, at least two weeks ago, if we had been doing what I wanted to do. It is quite obvious that we had a vague solution sitting on our doorstep now for about two weeks and nobody wants to grasp it. But I must say the one thing you have done which completes my day is when you got the President to agree to put in the U.S. troops. Of course, the subsequent difficulties we are going to have with that are going to be so immense that I will let Morris Draper take care of them.

Veliotis: Before Draper, there will be a few other of us who will take those things on here. Phil, what would you have Paganelli say in Damascus? Should he follow up with someone there and explain why we don't think this is a good time for Khaddam and Saud to come and use that as an occasion for an exchange of views at which point he would talk about the possibility of the PLO coming to Syria in the first tranch? Explore again of the requirements from the Syrian perspective of their withdrawal? What are your ideas?

Habib:

UNCLASSIFIED

5P.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

things. They think they are important. I don't know, give them a little leeway, is the way I would put it or Morris puts it and see what they can do. But I certainly would get something out of the Saudis before I would send them into the fray. You may have it resolved or you may not.

Helios: Ok, that is a good suggestion. It is not a question of leeway, it is a question of what is helpful. I think we have something now that we can send off to Dick. Then we can get his replies on both the visit and question of moving the Palestinians to Syria and then we will frame a good one for Paganelli to go in, which will turn into a review. He is a good man, he knows how to handle these things.

Habib: While you are at it, tell Larry that I am not worried that these negotiations would interfere with what I am doing, ~~what I am doing~~. What I am doing is already set. The package is there. What we have to do now if anybody raises the question, we just tell them about the package, this is the package, that's it. No, we are not getting any more. The package is clear but it has got to be a package and it has to have all its parts together. No one part separate from the other part. So, what ! Larry is concerned about -- crossing our wires -- doesn't bother me anymore because we have got to have a package and we have got to know what it is. Of course, the package is not yet equally agreed by everybody. We are agreed as to what the package is. The Lebanese seem to buy it. I am getting sort of glimpses that the PLO are approaching it. Whether I believe it or not -- allegedly they are. So I would just use the package as the basis if anybody asked me what is going on -- have they got other suggestions. Just say, no, no, those don't flush anymore. The package is as follows, this is what the package is and this resolves the issue of everybody getting out, they save face, they can claim victory, and the Israelis don't clean them out, and etc. Morris suggests that you might massage ~~the situation~~ when you are in Washington, you know the Ambassador there is Washington, he might have something to say, too. I don't know. You could judge that best.....Not to make a pitch just to show that you are paying a little attention to him. Let somebody call him in, maybe you or somebody else.

Helios: We haven't paid too much attention to the Ambassadors, in part because I just haven't been here. Everyone else has been flat out. Let me say a word about the Saud/Khaddam visit. If they wanted to come the 10th or 11th, there is no reason they couldn't come on the 13th or 14th. Now, Schultz is going to have his confirmation hearings on the 12th. Once those are out of the way, I am sure they will immediately put the nomination to the Senate. He, then, would feel in a position -- either confirmed or that far along to be able to be conducting business. It would be terribly embarrassing to him to be hiding in corners around this place with the Saudi Foreign Minister walking around Washington. So, [

(D)

[there is also the fact that they asked about a period which is just a few days before when the new Secretary of State would be functioning. I think that is an important consider-

~~SECRET (ENGINE)~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ation, particularly if you are going to talk about the long term since he, himself, is not at all sure that, based on my very brief discussions with him that what we see as the long term necessarily is going to fly.

Habib:I think they should understand they should walk a few days I haven't heard.....I don't think Murphy is going to get much negative reaction to that. But meanwhile we got to settle the thing in Beirut. And the first place if we settle the thing in Beirut and the package is pretty well put together. That will make a much better atmosphere and then we can really talk about the future.

Yeliotis: I know, and I'm glad you said "we".

Habib: When they come to California they come and visit me. That is about the way it is going to be. ~~What else is on your mind?~~ What else is on your mind?

Yeliotis: That's about it.

Over and Out.

Habib: Remember what I said about these check points. I don't know what Eric means when he says he is going to take care of it so the Prime Minister can come. His idea of how the Prime Minister can come, may not be similar to the Prime Minister's. The Prime Minister has announced very clearly that he will not come out of West Beirut and he will not continue to conduct his efforts for a settlement unless the citizens can go back and forth across those checkpoints, and that means the Israelis have to get out of there. Go around the corner or down the road. Look, there are lots of ways and the Israelis know it. We have told them that this morning. There are lots of ways they can open those cross roads and still control the basic entrance in and out of Beirut without appearing to tell people they can't move. I don't know, but frankly I think cutting off water and cutting off food, cutting off electricity is inhumane. But I guess you guys don't want to seem to take that up. I think it is bloody inhumane. It is not the Middle Ages, it is not the Duke of Burgundy's Castle under seize by the Visigoths.

Yeliotis: You know, the water is in charge of the Phalange I am told. The word we got on the crossings is that the Israelis presence would be neither obvious nor direct. I don't know what that means, but Larry did make a very strong pitch and he got a phone call back in half an hour.

Habib: Did you hear what I said? I said that anybody who said those things are in charge of the Phalange are full of -----. Bashir, himself, has told me he has nothing to do with it. It is completely an Israeli operation, cutting off water and electricity. I am getting tired of this ----- . You can not cut off the water and electricity for very much more time. There may be as many as 500,000 people in there. It isn't the PLO that are suffering. They got water, they got food, they got everything, they know how

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-5-

to take care of themselves. They got reserves. It is the kind of people that the French Ambassador was talking about this morning -- where his Nuns and his Priests have got kids with diarrhea and the kids are going to die and you are going to get disease in there. That's the places I am worried about.

-- Ok, Phil, understand. I will do what I can. Have you sent this in a telegram?

Habib: Yes, we have put this in a telegram. And, moreover, I must say that the next time some Israeli tells Sam that I am panicking, I wish that Sam would tell them that I have been sitting here cool as a cucumber for weeks, but that doesn't necessarily mean that my anger is completely subdued. I'm not panicking about anything, but if you had heard the stories the French Ambassador came this morning and told us about his visit to the French mini-camps as he calls them. Where they are trying women and children...where the Nuns are crying because the kids are sick in front of them, they have no way to take care of them, they have no water, He says the stench is unbearable. Does anybody realize what that means? The PLO isn't suffering. Don't worry about the PLO; they are relaxed. They got all their stuff.

-- I guess people understand what that means, but I hope you have put your facts and your views into a communication that can be given more general distribution.

Habib: We have sent it this morning. We have sent stuff, We have sent communications. We have been saying for at least 5 days, ever since they turned off the water, that it is inhumane, that it isn't really necessary, that we have other things that we have to deal with besides this. But nevertheless nobody pays any attention because it is too nasty. Nobody wants to handle anything that is nasty. Only we have to live with it.

-- Ok, I understand. Over and out.

Habib: Ok, I am hoping to get word soon that the roads are open and that Wazzan has come out. So at least I can find out what he has been negotiating so that maybe we can finish this thing off, at least in terms of an agreed package. Then we got to decide how we are going to implement it. That is going to take us...that isn't so easy either. Ok, over and out, go to work.

Out

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

175

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: MB30006-0181

P ~~SECRET~~
(w)(u) (u) (b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 DAMASC 05211 01 OF 02 071220Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 AQS-00 /000 W
-----331061 071224Z /46
Z 071216Z JUL 83 ZFF4 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2678
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 05211

NODIS **DECAPTIONED**

PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY FROM MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, US, LE, SA
SUBJECT: PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR SAUDIS ON SECRETARY'S
MEETINGS IN DAMASCUS

REF: A) DAMASCUS 8204 B), DAMASCUS 8210

- ~~SECRET~~ ~~ENTIRE PAGE~~
- I WILL SEEK MEETINGS WITH BANDAR AND/OR SAUD FRIDAY, JULY 8 AND MEETING WITH FAHD ON EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE NEXT WEEK FOLLOWING KING'S DEPARTURE FROM MECCA CEREMONIES.
- WHILE PREPARED TO DRAW FULLY ON REPTEL REPORTS OF SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH KHADAM AND ASSAD, I WOULD HIGHLIGHT FOLLOWING:
- ATMOSPHERICS: SECRETARY WAS WELL RECEIVED AND CORDIALLY INVITED TO RETURN TO DAMASCUS AT ANY TIME. THE PERSONAL LINK BETWEEN HIM AND ASSAD WAS STRENGTHENED BY THIS VISIT.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 DAMASC 05211 01 OF 02 071220Z

5. THE SECRETARY PROPOSED A FIVE-POINT AGENOA FOR HIS

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR *MM* Date: 5/15/96

FOI Exemptions: (b)(7) (D)

FOIA Exemptions: (b)(7) (D)

Authority to:

9302566

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

TALKS. IN THE EVENT ALL DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT.

6. THE AGREEMENT: BOTH MEETINGS PROVIDED USEFUL OPPORTUNITIES TO POINT OUT WHERE SYRIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WERE OFF BASE. KHADDAM, IN HIS FAMILIAR ROLE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, WOULD NOT YIELD AN INCH IN TERMS OF ACKNOWLEDGING SYRIAN VIEWS MIGHT BE INCORRECT (NOR, FOR THAT MATTER, DID ASSAD), BUT THIS EXCHANGE MAY HAVE SPARKED THEIR RESTUDY OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TEXT. (COMMENT: PERHAPS WE SHOULD CONSIDER OFFERING VISIT BY DRAPER TO SIT WITH KHADDAM FOR DETAILED REVIEW OF NEGOTIATING HISTORY AND REALITY OF ALLEGED RESTRICTIONS ON LEBANON'S FUTURE IN TERMS OF ITS AIR DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS, INNOCENT PASSAGE, ETC. END COMMENT.)

-- SECRETARY STRESSED ELEMENTS OF FLEXIBILITY, ADMINISTRABILITY AND THE ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT. (COMMENT: I WOULD SAY AS MY PERSONAL IMPRESSION THAT THIS CAUGHT ASSAD'S ATTENTION, BUT HE MADE NO SPECIFIC RESPONSE. END COMMENT)

7.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

(u) (d) (p) (s)

(u) (d)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

T

(A) (4)

b

L

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 DAMASC 05211 02 OF 02 071222Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----331107 071225Z /46
Z 071216Z JUL 83 ZFF4 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2679
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 05211

NODIS

PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY FROM MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, US, LE, SA
SUBJECT: PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR SAUDIS ON SECRETARY'S

(u) (d)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(chr) (1)

10. WORKING GROUP. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH AGREEMENT ONLY ON THE OBJECTIVE OF RESTORING AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN LEBANON. ASSAD AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY WE SHARED NO AGREEMENT ON HOW TO ATTAIN THIS OBJECTIVE. ASSAD DID NOT PICK UP ON SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS BY THE SECRETARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SYRIAN-LEBANESE DIALOGUE. THUS, THE WORKING GROUP WILL START AS A U.S.-SYRIAN AFFAIR AND BEGIN BY REFINING THE AGENDA FOR OUR DISCUSSIONS. ASSAD MADE NO RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION THAT IT MIGHT PROVE USEFUL LATER TO ADD BOTH LEBANESE AND SAUDI PARTICIPATION. ASSAD SAID THAT ANY FORMULA TO CONTINUE THE U.S.-SYRIAN DIALOGUE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE. HE BELIEVES THE "ROAD IS CLOSED," BUT NEVERTHELESS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PERHAPS SOME USEFUL PROCEDURE CAN BE DEVELOPED BY US TO WORK TOGETHER. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD MEET WITH KHADDOAM AT UNGA OR BEFORE.

11. I WOULD CONCLUDE WITH THE VIEW THAT SYRIA IS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 DAMASC 05211 02 OF 02 071222Z

MAINTAINING AN EXTREMELY HARD LINE. WE HEARD NOTHING TO SUGGEST ANY GREATER SYRIAN FLEXIBILITY SINCE ASSAD TALKED TO PRINCE BANDAR. CLEARLY THE SYRIAN COURSE IS ONE WHICH, IF PURSUED AS RIGOROUSLY AS OUTLINED TO THE SECRETARY, PROMISES ONLY POLITICAL STALEMATE AND A LIKELY FURTHER OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

(2) (1)

12. FOR JIDDA: PLEASE ATTEMPT SET UP BANDAR AND SAUD

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

FOR FRIDAY AND ADVISE MUHAMMAD SULAYMAN THAT SECRETARY HAS ASKED ME TO BRIEF KING AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY ON HIS OVERALL VISIT TO AREA.

13. FOR SECDEL: AS ABOVE BEING TYPED IN FINAL, I WAS TOLD BY EMBASSY JIDDA I SHOULD BE READY FOR MEETING WITH BANDAR ON ARRIVAL JIDDA TONIGHT (1730 ZULU). WOULD APPRECIATE QUICK REACTION TO ABOVE TALKING POINTS AND ANYTHING I SHOULD ADD RE SECRETARY'S TALKS IN ISRAEL. PAGANELLI

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

July 20, 1982

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

8221006

SADIX

Handwritten initials and notes

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH THE PRESIDENT

Dist.
7/20
S
D
P
NEA
S/S
S/S-I

THE STATUS OF THE HABIB NEGOTIATIONS

- THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON IS CENTRAL TO THE SUCCESS OF PHIL HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS.
- IN SPITE OF OUR EFFORTS, HOWEVER, NO ARAB STATE HAS BEEN WILLING TO RECEIVE THEM, EVEN TEMPORARILY.
- THE PROCESS HAS GONE AS FAR AS PHIL CAN TAKE IT UNTIL THIS ISSUE IS RESOLVED.
- THANKS TO YOUR LAST MESSAGE TO BEGIN, HE NOW SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THE QUANDARY ISRAEL IS IN.
- IF THEY ASSAULT WEST BEIRUT, THE PROBABLE DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONSHIP WOULD CAUSE HIM SERIOUS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.
- IF THEY DON'T, AND HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS DRAG ON WITHOUT SUCCESS, BEGIN WILL PAY A HEAVY DOMESTIC PRICE FOR LAUNCHING A MAJOR OPERATION WITH HEAVY ISRAELI CASUALTIES WITHOUT ACCOMPLISHING THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE.
- THE FACT IS THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CURRENTLY IN THE DOLDRUMS WITH NO BREAKTHROUGH IN SIGHT.
- THE ISRAELIS APPARENTLY FEEL IT IS IN THEIR OWN INTEREST TO GIVE US MORE TIME TO FIND A PLACE FOR THE PLO TO GO.
- BUT BEGIN'S SENSE OF FRUSTRATION WITH THE SITUATION COULD RESULT IN AN ATTACK ORDER BEFORE VERY LONG.
- AT THE VERY LEAST THERE COULD BE A BREAKDOWN IN THE CEASEFIRE AT ALMOST ANY TIME AND WE COULD BE HARD PRESSED TO KEEP IT FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FCC/CDR *Handwritten initials* Date *7/15/82*

FOIA Exemption PA

() RELEASE
 () EXEMPT
 () DENY

() DECLASSIFY
 () DOWNGRADE
 () IN PART

EO Citations *(a)(5)*

() CONFIDENTIAL
 () SECRET
 () DOWNGRADE (S or) S or

TS Authority

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

BREAKING THE IMPASSE

-- YOUR MEETING TODAY WITH KHADDAM AND SAUD PROVIDES ANOTHER CHANCE TO URGE THEM TO FIND A STATE TO RECEIVE THE PLO.

-- I PRESSED THEM HARD YESTERDAY. I STRESSED THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT. WE MUST AVOID AN ISRAELI ASSAULT ON THE CITY. THE CONTINUING LACK OF AN ARAB COUNTRY TO TAKE THE PLO IS DELEGITIMIZING THE PLO AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

copy (a)
(5)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

(u) (4) (a) (e)

- o THE IDEA HAS ALREADY BEEN FLOATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, WHICH CANNOT AGREE TO IT. THE LEBANESE WANT THE PLO TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY.
- o AND IF THE 6,000 PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT ONLY MOVE ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON, THE ISRAELIS WILL HAVE AN EXCUSE NOT TO WITHDRAW. IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BUDGE THEM.

-- THUS I LEFT THEM LAST NIGHT WITH A PLEA THAT THEY COME TO YOU TODAY WITH SOME WAY OF QUICKLY GETTING THE PLO FIGHTERS OUT OF WEST BEIRUT TO ANOTHER COUNTRY.

YOUR APPROACH TODAY

-- I SUGGEST THAT YOU STICK TO OUR LINE IN YOUR MEETING TODAY. YOU MIGHT TRY TO EASE THEIR CONCERNS IN GENERAL BY

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

STRESSING THAT:

- o THE US BELIEVES ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON COMPLETELY AND THAT SUCH WITHDRAWAL SHOULD START AS SOON AS CONDITIONS PERMIT.
- o THE US RECOGNIZES THAT THE REAL ISSUE IS NOT WEST BEIRUT OR LEBANON BUT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. WE INTEND TO WORK HARD AND CREATIVELY TO SOLVE IT.
- o AND THAT THE FIRST STEP TOWARD THESE GOALS WE SHARE IS THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FIGHTERS FROM WEST BEIRUT TO A COUNTRY OTHER THAN LEBANON. WE WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO FURTHER THE SAFETY AND DIGNITY BOTH OF THOSE WHO DEPART AND THOSE PALESTINIANS WHO REMAIN. YOUR DECISION TO COMMIT US FORCES IS EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE PALESTINIANS INVOLVED. THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE WILL WORK TO HELP THE LEBANESE FORCES ESTABLISH LAW AND STABILITY IN THE CAPITAL.

-- AFTER THESE ASSURANCES, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU MAKE A VERY STRONG PRESENTATION TO THEM ABOUT THE ARABS' SHOULDERING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

-- YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE US HAS DONE ITS PART, AND MORE. THE HABIB MISSION HAS BEEN A SUCCESS AS FAR AS IT HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO GO. THE PLO IS WILLING TO DEPART. WE HAVE SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN PRINCIPLE.

-- I HOPE YOU WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NOTHING MORE CAN BE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
UNCLASSIFIED

- 5 -

DONE UNTIL AN ARAB STATE COMES FORWARD TO DO ITS PART, AT LEAST AS A "WAY STATION" FOR THE PLO PRIOR TO DISPERSAL TO SEVERAL ARAB STATES.

-- THE FAILURE OF THE ARABS TO ACCEPT THE PLO IS IN FACT DELEGITIMIZING THE PLO AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

-- THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS MIGHT POSSIBLY PUSH FOR US TO GRANT SOME POLITICAL CONCESSIONS OR RECOGNITION TO THE PLO TO COMPENSATE FOR THEIR MILITARY DEFEAT. WE MUST TAKE CARE NOT TO BE STAMPEDED INTO THIS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR AT THE UN. WE SHOULD NOT PLAY OUR PALESTINIAN CARD OVER A TACTICAL ISSUE LIKE THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS ALONE. WE SHOULD HUSBAND THIS LEVERAGE UNTIL THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES TO USE IT TO INFLUENCE THE PEACE PROCESS.

-- YOU SHOULD ALSO, I BELIEVE, LET OUR VISITORS KNOW THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO CAMP DAVID -- BUT THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL'S CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY OR OF THE OUTCOME OF THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS.

THE ARABS' RESPONSE

-- I EXPECT THAT TODAY WITH YOU THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL REPLY MUCH AS THEY DID TO ME -- BUT VERY LIKELY WITH A NEW WRINKLE OR TWO. THEY WILL ASSERT THAT NO ARAB STATE IS NOW READY TO TAKE THE 6,000 PLO FROM WEST BEIRUT AND THAT SOME "PROVISIONAL" OR TRANSIT STOP ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON IS A NECESSARY INTERIM STEP.

-- YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE WOULD NOT EXPECT EITHER LEBANON OR ISRAEL TO AGREE TO THIS -- AND THAT IT WOULD MAKE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HARDER, NOT EASIER TO ACHIEVE.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 6 -

-- NONETHELESS, I DO NOT RULE OUT THIS ALTERNATIVE AND IT IS WORTH EXPLORING FURTHER:

- THE ISRAELIS HAVE HINTED THAT THEY MIGHT NOT OBJECT.
- WHILE THE LEBANESE LEADERS CANNOT POLITICALLY SUPPORT A MOVE OF THE PLO TO ANOTHER LOCATION IN LEBANON, HABIB THINKS THEY PERSONALLY ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE IDEA, AND IF ASKED BY THE ARABS TO ACCEPT IT, COULD DO SO AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI.
- WERE WE TO AGREE TO THIS ARAB ALTERNATIVE, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SHIFT THE BURDEN TO THEM OF GETTING THE PLO FIGHTERS DISPERSED RAPIDLY TO SEVERAL ARAB STATES. THIS WOULD HELP TAKE PRESSURE OFF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. CHOOSING THIS OPTION MIGHT ALSO SET UP A MECHANISM FOR THE ULTIMATE REMOVAL OF ALL PLO FORCES FROM LEBANON IN THE CONTEXT OF FINAL SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.
- AN AGREEMENT OF THIS SORT -- ALTHOUGH ONLY A "FALLBACK" -- WOULD GIVE SOME MUCH-NEEDED MOMENTUM TO A SITUATION NOW STALEMATED.
- BY GIVING US SOMETHING TO DISCUSS WITH THE ISRAELIS IT ALSO MAY HELP PUT OFF AN ISRAELI DECISION TO ATTACK WEST BEIRUT.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

-- I SUGGEST THAT TODAY YOU NOTE THE ARABS WILLINGNESS TO MEET TO DETERMINE WHICH OF SEVERAL STATES WILL TAKE THE PLO. YOU COULD SAY THAT YOU AGREE THAT A SINGLE STATE DOES NOT NOW SEEM POSSIBLE.

-- YOU SHOULD STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT TIME IS CRUCIAL. YOU CANNOT EMPHASIZE THIS TOO MUCH. YOU SHOULD SAY WE EXPECT THE ARABS TO SET A DEFINITE DEADLINE FOR SELECTING THE STATES (A FEW DAYS FROM NOW) AND A DEADLINE AS WELL FOR MOVING THE PLO OUT OF BEIRUT.

-- TO THIS END YOU SHOULD SAY THAT, AS A RESULT OF TODAY'S MEETINGS YOU WILL SEND HABIB TO SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA (AND JORDAN AND EGYPT) TO HELP WORK OUT A TIMETABLE. HE WILL TRAVEL EVEN THOUGH WE ARE COMING INTO THE HOLIDAY MARKING THE END OF RAMADAN.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCISE

7/18/82

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
8220840

P
(u)(c)(d)st
SADIXED

70

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECLASSIFIED

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH THE PRESIDENT

Dist
7/19

S
D
P
THE STATUS OF THE HABIB NEGOTIATIONS

S?S
S/S-I

-- THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON IS CENTRAL TO THE SUCCESS OF PHIL HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IN SPITE OF OUR EFFORTS, HOWEVER, NO ARAB STATE HAS BEEN WILLING TO RECEIVE THEM, EVEN TEMPORARILY.

-- THE PROCESS HAS GONE AS FAR AS PHIL CAN TAKE IT UNTIL THIS ISSUE IS RESOLVED.

-- THANKS TO YOUR MESSAGE OF LAST WEEK TO BEGIN, HE NOW SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THE QUANDARY ISRAEL IS IN.

-- IF THEY ASSAULT WEST BEIRUT, THE PROBABLE DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONSHIP WOULD CAUSE HIM SERIOUS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

-- IF THEY DON'T AND HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS DRAG ON WITHOUT SUCCESS, BEGIN WILL PAY A HEAVY DOMESTIC PRICE FOR LAUNCHING A MAJOR OPERATION WITH HEAVY ISRAELI CASUALTIES WITHOUT ACCOMPLISHING THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE.

-- THE FACT IS THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CURRENTLY IN THE DOLDRUMS WITH NO BREAKTHROUGH IN SIGHT.

-- THE ISRAELIS APPARENTLY FEEL THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO GIVE US MORE TIME TO FIND A PLACE FOR THE PLO TO GO.

-- BUT BEGIN'S SENSE OF FRUSTRATION WITH THE SITUATION COULD RESULT IN AN ATTACK ORDER BEFORE VERY LONG.

-- AT THE VERY LEAST THERE COULD BE A BREAKDOWN IN THE CEASE-FIRE AT ALMOST ANY TIME AND WE COULD BE HARD PRESSED TO KEEP IT FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

100-206

IS, FPO/CDR [Signature] Date 2/5/95

FOIA Exemptions PA Exemptions

() b1 () b2 () b3 () b4 () b5 () b6 () b7C () b7D () b7E () b7F () b7G () b7H () b7I () b7J () b7K () b7L () b7M () b7N () b7O () b7P () b7Q () b7R () b7S () b7T () b7U () b7V () b7W () b7X () b7Y () b7Z () b7AA () b7AB () b7AC () b7AD () b7AE () b7AF () b7AG () b7AH () b7AI () b7AJ () b7AK () b7AL () b7AM () b7AN () b7AO () b7AP () b7AQ () b7AR () b7AS () b7AT () b7AU () b7AV () b7AW () b7AX () b7AY () b7AZ () b7BA () b7BB () b7BC () b7BD () b7BE () b7BF () b7BG () b7BH () b7BI () b7BJ () b7BK () b7BL () b7BM () b7BN () b7BO () b7BP () b7BQ () b7BR () b7BS () b7BT () b7BU () b7BV () b7BW () b7BX () b7BY () b7BZ () b7CA () b7CB () b7CC () b7CD () b7CE () b7CF () b7CG () b7CH () b7CI () b7CJ () b7CK () b7CL () b7CM () b7CN () b7CO () b7CP () b7CQ () b7CR () b7CS () b7CT () b7CU () b7CV () b7CW () b7CX () b7CY () b7CZ () b7DA () b7DB () b7DC () b7DD () b7DE () b7DF () b7DG () b7DH () b7DI () b7DJ () b7DK () b7DL () b7DM () b7DN () b7DO () b7DP () b7DQ () b7DR () b7DS () b7DT () b7DU () b7DV () b7DW () b7DX () b7DY () b7DZ () b7EA () b7EB () b7EC () b7ED () b7EE () b7EF () b7EG () b7EH () b7EI () b7EJ () b7EK () b7EL () b7EM () b7EN () b7EO () b7EP () b7EQ () b7ER () b7ES () b7ET () b7EU () b7EV () b7EW () b7EX () b7EY () b7EZ () b7FA () b7FB () b7FC () b7FD () b7FE () b7FF () b7FG () b7FH () b7FI () b7FJ () b7FK () b7FL () b7FM () b7FN () b7FO () b7FP () b7FQ () b7FR () b7FS () b7FT () b7FU () b7FV () b7FW () b7FX () b7FY () b7FZ () b7GA () b7GB () b7GC () b7GD () b7GE () b7GF () b7GG () b7GH () b7GI () b7GJ () b7GK () b7GL () b7GM () b7GN () b7GO () b7GP () b7GQ () b7GR () b7GS () b7GT () b7GU () b7GV () b7GW () b7GX () b7GY () b7GZ () b7HA () b7HB () b7HC () b7HD () b7HE () b7HF () b7HG () b7HH () b7HI () b7HJ () b7HK () b7HL () b7HM () b7HN () b7HO () b7HP () b7HQ () b7HR () b7HS () b7HT () b7HU () b7HV () b7HW () b7HX () b7HY () b7HZ () b7IA () b7IB () b7IC () b7ID () b7IE () b7IF () b7IG () b7IH () b7IJ () b7IK () b7IL () b7IM () b7IN () b7IO () b7IP () b7IQ () b7IR () b7IS () b7IT () b7IU () b7IV () b7IW () b7IX () b7IY () b7IZ () b7JA () b7JB () b7JC () b7JD () b7JE () b7JF () b7JG () b7JH () b7JI () b7JJ () b7JK () b7JL () b7JM () b7JN () b7JO () b7JP () b7JQ () b7JR () b7JS () b7JT () b7JU () b7JV () b7JW () b7JX () b7JY () b7JZ () b7KA () b7KB () b7KC () b7KD () b7KE () b7KF () b7KG () b7KH () b7KI () b7KJ () b7KK () b7KL () b7KM () b7KN () b7KO () b7KP () b7KQ () b7KR () b7KS () b7KT () b7KU () b7KV () b7KW () b7KX () b7KY () b7KZ () b7LA () b7LB () b7LC () b7LD () b7LE () b7LF () b7LG () b7LH () b7LI () b7LJ () b7LK () b7LL () b7LM () b7LN () b7LO () b7LP () b7LQ () b7LR () b7LS () b7LT () b7LU () b7LV () b7LW () b7LX () b7LY () b7LZ () b7MA () b7MB () b7MC () b7MD () b7ME () b7MF () b7MG () b7MH () b7MI () b7MJ () b7MK () b7ML () b7MN () b7MO () b7MP () b7MQ () b7MR () b7MS () b7MT () b7MU () b7MV () b7MW () b7MX () b7MY () b7MZ () b7NA () b7NB () b7NC () b7ND () b7NE () b7NF () b7NG () b7NH () b7NI () b7NJ () b7NK () b7NL () b7NM () b7NO () b7NP () b7NQ () b7NR () b7NS () b7NT () b7NU () b7NV () b7NW () b7NX () b7NY () b7NZ () b7OA () b7OB () b7OC () b7OD () b7OE () b7OF () b7OG () b7OH () b7OI () b7OJ () b7OK () b7OL () b7OM () b7ON () b7OO () b7OP () b7OQ () b7OR () b7OS () b7OT () b7OU () b7OV () b7OW () b7OX () b7OY () b7OZ () b7PA () b7PB () b7PC () b7PD () b7PE () b7PF () b7PG () b7PH () b7PI () b7PJ () b7PK () b7PL () b7PM () b7PN () b7PO () b7PP () b7PQ () b7PR () b7PS () b7PT () b7PU () b7PV () b7PW () b7PX () b7PY () b7PZ () b7QA () b7QB () b7QC () b7QD () b7QE () b7QF () b7QG () b7QH () b7QI () b7QJ () b7QK () b7QL () b7QM () b7QN () b7QO () b7QP () b7QQ () b7QR () b7QS () b7QT () b7QU () b7QV () b7QW () b7QX () b7QY () b7QZ () b7RA () b7RB () b7RC () b7RD () b7RE () b7RF () b7RG () b7RH () b7RI () b7RJ () b7RK () b7RL () b7RM () b7RN () b7RO () b7RP () b7RQ () b7RR () b7RS () b7RT () b7RU () b7RV () b7RW () b7RX () b7RY () b7RZ () b7SA () b7SB () b7SC () b7SD () b7SE () b7SF () b7SG () b7SH () b7SI () b7SJ () b7SK () b7SL () b7SM () b7SN () b7SO () b7SP () b7SQ () b7SR () b7SS () b7ST () b7SU () b7SV () b7SW () b7SX () b7SY () b7SZ () b7TA () b7TB () b7TC () b7TD () b7TE () b7TF () b7TG () b7TH () b7TI () b7TJ () b7TK () b7TL () b7TM () b7TN () b7TO () b7TP () b7TQ () b7TR () b7TS () b7TT () b7TU () b7TV () b7TW () b7TX () b7TY () b7TZ () b7UA () b7UB () b7UC () b7UD () b7UE () b7UF () b7UG () b7UH () b7UI () b7UJ () b7UK () b7UL () b7UM () b7UN () b7UO () b7UP () b7UQ () b7UR () b7US () b7UT () b7UU () b7UV () b7UW () b7UX () b7UY () b7UZ () b7VA () b7VB () b7VC () b7VD () b7VE () b7VF () b7VG () b7VH () b7VI () b7VJ () b7VK () b7VL () b7VM () b7VN () b7VO () b7VP () b7VQ () b7VR () b7VS () b7VT () b7VU () b7VV () b7VW () b7VX () b7VY () b7VZ () b7WA () b7WB () b7WC () b7WD () b7WE () b7WF () b7WG () b7WH () b7WI () b7WJ () b7WK () b7WL () b7WM () b7WN () b7WO () b7WP () b7WQ () b7WR () b7WS () b7WT () b7WU () b7WV () b7WW () b7WX () b7WY () b7WZ () b7XA () b7XB () b7XC () b7XD () b7XE () b7XF () b7XG () b7XH () b7XI () b7XJ () b7XK () b7XL () b7XM () b7XN () b7XO () b7XP () b7XQ () b7XR () b7XS () b7XT () b7XU () b7XV () b7XW () b7XX () b7XY () b7XZ () b7YA () b7YB () b7YC () b7YD () b7YE () b7YF () b7YG () b7YH () b7YI () b7YJ () b7YK () b7YL () b7YM () b7YN () b7YO () b7YP () b7YQ () b7YR () b7YS () b7YT () b7YU () b7YV () b7YW () b7YX () b7YY () b7YZ () b7ZA () b7ZB () b7ZC () b7ZD () b7ZE () b7ZF () b7ZG () b7ZH () b7ZI () b7ZJ () b7ZK () b7ZL () b7ZM () b7ZN () b7ZO () b7ZP () b7ZQ () b7ZR () b7ZS () b7ZT () b7ZU () b7ZV () b7ZW () b7ZX () b7ZY () b7ZZ ()

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

-2-

BREAKING THE IMPASSE

-- YOUR MEETING TUESDAY WITH KHADDAM AND SAUD WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO TRY ONCE MORE TO FIND A STATE TO RECEIVE THE PLO.

(C) (u)
[
-- I MET YESTERDAY WITH BOTH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND HAD SEPARATE SESSIONS WITH EACH.

-- I RECOMMEND THAT YOU MAKE A VERY STRONG PRESENTATION TO THEM ABOUT THE ARABS' SHOULDERING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

-- YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE U.S. HAS DONE ITS PART, AND MORE. THE HABIB MISSION HAS BEEN A SUCCESS AS FAR AS IT HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO GO. THE PLO IS WILLING TO DEPART. WE HAVE SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN PRINCIPLE.

-- I HOPE YOU WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NOTHING MORE CAN BE DONE UNTIL AN ARAB STATE COMES FORWARD TO DO ITS PART, AT LEAST AS A WAY STATION FOR THE PLO PRIOR TO DISPERSAL TO SEVERAL ARAB STATES.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

-- THE FAILURE OF THE ARABS TO ACCEPT THE PLO IS IN FACT DELEGITIMIZING THE PLO AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

-- THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL PROBABLY PUSH FOR US TO GRANT SOME POLITICAL CONCESSIONS OR RECOGNITION TO THE PLO TO COMPENSATE FOR THEIR MILITARY DEFEAT. WE MUST TAKE CARE NOT TO BE STAMPEDED INTO THIS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR AT THE UN. WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO PLAY OUR PALESTINIAN CARD OVER A TACTICAL ISSUE LIKE THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS ALONE. WE SHOULD HUSBAND SUCH A TOOL UNTIL THE OPPORTUNITY IS CLEAR TO USE IT TO INFLUENCE THE PEACE PROCESS.

-- YOU SHOULD ALSO, I BELIEVE, LET OUR VISITORS KNOW THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO CAMP DAVID -- BUT THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL'S CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY OR OF THE OUTCOME OF THE FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS.

-- THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER WILL BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE NEW IRANIAN OFFENSIVE. WE NEED TO GIVE HIM THE SENSE THAT WE WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE GULF ARAB STATES AGAINST THIS THREAT.

-- THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER REPRESENTS A COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE HAVE FAR LESS THAN CORDIAL RELATIONS. IT MAY BE, HOWEVER, THAT SYRIA IS DISILLUSIONED WITH ITS SOVIET FRIENDS; WE SHOULD CONVEY THE SENSE OF HAVING AN OPEN MIND ABOUT U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS IF THE SYRIANS APPEAR SERIOUS ABOUT SHIFTING THEIR ORIENTATION AWAY FROM MOSCOW AND SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.

UNCLASSIFIED



~~EXCISE~~

P
(b)(1)
25
~~TELEGRAM~~

Department of State

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20002-0107

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01803 01 OF 02 041207Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----024212 041215Z /11
O 041155Z FEB 02 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2793
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 01803

NODIS

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,2,3 2/4/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: IS, LE, JO, SY, PLO, HARR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE ISRAELI MOVE AGAINST PLO IN LEBANON

REF: STATE 30130 ✓
1. ~~(S) (U) (F) (S) (S)~~

2. AT 1030 HOURS LOCAL, FEBRUARY 4, I REACHED
MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KINCHE (WHO HAD JUST ARRIVED AT HIS
JERUSALEM OFFICE IN THE SNOW STORM WHICH HAS ENVELOPED
THAT CITY), STATING THAT I WAS UNDER URGENT INSTRUCTIONS
FROM SECRETARY HAIG STIMULATED BY THE SECRETARY'S MEETING
WITH OMI SAGI. I ASKED KINCHE TO WRITE DOWN CAREFULLY THE
SECRETARY'S REPLY AND CONVEY IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO
PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND OTHER KEY CABINET MINISTERS. I
THEN READ AT DICTATION SPEED THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF PARA
FIVE AND SIX OF REPTEL, NOTING THAT WHILE THIS WAS NOT A
FORMAL MESSAGE IN THE PRECISE SENSE OF THE WORD, THE MATTER
WAS SO SERIOUS AS TO WARRANT PASSING THESE POINTS TO THE
PRIME MINISTER ET AL AS I HAD READ THEM.

3. IN THIS CONNECTION I MADE TWO PARENTHETICAL OBSERVA-

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01803 01 OF 02 041207Z

TIONS:

UNCLASSIFIED

9302566
FROM: [unclear]
TO: [unclear]
DATE: [unclear]
TIME: [unclear]
[unclear] 15:00

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

A. TO MY CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE WHAT I HAD JUST CONVEYED TO KINCHE CLOSELY PARALLELED THE REMARKS MADE BY SECRETARY HAIG TO THE PRIME MINISTER IN THEIR TETE-A-TETE OF JANUARY 27-28, PARTICULARLY THE FORMULATION THAT WE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND OR ACCEPT ANY ISRAELI MILITARY MOVE UNLESS IN RESPONSE TO AN ATTACK THAT WOULD BE AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED PROVOCATION.

B1

4. FULLY AWARE OF THE GRAVE IMPORT OF OUR MESSAGE, KINCHE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND OF COURSE OTHERS. HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A LENGTHY READ-OUT FROM NEHUSHTAN BUT HAD NOT YET DIGESTED IT.

5. COMMENT: CENTRAL AND NORTHERN ISRAEL AND, WE ASSUME, SOUTHERN LEBANON, ARE NOW UNDER STORM CONDITIONS WITH HEAVY WINDS AND SEAS AND FREQUENT RAIN DOWNPOURS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER LAUNCHING A LARGE-SCALE MILITARY OPERATION INTO LEBANON

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03

TEL AV 01803 01 OF 02 041207Z

WHILE THESE CONDITIONS PERSIST, WE KNOW THEY HAVE CALLED OFF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PAST BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER, THOUGH ONCE THE WEATHER CLEARS, THIS COULD CHANGE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE BEGIN'S MESSAGE TO YOU IS ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL AND HAS A THREEFOLD PURPOSE: FIRST, IT IS DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE POSSIBLE AMBIGUITY IN THE CEASEFIRE TERMS WITH RESPECT TO PLO OPERATIONS ACROSS ISRAEL'S EASTERN BORDERS, OPERATIONS WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE PLANNED, ORGANIZED, AND DIRECTED FROM THE PLO'S LEBANESE SANCTUARY. BY PUTTING DOWN THIS MARKER, BEGIN EXPECTS THAT WE WILL GET

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THIS MESSAGE, WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN CONVEYED PUBLICLY BY SHAMIR AND OTHER ISRAELI SPOKESMEN OVER THE WEEKEND, ACROSS TO THE PLO AND JORDANIANS FORCEFULLY. SECONDLY, BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON ITSELF. THEY PERCEIVED HABIB'S LAST MISSION TO THE AREA AS A FAILURE, I.E., THE SYRIAN MISSILES ARE STILL IN PLACE, HEAVY WEAPONRY CONTINUES TO FLOW INTO THE HANDS OF THE PLO, AND THE SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON REMAINS UNCHANGED. NEITHER DO THEY SEE ANY POSITIVE MOVEMENT ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. THEY SAUDIS APPEAR TO HAVE DROPPED OUT OF THE PICTURE AND THE WORK OF THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE IS STALLED. THEY FEAR THE HORSE ON THE UPCOMING LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND VIEW THE PHALANGE AS BEING PRESSED MORE AND MORE TO THE WALL. I SUSPECT THAT BEGIN HOPES TO INDUCE A MORE ENERGETIC AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE HOST OF LEBANESE PROBLEMS BY DRAWING THE LINE MORE CLEARLY ON WHAT COULD TRIGGER AN ISRAELI MILITARY MOVE INTO LEBANON, AND NOTCHING UP THE PRESSURE ON US. THIRD, BEGIN WANTS TO PRECLUDE ANY MORE U.S. ACCUSATIONS THAT WE WERE "SURPRISED" IF AND WHEN PLO INCURSIONS TRIGGER AN ISRAELI

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01803 02 OF 02 041208Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 M
-----024237 041218Z /11
O 041155Z FEB 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2794
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 01803

MODIS

MILITARY RESPONSE. SINCE I WILL BE SEEING BEGIN BRIEFLY ON FRIDAY MORNING (FEBRUARY 5), I ANTICIPATE THAT HE WILL RESPOND TO OUR MESSAGE AT THAT TIME, MOST LIKELY BY RE-STATING WHAT SAGI HAS ALREADY SAID TO YOU.

6. RECOMMEND THAT THIS MESSAGE BE REPEATED TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND JIDCA, OR AMBASSADORS ONLY.
LEWIS

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20002-0138

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 032961
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:HDRAPER:GCB
APPROVED BY S:THE SECRETARY
NEA:NAVELIOTES
S/S:LPBREMER, III
S/S-O:TSTRICKLER

-----124374 062130Z /61
O O 062104Z FEB 82 ZPF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 032961

DECAPTIONED

NODIS
AMMAN FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 2/5/82 (DRAPER, K.)

TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, XF, LE, IS, JO, SY, PLO

SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE: BEGIN'S FEB. 8 MESSAGE TO THE
SECRETARY

UNCLASSIFIED

1. [REDACTED]
2. ISRAELI CHARGE NEHUSTAN MET WITH S-CRETARY LATE AFTERNOON ON FEB. 8 TO PROVIDE A MESSAGE TO HIM FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN (TEXT BELOW). VELIOTES AND DRAPER WERE PRESENT.
3. AFTER READING THE MESSAGE, THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 032961

ONLY A FEW IMMEDIATE COMMENTS. HE HAD HIS OWN

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

9802566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

() MAIL ROOM
(X) EXCISE
() FBI
() FOIA Exemptions
FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) (b)(7)(C)

() CLASSIFIED
() DOWNCLASSIFIED

FOI OFFICER: (6)(3)

DATE: 3/5/80

UNCLASSIFIED

FORMULATION -- "AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED PROVOCATION" -- WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ANOTHER -- "CLEAR PROVOCATION". HE HAD NEVER AGREED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S FORMULATION. CONTINUING, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT A SUBJECTIVE DEFINITION OF PROVOCATION WOULD

REFLECT THE CONCERNS OF ISRAEL. HOWEVER, THERE WAS ALSO A NEED FOR AN OBJECTIVE DEFINITION OF PROVOCATION. IN THIS REGARD, NO MORE WORDS CAN ADEQUATELY COVER THE PROBLEM. HIS OWN MEANING WAS THAT THE WORLD WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO SEE THAT ISRAEL HAD TRULY BEEN PROVOKED IN A MAJOR WAY. BY "WORLD", HE INDICATED HE MEANT THOSE COUNTRIES HE RESPECTS; SOME WOULD NEVER AGREE ISRAEL HAD BEEN PROVOKED. WHEN NEHUSTAN ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARY THEN STOOD BY THE FORMULATION IN HIS MESSAGE, THE SECRETARY REPLIED YES.

4. THE SECRETARY WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD ALREADY TAKEN ACTION -- AS PROMISED PREVIOUSLY -- WITH THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS TO FORESTALL FURTHER TERRORIST ATTEMPTS. HE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW-UP. HE WILL DO MORE. HE DO NOT REGARD THE SITUATION AS BEYOND CONTROL. ABOVE ALL, THE SECRETARY SAID HE DO NOT WANT TO HAVE A "PROBLEM" WITH ISRAEL.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S FEBRUARY 5 MESSAGE CLASSIFIED ISRAELI TOP SECRET:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 07

STATE 032961

YOURS SINCERELY
HENACHEN BEGIN
END TEXT HAIG

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

65



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20010-0073

R [REDACTED]

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 01 OF 06 162333Z
ACTION NOBS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 U
-----022672 162340Z /60
O 162257Z DEC 02 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERU*ALEX
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3940

SECTION 01 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03015

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION; MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER BEGIN, DECEMBER 16

FOIA Exemptions	()
Excise	()
Deny	()
DECLASSIFY	()
DECLASSIFY IN PART	()

4302564

EO Classifications	()
CLASSIFY as	() S or
DOWNGRADE TS to	() S or
TS authority to	

IS/FC/ODR [Signature] Date: 3/5/96

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: AT OUR MEETING TONIGHT, THURSDAY, DEC. 16, WITH BEGIN, SHARON, AND THEIR COLLEAGUES, I OUTLINED IN DETAIL WHAT I CONSIDERED A REASONABLE POSITION ON THE ISRAELI OCTOBER PROPOSAL, POINT BY POINT, COVERING WITHDRAWAL, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, NORMALIZATION, ETC. I MADE THIS PRESENTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN APPROACH CALLING FOR THE WIDEST POSSIBLE COMMON UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS RELEVANT TO A SOLUTION FOR THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR URGENCY AND SET THE STAGE TO GO INTO DETAIL ON A "COURSE OF ACTION" ALONG THE LINES WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON.

3. BEFORE MOVING TO SPECIFICS, HOWEVER, I ASKED FOR THE ISRAELI REACTION. AT THIS POINT SHARON -- ENJOYING THE DRAMA OF THE SITUATION -- REPORTED THAT THROUGH SECRET DISCUSSIONS, ISRAEL AND LEBANON HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON A "WORKING PAPER" WHICH CONSISTED OF GUIDE-

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 01 OF 06 162333Z

LINE FOR DIRECT ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AND IF IT IS ACCEPTED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET. IF THIS IS POSSIBLE, THEN THERE MAY BE A BREAKTHROUGH -- SUBSTANTIAL ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES -- WITHOUT HAVING HAD TO PRESENT AN AMERICAN "PLAN."

22. THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE IS A MAJOR DIFFERENCE COMPARED TO PREVIOUS PROPOSALS, BUT THIS DOES NOT APPEAR A FATAL FLAW IF OTHER ARRANGEMENTS ARE SATISFACTORY. THE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING THE PHASING OF PLO, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED, PRIMARILY THROUGH LEBANESE NEGOTIATION WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO.

23. AN UNANSWERED QUESTION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE CONCERNS THE TIMING AND DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. HE STRESSED AT EVERY POINT THE NEED FOR RAPID AND CLEAR AGREEMENT. WHILE SHARON SPOKE OF MOVING QUICKLY TO NEGOTIATION, HE AVOIDED BEING PINNED DOWN ON THE DURATION OF NEGOTIATIONS OR A SPECIFIC TIME-TABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL. END COMMENT. GROVE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

COMMITTED TO EACH OF THESE GOALS AND WANTED TO KNOW WHERE THINGS STOOD. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIMING. LEWIS ADDED THAT A QUICK ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WAS IMPORTANT SO THAT THE ONUS COULD BE PUT ON SYRIA TO ACCEPT A SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL. SHARON THEN AGREED THAT I SHOULD DISCUSS THE PAPER IN A MEETING WITH BENAYEL ALONE.

19. FOLLOWING OUR MEETING, I MET PRIVATELY WITH BEGIN AND DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, WHICH BEGIN READ AND CHARACTERIZED AS WARM. I REPEATED THE NEED FOR CLEAR, VISIBLE AND EARLY PROGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. HE DID NOT TAKE ISSUE. BEGIN AGREED THAT HE WOULD MEET AFTER THE CABINET SESSION ON SUNDAY SO THAT I COULD HAVE A FULL READ-OUT FOR THE PRESIDENT ON WHERE WE STOOD AND WHAT NEXT STEPS WERE CONTEMPLATED.

20. WHILE I WAS MEETING PRIVATELY WITH BEGIN, TANIR TOLD KRECZKO THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD BE ASKED TO APPROVE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE. KINCHE SEPARATELY TOLD LEWIS THAT GENEVA WAS THE PREFERRED SITE, BUT THAT ROME WAS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. IN RESPONSE TO KRECZKO'S QUESTION, TANIR SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT EITHER TUENI OR SALIM KNEW ABOUT THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS OR THE AGREED WORKING PAPER. (TANIR SAID THAT HE HAD NEGOTIATED THE TEXTS; KINCHE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT MOST OF THE SESSIONS. SHARON SAID THAT THE WORKING PAPER HAD GONE THROUGH FOUR DRAFTS.) TANIR SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE, BUT THAT HE BELIEVED THAT FATTAL KNEW ABOUT THE TEXTS. TANIR ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT DIRECT

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03

JERUSA 03015 06 OF 06 170013Z

NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN WITHOUT THE WORKING PAPER BEING MADE PUBLIC. HE THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS ONLY FATTAL WOULD KNOW ABOUT ITS CONTENTS, BUT THAT IT WOULD NEVERTHELESS "GUIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS."

21. COMMENT: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT REACH ANY HASTY CONCLUSIONS. FIRST AND FOREMOST, I WILL NEED TO CONFIRM WITH BENAYEL PERSONALLY WHETHER OR NOT BENAYEL ACCEPTS THE WORKING PAPER, AND THE EXTENT OF THE "CLARIFICATIONS" WHICH HE MAY REQUIRE CONCERNING IT. THEN, WE WILL NEED TO SEE IF BENAYEL CAN SELL THE DOCUMENT TO HIS OWN CABINET

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 06 OF 06 170013Z
ACTION MODS-00**

**INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----023714 170022Z /61
O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM ANCONSOUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 3948**

**~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03015
MODIS**

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

**MOVEMENTS, WHICH IS APPARENTLY INCORPORATED IN THE
LEBANESE/ISRAELI WORKING PAPER, IS IDENTICAL TO THE
SEQUENCE OF MOVEMENTS PRESENTED IN THE ISRAELI CABINET
DECISION OF OCT. 10).**

**17. I THEN OUTLINED FOR BEGIN MY NEXT STEPS. I SAID THAT
I WOULD GO TO LEBANON TOMORROW AND MEET WITH BAHAYEL.
I WOULD DISCUSS THE WORKING PAPER, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT I
WOULD NOT OBJECT TO ANYTHING WHICH LEBANON HAD ACCEPTED.
I SAID THAT IT WOULD COME BACK SUNDAY TO LEARN OF THE
ISRAELI CABINET DECISION, OR EARLIER IF NECESSITATED BY
MY TALKS WITH BAHAYEL. AT THIS POINT, SHARON INTERRUPTED
TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM IN MY GOING OVER THE
SPECIFICS OF THE DOCUMENT WITH BAHAYEL. HE STRESSED THAT
BAHAYEL DID NOT KNOW THAT ISRAEL WAS SHARING THE PAPER
WITH US, AND CAUTIONED US ABOUT GOING OVER THE DETAILS
WITH BAHAYEL SINCE BAHAYEL STILL NEEDED "CLARIFICATIONS"
ON SEVERAL POINTS.**

**18. I RE-EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN INTER-
FERING WITH WHAT ISRAEL HAD ACHIEVED. HOWEVER, IT WAS
IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN UNDERSTOOD FULLY WHERE
THINGS STOOD. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD INDICATED PUBLICLY**

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 06 OF 06 170013Z

**HIS SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF
FOREIGN FORCES, AND ISRAELI SECURITY. THE PRESIDENT WAS**

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REFUSED TO SPECULATE ON THE LENGTH OF NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE DOCUMENT BE SOUND AND FORESTALL ANY NEED FOR ISRAEL TO ENTER LEBANON AGAIN. I ASKED SHARON HOW LONG WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE ONCE AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, AND AGAIN MENTIONED OUR IDEA OF A 30-DAY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. SHARON SAID THIS WAS A TECHNICAL MATTER WHICH DEPENDED ON LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DECLINED TO SPECULATE.

16. I ASKED SHARON WHETHER HE ENVISAGED AN INITIAL DIS-ENGAGEMENT AS PART OF THE PACKAGE, AND WHETHER HE FORESAW AN INTERPOSITION ROLE FOR THE MNF. SHARON SAID THAT AFTER THE LEBANESE HAD SIGNED THE AGREEMENT, AFTER ISRAELI POW'S AND MIA'S AND FALLEN BODIES HAD BEEN RETURNED, AND AFTER THE PLO HAD COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN, A SIMULTANEOUS ISRAEL/SYRIA DISENGAGEMENT WAS CONTEMPLATED. THE ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT LINE WOULD RUN FROM SOUTH OF DANOUR, THROUGH DAYT-A-DIN, NORTH OF JANNIN, CROSSING JABUL BARUK, AND TO QUARIN LAKE. THE SYRIANS WOULD LEAVE THE MOUNT LEBANON RANGE TO THE BEKAA. THE MNF WOULD DEPLOY AS AN INTERPOSITION FORCE. THEREAFTER, SIMULTANEOUS ISRAEL/LEBANON WITHDRAWAL WOULD PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ALREADY AGREED SCHEDULE. (COMMENT: THIS SEQUENCE OF

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

THE TWO IN REACHING ACCOMMODATIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES.

13. I ASKED SHARON WHAT THE NEXT STEPS WERE. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST WAS FOR THE ISRAELI CABINET TO APPROVE THE WORKING PAPER, AND TO DECIDE ON HOW (AND WHERE) DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN. (FOLLOWING THE MEETING, KINCHE TOLD LEVIS THAT GENEVA WAS THE LIKELY SITE, WITH ROME A SECOND CHOICE). IF THE CABINET AGREED, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN "SHORTLY", WHICH SHARON SAID COULD BE AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. AT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, ISRAEL WOULD PRESENT A DRAFT AGREEMENT ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND NORMALIZATION, WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE OCT. 10 ISRAELI CABINET DECISION AND THE AGREED WORKING PAPER.

14. I ASKED SHARON WHETHER THE WORKING PAPER HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE LEBANESE CABINET. SHARON SAID IT HAD NOT, AND SAID THAT HE EXPECTED GENAYEL TO PUT IT TO THE CABINET SHORTLY. SAM LEVIS AND I PRESSED SHARON ON WHETHER GENAYEL HAD IN FACT REALLY ACCEPTED THE DOCUMENT IN FULL. SHARON SAID THAT GENAYEL HAD READ THE DOCUMENT AND ACCEPTED IT, BUT WANTED CLARIFICATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, GENAYEL HAD ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF AN ISRAELI JEEP WERE AMBUSHED ON THE WAY TO RESUPPLY ONE OF THE ISRAELI-MANNED EARLY-WARNING STATIONS. (SAM PURSUED THE EXTENT OF GENAYEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE WORKING PAPER AGAIN FOLLOWING THE MEETING. TO PROVE THAT GENAYEL HAD ACCEPTED THE PAPER, SHARON SHOWED LEVIS THE ORIGINAL DRAFT, WHICH HAD LINES DRAWN THROUGH A PROVISION INDICATING THAT LEBANON WOULD BECOME A NEUTRAL COUNTRY. SHARON SAID THAT THE REFERENCE TO LEBANON'S NEUTRALITY HAD BEEN INCLUDED.

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03

JERUSA 03015 05 OF 06 170004Z

BUT THAT GENAYEL HAD SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED HIS MIND AND ASKED FOR ITS DELETION.)

