

**Governmental Relations Officer**

**Deloitte LLP**

**1 New Street Square**

**LONDON EC4 3HQ**

Dear Sir / Madam / Mr. / Ms,

**Institute of Statecraft Integrity Initiative project countering Russian  
malign influence**

Further to our phone conversation of xxxxx I would like to provide further information about the project, and look forward to a meeting when convenient to yourselves. My original call reflected the view in our project that, among major accountancy firms, Deloitte would be a potentially optimum discussant given that Mr. Rob Wainwright has recently joined you. I have heard Mr. Wainwright speak many times, most recently at the RUSI Counter Terrorism conference last autumn. We at the Institute believe that the views of Europol and its partners in EU Member States and beyond are likely to be of exceptional value for our project, and we hope that in carrying it out we may increase public awareness of how international law enforcement cooperation has involved in areas which reflect the particular characteristics of Russian associated strategic criminality and that this will contribute greatly to increased and improved public understanding.

We will be making similar approaches to banks and expect to meet a number of former law enforcement and agencies colleagues of Mr. Wainwright.

The Project's purpose, as funded by the F&CO ( Andrew Pryce, with day to day liaison currently by Adam Southgate) is to create and inform a network of researchers and publicists in the UK and the EU Member States, and in North America, to better identify Russian information issues which impact on the well-being and security of the UK and EU and NATO countries, and to better inform public and private awareness of the risks such operations pose and how they can be exposed and rebutted. *Cyber criminality and warfare issues are not parts of our remit, although they certainly need to be considered.*

As a consequence of these efforts, I have the responsibility for increasing awareness of Russian, Russian speaking and Russian proxies organised crime links with these countries "Deep States" nexus of political, senior bureaucracy, military and military industrial complex, big business and, of course, security and intelligence services. We prefer the term " strategic organised crime" and believe it is not capable of being adequately deterred by conventional criminal justice procedures.

We shall be approaching a range of international banks and institutions, including the BBA and ABI, together with major accountancy firms. We will use the results of these discussions to inform academia, think tanks and central government in the UK, particularly NCA, HMRC and MOD. We will also seek to put our views and, with permission, those of others into the public domain in a range of countries. Our clusters with whom we will cooperate and seek to cascade our outputs in EU MS currently include groups in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands and Greece, as well as Poland and the Baltic States.

This obviously leads to the need to consider both data protection following GDPR introduction, and client and criminal or civil justice proceedings' confidentiality requirements. We would not under any circumstances seek or divulge information naming clients, or

otherwise identifying them. Our purpose is to identify themes and risk indicators, and, while maintaining our independence, to take the views of the organisations we have met fully into account.

The nature of our outputs would change in the course of discussion with our contacts, such as yourselves, and F&CO and others such as NCA and HMRC. We would hope there would be mutually increased understanding of how Russian linked *strategic* criminality impacts and how it might be better identified and rebuffed. We would deliver these outputs, on an ongoing and evolving basis, through presentations at conferences and workshops for the financial and wider business communities, anti-corruption NGOs and through media articles and broadcast interviews. Were specific companies such as Deloitte be mentioned, this would only be done with written permission and we would not at present expect to cite individual firms. For instance, subject to approval, we might seek to quote you, anonymously if required.

I can be contacted as below. Within the wider team, I am working particularly closely with Chris Donnelly, Director in Charge ( former MOD), Stephen Dalziel ( ex F&CO and BBC World Service) and Ms. Charlie Hatton, our Chief Administrator. They can all be contacted via our office number below, and use the same email format as I do.

I thank you for your time earlier and look forward to hearing from HSBC.

Yours sincerely,

**Euan Grant**

**Senior Fellow**

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