15. I SAID WE WERE PLEASED THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE HAD APPEARED TO ACCOMPLISH SO MUCH, BUT CAUTIONED THAT IT REMAINED URGENT THAT WE COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS AND BEGIN THE WITHDRAWAL. I ASKED SHARON HOW LONG HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS. SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARING A DRAFT AGREEMENT, WHICH HE EXPECTED TO REVISE TOMORROW. HE SAID THAT THE DRAFT WOULD BE PRESENTED AT THE OPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 05 OF 06 170004Z
ACTION MODS-00**

**INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 M
-----023625 170012Z /61
O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3944**

SECTION 05 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03015

MODIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

ISRAELI FORCES WILL WITHDRAW AFTER THE FOLLOWING:

- PLO TERRORISTS WILL FIRST COMPLETE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON.**
 - ISRAELI PRISONERS IN THE HANDS OF SYRIA AND THE PLO, AS WELL AS THE BODIES OF DEAD ISRAELI PERSONNEL, WILL BE RETURNED, AND ISRAELI PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR.**
 - AN AGREEMENT WILL HAVE BEEN REACHED BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA CALLING FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON WITH THOSE OF ISRAEL.**
 - THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WILL BE SIMULTANEOUS WITH SYRIAN FORCES.**
 - THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WILL TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED AND SIGNED.**
- 12. WHEN SHARON COMPLETED HIS PRESENTATION, I OBSERVED THAT THEIR SECRET TALKS HAD APPARENTLY PRODUCED SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME CONCEPTS WHICH I HAD JUST SUPPORTED, A FEW EXCEPTIONS ASIDE. I SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD NEVER**

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 05 OF 06 170004Z

CREATE ANY PROBLEMS CONCERNING DIRECT AGREEMENTS FREELY REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON; WE HOPED TO ASSIST

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
-- (B) IN THE SECURITY ZONE, ONLY LEBANESE ARMY FORCES AND LOCAL POLICE FORCES WILL BE PRESENT.

-- (C) LOCAL FORCES PRESENT IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO A NATIONAL MILITARY STRUCTURE AND WILL FORM ONE OF THE LAF ELEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

-- (D) ISRAEL WILL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO PERFORM RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND NAVAL PATROLS FOR A PERIOD TO BE AGREED BY THE JOINT COMMISSION.

-- (E) THERE WILL BE SOME LIMITATIONS ON FORTIFICATIONS AND HEAVY WEAPONS IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

-- (F) A JOINT LEBANESE/ISRAELI COMMITTEE WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR SUPERVISION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

-- (G) LEBANON AND ISRAEL WILL NOT ALLOW ANY ARAB FORCES OR ANY FORCES FROM COUNTRIES WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EITHER OF THE TWO STATES TO BE STATIONED IN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

-- (H) THE ABOVE WILL BE FULLY ELABORATED IN THE FINAL AGREEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

JERUSA 03015 04 OF 06 162386Z

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

NORMALIZATION ARRANGEMENTS WILL INCLUDE:

- (A) A DECLARATION THAT NO STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.
- (B) OPEN BORDERS FOR PASSAGE OF PEOPLE AND GOODS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR REGULATIONS. (FOOTNOTE: THE LEBANESE SIDE REQUESTED TO HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF UN OBSERVERS ON THE LEBANESE SIDE OF THE BORDER AT ONE POINT AND FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME. THE ISRAELI SIDE REJECTED THIS. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS FREE TO RAISE THIS ISSUE IN MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.)
- (C) IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS, ISRAEL WILL MAINTAIN A LIAISON OFFICE IN THE DEIRUT AREA. THE JOINT COMMITTEE WILL HAVE ITS MEETINGS THERE AND WILL DEAL WITH ALL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES UNTIL A PEACE TREATY IS SIGNED.
- (D) NO HOSTILE PROPAGANDA AND TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT.
- (E) THE TWO SIDES WILL PROMPTLY ENTER INTO --NEGOTIATIONS FOR AGREEMENT IN VARIOUS FIELDS OF NORMALIZATION, TRADE, ETC.).
- (F) THE ABOVE ELEMENTS WILL BE ELABORATED IN A FINAL AGREEMENT.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03

JERUSA 03015 04 OF 06 162356Z

LEBANON WILL NEVER BE USED AS A BASE FOR HOSTILE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAEL. NO OFFICES, BASES OR INFRASTRUCTURE FOR TERRORIST ACTS WILL BE MAINTAINED IN LEBANON. NO ORGANIZATION WITH SUCH AIMS WILL BE ALLOWED TO FUNCTION IN LEBANON. THE PRINCIPAL POINTS:

- (A) TO ASCERTAIN THAT THERE ARE NO HOSTILE ELEMENTS IN THE 48-50 KM. SECURITY ZONE, THREE EARLY WARNING INSTALLATIONS WILL BE OPERATED BY ISRAEL FOR A PERIOD TO BE AGREED BY THE JOINT COMMITTEE.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
**PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 04 OF 06 162356Z
ACTION NODS-00**

**INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----023454 170003Z /61
O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM ANCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3948**

~~SECRET~~ **SECTION 04 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03015**

NODIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ACHIEVE RESULTS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE ON THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS, TO BE CONSIDERED AS A PACKAGE DEAL:

- NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS**
- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS**
- WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES**

TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT, DISCUSSIONS WILL BE HELD IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

- TWO OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS WILL MEET. THE LEBANESE DELEGATION WILL CONSIST OF THREE CIVILIANS AND THREE MILITARY OFFICERS AND WILL BE HEADED BY A CIVILIAN.**
- THE FINAL AGREEMENT WILL BE RATIFIED BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS.**
- THESE DELEGATIONS, WHICH WILL FORM A COMMITTEE, WILL**

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 04 OF 06 162356Z

CONTINUE TO MEET AFTER THE PACKAGE DEAL IS IMPLEMENTED AND AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL HAS TAKEN PLACE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

USEFULNESS OF AMERICAN "GOOD OFFICES," AND THE NEGOTIATION OF SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION ARRANGEMENTS, WHERE HE STRESSED THAT DIRECT LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WERE THE ONLY WAY TO GO. HE THEN REVEALED POINTEDLY THAT HE HAD BEEN WORKING ON THIS FOR SOME 60 DAYS, MEETING WITH "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT GENAYEL," AT THE DIRECTION OF BEGIN AND SHAMIR. TWO DAYS AGO (DECEMBER 14), THE TWO PARTIES HAD MANAGED TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON WORKING PAPER INCORPORATING THE MAIN POINTS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE INITIATION OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. US PARTICIPATION WOULD BE WELCOME, AND ISRAEL WOULD BE HAPPY IF THE US WERE PREPARED TO SIGN OR PROVIDE GUARANTEES. SOME POINTS REQUIRED FURTHER CLARIFICATION, BUT BASIC AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED.

11. SHARON THEN READ THE FOLLOWING PAPER, WHICH HE AGREED TO GIVE US AT A FUTURE TIME (THE TEXT BELOW IS AN ANALGRAM OF OUR NOTES, AND THE ACTUAL PAPER MAY VARY SLIGHTLY):

BASIC ELEMENTS AND GUIDELINES

WORKING PAPER

DECEMBER 14, 1982

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

JERUSA 03815 03 OF 06 162350Z

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

IN THE LAF OR INCORPORATED IN A BORDER POLICE FORCE. THERE WILL BE A LEBANESE SOLUTION REGARDING MAJOR HADDAD HIMSELF. UNIFIL MAY HAVE A ROLE IN THE NORTHERN PARTS OF THE ZONE AND IN THE PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN SIDON AND TYRE. WE DO NOT RULE OUT AN MNF ROLE IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

-- AS FOR AGREED SUPERVISORY AND EARLY-WARNING ARRANGEMENTS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE ISRAELI-MANNED EARLY WARNING STATIONS ARE WARRANTED, BUT ISRAELI AND LEBANESE MILITARY LIAISON OFFICES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WITH DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS, MEETINGS AT REGULAR INTERVALS, AND ALTERNATION OF MEETINGS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. HIGH-ALTITUDE ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED AS HOSTILE ACTIVITIES. ISRAELI NAVAL PATROLS SHALL BE CONDUCTED OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS. UNTSO SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE A ROLE.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE AND GOODS SHOULD MOVE ACROSS THE BORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NATIONAL LEGISLATION OF EACH COUNTRY AND ON THE BASIS OF CONTINUING LEBANESE-ISRAELI CONSULTATIONS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7. I SAID THAT DRAPER AND I HAD COME FROM CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE INTENTION OF RESTORING OUR DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL AND SEEKING SUBSTANTIVE UNDERSTANDING, SO THAT WE COULD ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. I SAID THAT DRAPER'S TRIP TO LEBANON HAD BEEN SOLELY TO ACCELERATE LEBANON'S TALKS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIA, AND HAD SUCCEEDED, AS DEMONSTRATED BY GENAYEL'S PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ASSAD AND HIS SENDING OF AN ENVOY (GDAYD) TO DAMASCUS YESTERDAY. HE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE LEBANESE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE SYRIANS AND PLO.

8. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING FORWARD RAPIDLY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND ARGUED THAT DELAY WOULD ONLY LEAD TO INCREASED DISORDER IN LEBANON AND PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. I SAID THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE ALSO KNEW EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS VERY WELL. I SAID THAT THE TIME HAD NOW COME TO TRY TO WRAP UP SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON EVERY ISSUE. WE DID NOT HAVE A US BLUEPRINT, BUT WE WANTED TO DISCUSS EACH ELEMENT TOGETHER AND SEE WHERE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

GUIDELINES COVERED ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF PLO, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM. ACCORDING TO SHARON, THESE GUIDELINES HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY PRESIDENT GENAYEL, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CLARIFICATIONS, ALTHOUGH NOT SHARED WITH HIS CABINET. THE WORKING PAPER IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE ISRAELI CABINET ON DECEMBER 19, AFTER WHICH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FORMAL AGREEMENT COULD THEORETICALLY BEGIN WITHIN A FEW DAYS. THE WORKING PAPER REFLECTS KEY POSITIONS WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD PUT FORTH IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS AND THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE APPROVED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET.

4. DESPITE THE ASSERTION THAT GENAYEL HAD APPROVED THE PAPER, WE WILL NEED TO CONFIRM THIS OURSELVES BY GOING TO BEIRUT TOMORROW. IF GENAYEL IS ON BOARD, A BREAK-THROUGH OF SORTS WILL HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. EVEN SO THERE WILL BE DIFFICULTIES. GENAYEL WILL NEED CABINET APPROVAL. THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEME CALLS FOR PLO DEPARTURE TO BE COMPLETE BEFORE ISRAEL BEGINS WITHDRAWING. FURTHERMORE, THERE WILL REMAIN THE NEED TO CONVINCE THE SYRIANS TO AGREE TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH THE ISRAELIS. OTHER COMPLICATIONS COULD ARISE BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT GENAYEL MAY HAVE AGREED TO CERTAIN ISRAELI DEMANDS THE SYRIANS (AND PERHAPS OTHER ARABS) WILL FIND DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. THUS, UNTIL WE HAVE MET WITH GENAYEL WE SHOULD RESERVE JUDGEMENT AS TO THE EXTENT OF PROGRESS. IT IS ALSO OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THIS REPORT BE ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS; PARTICULARLY PENDING ISRAELI CABINET CONSIDERATION.

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03

JERUSA 03015 01 OF 06 162333Z

5. PLEASE NOTE THAT AT THE END OF THE MEETING, I MET ALONE WITH BEGIN TO BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND TO STRESS THE NEED FOR CLEAR AND RAPID PROGRESS. END SUMMARY.

6. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DRAPER, PLUS STAFF, I MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH BEGIN THE EVENING OF DEC. 18. BEGIN WAS JOINED BY SHARON, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER NISSIN AND A FULL HANGOFF OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISERS.

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
CONCERNED ABOUT WHO WOULD TALK TO THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. I REVIEWED OUR EFFORTS TO URGE THE LEBANESE TO INTENSIFY CONTACTS WITH BOTH PARTIES. ON THE PLO, THE LEBANESE HAD ALREADY TAKEN THE FIRST STEP. WE ENVISAGED THE SAME PROCEDURES AS THIS SUMMER, WITH THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO AND THE US BEING HELPFUL WHENEVER IT COULD, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH ISSUES AS DESTINATIONS, FINANCING OF DEPARTURES, ETC.

-- PRIORITY OF PLO DEPARTURE. BEGIN STRESSED THAT IT REMAINED ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT ANY MOVE BY ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD BEGIN AFTER THE PLO HAD LEFT. I PRESSED HIM TO ACCEPT OUR IDEA THAT ISRAELI FORCES COULD BEGIN TO DEPART WHEN THE PLO FORCES HAD STARTED TO LEAVE, BUT HE CAME BACK WITH A VEHEMENT "NO," WARNING THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE THAT THE TRAGEDIES AND AGGRESSIVE ACTS OF THE PAST WOULD NOT OCCUR AGAIN. I ARGUED THAT THE PLO WOULD CERTAINLY NOT STAY IN LEBANON WITHOUT SYRIAN PROTECTION AND THAT IN ANY CASE IT WAS DESIRABLE TO GIVE THE LEBANESE SOME FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM TO MANEUVER ON THIS ISSUE. BEGIN WAS UNMOVED, SO I LEFT IT THAT WE WOULD SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOPED. DRAPER LATER REMARKED THAT THE ISRAELI CONDITION LEFT THE PLO WITH A "VETO" OVER PROGRESS.

-- REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS, I REPEATED THAT THE PROCESS HAD STARTED, BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO BRING THEMSELVES TO DEMAND A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IN EXPLICIT TERMS, PERHAPS WITH A DATE CERTAIN. THIS I KNEW, FROM MY TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS, WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER ARAB STATES, AND SYRIA WOULD HAVE TO HONOR THE LEBANESE DEMAND. HOWEVER, SYRIA WAS

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03

JERUSA 03015 03 OF 06 162300Z

A DIFFICULT PARTNER AND MIGHT WELL UPSET THE BEST OF PLANS. FOR THIS REASON, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO SPEAK OF "CONCURRENT," NOT "SIMULTANEOUS" DEPARTURES. BENAYEL HAD CALLED ASSAD YESTERDAY THANKS TO DRAPER'S EFFORTS.

10. AFTER THE ISRAELIS HAD POSED THEIR FEW QUESTIONS, SHARON EXPRESSED HIS HAPPINESS AT MY REFERENCE TO CO-OPERATION BETWEEN US ON LEBANON, SINCE, HE SAID, ALL THREE PARTIES, INCLUDING LEBANON, HAVE THE SAME BASIC INTERESTS THERE. HE WENT ON TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES, WHERE HE RECOGNIZED THE

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 03 OF 06 162350Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 U
-----023266 162356Z /61
O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3942

SECTION 03 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03015

NODIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

-- WE AGREE THERE WILL BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEGOTIATING
FUTURE DETAILS OF NORMALIZATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
LEBANON: WE AGREE THAT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE NORMALIZA-
TION SHOULD BE STATED AS A GOAL.

-- THERE WILL BE REPRESENTATION OF EACH STATE IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE OTHER: HOW THIS IS MANAGED SHOULD BE
RESOLVED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. WE BELIEVE IN THE
NECESSITY OF MECHANISMS TO DISCUSS A FULLER AND GREATER
NORMALIZATION, ENDING, WE HOPE, IN A PEACE TREATY. THE
LEBANESE TOO SEE THIS AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

-- IN LIEU OF FORMAL PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATING A
PEACE AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE A CONFORMA-
TION OF THE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY AND THE ABSENCE
OF A STATE OF WAR. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT IS TOO EARLY
TO ESTABLISH A MECHANISM FOR NEGOTIATING A PEACE TREATY.
THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
EVOLVE.

9. THE ISRAELIS HAD VERY FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT MY PRESEN-
TATION OF OUR IDEAS. WHY THIS WAS SO BECAME APPARENT
ONLY LATER. THEIR MAJOR QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON THE FOLLOW-
ING AREAS:

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 03 OF 06 162350Z

-- NATURE OF TALKS WITH SYRIA AND P.L.O. BEGIN WAS VERY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WRAHAL WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE BEGINNING OR END OF THE INITIAL DISENGAGEMENT OPERATION (EXPECTED TO REQUIRE ONLY 3-4 DAYS). AS WITHDRAWAL OCCURS, COORDINATION AMONG THE LAF, MNF, AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY.

-- B. PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

-- PREVENTION OF ALL ACTS OF HOSTILITY FROM THE TERRITORY OF EITHER SIDE: WE AGREE, AND FEEL THIS SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS TO PROHIBIT ALL HOSTILE ACTS, THE UNAUTHORIZED CROSSING OF BORDER BY ARMED INDIVIDUALS OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, HOSTILE PROPAGANDA, AND INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE A CONFIRMATION OF THE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY.

-- PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF OR ENTRY BY ANY FOREIGN FORCES INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY UNLESS AGREED TO BY BOTH PARTIES: WE AGREE IF THIS MEANS A RECIPROCAL PROHIBITION ON THE STATIONING OF HOSTILE RPT HOSTILE FOREIGN FORCES. IT COULD NOT COVER SOMETHING LIKE THE MNF. BEYOND THIS, THERE HAS TO BE SOME WAY OF DEFINING WHAT IS HOSTILE AND WHAT IS NOT. IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE TWO PARTIES ACCEPT THE JUDGMENT OF THE U.S.

-- PREVENTION OF ACTIVITY BY PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS: YES, WE WOULD SUPPORT RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS TO REFRAIN FROM SUPPORTING OR ACQUIESCING IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. THERE WOULD BE NO EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS FOR THE PLO OR OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS, AND THERE COULD BE NO CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE.

PAGE 03

JERUSA 03015 02 OF 06 162341Z

-- SECURITY ZONE ENSURING THAT NO ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ARE WITHIN ARTILLERY OR ROCKET RANGE: YES, EXCEPT FOR BELIEVING THAT LIGHT ARTILLERY SHOULD REMAIN IN THE HANDS OF THE LAF, WE AGREE THAT THE SECURITY ZONE WILL BE BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY A LINE ABOUT 40 KMS FROM THE BORDER.

-- WE AGREE THAT THE LAF SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING SECURITY WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE. LOCAL MILITIA CURRENTLY OPERATING IN THE ZONE SHALL BE INCORPORATED IN AUTHORIZED LEBANESE ORGANIZATIONS OR DISBANDED. HADDAD'S FORCES SHALL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE REINTEGRATED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 02 OF 06 1623412
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----023060 162345Z /60
O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-M
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3941

SECTION 02 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03015

NODIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

WE ARE TOGETHER. WE WERE NOT DOING THIS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ISRAELI/LEBANON DIRECT TALKS, WHICH WE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT, BUT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THOSE TALKS BEGAN THERE WAS A SOLID BASIS OF COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THEIR RAPID CONCLUSION. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A PROTRACTED PROCESS, AND THAT I BELIEVED LEBANON AND ISRAEL AGREED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT. I THEN PROCEEDED TO TAKE EACH OF THE POINTS IN THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION OF OCTOBER 10, BEGINNING WITH THE SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL, AND PRESENTED "US IDEAS" ON EACH:

- A) SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL: WE AGREE THAT, AS A FIRST STEP, ALL PU'S, NIA'S AND BODIES SHOULD BE RETURNED, BUT ASK WHAT HAPPENS TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOM ISRAEL HAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY FOR ACTS HOSTILE TO ITS SECURITY?
- AS A SECOND STEP, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PLO SHOULD "BEGIN TO LEAVE LEBANON," AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE TIED TO THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI CONDITION THAT ALL THE PLO MUST LEAVE.

-- THIRD STEP -- SYRIAN/ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT, WITH NMF AS INTERPOSITION FORCE -- GIVES US NO PROBLEM. IN CONTRAST TO THE ISRAELI POSITION, WE WOULD FORESEE THE COMPLETION OF PLO WITHDRAWAL AT ABOUT THIS STAGE. THIS

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03015 02 OF 06 1623412

WOULD BE PART OF A PACKAGE PLAN FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL.

--FOURTH STEP -- SYRIA AND ISRAEL COMPLETE THEIR WITH-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

283a
R

ACHIEVING U.S. GOALS IN LEBANON

We have two main problems in Lebanon. The first, covered here, is achieving U.S. political goals in Lebanon, on our own and with the contact group. The second, the PLO and encircled West Beirut, you will be discussing with the President tomorrow.

Phil Habib has found, and in some cases created, among Lebanese leaders a large degree of consensus in support of our goals in Lebanon. The following checklist lists each major U.S. goal and our best judgment right now as to what first steps we will need to take to achieve it. We are seeking Phil's views on each of these steps and his suggestions for any others we might take.

A. STRENGTHENING LEBANESE AUTHORITY:

-- Use contact group (Lebanon, France, Saudi Arabia and the U.S.) and other means to rally support for national unity government.

-- Urge Israeli government to pull IDF away from Palace and other critical points to give Lebanese some breathing room and to avoid appearance it is acting under Israeli duress.

-- Encourage rapid Lebanese Army deployment throughout West Beirut in conjunction with "normalization" of city, including re-opening of access in port, by road, etc..

-- Urge Lebanese to continue to plan for elections.

-- As soon as way is clear, urge other governments to reestablish diplomatic presences in Beirut in order to give visible and active support to Lebanese.

B. "DRAMATIC REDUCTION" OF SYRIAN PRESENCE IN CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

-- Urge Begin to cease public linkage between Syrian and Israeli withdrawal.

-- Urge Syrians to be flexible, particularly in taking early steps (with Israel) and separating their forces at critical flash points, (with LAF units replacing Syrians at disengagement points).

C. END TO PALESTINIAN STATE WITHIN A STATE:

-- Capitalize on consensus for disarming Palestinians by having Lebanese authorities start early discussions with PLO to this end.

-- Be prepared to urge flexibility on Begin if the tradeoff for Plo disarmament has to be continued presence in Beirut of PLO leaders.

-- Work with contact group and others to help assure that once disarmed, the PLO stays that way.

9/15/84
Date: 3/5/84
AM

93025660

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

PROPERTY OF
CLASSIFY AS
EX-100

-- Simultaneously, work to have Phalange (and possibly others) militia place their forces under central Lebanese Government command and place heavy equipment under Lebanese Army control.

-- Lebanese are prepared to deal generously with Haddad; we will have to obtain Begin's acceptance that Haddad will have to go, particularly since his "enclave" makes no sense under envisaged security arrangements in the South.

-- You would begin soon to discuss this with Israelis and get details from Lebanese about future reabsorption of Haddad's men into Lebanese society.

E. STRENGTHENING THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:

UNCLASSIFIED

-- Move quickly with Lebanese leaders and Begin to nail down Lebanese acceptance of 40 kilometer zone and outside peacekeeping force in exchange for end to Haddad zone in south (above).

-- Begin early discussions with Lebanese army on their needs in order to share role with multinational force.

-- Encourage Lebanese authorities to initiate mobilization of political and humanitarian infrastructure to enter areas of Lebanese Army control.

-- Decide soon for ourselves how to structure peacekeeping force -- UNIFIL expanded or UNIFIL augmented, or purely non-UN force.

-- Decide soon for ourselves, since it is already widely discussed, whether we would in principle be prepared to participate.

UNCLASSIFIED

280

Approved by President and Secretary 6/9/82 8:30 a.m.

Cable approved also and transmitted at 6:5 (attached)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8216678

June 9, 1982

COPIES: 3
3
3
3
EUR
NEA
S/S
TMC
S/S-S
RF:vhd

'82 JUN 21 11 11 AM

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
SUBJECT: Lebanon: Critical Moment at Hand

UNCLASSIFIED

R

I. SETTING

Israeli military activities already go well beyond Begin's forty kilometer buffer zone. While Begin has reaffirmed to Phil Habib that the zone is Israel's maximum intention, there are signs that Israel just might be tempted to collude with the Phalange militia in an effort to force Syrian units out of the Beriut area and to restructure Lebanon politically. The most immediately dangerous aspect of further Israeli advances remains that of a major Israeli-Syria explosion and we have conveyed to the Syrians Begin's terms for avoiding this. Habib is now in Damascus to discuss these, but they are unlikely to be acceptable. They require that both Syrian and PLO units pull out of positions in the south. The Syrians are very unlikely to agree if Israel is still moving north on the ground and attacking by sea and air targets well beyond the 40 km zone.

II. THE ISSUE

Our first priority must be to get Begin to pull his forces back inside the 40 km zone. Without this, there is a strong likelihood of a Syrian-Israeli war, whether or not either side intends it. Habib wants to be able to tell Begin, in your name, that we cannot work effectively for an outcome which improves Israeli security over the long term unless Israel begins now a pullback into the 40 km zone and, if we can arrange it, prepares for a ceasefire in place. Habib would have to add that Israel's failure to cooperate with us to this degree would be reflected in our bilateral relationship and in our ability and willingness to protect Israel from the international consequences of its actions. Cooperating now, by pulling back, would give us the chance to work out both a reasonable ceasefire and longer-term security arrangements.

III. RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Habib telling Begin, in your name, that Israel must pull back now into the 40 km zone and cease air, sea and artillery attacks beyond the zone

UNCLASSIFIED

Approve

Disapprove

FOIA Exemptions
1) DENY
2) EXCISE
3) DECLASSIFY
4) DECLASSIFY IN PART

9302566

Date: 3/5/46

EO Citations
() CLASSIFY as
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
STA 6/9/82
THE SECRETARY
WTCLUVERIUS
S/S:CEMCMANAWAY
S/S - 15

1
AMH
WTC

USDEL SECRETARY IN WINDSOR
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, FLASH
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, FLASH
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, IMMEDIATE

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
SECTO

FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/9/02 (HAIG, A.M., JR.)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PGOV, US, IS, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AVOIDING ESCALATION

REF: JERUSALEM 1785

1. ~~SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. WE AGREE THAT MOST PRESSING NEED IS AVOIDING SYRIA-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION AND PERHAPS WIDER WAR. ALSO, WE SHARE YOUR FEAR THAT ISRAEL MAY BE TEMPTED TO PURSUE GOALS BEYOND THE BUFFER ZONE, DESPITE BEGIN'S REASSURANCES. YOUR REQUEST THAT ISRAEL STOP ITS ATTACKS AGAINST BEIRUT WAS GOOD BEGINNING. NOW WE MUST MOVE BEYOND IT TO CONTAIN IMMEDIATE SITUATION AND PREPARE FOR EARLY CEASEFIRE IN PLACE AND FOLLOW-ON EFFORTS TO ASSURE WITHDRAWAL AND NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH.

3. PRESIDENT HAS CONSIDERED SITUATION AND AUTHORIZES YOU, IN HIS NAME, TO TAKE FIRM LINE WITH BEGIN TODAY TO GET HIM TO BEGIN TO PULL BACK HIS GROUND FORCES TO WITHIN 40 KM. ZONE AND CEASE ATTACKS ON TARGETS BEYOND ZONE. YOU SHOULD TELL BEGIN THAT FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH US TO THIS DEGREE WOULD BE REFLECTED IN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND IN OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO PROTECT ISRAEL FROM INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ACTIONS. COOPERATING NOW BY BEGINNING PULLBACK SOONEST WILL ENABLE US CREDIBLY TO SEEK SUITABLE CEASEFIRE TERMS AND BEGIN TO LAY GROUNDWORK FOR ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH WHICH WILL ENHANCE ISRAEL'S LONGER TERM SECURITY. YOU AND SAM WILL KNOW BEST HOW TO STRUCTURE YOUR APPROACH WITHIN CONTEXT OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH BEGIN.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

2

4. CONCERNING BEGIN'S REQUEST FOR U.S. FORCES, YOU SHOULD
REMAIN COMPLETELY NON-COMMITTAL, NOTING ONLY THAT OF
COURSE IT HAS BEEN PASSED TO ME AND TO PRESIDENT. HAIG##

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

~~ES CONFIDENTIAL~~
8216710

~~SECRET~~

281

R

t
5

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

June 15, 1982

MR. SECRETARY:

-I
Read File

We now have reports that the Israelis are moving on West Beirut. I believe it is highly important that you give Arens a clear statement of our policy on this matter: that, as Phil Habib says, we cannot accept what they are doing.

- Attacking West Beirut goes against all the indications, and assurances, they have made publicly and privately.
- Israeli attacks into Beirut will make the U.S. appear to have been acting as an accomplice in a pattern of Israeli deception, i.e., declare a ceasefire and then move ahead to take more territory. This can utterly destroy our credibility in future efforts to help meet Israel's security objectives.
- With the Israeli forces in Beirut no one will believe that Sarkis and his Salvation Council are anything but Israeli puppets. Without international support for the GOL our hands will be tied and the prospects for Phil Habib's mission gravely damaged.

Attachment:

Habib Cable

UNCLASSIFIED

ghm Date 3/5/96

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IS, FPC/CDR

DECLASSIFY
 DISCONTINUE
 EXTEND

EO Citations _____

CLASSIFY as _____ IS or _____
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or _____

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

9302566

~~SECRET~~

RDS 1-3: 6/15/02

UNCLASSIFIED

2769

R

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

ANNOUNCEMENT OF CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
MADE BY AMBASSADOR HABIB IN JERUSALEM

I have today reported to President Reagan that, as of 12:00 noon, July 24, 1981, all hostile military action between Lebanese and Israeli territory in either direction will cease.

9302566

CHM 2/29/80

DATE _____

DECLASSIFY ON _____

CLASSIFY AS _____

DOWNGRADE IS _____

FOIA Exemptions

~~Exemptions~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CEASE-FIRE UNDERSTANDING

From 12 noon, July 24, 1981:

- There will be no hostile military activity from Lebanon directed at targets in Israel, by land, sea, and air;
- There will be no hostile military activity from Israel at targets in Lebanon, whether by sea, land, or air;
- The same will apply to hostile military activity directed into Haddad's area or from it.

UNCLASSIFIED

7/13/81

() CLASSIFY AS
() DOWNGRADE TS TO

EXDIS FILE

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

EXDIS File

sent as
State 154098
TOSEC 80129

NEARBYCHILL	NEARBYCOLLINS
NEARBYSCHNEIDER	S/S-OTANORSE
NEARBYDRAPER	LEFARANES

IMMEDIATE SECRETARY

IN PART

9302566

2038401160

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 6/4/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAURENCE)

TAGS: PEPR, NLI, IS, LE, PLO

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - STATUS OF ISRAELI-PLO CLASHES: NEXT STEPS (S/S-821827)

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. CURRENT SITUATION: AS OF C.O.B. HERE ISRAELI AIRSTRIKES HAVE HALTED BUT WE BELIEVE ROCKET AND ARTILLERY EXCHANGES IN THE SOUTHERN LEBANON-NORTHERN ISRAEL AREA ARE STILL SPORADICALLY OCCURRING (IN THE MOST THREATENING DEVELOPMENT YET, ISRAEL HAS SUFFERED ONE DEAD AND THREE WOUNDED). IF THE PLO TOMORROW CONTINUES TO ROCKET AND SHELL HABBAD'S ENCLAVE AND NORTH ISRAEL, THIS WILL CERTAINLY SPARK RENewed SUPPRESSIVE ISRAELI AIRSTRIKES AGAINST PLO POSITIONS IN THE SOUTH, PERHAPS COMBINED WITH ONE OR MORE COMMANDO TYPE ACTIONS. UNDER AN IDEAL SCENARIO, OVER THE NEXT 24-36 HOURS THE FIGHTING COULD REACH A PLATEAU AND BEGIN TO SUBSIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL ISRAELI CIVILIANS BECOME CASUALTIES, FIGHTING WILL ESCALATE DRAMATICALLY.
3. WHAT WE HAVE DONE: AFTER YOUR RECENT MEETING WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

AD
CH
JC
BS
S/S-821827
TB

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

12

SHARON AND YOUR LETTER TO BEGIN LAST WEEK, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CAN HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR VIEWS ON MAJOR HOSTILITIES. EMBASSY TEL AVIV HAS TODAY EXPRESSED OUR HOPE THAT ISRAEL WILL ACT WITH RESTRAINT AND GIVE EFFORTS TO HALT THE FIGHTING A CHANCE TO SUCCEED. WE HAVE CONTACTED A NUMBER OF ARAB AND EUROPEAN PARTIES HAVING INFLUENCE WITH THE PLO. UNDER SYG URQUHART HAS REPORTED INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS AFTER TALKS WITH PLO OFFICIALS. WE HAVE EXERCISED PARTICULAR CARE IN MAKING BALANCED PUBLIC STATEMENTS, STRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN ANGLE. MEANWHILE WE ARE KEEPING SENIOR OFFICIALS BACK HERE APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS. WALT STOESEL HAS BRIEFED THE VICE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP THEM FULLY INFORMED. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, ESTABLISHED AN AROUND-THE-CLOCK WATCH AND A WORKING GROUP, WHICH IS REFINING CONTINGENCY PLANS.

4. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

-- WE HAVE PREPARED A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AS A CONTINGENCY SHOULD THAT BODY APPEAR READY TO TAKE UP THE FIGHTING. URQUHART TELLS US THAT THE ARABS ARE DIVIDED ON WHETHER TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TUENI APPARENTLY HAS SECURED INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO PRESS FOR A CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF IT WOULD IN ANY WAY JEOPARDIZE THE HABIB MISSION. ARAB LEAGUE AMBASSADOR MAKSOUB TOLD US ARABS WANT TO GIVE US A CHANCE TO HELP COOL THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE UNSC BECOME INVOLVED IN A NEGATIVE WAY, WE COULD TRY TO FOCUS DEBATE AND ANY RESOLUTION ON RETURNING TO THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND TENDING TO HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.

-- IF THE PLO CONTINUES TO FIGHT, IT IS UNREALISTIC TO ASK BEGIN TO REMAIN PASSIVE. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, DRAFTED A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER URGING BEGIN AT LEAST NOT TO ESCALATE THE FIGHTING AND REMAIN OPEN TO EFFORTS TO BRING IT TO A SWIFT CONCLUSION. SHOULD THE SITUATION WORSEN TOMORROW, WE MAY RECOMMEND TO YOU THAT IT BE SENT (DRAFT BY SEPTTEL FOR PRE-POSITIONING PURPOSES).

-- FINALLY, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF PHIL HABIB'S MISSION. WHETHER HE CAN GO WILL LARGELY DEPEND UPON WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT 24-36 HOURS. IF THE FIGHTING SHOULD TAIL OFF HABIB COULD PROBABLY PROCEED ESSENTIALLY ACCORDING TO CURRENT PLANS. IF, HOWEVER, IT CONTINUES HE WOULD LOOK FOOLISH DISCUSSING WAYS OF IMPROVING PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON'S STABILIZATION WHILE IGNORING THE CURRENT SITUATION. IN EITHER CASE, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

02038401161

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

| 3

ESSENTIAL FOR HIM TO CONSULT WITH YOU PRIOR TO GOING TO THE REGION. HABIB AGREES THIS IS NECESSARY AND THAT HE WOULD THEN HAVE TO GO TO ISRAEL FIRST RATHER THAN LEBANON, AND GET ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO ALLOW HIM TO TRY FOR A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. IF YOUR SCHEDULE PERMITS, WE WOULD TRY TO ARRANGE FOR HIM TO JOIN YOU WHILE IN ROME.

5. RECOMMENDATION:

-- THAT YOU AGREE TO MEET WITH PHIL HABIB IN ROME.

-- APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

YY

8 2 0 3 8 4 0 1 1 6 2

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

2639

R

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Habib and Begin went out to the press at 7:40 p.m., Begin read a statement of the Cabinet. Then Habib read the following statement:

BEGIN TEXT:

On the basis of the statement of the Government of Israel as presented to me by the Prime Minister, I will proceed with my mission -- as directed by President Reagan-- to seek to secure a cease-fire along the Israeli-Lebanese border, as a first step to bring calm to the area.

END TEXT

Following is the statement read in Hebrew and English by the Prime Minister:

9302566

MAR 5 1996

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPO/CR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO 12958
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/>		
FOIA Exemptions _____		TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____	<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
	<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

Small vertical text on the left margin.

The Prime Minister reported to the Cabinet on his talks with Mr. Philip Habib, the emissary of the President of the United States, and on the personal messages received from the Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig.

The Cabinet decided as follows:

(1) The Government agrees that Mr. Philip Habib embark upon contacts with the President of Lebanon, Mr. Sarkis, and with the Government of Lebanon with the aim of establishing peaceful relations between Israel and Lebanon from where the terrorist organization incessantly attacked the territory of Israel and murder and maim its citizens.

(2) The Government of Israel will under no circumstances conduct negotiations directly or indirectly with the Arab terrorist organizations whose declared aim is the destruction of Israel and its people and who intentionally turn their arms--which are supplied to them in large quantities by the Soviet Union, Syria, and Libya--against the Jewish civilian population. Likewise the Government of Israel will not authorize anybody to conduct negotiations with the aforementioned terrorist organizations.

(3) The Government will continue to defend the citizens of Israel; this is its right and duty.

Secretary's Memo

259



UNCLASSIFIED

R

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: June 4, 1981; 3:50-4:15 pm. Secretary's Meeting with Messrs. Habib, Veliotes, Wolfowitz, Burt, McFarlane, Stoessel, Bremer, Draper, and Sicherman

The Secretary said he had called the meeting to review Habib's mission before he embarked on the next round. Habib said he would first go to Paris and brief the French. He noted that Cassaroli in Italy supposedly wanted to see him, but he would not do so unless specifically requested. Habib said that Foreign Minister Saud may go to London after the Arab Quadripartite meeting and ask to see him there. Habib said he also had a message from Fahd that the Saudis would like him first to go to Lebanon and then to Saudi Arabia, and then Israel. Habib said this suited his purposes fine since he did not wish to go to Tel Aviv unless he had something to demonstrate to Begin that there was a viable diplomatic track. Draper interjected that the Saudis had just sent us a message that they wished Habib to go to Damascus after Beirut and then on to Riyadh and Tel Aviv. Habib said he expected to have an impression of what the Saudis had accomplished by Sunday. The key, however, was to have it before he went to Israel. He did not want to meet with Begin empty handed since Begin was already suspicious that the Saudi connection was futile. Habib said we should not let Begin decide when the Saudi connection was no longer useful--that is for us to decide. Begin's announcement after his meeting with Sadat that he would give Habib time to pursue his mission was a good sign, but we need to make the Arabs see the urgency of the situation. At the moment we could tell Begin that the Saudis were pursuing the status quo ante, that they believed they could achieve this and that they might deal first with the ridge and Zahle situations. They may be given a commitment that the missiles will be removed in time. Habib said he did not believe Begin would go back on his word not to strike the missiles as long as the Habib mission was underway. Begin had never gone back on his word.

3/5/94

9302560

SECRET/COR

X

Authority to

The Secretary asked Habib for his opinion should the worst case develop: Habib gets from the Saudis the likelihood of early resolution of the issues, but on the condition that the Phalange would publicly disassociate themselves from Israel. Habib said he did not consider this to be the worst case; Israel striking the missiles with Habib in the area was the worst case. The Secretary said that what he called the worst case was the outcome he considered most likely. Habib questioned whether the Phalange would actually



UNCLASSIFIED

be able to make this type of public declaration. While the Phalange were prepared to make gestures toward Syria, Habib did not believe they were ready to break with Israel without a guarantee of some continuing source of arms. The Secretary asked Habib how the Israelis would react. Habib said that the Israelis would know that they could continue a close relationship with the Phalange behind the scene. The Secretary agreed that this is what he thought would also happen. The Secretary asked Habib what the PLO stake was in such circumstances. Habib said that the PLO at the beginning feared that Syria would fight with Israel and Israel would "cream" the PLO. The PLO stake was with Syria and the Saudis. If the Saudis and Syrians acquiesced in such a resolution, there was no where for the PLO to go. Libya might try to upset such a settlement but would not have the influence to do so.

Burt said that this scenario sounded plausible. He asked what status quo we were talking about in Damascus and Tel Aviv--one designed to enable the Syrians to strengthen their forces in Libya or one to give Assad a face-saving way to ease the crisis? Habib said that right away we had to settle the two internal issues. That was enough to show we were moving in the right direction. For that reason, in addition to the missile question, he had also kept the ridge and Zahle questions on the table. Burt said that if we didn't have this the argument would build as we approached the Israeli elections that Begin was rolled. Habib countered, saying that Rabin's recent speech in the Knesset suggested that the argument was going the other way--i.e., that Begin's commitment to the Christians was excessive.

The Secretary said that we all appeared to be together in our views and knew what we were doing. He said he wished to underline two points: first, it was clear to him that the Israelis were highly skeptical, even suspicious, of what we were doing with the Saudis. Thus it was necessary to lay out for them the chapter and verse as best we knew it so that we didn't proceed with such Israeli concerns. Second, we have to have a sense of urgency and get to the point where we can diffuse the present crisis. The Saudis, Syrians and all parties must recognize this urgency. The Secretary said his nightmare was that we would get consensus among the parties and Begin would feel that despite this he could not give up the preemptive attack option against Palestinian threats. This would make the resolution extremely fragile. Habib said we could attempt to deal with this in a later context. He hoped Begin would not exercise that option

while he was in the region. The Secretary asked whether there were any major remaining issues to be discussed. Habib said that in the short run we can get Begin to be "minimal" not just "prudent." After all, he had already proved his point. Habib commented further that the Palestinians had not done much in the last month. Of course, Begin said this had been the case because he hit them hard, but Habib said he suspected the Palestinians had exercised some restraint.

Habib said there was one more item--the reconnaissance track. Habib said if we get close to a resolution we will have to define what the status quo ante means in terms of Israeli reconnaissance. Prior to the crisis, the Israelis had flown only one flight a month over the Bekka. We need to be flexible on this, Habib said, because this is one area where we can return to a "different" status quo ante. Habib said that reconnaissance might be a useful card to play but that he would keep it in his pocket and not play it unless necessary.

The Secretary and Habib had a brief discussion in private after the other participants left the room.

Michael  osson

UNCLASSIFIED

⋮

2556

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Guidelines for the Habib Mission

- Explore with involved governments and parties what may be done to resolve the Syrian-Israeli confrontation in the Bekaa, based upon arrangements that make it possible for both to draw back from the crisis. To that end:
 - Create a sense of momentum in the short term that will provide time for diplomacy and face-saving;
 - Assuming acceptance by Syria and Israel work out arrangements to restore equilibrium based on pullback of Syrian SAM missiles and withdrawal from the Mt. Sannine ridge. Such arrangements would take account of legitimate security concerns of both Syria and Israel regarding developments in Lebanon.
 - Take care that resolution does not concede or imply U.S. acceptance of permanent rights by either Israel or Syria to military presence or activities in Lebanon. Where possible, arrangements should contribute to enhancement of the prestige and authority of the Government of Lebanon;
 - Deal, within the context of this mission, only with those aspects of the general situation in Lebanon

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

9302866

CLASSIFY IN PART

DECLASSIFY

ED CHIEF

CLASSIFY 88

DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

TS authority to

3/8/96

(S) 1, 17/2001

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

(e.g., arrangements to deploy LAF or GOL observers to the Sannine ridge or other spots) that complement the focus of the mission and will not be seen to undercut other, Arab efforts to deal with the internal situation;

- Seek, by your meeting(s) with President Assad, to form judgments regarding Syrian interest in a more sustained, high-level dialog on Lebanon (and/or other topics);
 - Take care that, to the extent possible, the problems between Israel and Syria in Lebanon be resolved in ways that do not afford the Soviets political benefits or confirm that Syria has no alternative to overdependence upon Moscow. Under no circumstances, provide openings for the Soviets to use this crisis to gain acceptance for a role in wider Middle Eastern issues.
- Encourage, where possible, broader participation by moderate Arabs, particularly Saudi Arabia, in working out the problems of Lebanon and keep them informed so that, should your mission fail because of Syrian intransigence, the Syrian attitude will be a factor we can use to limit both the extent of violence and the damage to our position in the region.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: NEA/ARN:WNHowell:pdw
5/5/81, x 22670

Cleared: NEA:NAveliotas

810400146

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

64
R [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20009-0493

PAGE 01 ROME 27001 01 OF 03 021833Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----181144 021835Z /46
O 021716Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3881

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 27001

~~SECRET~~ DECAPTIONED

FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE

REF: A) TEL AVIV 17920; B) BEIRUT 8860

1. ~~SECRET~~

2. DURING MY RECENT SWING THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST I FOUND THE ARAB ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE GOOD, AND I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE CRUCIAL ARAB SUPPORT, THE CHANCES FOR JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN PARTNERSHIP HAVE BEEN ENHANCED AS A CONSEQUENCE. HOWEVER, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPASSE OVER THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON AND BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE PEACE INITIATIVE. HUSSEIN, HUBARAK, AND PAHD WERE CLEAR THAT WE MUST GET OFF DEAD CENTER ON LEBANON.

3. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS TIME TO ADOPT THE LEBANON STRATEGY WHICH WORKED IN BEIRUT, AND WHICH WE HAD ORIGINALLY

PAGE 02 ROME 27001 01 OF 03 021833Z

CONTEMPLATED FOR ACHIEVING THE CATHARAL OF ALL FOREIGN

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DENY
 DENY

FOLIA Exemptions
 PA Exemptions

IS/FOI/DOJ
 EG ORIGIN
 TS auth.

CLASSIFY
 DOWNGRADE
 S or
 S or

Date: 3/5/86

NS01566

UNCLASSIFIED

FORCES FROM ALL OF LEBANON. WE SHOULD FORMULATE A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES -- AKIN TO THE BEIRUT EVACUATION PLAN -- AND SEEK ITS PROMPT ACCEPTANCE BY ALL THE INVOLVED PLAYERS.

4. I REALIZE THAT THIS APPROACH WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL, WHICH HAS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRECT ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. BUT, WE HAVE MADE A SERIOUS AND PROLONGED (SEVEN WEEKS) EFFORT TO OBTAIN THIS, AND WE APPEAR TO BE IN FOR A LONG IMPASSE. MOREOVER, I FEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH MUCH BY RESOLVING THE VENUE ISSUE. AS SAM AND MORRIS HAVE POINTED OUT (REFTELS), SOME IN ISRAEL HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE LEBANON A TEST REGARDING THE PEACE INITIATIVE. THESE PEOPLE WILL FIND NEW PROCEDURAL HURDLES -- SUCH AS THE AGENDA, OR THE NUMBER AND NAMES OF COMMITTEES. ALSO SOME IN ISRAEL HAVE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURES DEPENDENT UPON ACHIEVING DRAMATIC OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON/ISRAEL RELATIONS. THESE PEOPLE WILL SEEK SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS WHICH THE LEBANESE CANNOT GIVE AT THIS TIME. WHILE THESE TWO GROUPS MAY NOT REPRESENT THE MAJORITY IN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, THEY WILL HAVE ENOUGH INFLUENCE, AS WE HAVE SEEN, TO MAKE PROGRESS VERY DIFFICULT AND SLOW. WE SIMPLY DO NOT HAVE THE FOUR MONTHS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SHARON'S AIDE TAHIR HAS SUGGESTED. IT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERMINE THE PEACE INITIATIVE, AND EVENTS WOULD OCCUR IN LEBANON WHICH WOULD DIMINISH THE CHANCES FOR ANY NEGOTIATED OUTCOME (THE CHOUP, THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON JUMBLATT, GENAYEL'S REQUEST FOR MORE MNF TROOPS, ETC.).

5. I DO NOT RULE OUT DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. IF BOTH ACCEPT OUR PLAN, BUT WITH MINOR COMMENTS,

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ROME 27001 01 OF 03 021833Z

THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR TWO DELEGATIONS TO COME TOGETHER AT A MUTUALLY AGREED PLACE FOR A SINGLE SESSION TO COMPLETE THE DEAL.

6. I WOULD IMPLEMENT THIS STRATEGY IN THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

(A) AMBASSADOR DRAPER HAS INTENSIVE TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE TO ASCERTAIN IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE HOW FAR THE LEBANESE WILL GO TO MEET THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS HADDAD'S FORCES, MOVEMENT ACROSS THE BORDER, AND REPRESENTATION. HE WILL ALSO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE OPENED DISCUSSIONS ON WITHDRAWAL WITH THE SYRIANS AND PLO;

(B) GENAYEL MUST MAKE HIS OWN DECISION ON WHETHER TO GO TO JERUSALEM, WITHOUT US PRESSURE. IF THE MATTER IS SETTLED AND NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN, WELL AND GOOD. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN WAIT MUCH LONGER FOR THIS, NOR DO I BELIEVE IT WILL OCCUR. IN MY VIEW, DRAPER'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE AREA IN THE FACE OF THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF "BUSINESS-AS-USUAL" AND UNDERMINES OUR CREDIBILITY. I SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT HE RETURN TO WASHINGTON NOT LATER THAN DECEMBER 7. THIS WILL ALSO SERVE TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE THINKING OF NEW WAYS TO MOVE FORWARD;

(C) WITH DRAPER IN WASHINGTON, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON PREPARING A PLAN FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM ALL OF LEBANON;

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 ROME 27001 02 OF 03 030746Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 (AS-01 NSCE-00)/000 W
-----204036 030939Z /11
O 021716Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3552

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 27001

NODIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA. 6 SUBPARA 2 AND 3)

(D) AS SOON AS FORMULATED, SAM LEWIS SHOULD DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PM BEGIN, WHICH INCORPORATES THE PLAN. THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE INFORMED AT THE SAME TIME. AT THIS POINT, WE WILL HAVE ALLOWED THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE SUFFICIENT TIME TO WORK OUT THEIR REMAINING PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTY. THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO ON TOP OF THE FUTILE EFFORTS OF THE PRECEDING WEEKS WILL BE CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT WE MUST FIND A BETTER WAY TO PRESS AHEAD IN LEBANON!

(E) IF ISRAEL'S RESPONSE IS POSITIVE, THEN WE WILL NEED TO PULL OUT ALL STOPS TO GAIN ITS ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHERS. IF IT IS NEGATIVE OR EQUIVOCAL, THEN THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO USE HIS MEETING WITH BEGIN IN EARLY JANUARY TO PRESS FOR ITS ACCEPTANCE. I HAVE IN MIND THAT THE PRESIDENT EITHER GAIN ISRAELI AGREEMENT OR BE PREPARED TO TELL PM BEGIN THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF ISRAELI FORCES IN LEBANON TO ACHIEVE MORE THAN OUR PLAN COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS "FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES". (IF BEGIN DOES NOT COME TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY, I WOULD CARRY THE SAME MESSAGE TO HIM IN JERUSALEM). I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE CAN ALLOW THE SITUATION IN LEBANON TO FESTER ANY LONGER AND TO JEOPARDIZE OUR BROAD POLICY INTERESTS.

PAGE 02 ROME 27001 02 OF 03 030746Z

7. OBVIOUSLY, THIS STRATEGY SHOULD ONLY BE UNDERTAKEN WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT. I WILL BE IN WASHINGTON DECEMBER 8 TO DISCUSS THIS STRATEGY. IN THE MEANTIME, IF YOU AGREE, DRAPER SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE THOROUGH DISCUSSION WITH THE LEBANESE INDICATED IN PARA 6(A), AND RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

B. I DO NOT PROPOSE TO FORMULATE THE PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES IN SPECIFIC TERMS, UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO GO OVER ALL OF THE ISSUES WITH DRAPER, WHO KNOWS BEST WHAT ARE THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS AND THE LEBANESE LIMITS. HOWEVER, I THINK THAT IT WILL NEED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

--A SCHEDULE WITH DATES SPECIFIED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THE PLO MAY LEAVE FIRST, IF PRINCE SAUD'S REPORTS ARE ACCURATE. WE WILL NEED A FORMULA FOR PARALLEL SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WITHOUT LINKING THEM;

--A SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, WITH REASONABLE LIMITATIONS ON THE LAF, BUT NO RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE. (OVERFLIGHTS WILL CONTINUE, BUT WITHOUT THE EXPLICIT CONCURRENCE OF THE GOL. NAVAL PATROLS WILL BE OUTSIDE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS.) ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE ZONE WILL BE BROUGHT UNDER THE DIRECT AUTHORITY OF THE LAF.

--GENERAL SECURITY UNDERTAKINGS WHICH WILL APPLY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND PERHAPS BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA, INCLUDING COMMITMENTS NOT TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES; NOT TO ALLOW THE PRESENCE OF HOSTILE FOREIGN FORCES; NOT TO ALLOW

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03 ROME 27001 02 OF 03 030746Z

USE OF TERRITORY FOR CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS; NOT TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS; AND NOT TO CONDUCT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA.

--LEBANON WILL AFFIRM THAT IT IS NOT IN A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL;

--THE BORDER WILL BE OPEN, SUBJECT TO NATIONAL LEGISLATION. THIS MEANS LEBANON WILL HAVE COMPLETE FREEDOM, AS DO OTHER SOVEREIGN STATES, REGARDING HUMAN PEOPLE AND GOODS CROSS ITS BORDERS. (HOWEVER, WE WILL NEED TO HAVE

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNDERSTANDINGS FROM THE GOL, WHICH WE CAN CONVEY TO THE GOI, THAT SOME PEOPLE AND GOODS CAN CROSS THE BORDER).

--THERE WILL BE CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS AT AN APPROPRIATE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, AFTER WITHDRAWAL, WITH A VIEW TO IMPROVING THEIR RELATIONSHIP.

--THERE WILL BE A ROLE FOR AN EXPANDED MNF, IN SERVING AS AN INTERPOSITION FORCE ON CERTAIN KEY TERRAIN AND PERHAPS IN PROTECTING THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS.

--THERE WILL BE A ROLE FOR UNIFIL, ALTHOUGH ITS AREA OF OPERATIONS MAY NEED TO BE SHIFTED AND ITS MANDATE STRENGTHENED.

--PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS WHO REMAIN IN LEBANON WILL BE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**PAGE 01 ROME 27001 03 OF 03 021834Z
ACTION MODS-00**

**INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 M
-----181163 021839Z /41
O 021716Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3883**

SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 27001

MODIS

**SUBJECT FULLY TO LEBANESE LAW, INCLUDING ITS PROTECTIONS.
NONE OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS AVAILABLE UNDER
THE CAIRO AND MELKART ACCORDS WILL REMAIN VALID.**

**9. THESE PROPOSALS ARE DESIGNED TO BREAK THE IMPASSE ON
LEBANON. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN LET THE PROBLEM
TRAIL OFF IN THE INDECISIVE WAY WHICH NOW THREATENS.
NOR DO I BELIEVE WE CAN ACCEPT THE LEISURELY SCHEDULE
WHICH THE ISRAELIS SEEM WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE. WHETHER
WE GO THE ROUTE I SUGGEST OR NOT, I PROPOSE THAT WE
HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT NEXT WEEK.**

10. DEPARTMENT PASS TO EMBASSIES BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV.

RABB

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20008-0198

R
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 DANASC 07144 01 OF 02 031025Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----023776 031035Z /12

O 031035Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY DANASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0841
INFO AMEMBASSY ANMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	
FOIA Exemptions	
PA Exemptions	

9302566

SECTION 01 OF 02 DANASCUS 07144

MODE **DECLASSIFIED**

STADIS:////////////////////

FROM HABIB/DRAPER FOR S/S AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, SY, US, IS
SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON

REF: STATE 279008 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~

2. THE REMAINING MAJOR SHORT-TERM TASK IN LEBANON IS TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES--ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND REMAINING PLO COMBATANTS. THIS IS NECESSARY IF THERE IS TO BE A UNITED, INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN LEBANON, WITH AUTHORITY OVER ALL ITS TERRITORY WITHIN ITS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 DANASC 07144 01 OF 02 031025Z

BORDERS. WITHOUT IT THERE IS NO FORESEEABLE SOLUTION

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
TO THE LEBANESE PROBLEM.

3. THE APPROACH WE HAVE BEEN TAKING TO ARRIVE AT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES HAS BEEN BASED UPON THE LOGICAL ASSUMPTION THAT A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL CAN BE ARRANGED. THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE DEPARTURE OF THE FORCES WITHIN A GIVEN TIME FRAME, ON A PHASED BASIS (PREFERABLY IN TWO-STEPS), WITH INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 40 KM BUFFER ZONE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ALONG THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.

4. WE TESTED THIS CONCEPT ON THE NEW PRESIDENT OF LEBANON AND RECEIVED HIS APPROVAL. WE AGREED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL WITHIN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE. THIS WOULD REQUIRE A PLAN AGREED UPON BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND NEGOTIATED IN THE LABYRINTHIAN WAY WHICH HAS BECOME THE NORM. FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES, WE SUGGESTED A PLAN WHICH WOULD SEE A FIRST PHASE DISENGAGEMENT OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES BY OCTOBER 15 AND A FINAL TOTAL WITHDRAWAL DATE OF NOVEMBER 1 FOR ALL FORCES. WHILE MAY SEEM SHORT, WE BELIEVED IT DESIRABLE TO EMPHASIZE WHAT WAS MEANT BY "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE," RECOGNIZING THAT ADJUSTMENT MIGHT BE NECESSARY (PARTICULARLY IF A SATISFACTORY UNIFIL OR INTERNATIONAL FORCE CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED IN TIME FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL BY NOVEMBER 1).

5. WITH LEBANESE APPROVAL, SAUDI BLESSING, EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN ACCEPTANCE, AND SOME PRELIMINARY GENERALIZED DISCUSSION WITH THE ISRAELIS, WE MOVED TO

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03



DAHASC 07144 01 OF 02 031025Z

SPECIFIC NEGOTIATION WITH THE SYRIANS. WE BELIEVE SYRIAN AGREEMENT WILL GIVE SUCH A PLAN THE IMPETUS IT NEEDS. IT WOULD ALSO, IN PART, HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS IN NORTHERN LEBANON, SINCE MANY OF THEM WOULD NOT WANT TO STAY WITHOUT SYRIAN PROTECTION.

6. THE SYRIAN REACTION IS REPORTED IN DETAIL SEPARATELY. IN SUM, THE SYRIANS ARE INSISTING THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON PRECEDE SYRIAN DEPARTURE. THE SYRIANS

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


INSIST THEY ARE READY TO LEAVE UPON LEBANESE REQUEST, BUT REJECT THE CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE THE INVADERS WHILE THE SYRIANS ARE A LEGAL PRESENCE. THEY ALSO ARGUE THAT WITH ARAB LEAGUE SUPPORT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO DEPART UNDER ISRAELI THREAT. THEIR POSITION MAY NOT SOUND PRATICAL, BUT IN THEIR MINDS IT IS LOGICAL, LEGAL AND SUPPORTABLE. WE BELIEVE IT MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT RUN. COMPLICATING OUR EFFORTS IS THE FACT THAT THE SYRIANS ARE EVEN MORE SKEPTICAL AND DIS-TRUSTFUL OF ISRAEL THAN NORMALLY HAS BEEN THE CASE BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS VIOLATED THEIR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH US, INVADED WEST BEIRUT, AND CREATED CONDITIONS WHICH LED TO THE MASSACRE.


UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 DAMASC 07144 02 OF 02 031007Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 U' S
-----023711 031017Z /21

O 031057Z OCT 82
FM ANEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0842
INFO ANEMBASSY ANNAN IMMEDIATE
ANEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
ANEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
ANCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
ANEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
ANEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECTION~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 07144

STADIS //

NODIS

7. THE QUESTION WE PROPOSE TO EXAMINE IS HOW TO PROCEED. IN DOING SO, WE ALSO NEED TO LOOK AT OTHER PROBLEMS LIKELY TO ARISE. THESE INCLUDE THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN STATE 279008 AND OTHERS SUCH AS:

- A. EXACTLY HOW TO GET THE PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS OUT AND WHERE THEY WILL GO.
- B. WHAT IS TO BE THE FATE OF SAAD HADDAD AND HIS FORCES, WHOM THE ISRAELIS SUPPORT AND MAY WISH TO RETAIN IN SOUTH LEBANON?
- C. WHAT KIND OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE BUFFER ZONE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
- D. WHAT WILL BE THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES?

PAGE 02 DAMASC 07144 02 OF 02 031007Z

E. EXACTLY HOW CAN WITHRAWAL AND DISENGAGEMENTS BE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PHASED ON THE GROUND? (BEAR IN MIND THAT THE AREA THE IDF WILL WANT TO HOLD UNTIL THE VERY END IS THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY.)

8. THE OPTIONAL COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO US SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD EARLY ACHIEVEMENT OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. WE SHOULD NOT ABANDON THE VIEW THAT NOVEMBER 1 IS A PRACTICAL TARGET DATE. GIVEN THE FORCES INVOLVED AND THEIR LOCATION, THIS IS NOT UNREASONABLE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. ALSO, THE LONGER THE FORCES ARE WHERE THEY ARE, THE GREATER THE CHANCES OF AN INCIDENT WHICH COULD SET BACK THE WHOLE PROCESS.

9. WE PROPOSE THAT THE FOLLOWING NEXT STEPS BE TAKEN:

A. HABIB'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK BE THE OCCASION FOR A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE SITUATION. HOPEFULLY, THIS CAN BE ARRANGED FOR WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6. BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO MEET WITH ASSAD ON OCTOBER 3, THIS IS THE EARLIEST HE CAN BE THERE.

B. DRAPER WILL RETURN TO BEIRUT AND INFORM PRESIDENT GENAYEL OF THE SYRIAN POSITION AND CONSULT WITH HIM. HE SHOULD THEN BRIEF THE ISRAELIS ON WHERE THINGS STAND AND ELICIT THEIR REACTION, BUT AVOID TAKING A FINAL POSITION.

C. MEANWHILE, WE SHOULD BEGIN AN EFFORT TO GET THE SYRIANS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL. THIS MEANS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING SAUDI AND LEBANESE SUPPORT

PAGE 03

DAMASC 07144 02 OF 02 031007Z

FOR A DIRECT PLEA TO ASSAD. WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC ON THIS SCORE, BELIEVING THAT THE SYRIANS ARE PREPARED TO RESIST STRONGLY, EVEN UNDER THE THREAT OF ISRAELI MILITARY PRESSURE. BUT WE THINK THE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE NEVERTHELESS. IF IT SUCCEEDS, THE ROAD WILL BE SMOOTHER AND EASIER TO VISUALIZE.

D. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO OPEN CHANNELS TO THE PLO TO BEGIN THE NECESSARY NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO PLO WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR REMAINING COMBATANTS.

E. WE SHOULD KEEP THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS INFORMED OF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WHERE THINGS STAND, PREVENT ANY PREMATURE MOVES AT THE UN, SECURE THE EXTENSION OF THE UNIFIL PRESENCE AND DECIDE ON THE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE WE WOULD HOPE TO PROMOTE IN SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE EFFORT.

F. WE SHOULD AVOID EXPOSING ANY ALTERNATIVE TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL UNTIL THE REVIEW IN WASHINGTON HAS TAKEN PLACE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE APPARENT IMPASSE IS TO INSIST ON SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL, BUT THIS NEEDS CAREFUL CONSIDERATION ON OUR PART BEFORE WE MAKE OUR VIEWS KNOWN TO OTHERS.

10. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

UNCLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

63

AM: NB20006-0178

~~Handwritten scribbles and redactions~~

PAGE 01 SECTO 13032 01 OF 04 011840Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 (AS-01 NSCE-00)/000 W
-----003157 020128Z /41
O 011822Z OCT 82 ZFF-4
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7006

~~REDACTED~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 SECTO 13032

DECAPTIONED

DAMASCUS FOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P), UNGA, PEPR, SY, US, LE. IS
SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SYRIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER KHADDAM, SEPTEMBER 30, 1982 - HENCON

1. ~~REDACTED~~

2. TONE: MEETING, SCHEDULED FROM 5-5:30PM, LASTED TWO HOURS. THERE WAS NONE OF THE USUAL HOSTILE RHETORIC, BUT TO THE CONTRARY, MEETING REFLECTED THOROUGH, SERIOUS SYRIAN CONSIDERATION OF USG POSITIONS, ESPECIALLY ON LEBANON AND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE. KHADDAM, WITH PREPARED NOTES, AND COPIES OF SECRETARY'S LETTER ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO CLARIFY REAGAN'S INITIATIVE, OBSERVING THAT SYRIA HAD NOT YET OFFICIALLY RESPONDED TO IT, AND THAT HE WAS NOT DEBATING OR OBJECTING TO USG VIEWS "BECAUSE THAT WOULD BE NEGOTIATING". KHADDAM WAS VERY PLEASED WITH SECRETARY'S UNGA SPEECH WHICH HE FOUND "BALANCED" AND "POSITIVE", STATING THAT ALL ARAB NATIONS FOUND REFERENCE TO RECOGNITION OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS VERY SATISFYING. PARTICIPANTS WERE

~~REDACTED~~

PAGE 02 SECTO 13032 01 OF 04 011840Z

KHADDAM, AMB. JOUEJATI, SAHIM ABU FAREZ, THE

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
 IN PART

FOIA Exemptions
 PA Exemptions

EO Citations

CLASSIFY as () S or
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

TS Authority

9302566

IS, FPC/COR

Date: 3/5/86

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRETARY, ASST. SECY VELIOTES, DESK OFFICER MOLLY WILLIAMSON.

FEZ

3. KHADDAM ASKED FOR USG REACTIONS. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE WELCOMED FEZ RESULTS; THAT, WHILE IT SET FORTH POSITIONS DIFFERENT FROM OURS, WE ARE INTERESTED IN SEEING A PROCESS FOR PEACE COME FORWARD AND THE SUMMIT WAS CONSISTANT WITH THAT. KHADDAM NOTED FEZ WAS FIRST TIME ARABS UNITED TO ADVANCE A PEACE PLAN, WHICH WAS BASED ON UN RESOLUTIONS AND DEFINED ARAB REQUIREMENTS AND PREREQUISITES FOR PEACE WHICH PROCEEDED FROM FACT THAT MIGHT AND FORCE WERE NOT FACTORS LEADING TO PEACE.

4. FEZ FOLLOW-UP MEETING: KHADDAM WANTED USG REACTION TO ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION OF A NUMBER OF HEADS OF STATE. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT USG IS GLAD TO HEAR FROM ITS ARAB FRIENDS. BUT IT NOT YET CLEAR IF VISITING DELEGATION TO BE COMPOSED OF ALL HEADS OF STATE OR DELEGATION TO BE HEADED BY A HEAD OF STATE WITH MINISTERS FROM OTHER STATES. KHADDAM SAID IN FACT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT: KING HASSAN WANTED A DELEGATION OF THREE OR FOUR HEADS OF STATE; ANOTHER VIEW WAS THAT DELEGATION WOULD BE HEADED BY ONE HEAD OF STATE AND THE REST WOULD BE MINISTERIAL LEVEL, BECAUSE MINISTERIAL LEVEL "MIGHT MAKE MORE GIVE AND TAKE POSSIBLE". IN ANY CASE, THERE WOULD BE A MEETING IN RABAT OCTOBER 23, TO DISCUSS FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS. VELIOTES ASKED IF OCT. 23 MEETING INTENDED TO ASSESS RESULTS OF DEMARCHES OR TO PREPARE FOR DEMARCHES WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER OCT. 23. KHADDAM SAID OCT. 23

PAGE 03

SECTO 13032 01 OF 04 011040Z

MEETING WOULD BE TO PREPARE FOR MEETINGS. SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT PERIOD COMPLICATED BY US NOVEMBER ELECTIONS AND LIKLIHOOD PRESIDENT AND OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS WOULD BE AWAY FROM WASHINGTON. KHADDAM THOUGHT DELEGATION MIGHT COME AFTER FIRST WEEK IN NOVEMBER. IN ANY CASE, KHADDAM NOTED MOROCCO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING ARRANGEMENTS. SECRETARY WELCOMED DELEGATION BUT HOPED MEETINGS WOULD NOT INTERRUPT THINKING ABOUT PEACE PLAN, AND SAID HE ASSUMED THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT FOCUS ON LEBANON.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

KHADDAM AGREED.

LEBANON:

5. KHADDAM SAID WE SHOULD ALL CONSIDER ACCELERATING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND ALLEGED THAT ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MASSACRES WAS TO INCITE MOSLEM RETALIATION AGAINST CHRISTIANS TO FURTHER DIVIDE LEBANON AND THUS "REQUIRE" ISRAEL TO REMAIN IN LEBANON BECAUSE OF THE CHAOS. "THIS IS WHY WE ENCOURAGED AMIN AND URGED MOSLEM FACTIONS TO SUPPORT AMIN - TO AVOID FURTHER MOSLEM-CHRISTIAN CONFLICT WHICH WOULD FURTHER JEOPARDIZE UNITY OF LEBANON."

6. SECRETARY ASKED IF KHADDAM'S COMMENT RE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES MEANT SARG ALSO PREPARED TO LEAVE LEBANON PROMPTLY. KHADDAM REPLIED, "WE HAVE SAID SO MANY TIMES TO THE UNITED STATES WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO REMAIN IN LEBANON." HE REFERRED TO HABIB MEETING WITH ASSAD TWO MONTHS AGO ABOUT CEASEFIRE AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND REVIEWED WHY SYRIA DOES NOT ACCEPT LINKAGE BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON: SYRIA RESPONDED TO GOL REQUEST AND ARAB LEAGUE DECISION. KHADDAM SAID "TTER HAD BEEN

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
PAGE 01 SECTO 13032 02 OF 04 011842Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 (AS-01 NSCE-00)/000 W
-----003161 020128Z /46 *
O 011875Z OCT 82 ZFF-4
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7007

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 04 SECTO 13032

NODIS

DAMASCUS FOR HABIB

DISCUSSED AT FEZ AND SARG WAS COMMITTED TO FEZ DECISION BUT SARG WANTED TO BE ASSURED THAT ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW, NOTING SARG RESPONDED TO GOL REQUEST FOR SYRIAN FORCES TO LEAVE BEIRUT WITH ASSURANCES THAT ISRAELIS WOULD NOT GO INTO WEST BEIRUT. "THEN CAME THE MASSACRE." SARG WANTS GUARANTEES THAT, FOLLOWING SYRIAN DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON THERE WOULD NOT BE A MASSACRE OF MOSLEMS. KHADDAM OBSERVED PHALANGE MILITIAS STILL HAVE THEIR WEAPONS WHILE MOSLEMS HAVE NONE, AND RESTATED SARG REQUIREMENTS: A) ISRAEL'S ALSO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AND B) THERE MUST BE NO MASSACRE OF MOSLEMS (WHICH CAN BE ASSURED, HE SAID, BY FORMING A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT AND DISARMING THE MILITIAS). KHADDAM SAID HE WISHED TO BE CLEAR: SARG MAIN AIM IN LEBANON IS THE RESTORATION OF INDEPENDENCE, UNITY, AND SOVEREIGNTY.

7. LEBANON-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY: KHADDAM SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO PRESSURE ON LEBANON TO MAKE A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL, SAYING HE BELIEVED BASHIR'S ASSASSINATION DUE TO REJECTION OF PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL AND THAT THEREFORE ISRAEL HAD MOSSAD KILL HIM.

SECRET
PAGE 02 SECTO 13032 02 OF 04 011842Z

SECRETARY STATED USG FAVORS PEACE IN THE AREA AND THEREFORE FAVORS A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEBANON JUST AS USG FAVORS PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF HER NEIGHBORS. BUT PEACE TREATY AT GUNPOINT IS NO PEACE TREATY. AN EFFORT TO FORCE A PEACE TREATY AS "PRICE" FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE ONLY VERY BAD EFFECT. TREATY IN THAT REGARD MUST BE VOLUNTARY - PEOPLE HAVE TO WANT IT - ELSE IT HAS NO MEANING. KHADDAM RESPONDED "GOOD* WE AGREE COMPLETELY."

8. DAVID DODGE KIDNAPPING: SECRETARY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR SARG EFFORTS TO BE HELPFUL RE DODGE CASE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS AND ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION. KHADDAM SAID SARG WANTS TO HELP ("DODGE SR. AND JR. HAVE EXTENDED SO MANY SERVICES TO THE REGION"), AND THAT HE HAD ASKED HIS DEPUTY TO SPEAK WITH THE IRANIANS ABOUT THE DODGE MATTER. SARG WOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS, BUT IN ADDITION, KHADDAM OBSERVED, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF THE TWO KIDNAPPED EMPLOYEES OF IRANIAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT COULD BE FOUND.

9. LEBANON: HABIB VISIT AND RETURN OF ARMED PLO TO BEKAA. VELIOTES STRESSED USG HOPE ASSAD COULD MEET WITH HABIB TO HEAR VERY IMPORTANT POINTS HABIB HAD TO MAKE. (PRIOR TO MEETING, KHADDAM TOLD WILLIAMSON ASSAD UNABLE TO MEET WITH HABIB SINCE ASSAD OUT OF DAMASCUS FOR TWO-WEEK VACATION.) VELIOTES ALSO RAISED VERY DISTURBING, AND VERY RELIABLE, INFORMATION USG HAD OF ARMED PLO INFILTRATION BACK INTO BEKAA AND FEAR THIS MAY GIVE AN EXCUSE TO THOSE WHO MIGHT WISH TO CAUSE TROUBLE TO TAKE UNFORTUNATE ACTION. KHADDAM

PAGE 03

SECTO 13032 02 OF 04 011042Z

SAID HE DID NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF ELEMENTS GETTING INTO LEBANON, NOTING ONE OF THE REASONS SARG HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO RECEIVE MORE PLO WAS DIFFICULTY OF CONTROLLING SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER. KHADDAM SAID HE WAS SURE NO TROOPS RETURNED. HE ALSO NOTED SOME PLO LEADERS HAD VISITED LEBANON AND RETURNED TO SYRIA.

10. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE: KHADDAM SAID SARG HADN'T RESPONDED YET BECAUSE IT HAS SOME QUESTIONS ("OF COURSE WE HAVE SOME IDEAS AND COMMENTS, BUT WE PREFER NOT TO TAKE AN OFFICIAL POSITION UNTIL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

WE HAVE ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS"). WHEN SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED KHADDAM'S POSITION AND ENCOURAGED HIM TO ASK HIS QUESTIONS, KHADDAM ASKED ABU FARES FOR PREPARED NOTES AND PAPERS FROM HIS BRIEFCASE AND BEGAN HIS QUESTIONS (THIS PORTION OF MEETING TOOK ABOUT ONE AND ONE HALF HOURS):

A. PALESTINIANS IN EXILE: KHADDAM NOTED REAGAN PLAN REFERRED TO INHABITANTS OF WEST BANK AND GAZA, BUT DIDN'T TACKLE ISSUE OF PALESTINIANS IN EXILE; WHAT IS USG VIEW? SECRETARY BEGAN BY SAYING USG DOESN'T PRESUME TO HAVE ALL THE ANSWERS AND WANTS TO HEAR WHAT OTHERS HAVE TO SAY, BUT THAT HE COULD IMAGINE THAT PALESTINIANS NOT LIVING IN THE WEST BANK, HAVING SATISFACTORY LIVES, COULD HAVE IDENTITY, A PASSPORT OF SOME SORT. BUT MOVEMENT OF PALESTINIANS TO WEST BANK AND GAZA IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE. THERE ISN'T ENOUGH ROOM FOR ANOTHER MILLION OR SO PEOPLE. RATHER, THERE MUST BE SOME MIXTURE OF PALESTINIANS WHO ARE CITIZENS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, PALESTINIANS WHO LIVE OUTSIDE BUT HAVE SOME FORM OF IDENTITY, AND SOME PALESTINIANS WHO WOULD MOVE BACK. NOT ALL PALESTINIANS WOULD WANT TO RETURN TO LIVE IN THE WEST BANK. KHADDAM SAID THIS QUESTION WAS A MAJOR ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SECTO 13032 03 OF 04 011844Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 (AS-01 NSCE-00)/000 W
-----003163 020120Z /46
O 011575Z OCT 82 ZFF-4
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 700B

SECTION 03 OF 04 SECTO 13032

MODIS

DAMASCUS FOR HABIB

EVEN THOSE WHO HAVE BUSINESSES AND LIVES OUTSIDE FEEL THE NEED FOR HOMETLAND. SOLUTION TO THIS COULD BE UN RESOLUTION 194 (COMPENSATION OR RIGHT OF RETURN) WHICH USG AGREED TO IN 1949.

B. KHADDAM THEN ASKED WHAT THE BASIS WAS FOR JORDAN TO HAVE THIS "PECULIAR STATUS" WITH WEST BANK AND GAZA. SECRETARY REVIEWED PAST ASSOCIATION, CURRENT COMMERCE, FAMILY TIES, MOVEMENT, ETC., AND NOTED THAT SPECIFIC FORM OF AFFILIATION WITH JORDAN WAS STILL A QUESTION TO BE MORE FULLY DEVELOPED.

C. KHADDAM ASKED WHAT THE REASONS WERE FOR USG TO NOT ACCEPT ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN STATE SINCE USG VOTED ORIGINALLY FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO STATES: ARAB AND JEWISH. SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT AS WE LOOK AT IT, THERE IS NOT A "NATURAL NATION" IN THAT LAND FOR SEPARATE EXISTENCE. CHANCES ARE BETTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LONGEVITY IF THERE IS SOME OTHER FORM OF EXISTENCE. WE ALSO KNOW THAT ISRAEL WOULD REGARD A PALESTINIAN STATE AS INEVITABLY A STATE WISHING CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL. THERE IS VERY LITTLE

PAGE 02 SECTO 13032 03 OF 04 011844Z

CHANCE OF NEGOTIATING THAT KIND OF ARRANGEMENT.

D. KHADDAM THEN ASKED, KNOWING USG RECOGNIZES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEGITIMATE RIGHTS FOR PALESTINIANS, WHAT PREVENTS USG FROM RECOGNIZING PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION? SECRETARY RESPONDED USG FAVORS CONCEPT OF PALESTINIANS HAVING RIGHT TO TAKE PART IN DETERMINING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY ARE GOVERNED. WE FAVOR THE IDEA OF SELF-DETERMINATION, BUT THE WORDS IN MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT HAVE COME TO HAVE THE SPECIAL MEANING OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE. WE HAVE A TROUBLING WORD GAME BUT NO TROUBLE WITH IDEA OF PEOPLE HAVING CONTROL OVER THERE ENVIRONMENT.

E. KHADDAM NOTED PALESTINIAN PEOPLE SUPPORT PLO AND MOST COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE LEGITIMACY OF PLO - WHY DOES USG CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE PLO, ESPECIALLY SINCE PLO ACCEPTS FEZ COMMUNIQUE? SECRETARY REPLIED PLO DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS HISTORICALLY HAVE TAKEN POSITION THAT ISRAEL IS TERRITORY WHICH BELONGS TO PALESTINIANS AND THEY THEREFORE BELIEVE ISRAEL SHOULD BE DESTROYED; PLO FURTHERMORE DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL OR EXPLICITLY SUPPORT UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. SINCE OUR VIEW OF ISRAEL'S LEGITIMACY IS VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PLO'S VIEW, WE HAVE TAKEN POSITION THAT WE DO NOT AGREE TO A DIALOGUE UNTIL PLO SAYS IT RECOGNIZES ISRAEL, UN RESOLUTION 242 AND 338. VELIOTES ADDED THAT OUR ARAB FRIENDS KEEP SEEING THE RESTRICTIVE SIDE OF USG'S POSITION RATHER THAN THE POSITIVE SIDE -- IT'S A STANDING INVITATION TO TALK. KHADDAM OBSERVED PLO'S ACCEPTANCE OF FEZ IS A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT. SECRETARY AGREED BUT NOTED THAT IT STILL IS NOT AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT AND WE FIND A CONTINUING

PAGE 03 SECTO 13032 03 OF 04 011844Z

PATTERN OF STATEMENTS GIVEN HERE AND THERE UNDER DIFFERING CIRCUMSTANCES AND SUBJECT TO VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS.

F. KHADDAM NOTED REAGAN'S SPEECH SAYS ISRAEL HAS A RIGHT TO SECURE BOUNDARIES; IN USG VIEW, IS THIS RIGHT ONLY FOR ISRAEL OR FOR ALL STATES? SECRETARY SAID WE THINK ANY COUNTRY SHOULD HAVE SECURE BOUNDARIES, THOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE MANY THAT ARE NOT DEFENSIBLE IN MILITARY TERMS. FOR EXAMPLE, US AND CANADA HAVE LONGEST UNDEFENDED BOUNDARY IN WORLD; BOUNDARY IS NOT NATURAL BUT ARBITRARY AND NOT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEFENSIBLE MILITARILY. BUT IT WORKS. THE RIGHT TO SECURE BORDERS IS OF COURSE ALSO THERE FOR SYRIA, AND NOTED IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECH THAT THE DETERMINATION OF BOUNDARIES WILL DEPEND ON WHAT KIND OF PEACE IS AVAILABLE. KHADDAM PRESSED: DOES SYRIA HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFENSIBLE BORDERS? FACT IS ISRAEL IS MAJOR MILITARY POWER AND IS THE AGRESSOR. IS RIGHT TO SECURITY JUST FOR ISRAEL OR FOR EVERYONE? SECRETARY REPLIED THE OBJECTIVE IS PEACE FOR EVERYBODY; THAT'S WHAT COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IS ALL ABOUT.

G. KHADDAM ASKED WHAT THE BASIS WAS FOR SUPPORTING EXISTING SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK BUT REQUIRING THEIR REMOVAL FROM THE SINAI. SECRETARY REPLIED CONCEPT WAS THAT JEWS CAN LIVE IN WEST BANK JUST AS ARABS LIVE IN ISRAEL. THE RESIDENTS MUST LIVE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE COUNTRY WHICH HAS JURISDICTION. SHOULD FINAL OUTCOME BE JORDANIAN RULE, IT WOULD BE UNDER JORDANIAN JURISDICTION THAT SETTLEMENTS RESIDENTS WOULD LIVE.

H. KHADDAM REFERRED TO SECRETARY'S LETTER OF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SECTO 13032 04 OF 04 011846Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 (AS-01 NSCE-00)/000 W
-----003167 020129Z /46
O 011575Z OCT 82 ZFF-4
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO ANEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7009

SECTION 04 OF 04 SECTO 13032

NODIS

DAMASCUS FOR HABIB

SEPTEMBER 1 NOTING MENTION OF WATER AND "FAIR GUARANTEES" AND WONDERED WHAT IT MEANT. SECRETARY OBSERVED WATER IS EXAMPLE OF SCARCE RESOURCE WHICH WAS A MATTER OF CONCERN WITHOUT REGARD TO BOUNDARIES AND THAT THEREFORE SOME ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR HOW SUCH RESOURCES SHOULD BE SHARED EFFICIENTLY AND FAIRLY.

I. KHADDAM WONDERED WHAT THE MEANING WAS FOR USG STAND OF NOT RECOGNIZING OR OPPOSING "ISOLATION" FROM ISRAEL. SECRETARY SAID IT MEANT THAT PEOPLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE BACK AND FORTH FREELY, TO BE ABLE TO LIVE IN AND WORK IN ANOTHER, TO HAVE EASY INTERCHANGE, AS FOR EXAMPLE CITIZENS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

J. KHADDAM SAID HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND LAST PARA OF SECRETARY'S SEPTEMBER 1 LETTER AND READ IT OUT LOUD (DISTINCTION BETWEEN FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PHASES). SECRETARY EXPLAINED HE ENVISION TWO STEPS: THE FINAL IS THE ONE IN WHICH DETERMINATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER DEFINED TERRITORY IS MADE; IN THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE

PAGE 02 SECTO 13032 04 OF 04 011846Z

THAT DETERMINATION WOULD NOT YET HAVE BEEN MADE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PERIOD WOULD BE FOR ISRAELI MILITARY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OCUPATION TO MOVE BACK AS RESIDENTS COULD, IN SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, CONTROL THEIR LIVES. WE THINK IT VERY IMPORTANT TO MOVE FROM DISCUSSING PALESTINIAN RIGHTS TO THE ACTUALITY OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. THE SOONER DISCUSSIONS GET UNDERWAY, THE SOONER MILITARY OCCUPATION CAN BE WITHDRAWN.

K. KHADDAM ASKED ABOUT ATTEMPTS TO DISPLACE PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS FROM LEBANON AND HOPED USG WOULD NOT LEND SUPPORT TO THIS TREND. VELIOTES EMPHASIZED WE HAD ALSO HEARD THESE STORIES, BUT BELIEVE THEM TO BE JUST STORIES, OF PLANS TO MOVE 500,000 PALESTINIANS, AND NOTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WORKING VERY HARD TO GET UNRWA TO PUT TENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. KHADDAM SAID THAT WAS VERY REASSURING AND SATISFYING TO HEAR.

10. KHADDAM ASKED IF USG STILL SUPPORTS UN RESOLUTION 194 AND VELIOTES RESPONDED EMPHATICALLY THAT WE DO. KHADDAM SAID THIS RESOLUTION APPLIED TO PALESTINIANS IN EXILE -- THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION OR RETURN. THE RIGHT TO RETURN DID NOT MEAN RETURN TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BUT TO THE HOMES THEY ACTUALLY LEFT TWENTY YEARS AGO. SECRETARY SAID THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THIS DIDN'T SOUND VERY REALISTIC SINCE THE HOUSES PROBABLY NO LONGER EXIST.

11. KHADDAM WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY TIME AND MUTUALLY RESPECTFUL TONE THE MEETING TOOK AND SAID "THE MAIN THING IS FOR US TO KEEP IN TOUCH." SECRETARY AND KHADDAM RECALLED

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03

SECTO 13032 04 OF 04 011846Z

HANDSHAKE OF FRIENDSHIP OF THEIR LAST MEETING (JULY 20) AND KHADDAM SAID ASSAD HAD BEEN VERY SATISFIED WITH REPORTS OF THAT MEETING. SECRETARY SUGGESTED THEY SHAKE HANDS AGAIN ON THAT.
SHULTZ

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AM: NB20007-0301

R

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05367 131421Z
ACTION MOOS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----366030 131430Z /41
O 131337Z AUG 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 7968
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

BEIRUT 5367

~~SECRET~~
DECAPTIONED
FROM HABIB

E.O 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, LE, IS, PLO9. /
SUBJECT: HABIB NIXICC: PROPOJED NEXO STEPS AUGUST 13-14

1. ~~SECRET~~
2. IN LIGHT OF THE LATEST PLO COMMUNICATION TO US, AS WELL AS THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WE HAD THIS MORNING, AUGUST 13, WITH SARKIS, NAZZAN, AND BUTRUS (SEE SEPTELS), I SUGGEST WE TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OVER THE NEXT 48 HOURS OF THE PRESENTLY POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE. HE IS WHERE I BELIEVE WE STAND AND WHAT MY NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE:
--THE CEASE-FIRE IS VIRTUALLY AIR-TIGHT. AN OCCASIONAL ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT DOES NOT DRAW FIRE.
--THANKS TO DECISIVE AND TIMELY ACTIONS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS, MUCH AMERICAN CREDIBILITY

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05367 131421Z

HAS BEEN RESTORED.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CLASSIFIED BY: []
DECLASSIFY IN FURTHERANCE OF: []
EXEMPTIONS: []

EO 12958

CLASSIFIED BY [] S of []
DOWNGRADE TO [] S of []

TS authority for: []

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

--I AM CONSIDERING GOING TO ISRAEL TOMORROW, SATURDAY, AUGUST 14, TO PRESENT TO BEGIN WHATEVER POSITION HAS DEVELOPED THROUGH THE PLO-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS TODAY AND TONIGHT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MAY BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE AMBASSADOR LEWIS PRESENT THE RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELI POSITION, AND KEEP ME IN RESERVE FOR A FINAL EFFORT.

--BEFORE REPORTING THE STATUS TO THE ISRAELIS, HOWEVER, WE NEED A SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO THE LEBANESE TO WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT THE SYRIAN AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL, AND AS EARLY IN THE PROCESS AS POSSIBLE. UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE LOST AT LEAST ONE DAY BECAUSE OF ISRAELI INTERFERENCE WITH THE TRAVEL OF THE LEBANESE ENVISSARY, GENERAL SANI KHATIB. KHATIB MAY RETURN TODAY TO LEBANON WITH THE SYRIAN ANSWER.

-AS REGARDS THE TIMETABLE FOR THE ENTRY OF THE VARIOUS MNF ELEMENTS, IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE PLO WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THERE BE A FRENCH UNIT OF 350 MEN PRESENT ON D-DAY. THE SUNNI MUSLIM NOTABLES OF WEST BEIRUT MAY EVEN BE MORE INSISTENT THAN THE PALESTINIANS THAT THERE BE A FRENCH ELEMENT PRESENT AS PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL BEGINS. ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST WEST BEIRUT YESTERDAY HAS INCREASED SUSPICION AND CONCERN FOR SAFETY.

--IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SARKIS AND WAZZAN THIS MORNING, HOWEVER, WE PLAYED AROUND WITH VARIATIONS ON THIS OPTION, SINCE WE CAN PRESUME CONTINUED ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO A FRENCH FORCE ON D-DAY. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE LAF IN ANY EVENT WILL HAVE TO BE PRESENT IN THE PORT AREA ON D-DAY. WITH THAT PREMISE ACCEPTED, WE CONJECTURED THAT POSSIBLY WE COULD EXPLORE THE LAF COMING IN ON D-DAY, WITH THE 350 MAN FRENCH ELEMENT A DAY OR TWO LATER, AND THEN A LAPSE OF SOME DAYS BEFORE THE BULK OF THE US, ITALIAN, AND REMAINING FRENCH FORCES ENTER BEIRUT. WE SHALL HAVE

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

BEIRUT 05367 131421Z

TO SEE.

--I STILL CONSIDER ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO A 350 MAN FRENCH DETACHMENT AS MISPLACED AND MISGUIDED. THE PLO HAS NOW AGREED TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE FRENCH ELEMENT IN THE INITIAL DAYS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PORT AREA AND ITS APPROACHES FROM WEST BEIRUT. AS A RESULT, THE ISRAELI ARGUMENT THAT THE FRENCH CONSTITUTE A "SHELTER" FOR THE PLO IS LESS AND LESS VALID.

--THUS, IF WE COULD COME UP WITH A REASONABLE AND IMAGINATIVE ARRANGEMENT THAT ADDRESSES IN PART ISRAELI CON-

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
CERNS, WE WOULD HAVE A GOOD BASIS ON WHICH TO URGE THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN THE NEW DEPLOYMENTS AND TIMETABLE. (AS NOTED ABOVE, WE WILL ALSO NEED A FIRM SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO LEAVE BEIRUT.)

--IF, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT MAKE HEADWAY WITH BEGIN, WE COULD CONSIDER AND EXPLORE AS A FINAL FALLBACK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM AND UNARMED US-FRENCH-ITALIAN "MONITORING" GROUP FROM THE MNF--OF PERHAPS 20-25 MEN FROM EACH COUNTRY, MAKING A TOTAL OF 60-75 MEN--TO MONITOR THE DEPARTURE BY SEA OF THE PALESTINIANS DURING THE PERIOD UP TO THE ENTRY INTO BEIRUT OF THE BULK OF THE MNF (IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO HAVE SUCH AN INTERIM OBSERVER GROUP ALSO MONITOR THE INITIAL DEPARTURES OVERLAND TO SYRIA, IF THE PLO ACCELERATES ITS DEPARTURE SCHEDULE AS NOW SEEMS POSSIBLE). THE GROUP COULD BE PROPOSED AS AN ADVANCE PARTY OF THE MNF, IF NECESSARY.

3. ACTION RECOMMENDED: I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO THE FOREGOING SCENARIO AND TO THE CONCEPT--AS A FALLBACK--OF PUTTING TOGETHER A 20-25 MAN US DETACHMENT INTO AN INTERIM OBSERVER GROUP. (THESE NEED NOT ALL BE MILITARY MEN; WE COULD PERHAPS INCLUDE A FEW ARABIC AND FRENCH-SPEAKING FSO VOLUNTEERS.) THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS INFORMALLY INDICATED THAT FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A GROUP WOULD NOT POSE A PROBLEM. MEANWHILE, NO ACTION NEED BE TAKEN WITH RESPECT

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 04

BEIRUT 05367 131421Z

TO ISRAEL, AND AMBASSADOR LEWIS CAN GIVE THEM AN INTERIM REPORT STATING THAT I AM ENGAGED IN ACTIVE EXCHANGES THROUGH THE LEBANESE INTERMEDIARIES AND WOULD HOPE TO HAVE A DEFINITIVE RESPONSE BY TOMORROW.

DILLON

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

615

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AN: NB20007-0238

R

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 TEL AV 12017 01 OF 02 071542Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----127013 071544Z /44

O 071532Z AUG 02 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7301
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

~~SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 12017~~

~~NO~~ DECAPTIONED

FOR THE SECRETARY AND HABIB FROM LEWIS

E.O. 12386: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, PLO, US, FR, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: ON THE WISDOM OF NOT
OVERESTIMATING OUR PERSUASIVENESS OR UNDERESTIMATING
THE ISRAELI RESISTANCE TO PRESSURE

REFS: A. BEIRUT 8168, B. BEIRUT 8178, C. TEL AVIV 12000,
D. STATE 220094, E. TEL AVIV 11997

1. ~~SECRET ENTIRE TEXP.~~

2. ALTHOUGH IT LOOKS TODAY AS IF PHIL HABIB
CAN FINALLY SEE THE FINISH LINE IN SIGHT, I MUST
RAISE A BRIGHT AMBER LIGHT. PHIL HAS EXPRESSED
THE CONVICTION IN A NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS AND
MESSAGES THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL SURELY NOT REJECT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 12017 01 OF 02 071542Z

THE OVERALL PACKAGE BECAUSE OF ONE OR TWO

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY

DECLASSIFY
 RECLASSIFY
 IN PART

FOIA Exemptions
 PA Exemptions

IS/Fec/ODR

EO Citations

CLASSIFY as S or 3 or
 DOWNGRADE TS to 3 or

TS Approved

Date: 5/11/10



UNCLASSIFIED

UNPALATABLE ELEMENTS, SO LONG AS ITS TOTAL EFFECT WILL ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL OF GETTING THE PLO LEADERS AND COMBATANTS OUT OF BEIRUT. HE IS COUNTING ON AMERICAN PERSUASIVENESS AND THE EXERCISE, IF NECESSARY, OF STRONG AMERICAN PRESSURE TO BRING THE ISRAELI CABINET AROUND WHEN THE TIME COMES. I EARNESTLY COUNSEL PHIL AND EVERYONE ELSE INVOLVED IN THIS INTRICATE ENTERPRISE NOT TO MAKE THAT ASSUMPTION.

3. AS THE PACKAGE NOW SHAPES UP, THE STICKING POINT WITH ISRAEL WILL BE OVER THE TIMING FOR INSERTION OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. BEGIN AND SHARON HAVE BOTH LAID DOWN UNEQUIVOCAL MARKERS DURING THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS ON THIS ISSUE (REFS B AND C). THEY AND ALL OTHER ISRAELIS INVOLVED ARE CONVINCED, PERHAPS UNREASONABLY BUT NO LESS UNSHAKABLY, THAT THE MOMENT A FRENCH MNF CONTINGENT, OR A UNIT OF UN OBSERVERS FOR THAT MATTER, ARE INSERTED BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE IDF, ALL BETS WILL BE OFF. ARAFAT'S APPARENT READINESS TO LEAVE UNDER PHIL'S PLAN WILL SUDDENLY EVAPORATE, TO BE REPLACED BY A PROLONGED EFFORT TO RENEGOTIATE ISSUES WHICH NOW SEEM TO HAVE FALLEN AWAY. THE ISRAELI LEADERS HAVE BEEN SAYING THIS TO US REPEATEDLY FOR THE PAST TWO WEEKS AND HAVE BEEN WARNING PHIL NOT TO MAKE SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IN THE EXPECTATION THAT IT WILL BE SWALLOWED IN JERUSALEM. I AM AFRAID THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THIS WARNING AS DEADLY SERIOUS.

4. IF THE PACKAGE IS PRESENTED TO THE ISRAELI CABINET WITH THIS ELEMENT IN IT, AS PHIL NOW HOPES

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

TEL AV 12017 01 OF 02 071542Z

TO DO IN THE NEXT VERY FEW DAYS, I AM CONVINCED IT WILL BE REJECTED. THERE WILL BE AN ARGUMENT HERE AS TO WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH MORE "MOOSE-TIGHTENING" MILITARY MOVES OR WHETHER TO GIVE PHIL A LITTLE LONGER TO CONVINCING THE PLO TO DROP THIS CONDITION. THAT DEBATE WILL BE A NARROW THING, BUT THE RESULT WILL LIKELY BE AN INSISTENCE THAT THIS PROVISION, IF NOT OTHERS, MUST BE RENEGOTIATED. WHILE THAT PROCESS GOES FORWARD, THE DANGERS OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS AND MORE MILITARY MOVES WILL

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

BE GREAT INDEED.

--

5. TACTICS OF PRESENTATION TO THE ISRAELIS ARE IMPORTANT BUT WILL NOT CHANGE THIS OUTCOME. I AM CERTAIN THAT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR HABIB TO COME TO JERUSALEM HIMSELF TO PRESENT THE PACKAGE, BACKED-UP BY A STRONG SIMULTANEOUS PITCH BY SECRETARY SHULTZ TO AMBASSADOR ARENS. BUT EVEN THAT DOUBLE WHAMMY WILL NOT, I FEAR, SERVE TO OVERCOME THE ISRAELI DETERMINATION TO BE ASSURED THAT THE PLO WILL NOT CHANGE ITS MIND ONCE SAFELY BEHIND THE BARRIER OF FRENCH FORCES.

6. WE MAY, REPEAT, MAY BE ABLE TO GET BEGIN AND SHARON BACK TO PHIL'S ORIGINAL IDEA, WHICH, OF COURSE, THEY NEVER FULLY ACCEPTED: HAVING ALL OF THE FORCE INSERTED AT A POINT WHERE THE PROCESS OF EVACUATION WAS WELL UNDERWAY AND IT HAD BECOME A PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE PLO LEADERS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. THAT IS THE MOST WE CAN

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

**PAGE 01 TEL AV 12017 02 OF 02 071544Z
ACTION NODS-00**

**INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----127022 071545Z /44
O 071532Z AUG 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7302
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY**

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 12017

NODIS

**HOPE FOR, AND IT WILL BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO
ACHIEVE.**

**7. MY STRONG ADVICE, THEREFORE, IS THAT PHIL TAKE
BEGIN AND SHARON'S STRICTURES TO HEART NOW RATHER
THAN LATER. DIFFICULT AS IT MAY BE WITH THE PLC,
IT IS BETTER TO FACE THIS ISSUE NOW RATHER THAN
NEXT WEEK. THE IMPRESSION I HAVE FROM AFAR IS
THAT PRESIDENT SARKIS, AT LEAST, AND PERHAPS OTHERS
IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT PRIVATELY AGREE VERY
STRONGLY WITH THE ISRAELI POSITION. THEY SHOULD,
THEREFORE, BE ALLIES, IF PHIL NOW REOPENS THIS
ISSUE OF THE TIMING OF FRENCH ENTRY, BASING HIMSELF
SQUARELY ON THE VERY CATEGORIC STATEMENTS MADE BY
BOTH BEGIN AND SHARON YESTERDAY AND TODAY.**

B. MINIMIZE BEIRUT, DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.

LEWIS

**~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~**

PAGE 02 TEL AV 12017 02 OF 02 071544Z

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

620

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20007-0296

AGE 01 STATE 225717
IGIN MODS-00

WFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

RAFTED BY NEA:CHILL:TH
PPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
EA:NAVELIOTES
/S:LPREMER
/ RHSTERN

-----332200 121857Z /41
O 121852Z AUG 82 ZFF6
M SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ANEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7947

STATE 225717
RECAPTIONED
MOD: E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MILI, IS, US, LE, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PH BEGIN

1. ~~66~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PLEASE DELIVER THIS MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO BEGIN AT ONCE. BEGIN QUOTE:
3. THIS MESSAGE FOLLOWS OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS TO EMPHASIZE THE DEPTH OF MY PERSONAL CONCERNS ABOUT RECENT ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT.
4. AT THIS MOST CRUCIAL MOMENT IN AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION, WHEN HE IS ONLY A FEW DAYS AWAY FROM WORKING OUT THE FINAL DETAILED POINTS OF HIS PACKAGE PLAN FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO IN BEIRUT FROM LEBANON, ISRAELI AIR

PAGE 02 STATE 225717

STRIKES, SHELLING AND OTHER MILITARY MOVES HAVE STOPPED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____
 PA Exemptions _____

EO Classifications _____

CLASSIFY as _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to _____

TS authority is _____

9302566
S:FPIC/CDR
Date: 3/5/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I FIND THIS INCOMPREHENSIBLE AND UNACCEPTABLE. ISRAEL MUST ADHERE TO AN IMMEDIATE, STRICT CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. THE ASSURANCES WHICH WE HEAR FROM JERUSALEM MUST BE BORNE OUT BY THE ACTIONS OF ISRAEL'S DEFENSE FORCES, WHO MUST STOP THESE MASSIVE ERUPTIONS TO ANY PROVOCATION.

5. I CANNOT STRESS ENOUGH TO YOU HOW SERIOUSLY I REGARD THIS SITUATION. AS I TOLD YOU ON THE TELEPHONE, OUR ENTIRE FUTURE RELATIONS ARE AT STAKE IF THESE MILITARY ERUPTIONS CONTINUE.

6. AMBASSADOR HABIB MUST BE ENABLED TO FULFILL THE LAST STEPS IN HIS MISSION. HE HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED A FULLY COMPREHENSIVE AND REASONABLE PACKAGE AGREEMENT. ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS OF THE PAST SEVERAL HOURS MAY HAVE MADE FURTHER ALTERATION OF THAT PACKAGE IMPOSSIBLE. IF THIS PROVES TO BE THE CASE, WE WILL LOOK TO ISRAEL TO ACCEPT IT FULLY SO THAT THE AGONY OF BEIRUT WILL END.

7. FURTHERMORE, WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF MOVES BY ISRAELI FORCES TOWARD JUBAYIL AND THE NORTH OF LEBANON? I CANNOT ACCEPT THIS NEW MILITARY ADVANCE AS COMPATIBLE WITH PLEDGES OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND SUPPORT FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A STABLE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

END QUOTE. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20007-0219

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 0516S 061623Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----076520 061636Z /44
O 061510Z AUG 82 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7791
INFO ANCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY OM
SCHEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 319

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 516S

~~SECRET~~ DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DNG: OADR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, PLO, XFOA
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: LOOKING AHEAD AUGUST 6

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY THE DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO AND THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER. I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO COME TO THE POINT WHELD J^o WILL HAVE A FINAL DRAFT OF A WITHDRAWAL PLAN BY XM AY, AUGUY 8. I PROPOSE TO PRESENT THAT PLAN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE PLO FOR APPROVAL. AT THAT TIME I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 0516S 061623Z

TO PROPOSE THAT D-DAY (THE BEGINNING OF PLO DEPARTURE) BE

UNCLASSIFIED

9302566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DECLASSIFY
 IN PART

FOIA Exemptions: _____

PA Exemptions: _____

EO Citations: _____

CLASSIFY as _____
 DOWNGRADE IS to: 1, 2, 3, 4

TS authority: _____

IS/FPC/CDR _____ Date: 3/5/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SET FOR AUMCO #

AUGUST 12. I HAVE IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY OF THAT DATE SLIPPING, DEPENDING UPON CONFIRMATION OF A DEPARTURE SCHEDULE BY PLO. IN THAT CASE, WE WOULD SUGGEST D-DAY NO LATER THAN AUGUST 15. THESE DATES SHOULD BE KEPT ONLY TO OURSELVES AT THE MOMENT.

3. IN THE MEANTIME, IT REMAINS ESSENTIAL THAT THE CEASE-FIRE BE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED WITH MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

IN MY MIND, IT IS EQUALLY ESSENTIAL THAT SERVICES TO WEST BEIRUT BE RESTORED. I HAVE GIVEN MY VIEWS IN THIS REGARD IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE. I WISH TO STRESS THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER ON BOTH HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL GROUNDS. FINALLY, SOME PUL

AXSCK#OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE CROSSING POINTS AT THE PORT AND THE MUSEUM AREA WOULD REDUCE THE CHANCES OF LOSING THE CEASE-FIRE, EASE THE PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY TO WEST BEIRUT, AND IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT GENERALLY AT A CRITICAL MOMENTNSN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

4. IF THE ISRAELIS REFUSE TO COOPERATE ON THE MEASURES RAISED IN THE PREVIOUS PARA, CONTINUE TO REINFORCE THEIR FORCES ON THE EDGE OF WEST BEIRUT, AND CONTINUE TO FLY THE SORT OF PROVOCATIVE LOW-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE WE HAVE NOTED TODAY, WE COULD FIND OUR EFFORTS HAMPERED WITHOUT REASON. SOMEHOW, WE MUST CONVINCHE THE ISRAELIS OF THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT. IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT IS A TASK BEST DONE FROM WASHINGTON. I WILL ALSO NEED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL PLAN, WHICH CONTAINS ELEMENTS

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06165 061623Z

THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE OBJECTED TO, BUT WHICH IN MY CONSIDERED OPINION ARE REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE.

5. FINALLY, WE MUST NOW GO ALL OUT TO PERSUADE THE EGYPTIANS TO RECEIVE PLO COMBATANTS. THE PALESTINIANS CLAIM THEY HAVE TOLD THE EGYPTIANS THAT THEY DO NOT WISH TO LINK THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT TO EGYPT WITH THEIR LONGER TERM POLITICAL CLAIMS. THIS WOULD IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF PERSUADING THE EGYPTIANS TO TAKE THEM.
DILLON

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NOTE BY OC/T: #GARBLED THROUGHOUT; CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

603

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AM: NB20007-0127

R
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 213728
ORIGIN MODS-00
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:CHILL:KM
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
NEA:NAVELIOTES
P:LEAGLEBURGER
S/ DMS
S/S-O:MHCADY
-----236213 310438Z /11
O O 310424Z JUL 82 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 213728

UNCLASSIFIED

DECAPTIONED
E.O. 12968:RDS-3 7/30/02 (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
TAGS: IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ

1. ~~SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. CHARGE BROWN SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO PM BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THIS IS MY FIRST MESSAGE TO YOU AND, WHILE THE PROBLEM OF WEST BEIRUT REMAINS OF THE GREATEST URGENCY, DANGER, AND COMPLEXITY, I AM PLEASED THAT THIS SEEMS TO BE A MOMENT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 213728
CONTAINING SOME HOPE FOR AN OUTCOME THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9302566

FOIA Exemptions: EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PART DENY

EO Citations: CLASSIFY EA DOWNGRADE TS to 1 S of 1 B of 1 8 of

TS authority to

IS/FC/CDR *AM* DATE: 3/5/96



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, LEAD TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM BEIRUT AND LEBANON, AND RESTORE PEACE TO THAT CAPITAL AGAIN.

THE DECLARATION OF THE ARAB LEAGUE COMMITTEE AT JIDDA

CONTAINS SOME CONSTRUCTIVE POINTS, SUCH AS "THE PLO ANNOUNCES ITS DECISION TO TRANSFER ITS ARMED FORCES OUT OF BEIRUT," ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES, AND ITS AVOIDANCE OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM AND OTHER ISSUES.

WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE ARRIVED AT A SIGNIFICANT POINT WHICH DESERVES OUR MOST SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE ATTENTION AND EFFORT. IT NOW SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT, WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT, AMBASSADOR HABIB WILL BE ABLE TO ENGAGE IN TALKS ON THE PRACTICAL DETAILS OF PRECISELY HOW AND WHEN THE DEPARTURE WILL TAKE PLACE. WHILE FURTHER DIFFICULTIES AND SETBACKS MAY LIE AHEAD, THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS, IN MY VIEW, COULD PROVIDE THE TURNING POINT IN OUR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES WHICH ISRAEL AND THE U.S. SHARE. IN THIS REGARD, AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS TOLD ME THAT HE HOPES YOU WILL CONSIDER AUTHORIZING DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE OR SUCH OTHER OFFICIAL AS YOU WISH TO DESIGNATE TO BE IN THE AREA TO CONSULT WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB WHEN SUCH DETAILED PRACTICAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN.

MR. PRIME MINISTER, IT IS ALSO, IN MY VIEW, INDISPENSABLE TO OUR HOPES FOR SUCCESS THAT AN ENVIRONMENT EXIST IN AND AROUND BEIRUT WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS CANNOT BE THE CASE UNTIL A FIRM

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

STATE 213728

CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. WE ARE URGING ADHERENCE BY THE OTHER SIDE AND TRUST THAT ISRAELI FORCES WILL NOT FIRE UNLESS FIRED UPON AND, IN SUCH CASES, WILL CONFINE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SOURCE OF THE VIOLATION WITH PROPORTIONALITY. ONLY IF THIS IS SO WILL WE HAVE ANY HOPE OF BRINGING THE FIRING TO A HALT IN A LASTING MANNER.

I AM EQUALLY CONCERNED AS WELL THAT A CONTINUATION OF PRESENT CONDITIONS -- INADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY, NO ELECTRICITY, AND IMPEDIMENTS TO THE SHIPMENT OF MEDICAL

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SUPPLIES AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN SERVICES -- WILL CAUSE THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATORS TO FOCUS ON THESE CONCERNS RATHER THAN ON THE SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS THAT MUST BE MADE. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE AT ALL, THUS WASTING THIS NEW OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS, WITH POTENTIALLY TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR COMMON LONG-TERM GOALS OF A PEACEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME.

THEREFORE, I MUST ASK YOU, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR MOST SERIOUS AND URGENT CONSIDERATION. MY EARNEST HOPE IS THAT, IN THE CAUSE OF A RAPID AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION, YOU WILL INSTRUCT YOUR FORCES

SURROUNDING WEST BEIRUT TO RESTORE FULLY WATER, POWER AND VITAL SERVICES TO THAT PART OF THE CITY.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO GOOD TALKS ON MONDAY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAHIR. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE PROMISING OPENING THAT NOW APPEARS BEFORE US WILL BY THAT TIME HAVE BEEN TAKEN SO THAT OUR TALKS CAN DEAL WITH PRACTICAL DETAILS OF THE PLO'S DEPARTURE AND POSITIVE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,
GEORGE P. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

STATE 213728

END TEXT.

4. IN DELIVERY THE ABOVE YOU SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS AS REFLECTING THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS:

-- WE ARE CLEARLY AT A CRUCIAL POINT WITH REGARD TO WEST BEIRUT. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS CAN SPELL SUCCESS OR FAILURE.

-- WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE VARIOUS FORCES SEEKING TO DESTROY OUR HOPES FOR SUCCESS. THE U.S. IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE TAKEN IN BY THESE EFFORTS.

-- THERE IS NO DOUBT BUT THAT THE PLO WILL USE EVERY DEVICE TO TRY TO PROLONG THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO TURN

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THEN TOWARD THEIR ELEVEN POINT PROGRAM. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US. AMBASSADOR HABIB IS CONTINUING TO WORK WITHIN THE SAME FRAMEWORK OF MODALITIES FOR THE PLO DEPARTURE THAT WE HAVE PURSUED ALL ALONG. WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY POINT THAT IS UNREASONABLE OR DISHONORABLE OR DESIGNED TO AVOID THE REALITY THAT THE PLO IN WEST BEIRUT MUST LEAVE LEBANON BY THE MOST RAPID MEANS POSSIBLE.

-- SIMILARLY, WE ARE COMPLETELY COGNIZANT OF THE REALITY THAT RADICAL DIEHARD ELEMENTS -- WHICH ARE PROBABLY COMMUNIST INSPIRED -- ARE ATTEMPTING AT VIRTUALLY EVERY MOMENT WHEN PROGRESS APPEARS POSSIBLE TO DESTROY OUR EFFORTS BY VIOLATING THE CEASEFIRE THROUGH ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI FORCES. IT IS VITAL THAT THESE RADICAL ELEMENTS BE DENIED THEIR OBJECTIVES. TO PLAY THEIR GAME BY RETALIATING IN A DISPROPORTIONATE FASHION THAT RESULTS IN A BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO WORK AGAINST OUR

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 05 STATE 213728

OWN INTERESTS.

-- THE COMPELLING FACT REMAINS THAT THIS IS A MOMENT FROUGHT WITH POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE POTENTIAL, AND THE

CHOICE IS OURS TO MAKE.

-- PHIL HABIB MUST HAVE A CHANCE TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS MOMENT TO MAKE PRACTICAL PROGRESS. OUR INTENTION IS TO GET THE WORD TO THE PLO THAT HABIB IS IMMEDIATELY PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN NEW AND CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS VIA THE LEBANESE INTERMEDIARY, BUT ONLY ON CONDITION THAT THE PLO COME TO TERMS ON A DETAILED AGREEMENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IT HAS TO BE RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE NEW AND CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IF VITAL SERVICES ARE RESUMED.

SHULTZ

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

OF THE SYRIAN JEWISH COMMUNITY AND ITS RECENT HISTORY, INCLUDING THE PERIOD WHICH LED TO THE LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE COMMUNITY BY THE SARG. HE STATED REPEATEDLY THAT THERE WAS NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND THAT THEY ENJOYED THE SAME RIGHTS AS SYRIANS OF OTHER FAITHS. HE SAID THAT HE REJECTED BEGIN'S PROPOSAL FROM BOTH A HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL VIEWPOINT.

4. CONCERNING AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, HE SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD ONLY DISCUSS THE MATTER FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ISRAELI POWS UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL OR SYRIAN POWS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL. HE NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN PRISONER EXCHANGES IN THE PAST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO AND THOSE PRISONERS OR ISRAELI BODIES UNDER PLO CONTROL SHOULD THEREFORE BE RAISED BY THE GOI WITH THE PARTY DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

5. ASSAD STATED THAT SYRIA WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND BODIES WITH ISRAEL THROUGH THE ICRC. HE RECALLED THAT AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF ICRC ACCESS AND REPEATED HIS STATEMENT THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW IF SYRIA HELD ISRAELI POWS, BUT GAVE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD BE WELL TREATED BY THE SARG.

6. ON THE QUESTION OF THE RETURN OF THE BODY OF ELI COHEN, HE SAID THAT THIS SUBJECT HAD A LONG HISTORY. IT HAD BEEN RAISED IN 1967 AND ALSO IN 1973-74. COHEN HAD BEEN BURIED IN AN UNMARKED GRAVE AND THE SARG DID NOT KNOW ITS LOCATION. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN IF SYRIA KNEW THE SITE OF THE GRAVE IT WOULD NOT RETURN

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

DAMASC 05216 231908Z

THE BODY BECAUSE COHEN WAS A SPY WHO HAD CAUSED GREAT HARM TO SYRIA.

7. I TOLD ASSAD THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS RESPONSE TO THE GOI. PAGANELLI

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

R 5

~~SECRET~~

AN: NB20006-0654

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 TEL AV 11097 01 OF 02 221539Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----264033 221544Z /42
O 221519Z JUL 02
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6908

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 11097

~~SECRET~~ DECAPTIONED

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

FOR THE SECRETARY, EAGLEBURGER AND HABIB FROM LEWIS
DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO AMBASSADOR HABIB ONLY AT APPROPRIATE
- POST

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/22/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: BEGIN ON HABIB AND EAGLEBURGER

REF: A) TEL AVIV 11043, B) STATE 202068

1. ~~CONTAINING TEXT~~
2. IN OUR SUMMARY REPORT OF MY JULY 21 MEETING WITH BEGIN AND SHARON (REF A), I REFERRED TO THE CRITICISMS WHICH THEY LEVELED AGAINST HABIB. IN LAUNCHING THIS DISCUSSION, BEGIN SAID HE HAD READ A REPORT ON EAGLEBURGER'S DISCUSSION WITH NATANYAHU AND WANTED TO REGISTER HIS STRONG EXCEPTION TO EAGLEBURGER'S USE OF "ZOOLOGICAL" REFERENCES IN DESCRIBING SHARON'S CONDUCT TOWARDS HABIB, ESPECIALLY IN DESCRIBING SHARON AS A "BULL IN THE CHINA SHOP" AND A "ROGUE ELEPHANT." HE FOUND SUCH LANGUAGE "DISRESPECTFUL" AND NOT APPROPRIATE FOR CIVILIZED DIPLOMATIC DISCOURSE

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11097 01 OF 02 221539Z
AMONG FRIENDS. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING HIS GREAT RESPECT FOR

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

1007-2500

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1) BELIEVE
1) ENFORCE
1) NEW
1) FROM
1) FROM

1) DECLASSIFY
1) RECLASSIFY
IN PART

ED CONTROL

1) CLASSIFY AS
1) DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED

TS

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

EAGLEBURGER, BEGIN WONDERED HOW NATANYAHU, WHO HAS JUST EMBARKED ON HIS DIPLOMATIC SERVICE, REACTED TO SUCH USE OF WORDS ABOUT A SENIOR CABINET MINISTER. BEGIN ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS COMPLAINT TO EAGLEBURGER "IN A PRIVATE CHANNEL."

3. I RESPONDED BY READING FROM THE LEAD OF OUR REPORTING CABLES ON THE MEETING IN QUESTION (PARA TWO, REF B), WHICH REPORTED EAGLEBURGER AS SAYING "THAT BOTH THE TONE AND SUBSTANCE OF SHARON'S MEETING YESTERDAY WERE UNNECESSARY . . . WE HAVE THE SAME OBJECTIVE OF TRYING TO GET THE PLO OUT OF BEIRUT. . . HABIB MUST MAINTAIN HIS REPUTATION AS AN HONEST BROKER. . . IT IS UNNECESSARY FOR SHARON TO TALK TO HABIB AS IF HE IS THE ENEMY." I ADDED THAT I WAS ALSO OFFENDED BY THE TONE OF SHARON'S REMARKS TO HABIB ON MONDAY AT WHAT WAS OBVIOUSLY "NOT A NICE MEETING." SHARON INTERJECTED DEFENSIVELY AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION THAT IT REALLY WAS "A PLEASANT TALK," ADDING IT WAS REALLY QUITE NICE TO HAVE DRINKS AND COFFEE IN BEIRUT, AND THAT HABIB WAS LAUGHING A GOOD DEAL DURING THEIR DISCUSSION. HE CONCEDED ONLY THAT THERE HAD BEEN AREAS OF SHARP DISAGREEMENT. I RETORTED THIS WAS NOT OUR IMPRESSION FROM OUR REPORT.

4. ON THE PERSONAL, NASTIER SIDE, BEGIN ALSO COMMENTED THAT HABIB WAS "PERHAPS TOO NERVOUS." I RESPONDED FORCEFULLY THAT HABIB WAS NOT NERVOUS AND BEGIN OUGHT TO KNOW BETTER. BEGIN INSISTED: "YES, HE IS TOO NERVOUS; WE KNOW IT VERY WELL." HE THEN REVEALED WHAT I TAKE TO BE THE KEY REASON FOR HIS NEW AND GROWING DISTRUST OF HABIB. BEGIN SAID HE KNEW FROM "A FRIEND IN WASHINGTON" THAT HABIB HAD "SUGGESTED THE PRESIDENT SEND BEGIN A VERY HARSH MESSAGE THREATENING ISRAEL WITH SANCTIONS." BEGIN EXCLAIMED HOW

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

TEL AV 11097 01 OF 02 221539Z

COULD HABIB EVEN MAKE SUCH A RECOMMENDATION WHEN ISRAEL HAD RENDERED SUCH A GREAT SERVICE TO THE FREE WORLD, ADDING THAT HE HAD JUST SENT A 20-PAGE DOCUMENT TO THE PRESIDENT DETAILING THE PLO'S CONNECTION TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO TERRORIST GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. I RESPONDED, AS HAD PHIL TO SHARON, THAT HABIB'S RECOMMENDATIONS WERE HIS OWN BUSINESS, BUT THAT I KNEW HE WAS REPORTING ABSOLUTELY STRAIGHT TO THE ISRAELIS WHAT HE WAS DOING, SAYING, AND HEARING FROM HIS INTERLOCUTORS.

5. COMMENT: THIS CONVERSATION PROVIDED SOME GREATER IN-

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SIGHT INTO THE SOURCE OF THE SUSPICION WITH WHICH PHIL IS NOW BEING LOOKED AT HERE AND THE INNUENDOS THAT CERTAIN ISRAELIS ARE DROPPING, SOME OF WHICH ARE CREEPING INTO PRINT. PHIL IS SUSPECTED OF HOLDING BACK FROM THE ISRAELIS INFORMATION ABOUT PROMISES HE IS BELIEVED TO BE MAKING TO THE PLO THROUGH WAZZAN, ET AL, ASSURANCES THAT "HE WILL ASSURE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BEIRUT AREA," OR ASSURANCES THAT HE WILL "PRODUCE ISRAELI AGREEMENT" ON OTHER ISSUES WHERE BEGIN OR SHARON HAVE REPEATEDLY TOLD US THEY WILL NOT AGREE. PHIL IS ALSO WELL KNOWN TO REJECT ABSOLUTELY ANY FURTHER USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO EJECT THE PLO, AND IS WIDELY SUSPECTED OF PAINTING AN UNREAL, OVER-OPTIMISTIC PICTURE OF THE PLO'S COMMITMENT TO LEAVE AND OF OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATION--ALL IN THE INTEREST OF FORESTALLING ISRAELI MILITARY MOVES.

6. THIS UNSAVORY SUSPICION CONTRASTS TOTALLY WITH THE HIGH ESTEEM BEGIN DISPLAYED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY FOR

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 01 TEL AV 11097 02 OF 02 221841Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----264075 221606Z /42
O 221819Z JUL 02
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6909

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 11097
MODIS

STADIS////////////////////////////////////
PHIL THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEAR, EVEN WHEN THE GOI WAS DISAP-
POINTED WITH HIS LACK OF PROGRESS, AS FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE
SYRIAN MISSILE ISSUE. THE CURRENT LACK OF CONFIDENCE PARTL
REFLECTS, I BELIEVE, THE LACK OF ANY PERSONAL CONTACT BE-
TWEEN PHIL AND BEGIN SINCE JUNE 14. A FRANK TETE-A-TETE
HERE SOON CAN HELP A GREAT DEAL TO CLEAR THE AIR, AT LEAST
WITH BEGIN. THE DESPICABLE LEAK OF PHIL'S RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE PRESIDENT HAS, HOWEVER, BADLY POISONED THE WELL.

7. I CANNOT, HOWEVER, DISMISS THE FEAR THAT SOME OF WHAT
WE ARE SEEING REFLECTS A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT
OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, THE ISRAELIS HAVING NOW CONCLUDED
THAT THEY WILL NOT BEAR FRUIT. IN SHORT, THE ISRAELIS ARE
BUILDING A CASE FOR THE INEVITABILITY OF SOME FORM OF
EVENTUAL MILITARY ACTION; DISCREDITING HABIB MAY BE PART
OF THAT EFFORT. IF SO, I SEE SHARON AS THE CULPRIT, NOT
BEGIN, BUT BEGIN LISTENS ALL TOO MUCH TO SHARON THESE DAYS.
LEWIS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

586

R



UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

AM: NS20006-0582

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04703 01 OF 02 171431Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----066004 171431Z /52

O 171445Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7410
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION OF STATE
X UNCLASSIFIED
X DECLASSIFY
N RECLASSIFY
N RECLASSIFY
N RECLASSIFY
N PART
EXEMPTIONS
PA

4302566

Director
EG Citations
CLASSIFY # () S or
DOWNGRADE TS W () S or
Authority to

DM 3/5/96

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4703

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3, 4 7/17/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: HILI, HOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, IS, PLO, US, XP
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: THE ISRAELI DILEMMA AS REGARDS WEST BEIRUT

REF: TEL AVIV 10810

1. ~~LE-ENHANCING PORT~~

2. I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE PORTRAYAL BY
SAM LEWIS OF THE ISRAELI DILEMMA OVER WEST BEIRUT:
--A) IS IS ESSENTIAL THAT EVERYONE REALIZE THAT I AM
NOT NOW IN AN ACTIVE NEGOTIATING SITUATION. I CANNOT
NEGOTIATE A FINAL POLITICAL SOLUTION AS LONG AS WE HAVE NO
AGREED PLACE TO PUT THE PLO COMBATANTS, EITHER TEMPORARILY
OR PERMANENTLY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE NEGOTIATING
PROSPECTS ARE DEAD AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE A FREE HAND

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04703 01 OF 02 171431Z

MILITARILY.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

--B) AT PRESENT, I AM MAKING SURE IN MY TALKS AND URGINGS WITH THE WIDE VARIETY OF LEBANESE AND FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES HERE THAT THE PLO CONTINUES TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY, THEIR HEADQUARTERS, THEIR OFFICES, AND THEIR COMBATANTS WILL HAVE TO LEAVE BEIRUT. I CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR IN ALL APPROPRIATE WAYS THAT ISRAELI PATIENCE IS NOT UNLIMITED. I ALSO CONTINUE TO STATE THE U.S. POSITION THAT ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES MUST EVENTUALLY LEAVE LEBANON.

--C) I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE PLO HAS CHANGED ITS POSITION OF READINESS TO LEAVE BEIRUT. IN FACT, THIS MORNING'S PRESS CARRIES A CLEAR INDICATION FROM THE PLO THAT THE PLO IS READY TO MOVE TO A "PROVISIONAL" DESTINATION IN NORTHERN LEBANON (SEPTEL).

--D) I DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO ENCOURAGE AND INSTILL A SENSE OF DETERMINATION IN THE PRINCIPAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT LEADERS, SO THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE MANY HARD DECISIONS. I HAVE ENCOURAGED DETAILED PLANNING ON THE PART OF THE LAF IN PARTICULAR SO THAT THEY CAN MOVE RAPIDLY WHEN A SOLUTION IS DEVELOPED - WHETHER INTERIM OR PERMANENT - FOR THE DESTINATION OR DESTINATIONS OF THE PLO COMBATANTS. THE PRECIOUSNESS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, THE FACT THAT SARKIS HAS ONLY TWO MONTHS LEFT IN OFFICE, AND THE USUAL COMMUNAL PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO MAKE IT A DIFFICULT TO GET ANYTHING LIKE A FIRM POSITION OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT.

-E) I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT, IF WE DETECT RELIABLE SIGNS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE ON THE VERGE OF A MILITARY ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT, WE SHOULD SPELL OUT CLEARLY - IN ADVANCE - WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE FOR THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP, LISTING SOME OF THE STRONG STEPS I HOPE WE WOULD TAKE. IN A SENSE,

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04703 01 OF 02 1714312

WE OWE IT TO THE ISRAELIS NOT TO LEAVE THEM IN ANY UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW WE WOULD REACT. IN THIS RESPECT, I CERTAINLY WILL NOT ACCEPT BEGIN'S ALLEGED REMARKS THAT HE WOULD GIVE ME ONLY EIGHT DAYS MORE.

3. WHILE I HAVE NOT REPORTED EVERY INSTANCE IN WHICH I HAVE TOLD THE ISRAELIS THEY MUST NOT GO INTO WEST BEIRUT MILITARILY, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THIS POINT HAS BEEN DRIVEN INTO THE HEAD OF ALL ISRAELI VISITORS SINCE I BEGAN MEETING THEM HERE, YESTERDAY, FOR EXAMPLE, I

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

TOLD DAVID KINCHE THAT I HAD TOLD SHARON LAST DECEMBER, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR ISRAEL TO GO INTO LEBANON THE WAY HE WAS PLANNING, THAT I CONTINUED TO BELIEVE IT HAD BEEN A MAJOR MISTAKE FOR ISRAEL TO HAVE GONE INTO LEBANON THIS JUNE, AND THAT I WOULD OPPOSE ANY MILITARY ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT UNDER ANY AND ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, WHETHER OR NOT HE FOUND A DESTINATION FOR THE PLO COMBATANTS RIGHT AWAY.

4. TWO OTHER POINTS ARE WORTH NOTING AS WE LOOK AHEAD TO THE EARLY FUTURE:

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04703 02 OF 02 171430Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----066061 171441Z /82
O 171445Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7411
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 4703

MODIS

--A) THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND CARS IN AND OUT OF WEST BEIRUT HAS STEPPED UP IN THE PAST TWO DAYS. ACCORDING TO OUR OWN AND OTHER OBSERVATIONS. MANY OF THESE PEOPLE ARE RETURNING AFTER BUYING NECESSITIES IN EAST BEIRUT. BUT IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS STILL A NET SUBSTANTIAL EXODUS. WE CANNOT BE SURE, BUT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR NOW BELIEVES THE NON-PALESTINIAN POLULATION OF WEST BEIRUT MAY HAVE FALLEN TO ABOUT 300,000, AS COMPARED TO HIS ESTIMATE AS OF A WEEK AGO OF ABOUT 500,000. ON THE OTHER HAND, OTHER LEBANESE AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS MAINTAIN THAT THE POOR AND LOWER MIDDLE CLASS PEOPLE HAVE LARGELY STAYED IN WEST BEIRUT. THE POINT TO RECOGNIZE IS THAT ISRAELIS ARE OBVIOUSLY READING SOME OF THE SAME SIGNS AS WE ARE, AND MAY SHORTLY JUDGE THAT THE RISK TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM AN ISRAELI ASSUALT IS MUCH REDUCED. I HOPE THIS IS NOT THE CASE, FOR CLEARLY A GREAT MANY PEOPLE WILL BE IN WEST BEIRUT IF AN ASSUALT TAKES PLACE.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04703 02 OF 02 171430Z

--B) IN A SENSE, I TOO AM A HOSTAGE IN THE CURRENT IMPASSE. PEOPLE HERE DEFEND ON RX TO BACK UP

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THEIR SPIRITS AND TO INTERCEDE WITH THE ISRAELIS OVER ALL SORTS OF DAILY PROBLEMS. IF I LEFT LEBANON-EVEN BRIEFLY- IT CONCEIVABLY COULD BE MISREAD AS MY GIVING UP OR, WORSE, GIVING THE ISRAELIS A GREEN LIGHT TO PROCEED AGAINST BEIRUT. CONSEQUENTLY, I DO NOT BELIEVE I SHOULD MAKE TRIP TO ISRAEL RIGHT NOW, BUT WILL KEEP THE OPTION OPEN PENDING FURTHER PROGRESS IN OUR EFFORTS.

S. MINIMUZE DANASCUS CONSIDERED.
DILLON

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



UNCLASSIFIED

584

Department of State

TELEGRAM **R**

~~SECRET~~

AN: MB20006-0552

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04688 01 OF 02 181743Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----373541 181750Z /42
O 181445Z JUL 82ZFP4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
UIYADH IMMEDIATE 60
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(1) RELEASE
(1) ENCL
(1) DENT
(1)
FROM Washington
FM Damascus
RM Damascus

93025tele

ED
(1) CLASSIFY AS
(1) DOWNGRADE TO (1) S OF

IS/FC/ICOR

3/5/96

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4688

~~SECRET~~ DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3,4 7/18/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS PINT, PLO, LE, IS, XP, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FALLBACK OPTION

REF: BEIRUT 4166

1. ~~(S. ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. THE WAY THINGS STAND, THE IMPASSE WHICH WE NOW FACE MAY BE WITH US FOR AN INDEFINITE BUT PROLONGED PERIOD. IF WE SET ASIDE A MILITARY SOLUTION AS UNACCEPTABLE, THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT CANNOT BE LEFT TO SHOLDER READY TO BURST INTO FLAMES AT THE FIRST STRAY SHOTS.
3. AT PRESENT, THERE IS NOWHERE FOR THE PLO COMBATANTS TO GO.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04688 01 OF 02 181743Z

WE SEEM TO HAVE STRUCK OUT WITH SYRIA. THIS CONCEIVABLY

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COULD CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE SAUD-KHADDAM VISIT TO WASHINGTON. IF IT DOES NOT CHANGE AND NO OTHER ARAB DESTINATION ARISES, THEN I PROPOSE WE SHIFT OUR POSITION. WE SHOULD NOT BE LEFT WITH NO OPTIONS EXCEPT PROLONGED IMPASSE OR ISRAELI ASSULT ON WEST BEIRUT.

4. THEREFORE, I SUGGEST WE BEGIN TO EXPLORE THE FOLLOWING PACKAGE DEAL:

--(A) CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE.

-- (B) PLO AGREEMENT FOR ALL LEADERS, OFFICES AND COMBATANTS TO LEAVE WEST BEIRUT.

--(C) THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND THEIR OFFICES (SEVERAL HUNDRED MEN), PLUS THEIR FAMILIES IF THEY WISH AND THE SYRIANS AGREE, WILL GO TO SYRIA.

-- (D) ALL OTHER PLO COMBATANTS, WITH THEIR INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, WILL LEAVE BEIRUT FOR A PLACE OR PLACES TO BE DETERMINED IN NON LEBANON, THE CAMPS WHERE THEY WILL BE LODGED WILL BE UNDER LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL. WHEN THEY ARRIVE THEY WILL PLACE THEIR ARMS IN AN ARMORY SEPARATE FROM BUT NEAR THE CAMPS, AND UNDER THE JOINT CONTROL OF THEIR OWN LEADERS AND THE LEBANESE ARMY.

--(E) THE MOVEMENT OF PLO LEADERSHIP AND COMBATANTS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER AMERICAN GUARANTEES FOR THEIR SAFETY, WITH THE COOPERATION AND PRESENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND UNITED NATIONS (UNTSO) OBSERVERS.

AAKF) A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WILL BE AVAILABLE, ON THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND WITH THE ACQUIESCENCE OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, TO ASSURE THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT AND THE SAFETY OF THE REMAINING PALESTINIANS IN BEIRUT.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

BEIRUT 04600 01 OF 02 101743Z

--(G) INITIAL (NON-U.S.) ELEMENTS OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WILL START TO ARRIVE AND BEGIN THEIR TASK AS THE PLO ELEMENTS BEGIN TO LEAVE BEIRUT. WHEN THE PLO DEPARTURE IS WELL UNDERWAY, ALL THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WILL BE IN PLACE AND THERE WILL BE NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE ADJUSTMENTS IN ISRAELI LINES IN AND AROUND BEIRUT.

-- (H) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WILL OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IN COORDINATION WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN AND AROUND BEIRUT. AS A FIRST TASK, THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE AND THE LEBANESE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ARMED FORCES WILL SECURE THE AIRPORT AREA, TAKE OVER POSITIONS ON THE DEMARCATION LINE, AND TAKE CONTROL OF THE HEAVY WEAPONS, SPARE ARMS AND MUNITIONS BELONGING TO THE PLO. (THEMNF WILL ASSIST IN THE SAFE DISPOSAL OF SUCH ITEMS.)

--(I) SYRIAN AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED ELEMENTS, WHETHER PART OF THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE OR OTHERWISE PRESENT, WILL LEAVE BEIRUT FOR SYRIA AT THE TIME AS THE PLO COMBATANTS MOVE AND WITH THE SAME GUARANTEES FOR THEIR SAFETY.

--(J) WHEN THE PLO COMBATANTS FROM WEST BEIRUT ARE GATHERED IN THE N LEBANON, THOSE OF THEM WHO HOLD CITIZENSHIP IN OR HAVE VALID PASSPORTS FROM ANY ARAB COUNTRY WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THAT COUNTRY WITHIN TWO WEEKS, UNDER ARRANGEMENTS TO BE CONCLUDED WITH RECEIVING COUNTRIES. PLO COMBATANTS WHO ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR RELOCATION IN ANY OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING NON-ARAB COUNTRIES, WILL ALSO BE TRANSPORTED TO THOSE COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD INCLUDE PALESTINIAN MEMBERS OF MILITARY UNITS FORMED IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS EGYPT, IRAQ AND JORDAN FOR SERVICE IN THE PALESTINE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04658 02 OF 02 181716Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-90 ADS-00 /000 W
-----372710 181716Z /40
O 181445Z JUL 82ZPFM
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 7377
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
UIYADH IMMEDIATE 60
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 4658

NODIS

LIBERTATION ARMY (PLO). (NOTE: WE RECOGNIZE THAT JORDAN MIGHT WANT TO REJECT SOME PALESTINIANS EVEN WITH NOMINAL JORDANIAN CITIZENSHIP, BUT WE WOULD URGE ACCEPTANCE OF A MAXIMUM NUMBER.) IN THIS STAGE, WE WOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE A WIDE VARIETY OF COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT COMBATANTS FROM BEIRUT. AT SUCH TIME AS IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE REMAINING PALESTINIANS TO MOVE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY THEY WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO DO SO.
--K) THE ABOVE ACTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OTHER FOREIGN ARMED FORCES FROM LEBANON ON THE DEMAND AND UNDER TERMS THAT WILL BE AGREED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THOSE FORCES. THIS WILL INCLUDE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES, AND SO-CALLED VOLUNTEER ARMED ELEMENTS SUCH AS THOSE FROM IRAN AND SOUTH YEMEN, IF THE LATTER HAVE NOT BEEN WITHDRAWN PREVIOUSLY. IN THIS STAGE, PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS FROM AREAS OUTSIDE BEIRUT WILL BE DISARMED AND JOIN THOSE REMAINING IN THE NORTHERN

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04658 02 OF 02 181716Z

CAMPS OR DEPART THE COUNTRY.
--L) A PROBLEM INHERENT IN THIS OR ANY SCHEME FOR GETTING

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THE PLO OUT OF LEBANON DERIVES FROM THE PRESENCE OF THEIR FAMILIES IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. WE DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED OR THEIR LOCATION, OR HOW THE IDF OCCUPATION IS AFFECTING THEM. IN CONSIDERING THIS MATTER WE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE FAMILIES SHOULD STAY WHERE THEY ARE PENDING THE FINAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE COMBATANTS. HOWEVER, THIS REINFORCES OUR BELIEF THAT ALL - OR ALMOST ALL - PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON EVENTUALLY. ONLY THOSE WHO CAN BE PEACEFULLY ABSORBED INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY SHOULD REMAIN. AS AND WHEN COMBATANTS MOVE TO OTHER COUNTRIES, THEIR FAMILIES CAN GO WITH THEM. IT DOES NOT APPEAR FEASIBLE TO HAVE THE FAMILIES JOIN THEIR MEN IN THE CAMPS. THIS WOULD MERELY RE-CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH LARGE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIANS WOULD BE GATHERED UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO REJECT LEBANESE AUTHORITY. THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PAST. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT SOME OF THE PLO COMBATANTS DO NOT LEAVE LEBANON BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO PLACE TO GO THEN THEY WILL JUST HAVE TO STAY HERE - UNARMED & UNDER LEBANESE AUTHORITY. HOPEFULLY, THERE WILL NOT BE SO MANY IN THIS CATEGORY THAT A STRONG SOL WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE THEM AND KEEP THEM DISARMED. ALL OF US - AMERICANS, ISRAELIS, LEBANESE AND OTHER ARABS - MAY HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE PROBABLY NEVER WILL BE ABLE TO PRODUCE A TOTAL SOLUTION UNTIL THE PALESTINIANS HAVE A HOMELAND.

5. I RECOGNIZE THAT THESE PROPOSALS FOR THE FIRST STAGE ARRANGEMENTS MEAN THAT THERE WILL PROBABLY NOT BE A RELATIVELY QUICK AND CLEAN EXODUS FROM LEBANON OF ALL THE

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

BEIRUT 04655 02 OF 02 181716Z

PLO COMBATANTS FROM BEIRUT. THUS, THESE PROPOSALS WILL POSE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS FOR THE LEBANESE, BUT THEY MAY BE DESPERATE ENOUGH TO LOOK UPON THEM AS A SHORT-TERM WAY OUT. WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TIME IN PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS. I MENTIONED ONLY SOME OF THE PROS AND CONS IN REPTEL AND IN THIS MESSAGE. THUS, WHILE I SUGGEST WE DISCUSS THESE PROPOSALS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND AGREE TO ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM THEM THAT ARE REASONABLE, WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PROCEED SO LONG AS WE ARE SATISFIED. IF THE DEPARTMENT AGREES, TO OPEN UP THIS LINE OF DISCUSSION WITH KIRCHE ON

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SATURDAY IN BEIRUT, AND FOLLOW THAT UP IMMEDIATELY BY
TALKING TO THE LEBANESE. AT SUCH TIME THEREAFTER THAT
IT WOULD BE DEEMED USEFUL, I WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO TO
ISRAEL AND SYRIA TO PURSUE THE MATTER.
DILLON

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

R 580

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20006-0506

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04611 01 OF 02 132346Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----301435 140002Z /66/60
O 132118Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIAGT IMMEDIATE 7334
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 101
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIODA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE ARY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4611

~~SECRET~~ DECAPTIONED

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS -1,3,4 7/13/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MILI, HOPS, PEPA, PINT, LE, IS, 019, SY, SA, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION, LOOKING AHEAD

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. BASIS ASSUMPTION: I CONTINUE TO OPERATE ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FORESTALL AN ISRAELI MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM. AN ISRAELI MILITARY SOLUTION WOULD CONFRONT US FOR YEARS TO COME WITH ENORMOUS DAMAGE TO OUR POLITICAL POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND BEYOND AS WELL AS TO OUR MORAL CREDIBILITY. FEW WILL EVER BELIEVE WE COULD NOT HAVE
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04611 01 OF 02 132346Z

DETERRED THE ISRAELIS FROM SUCH AN ACTION. ASIDE FROM

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE <input type="checkbox"/> EXTEND <input type="checkbox"/> DENY <input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY <input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART <input type="checkbox"/>	DEPARTMENT OF STATE 100-441110 100-441110
<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TO ()	EO 12958 TS authority:	R/S/P/C/D/R Date: 3/5/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THE APPALLING TOLL IN INNOCENT LIVES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE, AN ISRAELI MILITARY SOLUTION MIGHT WELL SPELL THE END TO ANY POSSIBILITIES OF A GENUINE LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AMONG CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS. I COULD LIST OTHER GRAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES AND HAVE DONE SO IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES. HAVING SAID THIS, I WILL LAY OUT BELOW WHERE I THINK WE STAND NOW AND WHAT OUR FUTURE STEPS SHOULD BE.

3. WHERE WE ARE NOW:

--A) WE ARE STYMIED BECAUSE THERE IS NO COUNTRY OR COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM FOR THE PLO COMBATANTS; THE LATEST REPORT OF THE HARDENED SYRIAN POSITION ON ACCEPTING THE PLO FIGHTERS (DAMASCUS 4984) MAKES IT MORE THAN CLEAR THAT SYRIA WILL NOT NOW BECOME A COUNTRY OF ASYLUM FOR THE VAST BULK OF THE COMBATANTS.

--B) I HAVE PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND COMBATANTS FROM BEIRUT ALONG WITH WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN JYND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED FORCES. IT HAS BEEN IN THE HANDS OF THE GOL AND PLO, AND FITS IN FAIRLY SATISFACTORILY WITH THE GOL "PLAN" PREPARED EARLIER BY JOHNNY ABU. IT IS BASED ON THE NINEPOINTS. THE PACKAGE PLAN IS NOT YET ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS AS REGARDS SOME RELATIVELY MINOR ISSUES, NOR IS THE PLO READY TO GO ALONG WITH SOME OF THE PACKAGE PLANS SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS. NEVERTHESS, IT REMAINS A REASONABLE COMBINATION OF PROPOSALS AND MODALITIES FOR CARRYING THEM OUT WITH WHICH WE SHOULD STICK. I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO PUSH THIS PLAN TO THE LIMIT WITH ANY OF THE PARTIES, MAINLY BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT FOUND AN AGREED DESTINATION FOR THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND COMBATANTS

--C) LEAVING ASIDE THE KNOWN ISRAELI RESERVATIONS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

BEIRUT 04611 01 OF 02 132346Z

TO THE PACKAGE PLAN THE PLO POSITION IS STILL WELL SHORT OF WHAT IS NEEDED. NEVERTHESS, THE PLO LEADERSHIP REPORTEDLY HAS AGREED THAT THEY, THEIR HEADQUARTERS APPARATUS, AND THEIR FIGHTERS SHOULD LEAVE BEIRUT AT LEAST. THEY HAVE BEEN CAREY ABOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO LEAVE LEBANON FOR GOOD. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BEHAVE AS THOUGH WE ACCEPT THEIR ALLEGED COMMITMENT TO LEAVE BEIRUT AT THE VERY LEAST.

--D) MEANWHILE, THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO THREATEN THAT THEY WILL NOT A MILITARY OPTION TO DESTROY THE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PLO IN WEST BEIRUT, IF NECESSARY, THEY HAVE THE PLO FORCES ENCIRCLED AND ENTRAPPED, AND WILL NOT WILLINGLY GIVE UP THIS GREAT ADVANTAGE. THEY ARE INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED BY OUR INABILITY TO BRING ABOUT A ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN A TIMELY WAY AND HAVE BEGUN TO SIGNAL THAT THEIR PATIENCE IS COMING TO AN END. --E) FOR THEIR PART, THE PLO LEADERS MUST REALIZE THAT THEY CANNOT OPERATE FREELY WHILE SURROUNDED BY THE IDF. EVEN IF ISRAEL DOES NOT RESORT TO THE MILITARY OPTION RIGHT AWAY, THE PLO LEADERS PROBABLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE A LONG SIEGE OF BEIRUT AND WILL CONTINUE TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE INHABITANTS OF WEST BEIRUT, WHAT EVER CONTRARY INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES ARE BROUGHT TO BEAR. ON THE OTHER HAND THE PLO SEEMS TO THINK THAT ARAB PRESSURE ON THE U.S. MAY STILL SAVE THEM FROM DESTRUCTION.

4. COURSES OPEN TO THE U.S.:

OSM SHOULD PROCEED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION IS STILL POSSIBLE. OUR BASIC PROBLEMS ARE TWOFOLD: --A) FINDING A COUNTRY OR COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM FOR THE PLO COMBATANTS (ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT SYRIA WILL ACCEPT THE TRANSFER OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP, ITS HEAD-QUARTERS, AND ITS VARIOUS OFFICES TO DAMASCUS OR SOME OTHER SYRIAN LOCALE).

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04611 02 OF 02 140415Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----307364 140430Z /21
O 132115Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 7330
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 102
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE ARU
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 4611

NODIS.

--B) HOW MECHANICALLY TO CARRY OUT THE WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT OF THE PLO LEADERS, OFFICES AND COMBATANTS. E. WE CAN CONTINUE TO TAKE THE POSITION WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY MUST NOT CARRY OUT A MILITARY SOLUTION, ON THE GROUNDS THAT A COUNTRY OR COUNTRIES OF ASYLYN HAVE NOT YET BEEN FOUND FOR THE PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS AND THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION REMAINS FEASIBLE. WE SHOULD CONTINUE ALL OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A PLACE OR PLACES OF ASYLYN. OUR NEXT MOVE (WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE UNDERWAY TODAY) SHOULD BE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO MAKE THE ARAB LEAGUE TAKE ACTION COLLECTIVELY TO FIND REFUGE FOR THE PLO COMBATANTS IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. OUR APPROACHES TO SUCH MODERATE STATES AS SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OUR ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION AND TO PREVENT A CATASTROPHE IN WEST BEIRUT IS LIMITED UNDER THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE SHOULD REITERATE THAT TO DEAL WITH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF WEST BEIRUT, THE SYRIAN FORCES AND THE PLO LEADERSHIP AND FORCES THAT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04611 02 OF 02 140415Z

ARE THERE MUST LEAVE LEBANON. AT A LATER STAGE ALL FORCES - ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND REMAINING PLO- ELSEWHERE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

IN LEBANON MUST LEAVE. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT OTHERWISE THE ARAB WORLD WILL FACE A LONG-TERM ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF MUCH OF LEBANON WITH ALL THAT THIS IMPLIES. (IF AS EXPECTED THERE IS NO TUNIS SUMMIT OR IF THE ARAB LEAGUE REMAINS INCAPABLE, WE SHOULD PURSUE THIS EFFORT WITH ALL APPROPRIATE ARAB STATES, INCLUDING EGYPT, IN ALL APPROPRIATE CHANNELS.)

6. IF, DESPITE OUR PRESENT EFFORTS, WE DO NOT FIND A PLACE OR PLACES OF REFUGE FOR THE PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS, WE COULD PROCEED TO A FALL BACK OPTION. WE SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS OPTION UNTIL AND UNLESS WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE FOR THE PLO TO GO ELSEWHERE. THIS OPTION WOULD HAVE US TRY TO MOVE THE COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT INTO EXISTING CAMPS IN THE NORTHERN BID'A AND TRIPOLI AREAS AS AN INTERIM MEASURE PENDING THEIR HOPED-FOR DISPERSAL ULTIMATELY TO SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES. THE ADVANTAGES ARE THAT SUCH A TRANSFER: (A) WOULD REMOVE THE ISRAELI MILITAR THREAT TO WEST BEIRUT; (B) WOULD REDUCE PLO OPPOSITIN TO WITHDRANAL FROM WEST BEIRUT SINCE MOVING TO THESE OTHER AREAS AS A FIRST STEP WAS PART OF THE ORIGINAL PLO COUNTER-PROPOSALS; AND (C) WOULD GIVE ALL OF US FURTHER TIME AND DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING ROOM TO FIND PERMANENT COUNTRIES OF ASYLYM FOR THESE AND ALL THE OTHER PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING THOSE 9,000 PALESTINAIN WHO MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE RELEASED BY ISRAEL, AND THE FAMILIES OF THOSE LEAVING LEBANON FOR GOOD.

7. THIS FALL BACK OPTION OF SENDING THE COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT TO PLACES ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON HAS MANY DISADVANTAGES THE ISRAELIS MIGHT OBJECT, ALTHOUGH SHARON'S SEEMING INDIFFERENCE OVER WHETHER THE PLO

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

BEIRUT 04611 02 OF 02 140415Z

FIGHTERS GO ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON RATHER THAN GO TO SYRIA MAY BE SOMETHING WE CAN PLAY WITH. THE CHRISTIANS CERTAINLY WULD OBJECT AS WELL AS MANY OF THE SHI'A AND CHRISTIAN INHABITANTS OF THE BID'A. THE ISRAELIS CERTAINLY WOULD CONTINUE TO OCCUPY THE PART OF LEBANON THEY NOW HOLD AS LONG AS THESE FIGHTERS REMAIN IN STRENGTH ANYWHERE IN LEBANON ALTHOUGH AS I HAVE REPORTED EARLIER, THIS MAY HAPPEN IN ANY EVENT DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS. THE SYRIANS MIGHT WELL USE THE PLO COMBATANTS TO FLESH OUT THEIR OWN MILITARY FORCES IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED LEBANON. THE CHANCES OF FUTURE MILITARY

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CONFRONTATIONS, IF NOT WITH THE IDF THEN WITH THE PHALANGE, WILL BE HIGH. THE PROSPECT OF A LEBANON PARTITIONED INTO TWO, THREE OR PERHAPS FOUR REGIONS WOULD BE ENHANCED.

8. EMPLOYING THIS FALL BACK OPTION WOULD ALSO TAKE A LOT OF THE HEAT OFF THE ARAB WORLD TO FIND A LONGER TERM SOLUTION AND A PERMANENT SANCTUARY OR SANCTUARIES FOR THE PLO MILITARY FORCES.

9. AS REGARDS THE SECOND MAJOR QUESTION - HOW TO CARRY OUT THE PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT- THERE STILL REMAINS SOME FLEXIBILITY. IF WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN FINDING A PLACE FOR THE PLO TO GO, WE CAN THEN MOVE URGENTLY TO GET OUR "PACKAGE PLAN" ACCEPTED BOTH AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURES FOR THE MNF ENTRY AND PLO WITHDRAWAL. ONCE AGAIN, HOWEVER, IF WE FAIL WE SHOULD HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO WITHDRAWAL IN RESERVE. IN THIS REGARD, WE SHOULD NOT REJECT OUT-OF-HAND THE FRENCH IDEA (SEPTEL) OF PLACING LAF AND FRENCH MNF MILITARY UNITS INTO POSITIONS NOW OCCUPIED BY THE PLO, WHILE THE PLO FIGHTERS ASSEMBLE IN LAF BARRACKS IN BEIRUT. THIS MAY SAVE US SOME NEW-FOUND FREEDOM OF ACTION, AND WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INTERFERE WITH OUR PREFERENCE FOR BRINGING THE U.S. ELEMENT OF AN MNF INTO THE CITY AT A LATER STAGE WHEN EVACUATION HAS GOTTEN WELL UNDERWAY. THE ISRAELIS MAY OBJECT TO THIS VARIATION ON THE "PACKAGE PLAN" I HAD PRESENTED BUT WITH CAREFUL TIMING, AND PROPER COORDINATION OF THE RESPECTIVE

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

BEIRUT 04611 02 OF 02 140415Z

U.S. AND FRENCH APPROACHES, THIS COULD PRODUCE A SCENARIO MORE REASSURING TO THE PLO WHILE NOT NECESSARILY UNDERCUTTING THE BASIC CONDITIONS WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN DEMANDING.

10. THUS, IN SUM, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK HARD TO BREAK THE IMPASSE OVER A COUNTRY OR COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM FOR THE PLO FIGHTERS IN BEIRUT. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD SEEK A TEMPORARY, INTERIM ARRANGEMENT PUTTING THEM IN THE DISA WHILE SEEKING ASYLUM FOR THEM ELSEWHERE. THROUGHOUT, WE SHOULD FIRM UP THE MODALITIES FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT, WHATEVER THEIR DESTINATION. WE SHOULD NOT LET THE ISRAELIS TAKE MATTERS OUT OF OUR HANDS WITH MILITARY ACTION WHILE A POLITICAL SOLUTION REMAINS A VIABLE POSSIBILITY.

DILLON

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

562

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20006-0123

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 175122
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY LNG:SJKRYS
APPROVED BY LNG:SJKRYS
S/S-O:ESHERMAN

-----355473 240924Z /12
Z 240945Z JUN 02 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ANEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175122

DECAPIOTED
NO. 1
FOR CHARGE BROWN

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 2, 3, 4 6/25/02 (KRYG, SHELDON J.)
TAGS: IS, LE, MILI, NOPS, PEPR
SUBJECT: ISRAELI PRESENCE IN BAABDA

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECURE VOICE MESSAGE FROM HABIB PARTY.
3. BEGIN TEXT

WE HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE -- KHALIL HADDAD -- THAT SOME 30 RPT 30 ISRAELI OFFICERS AND MEN SHOWED UP AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE THIS MORNING, JUNE 24, AND ASKED THAT THE IOP BE GIVEN PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH AN OBSERVATION POST THERE. THEY WERE OF COURSE REFUSED PERMISSION, AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE LEFT AS OF 0930. PASS THE WORD TO EAGLEBURGER, VELIOTES AND CHARGE BROWN IN TEL AVIV TO MAKE THE POINT URGENTLY TO THE ISRAELIS

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 175122

THAT SHARON HAD PROMISED H3 OF THE NEXT NIGHT THAT HE COULD

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9302566

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DECLASSIFY
 IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

NO. 1

RD. Directions _____

CLASSIFY as _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to _____
 S or _____
 S or _____

TS authority is _____

NSPC/CDR
Date: 3/17/06

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REDUCE THE IDF PRESENCE FROM AROUND THE SAABDA AREA IN THE VICINITY OF THE PALACE. IT IS SHOCKING AND ALMOST UNBELIEVABLE THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD NOW MAKE SUCH AN APPROACH. ASK THE ISRAELIS WHETHER THEY ARE TRYING TO DESTROY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT? THIS GROSS INSENSITIVITY IS HARMFUL TO EVERYTHING THAT HABIB IS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH HERE AND HARMFUL TO ISRAEL'S PROFESSED WISH THAT A STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY BE DEVELOPED HERE.

PROVIDE A REPORT URGENTLY WHICH COULD BE USED HERE BY HABIB.

END TEXT

HAIG

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

565
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20006-0196

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 180208
ORIGIN MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:NAKIRBY:KM
APPROVED BY NEA:NAVELIOTES
NEA:CHILL
S/S:APADANS
S/S-O: ESHERMAN

-----154016 29201Z /61
O 292004Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION	
1) RELEASE	1) DECLASSIFY
1) EXTEND	1) DECLASSIFY IN PART
1) REVIEW	
1) DOWNGRADE	
1) DOWNGRADE TS TO	1) S OF
1) DOWNGRADE TS TO	1) S OF
ED Changes	TS Authority

93025106
S/FFC/DR
3/5/146

~~SECRET~~ STATE 180208

~~NO~~ DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6/29/02 N.A. VELIOTES
TAGS: PEPR, LE, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: THE LEBANON CRISIS: ISRAELI COMMENTS ON
HABIB'S REPORTING

REF: KIRBY/LEWIS TELCON JUNE 29

1. ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~TEXT~~

2. YOU TOOK JUST THE RIGHT LINE WITH BEGIN AND KINCHE MONDAY NIGHT IN RESPONDING TO THEIR INDIRECT ALLEGATIONS THAT PHIL HABIB HAS NOT BEEN REPORTING ACCURATELY. ISRAEL SHOULD BE LEFT WITH NO DOUBT THAT AS FAR AS US IS CONCERNED HABIB IS THE ONLY COMPLETELY CREDIBLE REPORTER IN THE LEBANESE PICTURE. HE HAS REPORTED ONLY WHAT HE HAS BEEN TOLD AND THE FACT THAT VARIOUS LEBANESE PLAYERS HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDAS (ASHIR ABOVE ALL) IS LOST NEITHER ON PHIL NOR ON US AND IS TAKEN INTO FULL ACCOUNT.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 180208

UNCLASSIFIED

3. WE FIND ESPECIALLY TRAVELING AND INDICATIVE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ALLEGATIONS OF ABU AND BASHIR THAT PHIL IS SAYING THAT ISRAEL HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A FIVE-KILOMETER WITHDRAWAL. AS YOU ARE AWARE, PHIL HAS SPECIFICALLY AND REPEATEDLY TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT NO SUCH IDF MOVE WAS IN THE CARDS AND THAT IN FACT MINOR ADJUSTMENTS IN THE IDF LINES WOULD HAVE TO BE PRECEDED BY PLO ACCEPTANCE OF GOL TERMS AND BE PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL.

4. AS CONVEYED REFTELCON, NAZZAN IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS FROM THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY THAT THE PHALANGE IS MOVING FORCES INTO THE VILLAGES FROM WHICH THE IDF HAS FLUSHED PLO/LEFTIST ELEMENTS. ACCORDING TO NAZZAN, LEFTISTS ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION, ARGUING WITH SOME SUCCESS THAT IF MUSLIMS RID THEMSELVES OF THE PLO ONLY TO COME UNDER THE PHALANGE NOT ONLY ARE THEY NO BETTER OFF BUT IN ADDITION THEY ARE GOING TO LOSE THEIR MUSLIM RELIGIOUS TRADITION AND LEBANON IS GOING TO LOSE ITS TRADITION OF CONFSSIONAL COOPERATION. NAZZAN SAID THIS HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS FOR THE PAST TWO DAYS AND REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE PHALANGE MOVING AT SUNPOINT NIGHT OF JUNE 28 INTO A VILLAGE NEAR SHANDOUN WITH FATALITIES ON BOTH SIDES.

5. HABIB HAD BEEN INFORMED BY JUNBLATT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED AN ULTIMATUM FROM BASHIR TO RELINQUISH HIS ARMORY AND HIS HOUSE AT MUKHTARA BY 1600 LOCAL JUNE 29. HAIG

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SSS

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AM: 4820005-0406

B
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 155256 TOSEC 080198
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY P:RRAPHEL
APPROVED BY P:LSEAGLEBURGER
S/S-O:RHSTERN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
P, S, AND S/S ONLY

-----005352 070205Z /62
O 070141Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 155256 TOSEC 080198

RECAPTIONED

STADIS////////////////////////////////////
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 12065:RDS 3 6/6/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAURENCE S.)
TAGS: LE

SUBJECT: LEBANON: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

- ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~
- PARA 3 CONTAINS THE REVISED VERSION OF MC FARLANE'S MEMO TO CLARK FOR THE PRESIDENT ON LEBANON. IN OUR VIEW IT BORDERS ON THE SOPHONORIC, BUT IS HARMLESS, IF NOT USELESS. STATE, JCS, CIA, AND OSD HAVE ALL BEEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE MEMO. THE MEMO ALONG WITH THESE AGENCY COMMENTS WILL BE SENT TO THE PARTY THROUGH WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT OTHER AGENCY VIEWS ARE AT THIS STAGE, BUT EXPECT THAT DOD WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON, AND URGE THAT WE ISSUE TOUGH WARNINGS TO THE ISRAELIS NOW, EVEN BEFORE HABIB HAS HAD A CHANCE TO WORK WITH BEGIN AND OTHERS, ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 155256 TOSEC 080198

FAILURE TO WITHDRAW. PARA 4 CONTAINS STATE COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9302566

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
IN PART

FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

EO Citations

CLASSIFY in (1-8 or
 DOWNGRADE TO (1-4) POS

TS authorized

SI/FPC/CDR
Date: 3/5/96



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SUBMITTED TO MC FARLANE.

3. BEGIN TEXT MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: HOW TO PURSUE OUR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN
LEBANON

ISRAEL'S INVASION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON COULD HAVE SEVERE
ADVERSE EFFECTS ON U.S. INTERESTS, AND FORCES US TO
IMMEDIATELY REEXAMINE HOW TO PURSUE OUR POLICY GOALS IN
LEBANON. TO THAT END, THIS MEMORANDUM ANALYZES THE
LINKAGES BETWEEN POSSIBLE ACTIONS THAT WE MAY TAKE IN THE
NEXT 24-48 HOURS AND THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF STABILIZ-
ING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN LEBANON THROUGH PHIL
HABIB'S MISSION.

BACKGROUND TO THE ISRAELI INVASION

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION, WE HAVE
TRIED TO DIMINISH THE TERRORIST THREAT WHICH ISRAEL
FACES ON ITS NORTHERN BORDER. UNFORTUNATELY, THE FRAGILE
CEASE-FIRE ARRANGED BY PHIL HABIB, WHILE SAVING MANY
LIVES, WAS UNABLE TO DEAL WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC
PROBLEM OF LEBANON'S POLITICAL INSTABILITY. MOREOVER,
THE ISRAELIS CONCLUDED THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ISRAEL
AND ELSEWHERE OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS WERE ACTUALLY
ASSISTED BY THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH PROTECTED PALESTINIAN
FORCES IN LEBANON FROM ISRAELI ATTACK. WHILE WE HAVE
CONSISTENTLY COUNTERED THIS ISRAELI ARGUMENT, OUR
EFFORTS TO HELP THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON TO
CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL AND THEREBY DIMINISH THE THREAT
HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IT APPEARS THAT FOLLOWING THE
CYCLE OF VIOLENCE INITIATED BY THE BLACK JUNE ASSASSINA-
TION ATTEMPT (BLACK JUNE DOES NOT BELONG TO THE PLO), THE

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

STATE 158256 T0SEC 080198

ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CHOSE TO ELIMINATE THE PLO THREAT BY
FORCE.

U.S. POLICY

YOU RECENTLY DECIDED THAT IT HAD BECOME IMPERATIVE FOR
US TO REINVIGORATE AND GO BEYOND THE CEASE-FIRE. OUR
POLICY WAS THUS FRAMED TO DEMONSTRATE TO ISRAEL (AND
OTHER PARTIES) THAT WE CAN AND WILL DIMINISH THE
SECURITY THREATS TO ISRAEL BY DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

LEBANON IN A STRATEGIC CONTEXT. THIS WOULD HAVE INVOLVED A COORDINATED APPROACH AMONG KEY EUROPEAN AND ARAB FRIENDS TO: STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, HELP RESTORE AND PRESERVE THE CEASE-FIRE, REDUCE SYRIAN INFLUENCE, AND LESSEN THE PLO THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY. DEPENDENT ON HOW PHIL'S DISCUSSIONS EVOLVED, OUR PLAN WOULD HAVE BEEN TO ESTABLISH A "CONTACT GROUP" AND PERHAPS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT A LATER STAGE WHICH COULD PROVIDE THE FACTIONS IN LEBANON WITH A MECHANISM AND AN EXCUSE TO WORK OUT A VIABLE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

THIS LEBANON POLICY WOULD SUPPORT THE TWO CENTRAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR REGIONAL STRATEGY: (1) MAINTAINING THE U.S. AS THE SOLE OUTSIDE POWER THAT CAN MOVE THE REGION TOWARD PEACE; AND (2) STRENGTHENING THE PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. IS ABLE AND DETERMINED TO LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS AND PROTECT ITS FRIENDS.

WITHIN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE HAVE HAD TO WALK A FINE LINE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES WHILE MEETING THE OFTEN CONTRADICTORY EXPECTATIONS OF THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS. IN THE WAKE OF EGYPT'S PEACEFUL RECOVERY OF SINAI, IT APPEARED YOUR ACTIONS SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED ISRAELI CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. AND ENCOURAGED ARAB EXPECTATIONS THAT U.S. ACTIONS WOULD LEAD TO REAL PROGRESS

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

PAGE 04

STATE 158266 T0SEC 080198

IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. OUR RECENT ACTIVISM IN SUPPORT OF A MEDIATED OUTCOME OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR HAS ALSO BOLSTERED MODERATE ARAB CONFIDENCE THAT THE U.S. REMAINS VITALLY INTERESTED IN THE SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE GULF STATES.

OBVIOUSLY, ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES WILL HAVE NEARLY OPPOSITE EXPECTATIONS OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN LEBANON. WHILE THE ARABS WILL PRIVATELY EXPECT A DEGREE OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, GIVEN OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY, THEY WILL ALSO LOOK FOR SIGNS OF EFFECTIVE U.S. ACTIONS TO EXTRACT THE ISRAELIS FROM LEBANON AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. THE ISRAELIS WILL HOPE FOR U.S. SUPPORT, BUT PROBABLY EXPECT CONSIDERABLE U.S. PRESSURE AND A PERIOD OF STRAINED RELATIONS.

NEXT STEPS AND LONG-TERM POLICY

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI ACTIONS, THE EXPECTATIONS OF REGIONAL STATES AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. INTERESTS, WE MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE CURRENT GAME PLAN FOR LEBANON STILL REPRESENTS A VIABLE STRATEGY FOR MEETING THE CONCERNS OF ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, THE LEBANESE AND SYRIA. THE BASIC CRITERION AGAINST WHICH ARAB STATES WILL MEASURE OUR POLICY WILL BE OUR ABILITY TO SECURE A PROMPT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON. WHILE ARAB LEADERS WOULD APPRECIATE TOUGH U.S. RHETORIC THAT CONDEMNS ISRAEL AS WELL AS THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS, WHAT MATTERS IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IS WHETHER WE SUCCEED IN ENDING THE FIGHTING, REMOVING ISRAELI FORCES, STABILIZING THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON, AND TAKING ACTION TO ENSURE AGAINST A RECURRENCE OF ISRAELI INCURSIONS. ~~THOUGH THE CHALLENGE~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 05 STATE 155256 T0SEC 080198

TO PHIL HABIB HAS CERTAINLY BEEN COMPLICATED, THE GAME PLAN FOR LEBANON OUTLINED ABOVE REPRESENTS THE BEST

APPROACH FOR ACHIEVING OUR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES WHILE MEETING THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR FRIENDS.

IN THIS CONTEXT, YOU MUST CONSIDER WHAT PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC STEPS TO TAKE IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR PHIL HABIB'S LONGER-TERM EFFORT. OBVIOUSLY, THE MOST IMPORTANT STATE TO INFLUENCE IN THE NEAR-TERM IS ISRAEL. OUR PUBLIC STATEMENT CALLING UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW AND THE PALESTINIANS TO STOP USING LEBANON AS A LAUNCHING PAD FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL IS BALANCED AND SHOULD NOT COMPLICATE PHIL'S EFFORT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, IT MAKES CLEAR OUR LONG-TERM GOAL OF SEEKING TO STABILIZE THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SITUATION.

DEPENDING ON HOW HABIB IS RECEIVED IN ISRAEL, OVER THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS, OUR INTERESTS MAY DEMAND THAT WE CONDEMN ISRAEL AND/OR USE STRONG SANCTIONS AGAINST IT. HOWEVER, THE ESCALATION OF OUR PUBLIC RHETORIC DURING HABIB'S VISIT MAY PRODUCE EVEN MORE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE UNILATERAL ISRAELI ACTIONS AS THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT CONCLUDES THAT U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAELI SECURITY IS BEING FUNDAMENTALLY WEAKENED. CLEARLY, BEGIN MAY BARGAIN EXTREMELY HARD FOR A REPLACEMENT FORCE MUCH STRONGER

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THAN UNIFIL IF ISRAEL IS TO WITHDRAW.

IN THE U.N., WE HOPE THAT JEANE WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE AND VOTE FOR A BALANCED RESOLUTION WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE CONDEMNATION OR SANCTIONS. SUCH A RESOLUTION COULD SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION FOR OUR EFFORTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE STABILIZATION OF LEBANON. LOOKING WELL DOWN THE ROAD, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE STEPS TO STRENGTHEN THE UNIFIL, PERHAPS TO INCLUDE U.S. PARTICIPATION, IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND AN

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 06 STATE 156256 T0SEC 080198

ELIMINATION OF PALESTINIAN ENCROACHMENTS. FURTHERMORE, A beefed up UNIFIL IN COOPERATION WITH THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, MIGHT BE ABLE TO REPLACE THE SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO URGE RESTRAINT, SEEK THEIR VIEWS AND CO-OPERATION IN OUR EFFORT TO INTERNATIONALIZE LEBANON, AND THROUGH PHIL HABIB'S MISSION, TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES.

THE SOVIET MILITARY POSITION WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES ENGAGE IN COMBAT. THEY HAVE INDICATED THEY MIGHT PROVIDE AIR

DEFENSE HELP IN THE EVENT OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON SYRIAN POSITION IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THEY MIGHT BECOME MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING SYRIAN FORCES IF ISRAEL ATTACKED INSIDE SYRIA. OUR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL BE COMPLICATED AT EVERY STEP BY THE SOVIETS. THEIR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE BEST SERVED BY PROLONGING ARAB OUTRAGE OVER THE ISRAELI INVASION AND BY LINKING THE U.S. TO IT. THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON OFFERS IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES TO THE SOVIETS IN THIS REGARD. THEY WILL NOT BE HELPFUL DIPLOMATICALLY; THEIR MISCHIEF-MAKING ALREADY IS APPARENT AT THE U.N. THEY WILL COMPLICATE AND TRY ACTIVELY TO THWART A SOLUTION IN LEBANON THAT DOES NOT INVOLVE THEM IN A MAJOR WAY. TO PRECLUDE SOVIET MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR INTENTIONS, WE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

SHOULD INFORM THEM DIPLOMATICALLY THAT OUR FLEET MOVE-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 07

STATE 188256 TOSEC 080198

MENTS/DISPOSITIONS ARE NOT BEING MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION.

SUMMARY

IN SUM, PHIL HABIB'S MISSION DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT. BUT WE MUST TRY TO DEFUSE THE CONFLICT. YOU MAY HAVE TO TAKE BOLD AND STERN MEASURES TO ACHIEVE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND STABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. END TEXT

4. WE FEEL THAT OUR APPROACH AT THIS POINT SHOULD BE TO RETAIN AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY IN OUR POSITION AS POSSIBLE WHILE WE SEE HOW PHIL'S EFFORTS PROCEED. WE DO NOT WANT TO TAKE OR DECIDE ON FUTURE SPECIFIC ACTIONS NOW WHICH COULD COMPLICATE PHIL'S EFFORTS WITH BEGIN WHO IS THE KEY TO A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. ONCE PHIL HAS PROBED THE ISRAELI POSITION AND POSSIBLY THAT OF SOME OF THE OTHER KEY PLAYERS, WE WILL WANT TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT OUR OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING THE KIND OF SOLUTION WHICH CAN QUICKLY BRING ABOUT A HALT TO THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON, CESSATION OF PLO ROCKET AND MILITARY ATTACKS ON ISRAEL, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND A STRENGTHENED STRATEGIC BUFFER ON ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. IF BEGIN IS RESOLUTELY DETERMINED TO PURSUE A SOLUTION WHICH JEOPARDIZES OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE OR UNDERCUTS OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN U.S. LEADERSHIP OF THE PEACE PROCESS, WE WILL HAVE TO BE FIRM IN OUR NEXT STEPS.

AS FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONTINUE IN THIS DIRECTION IN CONNECTION WITH BRINGING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

AS A FINAL POINT, WHILE WE MAY HAVE TO THINK ABOUT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, FEW ISSUES ARE SO SENSITIVE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 08

STATE 188256 TOSEC 080198

5. NOTE: MCPARLANE TELLS ME HE FEARS WEINBERGER WILL
FRAG

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

TRY TO GET TO CLARK BACK CHANNEL ARGUING THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOW INSTRUCT PHIL TO THREATEN BEGIN WITH THE DIREST OF CONSEQUENCES IF THE ISRAELIS DO NOT WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY.

YOU WILL WANT TO GET TO CLARK IN THE MORNING TO KEEP HIM ON THE STRAIGHT AND NARROW. STOESSEL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

550

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20005-0607

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04160 131602Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 H
-----310166 131604Z /52

O 131627Z JUN 82 ZFFH
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6946
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4160

MODS DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,4 6/13/02 (BARRETT, ROBERT S) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, LE, IS
SUBJ: LEBANON/ISRAEL CONTACT

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. DURING THIS MORNING'S CONVERSTAION (SEPTEL) AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT SARKIS AGREED THAT A LIAISON WITH ISRAEL IS A GOOD IDEA AND THAT JOHNNY ABDO IS PROBABLY THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE JOB.
DILLON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 45025040

IS/FPIC/CDR [Signature] Date: 3/5/96

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions PA Exemptions

() RELEASE () EXEMPT () DENY () DECLASSIFY IN PART () CLASSIFY or DOWNGRADE TS to () S or TS authority ()

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

538

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20005-0521

R

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 DAMASC 04053 100924Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----163076 100926Z /10
O 100917Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO USDEL SECRETARY NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6664
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 04053

DEGAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,2 6/10/02 (HABIB, ABH.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER)
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL PLANS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. IF IT WORKS OUT THAT THE SECRETARY IS PROCEEDING TO ISRAEL TODAY UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, I WOULD NOT DEPART DAMASCUS BEFORE NAILING DOWN ASSAD'S AGREEMENT TO NECESSARY STEPS. HAVING DONE THAT, I PROPOSE THAT I FLY IMMEDIATELY TO JERUSALEM LATER TODAY TO JOIN THE SECRETARY THERE. I WOULD NOT RPT NOT LEAVE DAMASCUS UNTIL I WAS CERTAIN THAT WE HAVE ASSAD ON BOARD.

3. ASSUMING THAT ALL GOES ACCORDING TO PLAN AND ASSAD IS ON BOARD, I WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS WITH THE SECRETARY THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS MAKING A VERY BRIEF STOP IN DAMASCUS FOLLOWING HIS DEPARTURE FROM ISRAEL TO MEET WITH ASSAD. HABIB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9302516

IS/FPC/CDR Date 3/5/86

EO Citations

1) CLASSIFY as 1 2 5
1) DOWNGRADE 1S 1P 1 2 5

TS authority 1P

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY
 IN PART

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State
UNCLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

54

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20008-0833

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 DAMASC 04082 101751Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----203100 101755Z /42
Z 101739Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6683
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 04082

NOOD **DECAPTIONED**

FOR THE SECRETARY AND LEWIS FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/10/02 (HABIB, PHILIP C.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, IS, LE, SY, US
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: CEASEFIRE PROSPECTS

REF: TEL AVIV 08653 ✓

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. I DON'T THINK THE SECRETARY SHOULD GO TO ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF THE RESPONSE TO THE CONDITIONS THAT HE SET FORTH FOR SUCH A TRIP. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT WHAT THE ISRAELIS PROPOSE WILL HAVE TO BE DRASTICALLY IMPROVED IF THERE IS TO BE EITHER A CHANCE FOR GETTING SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE FOR A CEASEFIRE OR FOR CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE POST-CEASEFIRE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH WE COULD WORK.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION IS SO RIGID THAT IT CANNOT BE MOVED BY A FIRM

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 DAMASC 04082 101751Z

U.S. POSITION. AS SAM LEWIS SUGGESTS, EITHER THE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

9302566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

() RELEASE
() EXCISE
() DENY

() DECLASSIFY
() IN PART

FOIA Exemptions
FOIA Exemptions

NS/PIC/CDR

Date: 3/5/196

TS authority to

() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SECRETARY OR I COULD PROBABLY ACHIEVE SOME BEGINNING WITHDRAWALS FROM WHERE THE ISRAELI FORCES ARE AT PRESENT OR ARE LIKELY TO BE BY TOMORROW. HOWEVER, I AGREE WITH SAM THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE MINISCULE IN SYRIAN EYES AND DO NOT EXPECT THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO GET THEM TO ACCEPT IT EVEN IN THE FACE OF THEIR WEAK MILITARY POSITION. ON THE CONTRARY, I THINK IT WILL LEAD THEM TO TRY AND STRENGTHEN THEIR MILITARY POSITION TO SOME EXTENT AND THEY WILL BE MORE READY TO ENGAGE ISRAELI FORCES ON THE GROUND. SYRIAN READINESS TO THROW ITS AIR FORCE INTO THE HEAT GRINDER SO FAR IS A GOOD ILLUSTRATION OF THEIR CAPACITY TO SACRIFICE.

4. WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT ARAB AND OTHER SUPPORT IS BEGINNING TO MATERIALIZE. THERE IS NO SIGN THAT THEY WILL BE OF ANY GREAT IMPORTANCE MILITARILY BUT EVEN THE DIVIDED ARABS WILL FIND A CAUSE SUFFICIENT TO RALLY THEM TO TAKE SOME SORT OF POLITICAL AND POSSIBLY EVEN ECONOMIC ACTION IN THE FACE OF THE ISRAELI POSITION.

5. THE WAY TO BREAK THIS IMPASSE IS TO DECIDE WHAT WE WILL ACCEPT AND THEN WORK ASSIDUOUSLY TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE TO THAT POINT. IF THE SECRETARY'S CONDITIONS ARE THE MINIMUM THAT WE CAN ACCEPT, THEN THAT SHOULD BE OUR GOAL.

6. RATHER THAN HAVE THE SECRETARY BE FACED WITH THE TASK OF TRYING TO NEGOTIATE TO THAT POINT, I AM PREPARED TO RETURN TO JERUSALEM AND TRY MY HAND. I WOULD NEED SOME VERY STRONG AMMUNITION. IF WE ARE GOING TO GET TOUGH, NOW IS THE TIME TO DO IT. IF WE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

DAMASC 04082 101751Z

ARE NOT, THEN ALL WE CAN FALL BACK ON IS LOGICAL PERSUASION WHICH HAS NOT WORKED UP TO THIS POINT. A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY CAN ALWAYS BE HELD IN RESERVE IF NECESSARY.

7. THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON NEEDS TO BE SALVAGED WITHOUT ACCEPTING THE FULL SHARON SCHEME--IN WHICH LEBANON IS, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, POLITICALLY CONTROLLED BY ISRAEL WITH SOMETHING LIKE A QUIETLING GOVERNMENT IN POWER. THIS WILL NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND WILL MERELY INCREASE THE AREA OF CONFRONTATION. THE ONLY WAY TO PREVENT THIS IS TO ROLL BACK THE ISRAELI PRESENCE AND ISRAELI OBJECTIVES TO WHAT THEY HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN STATED TO BE. I BELIEVE THAT ANY COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL FOR THE POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING THAT THEY SEEM TO INTEND AND WHICH WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE CONTINUING DIRECT ISRAELI MILITARY SUPPORT IS UNACCEPTABLE. FOR THE SECRETARY TO ENGAGE IN THIS KIND OF DISCUSSION WITH THE ISRAELIS AT THIS TIME, WHICH PARA 12 REFTEL SUGGESTS THE ISRAELIS INTEND, WOULD BE UNSEENLY TO SAY THE LEAST. IF IT WERE TO INCLUDE THE DISMEMBERING OF LEBANON IN ADDITION, WE WOULD HAVE VIOLATED EVERY PRECEPT AND EVERY STATEMENT OF POLICY WHICH HAS GUIDED OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD LEBANON FOR MANY YEARS. THE FACT THAT SOME LEBANESE MAY BE WILLING TO PLAY THIS GAME SHOULD NOT CONVINCE US THAT IT IS IN OUR OVERALL INTEREST. PAGANELLI

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

533

~~SECRET~~

AM: HB20005-0490

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 DAMASC 04030 092136Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----143255 092144Z /61
Z 092111Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6648
USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 04030

~~NO~~ DECAPTIONED

E. O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/09/02 (HABIB, PHILIP) OR-N
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, LE, SY, US, PLO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION

1. I AM ASTOUNDED AND DISHAYED BY WHAT HAPPENED TODAY. THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL IN REALITY SENT ME OFF ON A WILD GOOSE CHASE. HE SET OUT A SET OF PROPOSALS TO WHICH HE ASKED ME TO SECURE SYRIAN AGREEMENT. HE ALSO ACCUSED THE SYRIANS OF DOUBLING THE NUMBER OF SA-6 BATTERIES IN THE BEKAA AND ASKED THAT I SECURE THE REMOVAL OF THE ADDITIONAL BATTERIES. (THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT SAYS HE HAD ADDED NO NEW BATTERIES, ONLY SHIFTING THE EXISTING ONES AROUND.)

2. I PUT THE PROPOSALS TO PRESIDENT ASSAD AND RECEIVED WHAT I CONSIDER AN ENCOURAGING RESPONSE WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY (\$)

IN DAMASCUS AND I DOUBT STRONGLY THAT EITHER ASSAD HERE, SARKIS IN BEIRUT, OR ANYONE ELSE CAN (\$) CEASEFIRE AGREED AND IN PLACE BY THEM --BUT I WILL TRY. MOREOVER, ASSAD TOLD ME HE WOULD REPLACE MISSILES OR WHATEVER ELSE THE ISRAELIS MAY

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 DAMASC 04030 092136Z

DESTROY OF HIS EQUIPMENT IN LEBANON. WE ARE INFORMED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DENY
 FOIA Exemptions
 PA Exemptions

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART

CLASSIFY as
 DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

EO CHANGE
 IS/FPC/CDR
 Date: 4/5/96

9302566

4/5/96

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THAT SA-6 MISSILES, WITH RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS ALONG, ARE ALREADY ON THEIR WAY INTO THE BEKAA TO REPLACE THOSE KNOCKED OUT TODAY.

4. FURTHER, TO TALK ABOUT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE WITHOUT RELATION TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, EVEN FROM THE ADVANCED POSITIONS THEY NOW OCCUPY, COMPLICATES THE MATTER TO SAY THE LEAST. I HAD READ THE DEPARTMENT'S EARLIER INSTRUCTION TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO PULL BACK TO THE GENERAL AREA OF THE FORTY KILOMETER LINE AS A REALISTIC PROPOSAL FOR A FIRST PHASE.

5. WITH ALL THIS IN MIND I ANTICIPATE RECEIVING A COOL HEARING FROM ASSAD IF I CAN GET TO HIM TONIGHT. HIS FORCES MAY BE IN SUCH DIRE STRAITS FROM THE ISRAELI ATTACKS THAT I CAN MOVE HIM, BUT I ALSO BELIEVE HE IS EQUALLY LIKELY TO DECIDE TO FIGHT IT OUT NO MATTER WHAT. ESPECIALLY WHEN HE KNOWS THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT ONLY OUT TO DEFEAT HIM, BUT TO HUMILIATE HIM AS WELL, AND DESTROY HIS POSITION IN LEBANON.

6. I WANTED YOU TO HAVE THESE THOUGHTS SO THAT HOWEVER THINGS MAY GO--AND I HOPE WE CAN SUCCEED TO GET A QUICK CEASEFIRE--THE BACKGROUND TO OUR EFFORTS TODAY WAS NOT WHAT ONE WOULD WISH. PAGANELLI

NOTE BY OC/T: (\$) TEXT GARBLED AND/OR OMITTED. CORRECTIONS FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

R

~~SECRET~~

AM: NB20005-0511

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 159059 TOSEC 080393
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:ESWALKER
APPROVED BY NEA:NAVELIOTES
P:RRAPHAEL
S/S-O:RSTERN

-----154414 100417Z /11
O 100405Z JUN 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 159059 TOSEC 080393

DECAPTIONED

NODS
DAMASCUS FOR AMB. HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3 6/9/02 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS)
TAGS: PEPR, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GAME PLAN FOR FIRST 24 HOUR PERIOD
FOLLOWING CEASEFIRE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. ONCE A CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE AND HAS TAKEN HOLD, WE SHOULD CONSIDER MOVING QUICKLY TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN OUR NEXT STEPS. ASSUMING OUR APPROACH IS TO BE ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED TO YOU OF SEEKING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WHICH SECURES ITS NORTHERN BORDER AND A BROADER POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN LEBANON, WE HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING CHECKLIST OF DETAILED ACTIONS WE MIGHT TAKE OVER THE 12 TO 24 HOURS AFTER A CEASEFIRE TO IMPLEMENT THAT DECISION. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE GIVEN OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW OF HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED THEREAFTER AS PHIL ENGAGES

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 159059 TOSEC 080393

IN THE FIRST PHASE OF HIS CONSULTATIONS IN THE AREA AND

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

9802566

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION

() EXEMPT
() DENY
() DENY
() DENY

DECLASSIFY IN PART

IS/IPC/CDR

EO Citations

Date: 3/5/76

19 authority to

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

IN EUROPE.

3. AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE TAKES HOLD:

-- TAILORED MESSAGES PASSED TO ISRAEL, SYRIA, LEBANON (INCLUDING PRINCIPLE LEBANESE FACTIONS

AND PLO THROUGH APPROPRIATE MEANS) SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, EGYPT, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY.

THE MESSAGES WILL EXPLAIN OUR INITIATIVE (A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT IS BEING SENT SEPTEL), SEEK INITIAL REACTIONS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT WHEN IT IS ANNOUNCED AND INDICATE THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT REGARDING THE INITIATIVE SHORTLY IN A MATTER OF HOURS. IN THE CASE OF THE EUROPEANS, IF THE TIMING IS RIGHT, YOU COULD CONVEY THIS MESSAGE PERSONALLY TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS. YOU COULD ALSO DISCUSS THE INITIATIVE PERSONALLY WITH PRINCE SAUD (ALTHOUGH WE WOULD ALSO WANT DICK MURPHY TO PASS YOUR MESSAGE TO THE CROWN PRINCE).

-- PHIL HABIB, WITH A BROAD MANDATE, BEGINS TO NAIL DOWN LOOSE ENDS OF THE CEASEFIRE WITH ISRAEL AND SYRIA AND THE PLO TO INCLUDE THE DISENGAGEMENT ASSAD SPOKE ABOUT TO THE 40 KM LINE WHICH IS A SENSIBLE SAFETY PRECAUTION. LEWIS WILL HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS FIRST PHASE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND LARRY REINFORCED HERE WITH ARENS.

4. AFTER INITIAL RESPONSES FROM OUR CONTACTS:

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

STATE 159059 TOSEC 080393

-- EVALUATION OF RESPONSES AND POSSIBLE SUPPORT. THIS WILL HAVE TO BE FACTORED INTO HOW THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBES THE INITIATIVE.

THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE RAPID FOR MAXIMUM IMPACT. IF POSSIBLE, WE WANT TO ANNOUNCE THE INITIATIVE WITHIN 12 HOURS OF OUR INITIAL CONTACTS WITH OTHER STATES TO PREVENT ANY LOSS OF MOMENTUM OR GIVE STATES AND PARTIES WE HAVE CONTACTED A CHANCE TO THINK OF ALL THE PROBLEMS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INVOLVED AND SEEK TO NEGOTIATE WITH US THE TERMS OF REFERENCE.

5. AN HOUR OR TWO BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT:

-- THE TEXT AND TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ARE PASSED TO THE CONTACTED STATES AS WELL AS TO ALL UNIFIL CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES AND THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

-- THE SOVIET UNION IS INFORMED OF THE IMPENDING PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND ITS CONTENTS (IF POSSIBLE AS AN ADD ON TO OUR CLARIFICATION OF FLEET MOVEMENTS).

WE WANT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE STATEMENT IN ADVANCE TO AVOID TRIGGERING THEIR ACTIVE OPPOSITION BY IGNORING THEM COMPLETELY. BUT, WE WANT TO DO SO IN A WAY WHICH DOES NOT ENGAGE THEM OR GIVE THEM TIME TO INITIATIVE - COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ACTION WITH ANY OF THE OTHER PARTIES.

6. IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP TO THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT:

PHIL BEGINS HIS CONSULTATIONS IN LEBANON, SYRIA, ISRAEL AND, AS APPROPRIATE, SAUDI ARABIA. HE WILL CONTINUE -- DISCUSSION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES ON THE CEASEFIRE - AND BEGIN EXPLORATION OF AN ENLARGED PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 STATE 159059 T0SEC 080393

AT THE SAME TIME, PHIL CAN EXPLORE THE LARGER LEBANESE-PROBLEM INDICATING ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE, BUFFER ZONE, AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS -- APPROPRIATE. ONCE THE CEASEFIRE IS STABILIZED AND UPON COMPLETING HIS INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH-THE PARTIES INVOLVED, PHIL MIGHT WANT TO CONSULT IN-SEVERAL ARAB AND EUROPEAN CAPITALS BEFORE COMING HOME TO CONSIDER NEXT STEPS.

NOTE: UNIFIL COMES UP FOR RENEWAL ON JUNE 19. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT WANT OUR DECISION ON THE APPROPRIATE - STRUCTURE OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE DICTATED BY AN ARBITRARY DEADLINE, UNIFIL IS CLEARLY ONE OF OUR BETTER OPTIONS. PHIL'S DISCUSSIONS MAY ALTER THIS PERCEPTION BUT WE WILL WANT TO HAVE AN IDEA OF OUR BEST APPROACH BEFORE THE UNIFIL DEADLINE, SINCE IT WILL AFFECT THE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

WAY WE HANDLE UNIFIL RENEWAL. IN ADDITION, UNTIL WE MAKE UP OUR MINDS WE WILL WANT TO KEEP PRESENT UNIFIL CONTRIBUTORS AND THE UN SYG INFORMED OF OUR PROGRESS AND HAVE PHIL CONSULT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON HIS RETURN.

FURTHER, WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE ADVISABILITY AND CHANCES FOR SUCCESS OF A UNSC RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE CEASEFIRE AND THE THRUST OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. STOESSEL

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

521

R

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

AN: NS20005-0447

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01782 01 OF 02 082114Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----076706 082121Z /61
O 082059Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2372
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

EXCERPT COPY AVAILABLE

SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01782

NODS
DECAPTIONED
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 6/8/02 (GROVE JR, BRANDON) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, US, LE, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: JUNE 8 MEETING WITH ALIGNMENT
OPPOSITION LEADERS

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: PERES AND COMPANY STRONGLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED LIMITED OBJECTIVES OF THE IDF INCURSION AND BELIEVE THAT THUS FAR IT IS BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THOSE PARAMETERS. CRITICAL OF THE UN CALL FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL IDF WITHDRAWAL, THEY WARN THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL PLO GUNS AND ROCKETS CURRENTLY UNDER THE SYRIAN UMBRELLA IN "FATAHLAND" ON THE EASTERN FRONT ARE REMOVED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER FROM STRIKING RANGE OF THE GALILEE. MOREOVER THE IDF WILL NOT WITHDRAW FROM THE NEW BUFFER ZONE UNTIL REPLACED BY A SUITABLE SUBSTITUTE, PREFERABLY AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, OR FAILING THAT PERHAPS AN EXPANDED CHRISTIAN MILITIA PRESENCE. CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01782 01 OF 02 082114Z

OF CLASHES WITH SYRIAN FORCES LEADING TO AN ESCALATION.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

() RELEASE
() EXCISE
() DENY

() DECLASSIFY
() DECLASSIFY IN PART

ED CHANGES

CLASSIFIED BY: []
DATE: []

UNCLASSIFIED BY: []
DATE: []

9302566

3/8/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THEY URGE THAT HE PLAY A MAJOR ROLE ACROSS THE BOARD TO GET A PROPER CEASEFIRE AND FOLLOWUP POLITICAL RESOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY SAM LEWIS, DEN BROWN, AND NAT HONELL, I SPENT AN HOUR AT NOON TODAY WITH ALIGNMENT OPPOSITION LEADERS SHIMON PERES, YITZHAK RABIN, AND ABBA EBAN. REVIEWING MY MANDATE AS I HAD WITH BEGIN LAST NIGHT, I STRESSED THAT HE HAD CONSISTENTLY CALLED FOR AN END TO THE ISRAELI ACTION AS REFLECTED IN OUR VOTE ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, AS WELL AS OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE QUESTION NOW IS HOW TO ARRIVE AT A SUITABLE ARRANGEMENT WITHOUT HARMING OUR OTHER INTERESTS, INCLUDING THE PEACE PROCESS, OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION, AND U.S.-ISRAELI BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DESCRIBED FOR ME THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES AND HAD TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SIMILARLY BRIEFED THE OPPOSITION. I THEN ASKED FOR THEIR THOUGHTS FOR THE SHORT-TERM AND MID-TERM FUTURE.

4. PERES SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE CLEAR DIFFERENCES WITH BEGIN'S GOVERNMENT ON SOME POLICY ISSUES VIS-A-VIS THE PLO, E.G. THE ALIGNMENT INSISTS THAT THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION MUST BE POLITICAL, THEY GENERALLY SEE EYE TO EYE WITH THE GOVERNMENT ALONG THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- ISRAEL HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN LEBANON.
- THERE IS NO INTENTION TO KEEP THE IDF IN LEBANON FOREVER. THE OPERATION IS LIMITED IN SCOPE AND TIME ("NOT YEARS OR MONTHS").

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA 01782 01 OF 02 082114Z

-- THERE IS NO INTENT TO GIVE THIS OPERATION A WAR DIMENSION.

-- THERE IS NO INTENTION OF ENGAGING THE SYRIANS IN WAR.

5. BRIEFLY REVIEWING THE EVENTS WHICH LED UP TO THE ISRAELI INCURSION, PERES SAID THAT ONCE PLO ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS STARTED TO SHELL NORTHERN ISRAEL THERE WAS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO PUSHING THEM OUT OF RANGE. PERES ET AL REITERATED THAT THE OPERATION WAS BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THE LIMITED PARAMETERS WHICH HAD BEEN DESCRIBED TO THEM AND THEY WOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT. (RABIN ADDED A CAVEAT: THE MOVE TO DANOUR WOULD NOT EXCEED THE PARAMETERS PROVIDED THAT IT WAS ONLY A BLOCKING ACTION.) ALL THREE NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD SOUGHT TO INFORM THE SYRIANS IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY THAT IT DESIRED NO CLASH WITH SYRIAN FORCES.

6. OPINING THAT THE IDF'S GROUND OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN LARGELY ACHIEVED, PERES AND HIS COLLEAGUES THEN CONCENTRATED ON THE MAJOR UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS. PLO ARTILLERY REMAINS UNDER SYRIAN UMBRELLA, AND THEY BELIEVE EFFECTIVE COMMAND/COORDINATION ON THE EASTERN FRONT ("FATAHLAND") NORTH OF HASBAYYA. KPAR UVAL AND SOME OTHER VILLAGES LAST NIGHT CAME UNDER FIRE FROM THIS PLO ARTILLERY. THE CONTINUATION OF SUCH A SITUATION WAS INTOLERABLE AND PERES AND HIS FRIENDS WERE WORRIED THAT THE SITUATION COULD EASILY GET OUT OF CONTROL AND LEAD TO A CONFLICT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01782 02 OF 02 082121Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----077121 082124Z /61
O 082059Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2373
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01782

NODIS

WITH SYRIA. TIME WAS VERY PRECIOUS AND THEY ARGUED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD THEREFORE PLAY AN IMMEDIATE ROLE. CERTAINLY THERE WOULD BE NO CEASEFIRE UNTIL THOSE PLO GUNS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN/SILENCED EITHER MILITARILY OR POLITICALLY.

7. RABIN REMARKED THAT AFTER THE IDF MILITARY OPERATION ENDS AN ADEQUATE POLITICAL SOLUTION MIGHT TAKE FROM THREE TO FIVE WEEKS AND WARNED US THAT THE IDF WOULD SIMPLY NOT WITHDRAW WITHOUT SUCH A SOLUTION. IN HIS VIEW THE ISRAELI OPERATION HAD NOW GIVEN THE U.S. BETTER CARDS FOR A LONG-TERM NEGOTIATION OF THE LEBANESE/PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. IN ANY EVENT, WE WOULD HAVE TO BRING THE SYRIANS AROUND BEFORE THE IDF WOULD WITHDRAW OR EVEN BEFORE A CEASEFIRE WENT INTO EFFECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, ALL THREE WERE CRITICAL OF THE FACT THAT THE U.S. BY ITS VOTING AND BY ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAD JOINED THE UN CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, A DEMAND WHICH THEY FOUND UNACCEPTABLE.

8. I THEN REVIEWED IN OUTLINE MAJOR CURRENT U.S. CONCERNS ON THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF U.S.-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01782 02 OF 02 082121Z

IN LEBANON, AND I WARNED THEM WAS NOT MERELY A QUESTION, AS THEY PUT IT, OF DEAL-

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ING WITH LEGALISMS. WHEN I TOUCHED ON A POSSIBLE MOVE TO APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL UNDER A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION INVOKING CHAPTER 7, THEY IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED THAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION WOULD DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE U.S. STANCE. EBAN NOTED THAT GENERALLY THE FRENCH STAND AGAINST CHAPTER 7 SANCTIONS AND PERES SAID THAT NOTWITHSTANDING HIS ATTACHMENT TO LEBANON MITTERRAND WOULD BE PRAGMATIC. SAM LEWIS SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS THAT ISRAEL "EXPECTED" A U.S. VETO OF SUCH A RESOLUTION AND COUNSELED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE MOST FELICITOUS PHRASE TO EMPLOY.

--
9. PERES THEN STATED THAT HAVING CAUCUSED LAST NIGHT, THE ALIGNMENT WOULD STATE ITS POSITION IN TODAY'S KNESSET DEBATE AS FOLLOWS:

-- THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.

-- THERE SHOULD BE EXPRESSED THE "WISH" OR "DESIRE" THAT A PROHIBITION OF TERROR ABROAD BE INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF THIS CEASEFIRE (THEY REALIZE OF COURSE HOW DIFFICULT THIS WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE).

-- SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE SO AS TO REPLACE THE IDF THROUGHOUT THE NEW 40-KILOMETER BUFFER ZONE WITH INTERNATIONAL FORCES. (HERE PERES CLARIFIED THAT THEY WERE NOT THINKING OF U.S. FORCES AND THEREFORE HAD NOT USED THE EXPRESSION "MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE.")

-- ISRAELI POSITIONS IN THE GALILEE SHOULD BE FURTHER FORTIFIED.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 JERUSA 01782 02 OF 02 082121Z

10. ASKED WHAT THEY THOUGHT THE PHALANGE WOULD DO, PERES AND RABIN REPLIED DISDAINFULLY THAT THE PHALANGE WANTS ISRAEL TO DO EVERYTHING. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY VENTURED THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF WE COULD NOT REPLACE AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO REPLACE THE IDF, A FALLBACK POSITION MIGHT BE TO EXPAND HADDAD'S FORCE SO AS TO DO THE JOB. I THREW COLD WATER ON HADDAD TAKING OVER SOUTH LEBANON. PERES REMARKED THAT THE COMBINATIONS ARE ENDLESS (E.G. HADDAD PLUS THE PHALANGISTS). IN THIS CONNECTION, THE QUESTION WAS ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT THE SHI'A OF SOUTH LEBANON WOULD NOW DO; BUT THERE WERE NO

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CONCLUSIVE ANSWERS.

11. BEFORE WE WOUND UP, PERES ET AL CAME BACK TO THE VITAL NECESSITY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM ON THE EASTERN FRONT WITH THE SYRIANS. PROBED FOR SOLUTIONS, THEY STATED THEIR OBVIOUS PREFERENCES:

-- SYRIAN FORCES TO WITHDRAW.

-- THE PLO TO TAKE OUT ITS ARTILLERY, ROCKETS, AND OTHER UNITS, WHILE THE SYRIAN FORCES WOULD REMAIN.

-- AS A MINIMUM FALLBACK ABOUT WHICH THEY WERE HIGHLY DUBIOUS, THE SYRIANS, WHO ARE BELIEVED TO CONTROL AND COORDINATE THE PLO, AT LEAST IN THAT AREA, MUST ENSURE THAT THE PLO DO NOT FIRE. GROVE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

R

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20005-0416

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01744 01 OF 02 072116Z
SECTION MODS-00

MFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----033212 072121Z /62

072050Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
M AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
O USDEL SECRETARY IN LONDON FLASH
ECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2346
MFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
MEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

930256.6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/>	
FOIA Exemptions	
PA Exemptions	

IS/FPC/CDR _____ Date: 3/5/82

EO Citations _____

TS _____

CLASSIFY as S or

DOWNGRADE TS to S or

SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01744

DECAPTIONED

LONDON FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-4 06/07/02 (HABIB, PHILIP) OR-N
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, US, SY
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT FOLLOWING FIRST MEETING WITH BEGIN

REF: STATE 155202 (TOSEC 80209)

1. [REDACTED]

2. SAM LEWIS AND I HAVE BEEN REVIEWING THE SITUATION AFTER OUR INITIAL TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH BEGIN, SHAMIR, AND SHARON ON JUNE 7, AND WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS. IT IS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL ADAMANTLY RESIST ANY IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL AND RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, EVEN IF SUBJECTED TO THE MOST DRACONIAN SANCTIONS BY THE UN OR THE U.S. AT THE SAME TIME, BEGIN STRESSED REPEATEDLY AND CATEGORICALLY THAT ISRAELI FORCES WILL LEAVE LEBANON AS SOON AS ALTERNATE CONDITIONS ARE ESTABLISHED WHICH CAN MEET THE OBJECTIVE ESTABLISHED FOR THEIR MILITARY OPERATION: I.E., COMPLETE

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01744 01 OF 02 072116Z

SECURITY FROM THREAT OF ATTACK AGAINST THEIR NORTHERN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BORDER TOWNS. THE 40 KILOMETERS BUFFER ZONE CONCEPT IS NOW FIRMLY ENTRENCHED.

3. MOST OF ISRAEL'S DECLARED MILITARY OBJECTIVES SEEM LIKELY TO ACHIEVEMENT WITHIN AT MOST TWO-THREE DAYS, BUT THE EXPLOSIVE DANGER OF ESCALATING CLASHES WITH SYRIAN FORCES IS VERY REAL AND COULD DESTROY THAT TIMETABLE. AT THIS POINT, BEGIN AND SHARON ARE INORDINATELY PROUD OF THE IDF'S PERFORMANCE. AFTER ONLY 34 HOURS THE ISRAELI FORCES HAVE REACHED THE GENERAL TARGET AREAS FOR THEIR MAXIMUM ADVANCE. ISRAELI CASUALTIES ARE WITHIN LEVELS THEY FIND ACCEPTABLE. STILL, UNTIL THE SYRIAN QUESTION MARK IS RESOLVED AND CONSOLIDATION OF ISRAELI POSITIONS AND "HOP UP" HAVE BEEN FINISHED, THERE WILL BE A RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE DIPLOMATICALLY WITH US IN GREAT DETAIL ABOUT THE NEXT PHASE.

4. WHEN I SEE BEGIN AGAIN LATE TUESDAY AFTERNOON, I EXPECT THAT HE WILL SAY FIRMLY THAT A CREDIBLE UN OR MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE MUST BE INSERTED BEFORE THE IDF WITHDRAWS. THIS FORCE WILL, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE GIVEN A STRONGER MANDATE THAN UNIFIL TO PROVIDE GUARANTEES THAT PLO ELEMENTS WOULD NOT SOON INFILTRATE BACK INTO THE BUFFER ZONE WITH KATYUSHA ROCKETS OR OTHER WEAPONS WHICH WOULD AGAIN THREATEN THE BORDER SETTLEMENTS. HE MAY PROVIDE US WITH ALTERNATIVE IDEAS INVOLVING A ROLE FOR CHRISTIAN PHALANGIST FORCES IN THE BUFFER REGION, ALTHOUGH THIS SEEMS TO ALL OF US TO BE FAR FETCHED. I ALSO EXPECT THAT HE WILL RESTATE AGAIN, WITH SUITABLE BRAVADO, ISRAEL'S DETERMINATION NOT TO BE PRESSURED BY SANCTIONS INTO "PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL" AGAIN, NO MATTER WHAT THE COST TO US-ISRAELI RELATIONS. WHILE THERE WILL BE HYPERBOLE IN THAT STATEMENT, BEGIN

PAGE 03 JERUSA 01744 01 OF 02 072116Z

AND INDEED HIS COUNTRYMEN BECOME MORE OBSTINATE RATHER THAN LESS UNDER THREAT OF "PUNISHMENT." IF WE ARE TO CONSIDER SANCTIONS, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE AND EVEN THEN RESULTS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. I HAVE MADE CERTAIN BEGIN UNDERSTANDS CLEARLY THE DEPTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERNS. BUT IF REAL DRACONIAN SANCTIONS ARE COMING UNLESS ISRAEL WITHDRAWS, I BELIEVE WE OWE IT TO BEGIN TO LEVEL WITH HIM NOW, RATHER THAN LATER.

5. WE ARE JUST AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR DIALOGUE WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BEGIN. DIFFICULT IT SURELY WILL BE, BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE. WE HAVE SOME AGREEMENT THAT CONDITIONS MUST BE ESTABLISHED UNDER WHICH ISRAEL'S BORDER AREA SECURITY CANNOT BE THREATENED. BEGIN HAS REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON UNDER ACCEPTABLE SECURITY CONDITIONS. WE ALSO AGREE THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE THE IDF REMAINING INDEFINITELY IN LEBANON. THIS IS NOT MUCH TO BUILD ON, BUT WE WILL HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF THE ISRAELI POSITION TOMORROW. MEANWHILE, WE NEED TO STALL UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS WHICH COULD CONFRONT US WITH HAVING TO VETO, OR NOT VETO, A CONDEMNATORY CHAPTER 7 RESOLUTION. WE SHOULD ALSO BE EXPLORING URGENTLY WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT AND WITHIN OUR OWN EXPERT RANKS HOW AND IF AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR UNIFIL COULD BE DEvised. I DO NOT SEE ANY GOOD ALTERNATIVE TO PURSUING THAT LINE. ONCE THE IDF HAS CONSOLIDATED ITS POSITION WITHIN THE 40 KILOMETER LINE, IDEALLY WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY OR ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO HAVE UNIFIL TAKE OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BORDER AREA, PRESUMABLY WITH AUGMENTED UNITS IF POSSIBLE AND CERTAINLY WITH A STRENGTHENED MANDATE OF SOME KIND. I DO NOT NECESSARILY NEED TO RESPOND TOMORROW IF BEGIN PRESENTS THE ANTICIPATED APPROACH. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

**PAGE 01 JERUSA 01744 02 OF 02 072119Z
ACTION NODS-00**

**INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 M
-----033303 -072123Z /62
Z 072050Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM ANCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO USDEL SECRETARY IN LONDON FLASH
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2347
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE**

SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01744

NODIS

IF I COULD HAVE SOME PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE.

6. THERE ARE CERTAIN "GIVENS" HERE WHICH ARE UNPLEASANT TO CONTEMPLATE BUT ARE REALISTIC: (A) RAPID DECISIONS BY THE ISRAELI CABINET TO WITHDRAW, UNDER ANY SET OF ALTERNATIVE CONDITIONS, ARE HIGHLY UNLIKELY; (B) WE CANNOT RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, WHICH MEANS THAT THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT WHICH I NEGOTIATED LAST SUMMER CANNOT BE REVIVED IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM; (C) DIFFICULT AS IT IS TO CONTEMPLATE, THE APPROACH WHICH HOLDS THE GREATEST PROMISE OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME IS UTILIZING THE EXISTING UNIFIL FORCE WITH ADDITIONS AND A STRENGTHENED MANDATE.

7. IN THE INTEREST OF DOING OUR BEST TO MODERATE ISRAELI ACTIONS, I INTEND TO URGE ON BEGIN THE WISDOM OF NOT DOING ANY FURTHER BOMBING IN THE BEIRUT AREA. HIS EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR NOT BOMBING URBAN AREAS IN THE CONVERSATION TODAY GIVES A GOOD OPENING DESPITE HIS APPARENT DESIRE TO HIT PLO HEADQUARTERS.

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01744 02 OF 02 072119Z

8. IT WILL TAKE SEVERAL DAYS, I FEAR, BEFORE WE WILL KNOW WHETHER SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL MAY BE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

██████████

POSSIBLE. THEREFORE, I PROPOSE TO STAY IN ISRAEL AND NOT
GO ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION UNLESS SOME CLEAR PURPOSE
WOULD BE SERVED. GROVE

UNCLASSIFIED

██████████



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

517

R



AN: NS20065-0420

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01745 01 OF 03 072259Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----036035 072304Z /61

3 072224Z JUN 82
FM ANCONSUL JERUSALEN
TO USDEL SECRETARY IN LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2348
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEN 01745

DECAPTIONED

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 6/7/02 (GROVE, BRANDON) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FIRST MEETING WITH BEGIN -- JUNE 7, 1982

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. BEGIN IS DETERMINED TO COMPLETE HIS OBJECTIVE OF SEIZING AND CLEARING THE PLO OUT OF A STRIP WHICH EXTENDS 43 KILOMETERS NORTH OF ISRAEL TO THE ALAWI RIVER IN WEST LEBANON, A TASK WHICH MAY TAKE ANOTHER TWO TO THREE DAYS. HE ADAMANTLY REFUSES TO RESTORE THE STATUS QUO ANTE WHICH HE ARGUES WOULD PERMIT THE PLO TO SHELL NORTHERN ISRAEL. NEVERTHELESS HE INSISTS THAT ISRAEL HAS NO TANTAMOUNT DESIGNS ON LEBANON AND IS SEARCHING FOR AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL ENSURE NORTH ISRAEL'S FREEDOM FROM PLO SHELLING/ INFILTRATION WITHOUT ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON. AFTER CONSULTING WITH HIS COLLEAGUES HE HOPES TO GIVE ME SOME FURTHER IDEAS TOMORROW AT 1730.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR SAMUEL LEWIS AND DCH BROWN.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01745 01 OF 03 072259Z

I CALLED ON BEGIN FOR ONE HOUR AND 45 MINUTES AT 1700

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE <input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE <input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY <input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART	EO 12958 (1) EXEMPT FROM (2) DOWNGRADE TO (1) S OR (3) DOWNGRADE TO (1) S OR	TS authority:
--	--	---	---------------

9302566

3/5/90

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

LOCAL IN HIS OFFICE. BEGIN WAS JOINED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND YEHUDA AVNER (NOTETAKER). HE WAS TIRED AND SOBERED BY RECENT SYRIAN MOVES AS WELL AS 20 KIA, BUT DELIGHTED WITH ISRAEL'S OVERALL MILITARY SUCCESSES THUS FAR.

4. THANKING BEGIN FOR RECEIVING ME ON SHORT NOTICE, I REITERATED OUR DISHAY OVER THE SHOCKING ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON AMBASSADOR ARSOV. REVIEWING THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE ON THE LEBANESE CRISIS, I SAID THAT IN OUR MEETING IN VERSAILLES ON JUNE 6 THE PRESIDENT, WHO WAS AWARE OF THE GOI CABINET STATEMENT AS WELL AS THE STATEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN BEGIN'S JUNE 6 LETTER, WAS GREATLY CONCERNED AT THE TURN OF EVENTS AND HAD ASKED ME TO OBTAIN BEGIN'S VIEWS ON WHAT WOULD NOW HAPPEN AND WHERE HE SAW THE SITUATION GOING. THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS CONVERSATION AND TO REMAIN IN JERUSALEM PENDING A PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE.

5. BEGIN SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HIS DUTY WAS TO BE WITH HIS SOLDIERS IN THE NORTH WHERE THERE WERE IMPORTANT DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN, HE HAD HELICOPTERED BACK FROM BEAUFORT CASTLE WHICH WAS SEIZED AFTER AN INTENSIVE ALL NIGHT BATTLE TO MEET ME AT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REQUEST. TOMORROW HE WOULD PROCEED TO THE NORTH ONCE AGAIN AND THEN RETURN HERE TO DEAL WITH A NOTION OF NO CONFIDENCE BY THE TINY COMMUNIST FACTION. HE WAS CERTAIN OF OVERWHELMING SUPPORT, HAVING CONSULTED OPPOSITION LEADERS AS WELL AS HIS COALITION PARTNERS. BEGIN SAID THAT MORE THAN A NATIONAL CONSENSUS "WE NOW HAVE NATIONAL UNITY."

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03

JERUSA 01745 01 OF 03 072259Z

6. AFTER A BRIEF FURTHER EXCHANGE IN WHICH BEGIN PROUDLY DESCRIBED THE KEY MILITARY ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LAST 30 HOURS, WE WERE JOINED BY DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON AND THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SABI. ASSERTING THAT HE HAD RECENTLY EMPHASIZED IN WASHINGTON THAT HE DID NOT WANT US CAUGHT BY SURPRISE, SHARON SAID THAT THE JULY CEASE FIRE, IN WHICH, AS HE PUT IT, THE KILLING OF JEWS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD WAS NOT CONSIDERED A CEASEFIRE VIOLATION, HAD BECOME INTOLERABLE TO THE POINT THAT IT HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE RECENT ISRAELI ACTION. THE GOAL OF THAT

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ACTION IS TO REMOVE THE PLO FROM ARTILLERY RANGE OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE BORDER. FOR THIS IT WAS NECESSARY TO CLEAR A 43 KILOMETER WIDE STRIP, WHICH WOULD REACH AS FAR AS THE ALAMI RIVER NORTH OF SIDON ON THE WEST BEARING IN MIND THAT THE PLO HAD OBTAINED FROM THE SYRIANS A 180 MM ARTILLERY PIECE WITH A RANGE OF 42.8 KILOMETERS. HE DID NOT DRAW A PRECISE LINE. A KEY PROBLEM WAS THE FACT THAT THE PLO HAD DEPLOYED WEAPONS AND UNITS DISBURSED AMONG SYRIANS IN THE VICINITY OF THE BEKAA VALLEY. ISRAEL WANTED TO AVOID ANY BATTLE WITH SYRIA. THEREFORE INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE IDF THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO ATTACK ON SYRIAN FORCES UNLESS THEY FIRST ATTACKED THE IDF. ON THE EASTERN FRONT THE IDF WAS TO INITIATE NO PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH SYRIAN TROOPS. ISRAEL HAD TRIED TO MAKE IT CLEAR BY VARIOUS MEANS THAT IT WANTED NO WAR WITH SYRIA AND IT HOPED THAT SYRIANS WOULD HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM "FATAHLAND" AND OTHER PLO AREAS.

7. CONTINUING, SHARON GAVE THE FOLLOWING RUNDOWN:
-- ON THE COASTAL ROAD, THE IDF HAD ALREADY REACHED THE ALAMI RIVER. IN SO DOING THE IDF HAD SINCE BYPASSED TYRE AND SIDON SO AS TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO THESE ANCIENT CITIES. USING "THE LATEST PSY-WAR METHODS" (LEAFLETS, LOUDSPEAKERS).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01745 02 OF 03 072308Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 M
-----036213 072315Z /61
O 072224Z JUN 82
FM ANCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO USDEL SECRETARY IN LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2349
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01745

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

THE ISRAELIS WERE SUCCEEDING IN ACHIEVING EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND SURRENDER OF PLO TERRORISTS FROM TYRE AND SIDON. IT HAD ALSO SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION LANDING NUMEROUS TANKS NORTH OF SIDON WITHOUT CASUALTIES.

--IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR THE IDF HAD TAKEN NABATIYAH AND CROSSED THE AKIYA BRIDGE TO REACH "BASRI" SOME 40 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE ISRAELI BORDER. SOME LINKUPS HAD ALREADY BEEN EFFECTED BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN COLUMNS.

--ON THE EASTERN FRONT THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN HASBAYYA BUT HAD STOPPED THERE SO AS NOT TO ENGAGE THE SYRIANS.

8. MEANWHILE, SAID SHARON, THERE HAD BEEN A VERY DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT: THE SYRIANS HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF ISRAELI CAUTION TO MOVE NEW FORCES INTO LEBANON AND SOUTHWARD NOT ONLY TO THE LOWER BAKAA VALLEY (IN A MANNER WHICH SUGGESTED THEY INTEND TO STAY THERE) BUT ALSO IN

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01745 02 OF 03 072308Z

THE CENTRAL REGION OF SOUTHWEST JAZZIN. NOW THE SYRIANS WERE MOVING AN ADDITIONAL SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE BRIGADE

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

INTO LEBANON. MOREOVER, SINCE THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 6 THE IDF IN CERTAIN SECTORS HAD COME UNDER SYRIAN ARTILLERY FIRE AND SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE CASUALTIES. IN ADDITION, SYRIAN COMMANDOS HAD CAPTURED CERTAIN POINTS ON THE CREST OF MOUNT LEBANON AND WERE CREATING "NEW FACTS". THIS HAD COMPLICATED THE IDF'S MISSION. ORIGINALLY, THE IDF'S GROUND OBJECTIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN REACHED BY NOON TOMORROW, JUNE 8. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT, THIS WOULD TAKE ANOTHER 2-3 DAYS. (HERE BEGIN INTERVENED TO STATE THAT THE DECISION ON HOW TO COPE WITH THE COMPLICATING INVOLVEMENTS OF THE SYRIANS WOULD BE MADE BY THE CABINET.) MOST OF THE GALILEE IS NOW SAFE FROM PLO SHELLING EXCEPT A FEW TOWNS IN THE UPPER GALILEE PANHANDLE WHICH CAN BE HIT BY PLO GUNS STILL INTERSPERSED WITH SYRIA UNITS IN "FATAHLAND" ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

9. WHEN I INQUIRED ABOUT THE CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY, BEGIN REMINDED ME OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO RESTORE THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND THEN FORCEFULLY ASSERTED THAT THE SITUATION HAD NOW FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED. THE STATUS QUO ANTE AS REFERRED TO IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER (OF MAY, 1981), COULD NO LONGER BE RESTORED. "IT IS INCONCEIVABLE TO ASSUME THAT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES HE WOULD ALLOW A SITUATION WHERE THOSE (PLO) SCOUNDRELS COULD AGAIN HIT OUR CIVILIANS IN THE GALILEE." BEGIN WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES HOW TO REACH THE GOAL OF COMPLETE SECURITY FOR THE INHABITANTS OF THE NORTHERN GALILEE WITHOUT RESORTING TO OCCUPATION OF THE NEW 40 KILOMETER BUFFER ZONE BY THE IDF. IN RESPONSE TO MY PROBING HE REITERATED THE POINTS HE HAD MADE IN HIS JUNE 6 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT: ISRAEL

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 JERUSA 01745 02 OF 03 072308Z

ADHERES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON WITH WHICH IT SEEKS A PEACE TREATY. ISRAEL DOES NOT COVET A SINGLE CENTIMETER OF LEBANESE SOIL AND WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT THE IDF WILL WITHDRAW. HOWEVER, THE STATUS QUO ANTE CANNOT BE RESTORED.

10. AT THIS JUNCTURE I INTERVENED THAT THERE WERE ELEMENTS TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WHICH WERE NOT CONTRARY TO THE GOALS THAT BEGIN HAD ARTICULATED, E.G., THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE IDF IN LEBANON WOULD AT A CERTAIN POINT BE NO LONGER NECESSARY. I ASKED WHETHER BEGIN

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COULD NOW SHARE WITH ME HIS THOUGHTS ON HIS PLANS FOR THE FUTURE. HE SAID HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO DO SO BUT ONLY AFTER CONSULTING WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES TONIGHT AND TOMORROW. I STRESSED THAT SOMEHOW WE HAD TO CREATE A SITUATION WHICH ISRAEL AND EVERYONE ELSE COULD LIVE IN THE WAKE OF WHAT HAD RECENTLY HAPPENED. SOON THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES ON THE GROUND. BUT BEYOND THAT, THERE HAD TO BE OTHER MEANS TO ACHIEVE THE SAME GOALS WITHOUT ISRAELI OCCUPATION. MEANWHILE, OTHER THINGS WERE HAPPENING. THE SYRIANS WERE ON THE MOVE.

11. REMINDING ME THAT ISRAEL HAD ALREADY PAID A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF BLOOD FOR ITS MOVE, BEGIN INSISTED THAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE COULD NOT BE REPEATED: "PEOPLE WOULD STONE US." HE WAS SEARCHING FOR AN ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH THE U.S. COULD AND SHOULD PLAY A ROLE. THE OUTCOME MUST REFLECT THE CLEAR GOAL OF THE RECENT CAMPAIGN THAT NEVER AGAIN SHOULD VILLAGES IN THE GALILEE BE BOMBARDED BY ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS. WHEN I REFERRED TO THE RESTORATION OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, BEGIN STATED SHARPLY

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01745 03 OF 03 072314Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----036336 072310Z /61
O 072224Z JUN 82

FM ANCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO USDEL SECRETARY IN LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2300
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01745

MODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

THAT THIS PREVIOUS PHASE WAS NOW AN ANACHRONISM. "WHAT DID IT MEAN? WHENEVER THEY KILLED OR WOUNDED OUR PEOPLE AND WE RESPONDED, THEY IMMEDIATELY SHELLED OUR NORTHERN SETTLEMENTS."

12. WHEN I REFERRED TO THE SECURITY RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, WHICH LATTER SHORTLY REQUIRED A REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL INCLUDING ISRAEL'S FORMAL RESPONSE, THERE WOULD BE FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE AND ACTION WHICH WOULD PUT THE PRESIDENT IN A DILEMMA.

-- THE PRESIDENT IS FACING A GROUNDSWELL OF CRITICISM OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN THE CONGRESS AND INQUIRIES ABOUT THE LEGAL IMPLICATION OF ISRAEL'S USE OF U.S. FURNISHED EQUIPMENT IN THE CURRENT MILITARY CAMPAIGN.

--THE PRESIDENT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HARMFUL EFFECT THE ISRAELI ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY IF PROLONGED, COULD HAVE ON THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND THE PEACE PROCESS.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01745 03 OF 03 072314Z

--FINALLY THE REACTIONS AMONG KEY ARAB STATES DIRECTLY ENDANGER IMPORTANT U.S. AND WEST EUROPEAN INTERESTS, AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ARE ALSO RELATED TO ISRAELI INTERESTS.

13. IN RESPONSE BEGIN SPOKE ESSENTIALLY TO THE FIRST TWO POINTS:

-- THE U.S. AT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL COST IN LATIN AMERICA HAD VETOED A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. HE WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT-- ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT ASKING -- THE PRESIDENT TO INSTRUCT THAT A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL WOULD BE VETOED, SINCE THE GOI HAD ONLY EXERCISED ITS INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE.

-- HIS OWN READING WAS THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS CONGRESSMAN FINDLEY THE HOOD IN CONGRESS WAS GENERALLY FAR MORE FAVORABLE TO ISRAEL THIS YEAR THAN IT HAD BEEN IN SEVERAL PREVIOUS YEARS. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT CONGRESS WOULD NOT CONDEMN OR PUNISH ISRAEL FOR ITS USE OF AMERICAN-ORIGIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE, ALL THE MORE SO IF, AS HE HOPED, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED WHY ISRAEL HAD BEEN COMPELLED TO TAKE THIS STEP. BEGIN REFERRED SCATHINGLY TO A NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT OF SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S ALLEGED INTENTION TO RECOMMEND SANCTIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE SAID HE HOPED THE PRESIDENT WOULD REJECT ANY SUCH RECOMMENDATION; IF HE DID NOT, THE RESULT WOULD MAKE THE ISRAELI POSITION MORE RIGID, NOT MORE FLEXIBLE. I MADE CLEAR I KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE REPORT. (HERE BEGIN CITED A WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL ALLEGEDLY ENDORSING ISRAEL'S ACTIONS AS SELF-DEFENSE).

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA. 0174E 03 OF 03 072314Z

-- IN ANY EVENT, HE WAS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED, ALONG WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AND PEOPLE THAT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN THE CORRECT COURSE. EVEN IF HE HAD ASCERTAINED IN ADVANCE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD CONDEMN ISRAEL AND EVEN IF (HEAVEN FORBID) THE U.S. SHOULD IMPOSE SANCTIONS FOR THE USE OF U.S. EQUIPMENT HE WOULD HAVE NEVERTHELESS MADE THE SAME RECOMMENDATION TO HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES, FOR THE ACTION WAS "ABSOLUTELY UNAVOIDABLE."

14. WITH THAT WE AGREED TO MEET TOMORROW, JUNE 8 AT 1730 LOCAL.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

GROVE

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AM: N820002-0450

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00618 01 OF 02 012057Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----120661 012105Z /61
O 012041Z MAR 82
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 143Z
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 00618

NODS [REDACTED]

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 3/1/02 (HABIB, PHILIP) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, US, MILI, LE, MOPS, IS, SY
SUBJECT: MY MEETING MARCH 1 WITH MENACHEM BEGIN: A
STORMY ENCOUNTER WITH AN EMBATTLED PRIME MINISTER

REF: JERUSALEM 619

2. THE DETAILED REPORT ON MY MEETING THIS
MORNING WITH BEGIN (REFTEL) IF ANYTHING UNDERSTATES
THE ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION, INJURED DIGNITY, DEFIANCE,
AND FRUSTRATION WHICH WE ENCOUNTERED. HAVING JUST
COME FROM THE HOSPITAL WHERE HIS WIFE IS IN INTENSIVE
CARE FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS, AND HAVING RECEIVED REPORTS
OVERNIGHT ABOUT THE TENSE UNPRECEDENTED CONFRONTATION
BUILDING UP IN SINAI OVER THE PROBLEM OF THE YAMIT
SETTLERS, BEGIN WAS IN A SOMBER MOOD. AS SOON AS WE
TOUCHED CONTROVERSIAL TOPICS HIS FRUSTRATIONS BOILED
OVER AND SOME OF OUR EXCHANGES WERE MORE THAN HEATED.
SAM LEWIS COMPARES HIS MOOD TODAY AS ALMOST EXACTLY
PARALLEL WITH THAT HE ENCOUNTERED ON DECEMBER 20

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00618 01 OF 02 012057Z

WHEN BEGIN READ HIM THE RIOT ACT IN HIS "BANANA REPUBLIC"

UNCLASSIFIED

4674 3510

9302566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	SECRET	NO FORN DISSEM
1/1 RELEASE	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED
1/1 CHANGE	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED
1/1 IDBY	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED
1/1	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED
FROM Exemptions	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED
PA Exemptions	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED	1/1 UNCLASSIFIED

NO FORN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY 1 1 85 BY

1/1 UNCLASSIFIED 12 14 85 BY

UNCLASSIFIED

DISCOURSE.

3. SAM ANALYZES THE PROBLEM HE FACED IN TODAY'S MEETING AS RESULTING FROM DEALING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT A MOMENT WHEN HE HAS LITERALLY MORE ON HIS PLATE THAN HE CAN HANDLE, BOTH PERSONALLY AND POLITICALLY. THE TRAUMA OF THE YAHIT SITUATION IS FOR BEGIN A PERSONAL TRAGEDY; YET HE GRITS HIS TEETH AND SAYS DEFIANTLY THAT HE WILL MEET HIS OBLIGATIONS TO EVACUATE THE SETTLERS AS HE IS COMMITTED TO DO, REGARDLESS OF THE PAIN IT CAUSES. HE OVER-REACTED A NOON PRESS STATEMENT BY DEAN FISCHER ON "VIOLENCE FROM ANY QUARTER" WHICH BEGIN, ALWAYS SUPER-SENSITIVE ON SUCH AN ISSUE, INTERPRETED AS PUTTING ISRAEL AND THE PLO ON THE SAME LEVEL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE SAID ISRAEL HAD REFRAINED FROM ANY MILITARY REACTION FOR EIGHT MONTHS SINCE THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT EVEN WHILE FACING OVER 60 INCIDENTS WHICH THE ISRAELIS REGARD AS PALESTINIAN VIOLATIONS. HUBARAK'S REFUSAL TO VISIT JERUSALEM, IMPLYING TO BEGIN THAT HE WILL NEVER MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO ISRAEL, IS A BITTER BLOW. A REPORT THIS MORNING THAT WEINBERGER MADE A SLIGHTING REMARK ABOUT BEGIN ON ABC-TV YESTERDAY INFURIATED HIM. ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE THAT HE INTEND TO GO AHEAD WITH SALE OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS TO JORDAN DESPITE ISRAEL'S ANGRY REACTION RAISES HIS FRUSTRATION LEVEL BY DEMONSTRATING THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOT EASILY DISSUADED BY ISRAELI REACTIONS FROM PURSUING A COURSE WHICH IT BELIEVES NECESSARY. AND FINALLY, PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, BEGIN NOW UNDERSTANDS FROM HIS LAST EXCHANGES WITH SAM LEWIS THAT THE MOU ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION REMAINS IN SUSPENSION AND THAT THIS IMPLIES ISRAEL IS "ON PROBATION", PARTICULARLY WITH

PAGE 03

JERUSA 00618 01 OF 02 012057Z

RESPECT TO MILITARY ACTIONS IN LEBANON. ALL OF THESE FACTORS ARE FOR BEGIN IN VARYING WAYS INSULTING TO HIS DIGNITY AND THAT OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

4. THIS AMALGAM OF FRUSTRATIONS AND RECENT EVENTS HELPS TO EXPLAIN HIS OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE ANGRY RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW WHICH I CONVEYED ABOUT THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO DEMONSTRATE MORE EFFECTIVELY TO THE PUBLIC ITS PATIENCE AND PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. IN HIS MOST TALMUDIC FASHION HE SEIZED ON THE WORDS "NEED TO PROVIDE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EVIDENCE" AS IF THEY MEANT THAT ISRAEL WAS BEING PLACED ON TRIAL FOR ITS BEHAVIOR, A CONCEPT WHICH I NEED NOT TELL YOU HARDLY IMPROVES BEGIN'S TEMPERAMENT. WE MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO GET ACROSS TO HIM THAS WAS NOT IN ANY SENSE THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION AND TRIED TO HEAD OFF HIS INITIATING A BOOTLESS NEW EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH THE PRESIDENT. I DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT WE SUCCEEDED, THOUGH I TRIED GAIN LATER IN THE DAY TO GET SHAMIR TO INTERCEDE WITH BEGIN. HIS RESPONSE WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT BEGIN WAS IN SUCH A MOOD TODAY THAT NONE OF HIS ASSOCIATES BELIEVE THEY HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE OVER HIS REACTIONS.

5. ALL OF THIS SAID, SAM AND I BOTH CONCLUDE THAT OUR STORMY SESSION THIS MORNING WAS WORTHWHILE. BEGIN'S OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE MEETING THAT IT WAS "DIFFICULT BUT GOOD" SEEMS TO AGREE WITH OUR ASSESSMENT. HE HAD TO GET A LOT OF THINGS OFF HIS CHEST, AND I WAS A CONVENIENT SOUNDING BOARD AND MESSENGER. HE REAFFIRMED CATEGORICALLY THE COMMITMENT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00618 02 OF 02 012100Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----120726 012107Z /63
O 012041Z MAR 82
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1433
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 00618

MODIS

NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING LEBANON WITHOUT PROVOCATION AND THAT THEY WISHED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT IN BEING. HE WAS REASSURED BY MY UNEQUIVOCAL AGREEMENT THAT THE RECENT INCURSION FROM LEBANON VIA JORDAN WAS INDEED A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION AND HE APPROVED OF THE WAY IN WHICH I DESCRIBED MY INTENTIONS FOR FUTURE STOPS ON THIS TRIP. HE WILL WELCOME ME BACK AFTER MY STOPS IN DAMASCUS, AMMAN, AND RIYADH. ALTHOUGH HE HAS ONLY LIMITED CONFIDENCE THAT I CAN ACHIEVE MUCH ON THIS ROUND, HE THOROUGHLY AGREES THAT THE EIGHT MONTHS WITHOUT LOSS OF ISRAELI LIFE RESULTING FROM THE CEASEFIRE BEING KEPT IS A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT IN ITSELF AND ONE NOT LIGHTLY TO BE DISCARDED.

6. I ALSO WAS REINFORCED IN MY CONVICTION THAT NEITHER BEGIN NOR HIS CABINET WERE ITCHING TO INVADE LEBANON, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE JOURNALISTS THINK. THEY WANT TO AVOID BEING FORCED INTO THAT DANGEROUS AND COSTLY COURSE, AND THEIR ACTIONS WILL, I BELIEVE, CONTINUE TO BE A GREAT DEAL MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THEIR RHETORIC WOULD SUGGEST. THE PROBLEM OF THE RHETORIC REMAINS, BUT EVEN THERE MY WORDS MAY HAVE MADE SOME DENT, IF NOT ON BEGIN PERSONALLY, THEN ON SHARON AND SHAMIR

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00618 02 OF 02 012100Z

WITH WHOM I MET SEPARATELY LATER IN THE DAY.

7. IT WAS A ROUGH MORNING, BUT NONETHELESS WORTHWHILE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

GROYE

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]



Department of State

TELEGRAM

R

SI

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS20005-0413

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01743 071925Z
ACTION MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----030524 071926Z /40
Z 071010Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM ANCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2348
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

9302566

Date: 3/5/96

JERUSALEM 01743

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 3/5/96

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

USDEL ALSO FOR CLUVERIUS

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART
<input type="checkbox"/>	
FOIA Exemptions _____	
PA Exemptions _____	

EO Citations _____

TS authority: _____

<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as	<input type="checkbox"/> S or
<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to	<input type="checkbox"/> S or

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,2,3, 7/6/02 (GROVE, BRANDON JR) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR HILI US LE IS XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FIRST MEETING WITH PH BEGIN

2. NO BREAKTHROUGH WAS ACHIEVED IN INITIAL HOUR AND ONE-HALF MEETING WITH BEGIN. I RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT ISRAELI PLANS AND OBJECTIVES, AND STRESSED THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERNS AS INSTRUCTED. IN HIS PRESENTATION, BEGIN STATED ISRAEL'S FIRM COMMITMENT NOT REPEAT NOT TO REMAIN IN LEBANON BUT WAS EQUALLY FIRM ON ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENT FOR A BUFFER ZONE OF 40 KILOMETERS TO ASSURE THAT NORTHERN ISRAEL WOULD NOT AGAIN FACE THE THREAT OF SHELLING. BEGIN SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO MEET WITH THE CABINET BEFORE DISCUSSING WITH ME THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON. WE ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN AT 1730 HOURS

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01743 071925Z

LOCAL JUNE 8, WHEN HE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

MATTER.

J. BEGIN SAID ISRAEL'S MAJOR MILITARY OBJECTIVES COULD BE ATTAINED BY TOMORROW, ALTHOUGH HE INDICATED THAT SYRIAN MILITARY MOVEMENTS COULD COMPLICATE AND RETARD MILITARY OPERATIONS. A FULL REPORT OF THE INITIAL MEETING, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STEPS, IS NOW BEING DRAFTED AND WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO ADDRESSEES BEFORE OPENING OF BUSINESS TUESDAY, JUNE 8. GROVE

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

R [Redacted] 505

AN: N830005-0587

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07265 292026Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----016267 292033Z /62
Z 292017Z JUN 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1371

9302566
CLASSIFIED BY: [Redacted] DATE: 3/2/80
DECLASSIFY ON: [Redacted]
() CLASSIFY as () S or
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

[Redacted] BEIRUT 07265

NODS CAPTIONED

STADIS //

FROM HABIB - FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY, DEPT PLS PASS SEC'Y

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, US, IS, XF, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: ISRAELI PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL
FROM LEBANON

REF: WHO 4401 (MESSAGE FROM JUDGE CLARK TO THE SECRETARY
AND HABIB)

1. [Redacted]
2. I AM DISTURBED BY THE MESSAGE FROM JUDGE CLARK IN EFFECT INSTRUCTING ME TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN CONJUNCTION WITH A POSSIBLY EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE MNF. THIS UNDERCUTS MY PRESENT EFFORT - APPROVED BY YOU AND THE PRESIDENT - TO EXPLORE ALTERNATE COURSES OF ACTION DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND NOT PIECEMEAL OPERATIONS WHICH COULD PRODUCE DE FACTO PARTITION.
3. TODAY I WAS INFORMED AUTHORITATIVELY BY THE LEBANESE OF THEIR STRONG OPPOSITION TO PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07265 292026Z

IF IT DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRM AND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AS PART OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES. THIS RECONFIRMS THE POSITION OUTLINED TO YOU BY MADIA HADDAD IN HIS MEETING WITH YOU IN WASHINGTON. IT IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH YOUR STATEMENT TO THE PRESS PRIOR TO YOUR DEPARTURE.

4. I AM STRONGLY OF THE VIEW THAT PARTIAL IDF WITHDRAWAL WILL ONLY STIFFEN THE SYRIAN STAND, AND THEY WILL TELL THEIR ARAB FRIENDS THEY CAN SIT TIGHT AND THE ISRAELIS WILL EVENTUALLY WITHDRAW FULLY. I ALSO BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS MAY HAVE IN MIND REMAINING IN DE FACTO CONTROL OF A SUBSTANTIAL PIECE OF SOUTHERN LEBANON, WITH MODEST ISRAELI FORCES AND A MAJOR ROLE FOR HADDAD.

5. I FEEL JUST AS STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT EXPAND THE MISSION OR THE GEOGRAPHIC POSITION OF THE MNF OTHER THAN IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREED TOTAL WITHDRAWAL SCHEME. OTHERWISE WE WILL BE PUTTING OUR FORCES INTO A HOSTILE SITUATION. WE WOULD NEED TO GO TO CONGRESS IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE U.S. COMPONENT AND ALTER ITS DEPLOYMENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE CONGRESS WILL BE SYMPATHETIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WILL BE CLEAR OUR FORCES WILL BE ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT OF PROLONGED AND INDEFINITE DURATION.

6. I AM ALSO CONCERNED AT THE ISRAELI ASSUMPTION THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND BRINGING THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE GO HAND IN HAND. EVEN IF THE LEBANESE WERE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE SYRIAN REACTION WILL BE TO CREATE AS MUCH TROUBLE AS THEY CAN FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. INSIDE OF LEBANON THE PROSPECT OF DE FACTO PARTITION WILL

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07265 292026Z

WEAKEN THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS AS THE SHIA, THE SUNNI, AND THE DRUZE OPPOSE. THUS THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WILL BE JEOPARDIZED.

7. I DO NOT KNOW WHO CONVINCED THE PRESIDENT OF THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. IT WAS EITHER A PERSON WHO DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SITUATION, OR SOMEONE WHO JUST DOES NOT WANT TO GO AGAINST A BAD ISRAELI POSITION. IN THE END, THE IDEA OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL MAY NOT GET FAR BECAUSE OF LEBANESE OPPOSITION.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



OR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, OR MAYBE EVEN BECAUSE WE INTEND TO STICK TO OUR WORDS ABOUT OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON. EITHER WAY I SUGGEST YOU DO WHAT YOU CAN TO KEEP THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM HARDENING AND GIVE FURTHER NEGOTIATING EFFORTS (INCLUDING YOUR OWN) A CHANCE.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECRETARY.



UNCLASSIFIED





Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CR

AM: NS30006-0003

PAGE 01 JERUSA 02391 011016Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----111621 011017Z /10

O 011014Z JUL 83 ZFF4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC MIACI IMMEDIATE 8851
US SECDEL WASHDC, MIACI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

9302566

IS FOR GDR	YM
EDITIONS	
CLASSIFY as	() S or
DOWNGRADE TS to	() R or

JERUSALEM 02391

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB FOR SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OPRC, LE, IS, US
SUBJ: PRESS GUIDANCE ON HABIB MISSION: REQUEST OF
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER?
1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN LIGHT OF THE DISASTROUS PRESS LEAK IN THE
MIDDLE-EAST POLICY SURVEY, ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER
SHAMIR HAS URGENTLY REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE PUBLIC
CLARIFICATION OF US POLICY CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL OF
FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE ISRAELI MEDIA STORIES
TODAY, STEMMING FROM THE WASHINGTON LEAK, HIGHLIGHT
THE INTERPRETATION THAT THE U.S. IS PROPOSING THAT ISRAEL
WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY.

3. IN A MEETING THIS MORNING (SEPTEL), PM BEGIN AND
DEFMIN ARENS JOINED SHAMIR IN ASKING THAT THE U.S.

PAGE 02 JERUSA 02391 011016Z

POLICY SUPPORTING SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AND SYRIAN FORCES BE PUBLICLY REAFFIRMED IMMEDIATELY. AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND I CONCUR. ANY CHANGE IN THAT PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED POLICY SHOULD ONLY BE MADE, IF NECESSARY, IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THUS I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BE ISSUED BY THE SPOKESMAN TODAY: THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THAT THERE SHOULD BE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A TOTAL AND SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. IN THE COURSE OF HIS CONSULTATIONS IN THE AREA, AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS BEEN REVIEWING THE SITUATION AND DISCUSSING A NUMBER OF IDEAS ON HOW BEST TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD OUR CONTINUING GOALS OF THE REMOVAL FROM LEBANON OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, THE ESTABLISHMENT THROUGHOUT LEBANON OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF ITS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ADEQUATE SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND ANY OTHER PARTIES WHO CAN BE OF ASSISTANCE IN ACHIEVING THESE GOALS. NONE OF THESE IDEAS CONCERN UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES.

5. I FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS RECEIVE THE USUAL ANSWER THAT WE WILL NOT GO INTO THE PARTICULARS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
KEENE

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

502
R
(6)

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

AM: 8830004-0268

PAGE 01 TEL AV 06485 121753Z
ACTION NCDS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----131632 121755Z /42
O 121748Z MAY 83 ZFFM
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE JEND
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

9302566
IS/FC/MOR
305, 80
DOWNGRADE IS/FC/MOR

TEL AVIV 06485

DECLASSIFIED

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

JERUSALEM FOR HABIB/DRAPER MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, JS
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS -- DEEPENING
ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN AND PLO MOVES
IN LEBANON

1. [REDACTED]

2. AMBASSADORS HABIB AND LEWIS MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS THURSDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 12, 1983, AT THEIR REQUEST TO DISCUSS LAST MINUTE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE SCHEDULING OF THE SIGNING CEREMONIES FOR THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, BEFORE GETTING TO THAT SUBJECT, ARENS SAID THAT HE WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT SYRIAN AND PLO MOVEMENTS AND INTENTIONS IN LEBANON.

3. ARENS REFERRED TO THE MOVEMENTS INTO LEBANON IN RECENT DAYS OF UP TO 1500 PLO AND PLA TROOPS FROM SYRIA, AND TO

PAGE 02 TEL AV 06485 121753Z

REINFORCEMENTS OF SYRIAN UNITS IN THE BEKAA. FONE: MORRI-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SOME WERE REPORTS THAT PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES WERE NOW POSITIONED ON THE SINNIN RIDGE FROM WHICH THEIR ARTILLERY CAN RANGE OVER ALL OF THE CHRISTIAN HEARTLAND INCLUDING JUNIYAH. ARENS ASKED: "WHAT WILL YOU DO IF JUNIYAH AND ITS SURROUNDING AREA COMES UNDER HEAVY BOMBARDMENT FROM EITHER PLO OR SYRIAN ARTILLERY?" LEWIS AND HABIB AVOIDED GIVING ANY DIRECT ANSWER BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THE MORRISOME NATURE OF THESE MOVEMENTS AND SAID THAT WE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT URGENTLY WITH BOTH THE GOL AND THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP IN THAT EVENT.

4. ARENS SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN MAKING STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN QUIET AMONG THE DRUZE IN THE AREAS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL, AND FOR THE MOMENT, SEEM TO BE SUCCESSFUL. (HABIB AND LEWIS TOLD ARENS THAT THE LEBANESE LEADERS, INCLUDING GENERAL TANHOUS, HAD ALSO BEEN WORKING ACTIVELY ON THE DRUZE PROBLEM AND HAD OBTAINED CERTAIN REASSURING PROMISES FROM WALID JUNBLATT THAT THE DRUZE WOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY SHELLING OF THE GREATER BEIRUT AREA.) WE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT WITH THE EVIDENT SYRIAN DETERMINATION TO ABORT FINALIZATION OF THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT, THE DANGER OF PLO AND/OR SYRIAN SHELLING APART FROM THE DRUZE PROBLEM WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY.

5. WE USED THIS MUTUAL WORRY TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETING THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENTS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT A SIGNING ON SUNDAY MAY NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GOL IN LIGHT OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S SENSITIVITY. EXPRESSED EARLIER TODAY, ABOUT COMPLETING THE KNESSET DEBATE AND VOTE ON MONDAY BEFORE THE SIGNING COULD OCCUR. ARENS PROMISED TO SPEAK TO BEGIN THIS EVENING AND SEE IF HE CAN GET OVER THIS PROBLEM, THOUGH HE INSISTED THAT BEGIN WOULD BE THE FINAL JUDGE AS

PAGE 03

TEL AV 06485 121753Z

TO HOW HE HAD TO MANAGE THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESS.

6. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT SYRIAN AND PLO MOVEMENTS IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS HAVE BEGUN TO HEIGHTEN THE SENSE OF FOREBODING HERE, AND OUR DATT REPORTS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN REINFORCEMENTS MOVING NORTH FROM SOUTHERN ISRAEL IN LIMITED NUMBERS IN THE PAST FORTY-EIGHT HOURS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SENSE OF CRISIS IN ISRAEL AND THE GENERAL SUPPOSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC REMAINS THAT THE SYRIANS ARE ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO THwart LEBANESE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT BY HEIGHTENING A SENSE OF CRISIS RATHER THAN PREPARING FOR AN OFFENSIVE. ARENS TAKES SERIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THE GROWING LIKELIHOOD THAT PLO UNITS WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE IDF WITHIN LEBANON IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, PERHAPS INTENDED TO PROVOKE AN ISRAELI RESPONSE. HE IS CLEARLY NOT ANXIOUS TO RESPOND, BUT IS PRESSING US AS TO WHAT WE ARE NOW DOING TO MAKE CLEAR IN MORE UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS TO THE SOVIETS WHAT A DANGEROUS GAME MAY BE DEVELOPING.

7. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

494

RESTRICTED

UNCLASSIFIED

AM: HB30063-0342

R

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05196 01 OF 02 171721Z
ACTION HQDS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----107377 171725Z /43

C 171701Z APR 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3909
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

9302566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	CLASSIFIED
RELEASE	UNCLASSIFY
DATE	BY
	CLASSIFIED BY
	UNCLASSIFIED TO

SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 05196

RECAPTIONED

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM AND VELIGTES
FROM LEWIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, IS, US, LE, PER
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO
- DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS AND DISCUSSION WITH
- ARENS CONCERNING LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 105415

1. S [REDACTED]
2. TO UNDERSCORE IMPLICITLY THE LINKAGE, PHIL HABIB AND I MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS AT 1330 ON SUNDAY, APRIL 17, TO DELIVER THE SECRETARY'S LETTER REGARDING THE RELEASE OF LAVI TECHNOLOGY, AND TO PROBE FURTHER INTO ARENS' POSITION ON HADDAD'S FUTURE. TWO OF ARENS' AIDES, INCLUDING GENERAL MERON, WERE ALSO PRESENT.

PAGE 02 TEL AV 05196 01 OF 02 171721Z

3. I OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY HANDING ARENS A COPY

UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TOGETHER WITH A COVERING LETTER FROM ME, IN WHICH I QUOTED THE ADDITIONAL POINTS VERBATIM FROM PARA 4 OF REFTEL. MY COVER LETTER MAKES CLEAR THAT THESE ADDITIONAL POINTS ARE OFFICIAL AND ARE CONVEYED ON INSTRUCTION FROM WASHINGTON.

4. ARENS READ MY LETTER AND THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE WITH CARE, THEN EXPRESSED HIS GREAT PLEASURE AT THE GOOD NEWS (WHICH HAD, OF COURSE, ALREADY BEEN SIGNALLED IN A NEWS BROADCAST FROM WASHINGTON EARLY THIS MORNING). I UNDERSCORED TO ARENS THE DIFFICULTY WHICH THE SECRETARY HAD CONFRONTED IN OBTAINING THIS DECISION AND HOW MUCH EFFORT HAD GONE INTO IT. GENERAL MERON SAID HE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND, FROM HIS OWN RECENT MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, HOW DIFFICULT INDEED HAD BEEN THE SECRETARY'S TASK. ARENS EXPRESSED HIS GREAT, PERSONAL APPRECIATION TO SECRETARY SHULTZ FOR THE DECISION AND FOR HIS WARM MESSAGE. (FORTUITOUSLY, ARENS WILL APPEAR LATER TODAY ON THE DAVID BRINKLEY INTERVIEW PROGRAM BY SATELLITE. HE HAD BEEN PREPARING, I LEARNED FROM HIS PRESS SPOKESMAN, TO RESPOND "VIGOROUSLY" TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE F-16 SUSPENSION AND THE LAVI AIRCRAFT ISSUE. THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE SHOULD RPT SHOULD PRODUCE MORE POSITIVE AND HELPFUL RESPONSES.)

5. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF ISRAEL-EGYPT RELATIONS, TRIGGERED BY ARENS' QUERY ABOUT HABIB'S TRIP TO CAIRO THE PREVIOUS DAY (SEPTEL), HABIB TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO MAJOR HADDAD'S FUTURE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT HADDAD MUST REMAIN A COMMANDER; HE ALSO WAS TOTALLY CONVINCED THAT THE LEBANESE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT GO BEYOND

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 03

TEL AV 05196 01 OF 02 171721Z

THEIR OFFER TO KEEP HIM AS A DEPUTY COMMANDER WITH CERTAIN SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTELLIGENCE/ SECURITY MATTERS. HABIB WANTED TO TRY TO USE HIS TRIP TODAY TO BEIRUT TO TRY TO SEE IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBLE WAY TO BRIDGE THESE POSITIONS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE HAD PRESENTED THEIR POSITION BADLY; HADDAD'S FUTURE ROLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS PART OF A TOTAL, COORDINATED COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THE SOUTH. IT MUST BE CLEARER HOW HADDAD WOULD FIT IN THAT STRUCTURE. "IT IS NOT TRUE,

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~_____~~
UNCLASSIFIED

AS SOME ISRAELIS THINK, THAT THE LEBANESE JUST WANT TO PUT HADDAD IN THE ASHLAN." (ARENS RESPONDED THAT THE FEAR IS THAT SOME MAY WANT TO SEE HIM IN THE CEMETERY.)

6. HABIB THEN REPEATED MANY OF THE ARGUMENTS HE HAD MADE ON FRIDAY, APRIL 15, TO BEGIN, ARENS, AND SHAMIR REGARDING THE WIDE RANGE OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS NOW AGREED UPON AND THE FAVORABLE CLIMATE IN BEIRUT FOR AGREEMENT AND COOPERATION WHICH NOW EXISTS BUT WHICH MAY SOON ERODE IF THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES. HE STRESSED THE ABSOLUTE LEBANESE COMMITMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO PLO FORCES ANYWHERE IN THE SECURITY ZONE, OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN LEBANON FOR THAT MATTER. HE THEN ASKED ARENS WHAT DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OR DUTIES FOR HADDAD AS DEPUTY COMMANDER MIGHT SATISFY ISRAELI CONCERNS.

7. ARENS REPLIED BY FIRST DESCRIBING HIS RECENT VISIT TO SOUTH LEBANON AND WITH HADDAD. A VISIT HE SAID HE

~~_____~~
UNCLASSIFIED
~~_____~~ ::::

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05196 02 OF 02 171722Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----107402 171732Z /43
O 171701Z APR 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3010
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 05196

NODIS

TOOK "TO GATHER DATA," WITHOUT PRECONCEPTIONS. HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE ARE ONLY TWO POSSIBILITIES: HADDAD AS COMMANDER, OR SOUTH LEBANON WITHOUT HADDAD; AND THE SECOND IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. HIS CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT FOR SEVEN YEARS HADDAD'S POSITION OF LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY HAS BEEN EXPANDING STEADILY, AND THAT HE HAS BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. HE HAS OBTAINED COOPERATION FROM THE SHIA AS WELL AS THE CHRISTIANS, AND HE HAS FOUGHT THE PLO HARD AND SUCCESSFULLY. HE IS NOW BOTH SUCCESSFUL AND HIGHLY RESPECTED BY THE SOUTH LEBANESE. (IN FACT, ARENS ARGUED, HADDAD IS MUCH MORE REASONABLE AND EFFECTIVE IN HIS HANDLING OF THE MUSLIMS THAN ARE SOME OF THE PHALANGISTS.) ARENS CONCLUDES THAT HADDAD CANNOT NOW GO BACK TO A LESSER, SUBORDINATE POSITION UNDER OFFICERS WHOM HE BELIEVES ARE "JOHNNY-COME-LATELY" TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PLO.

8. HABIB AGAIN PRESSED A VARIETY OF ARGUMENTS TO TRY TO ELICIT FROM ARENS SOME HINT THAT A GREATER SPECIFICITY OF RESPONSIBILITIES AS DEPUTY COMMANDER MIGHT PROVIDE A BRIDGE TOWARD A SOLUTION. HOWEVER, ALL ARENS WOULD SAY WAS THAT ISRAEL WILL "SURELY LISTEN TO ANYTHING FURTHER THE LEBANESE HAVE TO SAY."

PAGE 02 TEL AV 05196 02 OF 02 171722Z

9. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO EXPLICIT RECOGNITION

∴∴∴

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

IN THIS MEETING OF ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE LAVI
DECISION AND THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE IMPLICIT
LINKAGE WAS APPARENT, BOTH FROM THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
AND FROM HABIB'S PROMINENT ROLE IN THIS MEETING.
(HABIB ALSO MADE CLEAR TO ARENS THAT HE HAD WEIGHED IN
WITH THE SECRETARY DIRECTLY ON THE LAVI PROBLEM.) ARENS
GAVE NO SIGN THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION ON MADDAD
WOULD CHANGE, BUT IT WAS CLEAR NONETHELESS THAT THE
BALL REMAINS IN PLAY. LEWIS

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

7:3

483



UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

R
~~SECRET~~
TELEGRAM

AM: N030001-0392

PAGE 01 STATE 027307
ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO OCI-00 ADS-00 /000 R

9302566
TE
CLASS. BY
DATE
EXEMPTIONS
EO Citations
CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE IS to

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:HSPENOLETON/GP
APPROVED BY D-THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
NEA:WCLUVERIUS
NEA- AMBASSADOR HABIB
S/S:O : RDAVIS
S/S:KSHIRLEY

-----114267 291943Z /41
O 291930Z JAN 03 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0000

STATE 027307

DECLASSIFIED

BEIRUT ALSO FOR BRAPER

E.O. 12306: DECLASS
TAGS: PREL, NOPS, NARR, PLO, LE, IS, US, XP
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S JANUARY 20 MEETING
WITH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR ARENS REGARDING LEBANON

REF: STATE 024717

1. ~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 027207

2. SUMMARY: DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM CALLED IN ISRAELI

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

AMBASSADOR ARENS ON JANUARY 28 TO RESPOND TO ARENS' EARLIER PROPOSAL (REFTEL) THAT THE EMPHASIS IN THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS BE PLACED ON ACHIEVING AN INTERIM PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR HASBIS MADE CLEAR THAT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD PRESENT PROBLEMS AND WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON OR THE U.S. IT WOULD SUGGEST A DE FACTO DIVISION OF LEBANON AND LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT A FULL WITHDRAWAL IS LESS URGENT. ARENS ARGUED THAT THIS REASONING WAS SPECIOUS AND CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR FULL U.S. SUPPORT FOR SUCH AN APPROACH. END SUMMARY.

3. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TOLD ARENS THAT HE WANTED TO FOLLOW UP ON THEIR DISCUSSION ON JANUARY 25, AND, IN PARTICULAR, WANTED TO KNOW IN GREATER DETAIL WHAT THE GOI WAS CONSIDERING IN TERMS OF A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. MR. DAN ALSO NOTED THAT IN THEIR EARLIER DISCUSSION HE AND ARENS HAD NOT TALKED ABOUT THE PLO. THE ISRAELI POSITION HAD BEEN THAT THE PLO WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON ENTIRELY.

4. ARENS SEEMED TO BE SOMEWHAT UNFAMILIAR WITH THE PREVIOUS ISRAELI POSITION, BUT SAID THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON ENCOMPASSED THE PROPOSALS THAT HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD TO THE U.S. BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR IN OCTOBER 1982. A PRECONDITION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN TROOPS WAS THE EVACUATION OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON. THEN ISRAEL WOULD AGREE ON THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES FROM AROUND BEIRUT (SIC) AND ALONG THE DAMASCUS ROAD. THAT WOULD ASSURE THAT THE SYRIANS WERE OFF THE ROAD AS FAR AS ZAHLEN AND WOULD REPRESENT A

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03

STATE 027307

REASONABLY PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH FORCES. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WONDERED WHETHER IT WAS REALISTIC TO THINK IN TERMS OF THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO IN RETURN. ARENS SAID THE SECRETARY HAD TOLD SHAMIR THAT THE PLO HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO LEAVE AND TO BE RECEIVED IN IRAQ AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

5. AMBASSADOR HASBIS NOTED THAT THE PLO HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT NOT IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY WILL LEAVE ONLY AS PART OF AN OVERALL TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. WHEN DAN ASKED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

:::

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

IF THERE WERE ANY OTHER CONDITIONS, ARENS SAID THERE WERE NOT. A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BYPASS THE BILATERAL LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AND INTRODUCE SOME MOMENTUM INTO THE SITUATION.

6. DAM RESPONDED THAT THE PROPOSAL PRESENTS PROBLEMS. THERE IS A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IT IS REASONABLE FROM THE SYRIAN POINT OF VIEW. THAT IS A MILITARY MATTER INVOLVING THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES AND HOW SECURE THEY MIGHT BE. A MORE SERIOUS AND GROWING CONCERN, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID, RELATES TO INDICATIONS THAT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE IN LEBANON TO STAY. A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD SUGGEST A DE FACTO DIVISION OF LEBANON AND WOULD LEAVE IN THE MINDS OF MANY THE IMPRESSION THAT A FULL WITHDRAWAL IS LESS URGENT. THIS WOULD CREATE A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN IN MANY QUARTERS.

7. ARENS SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S POINT BUT HE FELT THAT THE REASONING IN THAT REGARD WAS SPECIOUS. IN HIS VIEW, ANY PROGRESS WOULD BE POSITIVE. THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE CONTROL OVER A WIDER PART OF THE COUNTRY ALSO WOULD BE POSITIVE. ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE PRESSING TO ASSURE CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING A FULL WITHDRAWAL. ARENS STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WANTS ITS SOLDIERS TO RETURN FROM LEBANON, AND WILL ENCOURAGE THE

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

STATE 027307

UNCLASSIFIED

LEBANESE TO PUSH AHEAD.

8. AMBASSADOR HABIB INTERJECTED THAT IT IS THE GENERAL FEELING OF THE LEBANESE THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS A FORMULA FOR PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WANT EARLY, QUICK AND TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. LEBANON DOES NOT WANT THE CONTINUATION OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN TROOPS ON ITS TERRITORY AND SEES PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AS A FORMULA FOR PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTINUED OCCUPATION. THE LEBANESE ARGUE THAT ONE SHOULD NEGOTIATE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. HABIB SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE LEBANESE THAT ONE MIGHT THINK IN TERMS OF THE FIRST STAGE OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. THE U.S. ALWAYS ACCENTED THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN AT LEAST TWO STAGES. THE LEBANESE WILL GIVE THEIR OWN RESPONSES. THEY ARE CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT A CONTINUED SYRIAN PRESENCE.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

9. HABIB ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE NOT REALLY DISCUSSED PRIOR WITHDRAWAL WITH THE PLO. WE HAVE URGED THEM TO DO SO, AND THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO FOLLOW UP. WITH REGARD TO PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, HABIB SAID HE THOUGHT ISRAEL MIGHT RECEIVE AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE FROM THE LEBANESE ON TUESDAY. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FULL WITHDRAWAL. WE BELIEVE IN EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. IN RESPONSE TO A SUGGESTION BY ARENS SUGGESTING THAT THE U.S. HAD INFLUENCED LEBANESE THINKING IN THIS REGARD, HABIB SAID THAT THE U.S. HAS DONE NOTHING BUT URGE THE LEBANESE TO NEGOTIATE.

10. WHEN HABIB SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD GO FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL, ARENS SAID HE BELIEVED THE U.S. SHOULD CHANGE ITS POSITION. IN THE FIRST PLACE, IF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL

PAGE 08

STATE 027307

UNCLASSIFIED

COULD BE IMPLEMENTED, IT WOULD MEAN THE DISENGAGEMENT OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. THAT WOULD BE A POSITIVE MOVE IN TERMS OF REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE AN UNMITIGATED GOOD IF THE PROCESS WERE TO GO ON FOR A LONG TIME, AND HABIB OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. HAD PROPOSED THE IDEA FOUR OR FIVE MONTHS AGO. AT THAT TIME, ISRAEL HAD NOT BEEN WILLING. NON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS NOTHING BUT A FORMULA FOR PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS. ARENS WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BRING ABOUT A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF THE AREA OF JURISDICTION UNDER DIRECT CONTROL BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT WOULD BE A GOOD THING.

11. ARENS SAID HE WAS NOT ARGUING THAT THE PARTIES SHOULD CALL OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE SHOULD CONTINUE IN PARALLEL. THE ONLY EFFECTIVE ARGUMENT AGAINST PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS, AS THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAS SAID, THAT THE PRESSURE WOULD BE OFF. HOWEVER, ARENS ADDED, HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO AGREE WITH THAT BECAUSE ISRAEL WANTS TO GET OUT OF LEBANON, AND THE ISRAELI PEOPLE WANT TO GET THE ARMY BACK. HE BELIEVED THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD INCREASE THE LEBANESE APPETITE TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS.

12. IN RESPONSE, HABIB SUGGESTED THAT ALL ARENS HAD SAID

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ARGUED FOR PRESSING FORWARD ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. DAM OBSERVED THAT THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT BEEN VERY VIGOROUS WHEN ONE CONSIDERED THE NUMBER OF MEETINGS THAT HAD BEEN HELD, AND HABIB ADDED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT BEEN SERIOUS IN TERMS OF COMING TO GRIPS WITH AND SETTLING ISSUES. HE WANTED RAPID MOVEMENT AND HAD PROPOSED A FORMULA TO ISRAEL. HE HAD NOT PROPOSED IT TO LEBANON. THE TALKS ARE NOT PROCEEDING AT THE RATE THEY SHOULD AND THE GAPS ARE NOT BEING NARROWED. ISRAEL HAS NOT PUT ITS BOTTOM LINE ON THE TABLE WITH THE LEBANESE. THE LEBANESE MUST

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 06

STATE 027307

UNCLASSIFIED

NOW CONSIDER PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY. WHEN NEGOTIATING WITH THEM ONE MUST MAKE THEM GIVE SERIOUS ATTENTION TO A PROPOSAL. UNTIL THEN, THEY WAFFLE.

13. DAM SAID THAT ONE REASON FOR THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS THAT THE DEMANDS MADE BY ISRAEL CONTINUE TO ESCALATE IN TERMS OF NORMALIZATION AND THE SECURITY ZONE. ISRAEL IS NOW INTERESTED IN MILITARY BASES AND ACCESS ROADS AS WELL AS ASSURING THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY IS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL. HABIB ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE SEE THE LATEST PROPOSALS AS GOING FAR BEYOND EVEN WHAT HAD BEEN ENVISAGED IN THE WORKING PAPER AND THAT THEY FIND THEMSELVES INCREASINGLY IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO CONSIDER SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD IN EFFECT MAKE LEBANON A DE FACTO PROTECTORATE OF ISRAEL. LEBANON IS RESISTING THIS. THE LEBANESE FREQUENTLY DO NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH THE CORE ISSUES, BUT THEY ARE NOW DOING BETTER ABOUT FOCUSING ON THE SITUATION.

14. ARENS SAID HE WANTED TO CONVINCE THE U.S. TO TELL LEBANON THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT A FIRST STAGE WITHDRAWAL IS A GOOD THING. THIS LED TO A REVIEW BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR HABIB OF MUCH THAT THEY HAD SAID TO ARENS IN THE PREVIOUS HALF HOUR AND REBUTTALS BY ARENS ALONG FAMILIAR LINES. DAM ALSO REMINDED ARENS THAT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S POINT OF VIEW A GREAT DEAL LESS PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE THAN HE HAD WANTED TO SEE ON THE FAST TRACK. ARENS STRESSED ISRAEL'S AFFECTION FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ARGUED THAT ISRAEL IS MORE IMPATIENT THAN PRESIDENT REAGAN IS, SINCE IT HAS THOUSANDS OF RESERVISTS SERVING IN LEBANON. ARENS SAID THAT ISRAEL IS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTER THE SAME THING THAT THE U.S. SEEKS: ASSURANCE THAT WHEN THE FOREIGN FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN, THERE WILL BE NO

PAGE 07

STATE 027307

REVERSAL OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. HABIB ARGUED THAT UNLESS THERE IS TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, ONE CANNOT GET TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BY THE SYRIANS, AND THE PLANS FOR EARLY WARNING STATIONS SUGGEST THAT WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE TOTAL. HE TOLD ARENS THAT THE LEBANESE CANNOT ACCEPT A RESIDUAL PRESENCE. IT DOES NOT MATTER IF THERE ARE ONLY FIFTEEN ISRAELIS LEFT IN THE SECURITY ZONE. IT WOULD BE A RESIDUAL FORCE.

15. IN CONCLUSION, ARENS REMINDED DAN AND HABIB THAT ISRAEL HAD BEEN THROUGH THIRTY YEARS OF WAR. HE STRESSED THAT FROM THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE, THERE CAN NO LONGER BE A SITUATION IN WHICH ROCKETS FALL ON THE TOWNS OF NORTHERN ISRAEL. THIS MUST BE AVOIDED AT ALL COST. IT MUST BE PREVENTED. THAT, HE SAID, IS THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVE. HABIB NOTED THAT THAT IS AN ISSUE FOR THE SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE TO DISCUSS. THE QUESTION MUST BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. ARENS CLOSED BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WISH TO LEAVE ONE ISRAELI SOLDIER IN LEBANON IN THE LONG RUN.

16. ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING WERE ISRAELI POLITICAL COUNSELOR SABEL, G EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT WALKER, AND NEA/IAI DIRECTOR PENDLETON. DAN

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

481

R

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS30001-0326

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01004 01 OF 05 211053Z
ACTION NO05-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----151237 211053Z /46
O 211026Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1000
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
ANCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01004

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12386: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PPTS, PINS, PGOV, PNAT, PREL, IS, LE, US, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN, JANUARY 21, 1983

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: IN AN HOUR-LONG MEETING WITH BEGIN PRIOR TO HABIB'S DEPARTURE FOR BEIRUT JANUARY 21, HABIB SUMMED UP THE UNSATISFACTORY NATURE OF HIS MEETINGS THIS WEEK WITH SHAMIR, SHARON, ET AL, AND STRESSED THAT HE COULD NOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE SAY HE HAD REACHED ANY UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ISRAELIS ON KEY ELEMENTS OF THE APPROACH TOWARD AN AGREEMENT. HE STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELI DRAFT AGREEMENT WAS A NON-STARTER AND THAT HE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT TAKE IT TO PRESENT TO THE LEAGUE. HE URGED BEGIN, WHO HAD SURPRISINGLY NOT READ THE U.S. DRAFT AND HAD BEEN MERELY BRIEFED ORALLY ON THE DISCUSSIONS, TO STUDY THE U.S. DRAFT APPROACH FURTHER BETWEEN NOW AND THE TIME HABIB WOULD RETURN TO JERUSALEM ON SUNDAY, STRESSING THE NEED TO AVOID ANY CONTINUING ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON, HOWEVER SMALL, IN ORDER TO AVOID GIVING THE SYRIANS ANY PRETEXT FOR NOT WITHDRAWING. HABIB URGED BEGIN TO LEAVE OPEN THE

efm 3/5/83

9302566

CLASSIFY OR
DOWNGRADE

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01004 01 OF 05 211053Z

QUESTION OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN SOME FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

TO REINFORCE LEBANESE FORCES IN THE SOUTH. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO SETTLE FOR THE BEGINNINGS OF NORMALIZATION PLUS A CONTINUING MECHANISM TO EXPAND IT, RATHER THAN THE "QUANTUM JUMP" TO TRY TO NAIL DOWN EVERYTHING AT THE BEGINNING. ANY OTHER APPROACH, HABIB SAID, COULD BRING DOWN ARAB BOYCOTT AND OSTRACISM ON THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND UNDERMINE IT IRREVOCABLY. WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT BEGIN WAS LISTENING INTENTLY BUT NOT PREPARED TO CHANGE IN ANY WAY THE BASIC RESPONSES HABIB HAD RECEIVED EARLIER FROM SHAMIR AND SHARON, HABIB AND LEVIS THEN BLUNTLY UNDERSCORED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S IMPATIENCE AND FRUSTRATION WITH THE NEGOTIATING SLUGGISHNESS AND PREDICTED THAT A DEEP, FUNDAMENTAL CRISIS IN THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP WAS NEAR UNLESS SOMETHING CHANGED IN THE ISRAELI APPROACH. BEGIN WAS VISIBLY SOBERED BY THEIR FERVENT WARNINGS, BUT MADE NO COMMITMENT OTHER THAN TO SUGGEST THAT HE CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES TOGETHER, ALL THE WHILE INSISTING ON ISRAEL'S DESIRE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES ALONG WITH ALL OTHER FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AS SOON AS SATISFACTORY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON HAD BEEN AGREED UPON. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADORS HABIB AND LEVIS MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR NEARLY AN HOUR ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 21, 1983, TO PERMIT HABIB TO SUN UP THE RESULTS OF HIS INTENSIVE MEETINGS DURING THE PAST WEEK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON, AND KEY MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFFS. BEGIN'S ASSISTANT, YEHUDA AVNER, ALSO WAS PRESENT AS A NOTETAKER. BEGIN SEEMED TO HAVE RECEIVED ONLY ORAL BRIEFINGS ON HABIB'S MEETINGS; UNCHARACTERISTICALLY, HE HAD NOT SEEN OR READ THE PROPOSED U.S. DRAFT AGREEMENT NOR HAD HE SEEN OVER IN DETAIL THE TRANSCRIPT OF HABIB'S SEVERAL MEETINGS. HE WAS RATHER PASSIVE AND ALMOST DETACHED IN HIS MANNER

PAGE 02

TEL AV 01004 01 OF 05 211003Z

WHenever details were raised, although he was clearly very sobered by statements both Habib and Levis made during the discussion about the dangers to the fundamental Israel-U.S. relationship which loom in the absence of a closer U.S.-Israeli understanding on how to proceed.

4. Habib began giving the tenor of his meetings with Shamir and Sharon and the very thorough nature of the exchanges, which, he said, produced a good deal of agreement but then ran into major difficulties. Habib said that it

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

HAS CLEAR THAT HE AGREES ON CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS AND PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE BEGINNING OF A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, THE NEED FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ONGOING MECHANISMS TO DEVELOP FURTHER THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AND TO ASSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED PRINCIPLES. THIS SAID, HOWEVER, HABIB WENT ON TO STRESS THAT HE WAS NOW DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE ISRAELI APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. JUDGING FROM THE ISRAELI DRAFT WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO US, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE GOI BELIEVED A TOTALLY NEW NORMAL RELATIONSHIP MUST BE PUT IN PLACE AT THE BEGINNING. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, WE KNOW THAT CERTAIN PRESSURES ARE BEING EXERTED ON THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO AVOID MAKING SUCH A MOVE AND THE LEBANESE MUST WALK A VERY FINE LINE, NOT ONLY TO RETAIN INTERNAL CONSENSUS BUT ALSO TO DEAL WITH EXTERNAL ARAB PRESSURES IN A WAY WHICH WILL AVOID DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON. HABIB SAID IT WAS HIS CONVICTION, BASED ON HIS PERCEPTION OF THESE VERY

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 01 TEL AV 01054 02 OF 05 221011Z
ACTION NO55-00

INFO OCT-00 AOS-00 /000 N
-----177635 221014Z /10
O 211026Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1006
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
ANCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01054

MODIS

REAL DANGERS, THAT THE LEBANESE CANNOT MAKE THE "QUANTUM JUMP" WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE DEMANDING.

S. HABIB STRESSED THAT HIS PERCEPTION OF THE NARROW LIMITS WITHIN WHICH THE LEBANESE MUST OPERATE IS DRAWN FROM THE MANY PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS HE HAS HELD WITH PRESIDENT GENAYEL AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS, AS WELL AS WITH OTHER LEADERS IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, HE NOW WANTED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT TO VERIFY VERY CAREFULLY WHETHER HIS PERCEPTION IS CORRECT. HE DID NOT WISH "TO BE MORE ROYAL THAN THE KING," BUT HIS CLEAR PERCEPTION HAS BEEN THAT SUCH PROPOSALS AS THAT TO MAINTAIN EARLY WARNING STATIONS IN LEBANON MANDATED BY ISRAELI PERSONNEL WENT MUCH TOO FAR. THIS KIND OF DEMAND, PLUS THE INSISTENCE ON ALMOST TOTALLY NORMAL RELATIONS ACROSS THE BORDER AT THE BEGINNING, WILL PRODUCE A VERY REAL THREAT OF TOTAL OSTRACISM AND BOYCOTT FROM ARAB STATES WHICH WOULD DESTROY THE LEBANESE ECONOMY. HOWEVER, THOUGH OBVIOUSLY HE CANNOT ALLOW THE MORE EXTREME ELEMENTS TO DETERMINE WHAT IS POSSIBLE, DEMANDS WHICH GO BEYOND ACCEPTABLE LIMITS FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH CAN PRODUCE A SITUATION IN WHICH SYRIA WOULD THEN REFUSE TO WITHDRAW. "I HAD HOPED WE COULD AGREE ON ACCEPTABLE

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01054 02 OF 05 221011Z

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MEET YOUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS THAT I COULD TRY TO SELL TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. BUT

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THE ISRAELI DRAFT, EVEN IF AFTER A LENGTHY NEGOTIATION WERE FINALLY SOLD, COULD LEAD TO SYRIAN STONEWALLING. LEAVING BEHIND IN LEBANON EVEN VESTIGIAL ISRAELI FORCES AT THE WARNING STATIONS WOULD PRODUCE PARALLEL DEMANDS FROM SYRIA AND WOULD THEREBY UNDERMINE THE OBJECTIVE WE HAVE BOTH PUBLICLY ESPOUSED: A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND A TRULY SOVEREIGN LEBANON, MASTER IN ITS OWN HOUSE."

6. HABIB THEN REMINDED BEGIN THAT HE HAD PRESENTED A DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES NECESSARY IN IT TO SAFEGUARD ISRAEL'S SECURITY INTERESTS AND TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION IN A WAY WHICH WOULD ASSURE LATER ELABORATION AND EXPANSION. HE HAD OFFERED THIS DRAFT AND URGED THE ISRAELIS TO PUT ASIDE THEIR OWN DRAFT, MAKING SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OR ENDOREMENT ON OUR APPROACH, CONVINCED AS WE ARE THAT OUR BASIC APPROACH IS AS MUCH AS THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR AT THIS TIME. "YOUR DRAFT AGREEMENT IS JUST 'OVERKILL'; IT IS MORE THAN THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR. AND THERE ARE MANY SIGNS WHICH DEMONSTRATE THIS TO US, REGARDLESS OF WHAT SOME OF YOUR LEBANESE FRIENDS MAY SAY. FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE, I DO NOT SEE THAT THEY COULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY YOUR DRAFT." THIS IS WHY, HABIB SAID, HE HAD KEPT ON URGING ALL WEEK THAT THE ISRAELIS OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF OUR CONCEPT AND DRAFT AND PUT THEIR OWN MORE ELABORATE VERSION ASIDE.

7. "AS IT NOW STANDS, I COULD NOT IN GOOD FAITH TAKE THE ISRAELI DRAFT TO LEBANON AND SAY TO THE LEBANESE THAT 'YOU CAN DO THIS.'" HABIB SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT LEBANON COULD AFFORD TO GO AS FAR AS ISRAEL WAS PRESSING. HOWEVER,

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

TEL AV 01004 02 OF 05 221011Z

HE NOW INTENDED TO GO BACK TO BEIRUT TO EXPLORE IN GREATER DEPTH WITH PRESIDENT ORAVEL WHAT INDEED ARE HIS LIMITS. THEN TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE RETURNING TO ISRAEL ON SUNDAY FOR A FINAL DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES. AFTER THAT, HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON MONDAY TO CONSULT ABOUT NEXT STEPS. HABIB SAID HE INTENDED TO RETURN TO THE AREA FOLLOWING PRESIDENT HOBARRK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF NEXT WEEK, AFTER A THOROUGH REVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER WASHINGTON OFFICIALS.

8. HABIB THEN STRESSED TO BEGIN THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS HAD

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BEEN TO SEEK ENOUGH AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL TO PERMIT THE ACCELERATION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. UNFORTUNATELY, AT THIS POINT, HE CANNOT SAY THAT HE HAS FOUND IT, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS WISER HEADS CAN STILL PREVAIL. HABIB SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SHARE FRANKLY WITH BEGIN THE HIGH DEGREE OF IMPATIENCE AND FRUSTRATION IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE PACE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, A FRUSTRATION WHICH CAN PRODUCE GREAT NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON THE OVERALL U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP. HE HAD DONE HIS UTMOST THE PAST FEW DAYS TO RECREATE A MOOD OF COOPERATION AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON HOW TO PURSUE COMMON OBJECTIVES WITH THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES. SINCE WASHINGTON SEES ISRAEL AS PULLING AWAY FROM ITS PREVIOUSLY STATED OBJECTIVES AND GOING MUCH TOO FAR BEYOND THEM. THE FACT IS, HABIB SAID MEANINGFULLY, "THE BASIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS IS NOW COMING TO BE AT STAKE IN THIS PROCESS." TURNING TO LEWIS, HE ASKED WHETHER HE WAS EXAGGERATING. LEWIS RESPONDED THAT HABIB HAD PUT INTO "NICE WORDS," "WHAT IS CLEARLY TENDING TOWARD "A TRAGICALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES."

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01054 03 OF 05 221009Z
ACTION NO05-00

INFO OCT-00 AOS-00 /000 N
-----177614 221010Z /10
O 211026Z JAN 03
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1007
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01054

9. AT THIS POINT, BEGIN SAID WITH A RUEFUL SMILE, THAT HE DID NOT FIND HABIB'S REMARKS TO BE VERY "NICE WORDS." HE THEN RECALLED THAT HABIB HAD SAID DURING HIS VISIT IN DECEMBER THAT HE HAD AT LEAST AN EIGHTY PERCENT AGREEMENT WITH THE INFORMAL ISRAELI-LEBANESE WORKING PAPER. WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO CHANGE THAT? HARRING TO HIS SUBJECT, BEGIN ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT IN THE WORLD IS WRONG FROM MORAL POINT OF VIEW IN ISRAEL ASKING FOR THE ESSENCE OF PEACE WITH LEBANON? HABIB INTERJECTED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG FROM A MORAL POINT OF VIEW, BUT RATHER FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE AT THIS MOMENT. THE ISRAELI DRAFT, HABIB SAID, IS A PEACE TREATY IN ALL BUT NAME. BEGIN SAID THAT HE WAS NOT NOW SPEAKING ABOUT THE TEXT. HE REMINDED HABIB THAT ISRAEL HAD AGREED TO SET ASIDE ITS DESIRE FOR A PEACE TREATY IN ORDER TO FIND A PRACTICAL EXPRESSION OF THE NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP FOR THE NEW ERA BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. ISRAEL HAD DROPPED ITS INSISTENCE ON THE WORD "NORMALIZATION" TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE LEBANESE. WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, BEGIN STRESSED THAT THE EARLY HARRING STATIONS TO BE HANDED BY ISRAELIS WOULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY, AND IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF SECURITY THREATS TO ISRAEL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01054 03 OF 05 221009Z

FROM THAT AREA WERE "THE MOST MODERATE DEMAND WE CAN MAKE." HE ALLUDED TO THE FACT THAT ARAFAT HAD DECLARED ONLY TEN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DAYS AGO THAT ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL WILL GO ON; THAT THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON WHO CAN BECOME MANPOWER FOR RENEWED PLO TERRORISM, AND THAT WHAT OCCURRED IN THE PAST CAN READILY REOCCUR UNLESS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE ADEQUATE. BEGIN STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELI EARLY WARNING STATIONS WOULD HAVE ONLY A FEW TROOPS MANNING THEM, AND WOULD BE THERE FOR A TEMPORARY, AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. HE INSISTED THAT THIS WAS NOT UNREASONABLE. ATTEMPTING TO COUNTER THE ARGUMENT THAT SYRIA WOULD DEMAND SIMILAR CONTINUED PRESENCE IN LEBANON, BEGIN REPEATED THE ARGUMENT SHARON HAD MADE EARLIER IN THE MORNING THAT NO ARMED BANDS HAD EVER BEEN SENT INTO SYRIA FROM LEBANON, WHILE THERE HAD BEEN MANY YEARS OF SUCH INCURSIONS INTO ISRAEL. HE SAW NO REASON OR JUSTIFICATION THEREFORE FOR SUCH A SYRIAN COUNTERDEMAND. HABIB RESPONDED THAT THE MORE SERIOUS DANGER FROM THE WARNING STATION PROPOSAL IS THAT SYRIA WILL THEN INSIST THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON AND WILL VOID ITS OWN COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW. THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, ENDORSED BY BOTH ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES, WILL INEVITABLY BREAK DOWN.

10. BEGIN THEN TRIED, IN A CONCILIATORY TONE, TO PERSUADE HABIB THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN US HE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO WORK THEM OUT. HE INSISTED THAT ISRAEL STANDS FOR A "TRULY COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL." A FEW TEMPORARY OBSERVATION POINTS MAINTAINED IN THE SOUTH WOULD NOT REPRESENT A "CONTINUING MILITARY PRESENCE" IN THE NORMAL SENSE OF THE WORDS. "YOU SHOULD HELP US TO CONVINCING THE LEBANESE THAT OUR DEMANDS ARE TOTALLY LOGICAL IN LIGHT OF THE HISTORY AND OF OUR GENUINE SECURITY

PAGE 03

TEL AV 01004 03 OF 05 221009Z

CONCERNS." HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE WAS SURE PRESIDENT BENAEL AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD TAKE EXACTLY THE SAME TACT, ATTEMPTING TO GET HIM TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO DROP THESE DEMANDS.

11. HABIB WENT ON TO SAY THE PROBLEM IN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AREA IS MORE THAN JUST ISRAEL'S DEMAND FOR EARLY WARNING STATIONS. IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THIS MORNING FINALLY IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SHARON THAT THERE WOULD BE CONTINUOUS MILITARY MOVEMENTS BACK AND FORTH TO THOSE WARNING STATIONS, JOINT PATROLS BY LAF AND IDF UNITS, AND

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OTHER "COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS" WHICH WILL ENABLE THE IDF TO CONTINUE A SMALL BUT STILL SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON. "LEBANON DOES NOT WANT TO AND MUST NOT END UP WITH A DE FACTO SITUATION OF PARTITION, EVEN IF IT IS CALLED TEMPORARY." HADID STRESSED PRESIDENT GENAYEL'S GREAT WORRY THAT SOME EXCUSE WOULD BE GIVEN FOR SYRIA TO CONTINUE ITS OCCUPATION OVER PART OF HIS TERRITORY. HE CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROSPECT OF A SYRIAN PROTECTORATE OVER NORTH AND EAST LEBANON, IN RESPONSE TO A CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH, EVEN IF RELATIVELY SMALL IN NUMBERS. THIS WOULD PRODUCE A TRUNCATED LEBANON WHICH WOULD VIOLATE EVERY PRINCIPLE WE HAVE ALL AGREED ON DURING RECENT MONTHS.

12. MOREOVER, HADID WENT ON, IT IS PERHAPS DESIRABLE FOR ISRAEL TO HAVE SOME OF THESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BUT THEY ARE NOT TRULY NECESSARY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LEBANESE KEEP RETURNING TO THEIR NEED TO HAVE SOME INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN THE SOUTH ALONGSIDE THEIR OWN FORCES, WHETHER THEY ARE FROM UNIFIL OR FROM THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE. BUT "YOUR PEOPLE SAY ABSOLUTELY NOT; THERE MUST BE ONLY LEBANESE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 01 TEL AV 01004 04 OF 05 211904Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----151501 211905Z /46
O 211026Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1000
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
ANCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01004

NODIS

FORCES WITH WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED AN IDF STIFFENING OF THEIR RESOLVE AND CAPABILITIES." FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS, HADID REMINDED BEGIN, THE PROBLEM OF CONTINUING PROTECTION FOR THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE NORTH AS WELL AS IN THE SOUTH. TODAY THE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH ARE PROTECTED BY THE ISRAELI FORCES. HOWEVER, WHEN ALL FOREIGN FORCES WITHDRAW, WHAT WILL THEN HAPPEN. SOME FORCE ALONGSIDE THE LAF WILL BE NEEDED TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, AND UNIFIL WOULD BE A LOGICAL CANDIDATE. WHY THEN, HADID ASKED, IS IT NECESSARY FOR YOUR MINISTERS TO REJECT TOTALLY WITHOUT DISCUSSION ANY POSSIBLE ROLE FOR ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE? I RECALL THAT YOU YOURSELF SUGGESTED LAST JUNE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THAT AREA.

13. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT THE UNIFIL ISSUE IS ALL A RESULT OF ISRAEL'S PAST UNHAPPY EXPERIENCE WITH UNIFIL. "SOME UNIFIL UNITS PERFORMED MARVELOUSLY WELL. OTHER UNITS PERMITTED PLO INFILTRATORS TO PASS THEIR LINES AND TO ATTACK US. WE WANT NEW, REAL GUARANTEES FOR OUR SECURITY WHICH ARE AS IRONCLAD AS POSSIBLE. NOT TO RELY ON THE OLD, INADEQUATE UNIFIL GUARANTEES. THIS IS A MATTER OF OUR LIVES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01004 04 OF 05 211904Z

AND THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH ARE VITAL TO US. STILL, LET US CONTINUE TO DISCUSS IT." HADID SAID THAT HE

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

:

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

AGREED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION WAS DESIRABLE; IN PARTICULAR HE WANTED TO GET "FURTHER INTO ANIN'S MIND" BEFORE HE CANACK ON SUNDAY TO DISCUS "FRANKLY, HOWEVER, I WAS BEING TOLD THIS MORNING THAT I SHOULD EITHER TAKE THE ISRAELI DRAFT OR LEAVE IT, THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE, THAT I SHOULD TAKE IT TO PRESIDENT GENAYEL AND SELL IT, THAT I CANNOT AND WILL NOT DO." BEGIN SAID "YOU KNOW THAT I DON'T TALK THAT WAY, BUT YOU ARE A PERSUASIVE SALESMAN." HABIB AGREED THAT THIS WAS NOT BEGIN'S OWN MODE OF EXPRESSION, BUT HE RETURNED TO THE BASIC FACT THAT THE LEBANESE ARE FEARFUL OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF GOING ANYWHERE NEAR AS FAR AS ISRAEL WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM GO. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO LEBANON IF THE SYRIANS CLOSED THEIR BORDERS? BEGIN RESPONDED THAT THIS KIND OF ARGUMENT HAD NO END TO IT. WHO COULD ASSURE ISRAEL THAT SYRIA WOULD WITHDRAW IN ANY CASE? HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE IS REASONABLY CONFIDENT ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS AT PRESENT AND WHEN THE TIME IS RIPE WILL GET THE NECESSARY BINDING ASSURANCES. IT IS CLEAR TO ALL OF US THAT THE SYRIANS MUST WITHDRAW AT THE SAME TIME THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW.

14. BEGIN THEN RATHER FORMALY RESTATED ISRAEL'S POSITION: "WE STAND BY THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE MUST BE A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, INCLUDING ISRAELI. WE WANT A NORMAL CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON, INITIALLY TO BE DESCRIBED DESCRIPTIVELY AND LATER AT SOME POINT HOPEFULLY TURNED INTO A FORMAL PEACE TREATY, AND WE WANT GENUINE GUARANTEES IN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AREA THAT THERE CAN BE NO RECURRENCE OF THE PLO THREAT TO OUR CITIZENS FROM SOUTH LEBANON."

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

TEL AV 01004 04 OF 05 211904Z

15. HABIB THEN ASKED BEGIN TO READ CAREFULLY THE TEXT OF THE U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT WHICH HE HAD PROVIDED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. (IT BECAME CLEAR IN THIS EXCHANGE THAT BEGIN HAD NOT SEEN THE U.S. DRAFT AND HAD APPARENTLY NOT READ THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETINGS AT WHICH HABIB HAD READ OUT THE TEXT OF THIFT FOR THE RECORD.) HABIB URGED THE PRIME MINISTER TO EXAMINE IT CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO SEE THAT IT INDEED COVERS ALL OF ISRAEL'S FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS IN WAYS WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTABLE, HE WOULD HOPE, TO LEBANON AT THIS JUNCTURE. "THINK ABOUT HOW OUR DRAFT COULD BE IMPROVED OR ENHANCED; THAT'S WHAT WE ARE ASKING. WE CANNOT DEAL

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

WITH YOUR DRAFT WHICH IS ALMOST A PEACE TREATY IN ALL BUT NAME." BEGIN BRISTLED SLIGHTLY AT THIS CHARACTERIZATION AND SARCASTICALLY ASKED HABIB TO STOP REFERRING TO THE ISRAELI DRAFT AS IF IT WERE SOME KIND OF EVIL DOCUMENT. "AFTER ALL, WHAT IS SO HORRIBLE ABOUT WANTING PEACE WITH OUR NEIGHBORS?" THE DISCUSSION THEN CONTINUED FOR SOME MINUTES OVER THE SAME GROUND, WITH BEGIN INSISTING THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT "PAPER GUARANTEES," BUT NEEDED REAL GUARANTEES ON THE GROUND IN SOUTH LEBANON FOR ITS SECURITY. HABIB INSISTED THAT THERE WAS AN EXAGGERATION ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF A RETURN TO A SERIOUS PLO THREAT FROM SOUTH LEBANON. TOO MUCH HAD CHANGED SINCE LAST JUNE, INCLUDING THE COMING TO POWER OF A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OF A FAR DIFFERENT ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL AND TOWARD THESE PROBLEMS THAN ITS PREDECESSORS. HABIB STRESSED IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS FAVORABLE SITUATION, THAT THERE IS A FINE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK OUT AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON, AND THAT IT WOULD BE TRAGIC TO PRESS SO FAR AS TO UNDERMINE BENAYEL'S GOVERNMENT. HE SAID AGAIN THAT HE CAN HELP TO PRODUCE SUCH AN AGREEMENT VERY QUICKLY IF

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 01 TEL AV 01054 05 OF 05 211905Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N
-----151516 211906Z /43
O 211026Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1009
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 TEL AVIV 01054

NODIS

ISRAEL WILL COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH US ON REASONABLE TERMS. BEGIN REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED WHAT ISRAEL HAD PRESENTED TO US WAS "A FAIR PROPOSAL." HE ASKED HABIB AGAIN TO HELP SELL THAT PROPOSAL.

16. AS THE CONVERSATION WAS NOW RUNNING DOWN, HABIB RETURNED TO THE THEME OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S IMPATIENCE AND THE GROWING FRUSTRATION IN WASHINGTON WITH THE ISRAELI APPROACH. HE STRESSED THAT OUR GOVERNMENT NOW BELIEVES THIS NEGOTIATION HAS ALREADY GONE ON TOO LONG AND THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO WAIT FOR WEEKS OR MONTHS TO SEE IT SPIN OUT AT ITS PRESENT PACE. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD AUTHORIZED HIM TO COME OUT TO TRY TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL ON HOW TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO A CONCLUSION; UNFORTUNATELY, HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING AND TIME IS RUNNING OUT.

17. AT HABIB'S REQUEST, LEWIS THEN REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AT THEIR LUNCHEON THE DAY BEFORE: "THE TREND LINE IN U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS HAS BEEN STEADILY DOWNWARD FOR THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, WITH ONLY A FEW TEMPORARY MOMENTS OF IMPROVEMENT. IN THE PAST

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01054 05 OF 05 211905Z

SIX MONTHS THE DECLINE HAS GOTTEN MORE AND MORE PRECIPITOUS. WE MUST REGAIN AN UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO PROCEED ON

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LEBANON TOWARD WHAT ARE OUR PROCLAIMED MUTUAL OBJECTIVES. IF WE CANNOT REGAIN THAT UNDERSTANDING VERY QUICKLY, I AM CONVINCED THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IS HEADED STRAIGHT FOR A TERRIBLISIS." HABIB UNDERSCORED LEVIS' WORDS AND ON THIS SOMBER NOTE THE MEETING ENDED. LEVIS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

470 c

ORAL UNDERSTANDING TO REFLECT AGREEMENT

May 1, 1983

IN PRINCIPLE ON OVERFLIGHTS/NAVAL PURSUIT

R

"Lebanon affirms that it will not assert that a material breach of the Agreement has occurred in the event:

- (a) that Israeli aircraft enter its airspace for purposes of reconnaissance or surveillance; or
- (b) that Israeli vessels enter its territorial waters when engaged in continuous pursuit of vessels which are reasonably believed to be engaging in actions directed against Israel in violation of the provisions of the Agreement, and which have fled into Lebanese waters.

It is understood that subparagraph (b) will apply only when Israeli authorities have made every reasonable effort to notify the Lebanese authorities of the situation and when the Lebanese authorities have been unable to intercept the vessel in question."

9302566

[Handwritten signature] 3/5/83

X

CLASSIFICATION

EXEMPTIONS

CLASSIFY as ()

DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

470 d
R

LEBANESE DRAFT (Submitted officially)

There will be a movement of products and goods between Lebanon and Israel which will take into consideration the protection of their respective agriculture and industry as well as their production and consumption needs. It is understood that Lebanon will not import from Israel products and goods that Lebanon produces for export.

The movement of the agreed products and goods will be on a non discriminatory basis.

Experts designated by the two governments will meet on a regular basis and no less than once a month, within the framework of the Joint Liason Committee to adjust the flow and character of the trade accordingly.

9302506

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS/EO/ODR *ghm* Date *3/5/96*

DECLASSIFY

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

CLASSIFY as S or

DOWNGRADE TS to S or

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~ES SENSITIVE~~
8312006

471

R

Dist.
4/20

NEXT STEPS IN THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

S
D
P
NEA
S/S
S/SN
S/S-I

Current Status: Habib believes we have reached a basic decision point and argues that we can either push forward to bring negotiations to an early conclusion or accept the prospect of an impasse followed by protracted negotiations. His suggestion to move the talks along is to indicate our views on reasonable solutions to the key problems--Haddad, UNIFIL, mutual recognition, Israeli liaison officers, trade relations, joint supervisory centers--and have the Lebanese table a package agreement, which the U.S. would support, at the tripartite talks on April 21. We would then consider whether to wait or escalate the level of persuasion.

Can any more flexibility be wrung out of Lebanon or Israel? Is it time to lay down U.S. positions? What are the risks of pushing Lebanon to concede further? Are there risks to the U.S., including the Marines, that we are not fully considering?

Proposed U.S. Positions: The course Habib proposes will demand the most retreat from the Israelis. We will probably differ with Israel on Haddad, UNIFIL, mutual recognition, Israeli liaison officers, trade relations and joint supervisory centers, taking a position closer to the Lebanese view on each.

Are these reasonable U.S. positions? How do the proposals relate to our overall objective to achieve Syrian and PLO withdrawal? Can we really give up UNIFIL if necessary? How do we present this--as a Lebanese draft supported by the U.S. or as a U.S. draft aimed at bridging the gaps? Which course is better suited to the Israeli audience?

What Happens Afterwards?: Habib acknowledges that his strategy may not assure early agreement, but has the benefit of defining remaining issues and marking U.S. support. The implications are important for the next actions we could take, including a possible visit by the Secretary to the area.

At what point does a visit by the Secretary make sense in view of the status of the negotiation? Should we first move by escalating the level of persuasion, such as by Shultz calling Shamir or sending a letter from the President to Begin? Or, is the foundation sufficient now to make a visit productive in breaking the impasse? Are other direct actions possible, without using the visibility of a Shultz visit?

0
3
7
1
J
3
J
0
0
0
0
3

UNCLASSIFIED

DECL: OADR 9302566

CLASSIFIED IS/FPC/CDR Date 3/5/98

DECLASSIFY IN CASE

EO Citations _____

TS auth

() CLASSIFY as () S or () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

FOIA Exemptions _____

PA Exemptions _____

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted: NEA/ARN--^{mw}CDWelch
x21018 4/19/83 #3572C

Cleared: NEA--RPelletreau ^{RMP}

1 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 3 1

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8223107

313

ACTION MEMORANDUM

'82 AUG 30 P8:51

'87 AUG 30 P8:51

AUG 30 1982

UNCLASSIFIED

(Sdg)

~~SECRET~~

S S-TO:
TMA
TMB
TMC
NEA
S/S-I

The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
SUBJECT: Travel of Phil Habib and Morris Draper

9
3
3
J
U
U
Y
U
3
3
0
2
8

DECLASSIFIED

seeks your concurrence in his September travel plans. He would leave Lebanon September 2 and, after brief stops in Rome and Paris, return to Washington in time to meet with the President September 9. Phil would return to Beirut for the inauguration of the new President on September 23 with a subsequent trip to Israel as a possibility. (Phil's cable is at Tab A.)

Morris Draper plans to leave Beirut September 4 for talks with the Israelis on a pullback of Israeli forces from the environs of Beirut. He would then join Phil for the return to Washington. We envisage a need for Morris to tour various key capitals in the area in mid-September.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the cable at Tab B concurring in Phil's travel plans.

9302566

Attachments:

- Tab A - Beirut 5814
- Tab B - Cable to Beirut

DECLASSIFIED

CLASSIFY as

DOWNGRADE TS to

Drafted: NEA/ARN:DLMack:jvw
8/30/82 x22670 #1243C

Cleared: NEA:CHillick

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DECL: 8/30/88

EXDIS

UNCLASSIFIED Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM
5844

3139

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05014 091443Z
ACTION 50-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY 01 ADS-00 550 00 021 W
-----17645 0915042 40 5

P 291318Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECRETARY WASH-DC PRIORITY 8325
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

ARN

BEIRUT 5814

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

DECAPTIONED

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

E O 12356 DECL 8/29/88
TAGS P500
SUBJ. HABIB MISSION MESSAGE FOR THE SECRETARY

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. UNLESS YOU WISH OTHERWISE, I PLAN TO LEAVE BEIRUT ON SEPTEMBER 2. THE LAST FLO DEPARTURE IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 3. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE FOR ME TO HANG AROUND BEIRUT AFTER THAT. INSTEAD I WILL TAKE A FEW DAYS REST IN ROME AND POSSIBLY PARIS ON MY WAY HOME. AS INSTRUCTED, I WILL ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 8.
3. GIVEN THE SPATE OF VISITORS TO ISRAEL, IT WOULD APPEAR BETTER FOR ME TO LET DRAPER GO THERE FOR A FEW DAYS TO GIVE AN IMPETUS TO HIS NEAR MISSION AND TO ALLOW HIM TO BEGIN TO PREPARE THE WAY HE CAN THEN JOIN ME ON THE WAY HOME SO THAT BOTH OF US ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 8.
4. IF, AS I HOPE, DRAPER AND I WILL BE NAMED TO THE DELEGATION FOR GENAYEL'S INAUGURATION ON SEPTEMBER 23, WE COULD AFTERWARD BOTH PROCEED TO ISRAEL TO MEET WITH BEGIN AND HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES. FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND, SAM LEVIS THINKS THIS WILL BE A GOOD PROCEDURE.
5. IF YOU CONCUR, I WILL PROCEED AS PROPOSED
DILLON

OBE

8 2 0 3 7 0 0 4 0

9302566

3586

CLASSIFIED BY _____ DATE _____

EXEMPTIONS _____

CLASSIFY AS _____

DOWNGRADE TS TO _____

UNCLASSIFIED

R

UNCLASSIFIED

LIAISON MEASURES IN THE SECURITY REGION
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON

Security Arrangements

--The ~~Military~~ Committee is at the apex of the liaison arrangements and constitutes an umbrella whereby contact between the IDF and the LAF can be *Security Arrangements* established as the need arises. The ~~Military~~ Committee itself, by frequent meetings, establishes liaison and contact at the senior military level.

Security Arrangements

--Under the ~~Military~~ Committee, there will be two Supervisory Centers located in the Security Region. These Supervisory Centers by definition are joint. This means that IDF/LAF liaison will occur in these centers by direct contact between operational staffs and the communication links from the centers to IDF/LAF headquarters, major subordinate units with a capability to expand this radio and telephone contact to any organization in the Security Region that performs a security function. Face-to-face contact can be established in these centers as Lebanese ~~forces~~ *security forces* provide liaison officers to the centers either permanently or on as-needed basis.

--Subordinate to these centers will be the Joint Supervisory Teams composed of an equal number of LAF/IDF personnel. Direct contact is thus established both face-to-face and by communications links, as these teams will report to the center and by virtue of their verification mission will also have direct contact with Lebanese security units in the region.

--There will be periodic face-to-face meetings between the commanders of the LAF/IDF. As time goes on, these contacts will probably be expanded to include reciprocal staff visits by each side to discuss and work out areas of mutual concern.

--In the border areas there will be face-to-face meetings between the Commander of the Lebanese Territorial Brigade and the Commander of the IDF Northern Area Command. There will also be direct radio and phone links between the commanders and most probably their operations centers. There will also be direct contact for coordination between subordinate commanders in the border areas when required.

9302566

g/m Date 3/5/96

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 104-101 (Rev. 11-83) SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFY as () S or () TS or () S or
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

RF
310

UNCLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: Habib Mission: Close to Final Agreement

IES TO:
S
A
S-S:DIR
IA
IB
IC
(JAB)✓

Phil got major concessions from Begin yesterday: Israel agrees that the French may come in on the first day of PLO withdrawal; and Begin accepts the fact that the PLO will not give Israel a list of names of their departing personnel.

Phil is now in Beirut working on the three remaining problems:

- Israel insists there be some mechanism to verify that those who depart are the PLO fighters and not "substitutes." Phil will try to have this set up by the Lebanese government.
- Israel wants the Syrian forces who depart Beirut to go straight to Damascus rather than just redeploy to join Syrian forces elsewhere in Lebanon. As a matter of principle Syria will not agree to this, as their troops are in Lebanon legally, under an Arab League Mandate. As a practical matter, however, the Syrian unit in Beirut is shattered and almost certainly will go home. Phil will have to convince Begin to realize this.
- Perhaps most important for Israel is the return of a pilot captured by the PLO and the remains of several Israelis killed in the fighting and buried in West Beirut. There is a good chance the PLO will agree to this.

Phil expects to be able to send a message to Begin Tuesday giving him the best deal possible on the above points. Phil also plans to present the final text of the departure plan to all the parties tomorrow. It is conceivable that we could have full agreement by Wednesday so that sometime that day you could issue a statement and I could follow up with a press conference.

8 2 0 3 8 4 0 0 0 7

22 Aug 28
3/5/86
DR

9302566

CLASSIFY
BY PART

TO
CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE TO () S of

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

We are proceeding as though all will go according to this timetable. The first day of the evacuation under this schedule would be Saturday, August 21. We are arranging to have the French contingent of 350 prepared to enter Beirut at daybreak Saturday. We will also have two commercial ships in Beirut port then to take off the first PLO departees to Cyprus. They would then be flown from Cyprus to their destinations: probably Jordan and Iraq for the first group out.

8 2 0 3 8 4 0 0 0 8

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Advance copy LDX to NSC.

UNCLASSIFIED

311
R
R224657

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to:

August 17,

~~SECRET~~

S
D
P
NEA
S/S
S/S-S
Team-B
RF:njs

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GP*
Subject: Habib Mission: Focus on Prisoners

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Phil is trying to produce what he hopes will be the final draft of the agreement by late evening our time today. He would then transmit it to all the parties. The Israeli Cabinet is scheduled to meet Wednesday morning to consider the plan for approval, but Begin has added a new requirement: Israel will not give its final approval to the plan until the Israeli pilot and the remains of nine Israeli soldiers buried inside West Beirut are physically handed over by the PLO.

The PLO, for its part, has been trying to trade the pilot and remains for the release of Palestinians captured by Israel. Phil has told them that it is too late for this and that they must turn over the pilot and remains unconditionally. To get a breakthrough we may have to give the Government of Lebanon a letter stating that the U.S. will remain concerned about Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and their treatment under conditions such as those envisioned by the Geneva Convention. We are now drafting this letter. In addition, Israel has asked us for a letter incorporating a long list of assurances they want from us (including a reaffirmation of the 1975 Kissinger commitment stating the conditions for U.S. recognition or negotiation with the PLO). Some of these assurances we can give; others are unrealistic. We will do our best, but Israeli complaints can be expected.

All this means that Phil is doing well and getting down to the wire. In Middle East negotiations we know we are close when the requests start pouring in for assurances. Phil is still setting Saturday as the day, but any announcement from here will have to await "all clear" signals both from Ambassador Lewis in Tel Aviv and from Phil in Beirut.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

82 MB 17 PG 53

9302566

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY <input type="checkbox"/> () <input type="checkbox"/> () <input type="checkbox"/> ()	DATE _____ BY _____ AUTHORITY _____ (S authority to)
IS: EPC/CDR DECL: OADR	3/5/96
ED: Citations _____	() CLASSIFY as () S or () DOWNGRADE IS to () S or

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

Department of State



~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02

BEIRUT 05367 131421Z

HAS BEEN RESTORED.

--I AM CONSIDERING GOING TO ISRAEL TOMORROW, SATURDAY, AUGUST 14, TO PRESENT TO BEGIN WHATEVER POSITION HAS DEVELOPED THROUGH THE PLO-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS TODAY AND TONIGHT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MAY BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE AMBASSADOR LEWIS PRESENT THE RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELI POSITION, AND KEEP ME IN RESERVE FOR A FINAL EFFORT.

--BEFORE REPORTING THE STATUS TO THE ISRAELIS, HOWEVER, WE NEED A SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO THE LEBANESE TO WITHDRAW FROM BEIRUT THE SYRIAN AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL, AND AS EARLY IN THE PROCESS AS POSSIBLE. UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE LOST AT LEAST ONE DAY BECAUSE OF ISRAELI INTERFERENCE WITH THE TRAVEL OF THE LEBANESE EMISSARY, GENERAL SAHI KHATIB. KHATIB MAY RETURN TODAY TO LEBANON WITH THE SYRIAN ANSWER.

-AS REGARDS THE TIMETABLE FOR THE ENTRY OF THE VARIOUS MNP ELEMENTS, IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE PLO WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THERE BE A FRENCH UN. OF 350 MEN PRESENT ON D-DAY. THE SUNNI MUSLIM NOTABLES OF WEST BEIRUT MAY EVEN BE MORE INSISTENT THAN THE PALESTINIANS THAT THERE BE A FRENCH ELEMENT PRESENT AS PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL BEGINS. ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST WEST BEIRUT YESTERDAY HAS INCREASED SUSPICION AND CONCERN FOR SAFETY.

--IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SARKIS AND HAZZAN THIS MORNING, HOWEVER, WE PLAYED AROUND WITH VARIATIONS ON THIS OPTION, SINCE WE CAN PRESUME CONTINUED ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO A FRENCH FORCE ON D-DAY. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE LAF IN ANY EVENT WILL HAVE TO BE PRESENT IN THE PORT AREA ON D-DAY. WITH THAT PREMISE ACCEPTED, WE CONJECTURED THAT POSSIBLY WE COULD EXPLORE THE LAF COMING IN ON D-DAY, WITH THE 350 MAN FRENCH ELEMENT A DAY OR TWO LATER, AND THEN A LAPSE OF SOME DAYS BEFORE THE BULK OF THE US, ITALIAN, AND REMAINING FRENCH FORCES ENTER BEIRUT. WE SHALL HAVE

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

•••••



Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

BEIRUT 05367 131421Z

TO SEE.

--I STILL CONSIDER ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO A 350 MAN FRENCH DETACHMENT AS MISPLACED AND MISGUIDED. THE PLO HAS NOW AGREED TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE FRENCH ELEMENT IN THE INITIAL DAYS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PORT AREA AND ITS APPROACHES FROM WEST BEIRUT. AS A RESULT, THE ISRAELI ARGUMENT THAT THE FRENCH CONSTITUTE A "SHELTER" FOR THE PLO IS LESS AND LESS VALID.

--THUS, IF WE COULD COME UP WITH A REASONABLE AND IMAGINATIVE ARRANGEMENT THAT ADDRESSES IN PART ISRAELI CONCERNS, WE WOULD HAVE A GOOD BASIS ON WHICH TO URGE THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN THE NEW DEPLOYMENTS AND TIMETABLE. (AS NOTED ABOVE, WE WILL ALSO NEED A FIRM SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO LEAVE BEIRUT.)

--IF, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT MAKE HEADWAY WITH BEGIN, WE COULD CONSIDER AND EXPLORE AS A FINAL FALLBACK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM AND UNARMED US-FRENCH-ITALIAN "MONITORING" GROUP FROM THE MNF--OF PERHAPS 20-25 MEN FROM EACH COUNTRY, MAKING A TOTAL OF 60-75 MEN--TO MONITOR THE DEPARTURE BY SEA OF THE PALESTINIANS DURING THE PERIOD UP TO THE ENTRY INTO BEIRUT OF THE BULK OF THE MNF (IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO HAVE SUCH AN INTERIM OBSERVER GROUP ALSO MONITOR THE INITIAL DEPARTURES OVERLAND TO SYRIA, IF THE PLO ACCELERATES ITS DEPARTURE SCHEDULE AS NOW SEEMS POSSIBLE). THE GROUP COULD BE PROPOSED AS AN ADVANCE PARTY OF THE MNF, IF NECESSARY.

3. ACTION RECOMMENDED: I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO THE FOREGOING SCENARIO AND TO THE CONCEPT--AS A FALLBACK--OF PUTTING TOGETHER A 20-25 MAN US DETACHMENT INTO AN INTERIM OBSERVER GROUP. (THESE NEED NOT ALL BE MILITARY MEN; WE COULD PERHAPS INCLUDE A FEW ARABIC AND FRENCH-SPEAKING PSD VOLUNTEERS.) THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS INFORMALLY INDICATED THAT FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A GROUP WOULD NOT POSE A PROBLEM. MEANWHILE, NO ACTION NEED BE TAKEN WITH RESPECT

UNCLASSIFIED

NOV-80



Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

BEIRUT 05367 131421Z

TO ISRAEL, AND AMBASSADOR LEWIS CAN GIVE THEM AN INTERIM
REPORT STATING THAT I AM ENGAGED IN ACTIVE EXCHANGES THROUGH
THE LEBANESE INTERMEDIARIES AND WOULD HOPE TO HAVE A DEFINI-
TIVE RESPONSE BY TOMORROW.
DILLON

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

...

~~SECRET~~

10:00 a.m.
8/12/82

308

R

DIST:
S
D
P
E/S
S/S-I

Talking Points
for use with
The President

~~ES SENSITIVE~~
8224185

UNCLASSIFIED

o I HAVE JUST TALKED TO PHIL HABIB ON THE RADIO.
AFTER GOOD MEETINGS WITH BEGIN IN JERUSALEM YESTERDAY, HE
HAD INTENDED TO GO TO WORK IN BEIRUT TODAY TO NEGOTIATE
THE LAST DETAILS OF THE PACKAGE.

- TIMING OF THE ENTRY OF THE MNF
- LISTS OF NAMES AND DESTINATIONS FOR THE PLO
- GETTING AGREEMENT THAT SYRIA WOULD WITHDRAW
ITS FORCES FROM BEIRUT

o PHIL HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO PROCEED, HOWEVER, BECAUSE
OF LARGE SCALE BOMBING AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS ON THE CITY.
WHILE PALESTINIAN DIEHARDS MAY HAVE INITIATED THE FIRING,
THE ISRAELI RESPONSE HAS BEEN ALL OUT OF PROPORTION. THERE
HAVE BEEN 8 CONSECUTIVE HOURS OF AIRSTRIKES.

o PHIL'S LEBANESE INTERMEDIARIES WITH THE PLO HAVE
NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET TO THE PALESTINIANS TO NEGOTIATE UNDER
THESE CONDITIONS. MORE DISTURBINGLY, THEY ARE SHOWING
SIGNS OF LOSING HOPE. PRESIDENT SARKIS AND PRIME MINISTER
WAZZAN WERE UNPRECEDENTEDLY EMOTIONAL THIS MORNING. THE
LEBANESE FEAR THAT THERE SOON MAY BE NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE
FOR, AS THE CITY IS BEING PROGRESSIVELY DESTROYED.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLAS: OADR

9302566

IS/FPIC/CDR

Date: 3/5/96

CLASSIFY AS

EX

UNCLASSIFIED

2.

o EVEN WORSE, IMPORTANT LEBANESE FIGURES WHO HAVE TRUSTED AND WORKED WITH US ARE SAYING THAT THIS ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT COULD NOT CONTINUE WERE IT NOT FOR AMERICAN COLLUSION. THEY CANNOT BELIEVE WE CANNOT CONTROL THE ISRAELIS.

o THERE ARE OTHER DISTURBING ISRAELI ACTIONS.

- THERE HAS BEEN A GENERAL BUILDUP OF FORCES AROUND BEIRUT.
- THEY HAVE MOVED UP THE COAST NORTH OF BEIRUT TOWARD TRIPOLI, PERHAPS WITH THE INTENTION OF STRIKING AT PALESTINIAN POSITIONS THERE.
(THIS COULD OPEN A NEW, NORTHERN PHASE OF THE WAR.)
- DESPITE POSITIVE ORAL RESPONSES TO TWO REQUESTS BY US, THE ISRAELIS HAVE REFUSED TO LET PRESIDENT SARKIS' REPRESENTATIVE TRAVEL TO DAMASCUS. THIS IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE, AS HIS MISSION IS TO CONVEY A LEBANESE REQUEST THAT SYRIA WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM BEIRUT.

o THIS PATTERN OF ISRAELI BEHAVIOR RAISES QUESTIONS ONCE AGAIN ABOUT WHETHER THEY REALLY WANT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT -- OR AT LEAST WHETHER SHARON DOES.

UNCLASSIFIED

..:..:

UNCLASSIFIED

3.

o PHIL'S PLEA IS THAT WE INSIST ON A STRICT THREE-DAY CEASEFIRE TO ENABLE HIM TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE FINAL DETAILS. IF THE ISRAELIS ARE FIRED UPON, WE WOULD RECOGNIZE THEIR RIGHT TO FIRE BACK IN SELF DEFENSE, BUT WE MUST INSIST ON THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND THAT IF A RESPONSE IS NECESSARY IT SHOULD BE LOCAL AND PROPORTIONATE. NO AIRSTRIKES.

o I HAVE HERE A DRAFT MESSAGE FROM YOU TO BEGIN THAT:

- EXPRESSES PROFOUND CONCERN
- INSISTS ON A THREE-DAY CEASEFIRE
- SUPPORTS PHIL'S PACKAGE AND INDICATES THAT SOME POINTS ISRAEL WANTS (NO EARLY FRENCH MNF ENTRY) MAY NOT BE REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

o AMBASSADOR LEWIS SENT HIS PERSONAL MESSAGE TO BEGIN TWO HOURS AGO (BEGIN WAS ON THE KNESSET FLOOR) SAYING, IN EFFECT, "YOUR FRIENDS CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHAT ISRAEL IS UP TO. YOU MUST STOP IT RIGHT THIS MINUTE."

UNCLASSIFIED

•••••

UNCLASSIFIED

IN NODIS FILES
S/S:8224301

309
W
8/14

Department of State



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

US
8/14

ORIGINAL TO: S/S-I NODIS FILE

COPIES TO: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

S
D
P

Nodis File
(jab)

RECAPTIONED

August 13, 1982

82 AUG 14 PM 30

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas Velozes
PM - Jonathan T. Howey
L - James H. Michel, Acting
SUBJECT: Habib Fallback

Upon receiving Phil's cable concerning an alternative fallback to use with the Israelis concerning MNP deployments on D Day, we have confirmed that:

-- He does not consider the use of US military personnel a viable option.

-- He would only use the 75-man "monitoring force", with a 25-man US component, as a last resort after first trying options such as 100 French on D Day building up gradually to 350, combinations of French and Italian personnel, etc.

While expressing reluctance to involve US civilians in such a risky operation, the proposed reply suggests that you will consult with the President if Phil believes this is the only alternative available for selling the plan. The only other alternative would appear to be to significantly escalate pressures on Israel.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached cable to Phil Habib.

9302506

S/SECDEF

33 10

Attachment:
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET / SENSITIVE~~

NODIS

8
2
0
3
0
1
2
1
8

Memo to the Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

Habib Fallback

Drafted:PM:JTHowe:oc
ext. 29022, 8/13/82

8 2 0 3 8 3 0 1 2 1 9

UNCLASSIFIED



Talking Points for Use with
Israeli Charge

400 PM
(Habib has cleared)

306

UNCLASSIFIED

ES SENSITIVE 8223752

R #

ST:
S
S-I

Minister Sharon is always welcome in Washington.

We believe, however, that this would not be an opportune moment for such a visit. The President has the fullest confidence in his personal emissary, Ambassador Habib, who will remain in the area, where he can be in instant contact with the parties concerned, to pursue his mission to achieve a negotiated peaceful solution to the problem of West Beirut. Ambassador Habib speaks for American policy in this regard and communicates information and views of the parties involved to the President rapidly and accurately. Therefore, the U.S. continues to take up any matter pertaining to West Beirut through Ambassador Habib. At this particular moment, when time is of the essence, and momentum toward the outcome we seek needs to be maintained and built upon, it would not in our view be wise to try to shift the focus of the negotiations away from Ambassador Habib's effort on the scene. We do not want anything to delay us in these crucial final days. Ambassador Habib now has produced a negotiated package arrangement that is reasonable and capable of being put into effect as early as the end of this week. We hope that Israel will give its cooperation to this package arrangement as quickly as possible. Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Lewis are ready to answer whatever questions Israel may have and to transmit messages as may be desired.

4/11/83 15146

9302566

X

Authority to
DECLASSIFY as

LDX'd to WH Ly S/S 8/6

UNCLASSIFIED

8223489

~~SECRET~~

307
R

Dist To:
D
P
S/S
S/S-S
TMA
TMB
TMC
EUR
NEA
RF
(SHM)

BEH COPY AVAILABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

'82 AUG -6 P2:10

August 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *WPS*
Subject: West Beirut Situation Looking Better

Phil Habib reports today that the PLO have virtually accepted all his terms for their departure. They have dropped their insistence on taking their heavy weapons with them. The PLO say they are in touch with the Egyptians to ask that Egypt stop trying to link acceptance of a PLO contingent to a major political concession by the U.S.

The major issue now remaining is when the multinational force (MNF) would arrive. The PLO, apparently fearing attacks by the Phalange and the Israelis, want it to come early. Israel believes that early MNF arrival would provide a protective screen for the PLO who would then refuse to budge. Phil is trying to bridge the gap by proposing that the French force arrive on the morning of D-day and the PLO start to depart that same afternoon.

Here is the rough schedule Phil has in mind:

- August 8: first joint session of the liaison officers of the MNF (U.S., French, Italian) with the Lebanese Military and Habib
- August 9: get agreement of the PLO to the "Final Plan"
- Aug. 10 : start to urge Israeli acceptance of the Plan
- Aug. 10-12 : Processing of PLO personnel by unit, destination, and preferred route.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

...

Drafted: NEA: CH1104

Cleared: NEA: Naveliotes

DECL: OADR

9305566
UNCLASSIFIED
TO: Liaisons
CLASSIFIED BY
DOWNGRADE TO ()

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

2.

- Aug. 12-15 : Day selected as "D-day". French MNF arrives, first PLO units depart by sea
- August 18 : U.S. and Italian MNF arrives. UN observers deployed
- August 25 : final PLO unit departs, PLO leadership leaves by airplane

Obviously there are many pitfalls ahead and we cannot expect it to be smooth going. If the PLO gets Egyptian agreement to receive them, our major problems will be with Israel. We must continue to use every occasion to impress upon Israel the necessity of keeping the level of hostilities down. We are doing this both here and in Jerusalem. It is clear that the Israelis are on a different wavelength from us: they are totally skeptical that the PLO will actually leave. To overcome this we have begun to tell the Israelis about the practical progress Phil has been making in Beirut. While this may help contain Israeli military actions, it will soon lead to strong protests from Sharon about the terms of the package Phil is negotiating. Sharon will complain about the arrival time of the MNF, about the employment of UN observers, about when heavy weapons will be handed over, and so on.

In my meeting today with Israeli Ambassador Arens, I briefed him on the current status of negotiations, the French desire to begin deploying their MNF unit simultaneously with the PLO departure and Phil's endorsement of this position. Arens' response was strongly negative on any MNF deployment before PLO evacuation was well underway. He refused to accept that the PLO had any reason to worry about the security of departing forces or of families left behind.

We will have to be ready to back up Phil in the strongest terms because his package as it is now shaping up will be a totally reasonable and honorable solution for all involved.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

••••

:::

UNCLASSIFIED

8223043 3041



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

82 AUG -3 P5:58

as 8/3



12

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

~~SECRET~~

August 3, 1982

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotos *NAV*

SUBJECT: Phil Habib's Views at End of Day August 3

Phil, over the radio to Charlie Hill a short while ago, asked that we give you his thoughts of the moment:

First, Phil is even more convinced than he was this morning that the negotiations have entered a crucially important testing phase. The PLO appear to be serious. If this turns out to be false, Phil feels his mission will be close to having run its course. If the present trend continues, however, we may be on the road to success.

Phil says that if our effort fails because the PLO is lying, or because the Egyptians won't take them, that is one thing. It will be something else, however, if failure is caused by Israel's refusal to keep a strict ceasefire. Phil wants the Israelis to know that their present small-scale activity around the southern edges of the city is not providing useful pressure. To the contrary, it is making the U.S. appear to have no control over the Israelis at the very time Phil needs to give credible assurances of safe conduct for the other side. In addition, current Israeli behavior appears to threaten Palestinian non-combatants in the camps and raises the danger that PLO fighters will lash out in an attempt to preserve their honor as protectors of their families.

Second, Phil wants you to be aware that even if successful, he will surely emerge with a package which is far from what the Palestinians want, but also will contain elements Israel rejects. Sharon is making daily pronouncements about such matters. If Phil can deliver the Palestinians, it will be largely up to us to deliver the Israelis. At present, Phil foresees at least three difficult issues on the horizon:

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

AM 3/6/95

9302566

CLASSIFY

CLASSIFY as () S or () TS

DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () TS

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Time of entry of the international force: Sharon says it cannot come in until all the PLO have departed. We will have to work on Israel, the PLO, -- and DOD -- to get agreement to a compromise, e.g., the French enter on the day the PLO starts to move out, and the U.S. enters on the third or fourth day after that. Total withdrawal time could take two weeks or so.
2. The kind of weapons the PLO takes with them: We have been saying only "personal" weapons. Phil says he may have to acquiesce in allowing them to take selected heavy weapons, such as rocket launchers.
3. The "visibility" of the Israelis as the PLO moves out: The Israelis gave a commitment to Phil that their forces would pull back so they could not be seen by the departing Palestinians. Sharon and Begin later reneged, saying this would be shameful. Phil thinks we may have to hold them to their initial commitment.

(Points 1 and 3 were raised by Ambassador Ghorbal today following his telephone discussion with PLO representative Khalid al-Hassan.)

These points do not require action now, but Phil wanted you to be aware of them. With regard to Israel's current abuse of the ceasefire, especially around the camps, Phil hopes we can keep reiterating our views to the Israelis, and perhaps to Shamir again before he leaves Washington Wednesday morning.

Finally, at Phil's request, we followed up his talk today with the French Ambassador in Beirut by pressing the Frenchman here to convey to Paris the urgency of their making a clear and final commitment to participate with us in the international force. Phil may want French (and U.S.) military liaison officers to join him in Beirut for planning talks as early as Friday.

Drafted: NEA-Chill/gp
08/03/82 x29464

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SADIAEE
R

Dist.
6/29

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~ DECAPTIONED

UNCLASSIFIED

June 29, 1982

S MEMORANDUM TO: S/S - Mr. L. Paul Bremer III
 D
 P FROM : NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
 S/S
 S/S-I SUBJECT : Message from Habib 0500 June 29: Day's
 S/d Activities, June 29
 NSC
 CIA e.o.

AMH

Casey It is 0900 Tuesday, June 29. I have been in touch this morning with Abdu to find out what happened in the meetings last night in Israel with Sharon. (Report by septel.) Sarkis is sick. I am seeing Wazzan later this morning. I am, however, unable to go very far with him in the absence of clear instructions on how to comment one way or the other on the GOL proposals given to me yesterday.

When I do meet with Wazzan, I will, as I have been doing all along, convey our strong desire for significant and clear-cut progress on an urgent basis and a sense that there will be serious trouble otherwise.

However, what I need more than anything else at this juncture are instructions on how to deal with the solution shaping up, as outlined in my meetings with Sarkis and Wazzan yesterday. It continues to be my strong conviction that we must move in tandem with the GOL at this important juncture; which should incidentally insure Saudi and, I hope, Egyptian support for the outcome. Moreover, I find the general thrust of the package plan discussed with the GOL yesterday to be a sound basis for exploration and further discussion toward an acceptable solution. That is why I wish to have the Department views in hand before I continue the discussions on a more detailed basis. In the course of such discussions, we will be able to determine whether the proposals have a truly valid basis or whether the GOL is being strung along by the PLO. I am not unaware of the possibility that the GOL does not have a clear idea of what the PLO will agree to, or that they may be putting the best interpretation on their discussions with the PLO. But they are the ones doing the negotiations with the PLO. We will do our best to verify and strengthen the direction and content of the GOL position in these negotiations.

9302560

AMH 3/5/96

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

() CLASSIFY RDS-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6/29/02
 () DOWNGRADE IS TO () S or

Another reason for instructions is that I would be reluctant to see Sharon today or tonight to confront his simplistic, bulldozing tactics without guidance. In my view, talks with the Israelis on the political solution shaping up should be with Begin, not with Sharon, since Begin would be a lot better equipped to foresee the advantages and better placed to put Israel's military objectives into perspective. Nevertheless, I am quite prepared to argue with Sharon if I know what we are prepared to accept in the way of a solution on the ground, beyond the general statements which we have been making so far.

UNCLASSIFIED



292

UNCLASSIFIED

8217987

NODIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

'82 JUN 27 A9:20

June 27, 1982

DIST:

S

P

S/S

S/S-O

NEA

LWG

S/S-I FROM:

NODIS

File: SUBJECT:

~~SECRET/NO~~ DECAPTIONED

TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer, III

NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis

Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0430 A.M.,
June 27, 1982

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1. ~~SECRET/NO~~
2. Israeli Cabinet is meeting today presumably to debate and decide their next steps in Lebanon. The political question of the moment centers upon Israeli intentions with regard to West Beirut. The GCI faces a basic choice -- whether to resume the onslaught against the remaining PLO forces, by bombing and shelling with or without a ground attack, or whether to hold off and let the political-diplomatic effort deal with the situation.
3. In my view it is absolutely necessary that the United States assure that there be no repeat no further attacks on West Beirut and its immediate populated suburbs. The situation in Beirut has become a symbol of this war, and it is widely believed that the survival of a large part of the city and its people has become the responsibility of the United States. There is no way that official and public opinion in the Middle East and elsewhere will let us escape that responsibility. It will not devolve on to Israel, which is expected to behave ruthlessly, nor will PLO intransigence and lack of concern for their host nation be blamed.
4. I cannot believe that we will sacrifice our interest by standing by -- as our failure to act will be viewed -- and letting West Beirut suffer further. No matter that some Lebanese are bloody minded in their hatred for Palestinians, no matter that some Israelis believe that the PLO can and must be totally and visibly smashed into oblivion -- we will pay a great price in terms of our broad interest and international image. Moreover, in my mind further pillaging of Beirut, by air, land or sea -- with or without a ground attack -- will be a monumental obscenity with which we must not be seen to be associated.
5. I understand that we have urged Prime Minister Begin not to attack West Beirut. I suggest that persuasion and a strong message need to be reinforced in a way which makes clear that we mean what we say and will brook no defiance. My specific recommendations are as follows:

[1] We should request of Prime Minister Begin today, following the cabinet meeting, a flat and unequivocal pledge that there will be no attack on Beirut. A ceasefire in place is to be maintained, with strength and proportionality will be the practice even under the kind of mild provocation that has led to massive retaliation hitherto. In place of violence Israel would now accept the continuation of the political-diplomatic effort without a deadline.

UNCLASSIFIED

9302546

PHOTO COPY

3/5/86

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[2] We must insist on a reply, if we get the kind of equivocation that has frequently been the case in the past.

[3] If he is not prepared to give the assurances we seek, our answer should be brief but telling as follows: Israel is an independent country which has a right to make its own decisions and follow its own interests as it sees them. The United States has the same right. If Israel persists and attacks West Beirut despite our position, the United States wishes to inform Israel what will happen when the attack begins. At that point the President will call a halt, under U.S. law, to all military shipments to Israel; we shall also be prepared to go immediately to the UN Security Council to seek a binding resolution calling on Israel to stop its military actions and withdraw from Lebanon; we are prepared to vote for or at any rate not veto any move to impose Chapter VII Sanctions. Mr. Begin must be left under no illusion that our action will be anything but immediate and unrelenting.

6. In sum, I believe we are at a crucial point where for the sake of our interests, and in the broadest consideration of the traditional American concern for what is decent, that we must bring an end to needless killing. Otherwise we face an immense human tragedy in West Beirut. I could list many more arguments in favor of the position I have set forth but I do not want to belabor the issues any further.

Desired Distribution: ONLY

The Secretary
Under Secretary Eagleburger
Executive Secretary Bremer
Assistant Secretary Veljotes
~~The White House~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

801 10

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

June 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer III

FROM : NEA - Nicholas A. *Reliotes*

SUBJECT : Radio Message from Amb. Habib, 6/27/82, 11:30 a.m.: Appeal from Grand Mufti

~~Entire text.~~

Grand Mufti Hassan Khalid, Sunni spiritual leader of Lebanon phoned me this afternoon with an urgent message. The Israeli's are dropping leaflets on West Beirut urging the entire population to leave the city, either north to Tripoli or East to Damascus. As a result, thousands of people were now trying to flee the city which in turn has spread panic and terror through the entire population. The Mufti said that he was also informed today that the roads south of Beirut are jammed with Israeli troops and military equipment heading north.

The Mufti recalled the terrible damage done to West Beirut and the southern suburbs during the intensive Israeli bombardment of Thursday and Friday which left hardly a single building untouched in some areas and said, that as a result of the Israeli leaflets and troop movements, he feared that even worse is still to come. He called on me to take urgent action to forestall an Israeli attack against the city. It is unthinkable, he said, that the entire population of West Beirut should pay the price of Israeli military ambitions. He warned that Islamic thought in Lebanon holds the United States accountable for what has already happened. A new onslaught against predominantly Moslem West Beirut would result in the United States being held responsible by Lebanon's Moslems.

I told the Mufti that I would transmit his message and his appeal immediately to Washington and that I would do everything possible on my part to avoid such a tragedy. He thanked me and said that he and Lebanon's Moslems were hopeful that I could bring an end to the danger that threatened Beirut.

Comment: In our first meeting June 25, the Mufti warned that continued Israeli attacks on Lebanon would transform Moslem opinion in the country, which is basically favorable to the United States, into hostility against us. He repeated that warning today but in considerably stronger and more urgent terms.

9/25/86

TS
BY
OR
DOWNGRADE IS TO () S or

930256de

UNCLASSIFIED

GDS 6/27/88



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

'S
'S-I

June 22, 1982 ^h6/22

R

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
SUBJECT: Habib Moves Over Next 24 Hours

We went over the situation in great depth with Phil at 1500-1600 Tuesday. Phil fully understands the need to get specific undertakings out of the PLO fast. Here are Phil's proposed plans for tonight and tomorrow:

- Tonight he probably will have to meet with Sharon, who has just arrived at Bashir's HQ. Phil hoped to avoid encountering Sharon in the Beirut area, but cannot avoid a meeting. We expect Sharon will refer to the Thursday morning Cabinet meeting in Jerusalem and tell Phil that he must produce something concrete from the PLO if there is to be any hope of Cabinet agreement to a disengagement.
- Tomorrow morning Phil intends to go to the Salvation Council and put "precise demands" to them to pass to the PLO. He will also "squeeze the timeframe" on the PLO, stressing that the IDF has them by the throat. In the course of the day he will work to get specific commitments from the PLO on the leadership's departure, stacking arms, Syrian withdrawal, etc.
- Tomorrow afternoon at 1630 Lebanon time Phil plans to go by USN helicopter to Israel to meet Sharon (and possibly Begin as well) with something specific from the PLO in hand. Phil does not expect the Cabinet to agree to any 5km withdrawal (in fact Phil himself now seems to agree with the Israelis that such a disengagement is not achievable either practically, on the ground, or politically). Phil will, however, try to get some further cosmetic steps from the Israelis--particularly in the areas of the airport and the palace.
- Phil would then return by helicopter to our residence in Yarze that same evening (Wednesday, June 23). On Thursday, the combination of a basically positive outcome in the Israeli Cabinet, together with some ominous warnings to the PLO (our Thursday evacuation should have a strong impact in this regard) could bring about the breakthrough we want.

Encl. 1

9302566

WJA
Date: 3/5/96

CLASSIFY as
DOWNGRADE TS to () or

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Radio Communication between

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

SADIXED

~~SECRET~~

C. Hill - Habib, L:

07/15 am

~~ES SENSITIVE~~
8218995

ST:
S
S-I

Habib -

Begin ~~says~~ he issued the order last night but somehow or another, I didn't realize his orders aren't carried out these days. Now we're told maybe by 5:00 this afternoon the water and electricity will be on, that there are technical difficulties. The technical difficulties are that the Israeli guys down at the end of the line don't want to do it, that's what the technical difficulties are, they just want to squeeze the people a little bit more. As far as I'm concerned those are the technical difficulties. I don't buy that in other words. Secondly. There is no way, absolutely no way in which I can move the negotiations along under the present conditions. I've got one telephone that's always busy, goes into the Prime Minister. All the other telephones are down and I can only get him on that phone once in awhile because he doesn't always stay sitting on the telephone. He can't come out. But he can go in. It's just, there is no way. They keep talking about I have to move in a hurry, they have lost two days by virtue of their refusing to do what I asked them to do. Two days of negotiation have been lost. I want them to understand that. I want you to understand it. I want the President to understand it, I want everybody in the country to understand it. I'm getting sick and tired. We get somewhere and then it all dissipates because somehow or another things go wrong. Most of the things that have gone wrong have gone wrong because of Israeli action in my opinion. I've been screaming for three weeks now about the importance of cease-fire in place. You want to know why they got into a fire fight the day before yesterday? Which set everything back another two days, that's four days? It's because the Israeli forces moved in. Under cover of a so-called cease-fire. They moved in closer and closer to the city. They kept moving. All right. Now maybe I've got them stopped once again. Meanwhile, I can't do anything because I can't talk to anybody. Now that's just the beginning. Now if you can make people begin to understand that. You understand what I'm talking about?

Hill:

Yes, I understand very clearly. We'll go get Aarons up and I'll be back to see him. I presume that somebody here has been talking to Sam in the early hours already. We'll get back on it. Over.

Habib

They've been talking. There's no question they've been talking. Well they're not getting. They're giving this line well, there's technical difficulties, but on Gary's demand you know what the latest line is? Oh, well, when they talk to Johnny Abdu yesterday, it was

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Johnny

3/5/86

9302566

Exemptions

CLASSIFY as () S or () TS or
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

:: ::

agreed they would stay in one place, Abdu would stay in one place, and that's nonsense I want them off. Off. Out. That was my request. It wasn't that they stay in one place these days another place. I want them out of that crossroad. No ifs, ands butts. That's one thing. I haven't been able to get a hold of Abdu the last half hour or so, I don't know what his latest (static) . The other thing is that there are some other problems I want to raise with you now. Now for one thing, Wazzan (static). the question. He says the PLO will not accept our participation in the MNF. I said is that right. I said the Israelis and don't want to accept the French position (static) don't want to accept our role so there isn't going to be any MNF. I said they asked for our guarantee, we're giving them the best guarantee possible, the answer is it's not negotiable. That is the MNF. That's the MNF that the government of Lebanon asked for. And it's up to him to go back and tell them so. And if they don't like it they know what they can do. All right. In addition, of course, the work of the so-called (static) is still supposedly being conducted. It is not being conducted very efficiently. They have this problem of communication. Over.

Hill: Phil, I lost you on both those transmissions a little bit. Let me just repeat if you understand me. You said that Wazzan said the PLO won't accept US participation. You told them that maybe the Israelis wouldn't accept the French but he should go back and tell them that was what the MNF was going to be. Then you said that the military commission was not proceeding well. Did I miss something? There's been a lot of static. Over.

Habib : One of the reasons that the Military commission is proceeding well is because I can't get at people because of the closed roads and also because of the lack of electricity which affects the telephone service too. (static) approach that the Israelis are using. Now in addition. I want to make sure that Howe isn't going too far with certain things. We have got now a revised version of the Lebanese so-called plan. It's not substantially changed in any real way. The important thing is that we're still going to have to negotiate things out. For example, the Lebanese prefer to use the Bain Militaire to take them out rather than the port. And that suits me as well for a number of reasons. Over.

Hill: Could you repeat that? The Lebanese prefer what? Instead of what to take them out? Over.

Habib They prefer a place called the Bain Militaire, the military bath rather than the port, and that would mean they'd have to be lightered (?) out to the freighters. There are good reasons for that. I'm not altogether

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

.. ..

opposed to them. But these are things that are going to be negotiated out over the next few days if we ever get to where we can negotiate. Over.

Hill: Give me a general idea where the Ban Militaire is. Is that over on the west coast part of the city? Over.

Habib Yes, it's on what they call the southern end of Ras Beirut. It's where we took people out in 1976. We evacuated. Anybody in the Working Group will show you where it is on the map. It's in west Beirut. Just on the south-west edge of Beirut. All right. Now. There are a number of other things that have to be worked out on an ad hoc basis and I'll just work them out. I don't need any advice or instructions, I'll just do the best I can. But I want you to understand that we're still hung up on this business of the Israelis, the Christians moaning about no PLO presence. Now if that isn't clear, then you know, our negotiations, we don't have a package. And I'm negotiating a package. I'm not negotiating pieces of a package. Over.

Hill: Yes. That's very clear. The situation here on that is that everybody, Secretary and so on, White House, say we will deliver on that, but we're not engaging the Israelis in negotiations on it now. Do you think that's the right way to proceed, or do you think we ought to start talking to them, and fighting with them, another set of talks, about these two points? Over.

Habib I talked to Sharon about it yesterday. He knows exactly where I stand. And he said they stand and I said I'm not arguing with it. I'm just telling you that's the way it's going to be. Now I have to be backed up. That's all. You have to make sure I'm backed up. Now we've just sent you in a cable which looks forward to the near term. You know, the next few weeks. So that you can start working, thinking about some of those things. Because if you think we're just going to (static). We've got to talk about disengagements, (static) we've got to get them out of this country. Now you have to start thinking about those things. They don't come to you, and say we're going to stay there for another two months, while we run Lebanon. No way. Now I've told you this before and nobody listens. Now maybe some of you think it's a good idea they stay here and run this country the next two months. I'm telling you it is not a good idea. There's going to be trouble

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

..: ..:

all along. There's going to be no cease-fire that way. There's going to be killing, there's going to be all sorts of trouble. Now. Three weeks or a month ago I told you we're going to have trouble with all the Arabs if we don't move, move, and we've gotten ourselves in this position and it's getting worse. My reading the cables, we're in, we're getting in a worse mess every day. They're introducing new things every day. All of a sudden now we gotta deal with the comprehensive peace settlement before we can deal with anything else. Three weeks ago nobody even mentioned (static). You wait another three weeks you'll have more things to think about. It is getting ridiculous. It has to end. (static)

Habib Charlie, are you still there.

static

Hill: Phil, I lost you for a minute there. Can you read me now. Over.

Habib static

Hill: Sorry, Phil, we're getting sunspots or something. I can tell you're transmitting, but I can't pick it up. Over.

Habib noise

Hill: Yes, you're a little bit clearer. Go ahead and try it. Over.

Habib We've got to look ahead a few weeks now. Even if we get this one thing done we've got to make sure we understand where we're going next. We cannot just let the Israelis sit. All over Lebanon where they are and let the Syrians stay where they are for that matter either. We have to start looking ahead. There's no way which they can stay here for the next several months and run this country. Is that understood. Over.

Hill: Yes, I think that's very well understood. Once we get the PLO out of there I think we'll be in a good position to really turn on the Israelis and make them do something. Over.

Habib Frankly, Charlie, I don't believe you. I mean, I believe you would love to, but I don't think that anybody back there has thought about it or is ready to do it. Maybe you have. But the important thing is that we don't even have them on board for the things I have to have for the package yet. And we've been talking about that now for several days. Now if I get squared away

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

:: ::.

and get some contact with these people in the next 24 hours, which I have not had for four or five days, and I can get the negotiations moving quickly, I can close this thing out in the next three days. That's presuming I get some decent contact if the Israelis will allow me to have it.

Hill Okay, we're having trouble with transmission again. I understand. I'll go down and talk to Larry and we'll step up the pressure to get you the things you need to day. To get the services back on, not any excuses, and to quit screwing around with the check point problem. Over.

Habib The galleries static I cannot move the way they've got me boxed in now. They've been telling me about how little time I had and I've ...4 days by virtue of the actions over the last four days. Over.

Hill Okay. Let me collar Larry and we'll talk to ~~ATENS~~ and I'll get to Sam Lewis on this and make it very clear what you're thinking about all of this. Over.

Habib I'm going to have enough trouble with the Lebanese, the Syrians, the by the way, the Katea are going to cause us trouble. They say they don't want the French now. And the Katea are saying they don't care whether the Israelis agree to a matter of fact, they didn't even want a multilateral force. Now only did they not want the French in it, they say they don't want a multilateral force. They say the Israelis agreed to it. They don't like it. They don't want it. They want to go in and kill all those people that's what they want to do. And the other thing is, they don't want a token force here. Symbolic force. And of course the Israelis don't want it either. I said to them, I don't give a damn what you want, this is a package. I don't accept what you say. And we still got this age-old problem of the cease-fire. Every time there's a cease-fire they move in another quarter of a mile around the city. What kind of a cease-fire is that? That's why the firing started two days ago. Does anybody understand that? Over.

Hill Phil, one problem we're really going to have is that if these guys, if the Phalange, Katea, say this kind of thing publicly we're never going to get the US Navy in there. They're going to be just too frightened

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED SECRET~~

to do it. You know, they want assurances from everybody that nothing's going to happen to their boys. I just got a note here saying that we have two TV channels this morning reporting that there's going to be 1600 Marines coming in as part of an international force. And I heard on the radio a little while ago speculation that it would be a US-French force. Over.

Habib How long did you think it was going to be kept secret? What radio is this? Is it Radio Israel? Where is it coming from? Over.

Hill Phil, it sounds like it's Guli Zahal, out of Israel. the Israeli military radio. Over.

Habib We crossed Charlie, did you really think we were going to keep that secret? I mean, where's the story come from? Over.

Hill No. We were sitting around here yesterday, amazed that it still hadn't come out. That we got through the weekend on it. But it apparently comes originally leaked by IDF Radio, Guli Zahal. Over.

Habib The Israelis leak any thing they wish. Now listen. As far as and all that, don't worry. I have told everybody that when they come in nobody shoots at them. I'm not going to worry about the Katea shooting at them. The Katea aren't going to shoot at them. And neither are the Israelis. But you know, anything that happened, every kid over the age of 12 has a gun, you understand that? They better have their bullet-proof vests on. Over.

Hill Yeah, they understand that they can't control everything. But if any major faction sounds like they are opposed to it or can't be willing to hold their fire, it's going to be a real problem getting Congress or anybody else to let these guys go in. Over.

Habib static. And if we don't get all the guarantees that you need you still bring them in. Over.

Hill Phil, I don't think we're in a very productive radio time here. It's very hard to get you. I'm losing you from time to time. I think we just better use the time to go get Larry and start to go to work, unless you have something other vital we better wait for a better atmospheric condition. Over.

Habib Okay. static. You get working on it so we can see what we can clear up. Maybe we can clear it up with a different channel. Over and out.

UNCLASSIFIED

2229

TAPE: PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN HABIB AND Charles Hill/Adm. Howe

12:07 p.m., July 3, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED

HABIB *

...final agreement, I keep talking about alleged agreement, suspicion whether or not these things will really be carried out I am still uncertain about where we are going to come out that the remaining critical issues are the question of the heavy weapons. He doesn't like them taking the heavy weapons with them so we are going to get static on that. David talked about less limited numbers and terrorism and that sort of thing and I said "Look, () said he would probably be back around () said that didn't sound like a bad idea () are you getting me, over ()

One point which I stress very hard () if it meant that we had to have a few hundred men here that would be sufficient to take on a () Anyway whatsoever is a threat to Israel. I have mentioned it to David, I told them we would not bring the men until we () I told them as far as the heavy weapons are concerned we would see what we can do but () the officer in charge of the war () they don't want them to stay, they of the token force the symbolic force, that was not too much trouble () the question of timing, and I said to him that I was willing () arms in place that in other words, it was a package deal () a place to put them that much depended on our ability to get the place to put them () he said he didn't like the idea of them going to Libya () because we were not going to put the King in that kind of spot. () not at all ah, now () you better make sure we can follow through on that I will get to Sam who is going to be off to see the Prime Minister very shortly and get him to make a very strong point about the importance of cutting it out, especially tonight, but keep the place quiet because it is getting too sensitive now.

HILL: Let me tell you () they would right away make a common cause with his domestic opposition and he just can't stand that kind of a problem now. He did not say "no" finally. He is going to put it to his adviser and give us

*N.B. This tape starts after the conversation started and contains numerous blank spots--as indicated throughout the text by spaces.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET/SENSITIVE

9302566

3/5/90 Date

Classification control form with fields for 'CLASSIFY as' and 'DOWNGRADE TS to'.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

a formal answer tonight but we are () as the answer and trying to come up with something else.

HABIB: Well we can't dump the bastards into the sea and there is no way we can put that many of them into Syria. They will be back here inside of a week or they will be in Jordan. I just don't know why the hell we can't use, well I presume you are trying your best, I don't know. If you can't get them there, how about taking half of them there and half of them in Saudi Arabia, or Oman or, I don't know, Christ I am not saying I'm kidding Oman. Somehow or another you have got to get them out of here. Otherwise, this whole thing falls apart because the whole thing is based on getting them out of here. I mean if we don't get them out of here, we don't have anything going for us. What are you thinking of? () Get Mubarak to take them for 30 days and parcel them out after that. We'll work on it for 30 days and we'll let them go to hell or something. I don't know. Somehow or another you have got to get them out of here.

HILL: Yeah, we are very aware of that and that is now our first focus but only other thing we have working at this moment is the French told us that they would approach the Libyans about this but they have not done so yet so the French Ambassador is coming into to talk to Larry in a few minutes so we may get more then. But now it looks very, very bleak.

HABIB: Well, you know, that is just going to throw the whole thing about. You got to work on Mubarak, even if it is temporary. Would he rather have them in Libya? Christ, they would be sitting on his border next and then what will the Libyans do with them, then it'll really become a center of terrorism. And then what the hell are you going to do, the Israelis bombing Libya? It's ridiculous. Well, hell, it'll be Mubarak's ticket back into the arab world for Christ sake and he can control them. He can control them. These guys have been whipped. Okay, you go to work Charlie, I've given you all you need now. Make sure Sam goes over the whole thing. You can't go any less than what we went with Kimche.

DRAPER: Let's go over the four points.

HABIB: What four points? I told you already the four points that he () Morrie is sitting here. Do you understand where the sensitive points are or don't you?

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

: : : : : : : :

-5-
UNCLASSIFIED

HILL: I have three sensitive points. One, the PLO political office, the second is the heavy weapons and the third is the token force. What is the fourth?

HABIB: The fourth is the timing. When all this kicks off. I told them we could get, technically we should not see any problem in getting them out within ten days to two weeks after the beginning of D day and I want D day to be as soon as possible, as soon as we have them nailed down and we had a place to send them, that was D day and that in terms of their readjustment was after their withdrawal began. In terms of the MNF coming in, that was after they started to pull down and we didn't want to get sucked in and having our force as a hostage.

HILL: Okay, Phil, Admiral Howe is here and he has been working on this morning with a team on the details of this situation. He would like to talk to you now and ask a few questions. Just a minute.

HABIB: Okay, but Charlie you go on down and get onto Sam. Morris is just what I told you awhile ago. We want a PLO declaration. This is very important. That starts the process and that could be D day or the day before D day. That's the way we are thinking in the way of timing. Once we get things nailed down, we want to move right away.

HILL: Roger, we've got that Phil.

HABIB: Okay, who's coming on now? Charlie, you can go and leave us. Anybody coming on, come on.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, John Howe on the line and he got your last message. In working the mechanics of this and I'm going to go off to a White House meeting shortly that involves OSD and others and some of the the congressional and public affairs aspects, and military aspects, the thing we need to know the most is just what your concept is for the use of U.S. forces. I can tell you what they have in mind which is as limited as possible. But we need to know what you need to have the Marines do when they are in there and how expensive it is?

HABIB: Well, what we have counted on is a total force of two battalions, about 1,600 men, half French, half American. Our concept is that they should come in a few days or after the beginning of the departure of the PLO and position themselves as, in effect, a sanitary belt, that would be somewhere between the Israelis and the Lebanese army force. My thought is that

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

they would go down mostly toward the airport area and so we can start using the airport. Get the airport in good hands, in friendly hands, or non-combative hands. Also we would undoubtedly have to have some kind of liaison set up with the Lebanese and the French and our thought there was that they would be up in the Ministry of Defense which is right above here. What I would really like to do is to think in terms of those numbers with a 48 hour trigger on it. In other words, 48 hours after the Lebanese tell us they want us to come in, they will come. So you would have to position them about 48 hours off the coast. It would by that time things would be in fairly good order for them to come in. After they come in and at the time they come in, the presumption would be we would get some readjustment from the Israeli lines about that time. Now what I suggest is that you get a couple liaison officers, staff men, to come early when I give you signal. Once we get this thing when it looks like it's in its final stages, we could give you a signal. Send me a couple of staff guys, we'll put them, hopefully we'll get the French to come in at the same time. I want French speakers. At least those staff guys have to be French speakers. As many French-speaking officers as we can put the better off we are. Now we wanted, when the PLO starts moving out to the ships, our guys ought to be around as part of the guarantee that nobody is going to try and kill them, either Israeli or Phalange. So really the deal has to start, if we call D day the day the PLO announce they have accepted the agreement and everything is going to happen and we have it all in hand, then presumably about, if we have a place to go. Hold on. If we have a place for them to go, we start moving. If we don't have a place for them to go, we ain't going to do a God damned thing. We just going to sit on our ass. But if we have a place for them to go, we then have the commercial ships off-shore, we start moving them and we think we ought to be able to move them within ten days, shorter if possible, maybe only three days for all I know, but certainly within ten days. Remember, they have to be assembled, they have to be basically, basically we will have to settle the arms problem by then as to what they take with them. At this point we have just got small arms but there is now a lot of debate around here as to whether they are going to take heavy arms with them too. We haven't settled that finally but the boys in Washington are giving me some ideas. At that point, our boys get in position, we'll probably want them, them and the French, in, as I said, in that area around the airport and coming up this way toward Baabda maybe and the Ministry of Defense. The Lebanese army is going to put about 4,000 men in the same operation with them so that you are going to have 1600 American

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

and Frenchmen, 4,000 Lebanese troops and then, presumably, the process just continues until it is cleared out and the Lebanese troops take over. I told them we are counting on a less than 30 day operation as far as we are concerned. Maximum, 30 days for our forces. I am not so sure the French are that limited although the French don't want to stay here forever either. So that they may not be limited to the 30 days that I've set. Now it may be that the MNF might have to monitor the inventory of heavy weapons and spare arms, and the transfers whether we put them on ships or put them in depots. In that case I would hope to use the French with some American presence. I want to maximize the use of the French if I can on the internal stuff. Keep our guys out on the fringes because it is easier to deal with the Israelis at that stage.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, that all tracks pretty well with the thinking that is going here which from the Pentagon standpoint is minimize direct U.S. contact. One specific question. They have a preference here for working with the airport as a priority way of getting out. What they have in mind because of the geography and closeness of the camp, is to have the U.S. presence primarily in the airport area to charter commercial aircraft even though that seems to be impractical to some of us and to try to get these guys out commercially that way with the U.S. being around the airport and the Israelis back a little bit and some French involvement there as well. If that's not politically 'doable', we need to know because the port or even an over the beach thing is also feasible and we either need to rule that out or say that's okay and you can start planning along those lines. With regard to liaison they have already started to identify some people that will be able to fly in as soon as you say 'go'. We will also get sorted out that EUCOM can, at least, start talking to the French military to start out what units and how they might work together. Secretary Haig has the thought that the U.S. should do as much as the French and the U.S. should not simply be transporters, communicators, but should be there in some force. And if you kind of concur in that, we'll kind of beat down the Pentagon who would like not to have such a substantial force although I think it makes sense that they keep their units together basically and either do the airport or do the seaport and provide some security there and help in the checking out. The other issue is if our forces, if we should want to bring in a few more. Does that make sense to you? The Marines have 1,200 off shore right now, within 24 hours. When their other ships get linked up, they'll have about 1800 other fully capable marines.

: : : : :

UNCLASSIFIED

HABIB: In terms of the numbers, if you want to bring in a few more, nobody is going to object. In my opinion, as I said, it should be 50/50 French and American. I don't want our troops cannot be just the communicators and the water carriers and the transporters. We have got to have our troops, Al is absolutely right. We have got to do our share. There is no way we can just dump the load on the French. On the other hand, I think the way the thing is going to work out. They are not going to use the airport to transport 5,000, 6/7,000 PLO out of here. I don't know how many we are going to end up with. We don't really know. It may be up to 10,000. Remember, some of them are going to have their families. We may run up to 15,000-20,2000 people. We ain't going to take them out in a god damned airplane. We'll take them out by boat. The port area is easy to get at. You can dock right in there. Obviously, we'll have to control the port area while we are doing this. If you are going to go over the beach in a landing craft you might be able to use the Banmilitair area, our people know where that is, but don't worry about things like that. It seems to me, for one thing, we've got to get our planning synchronized with the Lebanese. Remember, we are going to be depending alot on 4,000 Lebanese troops to be in the confrontation areas. They are going to be doing the street to street stuff.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, that makes good sense and that's what everybody wants here. But if we have this argument about the airport and certainly topically in terms of numbers, what you say makes sense to me and the port makes alot more sense, but politically do you think the PLO would even agree to go out by air or by perhaps the combined operation of going out by air and out by port. Over.

HABIB: Well, it is possible you could use air. But remember it is going to take three or four days after this thing starts and after you are on the ground before the airport is going to be in shape to take 747s or 707s or something like that. Now there may be, you may be able to do something with the air but I'm more interested, the important thing is they've got to start moving before our guys even come. I'm going to get them started simultaneously so it is not like, you know, we want them assembled and ready to go and our guys come in and monitor it and see that they don't get hurt. Now the reason for that is very simple. Let me explain it to you but it'll scare some of your guys. I don't want our guys in position between the Israelis and them and then the guys decide not to go. Then

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

what'll we do? Then if we pull out, we say, what are we doing, opening the door for the Israelis to come in, that is why it has got to be very carefully synchronized and it has got to be very carefully timed. That's why I want to get some staff back here working with the people who are on the ground. This is not going to be an easy operation but it should not involved any of our guys getting into trouble. I can't see that. But, you know, there is always the risk that something is going to go wrong. Every kid over the age of 14 in this god damned country has got an automatic rifle.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, and that, of course, is one of their other concerns that the Pentagon is laying on us is what kind of insurances we are gong to have from the various factions. That they are under control and that the risk is minimized. Do you have any comments on that? Over.

HABIB: By the time they start getting here, the factions will be under control. The Phalange is not going to go after our guys. We can take care of it. The Israelis are not going to go after our guys. I doubt whether the PLO is going to go after them because the PLO wants them there. If the PLO agrees to their coming, it is because they want them. For one of the reasons they are worried about what is going to happen to them and to the people they leave behind if they don't have some protection after they take off. So I think the Lebanese army is going to take care of the factions, the remaining factions. Obviously, all of this depends upon a certain degree of agreement and it's got to be getting underway when our guys get here. So, what you guys ought to think of when I give the signal, when I know that we have got enough that we are really going to start moving, then I'll signal you to send some staff guys, not too many. In the first place there is no place to put these people. Second place is we don't want them all over the god damned place. The minimum amount of staff, responsible guys who can give an order and have it carried out, who know what the hell they are doing. Then we'll bring them, talk it over, put them in touch, get a wheels and command group formed. It is not going to be anything of joint command or anything like that. The Lebanese don't want to command them in any way whatsoever. They are not going to be under Lebanese command. I doubt whether the French will put you under their command, take you under your command or vice versa. So it would seem to me we would have to have proper liaison and coordination. That is the important thing. Now we can handle two or three liaison officers but I don't them to come until I know that we have something. That may be tomorrow, it may be the next day. So have them ready to come. Over.

: : : : :

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


HOWE: Okay, Phil, the other question concerns this commercial shipping and if you envision the commercial shipping being there, we will need your advice on what the timing is in regard to contacting them and whether you want us to do it here or you want the ICRC to start talking to shipping companies and going through the problems that that might raise. They have identified some U.S. shipping that's in the area but it may take some heavy persuasion and also the question of arms looms up again. These guys can't be armed when they go aboard ships. Over.

HABIB: I think it would be better to get something like a Greek ship, very frankly, because you think () ground before they go on board, you are not dealing with reality. We told them they could take their individual arms and they are going to take them. Now it seems to me I told the boys earlier in the department they got to start working on the question of ships and I would expect that we'll know two or three days ahead of time when we should start thinking of getting the ships in. I don't think we'll get more notice than that very frankly. We could have longer notice if we need it. It is just that I don't want to wait that long. Once we get agreement, I want to start moving because otherwise these things have a tendency to move away from you. Next thing you know there are six more conditions that we've got from the Israelis and the Lebanese, the PLO, everybody and his brother has another condition out here that they want them to negotiate for them and I told them I ain't negotiating any more conditions. Over.

HOWE: Roger, Phil, well we will have to stay in sync in terms of timing and public awareness, but you are probably right, earlier rather than later, we need to get off the dime and move out on that. Larry is here and he has a couple of things he wants to pass on so I'm going to pass him over to you now.

HABIB: Hold on, John, one further thing, when I said I take it you have French-speaking people with these units. Hell, these guys have been in the area. Someone suggested former army attaches. I don't think that's the answer. I want them from the units so that the liaison is proper. Do you have french-speaking officers who speak french with the units that are on board ships or who are in the headquarters that are associated with them? Over.

UNCLASSIFIED



~~_____~~
UNCLASSIFIED

HOWE: We still have to determine that, Phil. I'm sure that in EUCOM who will want to send some of the people, they have a good french speaker. Whether they have got a Marine, Navy french speaker there, I don't know but we'll try to address that problem and take care of it for you and keep the presence small with () END OF SIDE A.

#1369A

LWG: BMcNaughton/MRegan
7/3/82

UNCLASSIFIED
~~_____~~
•••••

'82 JUN 29 A 6 55

~~ES Sensitive~~ S/S-1 207

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

R

8218166

Change to ES Sender EK

Return copy to Director of S/S-1 EK 6/29

DIST:

ORIG. - S/S

June 29, 1982

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

COPIES: ES SENSITIVE Files

MEMORANDUM TO: S/S - Mr. L. Paul Bremer III

FROM : NEA - Charles Hill

SUBJECT: Radio Telecon Draper/Hill, 0130 June 29, 1982

S
D
P
E/S
S/S-O
NEA
LWG
./jhc

Hill explained that he was calling pursuant to a phone call from Eagleburger who had received call from Secretary asking that following message be passed to Habib:

1) Secretary has received a message from Israel that Habib is getting a deliberately inaccurate reading out of his meetings with Lebanese and that information is being distorted to imply impression of progress but there is actually nothing but stalling. Secretary had asked that this message be passed as soon as possible.

2) Secretary also asked that Habib arrange to meet with Sharon today (June 29).

3) Secretary also asked that Habib tell people that, if nothing clear-cut emerges today we are in trouble.

Draper responded that he understood message but had some questions as follows:

1) Where is Sharon? Hill replied that we presume instruction to contact him implies he will be at the front at some point during the day. Draper replied that they would check but that Washington should understand that Habib might not be able to arrange such a session until evening simply because of logistics of other scheduled sessions.

2) Draper asked if Hill could provide further definition of clear-cut. Hill replied that he couldn't provide any definite guidance on that subject and was unable to pass on any information re the scenario paper that had been worked on during the day because the Secretary had not yet had time to study it.

Draper then requested help to clarify Israeli radio reports being received in Beirut to the effect that the Israelis had passed to Habib some clarification of the Israeli position. Hill replied that based on available information he could only conclude that reports referred to Ambassador Lewis' conversations of 6/28 in which Israelis conveyed information that cabinet communique of 6/27 was not intended as an ultimatum but as a bargaining position.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

RDS-3, 6/29/02

DECLASSIFIED

9302566

YHM Date: 3/5/96

CLASSIFY AS () S or () O or () U or () F or () G or () D or () A or () C or () E or () H or () I or () J or () K or () L or () M or () N or () P or () Q or () R or () S or () T or () U or () V or () W or () X or () Y or () Z or () AA or () AB or () AC or () AD or () AE or () AF or () AG or () AH or () AI or () AJ or () AK or () AL or () AM or () AN or () AO or () AP or () AQ or () AR or () AS or () AT or () AU or () AV or () AW or () AX or () AY or () AZ or () BA or () BB or () BC or () BD or () BE or () BF or () BG or () BH or () BI or () BJ or () BK or () BL or () BM or () BN or () BO or () BP or () BQ or () BR or () BS or () BT or () BU or () BV or () BW or () BX or () BY or () BZ or () CA or () CB or () CC or () CD or () CE or () CF or () CG or () CH or () CI or () CJ or () CK or () CL or () CM or () CN or () CO or () CP or () CQ or () CR or () CS or () CT or () CU or () CV or () CW or () CX or () CY or () CZ or () DA or () DB or () DC or () DD or () DE or () DF or () DG or () DH or () DI or () DJ or () DK or () DL or () DM or () DN or () DO or () DP or () DQ or () DR or () DS or () DT or () DU or () DV or () DW or () DX or () DY or () DZ or () EA or () EB or () EC or () ED or () EE or () EF or () EG or () EH or () EI or () EJ or () EK or () EL or () EM or () EN or () EO or () EP or () EQ or () ER or () ES or () ET or () EU or () EV or () EW or () EX or () EY or () EZ or () FA or () FB or () FC or () FD or () FE or () FF or () FG or () FH or () FI or () FJ or () FK or () FL or () FM or () FN or () FO or () FP or () FQ or () FR or () FS or () FT or () FU or () FV or () FW or () FX or () FY or () FZ or () GA or () GB or () GC or () GD or () GE or () GF or () GG or () GH or () GI or () GJ or () GK or () GL or () GM or () GN or () GO or () GP or () GQ or () GR or () GS or () GT or () GU or () GV or () GW or () GX or () GY or () GZ or () HA or () HB or () HC or () HD or () HE or () HF or () HG or () HH or () HI or () HJ or () HK or () HL or () HM or () HN or () HO or () HP or () HQ or () HR or () HS or () HT or () HU or () HV or () HW or () HX or () HY or () HZ or () IA or () IB or () IC or () ID or () IE or () IF or () IG or () IH or () II or () IJ or () IK or () IL or () IM or () IN or () IO or () IP or () IQ or () IR or () IS or () IT or () IU or () IV or () IW or () IX or () IY or () IZ or () JA or () JB or () JC or () JD or () JE or () JF or () JG or () JH or () JI or () JJ or () JK or () JL or () JM or () JN or () JO or () JP or () JQ or () JR or () JS or () JT or () JU or () JV or () JW or () JX or () JY or () JZ or () KA or () KB or () KC or () KD or () KE or () KF or () KG or () KH or () KI or () KJ or () KK or () KL or () KM or () KN or () KO or () KP or () KQ or () KR or () KS or () KT or () KU or () KV or () KW or () KX or () KY or () KZ or () LA or () LB or () LC or () LD or () LE or () LF or () LG or () LH or () LI or () LJ or () LK or () LL or () LM or () LN or () LO or () LP or () LQ or () LR or () LS or () LT or () LU or () LV or () LW or () LX or () LY or () LZ or () MA or () MB or () MC or () MD or () ME or () MF or () MG or () MH or () MI or () MJ or () MK or () ML or () MM or () MN or () MO or () MP or () MQ or () MR or () MS or () MT or () MU or () MV or () MW or () MX or () MY or () MZ or () NA or () NB or () NC or () ND or () NE or () NF or () NG or () NH or () NI or () NJ or () NK or () NL or () NM or () NN or () NO or () NP or () NQ or () NR or () NS or () NT or () NU or () NV or () NW or () NX or () NY or () NZ or () OA or () OB or () OC or () OD or () OE or () OF or () OG or () OH or () OI or () OJ or () OK or () OL or () OM or () ON or () OO or () OP or () OQ or () OR or () OS or () OT or () OU or () OV or () OW or () OX or () OY or () OZ or () PA or () PB or () PC or () PD or () PE or () PF or () PG or () PH or () PI or () PJ or () PK or () PL or () PM or () PN or () PO or () PP or () PQ or () PR or () PS or () PT or () PU or () PV or () PW or () PX or () PY or () PZ or () QA or () QB or () QC or () QD or () QE or () QF or () QG or () QH or () QI or () QJ or () QK or () QL or () QM or () QN or () QO or () QP or () QQ or () QR or () QS or () QT or () QU or () QV or () QW or () QX or () QY or () QZ or () RA or () RB or () RC or () RD or () RE or () RF or () RG or () RH or () RI or () RJ or () RK or () RL or () RM or () RN or () RO or () RP or () RQ or () RR or () RS or () RT or () RU or () RV or () RW or () RX or () RY or () RZ or () SA or () SB or () SC or () SD or () SE or () SF or () SG or () SH or () SI or () SJ or () SK or () SL or () SM or () SN or () SO or () SP or () SQ or () SR or () SS or () ST or () SU or () SV or () SW or () SX or () SY or () SZ or () TA or () TB or () TC or () TD or () TE or () TF or () TG or () TH or () TI or () TJ or () TK or () TL or () TM or () TN or () TO or () TP or () TQ or () TR or () TS or () TT or () TU or () TV or () TW or () TX or () TY or () TZ or () UA or () UB or () UC or () UD or () UE or () UF or () UG or () UH or () UI or () UJ or () UK or () UL or () UM or () UN or () UO or () UP or () UQ or () UR or () US or () UT or () UU or () UV or () UW or () UX or () UY or () UZ or () VA or () VB or () VC or () VD or () VE or () VF or () VG or () VH or () VI or () VJ or () VK or () VL or () VM or () VN or () VO or () VP or () VQ or () VR or () VS or () VT or () VU or () VV or () VW or () VX or () VY or () VZ or () WA or () WB or () WC or () WD or () WE or () WF or () WG or () WH or () WI or () WJ or () WK or () WL or () WM or () WN or () WO or () WP or () WQ or () WR or () WS or () WT or () WU or () WV or () WW or () WX or () WY or () WZ or () XA or () XB or () XC or () XD or () XE or () XF or () XG or () XH or () XI or () XJ or () XK or () XL or () XM or () XN or () XO or () XP or () XQ or () XR or () XS or () XT or () XU or () XV or () XW or () XX or () XY or () XZ or () YA or () YB or () YC or () YD or () YE or () YF or () YG or () YH or () YI or () YJ or () YK or () YL or () YM or () YN or () YO or () YP or () YQ or () YR or () YS or () YT or () YU or () YV or () YW or () YX or () YZ or () ZA or () ZB or () ZC or () ZD or () ZE or () ZF or () ZG or () ZH or () ZI or () ZJ or () ZK or () ZL or () ZM or () ZN or () ZO or () ZP or () ZQ or () ZR or () ZS or () ZT or () ZU or () ZV or () ZW or () ZX or () ZY or () ZZ

~~SECRET~~ 197 Feb
8217987
R DECAPTIONED
NODIS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

'82 JUN 27 A9:20

June 27, 1982

DIST:

S
P
S/S
S/S-O

~~SECRET/NODIS~~ DECAPTIONED

UNCLASSIFIED

NEA TO: S/S - L. Paul Bremer, III
LWG
S/S-I FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotes

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 0430 A.M.,
June 27, 1982

1. SECRET - Entire Text.
2. Israeli Cabinet is meeting today presumably to debate and decide their next steps in Lebanon. The political question of the moment centers upon Israeli intentions with regard to West Beirut. The GOI faces a basic choice -- whether to resume the onslaught against the remaining PLO forces, by bombing and shelling with or without a ground attack, or whether to hold off and let the political-diplomatic effort deal with the situation.
3. In my view it is absolutely necessary that the United States assure that there be no repeat no further attacks on West Beirut and its immediate populated suburbs. The situation in Beirut has become a symbol of this war, and it is widely believed that the survival of a large part of the city and its people has become the responsibility of the United States. There is no way that official and public opinion in the Middle East and elsewhere will let us escape that responsibility. It will not devolve on to Israel, which is expected to behave ruthlessly, nor will PLO intransigence and lack of concern for their host nation be blamed.
4. I cannot believe that we will sacrifice our interest by standing by -- as our failure to act will be viewed -- and letting West Beirut suffer further. No matter that some Lebanese are bloody minded in their hatred for Palestinians, no matter that some Israelis believe that the PLO can and must be totally and visibly smashed into oblivion --we will pay a great price in terms of our broad interest and international image. Moreover, in my mind further pillaging of Beirut, by air, land or sea -- with or without a ground attack -- will be a monumental obscenity with which we must not be seen to be associated.
5. I understand that we have urged Prime Minister Begin not to attack West Beirut. I suggest that persuasion and a strong message need to be reinforced in a way which makes clear that we mean what we say and will brook no defiance. My specific recommendations are as follows:

[1] We should request of Prime Minister Begin today, following the cabinet meeting, a flat and unequivocal pledge that there will be no attack on Beirut. A ceasefire in place is to be maintained, with strength and proportionality will be the practice even under the kind of mild provocation that has led to massive retaliation hitherto. In place of violence Israel would now accept the continuation of the political-diplomatic effort without a deadline.

9302506
3/5/86

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

RDS-3 06/27/02 (Veliotes, N.)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

[2] We must insist on a reply, if we get the kind of equivocation that has frequently been the case in the past.

[3] If he is not prepared to give the assurances we seek, our answer should be brief but telling as follows: Israel is an independent country which has a right to make its own decisions and follow its own interests as it sees them. The United States has the same right. If Israel persists and attacks West Beirut despite our position, the United States wishes to inform Israel what will happen when the attack begins. At that point the President will call a halt, under U.S. law, to all military shipments to Israel; we shall also be prepared to go immediately to the UN Security Council to seek a binding resolution calling on Israel to stop its military actions and withdraw from Lebanon; we are prepared to vote for or at any rate not veto any move to impose Chapter VII Sanctions. Mr. Begin must be left under no illusion that our action will be anything but immediate and unrelenting.

6. In sum, I believe we are at a crucial point where for the sake of our interests, and in the broadest consideration of the traditional American concern for what is decent, that we must bring an end to needless killing. Otherwise we face an immense human tragedy in West Beirut. I could list many more arguments in favor of the position I have set forth but I do not want to belabor the issues any further.

Desired Distribution: ONLY

The Secretary
Under Secretary Eagleburger
Executive Secretary Bremer
Assistant Secretary Velities
~~The White House~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

⋮



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ 18'

8217488

R

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
UNCLASSIFIED *4/22*

DIST:
S
P
NEA
S/S
S/S-I

RADIO TELECON FROM HABIB 2130, JUNE 22, 1982

TO: The Secretary
P - Ambassador Eagleburger
S/S - L. Paul Bremer III
NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis

FROM: NEA - Charles Hill *CH*

SUBJECT: Habib/Draper Meeting with Sharon in Beirut,
2300 Lebanon Time, June 22, 1982

Habib said that he met with Sharon for 1-1/4 hours. No Lebanese were present. Sharon said he would keep the meeting confidential. Sharon expressed the view that the near-term outcome should be as follows:

(1) Israel will hold the ceasefire unless fired upon. Habib insisted that the ceasefire must be "in place." Sharon did not argue against this point, nor did he swear to uphold it. At the moment of this call Habib said the situation was entirely quiet.

(2) Sharon said that all PLO fighters (estimated by the Israelis at 10,000) should leave Lebanon. They should not be permitted to stay even if they accept the authority of the PLO. Sharon said they would be given safe conduct out of the country to any destination and of course they would be disarmed.

(3) Sharon said he would not agree to any disengagement or pullback of the IDF. Habib said that he could not live with that approach. Habib was aware that the current disposition of the IDF makes a 5km pullback an impossibility. Nonetheless, he told Sharon that he must have something in the way of a symbolic withdrawal. As a result of this conversation Habib thinks he might achieve some kind of Israeli withdrawal in the vicinity of the airport.

(4) More immediately, however, Habib said that Sharon agrees to remove four IDF posts around Baabda that have been a real irritant. Habib will be meeting with the Lebanese in the palace at 1100, June 23. He asked Sharon to have the four posts evacuated by then. Sharon indicated that he would do so.

Habib arranged to meet Sharon on the evening of June 23 in Jerusalem. He presumes that it will be a meeting with the Prime Minister and Shamir present as well.

9302506
SECRET/SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
3/5/82

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
RDS-3-6/22/82
UNCLASSIFIED

R 183

DIST:

/S
/S-I



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~
8217487

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

June 22, 1982 ^h6/22 9302566

MAR 5 1982

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

TO: The Secretary
FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
SUBJECT: Habib Moves Over Next 24 Hours

UNCLASSIFIED

We went over the situation in great depth with Phil at 1500-1600 Tuesday. Phil fully understands the need to get specific undertakings out of the PLO fast. Here are Phil's proposed plans for tonight and tomorrow:

- Tonight he probably will have to meet with Sharon, who has just arrived at Bashir's HQ. Phil hoped to avoid encountering Sharon in the Beirut area, but cannot avoid a meeting. We expect Sharon will refer to the Thursday morning Cabinet meeting in Jerusalem and tell Phil that he must produce something concrete from the PLO if there is to be any hope of Cabinet agreement to a disengagement.
- Tomorrow morning Phil intends to go to the Salvation Council and put "precise demands" to them to pass to the PLO. He will also "squeeze the timeframe" on the PLO, stressing that the IDF has them by the throat. In the course of the day he will work to get specific commitments from the PLO on the leadership's departure, stacking arms, Syrian withdrawal, etc.
- Tomorrow afternoon at 1630 Lebanon time Phil plans to go by USN helicopter to Israel to meet Sharon (and possibly Begin as well) with something specific from the PLO in hand. Phil does not expect the Cabinet to agree to any 5km withdrawal (in fact Phil himself now seems to agree with the Israelis that such a disengagement is not achievable either practically, on the ground, or politically). Phil will, however, try to get some further cosmetic steps from the Israelis--particularly in the areas of the airport and the palace.
- Phil would then return by helicopter to his residence in Yarze that same evening (Wednesday, June 23). On Thursday, the combination of a basically positive outcome in the Israeli Cabinet, together with some ominous warnings to the PLO (our Thursday evacuation should have a strong impact in this regard) could bring about the breakthrough we want.



Department of State

R 156
TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

660004

AN: N030004-0290

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 134845
ORIGIN MODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:WTCLEVERIUS:CF
APPROVED BY NEA:OTSCHNEIDER
S/S:JCOVEY
S/S-O:NGARLAND

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

-----213012 140134Z /72
O 140129Z MAY 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

9302566

Map

5/83

Date:

~~SECRET~~ STATE 134845

UNCLASSIFIED
JERUSALEM/BEIRUT FOR HABIB/DRAFT

FOIA Exemptions _____
PA Exemptions _____

E.O. 12386: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL KF US SY SA LE IS
SUBJECT: PRINCE SULTAN'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER
WEINBERGER
REF: LONDON 10090

UNCLASSIFIED

1. ~~ENTIRE TARP.~~
2. REFTEL IS BEING REPEATED TO YOU. IT REPORTS ON SUGGESTION MADE TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER BY PRINCE SULTAN MAY 12 CONCERNING DELAY IN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS. OF COURSE, UNDER ARTICLE EIGHT SECTION TWO, LEBANON AND ISRAEL WOULD NOT BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS UNTIL AFTER

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 134845

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND, THEREFORE, THIS SAUDI CONCERN

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED



..:..

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

WOULD BE MET IN PART IN ANY EVENT. MOVEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE INTERIM BASED ON INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THIS OF COURSE COULD NOT BE DELAYED OR STOPPED. WE BELIEVE IT BEST TO RESPOND TO PRINCE SULTAN IN PERSON, IN THE CONTEXT OF A FULL BRIEFING FOR SAG ON THE AGREEMENT, AND THIS POINT SHOULD BE ON PHIL'S AGENDA FOR HIS TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA NEXT WEEK.

3. COMMENT: ADDRESSEES WILL NOTE IN READING REFTEL, PARTICULARLY PARAS FIVE AND SIX, THAT AT TIMES IN THE CONVERSATION SULTAN PRESENTED HIS VIEWS IN A WAY WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT ITSELF NOT BE SIGNED UNTIL SIX MONTHS AFTER WITHDRAWAL. THIS OF COURSE WOULD BE NONSENSICAL POSITION-- SINCE THERE THEN WOULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL--AND AMBASSADOR MURPHY IN SECURE TELECOM TO DAS CLUYERUS MAY 12 SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT SULTAN WAS REFERRING TO NEGOTIATION AND FORMALIZATION OF AGREEMENT ON ELEMENTS OF NORMALIZATION (MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS). EAGLEBURGER

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

R

AN: NS30002-0587

PAGE 01 STATE 080256
ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

ESTIMATED AVAILABLE

9302566

MAR 5 1996

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:D.L.HACK:JV
APPROVED BY P:LSEAGLEBURGER
L - M. KOZAK
NEA - D- T. SCHNEIDER
NEA/IAI - E. ASINGTON
S/S - CEMCHANANAY
S/S-O: MROBINSON

-----157411 240419Z /62

O 240413Z MAR 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
ANCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

STATE 080256

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
UNCLASSIFIED
FOR HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ISRAEL INTEREST IN A U.S.-
ISRAEL UNDERSTANDING ON FUTURE CONTINGENCIES IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 319E

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. WE CONCUR FULLY IN WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ARENS--THAT
WE CANNOT AGREE TO ANY UNDERSTANDING PROVIDING FOR
ISRAELI MILITARY REENTRY. WE ALSO ARE CONFIDENT THAT
LEBANESE ARE NOT LIKELY LET MATTERS RETURN TO A POINT WHERE
CONDITIONS WOULD JUSTIFY SUCH A STEP.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 080256

3. WE ALSO SUPPORT POSITION YOU HAVE ALREADY TAKEN IN

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

OPPOSITION TO RETENTION OF HADDAD. SHULTZ

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~



Department of State

~~SECRET~~
TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AM: NSJ0002-0454

~~SECRET~~
PAGE 01 STATE 072836
ORIGIN NODS-00

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:HSPENDLETON/GP
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
NEA-AMBASSADOR DRAPER
NEA - NAVELIOTES
AMBASSADOR HABIB
S/S-O: RDAVIS
S/S:LPBRENER, III
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/S ONLY

9302566
MAR 5 1966
Date: _____
IS/FPC/CDR _____
CLASSIFICATION _____
EXEMPTIONS _____
EXEMPTIONS _____

-----223637 170241Z /61
O 170222Z MAR 63 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ STATE 072836

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US

SUBJECT: ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS TO BE CONVEYED ORALLY TO MINISTER SHAMIR BY THE AMBASSADOR WHEN HE DELTVERS THE TEXT OF OUR NON-PAPER ON ENHANCED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON (BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL).
3. BEGIN TEXT: I WISH TO REPEAT, MR. MINISTER, HOW NORTHWILE I FOUND OUR DISCUSSIONS WHICH STARTED ON SUNDAY. THEY PROVIDED ME WITH FRESH INSIGHTS INTO THE THINKING OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. AS I PROMISED WHEN

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 072836

WE MET ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 16, 1963 AT

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DELIVERING TO YOU THE TEXT OF A NON-PAPER ON ENHANCED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. WE HAVE REFINED IT SOMEWHAT FOLLOWING YOUR DEPARTURE AND HAVE DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS WITH THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS DELEGATION. I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO AGREE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS DOCUMENT BE TREATED WITH THE STRICTEST CONFIDENTIALITY.]

(S) (C) (CS)

3. CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE SAID TO YOU ON MONDAY, THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER TO RETURN TO THE REGION THIS WEEKEND TO LEND THEIR ASSISTANCE FOR THE COMPLETION OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THEY ARE AS DETERMINED AS ARE THE PRESIDENT AND I THAT WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO MOVE AHEAD IN THE FULLEST SPIRIT OF COOPERATION. THEY WILL BE AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE YOUR REACTIONS TO THE IDEAS IN OUR NON-PAPER AND TO DISCUSS ANY ADDITIONAL POINTS YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE.

4. FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS: NEITHER IN THIS ORAL MESSAGE NOR IN THE NON-PAPER DO WE EXPLICITLY STATE THAT OUR REINFORCED MEASURES REPRESENT ALTERNATIVES AND SUBSTITUTES FOR A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE AND CERTAIN OTHER ISRAELI PROPOSALS WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON. THIS POSITION IS IMPLICIT IN OUR NON-PAPER. AT YOUR DISCRETION YOU SHOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR TO SHANIR WHEN DELIVERY TAKES PLACE.]

(S) (C) (CS)

SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

El68

*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

EXCISE

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 88TELAV15646

FILM= D880965-0232

DATE= 31 OCT 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEL AVIV

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION SS

TO= STATE
JERUSALEM

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= EXDIS

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= [REDACTED]

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= "DEATH SQUADS:" FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTER COMMENTS

REFERENCE= 88 TEL AVIV 15542

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DEATH SQUAD, REPORT, JOURNALIST, GOVERNMENT REACTION, POLICE F

TAGS= PHUM, PGOV, IS, US

<<<<>>>>

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE: FEB 12 1997

MR Cases Only: _____

EU Citations _____

TS authority 104

() CLASSIFY as () & of

() DOWNGRADE TO () & of

RELEASE
 EXCISE
 DELETE
 DELETE Non-Responsive Imp
 FOIA Exemptions
 PA Exemptions

DECLASSIFY
 DECLASSIFY IN PART

930402.9

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
PAGE 01 TEL AV 15646 311600Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----263050 311607Z /38

O 311757Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1799
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] TEL AVIV 15646
DECAPTIONED
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, IS, US
SUBJECT: "DEATH SQUADS:" [REDACTED] REPORTER
COMMENTS

REF: TEL AVIV 15542

1. [REDACTED]
2. OCTOBER 31, WE SPOKE WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PRESS CARD WAS WITHDRAWN AT THE SAME TIME THAT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WITHDREW PRESS CREDENTIALS FROM REUTERS FOR NOT OBSERVING CENSORSHIP REQUIREMENTS BEFORE FILING THE STORY ABOUT IDF "DEATH SQUADS" OPERATING IN THE TERRITORIES.

[REDACTED] EXPLAINED HE THOUGHT HIS PRESS CARD WAS WITHDRAWN TEMPORARILY AS A RESULT OF HAVING BEEN CITED BY REUTERS AS REUTERS SOUGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF. WHITLEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED A STORY TWELVE DAYS EARLIER ABOUT UNDERCOVER UNITS IN THE TERRITORIES KILLING PEOPLE.

[REDACTED] SAID "NO ONE HAS DENIED THE FACTS I CITED IN MY STORY."
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 15646 311600Z

3. [REDACTED] SAID THAT GOI ANGER WAS PRIMARILY AIMED AT REUTERS, AND HE THOUGHT HIS PRESS CARD WOULD BE RETURNED WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS. HE SAID INITIALLY RABIN WAS PERSONALLY FURIOUS WITH THE REUTERS REPORT, "AND HE WANTED TO HAVE REUTERS THROWN OUT AND SHUT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWN COMPLETELY." [REDACTED] SAID THE MOST OFFENSIVE ASPECT OF THE REUTERS REPORT WAS IN REFERRING TO THE SECRET UNIT AS "DEATH SQUADS." THE TERM EVOKED UNSAVORY PARALLELS WITH UNITS ACTIVE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AND [REDACTED] THOUGHT IT WAS AN UNFORTUNATE AND INACCURATE TERM FOR REUTERS TO HAVE EMPLOYED. (COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND OTHER PRESS SOURCES HAVE AGREED THAT THE USE OF THE TERM "DEATH SQUADS" WAS ILL-ADVISED IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE. YET ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL JOURNALIST TOLD US HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO SAY "HIT TEAMS," AND SAID HE HAD INDEPENDENT INFORMATION WHICH TRACKED WITH THE REUTERS AND FINANCIAL TIMES VERSIONS. END COMMENT)

4. [REDACTED] NOTED "IT IS ONE OF THE MOST SECRET UNITS," BUT HE WAS PERSONALLY AWARE OF AT LEAST SIX PEOPLE WHO KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF UNITS OF ISRAELIS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES "KILLING PEOPLE IN COLD BLOOD" IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES., HE RECALLED AGAIN THAT HIS STORY WAS PUBLISHED WITHOUT DENIAL OR IDF COMMENT.

5. OCTOBER 31, THE CHIEF MILITARY CENSOR, BRIG. GEN. SHANI, REPORTEDLY FILED A COMPLAINT WITH THE JERUSALEM POLICE AGAINST TWO CORRESPONDENTS OF THE REUTER NEWS AGENCY AND THE FINANCIAL TIMES CORRESPONDENT. THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT ALSO HAS DECIDED TO INVESTIGATE THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 TEL AV 15646 311600Z

CANCELLING THE VISAS AND WORK PERMITS OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN ISRAEL WHEN THEY FAIL TO SUBMIT MATERIAL TO THE MILITARY CENSOR. WE NOTE THAT THE ACCURACY OF A STORY IS IRRELEVANT TO THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT MATERIAL TO THE CENSOR.

PICKERING

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

R ~~SECRET~~ 5118

TELEGRAM

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

UNCLASSIFIED

AN: NS30001-0577

PAGE 01 STATE 030067 TOSEC 010246
ORIGIN NOOS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:AEJONES:JVM
APPROVED BY NEA:BTSCHNEIDER
NEA/ARN:DLRACK
NEA/IAT:OGREENLEE
NEA/IRN:BSCHELL
O:ESWALKER
S/S: KSHIRLEY
S/S-O:RDAVIS

9302506

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFY	EO Citations
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/>		
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE

-----241016 100029Z /62
O 100003Z FEB 83 ZFP4
FM SECRETATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 030067 TOSEC 010246

NO DIS
FROM VELIOTES

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: HARR, OVIP, PREL, LE, IS, US, MX
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST UPDATE: FEBRUARY 9

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ISRAEL/INTERNAL: ATTENTION IN ISRAEL REMAINS RIVETED ON HOW THE BESHIN GOVERNMENT WILL REACT TO THE COMMISSION OF INDUSTRY FINDINGS. THE CABINET MET FOR THREE HOURS TODAY BUT FAILED TO REACH A DECISION. THE MINISTERS WILL RESUME THEIR DELIBERATIONS TOMORROW AT 8:00 P.M. LOCAL AND REPORTEDLY HAVE REQUESTED THE IDF OFFICERS SINGLED OUT BY THE COMMISSION TO APPEAR. EARLY READOUTS INDICATE THAT THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE CABINET REMAINS SOLIDLY IN FAVOR OF ACCEPTING THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 030067 TOSEC 010246

RECOMMENDATIONS. UNLESS BESHIN REVERSES HIMSELF AND TURNS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

ON SHARON, HOWEVER, IT IS UNCLEAR HOW OR WHETHER THESE RECOMMENDATIONS CAN BE CARRIED OUT. SHARON, FOR HIS PART, HAS LET IT BE KNOWN THAT IF DEBTN WERE TO DISSOLVE THE GOVERNMENT AND ATTEMPT TO FORM A NEW ONE, SHARON AND HIS BACKERS IN THE KNESSET WOULD WITHHOLD THEIR SUPPORT--ENSURING FAILURE. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE FOCUS IS INCREASINGLY ON THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, WHICH MAY BE HAVERING ON ITS INITIAL OPPOSITION TO EARLY ELECTIONS. THE NRP MINISTERS REMAIN ADAMANT THAT SHARON MUST BE DISMISSED OR FORCED TO STEP DOWN. THE LABOR OPPOSITION, MEANWHILE, IS STICKING BY ITS POSITION THAT THE COMMISSION'S REPORT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN FULL. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS KEEPING A LOW PROFILE SO AS NOT TO GIVE THE LIKUD A REASON TO PULL TOGETHER. IN THIS CONTEXT, LABOR LEADERS ARE UPSET BY EFFORTS OF THE SMALL COMMUNIST (MADASH) FACTION TO TABLE AN EARLY NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION.

3. HABIB MEETING: AT HIS MEETING WITH PHIL HABIB TODAY, BEGIN SAID HE WAS WILLING TO MOVE AHEAD IN THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE BUT WOULD BE THOROUGHLY OCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE SUGGESTED THAT PHIL BE PREPARED TO STAND BY UNTIL THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN ISRAEL IS SORTED OUT.

4. LEBANON-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS: THE NEGOTIATING SUBCOMMITTEES MET YESTERDAY IN KHALDEN, BUT, BECAUSE BOTH DELEGATIONS WERE DISTRACTED BY THE RESULTS OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, THE SUBCOMMITTEES ADJOURNED EARLY. IN THE ABBREVIATED DISCUSSIONS, THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATOR STATED, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT HE BELIEVES

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

STATE 03067 T0SEC 010246

LEBANON WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE ARAB DEFENSE PACT AS PART OF ITS UNDERTAKING TO TERMINATE THE STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUBCOMMITTEE DECIDED THAT UNIFIL, UNTSO, AND THE "ANTI-TERRORIST STATIONS" ISSUES ARE TOO CONTENTIOUS FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO HANDLE, AND MUST BE ADDRESSED AT MORE SENIOR LEVELS. THERE WAS NO GIVE ON EITHER SIDE ON THE NORTHERN LIMIT OF THE SECURITY ZONE: ISRAEL INSISTS ON 45 KM AND LEBANON ON THE ANNATL RIVER LINE. THE NEXT MEETINGS ARE SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 10.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

5. CHRISTIAN-DRUZE PEACE AGREEMENT: CONTRARY TO LEBANESE FORCES EXPECTATIONS, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JUNBLATT DRUZE FACTION JOINED THE ARSALAN FACTION IN SIGNING THE FEBRUARY 7 PEACE AGREEMENT SPONSORED BY ISRAEL. THE AGREEMENT CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WITH A SERIES OF STEPS, INCLUDING THE DISMANTLING OF BARRICADES AND RELEASE OF ALL KIDNAPPED PERSONS. THE CEASEFIRE WAS VIOLATED THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 7, BUT THE MOUNTAINS WERE QUIET THROUGH FEBRUARY 8.

6. IRANIAN OFFENSIVE: IRAN LAUNCHED AN ATTACK AGAINST IRAQ OPPOSITE THE IRAQI TOWN OF AL-ANARAH ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 6. IRAN HAS DECLINED SOME GROUND, ALL OF WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY A NO-MAN'S-LAND BETWEEN THE OPPOSING LINES. IRAQI LINES HAVE HELD BUT THE BATTLE HAS BEEN SLOW TO DEVELOP AND THE BULK OF IRANIAN FORCES, INCLUDING ARMORED UNITS, HAS YET TO BE ENGAGED. IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW OFFENSIVE, IRAQ'S MFA CALLED IN THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING OUR OWN, TO SUGGEST IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN.

7. CHEYSSON VISIT TO IRAQ AND SYRIA: THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAS ADVISED US ON INSTRUCTIONS THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON WILL VISIT BAGHDAD FEBRUARY 12-13 VIA AMMAN. HE WILL RETURN VIA DAMASCUS AT THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF IRAQ.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

STATE 038067 T05EC 010246

FRANCE IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AND HAS DECIDED IT MUST DO WHAT IT CAN TO AVOID IRAQ'S DEFEAT AND TO KEEP IRAN'S SHITE REVOLUTION FROM SPREADING. IN DAMASCUS CHEYSSON WILL RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE IRAQ-SYRIA PIPELINE, BUT HE DOES NOT EXPECT TO SECURE THE REOPENING OF THE PIPELINE. DAN

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~